ITALY AND THE PAPACY, 1273-1313
Italy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries—Causes of Italian
disunion—The Guelfs and Ghibellines—The Italian towns—The House of
Anjou in Naples—The Sicilian Vespers—The Popes and their
States—Celestine V. is succeeded by Boniface VIII.—The last of the
Mediæval Popes—The difficulties of Benedict XI. and Clement V.—The
retirement of Clement V. to Avignon and beginning of the
‘Babylonish Captivity’—The condition of Tuscany—The Florentine
Constitution—Genoa and Milan—The Venetian Constitution—Henry VII.
makes an Expedition into Italy—Its failure—Death of Henry VII.
The two centuries which are treated in this volume constitute [Sidenote:
Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.] the most brilliant
period in Italian history since the age of Augustus. The absence of any
central authority, which disappeared even more completely in Italy than
in Germany, opened the way for the growth of a number of political
organisations, whose history is as fascinating as their variety is
bewildering. In addition to the great dynasties of Anjou, Visconti, and
Medici, we have to watch the fortunes of the great republics of Venice,
Florence, and Genoa, of the temporal states of the Church, and of a
number of lesser families, such as the House of Este in Ferrara, the
della Scalas in Verona, the Gonzagas in Mantua, the Montefeltri in
Urbino, whose kaleidoscopic changes are narrated with such wealth of
detail in the volumes of Sismondi. But what gives its special importance
to the history of this period is that in it Italy becomes the teacher of
Europe. It is to Italy that we trace that great movement, known as the
Renaissance, which began with the revival of classical learning, but led
on to the growth of national literatures, to the rise of a new spirit in
the arts of painting and sculpture, and to the enfranchisement of human
thought from the fetters of superstition, routine, and the formulas of
scholasticism. In the fifteenth century, Italy originated the art of
writing history as distinguished from the compilation of mediæval
chronicles. And finally, Italy instructed Europe in politics as well as
in letters and art. The foremost European rulers of the sixteenth
century learnt the maxims of government from Italian princes and Italian
writers: the great states of modern times learnt from Italy the
practices of diplomacy and the theory of the balance of power. Political
science, which had made no progress since the days of Aristotle, was
revived by the writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini.
Yet Italy profited less than any other state from the lessons which she
taught. France, England, and Spain, all of them the pupils of Italy,
became strong, united, and wealthy states, while Italy herself, in the
very middle of an intellectual and artistic activity which has remained
the wonder of the world, subsided into political insignificance, and
only finds a place in subsequent history as the stage on which other
nations fight out their quarrels. The solution of this crucial problem,
the combination of intellectual progress with political decadence, can
only be found in a careful study of the conditions which [Sidenote:
Causes of Italian disunion.] prevented the people of Italy from
following the normal tendencies of the period, and becoming a nation.
The causes of disunion are too numerous and deep-seated to be summed up
in a few sentences. But it may be instructive to form a clear
conception, at starting, of some of the most notable conditions which
influenced the course of Italian history in the period which we have to
consider. In the first place, geography in Italy, as in Greece, tended
to disunion. The Apennines cut off the Lombard plain from the rest of
Italy, and divided the latter into two unequal parts which were again
split up by the lateral offshoots into divisions, not quite so small as
those of Greece, but almost equally marked off. The nominal subjection
to an elective emperor, who was also king of Germany, rendered
impossible the rise of any strong native power which could weld together
the separate political units. The influence of the Papacy, which in the
thirteenth century combined the sovereignty of an Italian state with the
spiritual headship of Latin Christendom, proved almost as great an
obstacle as the Empire to national union. The great length of Italy, by
increasing isolation, hindered the growth of common interests. The
leagues occasionally founded for common aims, such as the Lombard league
against Frederick Barbarossa and the league of Venice against Charles
VIII., were never more than temporary alliances, and fell to pieces as
soon as their immediate object was gained.
The long quarrel between the Popes and the Hohenstaufen [Sidenote:
Guelfs and Ghibellines.] Emperors bequeathed a fatal heritage to Italy
in the party feuds of Guelfs and Ghibellines. These famous factions not
only set one state against another, but also gave rise to violent
discord within each state. And the parties lasted long after the
original cause of quarrel had come to an end. When the Hohenstaufen had
perished with Manfred and Conradin, when Rudolf of Hapsburg had
abandoned all imperial claims over central and southern Italy, when the
Papacy itself had quitted Italy to find a home on the further boundary
of Provence, it seemed as if party feuds must inevitably die out for
want of the fuel which had originally kindled them. But the blaze of
mutual hatred continued to rage as fiercely as ever. The famous strife
of the _Bianchi_ and _Neri_ in Florence, which drove Dante into exile
from his native city, was fought out when Albert I. and Boniface VIII.
were in close alliance. These stereotyped and quasi-hereditary feuds
were not only destructive of all sense of nationality, but they were
strong enough to overpower the far stronger and more local sentiment of
common citizenship.
