_Effects of Buonaparte's Government of France._
Ce qu'il y a de pis c'est le mécontentement général, et la pauvreté
universelle. Cette malheureuse révolution et ces suites ont ruiné le
pays, de fond en comble. Tout le monde est pauvre, et, ce qui est pis,
leurs institutions empêchent qu'aucune famille devienne riche et
puissante. Tous doivent donc nécessairement viser à remplir des emplois
publics, non, comme autrefois, pour l'honneur de les remplir, mais pour
avoir de quoi vivre. Tout le monde donc cherche de l'emploi public.
Buonaparte laissa une armée de million d'hommes en France, outres les
officiers prisonniers en Angleterre et en Russie. Le roi ne peut pas en
maintenir le quart. Tous ceux non employées sont mécontens. Buonaparte
gouvernait directement la moitié de l'Europe, et indirectement presque
l'autre moitié. Pour des causes à présent bien develloppées et connues,
il employait une quantité infinie de personnes dans ses administrations;
et tous ceux employés, ou dans les administrations extérieures, civiles,
ou dans les administrations militaires des armées, sont renvoyés, et
beaucoup des ceux employés dans les administrations intérieures; à cette
classe nombreuse ajouter la quantité d'émigrés, et de personnes rentrés,
tous mourant de faim, et tous convoitant de l'emploi public afin de
pouvoir vivre, et vous trouverez que plus des trois quarts de la classe
de la société, non employée à la main d'oeuvre ou à labourer la terre,
sont en état d'indigence, et, par conséquence, mécontens. Si vous
considerez bien ce tableau, qui est la stricte vérité, vous y verrez la
cause et la nature du danger du jour. L'armée les officiers, sourtout,
sont mécontens. Ils le sont pour plusieurs raisons inutiles à detailler
ici, mais ce mécontentement pourra ce vaincre en adoptant des mesures
sages pour améliorer l'esprit.
_Letter to Doumouriex, November 26, 1814._
* * * * *
_Re-establishment of the Bourbons necessary to the Peace of Europe._
I have frequently told your highness, and every day's experience shews
me that I am right, that the only chance of peace for Europe consists in
the establishment in France of the legitimate Bourbons. The
establishment of any other government, whether in the person of----, or
in a regency in the name of young Napoleon, or in any other individual,
or in a republic, must lead to the maintenance of large military
establishments, to the ruin of all the governments of Europe, till it
shall suit the convenience of the French government to commence a
contest which can be directed only against you, or others for whom we
are interested. In this contest we shall feel the additional difficulty,
that those who are now on our side will then be against us, and you will
again find yourself surrounded by enemies. I am convinced that the
penetration of your highness will have shewn you the danger of all these
schemes to the interests of the emperor, and that you will defeat them
all by adhering to that line of conduct (in which you will find us
likewise) which will finally lead to the establishment in France of the
legitimate government, from which alone can Europe expect any genuine
peace.
_May 20, 1815._
* * * * *
_Effects of Waterloo._
I may be wrong, but my opinion is, that we have given Napoleon his
death-blow: from all I hear, his army is totally destroyed, the men are
deserting in parties, even the generals are withdrawing from him. The
infantry throw away their arms, and the cavalry and artillery sell their
horses to the people of the country, and desert to their homes. Allowing
for much exaggeration in this account, and knowing that Buonaparte can
still collect, in addition to what he has brought back with him, the 5th
corps d'armée, under Rapp, which is near Strasbourg, and the 3rd corps,
which was at Wavre during the battle, and has not suffered so much as
the others, and probably some troops from La Vendée, I am still of
opinion that he can make no head against us--qu'il n'a qu'à se pendre.
_June 23, 1815._
* * * * *
Some of the regiments (the new ones I mean) are reduced to nothing; but
I must keep them as regiments, to the great inconvenience of the
service, at great expense; or I must send them home, and part with the
few British soldiers I have.
I never was so disgusted with any concern as I am with this; and I only
hope that I am going the right way to bring it to an early determination
some way or other.
_June 25, 1815._
* * * * *
_Waterloo described to a Soldier._
Notre Bataille du 18 a été une de géans; et notre succès a été complet,
comme vous voyez. Que Dieu me favorise assez pour que je n'en aie plus,
parceque je suis désolé de la perte de mes anciens amis et comrades.
Mon voisin et collaborateur (Blücher) est en bonne santé quoique un peu
souffrant d'une chute qu'il a faite d'un cheval blessé sous lui dans la
bataille du 16.
