For as Hyperides the orator bade the Athenians consider not only whether

he spoke bitterly, but whether he spoke so from interested motives,[451]

so the rebuke of a friend void of all private feeling is solemn and

grave and what one dare not lightly face. And if anyone shows plainly in

his freedom of speech, that he altogether passes over and dismisses any

offences his friend has done to himself, and only blames him for other

shortcomings, and does not spare him but gives him pain for the

interests of others, the tone of his outspokenness is invincible, and

the sweetness of his manner even intensifies the bitterness and

austerity of his rebuke. And so it has well been said, that in anger and

differences with our friends we ought more especially to act with a view

to their interest or honour. And no less friendly is it, when it appears

that we have been passed over and neglected, to boldly put in a word for

others that are neglected too, and to remind people of them, as Plato,

when he was out of favour with Dionysius, begged for an audience, and

Dionysius granted it, thinking that Plato had some personal grievance

and was going to enter into it, but Plato opened the conversation as

follows, "If, Dionysius, you knew that some enemy had sailed to Sicily

with a view to do you some harm, but found no opportunity, would you

allow him to sail back again, and go off scot-free?" "Certainly not,

Plato," replied Dionysius, "for we must not only hate and punish the

deeds of our enemies, but also their intentions." "If then," said Plato,

"anyone has come here for your benefit, and wishes to do you good, and

you do not find him an opportunity, is it right to let him go away with

neglect and without thanks?" And on Dionysius asking, who he meant, he

replied, "I mean AEschines, a man of as good a character as any of

Socrates' pupils whatever, and able to improve by his conversation any

with whom he might associate: and he is neglected, though he has made a

long voyage here to discuss philosophy with you." This speech so

affected Dionysius, that he at once threw his arms round Plato and

embraced him, admiring his benevolence and loftiness of mind, and

treated AEschines well and handsomely.

Sec. XXVII. In the next place, let us clear away as it were and remove all

insolence, and jeering, and mocking, and ribaldry, which are the evil

seasonings of freedom of speech. For as, when the surgeon performs an

operation, a certain neatness and delicacy of touch ought to accompany

his use of the knife, but all pantomimic and venturesome and fashionable

suppleness and over-finicalness ought to be far away from his hand, so

freedom of speech admits of dexterity and politeness, provided that a

pleasant way of putting it does not destroy the power of the rebuke, for

impudence and coarseness and insolence, if added to freedom of speech,

entirely mar and ruin the effect. And so the harper plausibly and

elegantly silenced Philip, who ventured to dispute with him about proper

playing on the harp, by answering him, "God forbid that you should be so

unfortunate, O king, as to understand harping better than me." But that

was not a right answer of Epicharmus, when Hiero a few days after

putting to death some of his friends invited him to supper, "You did not

invite me," he said, "the other day, when you sacrificed your friends."

Bad also was that answer of Antiphon, who, when Dionysius asked him

"which was the best kind of bronze," answered, "That of which the

Athenians made statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton." For this

unpleasant and bitter kind of language profits not those that use it,

nor does scurrility and puerile jesting please, but such kind of

speeches are indications of an incontinent tongue inspired by hate, and

full of malignity and insolence, and those who use such language do but

ruin themselves, recklessly dancing on the verge of a well.[452] For

Antiphon was put to death by Dionysius, and Timagenes lost the

friendship of Augustus, not by using on any occasion too free a tongue,

but at supper-parties and walks always declining to talk seriously,

"only saying what he knew would make the Argives laugh,"[453] and thus

virtually charging friendship with being only a cloak for abuse. For

even the comic poets have introduced on the stage many grave sentiments

well adapted to public life, but joking and ribaldry being mixed with

them, like insipid sauces with food, destroy their effect and make them

lose their nourishing power, so that the comic poets only get a

reputation for malignity and coarseness, and the audience get no benefit

from what is said. We may on other occasions jest and laugh with our

friends, but let our outspokenness be coupled with seriousness and

gravity, and if it be on important matters, let our speech be

trustworthy and moving from its pathos, and animation, and tone of

voice. And on all occasions to let an opportunity slip by is very

injurious, but especially does it destroy the usefulness of freedom of

speech. It is plain therefore that we must abstain from freedom of

speech when men are in their cups. For he disturbs the harmony of a

social gathering[454] who, in the midst of mirth and jollity, introduces

a topic that shall knit the brows and contract the face, and shall act

as a damper to the Lysian[455] god, who, as Pindar says, "looses the

rope of all our cares and anxieties." There is also great danger in such

ill-timed freedom of speech. For wine makes people easily slip into

rage, and oftentimes freedom of speech in liquor makes enemies. And

generally speaking it is not noble or brave but cowardly to conceal your

ideas when people are sober and to give free vent to them at table,

snarling like cowardly dogs. We need say no more therefore on this head.

Sec. XXVIII. But since many people do not think fit or even dare to find

fault with their friends when in prosperity, but think that condition

altogether out of the reach and range of rebuke, but inveigh against

them if they have made a slip or stumble, and trample upon them if they

are in dejection and in their power, and, like a stream swollen above

its banks, pour upon them then the torrent of all their eloquence,[456]

and enjoy and are glad at their reverse of fortune, owing to their

former contempt of them when they were poor themselves, it is not amiss

to discuss this somewhat, and to answer those words of Euripides,

"What need of friends, when things go well with us?"[457]

for those in prosperity stand in especial need of friends who shall be

outspoken to them, and abate their excessive pride. For there are few

who are sensible in prosperity, most need to borrow wisdom from others,

and such considerations as shall keep them lowly when puffed up and

giving themselves airs owing to their good fortune. But when the deity

has abased them and stripped them of their conceit, there is something

in their very circumstances to reprove them and bring about a change of

mind. And so there is no need then of a friendly outspokenness, nor of

weighty or caustic words, but truly in such reverses "it is sweet to

look into the eyes of a friendly person,"[458] consoling and cheering

one up: as Xenophon[459] tells us that the sight of Clearchus in battle

and dangers, and his calm benevolent face, inspired courage in his men

when in peril. But he who uses to a man in adversity too great freedom

and severity of speech, like a man applying too pungent a remedy to an

inflamed and angry eye, neither cures him nor abates his pain, but adds

anger to his grief, and exasperates his mental distress. For example

anyone well is not at all angry or fierce with a friend, who blames him

for his excesses with women and wine, his laziness and taking no

exercise, his frequent baths, and his unseasonable surfeiting: but to a

person ill all this is unsufferable, and even worse than his illness to

hear, "All this has happened to you through your intemperance, and

luxury, your dainty food, and love for women." The patient answers, "How

unseasonable is all this, good sir! I am making my will, the doctors are

preparing me a dose of castor and scammony, and you are scolding me and

plying me with philosophy." And thus the affairs of the unfortunate do

not admit of outspokenness and a string of Polonius-like saws, but they

require kindness and help. For when children fall down their nurses do

not run up to them and scold, but pick them up, and clean them, and tidy

their dress, and afterwards find fault and correct them. The story is

told of Demetrius of Phalerum, when an exile from his native country,

and living a humble and obscure life at Thebes, that he was not pleased

to see Crates approaching, for he expected to receive from him cynical

outspokenness and harsh language. But as Crates talked kindly to him,

and discussed his exile, and pointed out that there was no evil in it,

or anything that ought to put him about, for he had only got rid of the

uncertainties and dangers of public life, and at the same time bade him

trust in himself and his condition of mind, Demetrius cheered up and

became happier, and said to his friends, "Out upon all my former

business and employments, that left me no leisure to know such a man as

this!"

