The interest of the campaign being above all Napoleonic, its moral
must be found by discovering the "Napoleon touch" that differentiated
it from other Revolutionary campaigns. A great deal is common to all,
on both sides. The Austrians and Sardinians worked together at least
as effectively as the Austrians, Prussians, British and Dutch in the
Netherlands. Revolutionary energy was common to the Army of Italy and
to the Army of the North. Why, therefore, when the war dragged on from
one campaign to another in the great plains of the Meuse and Rhine
countries, did Napoleon bring about so swift a decision in these
cramped valleys? The answer is to be found partly in the exigencies of
the supply service, but still more in Napoleon's own personality and
the strategy born of it. The first, as we have seen, was at the end of
its resources when Beaulieu placed himself across the Genoa road.
Action of some sort was the plain alternative to starvation, and at
this point Napoleon's personality intervened. He would have no
quarter-rations on the Riviera, but plenty and to spare beyond the
mountains. If there were many thousand soldiers who marched unarmed
and shoeless in the ranks, it was towards "the Promised Land" that he
led them. He looked always to the end, and met each day as if with
full expectation of attaining it before sunset. Strategical conditions
and "new French" methods of war did not save Bonaparte in the two
crises--the Dego rout and the sullen halt of the army at San
Michele--but the personality which made the soldiers, on the way to
Montenotte, march barefoot past a wagon-load of new boots.
We have said that Napoleon's strategy was the result of this personal
magnetism. Later critics evolved from his success the theory of
"interior lines," and then accounted for it by applying the criterion
they had evolved. Actually, the form in which the will to conquer
found expression was in many important respects old. What, therefore,
in the theory or its application was the product of Napoleon's own
genius and will-power? A comparison with Souham's campaign of
Tourcoing will enable us to answer this question. To begin with,
Souham found himself midway between Coburg and Clerfayt almost by
accident, and his utilization of the advantages of his position was an
expedient for the given case. Napoleon, however, placed himself
_deliberately_ and by fighting his way thither, in an analogous
situation at Carcare and Cairo. Military opinion of the time
considered it dangerous, as indeed it was, for no theory can alter the
fact that had not Napoleon made his men fight harder and march farther
than usual, he would have been destroyed. The effective play of forces
on interior lines depends on the two conditions that the outer enemies
are not so near together as to give no time for the inner mass to
defeat one before the arrival of the other, and that they are not so
far apart that before one can be brought to action the other has
inflicted serious damage elsewhere.
Neither condition was fully met at any time in the Montenotte
campaign. On the 11th Napoleon knew that the attack on Voltri had been
made by a part only of the Austrian forces, yet he flung his own
masses on Montenotte. On the 13th he thought that Beaulieu's main body
was at Dego and Colli's at Millesimo, and on this assumption had to
exact the most extraordinary efforts from Augereau's troops at
Cossaria. On the 19th and 20th he tried to exclude the risks of the
Austrians' intervention, and with this the chances of a victory over
them to follow his victory over Colli, by transferring the centre of
gravity of his army to Ceva and Garessio, and fighting it out with
Colli alone.
It was not, in fact, to gain a position on interior lines--with
respect to _two_ opponents--that Napoleon pushed his army to Carcare.
Before the campaign began he hoped by using the "cannon-road" to
destroy the Piedmontese _before the Austrians were in existence at
all_ as an army. But on the news from Voltri and Monte Legino he
swiftly "concentrated fire, made the breach, and broke the
equilibrium" at the spot where the interests and forces of the two
Allies converged and diverged. The hypothesis in the first case was
that the Austrians were practically non-existent, and the whole object
in the second was to breach the now connected front of the Allies
("strategic penetration") and to cause them to break up into two
separate systems. More, having made the breach, he had the choice
(which he had not before) of attacking _either_ the Austrians or the
Sardinians, as every critic has pointed out. Indeed the Austrians
offered by far the better target. But he neither wanted nor used the
new alternative. His purpose was to crush Piedmont. "My enemies saw
too much at once," said Napoleon. Singleness of aim and of purpose,
the product of clear thinking and of "personality," was the
foundation-stone of the new form of strategy.
Relative superiority.
