Boston, where we should be well received, and provided with every
accommodation. We could open the campaign when we pleased, and might
make preparations beforehand for a great expedition against Rhode
Island, procuring, at the same time, from the inhabitants of the ports
of the north of Boston, and especially that of Marble Head, all the
information they may have acquired about Halifax.
But let us suppose ourselves established at Newport. The campaign opens
by the close of April, and the British will be in no haste to quit New
York. The fear of leaving himself unprotected on our side will prevent
his executing any design against the forts on the North River. It may
even be in our power to assist General Washington in making an attack
on New York. Count d'Estaing, before his departure, thought that he had
discovered the possibility of a passage through the Sound. This question
I leave to naval officers; but, without being one myself, I know that
Long Island might be captured, the troops driven off, and, whilst
General Washington made a diversion on his side, batteries might be
erected that would greatly annoy the garrison of New York. At all
events, preparations should be made to act against Halifax in the month
of June. With the claims which the other expedition would give us, I
will pledge myself that we should be assisted in this by the Americans.
I could find at Boston, and in the northern parts, trust-worthy
persons who could go to Halifax for us, and procure all the necessary
information; the town of Marble Head, in particular, would furnish us
with excellent pilots. The inhabitants of the north of New Hampshire and
Cascobay should be assembled under the command of their general, Stark,
who gained the victory at Bennington, ready to march, if circumstances
require it, by the route of Annapolis. The country is said to be
inhabited by subjects ill affected to British government; ~[7] some of
them have entered into a correspondence with the Americans, and have
given assurances that they will form a party in our favour.
With regard to ourselves, I suppose that we sail the 1st of June, and
that we are accompanied by some continental frigates, and such private
vessels as might be collected in Boston. Congress would undoubtedly
furnish us with as many troops as we should require, and those very
brigades which lately belonged to my division, and whose sole object at
present is to keep the enemy at Rhode Island in check, having no longer
any employment, would be able to join us without impairing the main
army. They would come the more willingly, as the greater part of the
regiments belonging to the northern part of New England would be
averse to crossing the Hudson River, and would prefer a service more
advantageous to their own country.~[8] We should find at Boston cannon
and mortars. Others, if necessary, might be sent from Springfield, and
the corps of American artillery is tolerably good.
The enemy would suspect our designs the less, as their ideas run wholly
upon an invasion of Canada; the movements of the militia in the north
would be considered as a plan for uniting with us at Sorel, near the
River St. Francis, as we ascended the St. Lawrence: this opinion, which,
with a little address, might be strengthened, would awaken apprehensions
and excite disturbances at Quebec;~[9] and if a vessel of war should by
chance be at Halifax ready for sea, they would probably despatch it to
the threatened colony.
I have never seen the town of Halifax, but those persons who, before
the war, were in the English service, and had spent most of the time in
garrison, inform me that the great point is, to force to the right
and left the passage of George's Island, and that a landing might be
effected without difficulty, either on the side towards the eastern
battery, in order to seize that battery and Fort Sackville, or, which
appears to be a shorter way, on the side towards the town. The northern
suburb, where the magazines are, is but slightly defended. The basin,
where vessels are repaired, might also be secured. Several officers,
worthy of confidence, have assured me, that Halifax is built in the form
as of an amphitheatre; that all the houses might be cannonaded by the
vessels that had forced the passage, and in that case, the town would
compel the garrison to surrender. As the troops might destroy all the
works on the shore, and the vessels of war easily carry the batteries on
the islands, I am well persuaded, and the accounts of all who have been
there convince me still more, that Halifax would be unable to withstand
the united power of our forces and those of America.~[10]
The idea of a revolution in Canada is gratifying to all good Frenchmen;
and if political considerations condemn it, you will perceive that
this is to be done only by suppressing every impulse of feeling. The
advantages and disadvantages of this scheme demand a full discussion,
into which I will not at present enter. Is it better to leave in the
neighbourhood of the Americans an English colony, the constant source
of fear and jealousy, or to free our oppressed brethren, recover the fur
trade, our intercourse with the Indians, and the profit of our ancient
establishments, with out the expenses and losses formerly attending
them? Shall we throw into the balance of the new world a fourteenth
state, which would be always attached to us, and which, by its
situation, would give us a superiority in the troubles that may, at
some future day, agitate America? Opinions are very much divided on
this topic. I know yours, and my own is not unknown to you; I do not,
therefore, dwell on it, and consider it in no other light than as a
means of deceiving and embarrassing the enemy. If, however, it should
at any time be brought under consideration, it would be necessary to
prepare the people beforehand; and the knowledge which I was obliged to
obtain when a whole army was about to enter that country has enabled me
to form some idea of the means of succeeding there But to return to Nova
Scotia: part of the American troops, who will accompany us, and such of
the inhabitants as take up arms in our favour, might be left there as a
garrison. It would be easy to destroy or take possession of the English
establishments on the banks of Newfoundland, and after this movement we
should direct our course according to circumstances. Supposing that we
could return to Boston or Rhode Island during the month of September,
and that New York had not yet been taken, we might still be enabled to
assist General Washington. Otherwise St. Augustine, the Bermudas, or
some other favourable points of attack, might engage our attention; on
the other hand, if we should be ordered home, we might reach France in
three weeks or a month from the banks of Newfoundland, and alarm the
coasts of Ireland on our way.
