would be very sorry to think this is my last letter. Accept however once
more the homage of the respect and of the affection that render me for
ever--
LAFAYETTE.
APPENDIX I.
A SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1781,
TO SERVE AS EXPLANATION TO THE MAP.
After the combat of MM. Destouches and Arbuthnot, the project on
Portsmouth was abandoned: the French sailed for Rhode Island; the
militia were dismissed, the regular troops proceeded to the north.
Arnold was afterwards reinforced by Major-general Phillips, and the
conquest of Virginia became the true object of the English during this
campaign. The allied army, under the Generals Washington and Rochambeau,
proceeded towards New York; that of General Greene attacked the posts
which had been left in Carolina, both about five hundred miles from
Richmond: Major-general the Marquis de Lafayette was charged with
defending Virginia.
_April_ and _May_.--From preparations made at Portsmouth, he conceives
that the capital was the proposed aim; a forced march of his corps
from Baltimore to Richmond, about two hundred miles; he arrives in the
evening of the 29th of April; the enemy had reached Osborn; the small
corps of militia assemble in the night at Richmond; the next morning the
enemy at Manchester, seeing themselves forestalled, re-embark at Bermuda
Hundred, and re-descend James River.
The Americans at Bottom's Bridge, a detached corps in Williamsburg;
General Phillips receives an _aviso_, and re-ascends the river, landing
at Brandon; second reinforcement from New York; Lord Cornwallis, who
was reported to have embarked at Charlestown, advances through North
Carolina.
The Americans at Osborn, to establish a communication on James and
Appomattox, are forestalled by the march of Phillips to Petersburg, the
10th, at Wilton; the 18th, canonading and reconnoitring, on Petersburg,
which, by assembling on one point, the hostile parties permit a convoy
to file off for Carolina; the 20th, at Richmond; junction of Lord
Cornwallis with the troops of Petersburg; the great disproportion of the
American corps, the impossibility of commanding the navigable rivers,
and the necessity of keeping the important side of James River, do not
allow any opposition.
Having sent a portion of the troops to Portsmouth, Lieutenant-general
Lord Cornwallis selected for himself an army of about five thousand men,
three hundred dragoons, and three hundred light horsemen; crosses to
Westover. The Americans had only about three thousand men, formed of one
thousand two hundred regulars, fifty dragoons, and two thousand militia.
All the important forces had evacuated Richmond; our troops at Wintson's
Bridge; a rapid march of the two corps, the enemies to engage an action,
the Americans to avoid it, and retain the heights of the country with
the communication of Philadelphia, which is equally necessary to our
army and to the existence of that of Carolina.
_June_.--The magazines of Fredericksburg are evacuated; the Americans at
Mattapony Church; the enemy at Chesterfield Tavern; heavy rains, which
will render the Rapid Ann impassable; Lord Cornwallis marches to engage
the front; our troops hasten their march, and repair to Racoon Ford, to
await General Wayne, with a regular corps of Pennsylvanians.
Despairing of being able to engage in action, or cut off the
communication between Wayne and Philadelphia, Lord Cornwallis changes
his own purpose,and endeavours to defeat that of the Americans; he
suddenly directs his movements against the great magazines of Albemarle
Court House; a detachment of dragoons strives to carry off the Assembly
of State at Charlottesville, but does not accomplish this end; another
detachment bore upon Point-of-Fork, where General Steuben formed six or
seven hundred recruits; he evacuated that point, and thought he ought to
retire in the direction of Carolina; some objects of slight importance
are destroyed. The passage of the Rapid Ann was necessary, to
avoid being embarrassed by Lord Cornwallis; the communication with
Philadelphia was indispensable. It was impossible to hope, even by
fighting, to prevent the destruction of the magazines before the
junction with the Pennsylvanians. Lafayette takes, therefore, the
resolution of waiting for them, and, as soon as they arrive, regains the
enemy with forced marches.