"For friendly speech is good to one in grief,

While bitter language only suits the fool."[460]

This is the way with generous friends. But the ignoble and low

flatterers of those in prosperity, as Demosthenes says fractures and

sprains always give us pain again when the body is not well,[461] adhere

to them in reverses, as if they were pleased at and enjoyed them. But

indeed if there be any need of reminding a man of the blunders he

committed through unadvisedly following his own counsel, it is enough to

say, "This was not to my mind, indeed I often tried to dissuade you from

it."[462]

Sec. XXIX. In what cases then ought a friend to be vehement, and when ought

he to use emphatic freedom of language? When circumstances call upon him

to check some headlong pleasure or rage or insolence, or to curtail

avarice, or to correct some foolish negligence. Thus Solon spoke out to

Croesus, who was corrupted and enervated by insecure good fortune,

bidding him look to the end.[463] Thus Socrates restrained Alcibiades,

and wrung from him genuine tears by his reproof, and changed his

heart.[464] Such also was the plain dealing of Cyrus with Cyaxares, and

of Plato with Dion, for when Dion was most famous and attracted to

himself the notice of all men, by the splendour and greatness of his

exploits, Plato warned him to fear and be on his guard against "pleasing

only himself, for so he would lose all his friends."[465] Speusippus

also wrote to him not to plume himself on being a great person only with

lads and women, but to see to it that by adorning Sicily with piety and

justice and good laws he might make the Academy glorious. On the other

hand Euctus and Eulaeus, companions of Perseus, in the days of his

prosperity ingratiated themselves with him, and assented to him in all

things, and danced attendance upon him, like all the other courtiers,

but when he fled after his defeat by the Romans at Pydna, they attacked

him and censured him bitterly, reminding him and upbraiding him in

regard to everything he had done amiss or neglected to do, till he was

so greatly exasperated both from grief and rage that he whipped out his

sword and killed both of them.

Sec. XXX. Let so much suffice for general occasions of freedom of speech.

There are also particular occasions, which our friends themselves

furnish, that one who really cares for his friends will not neglect, but

make use of. In some cases a question, or narrative, or the censure or

praise of similar things in other people, gives as it were the cue for

freedom of speech. Thus it is related that Demaratus came to Macedonia

from Corinth at the time when Philip was at variance with his wife and

son, and when the king asked if the Greeks were at harmony with one

another, Demaratus, being his well-wisher and friend, answered, "It is

certainly very rich of you, Philip, inquiring as to concord between the

Athenians and Peloponnesians, when you don't observe that your own house

is full of strife and variance."[466] Good also was the answer of

Diogenes, who, when Philip was marching to fight against the Greeks,

stole into his camp, and was arrested and brought before him, and the

king not recognizing him asked if he was a spy, "Certainly," replied he,

"Philip, I have come to spy out your inconsiderate folly, which makes

you, under no compulsion, come here and hazard your kingdom and life on

a moment's[467] cast of the die." This was perhaps rather too strong a

remark.

Sec. XXXI. Another suitable time for reproof is when people have been

abused by others for their faults, and have consequently become humble,

and abated their pride. The man of tact will ingeniously seize the

occasion, checking and baffling those that used the abuse, but privately

speaking seriously to his friend, and reminding him, that he ought to be

more careful if for no other reason than to take off the edge of his

enemies' satire. He will say, "How can they open their mouths against

you, or what can they urge, if you give up and abandon what you get this

bad name about?" Thus pain comes only from abuse, but profit from

reproof. And some correct their friends more daintily by blaming

others; censuring others for what they know are their friends' faults.

Thus my master Ammonius in afternoon school, noticing that some of his

pupils had not dined sufficiently simply, bade one of his freedmen

scourge his own son, charging him with being unable to get through his

dinner without vinegar,[468] but in acting thus he had an eye to us, so

that this indirect rebuke touched the guilty persons.

Sec. XXXII. We must also beware of speaking too freely to a friend in the

company of many people, remembering the well-known remark of Plato. For

when Socrates reproved one of his friends too vehemently in a discussion

at table, Plato said, "Would it not have been better to have said this

privately?" Whereupon Socrates replied, "And you too, sir, would it not

have become you to make this remark also privately?" And Pythagoras

having rebuked one of his pupils somewhat harshly before many people,

they say the young fellow went off and hung himself, and from that

moment Pythagoras never again rebuked anyone in another's presence. For,

as in the case of some foul disease, so also in the case of wrong-doing

we ought to make the detection and exposure private, and not

ostentatiously public by bringing witnesses and spectators. For it is

not the part of a friend but a sophist to seek glory by the ill-fame of

another, and to show off in company, like the doctors that perform

wonderful cures in the theatres as an advertisement.[469] And

independently of the insult, which ought not to be an element in any

cure, we must remember that vice is contentious and obstinate. For it is

not merely "love," as Euripides says, that "if checked becomes more

vehement," but an unsparing rebuke before many people makes every

infirmity and vice more impudent. As then Plato[470] urges old men who

want to teach the young reverence to act reverently to them first

themselves, so among friends a gentle rebuke is gently taken, and a

cautious and careful approach and mild censure of the wrong-doer

undermines and destroys vice, and makes its own modesty catching. So

that line is most excellent, "holding his head near, that the others

might not hear."[471] And most especially indecorous is it to expose a

husband in the hearing of his wife, or a father before his children, or

a lover in the presence of the loved one, or a master before his

scholars. For people are beside themselves with pain and rage if

reproached before those with whom they desire to be held in good repute.

And I think it was not so much wine that exasperated Alexander with

Clitus, as his seeming to put him down in the presence of many people.

And Aristomenes, the tutor of Ptolemy,[472] because he went up to the

king and woke him as he was asleep in an audience of some ambassadors,

gave a handle to the king's flatterers who professed to be indignant on

his behalf, and said, "If after your immense state-labours and many

vigils you have been overpowered by sleep, he ought to have rebuked you

privately, and not put his hands upon you before so many people." And

Ptolemy sent for a cup of poison and ordered the poor man to drink it

up. And Aristophanes said Cleon blamed him for "railing against the

state when strangers were present,"[473] and so irritating the

Athenians. We ought therefore to be very much on our guard in relation

to this point too as well as others, if we wish not to make a display

and catch the public ear, but to use our freedom of speech for

beneficial purposes and to cure vice. Moreover, what Thucydides has

represented the Corinthians saying of themselves, that "they had a right

to blame their neighbours,"[474] is not a bad precept for those to

remember who intend to use freedom of speech. Lysander, it seems, on one

occasion said to a Megarian, who was speaking somewhat boldly on behalf

of Greece among the allies, "Your words require a state to back

them":[475] similarly every man's freedom of speech requires character

behind it, and especially true is this in regard to those who censure

and correct others. Thus Plato said that his life was a tacit rebuke to

Speusippus: and doubtless Xenocrates by his mere presence in the

schools, and by his earnest look at Polemo, made a changed man of him.

Whereas a man of levity and bad character, if he ventures to rebuke

anybody, is likely to hear the line,

"He doctors others, all diseased himself."[476]

Sec. XXXIII. Yet since circumstances frequently call on people who are bad

themselves in association with other such to reprove them, the most

convenient mode of reproof will be that which contrives to include the

reprover in the same indictment as the reproved, as in the case of the

line,

"Tydides, how on earth have we forgot

Our old impetuous courage?"[477]

and,

"Now are we all not worth one single Hector."[478]

In this mild way did Socrates rebuke young men, as not himself without

ignorance, but one that needed in common with them to prosecute virtue,

and seek truth. For they gain goodwill and influence, who seem to have

the same faults as their friends, and desire to correct themselves as

well as them. But he who is high and mighty in setting down another, as

if he were himself perfect and without any imperfections, unless he be

of a very advanced age, or has an acknowledged reputation for virtue and

worth, does no good, but is only regarded as a tiresome bore. And so it

was wisely done of Phoenix to relate his own mishaps, how he had meant

killing his father, but quickly repented at the thought "that he would

be called by the Achaeans parricide,"[479] that he might not seem to be

rebuking Achilles, as one that had himself never suffered from excess of

rage. For kindness of this sort has great influence, and people yield

more to those who seem to be sympathetic and not supercilious. And since

we ought not to expose an inflamed eye to a strong light, and a soul a

prey to the passions cannot bear unmixed reproof and rebuke, one of the

most useful remedies will be found to be a slight mixture of praise, as

in the following lines,

"Ye will not sure give up your valiant courage,

The best men in the host! I should not care

If any coward left the fight, not I;

But you to do so cuts me to the heart."[480]

And,

"Where is thy bow, where thy wing'd arrows, Pandarus,

Where thy great fame, which no one here can match?"[481]

Such language again plainly cheers very much those that are down as,

"Where now is Oedipus, and his famous riddles?"[482]

and,

"Does much-enduring Hercules say this?"[483]

For not only does it soften the harsh imperiousness of censure, but

also, by reminding a man of former noble deeds, implants a desire to

emulate his former self in the person who is ashamed of what is low, and

makes himself his own exemplar for better things. But if we make a

comparison between him and other men, as his contemporaries, his

fellow-citizens, or his relations, then the contentious spirit inherent

in vice is vexed and exasperated, and is often apt to chime in angrily,

"Why don't you go off to my betters then, and leave off bothering me?"