_Letter to Doumouriex, June 26, 1815._
* * * * *
_If Buonaparte is to be put to Death, he will not be his Executioneer._
General----has been here this day to negociate for Napoleon's passing
to America, to which proposition I have answered, that I have no
authority. The Prussians think the Jacobins wish to give him over to me,
believing that I will save his life.---- wishes to kill him; but I have
told him I shall remonstrate, and shall insist upon his being disposed
of by common accord. I have likewise said that, as a private friend, I
advised him to have nothing to do with so foul a transaction; and that
he and I had acted too distinguished parts in these transactions to
become executioners, and that I was determined that, if the sovereigns
wished to put him to death, they should appoint an executioner, which
should not be me.
_June 26, 1815._
* * * * *
_The "Pounding Match."_
You will have heard of our battle of the 18th. Never did I see such a
pounding match. Both were what the boxers call "gluttons." Napoleon did
not manoeuvre at all. He just moved forward in the old style, in
columns, and was driven off in the old style. The only difference was
that he mixed cavalry with his infantry, and supported both with an
enormous quantity of artillery.
I had the infantry for some time in squares, and we had the French
cavalry walking about as if they had been our own. I never saw the
British infantry behave so well.
_Letter to Marshal Beresford, July 9, 1815._
* * * * *
_Blucher's Vandalism averted._
To Marshal Prince Blucher.--Several reports have been brought to me
during the evening and night, and some from the government, in
consequence of the work carrying on by your highness on one of the
bridges over the Seine, which it is supposed to be your intention to
destroy.
As this measure will certainly create a good deal of disturbance in the
town, and as the sovereigns when they were here before, left all these
bridges, &c., standing, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to delay
the destruction of the bridge, at least till they should arrive; or, at
all events, till I can have the pleasure of seeing you to-morrow
morning.
_July 8, 1815._
* * * * *
The destruction of the bridge of Jena is highly disagreeable to the king
and to the people, and may occasion disturbance in the city. It is not
merely a military measure, but is one likely to attach to the character
of our operations, and is of political importance. It is adopted solely
because the bridge is considered as a monument of the battle of Jena,
notwithstanding that the government are willing to change the name of
the bridge. Considering the bridge as a monument, I beg leave to suggest
that its immediate destruction is inconsistent with the promise made to
the commissioners on behalf of the part of the army, during the
negociation of the convention, viz., that the monuments, museums, &c.,
should be reserved for the decision of the allied sovereigns.
All that I ask is, that the execution of the orders given for the
destruction of the bridge may be suspended till the sovereigns shall
arrive here, when, if it should be agreed by common accord that the
bridge ought to be destroyed, I shall have no objection.
_July 9, 1815._[8]
[Footnote 8: The Duke rarely writes or speaks twice, when once will do.
On this occasion he was anxious; and--successful.]
* * * * *
_Summary Justice._
To the Sous-Préfet de Pontoise.--J'ai ordonné qu'on vous fasse
prisonnier, parceque, ayant envoyé une réquisition à Pontoise pour des
vivres, vous avez répondu que vous ne les donneriez pas, sans qu'on
envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre.
Vous vous êtes mis dans les cas des militaires, et je vous fais
prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre.
Si je vous traitais comme l'usurpateur et ses adherens ont traité les
habitans des pays ou ils ont fait la guerre, je vous ferais fusiller;
mais, comme vous vous êtes constitué guerrier, je vous fais prisonnier
de guerre.
_July 13, 1815._
* * * * *
_Characteristic Letter to Marshal Beresford_.
The battle of Waterloo was certainly the hardest fought that has been
for many years, I believe, and has placed in the power of the allies the
most important results. We are throwing them away, however, by the
infamous conduct of some of us; and I am sorry to add that our own
government also are taking up a little too much the tone of their
rascally newspapers. They are shifting their objects; and, having got
their cake, they want both to eat it and keep it.
As for your Portuguese concerns, I recommend you to resign, and come
away immediately. It is impossible for the British government to
maintain British officers for the Portuguese army, at an expense even so
trifling as it is, if the Portuguese government are to refuse to give
the service of the army in the cause of Europe in any manner. Pitch them
to the devil, then, in the mode which will be most dignified to
yourself, and that which will have the best effect in opening the
prince's eyes to the conduct of his servants in Portugal; and let the
matter work its own way. Depend upon it, the British government must and
will recall the British officers.
_August 7, 1815._
* * * * *