The 12th, the Americans at Boswell's Tavern; Lord Cornwallis has reached
Elk Island. The common road, which it is necessary for him to cross to
place himself above the enemy, passes at the head of Bird's Creek; Lord
Cornwallis carries thither, his advance-guard, and expects to fall upon
our rear; the Americans repair, during the night, a road but little
known, and, concealing their march, take a position at Mechunck Creek,
where, according to the orders given, they are joined by six hundred
mountaineers. The English general, seeing the magazines covered, retires
to Richmond, and is followed by our army.
Various manoeuvres of the two armies; the Americans are rejoined by
General Steuben, with his recruits; their force then consists of
two thousand regulars, and three thousand two hundred militia. Lord
Cornwallis thinks he must evacuate Richmond; the 20th, the Marquis de
Lafayette follows him, and retains a posture of defence, seeking to
manoeuvre, and avoiding a battle. The enemy retires on Williamsburg, six
miles from that town; their rear-guard is attacked in an advantageous
manner by our advanced corps under Colonel Butler. Station taken by the
Americans at one march from Williamsburg.
_July_.--Various movements, which end by the evacuation of Williamsburg;
the enemy at Jamestown. Our army advances upon them; the 6th, a sharp
conflict between the hostile army and our advance-guard under General
Wayne, in front of Green Spring: two pieces of cannon remain in their
hands; but their progress is arrested by a reinforcement of light
infantry; the same night they retire upon James Island, afterwards to
Cobham, on the other side of James River, and from thence to their works
at Portsmouth.
Colonel Tarleton is detached into Amelia County; the generals Morgan and
Wayne march to cut him off; he abandons his project, burns his wagons,
and retires with precipitation. The enemy remaining in Portsmouth, the
American army takes a healthy station upon Malvan Hill, and reposes
after all its labour.
_August_.--The Americans refusing to descend in front of Portsmouth, a
portion of the English army embarks and proceeds by water to Yorktown
and Gloucester. General Lafayette takes a position at the Fork of
Pamunkey and Mattapony River, having a detached corps upon both sides
of York River. The Pennsylvanians and some new levies receive orders to
remain on James River, and think them selves intended for Carolina. An
assembly of militia on Moratie or Roanoke River; the fords and roads
south of James River destroyed on various pretence; movements to occupy
the attention of the enemy. As in the event prepared by Lafayette, the
means of escape would remain to the garrison of Portsmouth, Lafayette
threatened that point. General O'Hara thinks he ought to nail up thirty
pieces of cannon, and join the largest part of the army. The whole was
scarcely united, when the Count de Grasse appears at the entrance of
Chesapeak Bay. General Wayne crosses the river, and places himself in
such a manner as to arrest the enemy's march, if he should attempt to
retreat towards Carolina. The French admiral is waited for at Cape
Henry by an aide-de-camp of Lafayette, to report to him the respective
situations of the land troops, and ask him to make the necessary
movements to cut off all retreat to the enemy. He anchors at Cape Henry,
sends three vessels to York River, and fills James River with frigates;
the Marquis de Saint Simon, with three thousand men, lands at James
Island or Jamestown.
_September_.--The river thus defended, General Wayne receives the order
to cross it; the Marquis de Lafayette marches upon Williamsburg, and
assembles together, in a good position, the combined troops, to the
number of seven thousand three hundred men. He had left one thousand
rive hundred militia in the county of Gloucester, and sends to hasten
some troops coming from the north. This station, which closes all
retreat to Lord Cornwallis, (our advance posts nine miles from York,)
is retained from the 4th to the 28th of September. Lord Cornwallis
reconnoitres the position of Lafayette, and despairs of forcing it.
The 6th September, the Count de Grasse, quitting the defended rivers,
goes out with the remainder of his fleet, pursues Admiral Hood, who
had presented himself, beats him, and sinks the _Terror_; he takes the
_Iris_ and _Richmond_ frigates; the 13th, he joins, in the bay, the
squadron of M. de Barras, which had sailed from Rhode Island, with eight
hundred men and the French artillery: the fleet of the Count de Grasse
consists, at this period, of thirty eight ships of the line.
