Hitherto we have ignored the operations on the Italian frontier, partly
because they were of minor importance and partly because the conditions
out of which Napoleon's first campaign arose can be best considered in
connexion with that campaign itself, from which indeed the previous
operations derive such light as they possess. It has been mentioned that
in 1792 the French overran Savoy and Nice. In 1793 the Sardinian army
and a small auxiliary corps of Austrians waged a desultory mountain
warfare against the Army of the Alps about Briancon and the Army of
Italy on the Var. That furious offensive on the part of the French,
which signalized the year 1793 elsewhere, was made impossible here by
the counter-revolution in the cities of the Midi.
Saorgio.
In 1794, when this had been crushed, the intention of the French
government was to take the offensive against the Austro-Sardinians. The
first operation was to be the capture of Oneglia. The concentration of
large forces in the lower Rhone valley had naturally infringed upon the
areas told off for the provisioning of the Armies of the Alps
(Kellermann) and of Italy (Dumerbion); indeed, the sullen population
could hardly be induced to feed the troops suppressing the revolt, still
less the distant frontier armies. Thus the only source of supply was the
Riviera of Genoa: "Our connexion with this district is imperilled by the
corsairs of Oneglia (a Sardinian town) owing to the cessation of our
operations afloat. The army is living from hand to mouth," wrote the
younger Robespierre in September 1793. Vessels bearing supplies from
Genoa could not avoid the corsairs by taking the open sea, for there the
British fleet was supreme. Carnot therefore ordered the Army of Italy to
capture Oneglia, and 21,000 men (the rest of the 67,000 effectives were
held back for coast defence) began operations in April. The French left
moved against the enemy's positions on the main road over the Col di
Tenda, the centre towards Ponte di Nava, and the right along the
Riviera. All met with success, thanks to Massena's bold handling of the
centre column. Not only was Oneglia captured, but also the Col di Tenda.
Napoleon Bonaparte served in these affairs on the headquarter staff.
Meantime the Army of the Alps had possessed itself of the Little St
Bernard and Mont Cenis, and the Republicans were now masters of several
routes into Piedmont (May). But the Alpine roads merely led to
fortresses, and both Carnot and Bonaparte--Napoleon had by now
captivated the younger Robespierre and become the leading spirit in
Dumerbion's army--considered that the Army of the Alps should be
weakened to the profit of the Army of Italy, and that the time had come
to disregard the feeble neutrality of Genoa, and to advance over the Col
di Tenda.
Napoleon in 1794.
Napoleon's first suggestion for a rapid condensation of the French
cordon, and an irresistible blow on the centre of the Allies by
Tenda-Coni,[7] came to nothing owing to the waste of time in
negotiations between the generals and the distant Committee, and
meanwhile new factors came into play. The capture of the pass of
Argentera by the right wing of the Army of the Alps suggested that the
main effort should be made against the barrier fortress of Demonte, but
here again Napoleon proposed a concentration of effort on the primary
and economy of force in the secondary objective. About the same time, in
a memoir on the war in general, he laid down his most celebrated maxim:
"The principles of war are the same as those of a siege. Fire must be
concentrated on one point, and as soon as the breach is made, the
equilibrium is broken and the rest is nothing." In the domain of tactics
he was and remains the principal exponent of the art of breaking the
equilibrium, and already he imagined the solution of problems of policy
and strategy on the same lines. "Austria is the great enemy; Austria
crushed, Germany, Spain, Italy fall of themselves. We must not disperse,
but concentrate our attack." Napoleon argued that Austria could be
effectively wounded by an offensive against Piedmont, and even more
effectively by an ulterior advance from Italian soil into Germany. In
pursuance of the single aim he asked for the appointment of a single
commander-in-chief to hold sway from Bayonne to the Lake of Geneva, and
for the rejection of all schemes for "revolutionizing" Italy till after
the defeat of the arch-enemy.
Operations, however, did not after all take either of these forms. The
younger Robespierre perished with his brother in the _coup d'etat_ of
9th Thermidor, the advance was suspended, and Bonaparte, amongst other
leading spirits of the Army of Italy, was arrested and imprisoned.
Profiting by this moment, Austria increased her auxiliary corps. An
Austrian general took command of the whole of the allied forces, and
pronounced a threat from the region of Cairo (where the Austrians took
their place on the left wing of the combined army) towards the Riviera.