Perhaps the strongest of all the disruptive forces in Italy was the
development, in the northern and central provinces, of the municipality
or commune as the normal [Sidenote: The Commune as a political unit.]
unit of political life. This applies not only to the republics proper,
but also to those cities whose liberties were overthrown by the rise of
some dominant family. The subjection of lesser cities by more powerful
neighbours did not create a state in which all subjects stood in an
equal relation of submission to a despotic government, but one in which
subject communes were enslaved by a dominant commune, and were excluded
by it from all voice in the government. The citizens of Pavia and
Cremona were not the direct subjects of the Visconti on a level with the
Milanese themselves. They were the subjects of Milan, and were ruled by
Milanese governors, just as Pisa and Pistoia were ruled by Florentines.
The absorption of the lesser cities continued, until in the fifteenth
century Italy practically consisted of five dominant states—Naples,
Milan, Venice, Florence, and the Papacy. The result was the creation of
a large subject population, deprived of that share in politics which
Italian citizens had learnt in earlier times to consider their dearest
right, and constituting a permanent and dangerous element of discontent.
It was from this population that the condottieri recruited those
mercenary armies to which Italian writers agree in attributing the
disasters that befel their country, and it was this population which
welcomed foreign invasion as a chance of escaping from domestic
oppressions. Commines tells us that the Italians ‘welcomed as saints’
the French army that followed Charles VIII. to Naples, and the phrase is
significant of the unsoundness of the political condition of Italy and
of the utter absence of any sense of nationality.
The quarrel between Frederick II. and the Popes had been embittered by
the former’s possession of Naples and Sicily, which brought him into
threatening proximity to the territories in central Italy which the
Popes claimed to rule. To drive the Hohenstaufen from Italian soil the
Popes did not hesitate to call in foreign assistance. After a vain
attempt to draw England into the quarrel, the crown of Sicily was
offered as a papal fief to [Sidenote: The House of Anjou in Naples.]
Charles of Anjou, the brother of Louis IX., and Count of Provence
through his wife Beatrix. At the battle of Grandella near Benevento
(February 26, 1266) Manfred, the illegitimate son of Frederick II., was
slain; and the still more famous battle of Tagliacozzo (August 23, 1268)
was followed by the capture and execution of Conradin, the last male
representative of the House of Hohenstaufen. These two victories secured
Charles’s possession of Naples and Sicily, though the marriage of
Manfred’s daughter, Constance, to Peter III. of Aragon created a rival
claim which proved a source of subsequent danger.
As the acknowledged head of the Guelf party, which was for the moment
supreme, Charles of Anjou seemed likely to establish his ascendency over
the greater part of Italy. The Pope, claiming supremacy during the
Interregnum, appointed him imperial vicar and senator of Rome, while a
number of cities in Tuscany and Lombardy acknowledged his lordship. But
his ambitious schemes were suddenly checked by the very power of which
he posed as the champion. The Papacy discovered that it had called in a
protector who might prove as dangerous a neighbour as the Hohenstaufen.
Gregory X. and Nicolas III., secured in their position by the
concessions of Rudolf of Hapsburg, did not hesitate to oppose the
further progress of the Neapolitan kings by a policy of mediation
between the Guelfs and Ghibellines. The election of Martin IV. (February
24, 1281), a creature of Charles, seemed to offer a new opportunity for
Angevin aggression. The ascendency of the Guelf faction was revived, and
Charles was planning an enterprise against Constantinople, when he was
arrested by the news of a great disaster. The [Sidenote: Sicilian
Vespers, 1282.] Sicilians had long resented the harshness of French
rule, and John of Procida, an old partisan of the Hohenstaufen, had
returned from his refuge in Aragon to encourage the malcontents and to
secure for them foreign assistance. His plans were still incomplete,
when a sudden rising at Palermo was provoked by a brutal insult offered
to a woman by a French soldier during a procession on Easter Monday
(March 30, 1282). The people rose with shouts of ‘Death to the French!’
and more than four thousand men, women, and children were massacred that
evening. The whole of Sicily joined in the rebellion, and offered the
crown to Peter III. of Aragon. When Peter arrived in August he found
that Charles, thirsting for vengeance, had already laid siege to
Messina. But the Catalan [Sidenote: House of Aragon in Sicily.] fleet
under Roger di Loria, the most distinguished naval commander of his
time, was too formidable to be faced by the mere transport vessels with
which Charles was provided. Sicily was perforce evacuated, and was never
recovered by the House of Anjou. The Sicilian Vespers gave rise to a
twenty years’ struggle, which concerns the history of France and Spain
as well as Italy. The Pope decreed Peter’s deposition, both in Sicily
and in Aragon, and offered the latter crown to Charles of Valois, the
second son of Philip the Fair. But papal bulls failed to overcome
Aragonese obstinacy and Sicilian devotion. In 1283 Charles’s son of the
same name was captured in a naval battle by Roger di Loria, and remained
a prisoner for the next five years. In 1285 Charles I. of Anjou died
(January 7), after a career which had known no failure till towards its
close. The same year witnessed the successive deaths of Pope Martin IV.