Admiral de Grasse and General Saint Simon, commanders of the French
under Lafayette, urge him to attack Lord Cornwallis and offer him a
reinforcement from the ship garrisons. He prefers acting on more secure
grounds, and waiting for the troops from the north. General Washington
succeeded in reality, in completely deceiving General Clinton as to
his intentions; he was advancing towards Virginia with an American
detachment, and the army of the Count de Rochambeau embarked at the head
of the Chesapeak; they proceeded upon transports, to Williamsburg.
The 28th, they march upon New York, and the combined army commences
investing it; the 29th, reconnoitring the place; the 30th, the enemy
evacuates the advance posts, and retires into the works of York.
_October_.--The 1st, a new reconnoitre; the 3rd, a skirmish between the
legion of the Duke of Lauzun and that of Tarleton, in which the former
gained the advantage. That legion and eight hundred men from the ships
under M. de Choisy, had joined the militia at Gloucester. The night
of the 6th, the trenches were opened; that of the 11th, the second
parallel. The night of the 14th, the redoubts of the enemy's left
were taken, sword in hand, the one by the grenadiers and French light
horsemen, the other by the light infantrymen of the Americans. The
first directed by the Baron de Viomenil, a field-marshal; the 2nd by the
Marquis de Lafayette. The morning of the 17th, Lord Cornwallis asked
to capitulate; that same evening the firing ceased. The English Army,
reduced to eight thousand men, comprising 900 militia gave themselves as
prisoners of war.
APPENDIX II.
TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Havre, 18th July, 1779.
SIR,--You ask me for some ideas respecting an expedition to America. As
it is not a fixed plan which you require, nor a memorial addressed
in form to the ministry, it will be the more easy to comply with your
wishes.
The state of America, and the new measures which the British appear to
be adopting, render this expedition more than ever necessary. Deserted
coasts, ruined ports, commerce checked, fortified posts whence
expeditions are sent, all seem to call for our assistance, both by sea
and land. The smallest effort made now, would have more effect on the
people than a great diversion at a more distant period; but besides the
gratitude of the Americans, and particularly of the oppressed states, a
body of troops would insure us a great superiority on that continent.
In short, sir, without entering into tedious details, you know that
my opinions on this point have never varied, and my knowledge of this
country convinces me, that such an expedition, if well conducted, would
not only succeed in America, but would be of very essential service to
our own country.
Besides the advantage of gaining the affection of the Americans, and
that of concluding a good peace, France should seek to curtail the means
of approaching vengeance. On this account it is extremely important to
take Halifax; but as we should require foreign aid, this enterprise must
be preceded by services rendered to different parts of the continent; we
should then receive assistance, and, under pretext of invading Canada,
we should endeavour to seize Halifax, the magazine and bulwark of the
British navy in the new world.
Well aware that a proposition on a large scale would not be acceded to,
I will diminish, as much as possible, the necessary number of troops.
I will say four thousand men, a thousand of them to be grenadiers and
chasseurs; to whom I will add two hundred dragoons and one hundred
hussars, with the requisite artillery. The infantry should be divided
into full battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels. If commissions
of higher rank should be desired for the older officers, you are aware
that the minister of marine has it in his power to bestow such, as
when the expedition returns to Europe, will have no value in the land
service. We want officers who can deny themselves, live frugally,
abstain from all airs, especially a quick, peremptory manner, and who
can relinquish, for one year, the pleasures of Paris. Consequently we
ought to have few colonels and courtiers, whose habits are in no respect
American.
I would ask, then, for four thousand three hundred men, and, as I am
not writing to the ministry, allow me, for greater ease in speaking, to
suppose myself for a moment the commander of this detachment. You are
sufficiently acquainted with my principles to know that I shall not
court the choice of the king. Although I have commanded, with some
success, a larger body of troops, and I frankly confess I feel myself
capable of leading them, yet my intention is not to put forth my own
claims; but to answer for the actions of a stranger would be a folly,
and as, setting talents apart, it is on the political conduct of the
leader, the confidence of the people and of the American army, that
half the success must depend, I am obliged, reluctantly, to set forth
a character that I know, in order to establish my reasonings upon some
basis.
