_The Battle of Vimeiro._
The action of Vimeiro is the only one I have ever been in (1808), in
which everything passed as was directed, and no mistake was made by any
of the officers charged with its conduct.
_Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1806._
* * * * *
_Distinction between Civil and Military Responsibility._
There is a great distinction of duty between military and civil inferior
situations. If, in a civil officer, the inferior differs materially from
the superior, he ought to resign, but in military appointments, it is
the duty of the inferior officer to assist his commander in the mode in
which that commander may deem his services most advantageous.
_Defence of his conduct with regard to the Convention of Cintra. House
of Commons, Feb. 21, 1809._
* * * * *
_Rapidity of the French Retreats accounted for._
It is obvious, that if an army throws away all its cannon, equipments,
and baggage, and everything which can strengthen it, and can enable it
to act together as a body; and abandons all those who are entitled to
its protection, but add to its weight and impede its progress;[4] it
must be able to march by roads through which it cannot be followed, with
any prospect of being overtaken by an army which has not made the same
sacrifice.
[Footnote 4: Alluding to the rapidity of the French retreat.]
_Dispatch, May 18, 1809._
* * * * *
I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither
success nor failure.[5]
[Footnote 5: Referring to their habits of plunder.]
_Dispatch, May 31, 1809._
* * * * *
_Inefficiency of Spanish Officers._
Nothing can be worse than the officers of the Spanish army, and it is
extraordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this
nation has by the measures which it has adopted in the last two years,
so little progress has been made in any one branch of the military
profession by any individual, and that the business of an army should be
so little understood. They are really children in the art of war, and I
cannot say they do anything as it ought to be done, with the exception
of running away, and assembling again in a state of nature.
_Dispatch, Aug. 1809._
* * * * *
_Terrorism and Force, not Enthusiasm, enabled the French Revolutionary
Armies to conquer._
People are very apt to believe that enthusiasm carried the French
through their revolution, and was the parent of those exertions which
have nearly conquered the world; but if the subject is nicely examined,
it will be found that enthusiasm was the name only, but that force was
the instrument which brought forward those great resources under the
system of terror which first stopped the allies; and that a perseverance
in the same system of applying every individual and every description of
property to the service of the army, by force, has since conquered
Europe.
_Dispatch, Aug. 25, 1809._
_The Spaniards and Portuguese want the true spirit of Soldiers._
We are mistaken if we believe that what these Portuguese and Spanish
armies require is discipline, properly so called. They want the habits
and spirit of soldiers--the habits of command on one side, and of
obedience on the other--mutual confidence between officers and men; and
above all, a determination in superiors to obey the spirit of the orders
they receive, let what will be the consequence, and the spirit to tell
the true cause if they do not.
_Dispatch, Sept. 8, 1809._
* * * * *
_Importance of good understanding between Negotiating Parties._
Half the business of the world, particularly that of our country, is
done by accommodation, and by the parties understanding each other, but
when rights are claimed they must be resisted, if there are no grounds
for them; when appeal must be made to higher powers there can be no
accommodation, and much valuable time is lost in reference which ought
to be spent in action.
_Dispatch, Sept. 20, 1809._
* * * * *
_Popular Assemblies unmanageable._
I acknowledge that I have a great dislike to a new popular assembly;
even our own ancient one would be quite unmanageable, and in three days,
would ruin us, if the present generation had not before its eyes the
example of the French revolution; and if there were not certain rules
and orders for its guidance and government, the knowledge and use of
which render safe, and successfully direct, its proceedings.
_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._
* * * * *
_Distracted State of Spain._
I declare that if I were in Buonaparte's situation, I should leave the
English and the Cortes to settle Spain in the best manner they could;
and I should entertain very little doubt but that in a very short space
of time Spain must fall into the hands of France. At the same time I
must agree with you in thinking that affairs are now in so desperate a
situation that they cannot be worse; that there is a real want of men of
common capacity in Spain, in whose hands any form of government,
intended for vigorous action, could be placed with any hope that their
powers could he used to the public advantage; and that the Cortes, with
all their faults, and the dangers attendant upon such an assembly, will
have at least this advantage, that they will have the confidence of the
country, and the prejudices of their countrymen of the lower class in
our favour, and against France; the remark being perfectly well founded,
that there is no prejudice or jealousy of us any where in Spain
excepting by the government.