The French, still dependent on Genoa for supplies, had to take the
offensive at once to save themselves from starvation, and the result was
the expedition of Dego, planned chiefly by Napoleon, who had been
released from prison and was at headquarters, though unemployed. The
movement began on the 17th of September; and although the Austrian
general Colloredo repulsed an attack at Dego (Sept. 21) he retreated to
Acqui, and the incipient offensive of the Allies ended abruptly.
The first months of the winter of 1794-1795 were spent in re-equipping
the troops, who stood in sore need after their rapid movements in the
mountains. For the future operations, the enforced condensation of the
army on its right wing with the object of protecting its line of supply
to Genoa and the dangers of its cramped situation on the Riviera
suggested a plan roughly resembling one already recommended by Napoleon,
who had since the affair of Dego become convinced that the way into
Italy was through the Apennines and not the Alps. The essence of this
was to anticipate the enemy by a very early and rapid advance from Vado
towards Carcare by the Ceva road, the only good road of which the French
disposed and which they significantly called the _chemin de canon_.
Scherer and Kellermann.
The plan, however, came to nothing; the Committee, which now changed its
personnel at fixed intervals, was in consequence wavering and
non-committal, troops were withdrawn for a projected invasion of
Corsica, and in November 1794 Dumerbion was replaced by Scherer, who
assembled only 17,000 of his 54,000 effectives for field operations, and
selected as his line of advance the Col di Tenda-Coni road. Scherer,
besides being hostile to any suggestion emanating from Napoleon, was
impressed with the apparent danger to his right wing concentrated in the
narrow Riviera, which it was at this stage impossible to avert by a
sudden and early assumption of the offensive. After a brief tenure
Scherer was transferred to the Spanish frontier, but Kellermann, who now
received command of the Army of Italy in addition to his own, took the
same view as his predecessor--the view of the ordinary general. But not
even the Scherer plan was put into execution, for spring had scarcely
arrived when the prospect of renewed revolts in the south of France
practically paralysed the army.
This encouraged the enemy to deliver the blow that had so long been
feared. The combined forces, under Devins,--the Sardinians, the Austrian
auxiliary corps and the newly arrived Austrian main army,--advanced
together and forced the French right wing to evacuate Vado and the
Genoese littoral. But at this juncture the conclusion of peace with
Spain released the Pyrenees armies, and Scherer returned to the Army of
Italy at the head of reinforcements. He was faced with a difficult
situation, but he had the means wherewith to meet it, as Napoleon
promptly pointed out. Up to this, Napoleon said, the French commanded
the mountain crest, and therefore covered Savoy and Nice, and also
Oneglia, Loano and Vado, the ports of the Riviera. But now that Vado was
lost the breach was made. Genoa was cut off, and the south of France was
the only remaining resource for the army commissariat. Vado must
therefore be retaken and the line reopened to Genoa, and to do this it
was essential first to close up the over-extended cordon--and with the
greatest rapidity, lest the enemy, with the shorter line to move on,
should gather at the point of contact before the French--and to advance
on Vado. Further, knowing (as every one knew) that the king of Sardinia
was not inclined to continue the struggle indefinitely, he predicted
that this ruler would make peace once the French army had established
itself in his dominions, and for this the way into the interior, he
asserted, was the great road Savona-Ceva. But Napoleon's mind ranged
beyond the immediate future. He calculated that once the French advanced
the Austrians would seek to cover Lombardy, the Piedmontese Turin, and
this separation, already morally accomplished, it was to be the French
general's task to accentuate in fact. Next, Sardinia having been coerced
into peace, the Army of Italy would expel the Austrians from Lombardy,
and connect its operations with those of the French in South Germany by
way of Tirol. The supply question, once the soldiers had gained the rich
valley of the Po, would solve itself.
Loano.
This was the essence of the first of four memoranda on this subject
prepared by Napoleon in his Paris office. The second indicated the means
of coercing Sardinia--first the Austrians were to be driven or scared
away towards Alessandria, then the French army would turn sharp to the
left, driving the Sardinians eastward and north-eastward through Ceva,
and this was to be the signal for the general invasion of Piedmont from
all sides. In the third paper he framed an elaborate plan for the
retaking of Vado, and in the fourth he summarized the contents of the
other three. Having thus cleared his own mind as to the conditions and
the solution of the problem, he did his best to secure the command for
himself.