Leaving this digression, I come to the embarkation of these four
thousand three hundred men. As the coasts of Normandy and Brittany have
been much harassed, I should propose sailing from the Island of Aix;
troops and provisions might be obtained in the vicinity. The ports
between Lorient and the channel would furnish transport vessels.~[1]
Lorient has some merchant ships of a pretty large burthen. The caracks
of the channel are still larger, and these vessels have, moreover, guns
of large calibre, which may be of use, either in battle, or in silencing
batteries onshore; besides, they might be ready in a very short time. I
would embark the soldiers, a man to every two tons, and would admit the
dragoons, with their cavalry equipage only. There are many details I
would give if the project be decided upon, but would be superfluous to
mention here. After the experience of Count d'Estaing, who found himself
straitened with biscuit for four months, and flour for two, I would take
the latter, adding biscuit for six months, which would make in all eight
months' provision for the marine and the troops. As to our escort,
that must be decided upon by the marine; but our transports being armed
vessels, three ships of the line, one of fifty guns for the rivers,
three frigates and two cutters, would appear to me to be more than
sufficient. As the expedition is especially a naval one, the commander
of the squadron should be a man of superior abilities; his character,
his patriotism, are important points. I have never seen M. de Guichen,
but the reports I have heard of his worth and modesty prepossess
me strongly in his favour. Being then at the Island of Aix with our
detachment, and the squadron that is to transport it, the next
question is how to act, and our movements must depend entirely upon
circumstances. According to the first project, we were to sail by the
first of September, and by the second to remain here until the last of
January;~[2] it might, however, be possible to sail in October. This
even appears to me better than remaining until the close of January;
but the different operations are included in the other plan. The enemy's
fleet is to be reinforced, and, as we are assured that four or five
weeks' preparation will be sufficient for the transports and the troops,
there is nothing unreasonable in forming our projects for this autumn,
and even for the month of September.
The advantages of commencing our operations in that month would be,
first, to deprive the enemy of Rhode Island; secure to ourselves, till
spring, a fine island and harbour, and have it in our power to open
the campaign when we please. Secondly, to establish our superiority
in America before the winter negotiations. Thirdly, if peace should
be desired, to place an important post in our side of the balance.
Fourthly, in case the enemy should have extended their forces over any
one of the states, to drive them away with the more ease, as we should
take them by surprise.
A few days before our departure, and not sooner (to prevent the
consequences of an indiscretion), three corvettes should be despatched
to America, with letters to M. de Luzerne, to congress, and to General
Washington. We might write that the king, desiring to serve his allies,
and agreeably to the requests of Dr. Franklin, intends sending some
vessels to America, and, with them, a body of land forces; and that, if
congress is in want of their assistance, they will willingly lend
their aid to General Washington, but otherwise they will proceed to the
Islands: This form will be perfectly appropriate. On any part, I would
write, in my capacity of an American officer, more detailed letters
to congress, and to General Washington. To the latter I would say,
confidentially, that we have almost a _carte blanche_, and unfold my
plans, and request him to make the necessary preparations. It should be
reported at our departure that we are destined as a garrison to one of
the Antilles, while the troops of these islands act on the offensive,
and that, in the summer, we shall be ordered to attempt a revolution in
Canada.
The squadron sailing before the 10th of September, would arrive at Sandy
Hook, off the coast of Jersey, early in November, one of the finest
months of the year in independent America. Our fleet would then seem
to threaten New York, and we should find, on our arrival, pilots for
different destinations, and the necessary signals and counter signs.~[3]
If Rhode Island should be the proper point of attack, of which I have
no doubt, we would steer southward towards evening, and, putting about
during the night, land at Block Island, and lay siege to Newport.
There are some continental troops, who might reach Bristol in a day.
There are militia at Tivertown, who might also be mustered. Greenwich
having also a body of troops, must have flat-bottomed boats; those at
Sledge Ferry would be sent down. All these we should find on the spot.