(March 12) and of Peter III. (November 11). The latter was succeeded in
Aragon by his eldest son Alfonso, and in Sicily by his second son James.
In 1288 the mediation of Edward I. of England resulted in the conclusion
of a treaty by which Charles II. of Anjou was released to take
possession of the Neapolitan crown, and Sicily was confirmed to the
House of Aragon. But the treaty was never observed. No sooner was
Charles II. free than Nicolas IV. absolved him from his obligations,
recognised him as king of the Two Sicilies on the same terms as his
father, and renewed the excommunication against James. The war continued
without a break. In 1291 Alfonso died, and James succeeded to the crown
of Aragon. Wearied of the long struggle, and anxious to free his Spanish
kingdom from the attacks of Charles of Valois, James agreed to renounce
the crown of Sicily. But the Sicilians refused to return to French rule,
and raised to the throne Frederick, the youngest son of Peter III., who
continued the struggle even in opposition to his own brother. At last,
in 1302, after an unsuccessful attack on Sicily by Charles of Valois,
peace was concluded. Frederick was to marry Charles II.’s sister
Eleanor, and to retain the kingdom of Sicily during his lifetime, but on
his death it was to revert to the House of Anjou. This last stipulation
was never fulfilled, and Sicily and Naples remained under separate
rulers till 1435, when they were reunited under an Aragonese king. The
only other notable event in the reign of Charles II. of Naples was the
acquisition of the Hungarian crown by his grandson, Carobert, which has
been already narrated (see p. 15). In 1309 Charles II. died, and the
crown of Naples passed to his second son, Robert, the superior
hereditary claims of Carobert of Hungary being passed over. For the next
thirty-four years Robert was the acknowledged head of the Guelf party in
Italy.
To the north of the kingdom of Naples lay the temporal [Sidenote: The
Papal States.] dominions which the Popes claimed by virtue of real or
pretended donations from Emperors and others. These territories had by
this time reached the boundaries which they retained to the present
century. They included the whole of Romagna, the Pentapolis, the March
of Ancona, and the Patrimony of St. Peter, with the city of Rome and the
Campagna. The concordat with Rudolf of Hapsburg abolished all imperial
suzerainty over these districts, and thus secured to the Papacy a
territorial principality which Frederick II. had threatened to
annihilate. But the victory, great as it appeared, was in reality
deceptive. It had been won with the aid of the House of Anjou, whose
protection might easily be converted into an oppressive patronage. And
the difficulties of temporal rule were a serious addition to those of
the spiritual oversight of Christendom, especially as the Popes were
usually elected in advanced years, and their tenure of office was
necessarily brief. More than two centuries elapsed before papal
suzerainty in central Italy developed into direct papal government; and
during that period the absorption in secular interests not only diverted
the attention of the Popes from their higher duties, but also tended to
lower their estimation in the eyes of Europe. The localisation of the
Papacy in central Italy, while it gave some appearance of security to
the papal power, really degraded it, just as the identification with the
German monarchy degraded the dignity of the Empire.
There is little reason to linger over the history of the [Sidenote: The
Popes, 1272-1290.] individuals who fill the papal chair from the end of
the Interregnum till the departure to Avignon. Gregory X. (1271-1276),
elected after a vacancy of nearly three years, was a man of high
character and ability, but he did not rule long enough to accomplish any
great ends. He set himself to restore order in Germany, to put an end to
party strife in Italy, and to check the arrogant ambition of Charles of
Naples. The council which he held at Lyons in 1274 is chiefly notable
for the regulations drawn up to prevent delays and external intervention
in papal elections. Ten days after the death of a Pope, the cardinals
present on the spot were to be shut up in conclave, and were to remain
excluded from intercourse with the outside world until they had agreed
on the choice of a successor. Gregory’s short-lived successors were
mainly occupied with their relations with Naples, with party struggles
in Italy, and with the growth of the noble families in Rome. Temporal
dominion, in which hereditary succession was impossible, brought with it
the vice of nepotism, the desire to make the most of a short tenure of
office for the aggrandisement of relatives. Nicolas III. (1277-1280)
bestowed lavish grants on the great House of Orsini, to which he
belonged; Martin IV. (1281-1285) was a mere puppet of Charles of Anjou,
and resided in his company at Viterbo; Honorius IV. (1285-1287) was a
Savelli, and exalted his family at the expense of the Orsini; while
Nicolas IV. (1288-1292) raised the Colonna as a counterpoise to the
other two families. From this time the history of Rome was filled with
the feuds of these great baronial houses, and they exercised a most
disastrous influence on the spiritual as well as on the temporal
position of the Popes.