We must therefore be on our guard against praising others, when we are

rebuking a man, unless indeed it be their parents, as Agamemnon says in

Homer,

"Little like Tydeus is his father's son!"[484]

or as Odysseus in the play called "The Scyrians,"[485]

"Dost thou card wool, and thus the lustre smirch

Of thy illustrious sire, thy noble race?"

Sec. XXXIV. But it is by no means fitting when rebuked to rebuke back, and

when spoken to plainly to answer back, for that soon kindles a flame and

causes dissension; and generally speaking such altercation will not look

so much like a retort as an inability to bear freedom of speech. It is

better therefore to listen patiently to a friend's rebuke, for if he

should afterwards do wrong himself and so need rebuke, he has set you

the example of freedom of speech. For being reminded without any malice,

that he himself has not been accustomed to spare his friends when they

have done wrong, but to convince them and show them their fault, he will

be the more inclined to yield and give himself up to correction, as it

will seem a return of goodwill and kindness rather than scolding or

rage.

Sec. XXXV. Moreover, as Thucydides says "he is well advised who [only]

incurs envy in the most important matters,"[486] so the friend ought

only to take upon himself the unpleasant duty of reproof in grave and

momentous cases. For if he is always in a fret and a fume, and rates his

acquaintances more like a tutor than a friend, his rebuke will be blunt

and ineffective in cases of the highest importance, and he will resemble

a doctor who dispenses some sharp and bitter, but important and costly,

drug in trifling cases of common occurrence, where it was not at all

needed, and so will lose all the advantages that might come from a

judicious use of freedom of speech. He will therefore be very much on

his guard against continual fault-finding, and if his friend is always

pettifogging about minute matters, and is needlessly querulous, it will

give him a handle against him in more important shortcomings. Philotimus

the doctor, when a patient who had abscesses on his liver showed him his

sore finger, said to him, "My friend, it is not the whitlow that

matters."[487] So an opportunity sometimes offers itself to a friend to

say to a man, who is always finding fault on small and trivial points,

"Why are we always discussing mere child's play, tippling,[488] and

trifles? Let such a one, my dear sir, send away his mistress, or give up

playing at dice, he will then be in my opinion in all respects an

excellent fellow." For he who receives pardon on small matters is

content that his friend should rebuke him on matters of more moment: but

the man who is ever on the scold, everywhere sour and glum, knowing and

prying into everything, is scarcely tolerable to his children or

brothers, and insufferable to his slaves.

Sec. XXXVI. But since "neither," to use the words of Euripides, "do all

troubles proceed only from old age,"[489] nor from the stupidity of our

friends, we ought to observe not only the shortcomings but also the good

points of our friends, aye, by Zeus, and to be ready to praise them

first, and only censure them afterwards. For as iron receives its

consistency and temper by first being submitted to fire and so made soft

and then dipped into cold water, so when friends have been first warmed

and melted with praises we can afterwards use gentle remonstrance, which

has a similar effect to that of dipping in the case of the metal. For an

opportunity will offer itself to say, "Are those actions worthy to be

compared with these? Do you see what fruits virtue yields? These are the

things we your friends ask of you, these become you, for these you are

designed by nature; but all that other kind of conduct we must reject

with abhorrence, 'cast it away on a mountain, or throw it into the

roaring sea.'"[490] For as a clever doctor would prefer to cure the

illness of his patient by sleep and diet rather than by castor or

scammony, so a kind friend and good father or teacher delight to use

praise rather than blame to correct the character. For nothing makes

rebuke less painful or more beneficial than to refrain from anger, and

to inveigh against wrong-doing mildly and kindly. And so we ought not

sharply to drive home the guilt of those who deny it, or prevent their

making their defence, but even contrive to furnish them with specious

excuses, and if they seem reluctant to give a bad motive for their

action we ought ourselves to find for them a better, as Hector did for

his brother Paris,

"Unhappy man, thy anger was not good,"[491]

suggesting that his absconding from the battle was not running away or

cowardice, but only anger. And Nestor says to Agamemnon,

"You only yielded to your lofty passion."[492]

For it has, I think, a better moral tendency to say "You forgot," or

"You did it inadvertently," than to say "You acted unfairly," or "You

behaved shamefully:" as also "Don't contend with your brother," than

"Don't envy your brother;" and "Avoid the woman who is your ruin," than

"Stop ruining the woman." Such is the language employed in rebuke that

desires to reform and not to wound; that rebuke which looks merely at

the effect to be produced acts on another principle. For when it is

necessary to stop people on the verge of wrong-doing, or to check some

violent and irregular impulse, or if we wish to rouse and infuse vigour

in those who prosecute virtue only feebly and languidly, we may then

assign strange and unbecoming motives for their behaviour. As Odysseus

in Sophocles' play,[493] striving to rouse Achilles, says he is not

angry about his supper,[494] but "that he is afraid now that he looks

upon the walls of Troy," and when Achilles was vexed at this, and talked

of sailing home again, he said,

"I know what 'tis you shun: 'tis not ill fame:

But Hector's near, it is not safe to beard him."

Thus by frightening the high-spirited and courageous man by the

imputation of cowardice, and the sober and orderly man by that of

licentiousness, and the liberal and munificent man by that of meanness

and avarice, people urge them on to what is good, and deter them from

what is bad, showing moderation in cases past remedy, and exhibiting in

their freedom of speech more sorrow and sympathy than fault-finding; but

in the prevention of wrong-doing and in earnest fighting against the

passions they are vehement and inexorable and assiduous: for that is the

time for downright plainness and truth. Besides we see that enemies

censure one another for what they have done amiss, as Diogenes

said,[495] he who wished to lead a good life ought to have good friends

or red-hot enemies, for the former told you what was right, and the

latter blamed you if you did what was wrong. But it is better to be on

our guard against wrong actions, through listening to the persuasion of

those that advise us well, than to repent, after we have done wrong, in

consequence of the reproaches of our enemies. And so we ought to employ

tact in our freedom of speech, as it is the greatest and most powerful

remedy in friendship, and always needs a well-chosen occasion, and

moderation in applying it.

Sec. XXXVII. Since then, as I have said before, freedom of speech is often

painful to the person who is to receive benefit from it, we must imitate

the surgeons, who, when they have performed an operation, do not leave

the suffering part to pain and smart, but bathe and foment it; so those

who do their rebuking daintily run[496] off after paining and smarting,

and by different dealing and kind words soothe and mollify them, as

statuaries smooth and polish images which have been broken or chipped.

But he that is broken and wounded by rebuke, if he is left sullen and

swelling with rage and off his equilibrium, is henceforth hard to win

back or talk over. And so people who reprove ought to be especially

careful on this point, and not to leave them too soon, nor break off

their conversation and intercourse with their acquaintances at the

exasperating and painful stage.

[348] Plato, "Laws," v. p. 731 D, E.

[349] "Laws," v. p. 730 C.