But in order to enjoy common safety under such an assembly as the
Spanish Cortes, the rules and orders for their proceedings and internal
government ought to be well defined, and to be, if possible, a part of
the constitution of the assembly. Great care should also be taken in
their formation to protect them from the effects of popular fury in the
place of their sitting; but still with all these precautions I should
prefer a wise Bourbon, if we could find one, for a regent, to the
Cortes.
_Dispatch, Sept. 22, 1809._
* * * * *
Whatever may be eventually the fate of Spain, Portugal must be a
military country.
_Dispatch, Sept. 24, 1809._
* * * * *
_Military Value of an Armed and Friendly People._
In respect to the army and armament of the people in Spain and Portugal,
there is no man more aware than I am of the advantage to be derived from
these measures; and if I had not reflected well upon the subject, my
experience of the war in Portugal and in Spain--(in Portugal, where the
people are in some degree armed and arrayed; and in Spain, where they
are not)--would have shewn me the advantage which an army has against
the enemy when the people are armed and arrayed, and are on its side in
the contest. But reflection, and, above all, experience have shewn me
the exact extent of this advantage in a military point of view; and I
only beg that those who have to contend with the French, will not be
diverted from the business of raising, arming, equipping, and training
regular bodies, by any notion that the people, when armed and arrayed,
will be of, I will not say any, but of much use to them.
_Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1809._
* * * * *
_Difficulties in the Peninsular War. The Battle of Talavera._
You will have heard of all that has passed in this country, and I will
not therefore trouble you with a repetition of the story. The battle of
Talevera was certainly the hardest fought of modern days, and the most
glorious in its results to our troops. Each side engaged lost a quarter
of their numbers.
It is lamentable that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the
Spaniards, to their want of exertion, and the deficiency of numbers,
even, of the allies, much more of discipline and every other military
quality, when compared with the enemy in the Peninsula, the glory of the
action is the only benefit we have derived from it. But that is a solid
and substantial benefit, of which we have derived some good consequences
already; for, strange to say, I have contrived with the little British
army to keep everything in check since the month of August last; and if
the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own folly and against my
entreaties and remonstrances, to lose an army in La Mancha about a
fortnight ago, I think we might have brought them through the contest;
as it is, however, I do not despair. I have in hand a most difficult
task, from which I may not extricate myself; but I must not shrink from
it, I command an unanimous army; I draw well with all the authorities in
Spain and Portugal; and I believe I have the good wishes of the whole
world. In such circumstances, one may fail, but it would be
dishonourable to shrink from the task.
_Letter to Col. Malcome, Dec. 3, 1809._
* * * * *
_Buonaparte's System Hollow._
The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must prevent any great
movement on the continent for the present. Still I do not despair of
seeing, at some time or other, a check to the Buonaparte system. Recent
transactions in Holland shew that it is all hollow within; and that it
is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and even the
existence of civilized society, that he cannot trust even his brothers
to carry it into execution.
_Dispatch, April 4, 1810._
* * * * *
_Military Law the will of the General._
Military law, as applied to any persons excepting the officers,
soldiers, and followers of the army, for whose government there are
particular provisions of law in all well regulated countries, is neither
more nor less than the will of the general of the army. He punishes
either with or without trial, for crimes either declared to be so, or
not so declared, by any existing law, or by his own orders. This is the
plain and common meaning of the term military law. Besides the mode of
proceeding above described, laws have been made in different countries
at different times to establish and legalize a description of military
constitution.
The commander-in-chief, or the government, has been authorized to
proceed by military process--that is, by court martial or council of
war--against persons offending against certain laws, or against their
own orders, issued generally for the security of the army; or for the
establishment of a certain government or constitution odious to the
people among whom it is established.
Of both descriptions of military law, there are numerous instances in
the history of the operations of the French army during the revolution;
and there is an instance of the existence both of the first-mentioned
description and of the last-mentioned in Ireland, during the rebellion
of 1798, when the people were in insurrection against the government,
and were to be restrained by force.
