AFRICAN SLAVES.

Mr. PARKER moved to insert a clause in the bill, imposing a duty on the

importation of slaves, of ten dollars each person. He was sorry that the

constitution prevented Congress from prohibiting the importation

altogether; he thought it a defect in that instrument that it allowed of

such a practice; it was contrary to the Revolution principles, and ought

not to be permitted; but as he could not do all the good he desired, he

was willing to do what lay in his power. He hoped such a duty as he

moved for would prevent, in some degree, this irrational and inhuman

traffic; if so, he should feel happy from the success of his motion.

Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, hoped that such an important and serious

proposition as this would not be hastily adopted. It was a very late

moment for the introduction of new subjects. He expected the committee

had got through the business, and would rise without discussing any

thing further. At least, if gentlemen were determined on considering the

present motion, he hoped they would delay it for a few days, in order to

give time for an examination of the subject. It was certainly a matter

big with the most serious consequences to the State he represented; he

did not think any one thing that had been discussed was so important to

them, and the welfare of the Union, as the question now brought forward;

but he was not prepared to enter on any argument, and therefore

requested the motion might either be withdrawn or laid on the table.

Mr. SHERMAN approved of the object of the motion, but he did not think

this bill was proper to embrace the subject. He could not reconcile

himself to the insertion of human beings as an article of duty, among

goods, wares, and merchandise. He hoped it would be withdrawn for the

present, and taken up hereafter as an independent subject.

Mr. JACKSON, observing the quarter from which this motion came, said it

did not surprise him, though it might have that effect upon others. He

recollected that Virginia was an old settled State, and had her

complement of slaves; so she was careless of recruiting her numbers by

this means; the natural increase of her imported blacks was sufficient

for their purpose; but he thought gentlemen ought to let their neighbors

get supplied, before they imposed such a burthen upon the importation.

He knew this business was viewed in an odious light to the eastward,

because the people were capable of doing their own work, and had no

occasion for slaves; but gentlemen will have some feeling for others;

they will not try to throw all the weight upon those who have assisted

in lightening their burthens; they do not wish to charge us for every

comfort and enjoyment of life, and at the same time take away the means

of procuring them; they do not wish to break us down at once.

He was convinced, from the inaptitude of the motion, and the want of

time to consider it, that the candor of the gentleman would induce him

to withdraw it for the present; and if ever it came forward again, he

hoped it would comprehend the white slaves as well as black, who were

imported from all the jails of Europe; wretches, convicted of the most

flagrant crimes, were brought in and sold without any duty whatever. He

thought that they ought to be taxed equally with the Africans, and had

no doubt but the constitutionality and propriety of such a measure was

equally apparent with the one proposed.

Mr. TUCKER thought it unfair to bring in such an important subject at a

time when debate was almost precluded. The committee had gone through

the impost bill, and the whole Union was impatiently expecting the

result of their deliberations; the public must be disappointed, and much

revenue lost, or this question cannot undergo that full discussion which

it deserves.

We have no right, said he, to consider whether the importation of slaves

is proper or not; the constitution gives us no power on that point; it

is left to the States to judge of that matter as they see fit. But if it

is a business the gentleman is determined to discourage, he ought to

have brought his motion forward sooner, and even then not have

introduced it without previous notice. He hoped the committee would

reject the motion, if it was not withdrawn. He was not speaking so much

for the State he represented as for Georgia; because the State of South

Carolina had a prohibitory law, which could be renewed when its

limitation expired.

Mr. PARKER had ventured to introduce the subject after full

deliberation, and did not like to withdraw it. Although the gentleman

from Connecticut (Mr. SHERMAN) had said, that they ought not to be

enumerated with goods, wares, and merchandise, he believed they were

looked upon by the African traders in this light. He knew it was

degrading the human species to annex that character to them; but he

would rather do this than continue the actual evil of importing slaves a

moment longer. He hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power to

restore to human nature its inherent privileges, and, if possible, wipe

off the stigma under which America labored. The inconsistency in our

principles, with which we are justly charged, should be done away, that

we may show, by our actions, the pure beneficence of the doctrine we

hold out to the world in our Declaration of Independence.

Mr. SHERMAN thought the principles of the motion, and the principles of

the bill, were inconsistent; the principle of the bill was to raise

revenue, the principle of the motion to correct a moral evil. Now,

considering it as an object of revenue, it would be unjust, because two

or three States would bear the whole burthen, while he believed they

bore their full proportion of all the rest. He was against receiving the

motion into this bill, though he had no objection to taking it up by

itself, on the principles of humanity and policy; and therefore would

vote against it if it was not withdrawn.

Mr. AMES joined the gentleman last up; no one could suppose him

favorable to slavery; he detested it from his soul; but he had some

doubts whether imposing a duty on the importation would not have the

appearance of countenancing the practice; it was certainly a subject of

some delicacy, and no one appeared to be prepared for the discussion. He

therefore hoped the motion would be withdrawn.

Mr. LIVERMORE was not against the principle of the motion; but in the

present case he conceived it improper. If negroes were goods, wares, or

merchandise, they came within the title of the bill; if they were not,

the bill would be inconsistent. But if they are goods, wares, or

merchandise, the five per cent. _ad valorem_ will embrace the

importation, and the duty of five per cent. is nearly equal to ten

dollars per head; so there is no occasion to add it even on the score of

revenue.

Mr. JACKSON said, it was the fashion of the day to favor the liberty of

slaves. He would not go into a discussion of the subject; but he

believed it was capable of demonstration that they were better off in

their present situation than they would be if they were manumitted. What

are they to do if they are discharged? Work for a living? Experience has

shown us they will not. Examine what has become of those in Maryland;

many of them have been set free in that State. Did they turn themselves

to industry and useful pursuits? No, they turn out common pickpockets,

petty larceny villains. And is this mercy, forsooth, to turn them into a

way in which they must lose their lives; for when they are thrown upon

the world, void of property and connections, they cannot get their

living but by pilfering. What is to be done for compensation? Will

Virginia set all her negroes free? Will they give up the money they cost

them, and to whom? When this practice comes to be tried there, the sound

of liberty will lose those charms which make it grateful to the ravished

ear. But our slaves are not in a worse situation than they were on the

coast of Africa. It is not uncommon there for the parents to sell their

children in peace; and in war, the whole are taken and made slaves

together. In these cases, it is only a change of one slavery for

another; and are they not better here, where they have a master, bound

by the ties of interest and law, to provide for their support and

comfort in old age or infirmity, in which, if they were free, they would

sink under the pressure of woe for want of assistance?