On the death of Nicolas IV. these baronial factions were so [Sidenote:
Celestine V., 1294.] predominant and so evenly balanced in the conclave
that no election could take place for two years. At last, in 1294, a
sudden impulse induced the cardinals to throw aside all secular
considerations and to offer the highest ecclesiastical dignity to a man
whose only claim was his reputation for sanctity. Celestine V. had for
years lived a hermit’s life in a cave near Sulmona. His election was a
unique experiment in papal history, and it was unsuccessful. Personal
piety was no sufficient substitute for the worldly wisdom and experience
required for the occupant of the papal chair. After five months he was
persuaded to abdicate, and ultimately died (May, 1296) in a prison to
which he was consigned by his successor, Boniface VIII.
The pontificate of Boniface VIII. is by far the most important
[Sidenote: Boniface VIII., 1294-1303.] of this period. He has been
called the last of the mediæval Popes. He was certainly the last who
attempted to exercise that general authority over Christendom which
Gregory VII. had claimed and Innocent III. had acquired. His complete
failure proved how little the Papacy really profited by its victory over
the Empire. In order to weaken the authority of the Emperors, the Popes
had encouraged the growing nationality of the outlying kingdoms,
forgetful that they were forging a weapon which might be used against
themselves. Honorius III. and Innocent IV. had waged a desperate
struggle against Frederick II. But the defeat of the Hohenstaufen did
not, as they expected, leave the Papacy supreme. Boniface VIII. found
equally formidable opponents in Edward I. of England and Philip IV. of
France. The Papacy might defeat the Empire, because the latter was
opposed to all the tendencies of the age, but it was powerless against
the force of national development. To coerce the French and English
kings, who refused to submit to his arbitration, Boniface issued the
bull _Clericis laicos_ which forbade the clergy to pay taxes to the
secular power. Edward I. replied by outlawing the clergy, and forced
them to acknowledge their membership of the state and to contribute to
its support. Philip IV. retaliated by prohibiting the export of money
from France, and thus cut off French contributions to Rome. When the
Pope claimed Scotland as a papal fief and forbade any further English
invasions, Edward I. brought the bull before a parliament at Lincoln
(1301), which decreed that the king should not answer before the Pope on
any question concerning his temporal rights. Philip IV. met the
exorbitant papal pretensions by a similar protest from the national
representatives at a meeting of the States-General (1302). And the
French king did not content himself with verbal protests. Taking
advantage of the discontent of the Colonnas, French troops entered
Anagni, where Boniface was residing, and for a few days kept him a
prisoner. This insult was a terrible blow to the proud Pope, and a few
weeks later he died (October, 1303).
Benedict XI., the new Pope, had a difficult task to avoid [Sidenote:
Benedict XI., 1303-1304.] either a degrading submission to France or a
new quarrel with Philip IV. and the Colonnas. To escape intimidation he
withdrew to Perugia, and for a time succeeded in maintaining a
conciliatory but not dishonourable attitude. At last he found it
necessary to issue a bull against the chief authors of the outrage at
Anagni (June 29, 1304). Four weeks later the Pope was dead, and
contemporaries were almost unanimous in attributing his death to poison.
The posthumous reputation of Boniface VIII. was now the vital question
at issue, and the cardinals were almost evenly divided into a French
party which condemned him, and an Italian party which anathematised his
assailants. So irreconcilable were the two parties that the cardinals,
though shut up in the palace at Perugia in accordance with the
constitution of Gregory X., spent ten months in the vain attempt to
choose a new Pope. At last the deadlock was terminated by a strange
compromise. The supporters of Boniface were to name three non-Italian
prelates, and the hostile party was to choose one of them. One of the
three was the Archbishop of Bordeaux, whose diocese lay within the
dominions of Edward I. His selection was due to the belief that he was
the bitter enemy of the French king. But tradition maintained that
Philip IV. contrived to buy him over to his side, [Sidenote: Clement V.,
1305-1313.] and he was chosen Pope as Clement V. The coronation ceremony
took place at Lyons, and the new Pope never ventured into Italy. His
pontificate was one long struggle to avoid or to moderate the
concessions which Philip expected from him. The charges against Boniface
were ultimately referred to a council at Vienna, which exonerated his
memory. But on most points Clement had to follow the wishes of the
French king, especially in the condemnation of the Templars. In 1309
Clement V. fixed his residence at Avignon, which was not then a French
town, and was probably chosen partly for that reason, and partly for its
neighbourhood to the Venaissin, already a papal possession. But Avignon
was in Provence, which was held by the House of Anjou, and it was only
separated from France by the Rhone. As long as the Popes continued to
live there, they were exposed to overwhelming French influence, and
could hardly escape the charge, made both from England and Germany, that
they were mere vassals of the king of France. It says much for the
vitality of the papal system that the ‘Babylonish captivity,’ as the
next seventy years have been called, did not result in the complete
loss, not only of the Italian provinces, but of all spiritual authority
in Europe.
The district of Tuscany, which lies to the north-west of the Papal
States, had been split up since the death of the [Sidenote: Tuscany.]
Countess Matilda into a number of city states, mostly republics, but
which from time to time were subject to native or foreign despots.