_Dispatch, April 19, 1810._
* * * * *
_Letter to a Portuguese of Rank on the Position and Duties of Persons in
his station._
I have received your letter containing a complaint against----, of the
quarter-master general's department, that he had ill-treated one of your
servants, into which I shall make inquiry, and let you know the result.
It is impossible, however, for me to interfere in any manner with a
billet, given by the magistrates of Coimbra, for an officer and his
family to be quartered in your house. I must at the same time inform
you, that I am not a little surprised that a person of your rank and
station, and quality in the country, should object to give accommodation
in your house, and should make a complaint of this officer, that he had
asked you for additional accommodation, when it appears by the letter
which you enclosed, and which I now return, that when you objected to
give him this additional accommodation for which he asked, he acquiesced
in your objection, and did not any longer require this accommodation.
The unfortunate situation in which Portugal is placed, and the desire of
the insatiable enemy of mankind to force this once happy and loyal
people to submit to his iron yoke, to plunder them of their properties
to destroy their religion and to deprive them of their monarch, has
rendered it necessary to collect in this country a large army, in order,
if possible, to defeat and frustrate the designs of the enemy. It is the
duty of those whose age, whose sex, or whose profession, do not permit
them to take an active part in the defence of their country, to assist
those employed in its defence with provisions, lodgings for officers and
troops, means of transport, &c., and at all events not to oppose
themselves to the granting of this description of assistance. These
duties are more particularly incumbent upon the rich and high in
station, who would be the first victims of, and greatest sufferers
from, the enemy's success, unless, indeed, they should be of the number
of those traitors who are aiding to introduce the common enemy into the
country, to destroy its happiness and independence.
Under these circumstances I am not a little astonished to receive these
frivolous and manifestly unfounded complaints from you, and that you
should be the person to set the example of objecting to give quarters to
an officer, because he is married and has children.
It is not very agreeable to anybody to have strangers quartered in his
house; nor is it very agreeable to us strangers, who have good houses in
our own country, to be obliged to seek for quarters here. We are not
here for our pleasure; the situation of your country renders it
necessary: and you, a man of family and fortune, who have much to lose,
should not be the first to complain of the inconvenience of our presence
in the country.
I do everything in my power to alleviate the inconvenience which all
must suffer. We pay extravagant prices with unparalleled punctuality for
everything we receive; and I make it a rule to inquire into and redress
every injury that is really done by the troops under my command, as I
shall that to which I have above referred, of which you complain, in the
conduct of----towards your servant.
_Dispatch, August 23, 1810._
* * * * *
_Croaking Spirit in the British Army in Portugal_.
It appears that you have had a good smart contest with the government
respecting our plan of operations. They will end in forcing me to quit
them, and then they will see how they will get on. They will then find
that I alone keep things in their present state. Indeed the temper of
some of the officers of the British army gives me more concern than the
folly of the Portuguese government. I have always been accustomed to
have the confidence and support of the officers of the armies which I
have commanded; but for the first time, whether owing to the opposition
in England, or whether the magnitude of the concern is too much for
their minds and their nerves, or whether I am mistaken and they are
right, I cannot tell; but there is a system of croaking in the army
which is highly injurious to the public service, and which I must devise
some means to put an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have
a right to form their own opinions upon events and transactions, but
officers of high rank or situation ought to keep their opinions to
themselves; if they do not approve of the system of operations of their
commander, they ought to withdraw from the army. And this is a point to
which I must bring some, if I should not find that their own good sense
prevents them from going on as they have done lately. Believe me that if
any body else, knowing what I do, had commanded the army, they would now
have been in Lisbon, if not, in their ships.
_Dispatch, September 11, 1810._
_Note_--This passage from a letter to the British minister at Lisbon is
one of many, which explain the difficulties Lord Wellington had to
encounter from the Portuguese Government, from the opposition and the
press in England, and from the want of proper military spirit in his own
officers.
_Conduct of the Portuguese._
If we are to go on as we have hitherto; if Great Britain is to give
large subsidies, and to expend large sums in the support of a cause in
which these most interested sit by and take no part; and those at the
head of the government, with laws and power to force the people to
exertion in the critical circumstances in which the country is placed,
are aware of the evil, but neglect their duty and omit to put the laws
into execution, I must believe their professions to be false; that they
look to a little dirty popularity instead of to save their country; that
they are unfaithful servants to their master, and persons in whom his
allies can place no confidence.