In the course of subduing the Sardinians, Napoleon found himself
placed on interior lines between two hostile masses, and another new
idea, that of "relative superiority." reveals itself. Whereas Souham
had been in superior force (90,000 against 70,000), Napoleon (40,000
against 50,000) was not, and yet the Army of Italy was always placed
in a position of relative superiority (at first about 3 to 2 and
ultimately 2 to 1) to the immediate antagonist. "The essence of
strategy," said Napoleon in 1797, "is, with a weaker army, always to
have more force at the crucial point than the enemy. But this art is
taught neither by books nor by practice; it is a matter of tact." In
this he expressed the result of his victories on his own mind rather
than a preconceived formula which produced those victories. But the
idea, though undefined, and the method of practice, though imperfectly
worked out, were in his mind from the first. As soon as he had made
the breach, he widened it by pushing out Massena and Laharpe on the
one hand and Augereau on the other. This is mere common sense. But
immediately afterwards, though preparing to throw all available forces
against Colli, he posted Massena and Laharpe at Dego to guard, not
like Vandamme on the Lys against a real and pressing enemy, but
against a _possibility_, and he only diminished the strength and
altered the position of this containing detachment in proportion as
the Austrian danger dwindled. Later in his career he defined this
offensive-defensive system as "having all possible strength at the
decisive point," and "being nowhere vulnerable," and the art of
reconciling these two requirements, in each case as it arose, was
always the principal secret of his generalship. At first his
precautions (judged by events and not by the probabilities of the
moment) were excessive, and the offensive mass small. But the latter
was handled by a general untroubled by multiple aims and anxieties,
and if such self-confidence was equivalent to 10,000 men on the
battlefield, it was legitimate to detach 10,000 men to secure it.
These 10,000 were posted 8 m. out on the dangerous flank, not almost
back to back with the main body as Vandamme had been,[9] and although
this distance was but little compared to those of his later campaigns,
when he employed small armies for the same purpose, it sufficed in
this difficult mountain country, where the covering force enjoyed the
advantage of strong positions. Of course, if Colli had been better
concentrated, or if Beaulieu had been more active, the calculated
proportions between covering force and main body might have proved
fallacious, and the system on which Napoleon's relative superiority
rested might have broken down. But the point is that such a system,
however rough its first model, had been imagined and put into
practice.
This was Napoleon's individual art of war, as raiding bakeries and
cutting communications were Beaulieu's speciality. Napoleon made the
art into a science, and in our own time, with modern conditions of
effective, armament and communications, it is more than possible that
Moreaus and Jourdans will prove able to practise it with success. But
in the old conditions it required a Napoleon. "Strategy," said Moltke,
"is a system of expedients." But it was the intense personal force, as
well as the genius, of Napoleon that forged these expedients into a
_system_.
The first phase of the campaign satisfactorily settled, Napoleon was
free to turn his attention to the "arch-enemy" to whom he was now
considerably superior in numbers (35,000 to 25,000). The day after the
signature of the armistice of Cherasco he began preparing for a new
advance and also for the role of arbiter of the destinies of Italy. Many
whispers there were, even in his own army, as to the dangers of passing
on without "revolutionizing" aristocratic Genoa and monarchical
Piedmont, and of bringing Venice, the pope and the Italian princes into
the field against the French. But Bonaparte, flushed with victory, and
better informed than the malcontents of the real condition of Italy,
never hesitated. His first object was to drive out Beaulieu, his second
to push through Tirol, and his only serious restriction the chance that
the armistice with Piedmont would not result in a definitive treaty.
Beaulieu had fallen back into Lombardy, and now bordered the Po right
and left of Valenza. To achieve further progress, Napoleon had first to
cross that river, and the point and method of crossing was the immediate
problem, a problem the more difficult as Napoleon had no bridge train
and could only make use of such existing bridges as he could seize
intact.[10] If he crossed above Valenza, he would be confronted by one
river-line after another, on one of which at least Beaulieu would
probably stand to fight. But quite apart from the immediate problem,
Napoleon's intention was less to beat the Austrians than to dislodge
them. He needed a foothold in Lombardy which would make him independent
of, and even a menace to, Piedmont. If this were assured, he could for a
few weeks entirely ignore his communications with France and strike out
against Beaulieu, dethrone the king of Sardinia, or revolutionize Parma,
Modena and the papal states according to circumstances.
Piacenza.
Milan, therefore, was his objective, and Tortona-Piacenza his route
thither. To give himself every chance, he had stipulated with the
Piedmontese authorities for the right of passing at Valenza, and he had
the satisfaction of seeing Beaulieu fall into the trap and concentrate
opposite that part of the river. The French meantime had moved to the
region Alessandria-Tortona. Thence on the 6th of May Bonaparte, with a
picked body of troops, set out for a forced march on Piacenza, and that
night the advanced guard was 30 m. on the way, at Castel San Giovanni,
and Laharpe's and the cavalry divisions at Stradella, 10 m. behind them.