Siena, which became in the fifteenth century mistress of southern
Tuscany, had not yet risen into prominence and never ranked among the
great states of Italy. Pisa, hitherto the most powerful of the Tuscan
communes and one of the greatest of Italian ports, began to decline when
the restoration of the Eastern Empire (1261) established the ascendency
of Genoa in the Levant. In the naval struggle which followed, the two
republics were fairly evenly balanced; but a great Genoese victory off
the island of Meloria (1284) inflicted a blow from which Pisa never
recovered, though she retained her independence for another century.
Lucca rose to some importance under Castruccio Castracani, and from time
to time successfully resisted the aggressions of Florence, but has no
continuous history that attracts attention. By far the most important of
the Tuscan cities was Florence, destined to be [Sidenote: Florence.] for
a brilliant period the chief home of Italian art and literature, to
acquire the supremacy over the whole of Tuscany, and to become for a few
years in the present century the capital of an Italian kingdom. It is at
the end of the thirteenth century that the foundation was laid of the
Florentine constitution, which has always attracted special attention on
account both of its own peculiarities and of the greatness of the city
in which it grew up.
No city in Italy had been more convulsed than Florence [Sidenote:
Constitution of Florence.] by the struggle between Guelfs and
Ghibellines, and these factions were the more embittered against each
other by their coincidence with class distinctions. The feudal nobles,
although by no means united, were preponderantly Ghibelline, while the
wealthy burghers were inclined to the cause of the Papacy and Charles of
Anjou. After the defeat of Manfred in 1266 the supremacy of the Guelfs
was established, and was never overthrown from that date. For some years
the government was moderate and pacific, but the news of the Sicilian
Vespers in 1282 frightened the Guelfs into an attempt to secure their
power by constitutional changes. The existing magistrates were
superseded [Sidenote: The ‘Priori.’] by the ‘_Priori delle Arti_,’ at
first three and afterwards six in number. These constituted the signory
and held the chief executive power. They were chosen from the seven
greater guilds (_arti maggiori_) and held office for two months at a
time, re-election being forbidden (_divieto_) until after an interval of
two years. The greater guilds, which had long existed as trade
corporations before their rise to political importance, consisted of the
_Calimala_, or cloth merchants, the wool-weavers, the bankers, the silk
manufacturers, physicians, furriers and lawyers. About the same time a
number of lesser guilds (_arti minori_) were organised, and their number
increased within the next sixteen years to fourteen. Henceforth we can
trace the existence of four main divisions of the people of Florence:
(1) the _grandi_, or nobles; (2) the _popolo grasso_, the members of the
seven greater guilds; (3) the _popolo minuto_, or members of the
fourteen lesser guilds; (4) the _ciompi_, though this name is of later
origin, including those citizens who had no guild organisation, and
therefore no machinery either for self-government or for influencing the
conduct of public business.
By the constitution of 1282 the nobles were not excluded from office,
but if they wished to qualify themselves for it they had to enter a
guild. Many of them fulfilled this condition, and several nobles held
the office of prior during the next ten years. But class jealousies
continued to create domestic quarrels, and in 1293 Giano della Bella,
himself of noble origin, proposed and carried the famous [Sidenote:
Ordinances of Justice, 1293.] ‘Ordinances of Justice.’ To qualify for
office a man must really practise the trade or craft to which he
belonged. The _grandi_ were not only to be excluded from any share in
the government, but they were subjected to serious social
disqualifications. In time of disorder they were confined to their
houses on penalty of exile. A noble could not accuse a citizen or bear
witness against him without the consent of the signory, and the severest
penalties were imposed on a noble who wounded or killed a citizen. The
duty of enforcing these ordinances was intrusted to a specially created
official, the gonfalonier of justice, who [Sidenote: The Gonfalonier.]
was to be appointed every two months and was to be a member of the
signory. The gonfalonier, who was intrusted with the command of a large
force of infantry, became the most dignified officer of the state,
though his actual powers were not greater than those of the priors. From
this time one of the harshest penalties was to confer nobility upon a
political offender, and the greatest reward that could be conferred upon
a deserving _grande_ was to degrade him to the rank of a citizen. To
protect the signory from attack a fortified _Palazzo Pubblico_ was built
for their reception, a building which is now famous as the _Palazzo
Vecchio_.
Although the actual government of Florence from 1293 may be considered
to be a plutocracy, in that the actual conduct of affairs was
monopolised by the wealthy burghers, yet the constitution possessed a
real democratic basis. The ultimate power of making any constitutional
change rested with the _parlamento_, a mass meeting [Sidenote: The
Parliament.] of all citizens in the great piazza. Such a meeting could
at any time appoint a _balia_, _i.e._ a committee with full powers to
alter the laws; and it was by this method that most of the revolutions
in Florentine history were accomplished.
Early in the fourteenth century the Florentine constitution assumed the
main features which it retained till the fall of the republic. In 1321 a
disastrous war with Castruccio Castracani discredited the signory, and
displayed the weakness of a government which changed every two months.
To remedy this, a council of twelve [Sidenote: The ‘Buonuomini.]