_Oct. 28, 1810._
* * * * *
_The National Disease of Spain._
The national disease of Spain, that is, boasting of the strength and
power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced that they
are in no danger, then sitting down quietly and indulging their national
indolence.
_Dec. 2, 1810._
* * * * *
_Apathy of the Portuguese._
There exists in the people of Portugal, an unconquerable love of their
ease, which is superior even to their fear and detestation of the enemy.
Neither will they, or their magistrates, or the government, see that the
temporary indulgence of this passion for tranquillity must occasion the
greatest misfortunes to the state and hardships to the individuals
themselves; and no person in the country likes to have his tranquillity
and habits disturbed for any purpose, however important, or to be the
instrument of disturbing those of others. Thus every arrangement is
defeated, and every order disobeyed with impunity. The magistrate will
not force the inhabitants to adopt a measure, however beneficial to the
state and himself, which will disturb his old habits; and the government
will not force the magistrate to do that which will be disagreeable to
him and to the people: thus we shall go on till the end of time.
_January 3, 1811._
* * * * *
_Takes no Notice of Newspapers._
I hope that the opinions of the people in Great Britain are not
influenced by paragraphs in newspapers, and that those paragraphs do not
convey the public opinion or sentiment upon any subject: therefore I
(who have more reason than any other public man of the present day to
complain of libels of this description) never take the smallest notice
of them; and have never authorized any contradiction to be given, or any
statement to be made in answer to the innumerable falsehoods, and the
heaps of false reasoning, which have been published respecting me and
the operations which I have directed.
_January 7, 1811._
_Indolence of the Natives of the Peninsula._
There is something very extraordinary in the nature of the people of the
Peninsula. I really believe them, those of Portugal particularly, to be
the most loyal and best disposed, and the most cordial haters of the
French, that ever existed; but there is an indolence and a want even of
the power of exertion in their disposition and habits, either for their
own security, that of their country, or of their allies, which baffle
all our calculations and efforts.
_January 16, 1811._
* * * * *
_Different Constitution of the French and English Armies._
It may also be asked why should we spend our money, and why these troops
should not go on as the French troops do, without pay, provisions,
magazines, or any thing? The French army is certainly a wonderful
machine; but if we are to form such a one, we must form such a
government as exists in France, which can with impunity lose one-half of
the troops employed in the field every year, only by the privations and
hardships imposed upon them. Next, we most compose our army of soldiers
drawn from all classes of the population of the country; from the good
and middling, as well as in rank as education, as from the bad; and not
as all other nations do, and we in particular, from the bad only.
Thirdly, we must establish such a system of discipline as the French
have; a system founded on the strength of the tyranny of the government,
which operates upon an army composed of soldiers, the majority of whom
are sober, well disposed, amenable to order, and in some degree
educated.
When we shall have done all this, and shall have made these armies of
the strength of those employed by the French, we may require of them to
live as the French do, viz., by authorised and regular plunder of the
country and its inhabitants, if any should remain; and we may expose
them to the labour, hardships and privations which the French soldier
suffers every day; and we must expect the same proportion of loss every
campaign, viz., one-half of those who take field.
_January 26, 1811._
* * * * *
_Character of the Marques de la Romana._
In him the Spanish army have lost their brightest ornament, his country
their most upright patriot, and the world the most strenuous and zealous
defender of the cause in which we are engaged; and I shall always
acknowledge with gratitude the assistance which I received from him, as
well by his operations as by his counsel, since he had been joined with
this army.
_January 26, 1811._
* * * * *
_None but the worst men enter the Army as Privates._
In respect to recruiting the army, my own opinion is, that the
government have never taken an enlarged view of the subject. It is
expected that people will become soldiers in the line, and leave their
families to starve, when, if they become soldiers in the militia, their
families are provided for. This is an inconsistency that must strike the
mind of even the least reflecting of mankind. What is the consequence?
That none but the worst description of men enter the regular service.