He would say nothing of the partiality of such a tax; it was admitted by

the avowed friends of the measure; Georgia, in particular, would be

oppressed. On this account, it would be the most odious tax Congress

could impose.

Mr. SCHUREMAN hoped the gentleman would withdraw his motion, because the

present was not the time or place for introducing the business. He

thought it had better be brought forward in the House as a distinct

proposition. If the gentleman persisted in having the question

determined, he would move the previous question, if he was supported.

Mr. MADISON.--I cannot concur with gentlemen who think the present an

improper time or place to enter into a discussion of the proposed

motion. If it is taken up in a separate view, we shall do the same thing

at a greater expense of time. But gentlemen say that it is improper to

connect the two objects, because they do not come within the title of

the bill; but this objection may be obviated by accommodating the title

to the contents. There may be some inconsistency in combining the ideas

which gentlemen have expressed, that is, considering the human race as a

species of property; but the evil does not arise from adopting the

clause now proposed; it is from the importation to which it relates. Our

object in enumerating persons on paper with merchandise, is to prevent

the practice of actually treating them as such, by having them in future

forming part of the cargoes of goods, wares, and merchandise to be

imported into the United States. The motion is calculated to avoid the

very evil intimated by the gentleman.

It has been said that this tax will be partial and oppressive; but if a

fair view is taken of this subject, I think we may form a different

conclusion. But if it be partial or oppressive, are there not many

instances in which we have laid taxes of this nature? Yet are they not

thought to be justified by national policy? If any article is warranted

on this account, how much more are we authorized to proceed on this

occasion? The dictates of humanity, the principles of the people, the

national safety and happiness, and prudent policy require it of us. The

constitution has particularly called our attention to it; and of all the

articles contained in the bill before us, this is one of the last I

should be willing to make a concession upon, so far as I am at liberty

to go, according to the terms of the constitution or principles of

justice. I would not have it understood that my zeal would carry me to

disobey the inviolable commands of either.

I understood it had been intimated, that the motion was inconsistent or

unconstitutional. I believe, sir, my worthy colleague has formed the

words with a particular reference to the constitution; any how, so far

as the duty is expressed, it perfectly accords with that instrument. If

there are any inconsistencies in it, they may be rectified. I believe

the intention is well understood, but I am far from supposing the

diction improper. If the description of the persons does not accord with

the ideas of the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. JACKSON,) and his idea is

a proper one for the committee to adopt, I see no difficulty in changing

the phraseology.

I conceive the constitution, in this particular, was formed in order

that the Government, whilst it was restrained from laying a total

prohibition, might be able to give some testimony of the sense of

America with respect to the African trade. We have liberty to impose a

tax or duty upon the importation of such persons, as any of the States

now existing shall think proper to admit; and this liberty was granted,

I presume, upon two considerations. The first was, that until the time

arrived when they might abolish the importation of slaves, they might

have an opportunity of evidencing their sentiments on the policy and

humanity of such a trade. The other was, that they might be taxed in due

proportion with other articles imported; for if the possessor will

consider them as property, of course they are of value, and ought to be

paid for. If gentlemen are apprehensive of oppression from the weight of

the tax, let them make an estimate of its proportion, and they will find

that it very little exceeds five per cent. _ad valorem_; so that they

will gain very little by having them thrown into that mass of articles;

whilst, by selecting them in the manner proposed, we shall fulfil the

prevailing expectations of our fellow-citizens, and perform our duty in

executing the purposes of the constitution. It is to be hoped, that by

expressing a national disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it,

and save ourselves from reproaches, and our posterity the imbecility

ever attendant on a country filled with slaves.

I do not wish to say any thing harsh to the hearing of gentlemen who

entertain different sentiments from me, or different sentiments from

those I represent; but if there is any one point in which it is clearly

the policy of this nation, so far as we constitutionally can, to vary

the practice obtaining under some of the State Governments, it is this.

But it is certain a majority of the States are opposed to this practice;

therefore, upon principle, we ought to discountenance it as far as is in

our power.

If I were not afraid of being told that the Representatives of the

several States are the best able to judge of what is proper and

conducive to their particular prosperity, I should venture to say that

it is as much the interest of Georgia and South Carolina as of any in

the Union. Every addition they receive to their number of slaves, tends

to weaken and render them less capable of self-defence. In case of

hostilities with foreign nations, they will be the means of inviting

attack, instead of repelling invasion. It is a necessary duty of the

General Government to protect every part of the empire against danger,

as well internal as external. Every thing, therefore, which tends to

increase this danger, though it may be a local affair, yet, if it

involves national expense or safety, becomes of concern to every part of

the Union, and is a proper subject for the consideration of those

charged with the general administration of the Government. I hope, in

making these observations, I shall not be understood to mean that a

proper attention ought not to be paid to the local opinions and

circumstances of any part of the United States, or that the particular

representatives are not best able to judge of the sense of their

immediate constituents.

If we examine the proposed measure by the agreement there is between it

and the existing State laws, it will show us that it is patronized by a

very respectable part of the Union. I am informed that South Carolina

has prohibited the importation of slaves for several years yet to come.

We have the satisfaction, then, of reflecting that we do nothing more

than their own laws do at this moment. This is not the case with one

State. I am sorry that her situation is such as to seem to require a

population of this nature; but it is impossible, in the nature of

things, to consult the national good, without doing what we do not wish

to do to some particular part.

Perhaps gentlemen contend against the introduction of the clause on too

slight grounds. If it does not comport with the title of the bill, alter

the latter. If it does not conform to the precise terms of the

constitution, amend it. But if it will tend to delay the whole bill,

that, perhaps, will be the best reason for making it the object of a

separate one. If this be the sense of the committee, I shall submit.