[350] Inscribed in the vestibule of the temple of Apollo

at Delphi. See Pausanias, x. 24.

[351] Used here apparently proverbially for poverty or

low position in life.

[352] Wyttenbach well compares Cicero, "De Amicitia,"

xviii.: "Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum

atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae.

Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas, habet illa

quidem gravitatem: sed amicitia remissior esse debet, et

liberior, et dulcior, et ad omnem comitatem

facilitatemque proclivior."

[353] Hesiod, "Theogony," 64.

[354] Euripides, "Ion," 732.

[355] Our author assigns this saying to Prodicus, "De

Sanitate Praecepta," Sec. viii. But to Evenus, "Quaest.

Conviv." Lib. vii. Prooemium, and "Platonicae

Quaestiones," x. Sec. iii.

[356] As was usual. See Homer, "Odyssey," i. 146. Cf.

Plautus, "Persa," v. iii. 16: "Hoc age, accumbe: hunc

diem suavem meum natalem agitemus amoenum: date aquam

manibus: apponite mensam."

[357] From a play of Eupolis called "The Flatterers."

Cf. Terence, "Eunuchus," 489-491.

[358] See Athenaeus, 256 D. Compare also Valerius Maximus,

ix. 1.

[359] "Videatur Casaubonus ad Athenaeum, vi. p. 243

A."--_Wyttenbach._

[360] "Republic," p. 361 A.

[361] See Herodotus, iii. 78.

[362] See Erasmus, "Adagia," p. 1883.

[363] "Proverbium etiam a Cicerone laudatum 'De

Amicitia,' cap. vi.: Itaque non aqua, non igne, ut

aiunt, pluribus locis utimur, quam amicitia. Notavit

etiam Erasmus 'Adag.' p. 112."--_Wyttenbach._

[364] Compare Sallust, "De Catilinae Conjuratione," cap.

xx.: "Nam idem velle atque idem nolle, ea demum firma

amicitia est."

[365] "Proverbiale, quo utitur Plutarchus in Alcibiade,

p. 203 D. Iambus Tragici esse videtur, ad Neoptolemum

dictus."--_Wyttenbach._

[366] As the polypus, or chameleon.

[367] Plato, "Phaedrus," p. 239 D.

[368] Wyttenbach compares Juvenal, iii. 100-108.

[369] See my note "On Abundance of Friends," Sec. ix.

Wyttenbach well points out the felicity of the

expression here, "siquidem parasitus est [Greek: aoikos

kai anestios]."

[370] Euripides, "Hippolytus," 219, 218. Cf. Ovid,

"Heroides," iv. 41, 42.

[371] Compare "How one may be aware of one's progress in

virtue," Sec. x. Cf. also Horace, "Satires," ii. iii. 35;

Quintilian, xi. 1.

[372] "Odyssey," xxii. 1.

[373] The demagogue is a kind of flatterer. See

Aristotle, "Pol." iv. 4.

[374] Cf. Aristophanes, "Acharnians," 153, [Greek: hoper

machimotaton thrakon ethnos].

[375] Plato was somewhat of a traveller, he three times

visited Syracuse, and also travelled in Egypt.

[376] As to the polypus, see "On Abundance of Friends,"

Sec. ix.

[377] As "Fumum et opes _strepitumque_ Romae."--Horace,

"Odes," iii. 29. 12.

[378] Homer, "Odyssey," xvi. 181.

[379] Sophocles, "Antigone," 523.

[380] As to these traits in Plato and Aristotle, compare

"De Audiendis Poetis," Sec. viii. And as to Alexander,

Plutarch tells us in his Life that he used to hold his

head a little to the left, "Life," p. 666 B. See also

"De Alexandri Fortuna aut Virtute," Sec. ii.

[381] "De Chamaeleonte Aristoteles 'Hist. Animal.' i. 11;

'Part. Animal.' iv. 11; Theophrastus Eclog. ap. Photium

edit. Aristot. Sylburg. T. viii. p. 329: [Greek:

metaballei de ho chamaileon eis panta ta chromata; plen

ten eis to leukon kai to eruthron ou dechetai metabolen.]

Similiter Plinius 'Hist. Nat.' viii. 51."--_Wyttenbach._

[382] See Athenaeus, 249 F; 435 E.

[383] Cf. Juv. iii. 113; "Scire volunt secreta domus,

atque inde timeri."

[384] Cf. Menander apud Stob. p. 437: [Greek: Ta deuter

aiei ten gynaika dei legein, Ten d' egemonian ton olon

ton andr' echein].

[385] As Lord Stowell used to say that "dinners

lubricated business."

[386] Homer, "Iliad," xi. 643.

[387] Homer, "Odyssey," iv. 178, 179.

[388] Perhaps the poley-germander. See Pliny, "Nat.

Hist," xxi. 84. The line is from Nicander Theriac. 64.

[389] "Iliad," viii. 281, 282.

[390] "Iliad," x. 243.

[391] "Iliad," vii. 109, 110.

[392] Xenophon, "Agesilaus," xi. 5. p. 673 C.

[393] To filch the grain from the bin or granary would

not of course be so important a theft as to steal the

seed-stock preserved for sowing. So probably Cato, "De

Re Rustica," v. Sec. iv.: "Segetem ne defrudet," sc.

villicus.

[394] Thucydides, iii. 82.

[395] Plato, "Republic," v. p. 474 E. Compare also

Lucretius, iv. 1160-1170; Horace, "Satires," i. 3. 38

sq.

[396] This Ptolemy was a votary of Cybele, and a

spiritual ancestor of General Booth. The worship of

Cybele is well described by Lucretius, ii. 598-643.

[397] This was Ptolemy Auletes, as the former was

Ptolemy Philopator.

[398] See Suetonius, "Nero," ch. 21.

[399] "Plerumque _minuta voce

cantillare_."--_Wyttenbach._ What Milton would have

called "a lean and flashy song."

[400] Naso suspendit adunco, as Horace, "Sat." i. 6. 5.

[401] See Athenaeus, p. 434 C.

[402] As Gnatho in Terence, "Eunuch." 496-498.

[403] Reading [Greek: Helon], as Courier, Hercher.

[404] "Iliad," x. 249. They are words of Odysseus.

[405] This was carrying flattery rather far.

"Mithridatis medicinae scientia multis memorata

veterum."--_Wyttenbach._

[406] Euripides, "Alcestis," 1159.

[407] Our author gives this definition to Simonides, "De

Gloria Atheniensium," Sec. iii.

[408] So our author again, "On Contentedness of Mind," Sec.

xii.

[409] See Herodotus, i. 30, 33; Juvenal, x. 274, 275;

and Pausanias, ii. 20.

[410] "Nobile Stoae Paradoxum. Cicero Fin. iii. 22, ex

persona Catonis. Horatius ridet Epistol. i. 1. 106-108.

Ad summam sapiens uno minor est Jove: dives, Liber,

honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum; Praecipue sanus,

nisi quum pituita molesta est."--_Wyttenbach._

[411] See also "On Contentedness of Mind," Sec. xii.

[412] Homer, "Iliad," xvi. 141. See the context also

from 130 sq.

[413] Our author has used this illustration again in

"Phocion," p. 742 B.

[414] Namely in Sec. xxvii. where [Greek: parrhesia] is

discussed.

[415] Contrary to the severe training he ought to

undergo, well expressed by Horace, "De Arte Poetica,"

412-414.

[416] Reading with Hercher [Greek: apotympanizontos kai

streblountos]. This was Ptolemy Physcon.

[417] "Unus ex Alexandri adulatoribus: memoratus Curtio

viii. 5, 6."--_Wyttenbach._

[418] A common proverb among the ancients. See "Conjugal

Precepts," Sec. xl.; Erasmus, "Adagia," pp. 1222, 1838.

[419] A line out of AEschylus' "Myrmidons." Quoted again

by our author, "Of Love," Sec. V.

[420] Cleopatra.