_buonuomini_ was created, two from each _sesto_ or district. They were
to hold office for six months instead of two, and the signory was to
take no important step without consulting them. Two years later a far
more important change was made, when the system of filling offices by
lot was introduced. Hitherto the members of the outgoing administration
had elected their successors. But the city was disquieted by factious
quarrels at each election, and there was no security for that equality
which was rapidly becoming a passion among the Florentines. In 1323 it
was determined to hold a _squittinio_, or scrutiny, every two [Sidenote:
The ‘Squittinio,’ 1323.] years in place of the elections every two
months. A committee was formed of the signory for the time being with
the councils of the greater guilds and other influential citizens. A
list was drawn up of all citizens qualified for office by age and by
being clear of debt to the state (_netti di specchio_). Their names were
then put up to ballot in the committee. The voting was by black and
white beans, the former being in favour of the candidate. All the names
which received not less than two-thirds of the black beans were placed
in bags (_imborsare_), and from these bags they were drawn to fill
vacancies as they arose. When the bags were empty a new _squittinio_
became necessary. It resulted from this system that qualified citizens
had a fairly equal chance of selection, but there was no security that
offices would go to the most capable, and the arrangement was liable to
serious abuses. The party which could obtain a majority in the selecting
committee (_balia_), was certain to secure most of the offices for its
own partisans for at least two years.
By 1323 the Florentine constitution had assumed a fairly definite shape.
At its head stood the gonfalonier of justice and the six priors, who had
the chief conduct of affairs and the right of initiating legislation.
Then came the twelve _buonuomini_, who were a sort of privy council to
the signory, and served as a check on its power. Next in rank were the
_capitano del popolo_, once the chief magistrate of the city, and the
sixteen gonfaloniers of companies, who were responsible for police and
military arrangements. These were known as the three greater offices (_i
tre maggiori_). In critical times special magistracies were sometimes
created for a limited time, such as the eight of war (_otto di guerra_),
or the ten of the sea (_dieci del mare_). There were two legislative
councils: the _consiglio del popolo_, three hundred in number,
containing only _popolani_; and the _consiglio del commune_, numbering
two hundred and fifty, to which nobles were also admitted. Besides the
regular municipal magistracies, there was an [Sidenote: The ‘Parte
Guelfa.’] important body, the _parte guelfa_, which exercised very great
political influence. This corporation, which had its own captains and
council, had been formed after the great Guelf victory of 1267 to
administer the confiscated property of the exiled Ghibellines. Its great
wealth and efficient organisation were employed for the assiduous
maintenance of Guelf ascendency, and in later times for resisting the
claims of the lower classes to a voice in the government.
Of the northern states only three deserve special mention [Sidenote:
Genoa.] at this time. Genoa, isolated in the north-western corner and
surrounded by mountains, plays a very slight part in the general history
of Italy, though it has some considerable importance as commanding the
direct route from Provence to the peninsula. The energies of its
citizens were mainly absorbed in the acquisition of wealth by eastern
trade, in maintaining wars with Pisa and Venice, and in the incessant
feuds of the great families of Doria and Spinola. Milan, which had long
held a predominant position among [Sidenote: Milan.] the Lombard towns,
was already beginning to lose its republican independence. There, as in
Florence, class divisions were mixed up with the quarrels of factions.
In 1259 the Guelf leader, Martino della Torre, headed the citizens in a
successful struggle against the Ghibelline nobles, and took advantage of
his victory to assume the lordship of the city. The neighbouring towns
of Lodi, Como, Vercelli, and Bergamo fell one after another under the
rule of the Della Torre. But in 1277 a revolution was effected by the
Ghibellines under the Archbishop of Milan, Otto Visconti, to whom the
lordship of the city was transferred, and from whom it passed on his
death in 1295 to his nephew Matteo Visconti, the ancestor of the later
dukes of Milan. But the Visconti dynasty was not yet permanently
established, and in 1302 a Guelf league was formed among the chief
Lombard towns which forced Matteo to withdraw, and Guido della Torre
became the ruler of Milan.
Venice, the last of the important northern states, was even [Sidenote:
Venice.] more isolated from Italy than Genoa, both by geography and by
its absorbing interests in the Levant. The overthrow of the Greek Empire
in 1204 had given Venice a commanding position in the east, but the
restoration of 1261 had raised a very formidable rival in Genoa, and for
more than a century the two republics were engaged in a series of costly
and exhausting wars. But the main interest of Venetian history at this
time lies in the building up of that oligarchical constitution which
gave to Venice a vigour and consistency of political action quite unique
in Italy, and enabled her in the fifteenth century to establish a very
formidable power on the mainland.