Mr. GERRY thought all duties ought to be laid as equal as possible. He

had endeavored to enforce this principle yesterday, but without the

success he wished for; he was bound by the principle of justice,

therefore, to vote for the proposition. But if the committee were

desirous of considering the subject fully by itself, he had no

objection; but he thought when gentlemen laid down a principle, they

ought to support it generally.

Mr. BURKE said, gentlemen were contending for nothing; that the value of

a slave averaged about eighty pounds, and the duty on that sum at five

per cent. would be ten dollars. As Congress could go no further than

that sum, he conceived it made no difference whether they were

enumerated or left in the common mass.

Mr. MADISON.--If we contend for nothing, the gentlemen who are opposed

to us do not contend for a great deal. But the question is, whether the

five per cent. _ad valorem_, on all articles imported, will have any

operation at all upon the introduction of slaves, unless we make a

particular enumeration on this account. The collector may mistake; for

he would not presume to apply the term goods, wares, and merchandise to

any person whatsoever. But if that general definition of goods, wares,

and merchandise, is supposed to include African slaves, why may we not

particularly enumerate them, and lay the duty pointed out by the

constitution, which, as gentlemen tell us, is no more than five per

cent. upon their value. This will not increase the burthen upon any; but

it will be that manifestation of our sense expected by our constituents,

and demanded by justice and humanity.

Mr. BLAND had no doubt of the propriety or good policy of this measure.

He had made up his mind upon it; he wished slaves had never been

introduced into America. But if it was impossible at this time to cure

the evil, he was very willing to join in any measures that would prevent

its extending further. He had some doubts whether the prohibitory laws

of the States were not in part repealed. Those who had endeavored to

discountenance this trade by laying a duty on the importation, were

prevented by the constitution from continuing such regulation, which

declares that no State shall lay any impost or duties on imports. If

this were the case, and he suspected pretty strongly that it was, the

necessity of adopting the proposition of his colleague was more

apparent.

Mr. SHERMAN said the constitution does not consider these persons as

species of property; it speaks of them as persons, and says, that a tax

or duty may be imposed on the importation of them into any State which

shall permit the same, but they have no power to prohibit such

importation for twenty years. But Congress have power to declare upon

what terms persons coming into the United States shall be entitled to

citizenship; the rule of naturalization must, however, be uniform. He

was convinced there were others who ought to be regulated in this

particular, the importation of whom was of an evil tendency; he meant

convicts particularly. He thought that some regulation respecting them

was also proper; but it being a different subject, it ought to be taken

up in a different manner.

Mr. MADISON was led to believe, from the observation that had fallen

from the gentlemen, that it would be best to make this the subject of a

distinct bill: he, therefore, wished his colleague would withdraw his

motion, and move in the House for leave to bring in a bill on the same

principles.

Mr. PARKER consented to withdraw his motion, under a conviction that the

House was fully satisfied of its propriety. He knew very well that these

persons were neither goods nor wares, but they were treated as articles

of merchandise. Although he wished to get rid of this part of his

property, yet he should not consent to deprive other people of theirs by

any act of his, without their consent.

The committee rose, reported progress, and the House adjourned.

FRIDAY, May 15.

Mr. WHITE, one of the Representatives from Virginia, presented to the

House a resolve of the Legislature of that State, of the 27th of

December, 1788, offering to the acceptance of the Federal Government,

ten miles square of territory, or any lesser quantity, in any part of

that State, which Congress may choose, to be occupied and possessed by

the United States, as the seat of the Federal Government; which was

read, and ordered to lie on the table.

An engrossed bill for laying a duty on goods, wares, and merchandises,

imported into the United States, was read a third time, and, on a motion

made, ordered to be recommitted to a Committee of the whole House

immediately.

The House, accordingly, resolved itself into the said committee; and,

after some time, the committee rose, and reported the bill with

amendments, which were agreed to by the House.

Mr. MADISON made a motion further to amend the said bill, by adding to

the end thereof a clause for limiting the time of its continuance.

Mr. AMES expressed a doubt of the propriety of the motion. He thought

the bill ought to be commensurate with the wants of Government.

Mr. FITZSIMONS.--For want of a proper knowledge of the true situation of

our affairs, we are unable to determine how far the present provision is

equal to the necessities of the Union, and this circumstance will tend

to add considerably to our embarrassment in limiting the duration. If we

make the time too short to supply the public wants, we shall not hold

out to the public creditors a sufficient security for the punctual

payment of their debts. If we should want to raise money by a loan, we

could only expect it according to the duration of the fund: this makes

the present motion a subject of serious consideration. Not that I object

to what the gentleman has in contemplation, but I wish such language to

be used, that shall designate the continuation of the law to be till the

wants are supplied and thereafter cease. I am not of opinion that it

should be for half a century, because I hope our national debt will be

extinguished in much less time; but really I must confess, at this

moment, I feel considerable embarrassment in determining in my mind the

period for which it should exist, whether an enumerated term of years,

or a general declaration during the continuance of the public wants.

Mr. LEE thought the operation of the law could not be well understood;

that it was a system of experiment, and ought to be temporary, in order

that a future Congress might make such amendments as time should

discover to be necessary. How perfect soever the theory might appear,

practice might prove it otherwise; he therefore wished its operation

limited for three or five years. He thought it would be wise in the

House to adopt the motion, in order to prevent any injustice which a

permanent and imperfect regulation might have on posterity. He expected

this would beget confidence in the Government, which was to him a very

desirable object.

Mr. WHITE.--The constitution having authorized the House of

Representatives alone to originate money bills, places an important

trust in our hands, which, as their protectors, we ought not to part

with. I do not mean to imply that the Senate are less to be trusted than

this House; but the constitution, no doubt for wise purposes, has given

the immediate Representatives of the People a control over the whole

Government in this particular, which for their interest they ought not

to let out of their hands. Besides, the constitution says further, that

no appropriation shall be for a longer term than two years, which of

consequence limits the duration of the revenue law to that period; when,

if it is found conducive to the public welfare, it may be continued by

the legislators appointed by the people, and who alone are authorized to

declare upon this question in the first instance.