* * * * *
But admitting the truth of the expense, I say that the country has not a
choice between army and no army, between peace or war. They must have a
large and efficient army, one capable of meeting the enemy abroad, or
they must expect to meet him at home; and then farewell to all
considerations of measures of greater or lesser expense, and to the
ease, the luxury, and happiness of England. God forbid that I should see
the day on which hostile armies should contend within the United
Kingdom; but I am very certain that I shall not only see that day, but
shall be a party in the contest, unless we alter our system, and the
public feel in time the real nature of the contest in which we are at
present engaged, and determine to meet its expense. I have gone a little
beyond the question of recruiting; but depend upon it that you will get
men when you provide for the families of soldiers in the line and not in
the militia, and not before.
_January 28, 1811._
_Buonaparte's "disgusting Tyranny."_
I am glad to hear such good accounts of affairs in the North. God send
that they may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting
tyranny: however, of this I am certain, that whether true or not at
present, something of the kind must occur before long, and, if we can
only hold out, we shall yet see the world relieved.
_March 23, 1811._
* * * * *
_A French army in England would be the consequence of our withdrawal
from the Peninsula._
I shall be sorry if government should think themselves under the
necessity of withdrawing from this country, on account of the expense of
the contest. From what I have seen of the objects of the French
government, and the sacrifices they make to accomplish them, I have no
doubt that if the British army were for any reason to withdraw from the
Peninsula, and the French government were relieved from the pressure of
military operations on the Continent, they would incur all risks to land
an army in his majesty's dominions. Then indeed would commence an
expensive contest; then his majesty's subjects discover what are the
miseries of war, of which, by the blessing of God, they have hitherto
had no knowledge; and the cultivation, the beauty, and prosperity of the
country, and the virtue and happiness of its inhabitants, would be
destroyed: whatever might be the result of the military operations; God
forbid that I should be a witness, much less an actor, in the scene.[6]
[Footnote 6: At this time the clamours of the opposition regarding the
expense of the war induced a fear that the government might determine to
discontinue it.]
_March 23, 1811._
* * * * *
_The Peninsular Governments must not mind unpopularity._
I recommend to them (the Spaniards and Portuguese) to advert seriously
to the nature of the task which they have to perform. Popularity,
however desirable it may be to individuals, will not form, or feed, or
pay an army; will not enable it to march and fight; will not keep it in
a state of efficiency for long and arduous services. The resources which
a wise government must find for these objects must be drawn from the
people, not by measures which will render those unpopular who undertake
to govern a country in critical circumstances, but by measures which
must for a moment have a contrary effect. The enthusiasm of the people
in favour of any individual never saved any country. They must be
obliged by the restraint of law and regulation, to do those things and
to pay those contributions, which are to enable the government to carry
on this necessary contest.
_April 9, 1811._
* * * * *
_Coolness in action, not headlong bravery, is required in the Army._
The desire to be forward in engaging the enemy is not uncommon in the
British array; but that quality which I wish to see the officers
possess, who are at the head of the troops, is a cool, discriminating
judgment in action, which will enable them to decide with promptitude
how far they can and ought to go, with propriety; and to convey their
orders, and act with such vigour and decision, that the soldiers will
look up to them with confidence in the moment of action, and obey them
with alacrity.
_May 15, 1811._
* * * * *
_The battle of Albuera one of the most glorious in the War._
You will have heard of the Marshal's (Beresford) action on the 16th. The
fighting was desperate, and the loss of the British has been very
severe; but, adverting to the nature of the contest, and the manner in
which they held their ground against all the efforts the whole French
army could make against them, notwithstanding all the losses which they
had sustained, I think this action one of the most glorious, and
honourable to the character of the troops, of any that has been fought
during the war.
_May 20, 1811._
* * * * *
_Portuguese Troops, better than Spanish._
What a pity it is that the Spaniards will not set to work seriously to
discipline their troops! We do what we please now with the Portuguese
troops; we manoeuvre them under fire equally with our own, and have some
dependence on them; but these Spaniards can do nothing but stand still,
and we consider ourselves fortunate if they do not run away.