The institutions of Venice, though sufficiently alien from [Sidenote:
Constitution of Venice.] modern usages, were simplicity itself as
compared with those of Florence. This simplicity is due primarily to the
entire absence in Venice of a landed nobility, whose power had to be
overthrown in other Italian cities by a series of revolts on the part of
the citizens, and also to the fact that Venice remained completely
untouched by the faction fights of Guelfs and Ghibellines. At the head
of the state stood the doge, elected for life, and in early [Sidenote:
The Doge.] times possessed of almost autocratic power. But his authority
had been gradually limited by the compulsory association of councillors,
by the exaction of a solemn oath on election (_promissione ducale_), and
by the creation of new institutions. By the fourteenth century the doge
had become an ornamental sovereign, surrounded by great pomp and
ceremonial, presiding in all assemblies, but possessed of no power of
initiation and of no means of exerting more than personal influence. A
doge of strong character might still mould the destinies of Venice, but
it was by persuading his colleagues, not by the exercise of any regal
authority. The election of the doge rested originally with the whole
people. In 1172 a council, which grew into the _Maggior Consiglio_, was
intrusted with the task, which was gradually delegated to small
committees chosen in various ways. At last, in 1268, the elaborate
system was adopted which lasted till the fall of the republic. All
members of the Grand Council over thirty years of age drew balls from an
urn, and thirty of these balls were gilt. The thirty who drew the gilt
balls were reduced to nine by a second drawing of lots. The nine elected
forty, seven votes being a necessary minimum. The forty were reduced by
lot to twelve, who elected twenty-five, each receiving at least nine
votes. The twenty-five were reduced by lot to nine, who elected
forty-five, who must each receive seven votes. The forty-five were
reduced to eleven, who chose forty-one, each to receive nine votes. The
forty-one then took an oath and proceeded to vote for the vacant office.
The voting was repeated until some candidate had received at least
twenty-five votes, and he became doge. The form of demanding popular
approval of the election did not become obsolete until the election of
Francesco Foscari in 1423.
With the doge were associated six ducal councillors, who were
necessarily consulted on every subject and without whom the doge could
do nothing. In fact, the ducal functions were really discharged, not by
the doge, but by a committee of seven of whom the doge was one. The
_Collegio_ or cabinet of ministers (_savii_), conducted the routine work
of administration, and prepared all business for the other public
bodies. The business of every department passed through the _Collegio_,
in which the six _savii grandi_ presided in weekly terms. The
_Quarantia_, or Forty, was originally created in the twelfth century to
act as a permanent senate, but it was gradually limited to judicial
functions, and became the great law-court of Venice. The functions of
the senate fell to the _Pregadi_, a body of a hundred and sixty members,
whose name was derived from the originally voluntary consultation of
prominent citizens by the doge. The _Pregadi_ became a permanent part of
the constitution in 1229. Their chief business was the first
consideration of all legislative proposals, the appointment of
ambassadors, and the general supervision of foreign affairs.
At the basis of the constitution was the _Maggior Consiglio_, [Sidenote:
The Great Council.] which had gradually taken the place of the primary
assembly of all citizens. The council was originally elective, and its
rise was a natural result of the growth of Venetian population. But in
1297 a law was carried which finally changed the government of Venice
from a democracy to a close oligarchy. A list was drawn up of all who
had sat in the Great Council for the last four years, and their names
were put up to ballot in the _Quarantia_. All who received twelve votes
were to be members of the council. Three electors were to be appointed
every year to make a list of any other candidates, and their names, if
approved by the doge and his councillors, were to be balloted by the
_Quarantia_. For a few years the addition of names was frequent, though
few candidates were successful unless their ancestors had at some time
or other had a seat in the council. But in 1315 the names of all
eligible candidates were drawn up once for all and placed in a book, and
in 1319 the three annual electors were abolished. Henceforth membership
of the Great Council became a hereditary privilege, and the admission of
a member’s son as soon as he had reached the age of twenty-five was
regarded as a matter of course. The _serrata del Maggior Consiglio_, or
closing of the Great Council, divided the Venetian population into two
sharply defined classes: the nobles, who had the privilege of
membership, and the lower classes, who were for ever excluded from any
voice in the government.
Although the abolition of popular election in 1297 was a change to which
things had long been tending, it could hardly take place without
exciting considerable discontent. Several conspiracies were formed
against the new oligarchy, and after the failure of a formidable plot
under Bajamonte Tiepolo in 1310, it was determined to devise some new
machinery for the detection and repression of future revolts. Ten
members were chosen by [Sidenote: Council of Ten, 1319.] the Great
Council to act as a sort of committee of public safety. So useful did
they prove that they were renewed year after year, and in 1335 they were
made a permanent part of the constitution. The Council really consisted
of seventeen, as the doge and his six councillors were associated with
the Ten. The latter were elected yearly, and could not hold office again
till a year had elapsed. The proper function of the Ten was to act as a
court of exceptional jurisdiction, somewhat like the Star Chamber in
England. In this capacity they served as the efficient bulwark of the
Venetian aristocracy, and coerced the inferior citizens into passive
acquiescence in the rule of their superiors. As time went on, the Ten
became more and more powerful, and began to interfere in the general
conduct of affairs. So great became the passion for secrecy in the
Venetian government, that in the sixteenth century the Ten began to
delegate their functions to a sub-committee, the three Inquisitors of
State.