Mr. LIVERMORE hoped but little time would be taken up in the discussion

of this subject; the people were anxiously waiting the result of their

deliberations; beside the impost was daily slipping away. He had no

doubt of the propriety of the motion, because from the acknowledged

imperfections of the bill, it would never do for a permanent system. If

the people, who consider themselves subjected to very high and very

unequal duties, find no termination of the grievance, they will

immediately adopt measures in their defence, to thwart the views of

Government; but if they understand the law as temporary, and only passed

in order to gain experience for forming a better system, they will be

induced to give it fair play, and bear the burthen without complaint,

trusting to the wisdom and justice of Congress for such alterations as

practice may show to be necessary.

Besides, the objects for which the revenue is now wanting, will decrease

annually; this will be an additional reason for limiting its duration.

He was not for a very short term; he thought five, seven, or ten years,

would be more eligible than two or three, but he was decidedly against

making it perpetual.

Mr. SINNICKSON had understood, that one of the objects of the bill was

the re-establishment of public credit; but it never could be imagined

that a law, limited to three or four years, could do this in any great

degree; nor could any advantage arise from loans negotiated and

terminated within such a short period. Under these impressions, he

conceived the motion struck at the credit of the new Government, which

the people had just established.

Mr. MADISON.--When he offered this amendment to the bill, he thought its

propriety was so obvious and striking, that it would meet no opposition.

To pass a bill, not limited in duration, which was to draw revenue from

the pockets of the people, appeared to be dangerous in the

administration of any Government; he hoped, therefore, the House would

not be less cautious in this particular than other nations are, who

profess to act upon sound principles. He imagined it might be considered

by their constituents as incompatible with the spirit of the

constitution, and dangerous to republican principles, to pass such a law

unlimited in its duration.

Besides the restoration of public credit, he thought the act had in view

the encouragement of a particular description of people, which might

lead them into enterprises of a peculiar nature, for the protection of

which the public faith seemed to be pledged. But would gentlemen infer

from hence, that no alteration ought to take place if the manufactures

were well established? The subject appeared to him in a twofold point of

view; first, to provide for the exigencies of Government, and second,

for the establishment of public credit; but he thought both these

objects could be obtained without making the bill perpetual. If the

Government showed a proper attention to the punctual performance of its

engagements, it would obtain the latter; the other would be secured by

making provision as the occasion demanded. If the bill was to be made

perpetual, it would be continued after the purpose for which it was

adopted had ceased; the error would in this case be irremediable;

whereas, if its limitation was determined, it would always be in the

power of the Government to make it commensurate with what the public

debts and contingencies required.

The constitution, as had already been observed, places the power in the

House of originating money bills. The principal reason why the

constitution had made this distinction was, because they were chosen by

the people, and supposed to be best acquainted with their interests and

ability. In order to make them more particularly acquainted with these

objects, the democratic branch of the Legislature consisted of a greater

number, and were chosen for a shorter period, so that they might revert

more frequently to the mass of the people. Now, if a revenue law was

made perpetual, however unequal its operation might be, it would be out

of the power of this House to effect an alteration; for if the President

chose to object to the measure, it would require two-thirds of both

Houses to carry it. Even if the House of Representatives were unanimous

in their opinion that the law ought to be repealed, they would not be

able to carry it, unless a great majority appeared in the Senate also.

Mr. BOUDINOT said, the time mentioned by the former Congress, and to

which they requested the concurrence of the several States, was, that

the impost duties might be continued for twenty-five years. This request

was made on full consideration, and they did not think it was more than

sufficient to discharge the principal and interest of the national debt.

He concluded, therefore, that it was better to let the law remain

without limitation; because when they found the purposes for which it

was intended were accomplished, it would be in the power of Congress to

repeal the law.

Mr. LAWRENCE thought the present was a subject of great importance, and

he lamented it was not brought forward at an earlier period, because he

feared the time would not allow that full discussion or deliberation

which ought to take place. He wished also that the House was acquainted

with the necessities of the United States, that so they might make

provision accordingly; but these two points were mere matter of

speculation as to their precise amount; yet he believed it was agreed on

all hands, that the ways and means provided in this bill for the support

of Government, the payment of interest and instalments of the foreign

and domestic debt, were, so far as agreed to, inadequate to the object.

If this be the case, the public debt must accumulate; and as we do not

know when the time may come for its extinguishment, the provision cannot

be limited; for every gentleman will agree, that if the demand for

revenue be increased, the fund ought to be commensurate to the object.

Is there any time when the civil list will cease its demand? If there is

not, there will be a perpetual call for revenue. He thought it

absolutely impossible to provide for the payment of the debts, if the

bill was limited to two, three, or four years; such a precarious

provision would never tend to the re-establishment of public credit. If

the bill was not limited, it would always be in the power of the

Legislature to lower the duties, or make such other alteration as might,

upon experience, be thought beneficial to the community; whereas if the

bill were limited, it would be thought improper to make any amendments

during the term for which it is enacted, although those amendments

appeared indispensably necessary. But why is this degree of caution

necessary? Will not the administration of public affairs be conducted in

future by representatives as good as ourselves? Will they have less

wisdom or virtue, to discover and pursue the good of their

fellow-citizens than we have?

Mr. BLAND.--Our public credit consists of two branches: first, as it

respects the evidences of our debt, in the hands of those from whom we

have had money or services; and secondly, as it respects our ability to

borrow in future. Now, the first branch of public credit depends upon

the punctuality with which the interest is paid; but this in foreign

nations, does not depend upon the limitation of the act. Do gentlemen

suppose our laws, like those of the Medes and Persians, unchangeable?

Can any person, who has read our constitution, believe that it is in our

power to pass a law without limitation? No, it is impossible. Every

person knows that a future Congress may repeal this and every other law

we pass, whenever they think proper. The constitution had particularly

intrusted the House of Representatives with the power of raising money;

great care was necessary to preserve this privilege inviolate; it was

one of the greatest securities the people had for their liberties under

this Government. Moreover, the importance of the House itself depended

upon holding the purse-strings; if they once part with this power, they

would become insignificant, and the other branch of the Legislature

might become altogether independent of them. For these reasons, he was

in favor of the motion of his honorable colleague, and hoped it would

obtain.