_May 25, 1811._
* * * * *
_Disorganized state of the Peninsular Governments._
Those unfortunate governments in the Peninsula have been reduced to such
a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was no authority existing
within Spain or Portugal before the French invaded these countries. The
French invasion did not improve this state of things; and, since what is
called in Spain the revolution, and in Portugal the restoration, no
crime that I know of has been punished in either, excepting that of
being a French partisan. Those malversations in office--those neglects
of duty; the disobedience of orders; the inattention to regulation,
which tend to defeat all plans for military operation, and ruin a state
that is involved in war, more certainly than the plots of all the French
partisans, are passed unnoticed; and, notwithstanding the numerous
complaints which Marshal Beresford and I have made, I do not know that
one individual has yet been punished, or even dismissed from his
office. The cause of this evil is the mistaken principle on which the
government have proceeded. They have imagined that the best foundation
for their power was a low, vulgar popularity; the evidence is the shouts
of the mob of Lisbon, and the regular attendance at their levees, and
the bows and scrapes of people in office, who ought to have other modes
of spending their time; and to obtain this babble the government of
Portugal, as well as the successive governments in Spain, have neglected
to perform those essential duties of all governments, viz., to force
those they are placed over to do their duty, by which, before this time,
these countries would have been out of danger.
The other evil is connected very materially with the first. The
government will not regulate their finances, because it will interfere
with some man's job. They will not lay on new taxes, because in all
countries those who lay on taxes are not favourites with the mob. They
have a general income-tax, called 10 per cent., and, in some cases, 20
per cent., which they have regulated in such a manner as that no
individual, I believe, has paid a hundredth part of what he ought to
have paid. Then, for want of money, they can pay nobody, and, of course,
have not the influence which they ought to have over the subordinate
departments.
In addition to embarrassments of all descriptions surrounding us on all
sides, I have to contend with an ancient enmity between these two
nations, which is more like that of cat and dog than anything else, of
which no sense of common danger, or common interest, or anything, can
get the better, even in individuals.
_June 12, 1811._
To write an anonymous letter is the meanest action of which any man can
be guilty.
_Dispatch, July 3, 1811._
* * * * *
_British Officers, as well at Soldiers, require to be kept in order._
I must also observe that British officers require to be kept in order,
as well as the soldiers under their command, particularly in a foreign
service. The experience which I have had of their conduct in the
Portuguese service has shown me that there must be authority, and that a
strong one, to keep them within due bounds, otherwise they would only
disgust the soldiers over whom they should be placed, the officers whom
they should be destined to assist, and the country in whose service they
should be employed.
_October 1, 1811._
* * * * *
_Money in aid of Labour better than Charity._
That which would be desirable is, if possible, to aid laborious
exertions to procure a subsistence by small advances of money; and I
propose to keep this principle in view in the distribution of the money
entrusted to me, by which not only it will subsist those to whom it will
be given for a longer period, but it may be hoped that the people will
resume their habits of industry, and that they will soon again be able
to provide for their own subsistence.
_Oct. 11, 1811._
_A General Re-action against Buonaparte predicted._
I have, however, long considered it probable, that even _we_ should
witness a general resistance throughout Europe to the fraudulent and
disgusting tyranny of Buonaparte, created by the example of what has
occurred in Spain and Portugal; and that _we_ should be actors and
advisers in these scenes; and I have reflected frequently upon the
measures which should be pursued to give a chance of success.
Those who embark in projects of this description should be made to
understand, or to act as if they understood, that having once drawn the
sword they must not return it, till they shall have completely
accomplished their object. They must be prepared, and must be forced, to
make all sacrifices to the cause. Submission to military discipline and
order is a matter of course; but when a nation determines to resist the
authority, and to shake off the government of Buonaparte, they must be
prepared and forced to sacrifice the luxuries and comforts of life, and
to risk all in a contest, which it should be clearly understood before
it is undertaken, has for its object to save all or nothing.
The first measure for a country to adopt is to form an army, and to
raise a revenue from the people to defray the expense of the army:
above all, to form a government of such strength, as that army and
people can be forced by it to perform their duty. This is the rock upon
which Spain has split; and all our measures in any other country which
should afford hopes of resistance to Buonaparte should be directed to
avoid it. The enthusiasm of the people is very fine, and looks well in
print; but I have never known it to produce any thing but confusion. In
France, what was called enthusiasm was power and tyranny, acting through
the medium of popular societies, which have ended by overturning Europe,
and in establishing the most powerful and dreadful tyranny that ever
existed. In Spain, the enthusiasm of the people spent itself in _vivas_
and vain boasting. The notion of its existence prevented even the
attempt to discipline the armies; and its existence has been alleged,
ever since, as the excuse for the rank ignorance of the officers and the
indiscipline and constant misbehaviour of the troops.