The measures recommended by Napoleon were translated into a formal and
detailed order to recapture Vado. To Napoleon the miserable condition of
the Army of Italy was the most urgent incentive to prompt action. In
Scherer's judgment, however, the army was unfit to take the field, and
therefore _ex hypothesi_ to attack Vado, without thorough
reorganization, and it was only in November that the advance was finally
made. It culminated, thanks once more to the resolute Massena, in the
victory of Loano (November 23-24). But Scherer thought more of the
destitution of his own army than of the fruits of success, and contented
himself with resuming possession of the Riviera.
Meanwhile the Mentor whose suggestions and personality were equally
repugnant to Scherer had undergone strange vicissitudes of
fortune--dismissal from the headquarters' staff, expulsion from the list
of general officers, and then the "whiff of grapeshot" of 13th
Vendemiaire, followed shortly by his marriage with Josephine, and his
nomination to command the Army of Italy. These events had neither shaken
his cold resolution nor disturbed his balance.
Napoleon in command.
The Army of Italy spent the winter of 1795-1796 as before in the narrow
Riviera, while on the one side, just over the mountains, lay the
Austro-Sardinians, and on the other, out of range of the coast batteries
but ready to pounce on the supply ships, were the British frigates. On
Bonaparte's left Kellermann, with no more than 18,000, maintained a
string of posts between Lake Geneva and the Argentera as before. Of the
Army of Italy, 7000 watched the Tenda road and 20,000 men the
coast-line. There remained for active operations some 27,000 men,
ragged, famished and suffering in every way in spite of their victory of
Loano. The Sardinian and Austrian auxiliaries (Colli), 25,000 men, lay
between Mondovi and Ceva, a force strung out in the Alpine valleys
opposed Kellermann, and the main Austrian army (commanded by Beaulieu),
in widely extended cantonments between Acqui and Milan, numbered 27,000
field troops. Thus the short-lived concentration of all the allied
forces for the battle against Scherer had ended in a fresh separation.
Austria was far more concerned with Poland than with the moribund French
question, and committed as few of her troops as possible to this distant
and secondary theatre of war. As for Piedmont, "peace" was almost the
universal cry, even within the army. All this scarcely affected the
regimental spirit and discipline of the Austrian squadrons and
battalions, which had now recovered from the defeat of Loano. But they
were important factors for the new general-in-chief on the Riviera, and
formed the basis of his strategy.
Napoleon's first task was far more difficult than the writing of
memoranda. He had to grasp the reins and to prepare his troops, morally
and physically, for active work. It was not merely that a young general
with many enemies, a political favourite of the moment, had been thrust
upon the army. The army itself was in a pitiable condition. Whole
companies with their officers went plundering in search of mere food,
the horses had never received as much as half-rations for a year past,
and even the generals were half-starved. Thousands of men were
barefooted and hundreds were without arms. But in a few days he had
secured an almost incredible ascendancy over the sullen, starved,
half-clothed army.
"Soldiers," he told them, "you are famished and nearly naked. The
government owes you much, but can do nothing for you. Your patience,
your courage, do you honour, but give you no glory, no advantage. I will
lead you into the most fertile plains of the world. There you will find
great towns, rich provinces. There you will find honour, glory and
riches. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage?"
Such words go far, and little as he was able to supply material
deficiencies--all he could do was to expel rascally contractors, sell a
captured privateer for L5000 and borrow L2500 from Genoa--he cheerfully
told the Directory on the 28th of March that "the worst was over." He
augmented his army of operations to about 40,000, at the expense of the
coast divisions, and set on foot also two small cavalry divisions,
mounted on the half-starved horses that had survived the winter. Then he
announced that the army was ready and opened the campaign.
The first plan, emanating from Paris, was that, after an expedition
towards Genoa to assist in raising a loan there, the army should march
against Beaulieu, previously neutralizing the Sardinians by the
occupation of Ceva. When Beaulieu was beaten it was thought probable
that the Piedmontese would enter into an alliance with the French
against their former comrades. A second plan, however, authorized the
general to begin by subduing the Piedmontese to the extent necessary to
bring about peace and alliance, and on this Napoleon acted. If the
present separation of the Allies continued, he proposed to overwhelm the
Sardinians first, before the Austrians could assemble from winter
quarters, and then to turn on Beaulieu. If, on the other hand, the
Austrians, before he could strike his blow, united with Colli, he
proposed to frighten them into separating again by moving on Acqui and
Alessandria. Hence Carcare, where the road from Acqui joined the
"cannon-road," was the first objective of his march, and from there he
could manoeuvre and widen the breach between the allied armies. His
scattered left wing would assist in the attack on the Sardinians as well
as it could--for the immediate attack on the Austrians its co-operation
would of course have been out of the question. In any case he grudged
every week spent in administrative preparation. The delay due to this,
as a matter of fact, allowed a new situation to develop. Beaulieu was
himself the first to move, and he moved towards Genoa instead of towards
his Allies. The gap between the two allied wings was thereby widened,
but it was no longer possible for the French to use it, for their plan
of destroying Colli _while Beaulieu was ineffective_ had collapsed.