[421] Homer, "Odyssey," x. 329. They are the words of

Circe to Odysseus. But the line was suspected even by

old grammarians, and is put in brackets in modern

editions of the "Odyssey."

[422] See Lucretius, iv. 1079-1085.

[423] So Pliny, "Hist. Nat." xxv. 95: "Remedio est

(cicutae), priusquam perveniat ad vitalia, vini natura

excalfactoria: sed in vino pota irremediabilis

existimatur."

[424] Assigned to Pittacus by our author, "Septem

Sapientum Convivium," Sec. ii.

[425] So Wyttenbach, who reads [Greek: enstaseis], and

translates, "et libertate loquendi in nobis

reprehendendis utitur, quando nos cupiditatibus

morbisque animi nostri non indulgere, sed resistere,

volumus."

[426] "Phoenissae," 469-472.

[427] Like Juvenal's "Graeculus esuriens in caelum,

jusseris, ibit."--Juvenal, iii, 78.

[428] These are two successive lines found three times

in Homer, "Iliad," xiv. 195, 196; xviii. 426, 427;

"Odyssey," v. 89, 90. The two lines are in each case

spoken by one person.

[429] Probably lines from "The Flatterer" of Menander.

[430] From the "Ino" of Euripides.

[431] From the "Erechtheus" of Euripides.

[432] We know from Athenaeus, p. 420 D, that Apelles and

Arcesilaus were friends.

[433] An allusion to Hesiod, "Works and Days," 235. Cf.

Horace, "Odes," iv. 5. 23.

[434] See the beautiful story of Baucis and Philemon,

Ovid, "Metamorphoses," viii. 626-724: "Cura pii dis

sunt, et qui coluere coluntur."

[435] Compare Terence, "Andria," 43, 44. So too Seneca,

"De Beneficiis," ii. 10: "Haec enim beneficii inter duos

lex est: alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter

accepti nunquam. Lacerat animum et premit frequens

meritorum commemoratio."

[436] A similar story about the Samians and

Lacedaemonians is told by Aristotle, "Oeconom." ii. 9.

[437] A line from Euripides, "Iphigenia in Aulis," 407.

[438] Also in "Conjugal Precepts," Sec. xxix.

[439] See Persius, iii. 21, 22, with Jahn's Note.

[440] See "On Love," Sec. xxi.

[441] "Auri plumbique oppositio fere proverbialis est.

Petronius, 'Satyricon,' 43. Plane fortunae filius: in

manu illius plumbum aureum fiebat."--_Wyttenbach._ The

passage about the Lydian chariot is said to be by Pindar

in our author, "Nicias," p. 523 D.

[442] Wyttenbach compares Seneca, "Epist." cxxiii. p.

495: "Horum sermo multum nocet: nam etiamsi non statim

officit, semina in animo relinquit, sequiturque nos

etiam cum ab illis discesserimus, resurrecturum postea

malum."

[443] Compare Cicero, "De Amicitia," xxvi.: "Assentatio,

quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest, nisi

ei, qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur. Ita fit, ut is

assentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse

sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet."

[444] Compare Sec. i.

[445] Compare our Author, "Quaestiones Convivalium,"

viii. p. 717 F.

[446] So Horace, "Satires," i. 2, 24: "Dum vitant stulti

vitia in contraria currunt."

[447] Homer, "Iliad," xiv. 84, 85.

[448] Compare Cicero, "De Officiis," i. 25: "Omnis autem

animadversio et castigatio contumelia vacare debet:

neque ad ejus, qui punitur aliquem aut verbis fatigat,

sed ad reipublicae utilitatem referri."

[449] "Iliad," xi. 654.

[450] "Iliad," xvi. 33-35.

[451] Cf. Plutarch, "Phocion," p. 746 D.

[452] A proverb of persons on the brink of destruction.

Wells among the ancients were uncovered.

[453] "Iliad," ii. 215, of Thersites. As to Theagenes,

see Seneca, "De Ira," ii. 23.

[454] Literally, "brings a cloud over fair weather."

[455] The MSS. have Lydian. Lysian Dionysus is also

found in Pausanias, ix. 16. Lyaeus is suggested by

Wyttenbach, and read by Hercher. Lysius or Lyaeus will

both be connected with [Greek: luo], and so refer to

Dionysus as the god that looses or frees us from care.

See Horace, "Epodes," ix. 37, 38.

[456] Compare Juvenal, iii. 73, 74: "Sermo Promptus et

Isaeo torrentior."

[457] "Orestes," 667.

[458] Euripides, "Ion," 732.

[459] "Anabasis," ii. 6, 11.

[460] Perhaps by Euripides.

[461] "Olynth." ii. p. 8 C; "Pro Corona," 341 C.

[462] Homer, "Iliad," ix. 108, 109. They are the words

of Nestor to Agamemnon.

[463] See Herodotus, i. 30-32.

[464] See Plato's "Symposium," p. 215 E.

[465] See Plato, "Epist." iv. p. 321 B.

[466] See our author, "Apophthegmata," p. 179 C.

[467] Compare Horace, "Satires," i. 1. 7, 8: "Quid enim,

concurritur: horae Momento cita mors venit aut victoria

laeta."

[468] And so being dainty. See Athenaeus, ii. ch. 76.

[469] We see from this and other places that the

mountebanks and quacks of the Middle Ages and later

times existed also among the ancients. Human nature in

its great leading features is ever the same. "Omne

ignotum pro magnifico est."

[470] "Laws," p. 729 C.

[471] Homer, "Odyssey," i. 157; iv. 70; xvii. 592.

[472] Ptolemy V., Epiphanes. The circumstances are

related by Polybius, xv. 29; xvii. 35.

[473] See "Acharnians," 501, 502.

[474] Thucydides, i. 70: [Greek: kai hama, eiper tines

kai alloi, nomizomen axioi einai tois pelas psogon

epenenkein].

[475] See our Author, "Apophthegmata," p. 190 E.

[476] A line of Euripides, quoted again in "How a Man

may be benefited by his Enemies," Sec. iv.

[477] Homer, "Iliad," xi. 313.

[478] Do. viii. 234, 235.

[479] Do. ix. 461.

[480] "Iliad," xiii. 116-119.

[481] Do. v. 171, 172.

[482] Euripides, "Phoenissae," 1688.

[483] Euripides, "Hercules Furens," 1250.

[484] "Iliad," v. 800. Athene is the speaker.

[485] A play by Sophocles, now only in fragments,

relating the life of Achilles in the island of Scyros,

the scene of his amour with Deidamia, the daughter of

Lycomedes, by whom he became the father of Pyrrhus.

[486] Thucydides, ii. 64. Quoted again in "On Shyness,"

Sec. xviii.

[487] See also "De Audiendo," Sec. x.

[488] [Greek: potous] comes in rather curiously here.

Can any other word lurk under it?

[489] "Phoenissae," 528, 529.

[490] Homer, "Iliad," vi. 347.

[491] Do. vi. 326.

[492] Homer, "Iliad," ix. 109, 110.

[493] In Dindorf's "Poetae Scenici Graeci," Fragment 152.

[494] As it is not quite clear why Achilles should have

been angry about his supper, [Greek: dia to deipnon],

apropos of the context, Wyttenbach ingeniously suggests,

as this lost play of Sophocles was called [Greek: Syn

deipnon], that Plutarch may have written [Greek: en to

Deipno].

[495] Compare "How One may be aware of one's Progress in

Virtue," Sec. xi.

[496] "Ductum e proverbiali dictione [Greek: balonta

ekpheugein], emisso telo aufugere."--_Wyttenbach._

HOW A MAN MAY BE BENEFITED BY

HIS ENEMIES.