If the September plan, which combines all advantages, appears too near
at hand, if it were decided even not to send us in October, it would be
necessary to delay our departure until the end of January. In this case,
as in the former, we should be preceded fifteen days only by corvettes;
we should pass the month of April in the south, attack Rhode Island to
May, and arrive at Halifax the last of June. But you are aware that the
autumn is, on many accounts, the most favourable time for our departure;
at all events, you will not accuse me of favouring this opinion from
interested motives, as a winter at Boston or Newport is far from
equivalent to one spent at Paris.~[11]
These views, in obedience to your request, I have the honour to submit
to your judgment; I do not affect to give them the form of a
regular plan, but you will weigh the different schemes according to
circumstances. I trust that you will receive these remarks with the
greater indulgence, as my American papers, those respecting Halifax
excepted, are at Paris, and, consequently, almost all my references are
made from memory; beside, I did not wish to annoy you with details too
long for a letter, and if you are desirous to converse more freely on
the subject, the impossibility of leaving the port of Havre, at present,
will allow me time to spend three days at Versailles.
I am thoroughly convinced, and I cannot, without violating my
conscience, forbear repeating, that it is highly important for us to
send a body to America. If the United States should object to it, I
think it is our duty to remove their objections, and even to suggest
reasons for it. But on this head you will be anticipated, and Dr.
Franklin is only waiting a favorable occasion to make the propositions.
Even if the operations of the present campaign, with the efforts of
Count d'Estaing or some other fortunate accident should have given
affairs a favorable turn, there will be a sufficient field for us, and
one alone of the, proposed advantages would repay the trouble of sending
the detachment.
A very important point, and one on which I feel obliged to lay the
greatest stress, is the necessity of perfect and inviolable secrecy.
It is unnecessary to trust any person, and even the men who are most
actively employed in fitting out the detachment and the vessel need not
be informed of the precise intentions of government. At farthest, the
secret should be confided to the naval commander, and to the leader of
the land forces, and not even to them before the last moment.
It will certainly be said that the French will be coldly received in
that country, and regarded with a jealous eye in their army. I cannot
deny that the Americans are difficult to be dealt with, especially by
the Frenchmen; but if I were intrusted with the business, or if the
commander chosen by the king, acts with tolerable judgment, I would
pledge my life that all difficulties would be avoided, and that the
French troops would be cordially received.
For my own part, you know my sentiments, and you will never doubt that
my first interest is to serve my country. I hope, for the sake of the
public good, that you will send troops to America. I shall be considered
too young, I presume, to take the command, but I shall surely be
employed. If, in the arrangement of this plan, any one, to whom my
sentiments are less known than to yourself, in proposing for me either
the command or some inferior commission, should assign as a reason, that
I should thereby be induced to serve my country with more zeal either in
council or in action, I took the liberty (putting aside the minister of
the king) to request M. de Vergennes to come forward as my friend, and
to refuse, in my name, favors bestowed from motives so inconsistent with
my character.
I have the honor to be, &c.
LAFAYETTE.
Footnotes:
1. I hear that you have, at Lorient, three vessels of the India company,
of forty guns and eight hundred tons. These caracks, if I recollect
rightly, are fifty-gun ships, of nine hundred and sixty tons all number
of vessels would be sufficient; they might soon be got ready, and their
force would diminish the required escort. As for frigates, you will
find in readiness, at Lorient, the _Alliance_, the _Pallas_, and others.
However, if you are determined to employ the vessels which are fitted
out, in the expedition against England, it would be necessary to take
ours from St. Malo in preference. (Note from M. de Lafayette.)
2. Virginia and Carolina would be the scene of our operations during the
months of December and January, and we should pass the remainder of the
winter at Boston. I greatly prefer this project to waiting until the
last of January.
3. To deceive the enemy, pilots might be assembled from different parts,
under pretence of sending them to the Islands, at the request of the
French. This business, as well as the preparations and signals, might
be entrusted to a lieutenant-colonel of the royal corps of engineers, an
officer of great merit at the head of the American corps of engineers,
who, under cover of working to the fortifications of the Delaware, might
remain near Sandy Hook.
4. The frigates or vessels necessary to protect the landing, either real
or pretended, of the Americans, should anchor in those channels. The
enemy would then be obliged either to disperse among the forts, and
thereby to weaken their lines, or else to leave the field open to the
Americans, who, by a diversion upon the lines, would force the enemy to
have them fully manned, and prevent them attending to their rear.
5. It is necessary, however, to consider all the unfortunate
contingencies that may occur. If the expedition to Rhode Island
should be prevented, or if it should not succeed, or if nothing can
be attempted at New York, we ought then to proceed on our expeditions
against Virginia, or Georgia, or Carolina, and winter afterwards at
Boston, leaving Rhode Island to the next season, as proposed in our plan
of sailing in the month of October.
6. If the capture of the Bermudas, or some expedition of the kind,
should be considered necessary, the rest of the winter might be employed
in carrying it into effect.
7. The last time I was at Boston, I saw there a respectable man, a
member of the council in Nova Scotia, who had secretly entered into
the service of General Gates, and who assured us of the favourable
disposition of the inhabitants.
8. General Gates, who is popular in New England, and perfectly
acquainted with Halifax, has often proposed to make an expedition, in
concert, against that town, with French and American troops combined.
9. In the present harassed state of the English, I doubt if they will
have in port any vessel capable of joining the squadron.
10. I have not made any allowance for the diversion in the north, of
which, however, I feel certain, and if the troops should not go to
Annapolis, would, at least, compel a part of the British garrison, and
such of the inhabitants as adhered to the royal party, to remain in the
fort.
11. Fifteen hundred or two thousand select troops thrown into America
might aid General Washington, and enable him to act on the offensive, by
supplying him with good heads to his columns, and by uniting the French
with an American division for combined operations. This plan would be of
some use, but it appeared to me that you wished for one offering results
of greater importance.