Opening movements.
In connexion with the Genoese loan, and to facilitate the movement of
supply convoys, a small French force had been pushed forward to Voltri.
Bonaparte ordered it back as soon as he arrived at the front, but the
alarm was given. The Austrians broke up from winter quarters at once,
and rather than lose the food supplies at Voltri, Bonaparte actually
reinforced Massena at that place, and gave him orders to hold on as long
as possible, cautioning him only to watch his left rear (Montenotte).
But he did not abandon his purpose. Starting from the new conditions, he
devised other means, as we shall see, for reducing Beaulieu to
ineffectiveness. Meanwhile Beaulieu's plan of offensive operations, such
as they were, developed. The French advance to Voltri had not only
spurred him into activity, but convinced him that the bulk of the French
army lay east of Savona. He therefore made Voltri the objective of a
converging attack, not with the intention of destroying the French army
but with that of "cutting its communications with Genoa," and expelling
it from "the only place in the Riviera where there were sufficient ovens
to bake its bread." (Beaulieu to the Aulic Council, 15 April.) The
Sardinians and auxiliary Austrians were ordered to extend leftwards on
Dego to close the gap that Beaulieu's advance on Genoa-Voltri opened up,
which they did, though only half-heartedly and in small force, for,
unlike Beaulieu, they knew that masses of the enemy were still in the
western stretch of the Riviera. The rightmost of Beaulieu's own columns
was on the road between Acqui and Savona with orders to seize Monte
Legino as an advanced post, the others were to converge towards Voltri
from the Genoa side and the mountain passes about Campofreddo and
Sassello. The wings were therefore so far connected that Colli wrote to
Beaulieu on this day "the enemy will never dare to place himself between
our two armies." The event belied the prediction, and the proposed minor
operation against granaries and bakeries became the first act of a
decisive campaign.
On the night of the 9th of April the French were grouped as follows:
brigades under Garnier and Macquard at the Finestre and Tenda passes,
Serurier's division and Rusca's brigade east of Garessio; Augereau's
division about Loano, Meynier's at Finale, Laharpe's at Savona with an
outpost on the Monte Legino, and Cervoni's brigade at Voltri. Massena
was in general charge of the last-named units. The cavalry was far in
rear beyond Loano. Colli's army, excluding the troops in the valleys
that led into Dauphine, was around Coni and Mondovi-Ceva, the latter
group connecting with Beaulieu by a detachment under Provera between
Millesimo and Carcare. Of Beaulieu's army, Argenteau's division, still
concentrating to the front in many small bodies, extended over the area
Acqui-Dego-Sassello. Vukassovich's brigade was equally extended between
Ovada and the mountain-crests above Voltri, and Pittoni's division was
grouped around Gavi and the Bocchetta, the two last units being destined
for the attack on Voltri. Farther to the rear was Sebottendorf's
division around Alessandria-Tortona.
On the afternoon of the 10th Beaulieu delivered his blow at Voltri, not,
as he anticipated, against three-quarters of the French army, but
against Cervoni's detachment. This, after a long irregular fight,
slipped away in the night to Savona. Discovering his mistake next
morning, Beaulieu sent back some of his battalions to join Argenteau.
But there was no road by which they could do so save the detour through
Acqui and Dego, and long before they arrived Argenteau's advance on
Monte Legino had forced on the crisis. On the 11th (a day behind time),
this general drove in the French outposts, but he soon came on three
battalions under Colonel Rampon, who threw himself into some old
earthworks that lay near, and said to his men, "We must win or die here,
my friends." His redoubt and his men stood the trial well, and when day
broke on the 12th Bonaparte was ready to deliver his first
"Napoleon-stroke."
Montenotte.
The principle that guided him in the subsequent operations may be called
"superior numbers at the decisive point." Touch had been gained with the
enemy all along the long line between the Tenda and Voltri, and he
decided to concentrate swiftly upon the nearest enemy--Argenteau.