I therefore earnestly recommend you, wherever you go, to trust nothing
to the enthusiasm of the people. Give them a strong and a just, and, if
possible, a good government; but, above all, a strong one, which shall
enforce upon them to do their duty by themselves and their country; and
let measures of finance to support an army go hand in hand with measures
to raise it.
I am quite certain that the finances of Great Britain are more than a
match for Buonaparte, and that we shall have the means of aiding any
country that may be disposed to resist his tyranny. But those means are
necessarily limited in every country by the difficulty of procuring
specie. This necessary article can be obtained in sufficient quantities
only by the contributions of the people; and although Great Britain can
and ought to assist with money, as well as in other modes, every effort
of this description, the principal financial as well as military effort,
ought to be by the people of the resisting country.
_Dec. 10, 1811._
* * * * *
_The French System of Predatory War._
In the early days of the revolutionary war, the French, at the
recommendation, I believe, of Brissot, adopted a measure which they
called a _levée en masse_; and put every man, animal, and article, in
their own country, in requisition for the service of the armies. This
system of plunder was carried into execution by the popular societies
throughout the country. It is not astonishing that a nation, among whom
such a system was established, should have been anxious to carry on the
war beyond their own frontiers. This system both created the desire and
afforded the means of success; and with the war, they carried, wherever
they went, the system of requisition; not, however, before they had, by
these and other revolutionary measures, entirely destroyed all the
sources of national prosperity at home.
Wherever the French armies have since gone, their subsistence, at least,
the most expensive article in all armies, and means of transport, have
been received from the country for nothing. Sometimes, besides
subsistence, they have received clothing and shoes; in other instances,
besides these articles, they have received pay; and from Austria and
Prussia, and other parts of Germany and Italy, they have drawn, besides
all these articles of supply for their troops, heavy contributions in
money for the supply of the treasury at Paris. To this enumeration ought
to be added the plunder acquired by the generals, officers, and troops;
and it will be seen that the new French system of war is the greatest
evil that ever fell on the civilised world.
The capital and industry of France having been destroyed by the
revolution, it is obvious that the government cannot raise a revenue
from the people of France adequate to support the large force which must
be maintained in order to uphold the authority of the new government,
particularly in the newly-conquered or ceded states; and to defend the
widely-extended frontier of France from all those whose interest and
inclination must lead them to attack it. The French government,
therefore, under whatever form administered, must seek for support for
their armies in foreign countries. War must be a financial resource; and
that appears to me to be the greatest misfortune which the French
revolution has entailed upon the present generation.
_Jan. 31, 1812._
* * * * *
I consider the Portuguese troops, next to the British, the best in the
Peninsula.
_May 3, 1812._
* * * * *
It is very difficult to manage the defence of the kingdom of Portugal,
the whole country being frontier.
_June 11, 1812._
_How to establish National Credit._
When a nation is desirous of establishing public credit, or, in other
words, of inducing individuals to confide their property to its
government, they must begin by acquiring a revenue equal to their fixed
expenditure; and they must manifest an inclination to be honest, by
performing their engagements in respect to their debts.
_June 25. 1812._
* * * * *
_The Spaniards cry "Viva!" but don't act._
I do not expect much from the exertions of the Spaniards,
notwithstanding all that we have done for them. They cry _viva!_ and are
very fond of us, and hate the French; but they are, in general, the most
incapable of useful exertion of all the nations that I have ever known;
the most vain, and at the same time the most ignorant, particularly of
military affairs, and above all of military affairs in their own
country.
_August 18, 1812._
* * * * *
_Imbecility of the Spanish Leaders._
It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not have
produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation of the
country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and thinking, and
talking of any other subject but Spain.
_November 1, 1812._
_Evils of uncontrolled popular Legislatures._
The theory of all legislation is founded in justice; and, if we could be
certain that legislative assemblies could on all occasions act according
to the principles of justice, there would be no occasion for those
checks and guards which we have seen established under the best systems.