Mr. GERRY.--There seems to be a great variety of opinions entertained

by gentlemen on this question. But he thought they would all agree on

these two points: first, that there were very great demands upon the

federal treasury; and, secondly, that they had no kind of documents to

show what they were, or what the revenue bill would produce. Under these

circumstances, gentlemen must agree, that there is danger of passing a

law that would operate oppressively, and without reason. There was also

danger of erring in the mode of collecting, for want of experience to

guide them. From these considerations, there was no doubt but the act

would require the reconsideration of the Legislature in a short time;

there may be applications from the people of all quarters to repeal a

part of it. But what are their immediate representatives to do, in case

the bill be made perpetual? They may be convinced that a repeal would be

just and necessary; but it may not be in their power to remedy the

grievances of their constituents, however desirous they may be of doing

so; for, although this House may originate and carry a bill unanimously

through for the repeal, yet it will be in the power of the President,

and the minority of the other branch of Congress, to prevent a repeal.

Mr. HUNTINGDON thought it easy to see the danger of making this bill

perpetual: besides parting with the power which the constitution gave to

the House of Representatives, in authorizing them solely to originate

money bills, there would be another inconvenience, which was, extending

the revenue beyond what the nature of the public debt required. The

foreign debt was payable by instalments; it was saying nothing to allege

that the debt would accumulate, because the United States must make

provision for the annual extinguishment of a part. If the revenue,

arising from the impost, be insufficient for this purpose, recourse must

be had to some other fund, which will enable us to perform the

engagements of the late Congress. It is true the debt is large, and will

take time to pay it off, but he had no doubt but it would be done

according to contract, and with honor to the Union. How, then, can

gentlemen suppose the revenue ought to be perpetual, in order to be

commensurate with the object? If they contemplated the contraction of

more debts in future, the supposition might be true; but he saw no

reason why gentlemen should extend their views so far. He thought if a

future war, or some other untoward circumstance, should increase the

national debt, it ought to be provided for by the Government who were

acquainted with the necessity. He thought the House ought to consider

seriously before they parted with their powers; it was easy for them to

pass a bill to give power, but it was difficult to recall it. He had

seen many instances of this kind; one in particular in the State from

which he came, where the Legislature had given the appointment of

sheriffs, and some other little matters, out of their hands, and had

been a long time endeavoring to get it back; but they had not been able

to obtain it. He had no suspicions of any character in the Senate, but

the constitution had made that body in some degree perpetual, to obtain

a permanency in the laws; if, therefore, this revenue bill had once

their approbation, they might be inclined to continue it, even against

the sentiments of the people and of the House. Though he was not against

trusting the gentlemen who now composed the Senate, he was against

trusting their successors.

Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, was also in favor of the clause; he

conceived the only reason of weight urged against it, related to the

restoration of public credit; but he thought every person possessed of

the stock or debt of the United States would have the same feelings and

reasoning as the House; they would know that their demands depended upon

a higher source than Congress, and might be sure that we would do our

duty in making particular provision. If Congress neglected this, one

part of the creditors would compel them. If it was found that the United

States were not disposed to pay their debts, foreigners would find the

means to make them. Taking it therefore for granted, that Congress would

always provide for these objects, he would proceed to consider what

effect might arise from a permanent or temporary provision. If the

latter were made, the creditors would honor us for our exertions, and

confide in our continuing to provide for them in the manner we should

find upon experience most convenient to the community. If the system was

declared to be a perpetual provision for the payment of their interest,

it would give no hope, in the first place, for the redemption of the

capital; and in the second, if Congress were to alter it, and which, in

all probability they shortly must, the security would be impaired, and

an essential injury done to the public credit, which we are so desirous

to revive.

Mr. AMES considered this as a very important question; and in order that

his own mind might be fully enlightened, he had listened with the most

unwearied attention to the arguments urged on both sides; but he was far

from being satisfied that the motion was necessary or proper for the

House to adopt.

Gentlemen tell us they are willing to make the revenue commensurate with

the debt. If they do this, all the inconveniences resulting from the

imperfection of the system will be entailed upon us for a number of

years. Other gentlemen mention a year or two for its limitation. Can the

House listen seriously to such a proposition? If we were to tell our

creditors that we are making provision for them for one year, would it

tend to inspire them with confidence in our wisdom or justice? Would our

foreign creditors believe we were scrupulously fulfilling our

engagements with them? No: nothing less than a fixed, permanent system,

can beget confidence or give security. An illusory system of one or two

years' duration would engender distrust; its very visage would make the

public suspect deception. If we do not mean to deceive, why not make the

provision commensurate to the occasion? His idea of a temporary act was

_pro hac vice_, by way of experiment: but he thought the House could not

make the experiment with this bill, because the public credit would not

admit of it. If this act be made for one year, will it not be a

considerable expense to the public by going over all the ground again,

which had taken the House such a length of time to discuss?

What has been the conduct of Great Britain, in relation to her funds?

What has carried the credit of that kingdom to a superior eminence, but

the attention she has paid to public credit? He considered these

advantages as having made that nation rich and powerful. He believed a

like conduct on our part would produce the same consequences, because

our Government is of such a nature as to give the public creditors the

greatest security they could wish. If the revenue is appropriated, and

the law for collecting it is without any limitation, the funds cannot be

taken away without a positive act of injustice, to which both Houses of

the Legislature must assent by a majority of two-thirds, or three

independent parties must unite. It was therefore three to one in favor

of the public creditor, that the funds appropriated to his use would not

be annihilated. Under these circumstances, Government might more safely

be trusted. This, he observed, was not the case under despotic princes;

their will alone could tear away the security of the subject. Under a

pure democracy, the case was almost as bad; no confidence could be

placed, because the caprice and whim of one body could dictate a change.

Mr. PAGE expressed his surprise to find gentlemen opposed to the

limitation of the bill, who had complained so much of its imperfections.

He thought a measure of the kind now proposed absolutely necessary to

reconcile these gentlemen to particular parts of the bill. For his own

part, he had objections to some articles, and for that reason, if there

was no other, he would be in favor of the limitation. It had been

frequently asserted that half the revenue would be lost by smuggling.