Augereau's division, or such part of it as could march at once, was
ordered to Mallare, picking up here and there on the way a few horsemen
and guns. Massena, with 9000 men, was to send two brigades in the
direction of Carcare and Altare, and with the third to swing round
Argenteau's right and to head for Montenotte village in his rear.
Laharpe with 7000 (it had become clear that the enemy at Voltri would
not pursue their advantage) was to join Rampon, leaving only Cervoni and
two battalions in Savona. Serurier and Rusca were to keep the Sardinians
in front of them occupied. The far-distant brigades of Garnier and
Macquard stood fast, but the cavalry drew eastward as quickly as its
condition permitted. In rain and mist on the early morning of the 12th
the French marched up from all quarters, while Argenteau's men waited in
their cold bivouacs for light enough to resume their attack on Monte
Legino. About 9 the mists cleared, and heavy fighting began, but Laharpe
held the mountain, and the vigorous Massena with his nearest brigade
stormed forward against Argenteau's right. A few hours later, seeing
Augereau's columns heading for their line of retreat, the Austrians
retired, sharply pressed, on Dego. The threatened intervention of
Provera was checked by Augereau's presence at Carcare.
[Illustration: Sketch of the positions occupied on the night of April
14th.]
Millesimo.
Montenotte was a brilliant victory, and one can imagine its effects on
the but lately despondent soldiers of the Army of Italy, for all
imagined that Beaulieu's main body had been defeated. This was far from
being the case, however, and although the French spent the night of the
battle at Cairo-Carcare-Montenotte, midway between the allied wings,
only two-thirds of Argenteau's force, and none of the other divisions,
had been beaten, and the heaviest fighting was to come. This became
evident on the afternoon of the 13th, but meanwhile Bonaparte, eager to
begin at once the subjugation of the Piedmontese (for which purpose he
wanted to bring Serurier and Rusca into play) sent only Laharpe's
division and a few details of Massena's, under the latter, towards Dego.
These were to protect the main attack from interference by the forces
that had been engaged at Montenotte (presumed to be Beaulieu's main
body), the said main attack being delivered by Augereau's division,
reinforced by most of Massena's, on the positions held by Provera. The
latter, only 1000 strong to Augereau's 9000, shut himself in the castle
of Cossaria, which he defended _a la_ Rampon against a series of furious
assaults. Not until the morning of the 14th was his surrender secured,
after his ammunition and food had been exhausted.
Argenteau also won a day's respite on the 13th, for Laharpe did not join
Massena till late, and nothing took place opposite Dego but a little
skirmishing. During the day Bonaparte saw for himself that he had
overrated the effects of Montenotte. Beaulieu, on the other hand,
underrated them, treating it as a mishap which was more than
counterbalanced by his own success in "cutting off the French from
Genoa." He began to reconstruct his line on the front Dego-Sassello,
trusting to Colli to harry the French until the Voltri troops had
finished their detour through Acqui and rejoined Argenteau. This, of
course, presumed that Argenteau's troops were intact and Colli's able to
move, which was not the case with either. Not until the afternoon of the
14th did Beaulieu place a few extra battalions at Argenteau's disposal
"to be used only in case of extreme necessity," and order Vukassovich
from the region of Sassello to "make a diversion" against the French
right with _two_ battalions.
Dego.
Thus Argenteau, already shaken, was exposed to destruction. On the 14th,
after Provera's surrender, Massena and Laharpe, reinforced until they
had nearly a two-to-one superiority, stormed Dego and killed or captured
3000 of Argenteau's 5500 men, the remnant retreating in disorder to
Acqui. But nothing was done towards the accomplishment of the purpose of
destroying Colli on that day, save that Serurier and Rusca began to
close in to meet the main body between Ceva and Millesimo. Moreover, the
victory at Dego had produced its usual results on the wild fighting
swarms of the Republicans, who threw themselves like hungry wolves on
the little town, without pursuing the beaten enemy or even placing a
single outpost on the Acqui road. In this state, during the early hours
of the 15th, Vukassovich's brigade,[8] marching up from Sassello,
surprised them, and they broke and fled in an instant. The whole morning
had to be spent in rallying them at Cairo, and Bonaparte had for the
second time to postpone his union with Serurier and Rusca, who
meanwhile, isolated from one another and from the main army, were
groping forward in the mountains. A fresh assault on Dego was ordered,
and after very severe fighting, Massena and Laharpe succeeded late in
the evening in retaking it. Vukassovich lost heavily, but retired
steadily and in order on Spigno. The killed and wounded numbered
probably about 1000 French and 1500 Austrians, out of considerably less
than 10,000 engaged on each side--a loss which contrasted very forcibly
with those suffered in other battles of the Revolutionary Wars, and by
teaching the Army of Italy to bear punishment, imbued it with
self-confidence. But again success bred disorder, and there was a second
orgy in the houses and streets of Dego which went on till late in the
morning and paralysed the whole army.