Sec. I. I am well aware, Cornelius Pulcher, that you prefer the mildest

manners in public life, by which you can be at once most useful to the

community, and most agreeable in private life to those who have any

dealings with you. But since it is difficult to find any region without

wild beasts, though it is related of Crete;[497] and hitherto there has

been no state that has not suffered from envy, rivalry, and strife, the

most fruitful seeds of hostility; (for, even if nothing else does, our

friendships involve us in enmities, as Chilo[498] the wise man

perceived, who asked the man who told him he had no enemy, whether he

had a friend either), it seems to me that a public man ought not only to

examine the whole question of enemies in its various ramifications, but

also to listen to the serious remark of Xenophon,[499] that a sensible

man will receive profit even from his enemies. The ideas therefore that

lately occurred to me to deliver, I have now put together nearly in the

identical words and send them to you, with the exception of some matter

also in "Political Precepts,"[500] a treatise which I have often noticed

in your hands.

Sec. II. People in old times were well satisfied if they were not injured

by strange and wild beasts, and that was the only motive of their fights

with them, but those of later days have by now learnt to make use of

them, for they feed on their flesh, and clothe themselves with their

wool, and make medical use of their gall and beestings, and turn their

hides into shields, so that we might reasonably fear, if beasts failed

man, that his life would become brutish, and wild, and void of

resources. Similarly since all others are satisfied with not being

injured by their enemies, but the sensible will also (as Xenophon says)

get profit out of them, we must not be incredulous, but seek a method

and plan how to obtain this advantage, seeing that life without an enemy

is impossible. The husbandman cannot cultivate every tree, nor can the

hunter tame every kind of animal, so both seek means to derive profit

according to their several necessities, the one from his barren trees,

the other from his wild animals. Sea-water also is undrinkable and

brackish, but it feeds fish, and is a sort of vehicle to convey and

transport travellers anywhere. The Satyr, when he saw fire for the first

time, wished to kiss it and embrace it, but Prometheus warned him,

"Goat, thou wilt surely mourn thy loss of beard."[501]

For fire burns whoever touches it, but it also gives light and warmth,

and is an instrument of art to all those who know how to use it.[502]

Consider also in the case of the enemy, if he is in other respects

injurious and intractable, he somehow or other gives us a handle to make

use of him by, and so is serviceable. And many things are unpleasant and

detestable and antagonistic to those to whom they happen, but you must

have noticed that some use even illnesses as a period of rest for the

body, and others by excessive toil have strengthened and trained their

bodily vigour, and some have made exile and the loss of money a passage

to leisure and philosophy, as did Diogenes and Crates. And Zeno, when he

heard of the wreck of the ship which contained all his property, said,

"Thou hast done well, Fortune, to confine me to my threadbare

cloak."[503]

For as those animals that have the strongest and healthiest stomachs eat

and digest serpents and scorpions, and some even feed on stones and

shells, which they convert into nourishment by the strength and heat of

their stomachs, while fastidious people out of health almost vomit if

offered bread and wine, so foolish people spoil even their friendships,

while the wise know how to turn to account even their enmities.

Sec. III. In the first place then it seems to me that what is most

injurious in enmity may become most useful to those that pay attention

to it? To what do I refer? Why, to the way in which your enemy ever wide

awake pries into all your affairs, and analyzes your whole life, trying

to get a handle against you somewhere, able not only to look through a

tree, like Lynceus,[504] or through stones and shells, but through your

friend and domestic and every intimate acquaintance, as far as possible

detecting your doings, and digging and ferreting into your designs. For

our friends are ill and often die without our knowing anything about it

through our delay and carelessness, but we almost pry into even the

dreams of our enemies; and our enemy knows even more than we do

ourselves of our diseases and debts and differences with our wives.[505]

But they pay most attention to our faults and hunt them out: and as

vultures follow the scent of putrid carcases, and cannot perceive sound

and wholesome ones, so the diseases and vices and crimes of life attract

the enemy, and on these those that hate us pounce, these they attack and

tear to pieces. Is not this an advantage to us? Certainly it is. For it

teaches us to live warily and be on our guard, and neither to do or say

anything carelessly or without circumspection, but ever to be vigilant

by careful mode of living that we give no handle to an enemy. For the

cautiousness that thus represses the passions and follows reason

implants a care and determination to live well and without reproach. For

as those states that have been sobered by wars with their neighbours and

continual campaigns love the blessings of order and peace, so those

people who are compelled to lead a sober life owing to their enemies,

and to be on their guard against carelessness and negligence, and to do

everything with an eye to utility, imperceptibly glide into a faultless

mode of life, and tone down their character, even without requiring much

assistance from precepts. For those who always remember the line,

"Ah! how would Priam and his sons rejoice,"[506]

are by it diverted from and learn to shun all such things as their

enemies would rejoice and laugh at. Again we see actors[507] and singers

on the stage oftentimes slack and remiss, and not taking sufficient

pains about their performances in the theatres when they have it all to

themselves; but when there is a competition and contest with others,

they not only wake up but tune their instruments, and adjust their

chords, and play on the flute with more care. Similarly whoever knows

that his enemy is antagonistic to his life and character, pays more

attention to himself, and watches his behaviour more carefully, and

regulates his life. For it is peculiar to vice to be more afraid of

enemies than friends in regard to our faults. And so Nasica, when some

expressed their opinion that the Roman Republic was now secure, since

Carthage was rased to the ground and Achaia reduced to slavery, said,

"Nay rather we are now in a critical position, since we have none left

to fear or respect."

Sec. IV. Consider also that very philosophical and witty answer of Diogenes

to the man who asked, "How shall I avenge myself on my enemy?" "By

becoming a good and honest man."[508] Some people are terribly put about

if they see their enemies' horses in a good condition, or hear their

dogs praised; if they see their farm well-tilled, their garden

well-kept, they groan aloud. What a state think you then they would be

in, if you were to exhibit yourself as a just man, sensible and good, in

words excellent, in deeds pure, in manner of life decorous, "reaping

fruit from the deep soil of the soul, where good counsels grow."[509]

Pindar says[510] "those that are conquered are reduced to complete

silence:" but not absolutely, not all men, only those that see they are

outdone by their enemies in industry, in goodness, in magnanimity, in

humanity, in kindnesses; these, as Demosthenes says, "stop the tongue,

block up the mouth, choke people, and make them silent."[511]

"Be better than the bad: 'tis in your power."[512]

If you wish to vex the man who hates you, do not abuse him by calling

him a pathick, or effeminate, or intemperate, or a low fellow, or

illiberal; but be yourself a man, and temperate, and truthful, and kind

and just in all your dealings with those you come across. But if you are

tempted to use abuse, mind that you yourself are very far from what you

abuse him for, dive down into your own soul, look for any rottenness in

yourself, lest someone suggest to you the line of the tragedian,

"You doctor others, all diseased yourself."[513]

If you say your enemy is uneducated, increase your own love of learning

and industry; if you call him coward, stir up the more your own spirit

and manliness; and if you say he is wanton and licentious, erase from

your own soul any secret trace of the love of pleasure. For nothing is

more disgraceful or more unpleasant than slander that recoils on the

person who sets it in motion; for as the reflection of light seems most

to injure weak eyes, so does censure when it recoils on the censurer,

and is borne out by the facts. For as the north-east wind attracts

clouds, so does a bad life draw upon itself rebukes.

Sec. V. Whenever Plato was in company with people who behaved in an

unseemly manner, he used to say to himself, "Am I such a person as

this?"[514] So he that censures another man's life, if he straightway

examines and mends his own, directing and turning it into the contrary

direction, will get some advantage from his censure, which will be

otherwise idle and unprofitable. Most people laugh if a bald-pate or

hump-back jeer and mock at others who are so too: it is quite as

ridiculous to jeer and mock if one lies open to retort oneself, as Leo

of Byzantium showed in his answer to the hump-back who jeered at him for

weakness of eyes, "You twit me with an infirmity natural to man, while

you yourself carry your Nemesis on your back."[515] And so do not abuse

another as an adulterer, if you yourself are mad after boys: nor as a

spendthrift, if you yourself are niggardly. Alcmaeon said to Adrastus,

"You are near kinsman to a woman that slew her husband." What was his

reply? He retaliated on him with the appropriate retort, "But you killed

with your own hand the mother that bore you."[516] And Domitius said to

Crassus, "Did you not weep for the lamprey that was bred in your

fishpond, and died?" To which Crassus replied, "Did you weep, when you

buried your three wives?" He therefore that intends to abuse others must

not be witty and noisy and impudent, but a man that does not lie open to

counter-abuse and retort, for the god seems to have enjoined upon no one

the precept "Know thyself" so much as on the person who is censorious,

to prevent people saying just what they please, and hearing what don't

please them. For such a one is wont, as Sophocles[517] says, "idly

letting his tongue flow, to hear against his will, what he willingly

says ill of others."