Augereau was at Broni, Massena at Sale and Serurier near Valenza, the
whole forming a rapidly extending fan, 50 m. from point to point. If the
Piacenza detachment succeeded in crossing, the army was to follow
rapidly in its track. If, on the other hand, Beaulieu fell back to
oppose the advanced guard, the Valenza divisions would take advantage of
his absence to cross there. In either case, be it observed, the
Austrians were to be _evaded_, not brought to action.
On the morning of the 7th, the swift advanced guard under General
Dallemagne crossed at Piacenza,[11] and, hearing of this, Bonaparte
ordered every division except Serurier's thither with all possible
speed. In the exultation of the moment he mocked at Beaulieu's
incapacity, but the old Austrian was already on the alert. This game of
manoeuvres he understood; already one of his divisions had arrived in
close proximity to Dallemagne and the others were marching eastward by
all available roads. It was not until the 8th that the French, after a
series of partial encounters, were securely established on the left bank
of the Po, and Beaulieu had given up the idea of forcing their most
advanced troops to accept battle at a disadvantage. The success of the
French was due less to their plan than to their mobility, which enabled
them first to pass the river before the Austrians (who had actually
started a day in advance of them) put in an appearance, and afterwards
to be in superior numbers at each point of contact. But the episode was
destined after all to culminate in a great event, which Napoleon himself
indicated as the turning-point of his life. "Vendemiaire and even
Montenotte did not make me think myself a superior being. It was after
Lodi that the idea came to me.... That first kindled the spark of
boundless ambition."
Lodi.
The idea of a battle having been given up, Beaulieu retired to the Adda,
and most of his troops were safely beyond it before the French arrived
near Lodi, but he felt it necessary to leave a strong rearguard on the
river opposite that place to cover the reassembly of his columns after
their scattered march. On the afternoon of the 10th of May, Bonaparte,
with Dallemagne, Massena and Augereau, came up and seized the town. But
200 yds. of open ground had to be passed from the town gate to the
bridge, and the bridge itself was another 250 in length. A few hundred
yards beyond it stood the Austrians, 9000 strong with 14 guns. Napoleon
brought up all his guns to prevent the enemy from destroying the bridge.
Then sending all his cavalry to turn the enemy's right by a ford above
the town, he waited two hours, employing the time in cannonading the
Austrian lines, resting his advanced infantry and closing up Massena's
and Augereau's divisions. Finally he gave the order to Dallemagne's 4000
grenadiers, who were drawn up under cover of the town wall, to rush the
bridge. As the column, not more than thirty men broad, made its
appearance, it was met by the concentrated fire of the Austrian guns,
and half way across the bridge it checked, but Bonaparte himself and
Massena rushed forward, the courage of the soldiers revived, and, while
some jumped off the bridge and scrambled forward in the shallow water,
the remainder stormed on, passed through the guns and drove back the
infantry. This was, in bare outline, the astounding passage of the
Bridge of Lodi. It was not till after the battle that Napoleon realized
that only a rearguard was in front of him. When he launched his 4000
grenadiers he thought that on the other side there were four or five
times that number of the enemy. No wonder, then, that after the event he
recognized in himself the flash of genius, the courage to risk
everything, and the "tact" which, independent of, and indeed contrary to
all reasoned calculations, told him that the moment had come for
"breaking the equilibrium." Lodi was a tactical success in the highest
sense, in that the principles of his tactics rested on psychology--on
the "sublime" part of the art of war as Saxe had called it long ago. The
spirit produced the form, and Lodi was the prototype of the Napoleonic
battle--contact, manoeuvre, preparation, and finally the well-timed,
massed and unhesitating assault. The absence of strategical results
mattered little. Many months elapsed before this bold assertion of
superiority ceased to decide the battles of France and Austria.
Milan.