Unfortunately, however, we have seen that legislative assemblies are
swayed by the fears and passions of individuals; when unchecked, they
are tyrannical and unjust; nay, more, it unfortunately happens too
frequently, that the most tyrannical and unjust measures are the most
popular. Those measures are particularly popular which deprive rich and
powerful individuals of their properties under the pretence of the
public advantage; and I tremble for a country in which, as in Spain,
there is no barrier for the preservation of private property, excepting
the justice of a legislative assembly possessing supreme powers.
_January 29, 1813._
* * * * *
_Ingratitude of the Portuguese to the British Army._
I must say, that the British army, which I have the honour to command,
have met with nothing but ingratitude from the government and
authorities in Portugal for their services; and that everything that
could be done has been done by the civil authorities, lately, to oppress
the officers and soldiers on every occasion in which it has by any
accident been in their power. I hope, however, that we have seen the
last of Portugal.
_July 20, 1813._
* * * * *
Jealousy of the interference of foreigners in their internal concerns,
is the characteristic of all Spaniards.
_July 12, 1813._
* * * * *
Sound sense is better than abilities.
_August 8, 1813._
* * * * *
_Basis of military operations against the United States from the side of
Canada._
Any offensive operation founded upon Canada must be preceded by a naval
superiority on the lakes. But even if we had that superiority, I should
doubt our being able to do more than secure the points on those lakes at
which the Americans could have access. In such countries as America,
very extensive, thinly peopled, and producing but little food in
proportion to their extent, military operations by large bodies are
impracticable, unless the party carrying them on has the uninterrupted
use of a navigable river, or very extensive means of land transport,
which such a country can rarely supply.
I conceive, therefore, that were your army larger even than the proposed
augmentation would make it, you could not quit the lakes; and, indeed,
would be tied to them the more necessarily in proportion as your army
would be large.[7]
[Footnote 7: The letter from the Duke the above is taken was written in
reply to an application by the home government for his opinion. We
frequently find the Duke applied to for his opinion on political matters
at home, while serving in the Peninsula.]
_February 22, 1814._
* * * * *
_The Morale of an Army important to Discipline._
No reliance can be placed on the conduct of troops in action with the
enemy, who have been accustomed to plunder, and those officers alone can
expect to derive honour in the day of battle from the conduct of the
troops under their command, who shall have forced them, by their
attention and exertions, to behave as good soldiers ought in their
cantonments, their quarters, and their camps.
_March 5, 1814._
* * * * *
English officers are very strictly instructed, and those who mean to
serve their country well must obey their instructions, however fearless
they may be of responsibility. Indeed, I attribute this fearlessness
very much to the determination never to disobey, as long as the
circumstances exist under which an order is given.
_April 16, 1814._
* * * * *
_French Feelings about the Slave Trade._
You (Mr. Wilberforce) judge most correctly regarding the state of the
public mind here upon this question. Not only is there no information,
but, because England takes an interest in the question, it is impossible
to convey any through the only channel which would be at all effectual,
viz., the daily press. Nobody reads anything but the newspapers; but it
is impossible to get anything inserted in any French newspaper in Paris
in favour of the abolition, or even to show that the trade was abolished
in England, from motives of humanity. The extracts made from English
newspapers upon this, or any other subject, are selected with a view,
either to turn our principles and conduct into ridicule, or to
exasperate against us still more the people of this country; and
therefore the evil cannot be remedied by good publications in the daily
press in England, with a view to their being copied into the newspapers
here.
* * * * *
I must say that the daily press in England do us a good deal of harm in
this as well as in other questions. We are sure of the king and his
government, if he could rely upon the opinion of his people. But as long
as our press teems with writings drawn with a view of irritating persons
here, we shall never be able to exercise the influence which we ought to
have upon this question, and which we really possess.
_Letter to Mr. Wilberforce, October 8, 1814._
* * * * *
The real power in Spain is in the clergy.
_October 20, 1814._
* * * * *
Les choses neuves, surtout quand elles sont compliquées, ne vont pas
bien.
_Letter to Doumouriex, November 3, 1814._