Can this, then, he would ask, be a bill proper to perpetuate, or fit for

the restoration of the credit of the United States? He asked gentlemen

whether they would lend a hand to rivet round the necks of their

fellow-citizens a regulation which experience had convinced them was

unjust, unequal, and oppressive? Yet the gentleman from Massachusetts

(Mr. AMES) had declared that experience had convinced him that at least

one particular article was subjected to a duty of this kind.

Mr. GERRY asked his colleague if he advocated carrying the taxes to such

an extent as to accumulate sums in the treasury for which the United

States had no particular use? Yet if this revenue law were made

perpetual, it would collect money into the public coffers after the

national debt was paid. This would be such a temptation to the Executive

to possess itself by force of the treasures of the nation, as he hoped

would never be put in its way. If our commerce and population increased,

this revenue would increase in the same proportion. He could not,

therefore, bear the idea of all this money being collected into one

spot, unless there was an absolute demand for it. He thought it

incompatible with the liberty and security of the people, and therefore

hoped the House would agree to a short limitation.

Mr. MADISON, for the sake of accommodation, would make another

proposition. He was extremely sorry to differ with gentlemen about

modes, when their object appeared to be the same. He thought the spirit

of the constitution and the structure of the Government rendered it

improper to pass a perpetual revenue law. The arguments had been clear

on this point; but as there was an evident propriety in making the means

commensurate to the occasion, he was inclined to give the bill such a

perpetuity as would answer the purpose of providing for the public debt

and restoring the national credit. He thought this might be done by

modifying his motion so as to refer to the collection bill; for he

hoped, before that passed, the House would be able to ascertain the

appropriation, and could limit it accordingly. The words he would

propose were, that this act should not continue and be in force longer

than the ---- day of ----, unless otherwise limited by the act providing

for the appropriation. As he had heard it intimated that the yeas and

nays would be called on this question, he was desirous of rendering the

clause as satisfactory as possible.

Mr. AMES could not bear to lie under the imputation of inconsistency,

with which he was charged, inasmuch as he contended against the

limitation of a bill he had opposed as oppressive in some of its parts.

He believed the amendment now offered was new to almost every gentleman.

For his part, he had always supposed it was intended as a permanent

system. He remembered many gentlemen made use of this expression,

through the various debates which had taken place in the several stages

of the bill. He had understood it in this light, and had therefore

combated, with some degree of energy, such parts as appeared to him

impolitic or unjust. He imagined the gentlemen on both sides had labored

to make the bill as perfect as possible, with a view of making an

equitable provision for the public exigencies, which should affect all

parts of the Union with the greatest degree of impartiality.

Mr. SHERMAN observed, that when Congress applied to the several States

for the five per cent. impost, they judged it would enable them to

extinguish the national debt in twenty-five years; but, in addition to

this fund, they expected to make annual requisitions on the States, for

one and a half million of dollars at least; so that gentlemen could not

expect the whole to be paid by this single fund in a short time. He

wished a limitation to the law in general terms, such as until the debt,

foreign and domestic, is discharged. He thought a short term would made

an unfavorable impression upon the minds of the public creditors, and

tend in a great measure to cloud the happy prospects that began to

brighten the political hemisphere of this country.

Mr. GERRY expressed an intention of calling the yeas and nays if he was

supported, because he thought it a question in which the essential

interests of the people were deeply involved.

Mr. LAWRENCE said, he held his present opinion upon the purest

principles of patriotism, and an ardent love for his country's

happiness. He had no objection to the yeas and nays being taken, as he

was not inclined to disguise his sentiments.

Mr. PAGE was glad the yeas and nays were called, as it would give

gentlemen an opportunity of showing to their constituents their

approbation of a measure calculated to secure the blessings of liberty

to themselves and posterity.

Several members rose to speak on this question, when Mr. AMES moved the

adjournment, fearing gentlemen would grow warm upon the question.

Whereupon, the House adjourned.

SATURDAY, May 16.

Mr. SENEY, from Maryland, presented to the House an act of the

Legislature of that State, offering to the acceptance of Congress ten

miles square of territory, in any part of the said State, for the seat

of the Federal Government, which was read and ordered to lie on the

table.

_Duties on Imports._

The House resumed the consideration of the amendment proposed yesterday

to the bill for laying a duty on goods, wares, and merchandises imported

into the United States, and the said amendment read as follows: "And be

it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that this act shall be in

force until the ---- day of ----, and from thence until the end of the

next session of Congress which shall happen thereafter."

The question was called for, and Mr. LAWRENCE required the ayes and

noes.

Mr. JACKSON wished to say a few words on the bill. The ayes and noes

being called for, he conceived it his duty to state his reasons for his

vote. He declared himself to be in favor of the limitation, for the

reasons offered by honorable gentlemen yesterday. He said he had as

ardent a desire to re-establish public credit, and place it on a good

footing, as any member on that floor, yet he did not think making this

law perpetual would have that tendency. He had no doubt but every

subsequent Legislature would be equally desirous of doing justice to

the creditors of the Union, and he therefore felt no uneasiness in

leaving such provision to be made by them. If the next Legislature were

disposed to violate the public honor, would the law now under

consideration stand in their way? For his part, he could not conceive it

an insuperable bar. He believed there was not a member who liked every

part of the bill. Under these circumstances, what was to be expected but

complaints from the people, and a consequent repeal of the bill? He did

not wish to insinuate that the Senate would be so depraved as to oppose

the public voice, but they might misunderstand it; they were a permanent

body, and might be more inclined to support what they considered the

honor of the Government than the convenience of the people.

The House of Representatives appeared to him to be the body best

calculated to know and feel the interests of their immediate

constituents; they ought, therefore, to preserve the power of redressing

grievances, and not give too much into the hands of the Senate. He

acknowledged the claims which those that fought and bled for their

country had upon the justice of Congress; but he did not believe that

class of citizens would complain or murmur at this House for keeping the

purse strings in their hands, when it was considered necessary to the

security and happiness of the people.