Sec. VI. This use and advantage then there is in abusing one's enemy, and

no less arises from being abused and ill-spoken of oneself by one's

enemies. And so Antisthenes[518] said well that those who wish to lead a

good life ought to have genuine friends or red-hot enemies; for the

former deterred you from what was wrong by reproof, the latter by abuse.

But since friendship has nowadays become very mealy-mouthed in freedom

of speech, voluble in flattery and silent in rebuke, we can only hear

the truth from our enemies. For as Telephus[519] having no surgeon of

his own, submitted his wound to be cured by his enemy's spear, so those

who cannot procure friendly rebuke must content themselves with the

censure of an enemy that hates them, reprehending and castigating their

vices, and regard not the animus of the person, but only his matter. For

as he who intended to kill the Thessalian Prometheus[520] only stabbed a

tumour, and so lanced it that the man's life was saved, and he was rid

of the tumour by its bursting, so oftentimes abuse, suddenly thrust on a

man in anger or hatred, has cured some disease in his soul which he was

ignorant of or neglected. But most people when they are abused do not

consider whether the abuse really belongs to them properly, but look

round to see what abuse they can heap on the abuser, and, as wrestlers

get smothered with the dust of the arena, do not wipe off the abuse

hurled at themselves, but bespatter others, and at last get on both

sides grimy and discoloured. But if anyone gets a bad name from an

enemy, he ought to clear himself of the imputation even more than he

would remove any stain on his clothes that was pointed out to him; and

if it be wholly untrue, yet he ought to investigate what originated the

charge, and to be on his guard and be afraid lest he had unawares done

something very near akin to what was imputed to him. As Lacydes, the

king of the Argives, by the way he wore his hair and by his mincing walk

got charged with effeminacy: and Pompey's scratching his head with one

finger was construed in the same way, though both these men were very

far from effeminacy or wantonness. And Crassus was accused of an

intrigue with one of the Vestal Virgins, because he wished to purchase

from her a pleasant estate, and therefore frequently visited her and

waited upon her. And Postumia, from her readiness to laugh and talk

somewhat freely with men, got accused and even had to stand her trial

for incest,[521] but was, however, acquitted of that charge: but Spurius

Minucius the Pontif ex Maximus, when he pronounced her innocent, urged

her not to be freer in her words than she was in her life. And though

Themistocles[522] was guiltless of treason, his intimacy with Pausanias,

and the letters and messages that frequently passed between them, laid

him under suspicion.

Sec. VII. Whenever therefore any false charge is made against us, we ought

not merely to despise and neglect it as false, but to see what word or

action, either in jest or earnest, has made the charge seem probable,

and this we must for the future be earnestly on our guard against and

shun. For if others falling into unforeseen trouble and difficulties

teach us what is expedient, as Merope says,

"Fortune has made me wise, though she has ta'en

My dearest ones as wages,"[523]

why should we not take an enemy, and pay him no wages, to teach us, and

give us profit and instruction, in matters which had escaped our notice?

For an enemy has keener perception than a friend, for, as Plato[524]

says, "the lover is blind as respects the loved one," and hatred is both

curious and talkative. Hiero was twitted by one of his enemies for his

foul breath, so he went home and said to his wife, "How is this? You

never told me of it." But she being chaste and innocent replied, "I

thought all men's breath was like that."[525] Thus perceptible and

material things, and things that are plain to everybody, are sooner

learnt from enemies than from friends and intimates.

Sec. VIII. Moreover to keep the tongue well under control, no small factor

in moral excellence, and to make it always obedient and submissive to

reason, is not possible, unless by practice and attention and

painstaking a man has subdued his worst passions, as for example anger.

For such expressions as "a word uttered involuntarily," and "escaping

the barrier of the teeth,"[526] and "words darting forth spontaneously,"

well illustrate what happens in the case of ill-disciplined souls, ever

wavering and in an unsettled condition through infirmity of temper,

through unbridled fancy, or through faulty education. But, according to

divine Plato,[527] though a word seems a very trivial matter, the

heaviest penalty follows upon it both from gods and men. But silence can

never be called to account, is not only not thirsty, to borrow the

language of Hippocrates, but when abused is dignified and Socratic, or

rather Herculean, if indeed it was Hercules who said,

"Sharp words he heeded not so much as flies."[528]

Not more dignified and noble than this is it to keep silent when an

enemy reviles you, "as one swims by a smooth and mocking cliff," but in

practice it is better. If you accustom yourself to bear silently the

abuse of an enemy, you will very easily bear the attack of a scolding

wife, and will remain undisturbed when you hear the sharp language of a

friend or brother, and will be calm and placid when you are beaten or

have something thrown at your head by your father or mother. For

Socrates put up with Xanthippe, a passionate and forward woman, which

made him a more easy companion with others, as being accustomed to

submit to her caprices; and it is far better to train and accustom the

temper to bear quietly the insults and rages and jeers and taunts of

enemies and estranged persons, and not to be distressed at it.

Sec. IX. Thus then must we exhibit in our enmities meekness and

forbearance, and in our friendships still more simplicity and

magnanimity and kindness. For it is not so graceful to do a friend a

service, as disgraceful to refuse to do so at his request; and not to

revenge oneself on an enemy when opportunity offers is generous. But the

man who sympathizes with his enemy in affliction, and assists him in

distress, and readily holds out a helping hand to his children and

family and their fortunes when in a low condition, whoever does not

admire such a man for his humanity, and praise his benevolence,

"He has a black heart made of adamant

Or iron or bronze."[529]

When Caesar ordered the statues of Pompey that had been thrown down to be

put up again,[530] Cicero said, "You have set up again Pompey's statues,

and in so doing have erected statues to yourself." We ought not

therefore to be niggardly in our praise and honour of an enemy that

deserves a good name. For he who praises another receives on that

account greater praise himself, and is the more credited on another

occasion when he finds fault, as not having any personal ill-feeling

against the man, but only disapproving of his act; and what is most

noble and advantageous, the man who is accustomed to praise his enemies,

and not to be vexed or malignant at their prosperity, is as far as

possible from envying the good fortune of his friends, and the success

of his intimates. And yet what practice will be more beneficial to our

minds, or bring about a happier disposition, than that which banishes

from us all jealousy and envy? For as in war many necessary things,

otherwise bad, are customary and have as it were the sanction of law, so

that they cannot be abolished in spite of the injury they do, so enmity

drags along in its train hatred, and envy, and jealousy, and malignity,

and revenge, and stamps them on the character. Moreover knavery, and

deceit, and villainy, that seem neither bad nor unfair if employed

against an enemy, if they once get planted in the mind are difficult to

dislodge; and eventually from force of habit get used also against

friends, unless they are forewarned and forearmed through their previous

acquaintance with the tricks of enemies. If then Pythagoras,[531]

accustoming his disciples to abstain from all cruelty and inhumanity to

the brute creation, did right to discountenance bird-fowling, and to buy

up draughts of fishes and bid them be thrown into the water again, and

to forbid killing any but wild animals, much more noble is it, in

dissensions and differences with human beings, to be a generous, just

and true enemy, and to check and tame all bad and low and knavish

propensities, that in all intercourse with friends a man may keep the

peace and abstain from doing an injury. Scaurus was an enemy and accuser

of Domitius, but when one of Domitius' slaves came to him to reveal some

important matters which were unknown to Scaurus, he would not hear him,

but seized him and sent him back to his master. And when Cato was

prosecuting Murena for canvassing, and was getting together his

evidence, he was accompanied as was usual by people who watched what he

was doing,[532] and would often ask him if he intended that day to get

together his witnesses and open the case, and if he said "No," they

believed him and went their way. All this is the greatest proof of the

credit which was reposed in Cato, but it is better and more important,

that we should accustom ourselves to deal justly even with our enemies,

and then there will be no fear that we should ever act unjustly and

treacherously to our friends and intimates.