To escape the inconveniences experienced the last year, the naval
commander should send, without a moment's delay, two frigates, to occupy
the eastern channel, and force the middle one, a thing of trifling
danger. The vessels found there should be destroyed; and as the enemy
usually leave at Conanicut Island a body of from six to fifteen hundred
men, we might easily seize it, and make our land rendezvous there. If
the wind should be favourable, the vessels might return the same night,
or the end of the squadron might join them; all these manoeuvres,
however, will depend on circumstances. Thus much is certain, that the
same wind which brings us to land will enable us to make ourselves
masters of the eastern channel, so as to assist the Americans at Bristol
and Tivertown, and, if possible, to secure the middle channel; at
all events, however, it is easy to effect a landing in the manner I
describe.~[4]
Newport is strongly fortified on the side towards the land, but all the
shore that is behind the town offers great facilities for landing; it
is, besides, too extensive to admit of being defended by batteries.
There the French troops might easily disembark, and, reaching at
day-break the heights which command the town and the enemy's lines,
might seize their outworks and storm all before there, protected, if
necessary, by the fire of the ships. The enemy, scattered and confounded
by these false attacks on both sides of the island, would suppose that
the system of the past year was re-adopted. The bolder this manoeuvre
appears, the more confident we may be of its success.
You are aware, moreover, that in war all depends on the moment; the
details of the attack would be quickly decided on the spot. I need only
say here, that my thorough knowledge of the island leads me to think
that, with the above mentioned number of troops, and a very slender
co-operation on the part of America, I might pledge myself to gain
possession of the island in a few days.~[5]
As soon as we are in possession of the island, we must write to the
state of Rhode Island, offering to resign the place to the national
troops. Unless the state should prefer waiting for the opinion of
General Washington, our offer would be accepted, and we should be
invited to establish ourselves there during the winter. The batteries
upon Goat Island, Brenton's Point and Conanicut Island, would render the
passage of the harbour the more secure to us, particularly with the aid
of our vessels, as the British are not strong enough to attack us there,
and would never attempt it in an unfavourable season. We should be
supported by the country, and although it is said to be difficult to
procure provisions, I should endeavour to preserve our naval stores, and
should obtain more resources than the American army itself.
The same letter that announces to congress our success in Rhode Island,
of which, as far as calculations may be relied on, there is little
doubt, should also mention our proposed voyage to the West Indies, and
inquire whether, our assistance is further needed. Their reply would
open to new fields of service, and, with their consent, we would leave
the sick in a hospital at Greenwich, and the batteries manned by
the militia, and proceed to Virginia. It might be hoped, without
presumption, that James River Point, if still occupied, would yield to
the united efforts of our troops and those of the Virginians. The bay of
Chesapeak would then be free, and that state might bend its whole force
against its western frontiers.~[6]
It is impossible to estimate here the posts which the British occupy
in America. Georgia and Carolina appear to need our assistance, and the
precise operation against Rhode Island must be decided on the spot;
but to give a general idea, it is sufficient to say that the months of
December and January should be employed at the south. As the English are
obliged to station some of their vessels, frigates, merchant ships, or
transports, in each of their ports, they would amount in the whole to a
considerable loss.
In the month of February we would return to Newport, where we might
employ ourselves in interchanges with New York; and the French sailors,
exchanged for soldiers, might be sent under a flag of truce to M.
d'Orvillers. Political interests might be treated of with congress, and
the commander of the detachment go to Philadelphia to make arrangements
with the minister plenipotentiary for the next campaign, and to lay
some proposals before congress and General Washington. I should propose
sending for deputies from the different savage nations, making them
presents, endeavouring to gain them over from the side of the English,
and to revive in their hearts that ancient love of the French nation
which, at some future day, it may be important for us to possess.
It is needless to say here, that if we should wait until the month of
October, the season would be too far advanced to think of Rhode Island,
but the southern operations would be equally practicable, and their
success more certain, as we should take the enemy by surprise.