1. I first lay this down for an axiom, that there ought to be seen
in men’s lives an agreement with their doctrines. For it is not so
necessary that the pleader (as Aeschines has it) and the law speak one
and the same thing, as that the life of a philosopher be consonant
to his speech. For the speech of a philosopher is a law of his own
and voluntarily imposed on himself, unless they esteem philosophy to
be a game, or an acuteness in disputing invented for the gaining of
applause, and not—what it really is—a thing deserving our greatest
study.
2. Since then there are in their discourses many things written by Zeno
himself, many by Cleanthes, and most of all by Chrysippus, concerning
policy, governing, and being governed, concerning judging and pleading,
and yet there is not to be found in any of their lives either leading
of armies, making of laws, going to parliament, pleading before the
judges, fighting for their country, travelling on embassies, or
bestowing of public gifts, but they have all, feeding (if I may so say)
on rest as on the lotus, led their whole lives, and those not short but
very long ones, in foreign countries, amongst disputations, books, and
walkings; it is manifest that they have lived rather according to the
writings and sayings of others than their own professions, having spent
all their days in that repose which Epicurus and Hieronymus so much
commend.
Chrysippus indeed himself, in his Fourth Book of Lives, thinks
there is no difference between a scholastic life and a voluptuous
one. I will set down here his very words: “They who are of opinion
that a scholastic life is from the very beginning most suitable to
philosophers seem to me to be in an error, thinking that men ought to
follow this for the sake of some recreation or some other thing like to
it, and in that manner to spin out the whole course of their life; that
is, if it may be explained, to live at ease. For this opinion of theirs
is not to be concealed, many of them delivering it clearly, and not a
few more obscurely.” Who therefore did more grow old in this scholastic
life than Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Diogenes, Zeno, and Antipater, who
left their countries not out of any discontent, but that they might
quietly enjoy their delight, studying, and disputing at their leisure.
To verify which, Aristocreon, the disciple and intimate friend of
Chrysippus, having erected his statue of brass upon a pillar, engraved
on it these verses:
This brazen statue Aristocreon
To’s friend Chrysippus newly here has put,
Whose sharp-edged wit, like sword of champion,
Did Academic knots in sunder cut.
Such a one then was Chrysippus, an old man, a philosopher, one who
praised the regal and civil life, and thought there was no difference
between a scholastic and voluptuous one.
3. But those others of them who intermeddle in state affairs act yet
more contradictorily to their own doctrines. For they govern, judge,
consult, make laws, punish, and honor, as if those were indeed cities
in the government of which they concern themselves, those truly
counsellors and judges who are at any time allotted to such offices,
those generals who are chosen by suffrages, and those laws which were
made by Clisthenes, Lycurgus, and Solon, whom they affirm to have been
vicious men and fools. Thus even in the management of state affairs are
they at war with themselves.
4. Indeed Antipater, in his writings concerning the difference between
Cleanthes and Chrysippus, has related that Zeno and Cleanthes would not
be made citizens of Athens, lest they might seem to injure their own
countries. I shall not much insist upon it, that, if they did well,
Chrysippus acted amiss in suffering himself to be enrolled as a member
of that city. But this is very contradictory and absurd, that, removing
their persons and their lives so far off amongst strangers, they
reserved their names for their countries; which is the same thing as if
a man, leaving his wife, and cohabiting and bedding with another, and
getting children on her, should yet refuse to contract marriage with
the second, lest he might seem to wrong the former.
5. Again, Chrysippus, writing in his treatise of Rhetoric, that a wise
man will so plead and so act in the management of a commonwealth, as if
riches, glory, and health were really good, confesses that his speeches
are inextricable and impolitic, and his doctrines unsuitable for the
uses and actions of human life.
6. It is moreover a doctrine of Zeno’s, that temples are not to be
built to the Gods; for that a temple is neither a thing of much value
nor holy; since no work of carpenters and handicrafts-men can be of
much value. And yet they who praise these things as well and wisely
said are initiated in the sacred mysteries, go up to the Citadel (where
Minerva’s temple stands), adore the shrines, and adorn with garlands
the sacraries, being the works of carpenters and mechanical persons.
Again, they think that the Epicureans, who sacrifice to the Gods and
yet deny them to meddle with the government of the world, do thereby
refute themselves; whereas they themselves are more contrary to
themselves, sacrificing on altars and in temples, which they affirm
ought not to stand nor to have been built.
7. Moreover, Zeno admits (as Plato does) several virtues with various
distinctions—to wit, prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice—as
being indeed inseparable, but yet divers and different from one
another. But again, defining every one of them, he says that fortitude
is prudence in executing, justice prudence in distributing, as being
one and the same virtue, but seeming to differ in its relation to
various affairs when it comes to action. Nor does Zeno alone seem to
contradict himself in these matters; but Chrysippus also, who blames
Ariston for saying that the other virtues are different habits of one
and the same virtue, and yet defends Zeno, who in this manner defines
every one of the virtues. And Cleanthes, having in his Commentaries
concerning Nature said, that vigor is the striking of fire, which, if
it is sufficient in the soul to perform the duties presented to it, is
called force and strength; subjoins these very words: “Now this force
and strength, when it is in things apparent and to be persisted in, is
continence; when in things to be endured, it is fortitude; when about
worthiness, it is Justice; and when about choosing or refusing, it is
temperance.”