For sixty years Italy had been allowed to take its own course without
any attempt at interference on the part of its nominal suzerain in
Germany. The news that Henry of [Sidenote: Henry VII. in Italy,
1310-1313.] Luxemburg, elected in 1308, was preparing to visit Italy and
to revive the imperial power, made a profound impression in the
peninsula, where the Guelf and Ghibelline parties were as active and
bellicose as ever. These party names had by this time ceased to express
any essential difference of principle. The imperial suzerainty in the
north, and the papal suzerainty in the south were equally shadowy, and
neither seemed substantial enough to fight for. The idea that the Guelfs
were the champions of republican liberty as against aggressive despots,
had ceased to have any real foundation in facts. A Della Torre was just
as dangerous to the liberties of Milan as a Visconti. Since the Popes
had called in the House of Anjou, and especially since a Pope had fixed
his residence in Avignon, it was impossible to contend that the Guelfs
were the champions of Italian independence against foreign domination.
The anomalous relations of Italian parties were reflected in the equally
anomalous position of Henry VII. A German prince elected by German
princes to the throne of the Hohenstaufen, he seemed destined to revive
the principles of Ghibellinism and to assume the headship of a revived
Ghibelline faction. On the other hand, Henry was French by education and
sympathies, he owed his election to the clerical partisans of France
acting under papal influence, and he was accompanied in his march by
legates whom the Pope had authorised to confer upon him the imperial
crown in Rome. It was no empty pretence of moderation, but the
expression of a real policy, when Henry professed that he belonged to
neither faction and intended to act as a mediator between them. And his
actions corresponded with his professions. As he passed through the
Lombard cities he insisted on the return of all political exiles,
whichever party they belonged to. In Milan, where he received the iron
crown of Lombardy (January 6, 1311), he recalled Matteo Visconti without
overthrowing the rule of Guido della Torre. But the Italians themselves
had no sympathy with his impartiality. Henry VII., like most of his
German predecessors, was in need of money, and the attempt to levy a
contribution of 100,000 ducats provoked a rising in Milan. The rising
was suppressed, but it resulted in an inevitable alliance between the
Emperor and the Ghibellines. Guido della Torre and his family were
driven into exile, and an attempted rebellion in the Guelf cities was
suppressed. Brescia alone made any lengthy resistance to the German
army. Before leaving Lombardy, Henry appointed imperial vicars in the
chief cities, and in Milan he intrusted the office to Matteo Visconti,
thus finally establishing the dynasty which ruled Milan for a century
and a half, and at one time seemed likely to unite the whole of northern
Italy under its sway.
From this time the difficulties of Henry VII. rapidly increased. The
force of circumstances had compelled him to become a Ghibelline against
his will. The hopes which that party built upon his arrival are
expressed in the _De Monarchia_ of Dante. Peace could only be bestowed
upon Italy by a strong monarchy, and such a monarchy could only be
established by a German king with the traditions of the Empire at his
back. But the more enthusiastic the Ghibellines became, the more
resolute was the opposition of the Guelfs. Robert of Naples, the close
ally of Clement V., did not venture to embark on open hostilities, but
he was rendered both jealous and uneasy by Henry’s progress, and did not
hesitate to intrigue against him. Henry VII. succeeded in obtaining the
lordship of Genoa and Pisa, the latter of which was always on the
Ghibelline side. But Florence, the leading Guelf city in Tuscany,
obstinately refused to admit the German king or his troops, and he was
compelled to pass on one side on his journey to Rome. There he found the
greater part of the city occupied by the Guelf family of Orsini,
assisted by a Neapolitan force. A battle would have been necessary to
obtain possession of St. Peter’s, and the coronation ceremony had to
take place in the church of St. John Lateran (June 29, 1312). Henry VII.
was now convinced that the reduction of Italy to obedience could only be
accomplished by force of arms. King Robert had as yet avoided any
declaration of war, and it would have been dangerous to attack Naples
while the Guelfs in the north were strong enough to cut off
communications with Germany. It was decided to strike terror into the
Guelfs by the reduction of Florence. The German troops advanced to the
city walls in September, 1312, but they found them too strong and too
well garrisoned to venture on an attack. Henry retreated to Pisa to
await reinforcement. Against Robert of Naples, who was preparing to give
active assistance to Florence, he issued the imperial ban, and concluded
an alliance with the Aragonese king of Sicily. Henry had commenced his
march to meet the Neapolitan troops, when he suddenly died of [Sidenote:
Death of Henry VII., 1313.] fever at Buonconvento, twelve miles from
Siena (August 24, 1313). The Ghibellines believed that he had been
poisoned by a Dominican monk in administering the sacrament. The schemes
of Henry VII. were entirely out of date: the Holy Roman Empire, as Dante
understood it, was already an anachronism: and the Emperor’s death is
only important as marking the failure of the last serious attempt to
reduce Italy to obedience to a German king. The forces of disunion were
strong enough to break up any monarchy; it was only an added weakness
that the monarchy was claimed by a foreigner.