Sec. X. But since, as Simonides says, "all larks must have their

crests,"[533] and every man's nature contains in it pugnacity and

jealousy and envy, which last is, as Pindar says, "the companion of

empty-headed men," one might get considerable advantage by purging

oneself of those passions against enemies, and by diverting them, like

sewers, as far as possible from companions and friends.[534] And this it

seems the statesmanlike Onomademus had remarked, for being on the

victorious side in a disturbance at Chios, he urged his party not to

expel all of the different faction, but to leave some, "in order," he

said, "that we may not begin to quarrel with our friends, when we have

got entirely rid of our enemies." So too our expending these passions

entirely on our enemies will give less trouble to our friends. For it

ought not to be, as Hesiod[535] says, that "potter envies potter, and

singer envies singer, and neighbour neighbour," and cousin cousin, and

brother brother, "if hastening to get rich" and enjoying prosperity. But

if there is no other way to get rid of strife and envy and quarrels,

accustom yourself to be vexed at your enemies' good fortune, and sharpen

and accentuate on them your acerbity. For as judicious gardeners think

they produce finer roses and violets by planting alongside of them

garlic and onions, that any bitter or strong elements may be transferred

to them, so your enemy's getting and attracting your envy and malignity

will render you kinder and more agreeable to your prosperous friends.

And so let us be rivals of our enemies for glory or office or righteous

gain, not only being vexed if they get ahead of us, but also carefully

observing all the steps by which they get ahead, and trying to outdo

them in industry, and hard work, and soberness, and prudence; as

Themistocles said Miltiades' victory at Marathon would not let him

sleep.[536] For he who thinks his enemy gets before him in offices, or

advocacies, or state affairs, or in favour with his friends or great

men, if from action and emulation he sinks into envy and despondency,

makes his life become idle and inoperative. But he who is not blinded by

hate,[537] but a discerning spectator of life and character and words

and deeds, will perceive that most of what he envies comes to those who

have them from diligence and prudence and good actions, and exerting

himself in the same direction he will increase his love of what is

honourable and noble, and will eradicate his vanity and sloth.

Sec. XI. But if our enemies seem to us to have got either by flattery, or

fraud, or bribery, or venal services, ill-got and discreditable power at

court or in state, it ought not to trouble us but rather inspire

pleasure in us, when we compare our own liberty and purity and

independence of life. For, as Plato[538] says, "all the gold above or

below the earth is not of equal value with virtue." And we ought ever to

remember the precept of Solon, "We will not exchange our virtue for

others' wealth."[539] Nor will we give up our virtue for the applause of

banqueting theatres, nor for honours and chief seats among eunuchs and

harlots, nor to be monarchs' satraps; for nothing is to be desired or

noble that comes from what is bad. But since, as Plato[540] says, "the

lover is blind as respects the loved one," and we notice more what our

enemies do amiss, we ought not to let either our joy at their faults or

our grief at their success be idle, but in either case we ought to

reflect, how we may become better than them by avoiding their errors,

and by imitating their virtues not come short of them.

[497] So Pliny, viii. 83: "In Creta Insula non vulpes

ursive, atque omnino millum maleficum animal praeter

phalangium."

[498] See the same remark of Chilo, "On Abundance of

Friends," Sec. vi.

[499] "Oeconom." i. 15.

[500] A treatise of Plutarch still extant.

[501] A line from a lost Satyric Play of AEschylus,

called "Prometheus Purphoros."

[502] So fire is called [Greek: pantechnon] in AEschylus,

"Prometheus Desmotes," 7.

[503] Compare Seneca, "De Animi Tranquillitate," cap.

xiii.: "Zeno noster cum omnia sua audiret submersa,

Jubet, inquit, me fortuna expeditius philosophari."

[504] See Horace, "Epistles," i. I. 28; Pausanias, iv.

2.

[505] See Plautus, "Trinummus," 205-211.

[506] Homer, "Iliad," i. 255.

[507] Literally "the artists of Dionysus." We know what

they were from our author's "Quaestiones Romanae," Sec. 107:

[Greek: dia ti tous peri ton Dionuson technitas

histrionas Rhomaioi kalousin];

[508] Compare "De Audiendis Poetis," Sec. iv.

[509] AEschylus, "Septem contra Thebas," 593, 594.

[510] Pindar, "Fragm." 253.

[511] Demosthenes, "De Falsa Legatione," p. 406.

[512] Euripides, "Orestes," 251.

[513] A line from Euripides. Quoted also "De Adulatore

et Amico," Sec. xxxii.

[514] Compare "De Audiendo," Sec.vi. See also Horace,

"Satires," i, 4. 136, 137.

[515] The story is somewhat differently told, "Quaest.

Conviv.," Lib. ii. Sec. ix.

[516] From a lost play of Euripides.

[517] In some lost play. Compare Hesiod, "Works and

Days," 719-721; Terence, "Andria," 920.

[518] The sentiment is assigned to Diogenes twice

elsewhere by our author, namely, "How One may be aware

of one's Progress in Virtue," Sec. xi., and "How One may

discern a Flatterer from a Friend," Sec. xxxvi.

[519] See Propertius, ii. 1. 63, 64; Ovid,

"Metamorphoses," xii. 112; xiii. 171; "Tristia," v. 2.

15, 16; "Remedia Amoris," 47, 48; Erasmus, "Adagia," p.

221.

[520] "Jason Pheraeus cognomine Prometheus dictus est.

Vide Ciceronem, 'Nat. Deor.' iii. 29; Plinium, vii. 51;

Valerium Maximum, i. 8, Extem. 6."--_Wytttenbach._

[521] She was a Vestal Virgin. See Livy, iv. 44.

[522] See Thucydides, i. 135, 136.

[523] From a lost play of Euripides. Compare the

proverb, [Greek: pathemata mathemata].

[524] "Laws," v. p. 731 E.

[525] Told again "Reg. et Imperator. Apophthegm.," p.

175 B.

[526] A favourite image of Homer, employed "Iliad," iv.

350; xiv. 83; "Odyssey," i. 64; xxiii. 70.

[527] "Laws," xi. p. 935 A. Quoted again "On

Talkativeness," Sec. vii.

[528] See Pausanias, v. 14.

[529] From a Fragment of Pindar.

[530] See Suetonius, "Divus Julius," 75: "Sed et statuas

L. Sullae atque Pompeii a plebe disjectas reposuit."

[531] Compare our author, "Quaestiones Convivalium,"

viii. p. 729 E.

[532] No doubt in the interest of the defendant. See our

author, "Cato Minor," p. 769 B.

[533] A Greek proverb, see Erasmus, "Adagia," p. 921.

[534] So Cicero, "Nat. Deor." ii. 56: "In aedibus

architecti avertunt ab oculis naribusque dominorum ea

quae profluentia necessario taetri essent aliquid

habitura."

[535] "Works and Days," 23-26. Our "Two of a trade

seldom agree."

[536] Compare "How One may be aware of one's Progress in

Virtue," Sec. xiv.

[537] For as the English proverb says, "Hatred is blind

as well as love."

[538] "Laws," v. p. 728 A.

[539] Quoted more fully "How One may be aware of one's

Progress in Virtue," Sec. vi.

[540] "Laws," v. p. 731 E. See also above, Sec. vii.

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