Next day, still under the vivid tactical impressions of the Bridge of
Lodi, he postponed his occupation of the Milanese and set off in pursuit
of Beaulieu, but the latter was now out of reach, and during the next
few days the French divisions were installed at various points in the
area Pavia-Milan-Pizzighetone, facing outwards in all dangerous
directions, with a central reserve at Milan. Thus secured, Bonaparte
turned his attention to political and military administration. This took
the form of exacting from the neighbouring princes money, supplies and
objects of art, and the once famished Army of Italy revelled in its
opportunity. Now, however, the Directory, suspicious of the too
successful and too sanguine young general, ordered him to turn over the
command in Upper Italy to Kellermann, and to take an expeditionary corps
himself into the heart of the Peninsula, there to preach the Republic
and the overthrow of princes. Napoleon absolutely refused, and offered
his resignation. In the end (partly by bribery) he prevailed, but the
incident reawakened his desire to close with Beaulieu. This indeed he
could now do with a free hand, since not only had the Milanese been
effectively occupied, but also the treaty with Sardinia had been
ratified.
But no sooner had he resumed the advance than it was interrupted by a
rising of the peasantry in his rear. The exactions of the French had in
a few days generated sparks of discontent which it was easy for the
priests and the nobles to fan into open flames. Milan and Pavia as well
as the countryside broke into insurrection, and at the latter place the
mob forced the French commandant to surrender. Bonaparte acted swiftly
and ruthlessly. Bringing back a small portion of the army with him, he
punished Milan on the 25th, sacked and burned Binasco on the 26th, and
on the evening of the latter day, while his cavalry swept the open
country, he broke his way into Pavia with 1500 men and beat down all
resistance. Napoleon's cruelty was never purposeless. He deported
several scores of hostages to France, executed most of the mob leaders,
and shot the French officer who had surrendered. In addition, he gave
his 1500 men three hours' leave to pillage. Then, as swiftly as they had
come, they returned to the army on the Oglio. From this river Napoleon
advanced to the banks of the Mincio, where the remainder of the Italian
campaign was fought out, both sides contemptuously disregarding Venetian
neutrality.
It centred on the fortress of Mantua, which Beaulieu, too weak to keep
the field, and dislodged from the Mincio in the action of Borghetto (May
30), strongly garrisoned before retiring into Tirol. Beaulieu was soon
afterwards replaced by Dagobert Siegmund, count von Wurmser (b. 1724),
who brought considerable reinforcements from Germany.
At this point, mindful of the narrow escape he had had of losing his
command, Bonaparte thought it well to begin the resettlement of Italy.
The scheme for co-operating with Moreau on the Danube was indefinitely
postponed, and the Army of Italy (now reinforced from the Army of the
Alps and counting 42,000 effectives) was again disposed in a protective
"zone of manoeuvre," with a strong central reserve. Over 8000 men,
however, garrisoned the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, and the
effective blockade of Mantua and political expeditions into the heart of
the Peninsula soon used up the whole of this reserve.
Moreover, no siege artillery was available until the Austrians in the
citadel of Milan capitulated, and thus it was not till the 18th of July
that the first parallel was begun. Almost at the same moment Wurmser
began his advance from Trent with 55,000 men to relieve Mantua.
Siege of Mantua.
The protective system on which his attack would fall in the first
instance was now as follows:--Augereau (6000) about Legnago, Despinoy
(8000) south-east of Verona, Massena (13,000) at Verona and Peschiera,
with outposts on the Monte Baldo and at La Corona, Sauret (4500) at Salo
and Gavardo. Serurier (12,000) was besieging Mantua, and the only
central reserve was the cavalry (2000) under Kilmaine. The main road to
Milan passed by Brescia. Sauret's brigade, therefore, was practically a
detached post on the line of communication, and on the main defensive
front less than 30,000 men were disposed at various points between La
Corona and Legnago (30 m. apart), and at a distance of 15 to 20 m. from
Mantua. The strength of such a disposition depended on the fighting
power and handiness of the troops, who in each case would be called upon
to act as a rearguard to gain time. Yet the lie of the country scarcely
permitted a closer grouping, unless indeed Bonaparte fell back on the
old-time device of a "circumvallation," and shut himself up, with the
supplies necessary for the calculated duration of the siege, in an
impregnable ring of earthworks round Mantua. This, however, he could not
have done even if he had wished, for the wave of revolt radiating from
Milan had made accumulations of food impossible, and the lakes above and
below the fortress, besides being extremely unhealthy, would have
extended the perimeter of the circumvallation so greatly that the
available forces would not suffice to man it. It was not in this, but in
the absence of an important central reserve that Bonaparte's disposition
is open to criticism, which indeed could impugn the scheme in its
entirety, as overtaxing the available resources, more easily than it
could attack its details.
[Illustration: Operations around Mantua 1796-7.