This was perhaps the crisis of the campaign. Even now it was not certain
that the Austrians had been definitively pushed aside, while it was
quite clear that Beaulieu's main body was intact and Colli was still
more an unknown quantity. But Napoleon's intention remained the same, to
attack the Piedmontese as quickly and as heavily as possible, Beaulieu
being held in check by a containing force under Massena and Laharpe. The
remainder of the army, counting in now Rusca and Serurier, was to move
westward towards Ceva. This disposition, while it illustrates the
Napoleonic principle of delivering a heavy blow on the selected target
and warding off interference at other points, shows also the difficulty
of rightly apportioning the available means between the offensive mass
and the defensive system, for, as it turned out, Beaulieu was already
sufficiently scared, and thought of nothing but self-defence on the line
Acqui-Ovada-Bocchetta, while the French offensive mass was very weak
compared with Colli's unbeaten and now fairly concentrated army about
Ceva and Montezemolo.
On the afternoon of the 16th the real advance was begun by Augereau's
division, reinforced by other troops. Rusca joined Augereau towards
evening, and Serurier approached Ceva from the south. Colli's object was
now to spin out time, and having repulsed a weak attack by Augereau, and
feeling able to repeat these tactics on each successive spur of the
Apennines, he retired in the night to a new position behind the
Cursaglia. On the 17th, reassured by the absence of fighting on the Dego
side, and by the news that no enemy remained at Sassello, Bonaparte
released Massena from Dego, leaving only Laharpe there, and brought him
over towards the right of the main body, which thus on the evening of
the 17th formed a long straggling line on both sides of Ceva, Serurier
on the left, echeloned forward, Augereau, Joubert and Rusca in the
centre, and Massena, partly as support, partly as flank guard, on
Augereau's right rear. Serurier had been bidden to extend well out and
to strive to get contact with Massena, i.e. to encircle the enemy. There
was no longer any idea of waiting to besiege Ceva, although the
artillery train had been ordered up from the Riviera by the
"cannon-road" for eventual use there. Further, the line of supply, as an
extra guarantee against interference, was changed from that of
Savona-Carcare to that of Loano-Bardinetto. When this was accomplished,
four clear days could be reckoned on with certainty in which to deal
with Colli.
San Michele.
The latter, still expecting the Austrians to advance to his assistance,
had established his corps (not more than 12,000 muskets in all) in the
immensely strong positions of the Cursaglia, with a thin line of posts
on his left stretching towards Cherasco, whence he could communicate, by
a roundabout way, with Acqui. Opposite this position the long straggling
line of the French arrived, after many delays due to the weariness of
the troops, on the 19th. A day of irregular fighting followed,
everywhere to the advantage of the defenders. Napoleon, fighting against
time, ordered a fresh attack on the 20th, and only desisted when it
became evident that the army was exhausted, and, in particular, when
Serurier reported frankly that without bread the soldiers would not
march. The delay thus imposed, however, enabled him to clear the
"cannon-road" of all vehicles, and to bring up the Dego detachment to
replace Massena in the valley of the western Bormida, the latter coming
in to the main army. Further, part at any rate of the convoy service was
transferred still farther westward to the line Albenga-Garessio-Ceva.
Nelson's fleet, that had so powerfully contributed to force the French
inland, was becoming less and less innocuous. If leadership and force of
character could overcome internal friction, all the success he had hoped
for was now within the young commander's grasp.
Mondovi.
Twenty-four thousand men, for the first time with a due proportion of
cavalry and artillery, were now disposed along Colli's front and beyond
his right flank. Colli, outnumbered by two to one and threatened with
envelopment, decided once more to retreat, and the Republicans occupied
the Cursaglia lines on the morning of the 21st without firing a shot.
But Colli halted again at Vico, half-way to Mondovi (in order, it is
said, to protect the evacuation of a small magazine he had there), and
while he was in this unfavourable situation the pursuers came on with
true Republican swiftness, lapped round his flanks and crushed him. A
few days later (27th April), the armistice of Cherasco put an end to the
campaign before the Austrians moved a single battalion to his
assistance.