Mr. WHITE did not see the necessity of calling the yeas and nays: he

thought the measure was intended to have one of these two objects,

either to show one part of the House had mistaken the interest of their

country, and ought to be held up to posterity, in order that their

memories may be charged with their want of knowledge; or that there is a

part of this House who think themselves more wise and patriotic than the

majority. He never called the yeas and nays in his life, nor believed he

ever should; but he was willing to have his vote appear, in all cases,

when gentlemen thought proper to perpetuate the decision of the House in

that way. On this occasion he would vote in favor of the amendment, and

would endeavor to answer the objections, which, if well founded, would

be a subject of great uneasiness in his mind, considering how he

intended to give his vote.

He would now proceed to examine, whether rendering this law perpetual

would be a wise and prudent measure. It had been well observed by the

gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. JACKSON,) that every part of the law would

bear harder on some States than on others; perhaps there was no State in

the Union which would not be in some degree dissatisfied. He could

perceive, by the sentiments of gentlemen in this House, that the

burthens would be peculiarly felt; under these impressions, gentlemen

have expressed themselves more warmly than perhaps they ought. There had

been predictions of the most dangerous consequences of high duties,

which he would not repeat; if these dangers were not imaginary, would it

be prudent in the House, to risk these consequences, and make these

dangers unavoidable by rendering the law perpetual.

Much pains had been taken to impose the burthens as equally as possible.

If the duty on molasses bears hard upon one State, the tonnage duty

would bear equally so upon others. But still it is probable, that there

are unequal pressures laid by the bill, which experience alone could

enable the Legislature to alter to the satisfaction of all parties. The

system was great, complex, and comprehensive; it embraces commerce,

manufactures, agriculture, finance, and, in short, every thing in which

a nation can be concerned. Will it be prudent, then, under our present

disadvantages, and without information, to enact a law affecting the

highest interests of the people, which can never be repealed but by the

consent of three independent bodies? Gentlemen have told us, that no

valuable purpose can be answered by making the law temporary; now, he

thought a valuable purpose could be answered by it. The two Houses of

Congress, with the qualified negative of the President, formed the

legislative power of the United States; they are distinct powers to be

exercised by both branches of the Legislature. The House had been told,

on a former occasion, that the Senate possessed greater powers than the

Representatives. He admitted that, in some instances, they had greater

powers; but with respect to revenue matters, they certainly had less,

and very properly so. Shall we then give up to a body, who has already a

superiority over us, those superior powers which we possess relative to

revenue? A perpetual system would give the Senate greater advantages

than constitutionally they ought to enjoy. He thought it of little

consequence for the House to possess the right of originating money

bills, if those money bills were made perpetual. The exercise of this

right would be lost, and he thought it necessary that every part of

Government should feel itself dependent upon the people. We have been

told, with truth, that the Senate are a virtuous body; they are so, and

he hoped would remain so, for ages yet to come, nay for ever; and, in

his legislative capacity, he would act upon no other supposition. But

still it ought to be remembered, that they would always be men, and

liable to all the errors, frailties, and infirmities, with the rest of

their fellow-mortals; besides, they were constituted in some measure for

purposes to which the other branch was incompetent; while this House was

constituted for purposes for which the Senate is unequal. It is a

well-grounded republican maxim, that taxation and representation should

depend each on the other. The people should be taxed only by

representatives chosen for that purpose. This principle was written in

the hearts of our British ancestors; it had been maintained by the best

blood of our citizens, and he hoped it would descend with the fullest

energy to our posterity. What, said he, are we about to do? A great

branch of revenue, indeed the only branch, to which an application is

now proper, or expected by the people, is about to be put out of our

hands for ever; for it would not be in the power of this House, or any

future House, to annihilate those funds without the consent of the

Senate and the concurrence of the President. Now, the Senate are not an

equal representation of the people; in that body the States have equal

numbers, while, in this House, the representation is proportioned to

their population. Delaware sends one, Georgia three, and Virginia ten.

Is it possible, in the nature of things, that two Senators can be as

well acquainted with the feelings and interest of the people of

Virginia, as ten men selected from among them, and taken from the

several parts of the State? Will the people be satisfied to have that

body able to continue a revenue system which their immediate

representatives think oppressive, or perhaps unnecessary? Certainly they

would not; whatever the wisdom and virtue of the Senate may be, he was

convinced they were not competent to those peculiar objects for which a

just representation was absolutely necessary. The Senate, it is true, is

not a House of Lords; they do not possess any properties materially

distinguishing them from the members of the House of Representatives;

but, though the distinction is not so striking in the one case as in the

other, yet it was nevertheless real. The House of Lords is created by

the King, and is a permanent body; the Senate is chosen by the State

Legislatures, and though the individuals have not a permanency in

office, yet the body never ceases to exist. These circumstances, in the

constitution of the Senate, afforded a powerful objection to the new

system of Government, and the people would never have adopted it, had

they supposed that the powers of this body were unlimited in continuing

a system of taxation, which had at any time met the approbation of their

particular representatives.[23]

Mr. TUCKER did not think it necessary to give his opinion otherwise than

by his vote, because gentlemen, who had yesterday delivered their

sentiments in favor of the clause, had anticipated what he had to say.

But as he found himself influenced by the call for the ayes and noes on

this question, he should be induced to state some of his reasons in

favor of the amendment. He said, he was glad the ayes and noes had been

called, and if it had not been done by any other gentleman, he should

have conceived himself bound to have done it; because he did not think

himself at liberty, but on very particular occasions, to make a law

perpetual. He wished to see a doctrine established, never to pass a law

without limitation, unless justified by some extraordinary

circumstances. Nothing, he thought, could ever justify such an act but

the immutability of the object, and the absolute necessity and

simplicity of every thing relating to it. If the House passed a

perpetual revenue law, which had not an immutable object, they would

abridge their own power, and destroy one of the great privileges of the

people. Every bill of this nature, more or less, narrows the powers of

this House, and throws it into the hands of the Executive and a minority

of the Senate; for it is to be considered, that whenever we pass a bill

on any subject, every matter in that bill contained is given up to the

Executive and one-third of the Senators, so much so that it is out of

the power of this House, even with a unanimous vote, to recover any part

of it.

Mr. SYLVESTER was in favor of the limitation clause. A good deal had

been said in the House respecting the jarring interests of the several

States. It had been confessed on all hands, that this was an

experimental law: he viewed it as such, and expected, in the course of a

few years, the Legislature would be able to discover the errors of this

day. But what advantage can result from their knowledge, if they have

not power to make the necessary alterations, or to build up a new system

more perfect than the old? He had examined the annals of history, but

was unable to discover that any nation had ever established a perpetual

revenue law. He imagined gentlemen would admit these reasons to be

sufficient to warrant the vote they were about to give.

Mr. SINNICKSON did not expect this was to be a perpetual law, incapable

of alteration; but he wished to see it a permanent system. The idea of a

temporary system was long ago said to be out of the contemplation of the

House. He should only observe, in addition to this, that our credit

depended essentially upon what should be done at this time. He thought

if the revenue existed merely upon the breath of the Legislature, for

one or two years at a time, we should never attain that object. He

thought that the public good required something substantial to be done

in favor of those who had lent the public money in the hour of distress.

Mr. BOUDINOT thought himself obliged to say a few words more, in order

to justify the part he should take in the division of the House on this

question. He conceived the manner in which the motion was brought before

the House, after the bill was supposed to be gone through, did not give

such opportunity for the members to consider the subject as its

importance seemed to require, and which might have been had if it had

been brought forward at an earlier period.

If, said he, we are to have the measures of the Parliament of Great

Britain hung about our necks in all our public proceedings, and

observations from their practice perpetually sounding in our ears, that

practice ought to be defined and established. He believed that in the

whole volumes of the statute law, there was not one single revenue act

to be found with a limitation. He believed that the revenue laws, passed

fifty, sixty, eighty, and near a hundred years ago, in that kingdom,

existed at the present moment. We have long seen and been convinced of

the infirmities of the former confederation, and shall we now rivet

those infirmities upon the present constitution? Are we never to stand

upon a certain and solid foundation? Is not our public credit totally

gone? Has not experience convinced us that the loss of it would have

been our total destruction, if the generous exertions we have lately

made had not revived some degree of confidence in our future measures?

Are we not so deeply in debt as to give us reason to believe that it

will require many years to emancipate ourselves? If this is the case,

will a revenue law for one or two years bring that relief which is

expected? Will this prevent an increase of the public debt? Will it

restore value to the evidences of that debt held by our creditors? He

would ask any man, whether, if the United States were in the situation

in which they were last war, he would be induced to lend money upon a

temporary and inadequate fund provided for two years? He believed the

answer would be in the negative.

Mr. MADISON withdrew his motion in order to introduce another, which he

hoped would reconcile both sides of the House. He joined those gentlemen

who opposed the clause in thinking that one or two years would be a

period insufficient to answer the purposes in contemplation. If the

House agree to the clause he would substitute for the one just

withdrawn, he would move to fill the blank with a more distant day. His

motion was, that this act shall not continue in force after the ---- day

of ---- unless otherwise provided in the act for the appropriation of

the revenue.

Mr. FITZSIMONS seconded the motion.

Mr. SHERMAN liked this motion better than the other. Although he was in

favor of leaving the law at large, he would vote for this clause, if the

blanks were filled up with a sufficient time to accomplish those objects

which the Government had in view in providing revenue.

Mr. AMES thought the question would recur when the appropriation or

collecting bill came before them; he would rather, for his own part,

decide the question at this moment, than consume the time of the House

with another debate. Besides the House was not in possession of an act

for appropriating the revenue; such a measure might never be agreed to;

therefore he hoped the decision would take place at this time rather

than be evaded.

Mr. FITZSIMONS was of opinion, that this revenue ought to be

appropriated to the payment of the public debts; what were the views of

other gentlemen he could not say. He was nevertheless in favor of

limiting the law, and that upon constitutional principles, though he

wished it commensurate to its object. Gentlemen had said a great deal

respecting the imperfection of the system, that it was the effect of

compromise; but nevertheless, he thought it as free from defects as it

was possible a revenue system could be formed with such materials as the

House possessed; but if it was imperfect, he did not see the

difficulties some gentlemen mentioned, in altering and amending it when

experience shall have pointed out its defects.

Mr. BOUDINOT acquiesced in the motion now brought forward for the sake

of accommodation, although he thought the bill would stand better

without any limitation clause whatever.

Mr. PAGE was against the latter part of this clause. It had been justly

said, that the bill would be oppressive; but, from the necessity of the

times, the people will submit to it. Shall we not let them see the end

of their burthen in the law itself? Are they to look into another bill

for that purpose? Perhaps after the Senate have agreed to this act, they

may oppose the limitation in the subsequent one; they may insist upon

having this in perpetuity, and then the object which the House have in

view will be defeated.

Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, moved a division of the question.

Mr. LEE wished to strike out that part of the motion which related to

the exception.

Mr. LIVERMORE seconded Mr. LEE.

The question was put, and that part of the clause lost.

The question now stood as originally introduced to the House.

The previous question was then demanded by five members: Shall the main

question be now put? And on the question, shall the main question be now

put? it was resolved in the affirmative.

And then the main question being put, that the House do agree to the

amendment proposed to the said bill, it was resolved in the

affirmative--ayes 41, noes 8.

The ayes and noes being called for by one-fifth of the members present:

Those who voted in the affirmative, are,

Messrs. Abraham Baldwin, Egbert Benson, Theodorick Bland,

Ædanus Burke, Daniel Carroll, Isaac Coles, Benjamin Contee,

Thomas Fitzsimons, William Floyd, George Gale, Elbridge

Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, Samuel Griffin,

Jonathan Grout, John Hathorn, Daniel Heister, Benjamin

Huntington, James Jackson, Richard Bland Lee, George

Leonard, Samuel Livermore, James Madison, junior, Andrew

Moore, Peter Muhlenberg, John Page, Josiah Parker, George

Partridge, Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, Joshua Seney, Thomas

Scott, William Smith, William Smith, of South Carolina,

Jonathan Sturgis, Peter Sylvester, Jonathan Trumbull, Thos.

Tudor Tucker, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Alexander

White, and Henry Wynkoop.

Those who voted in the negative, are,

Messrs. Fisher Ames, Elias Boudinot, Lambert Cadwalader,

George Clymer, John Lawrence, Roger Sherman, Thomas

Sinnickson, and George Thatcher.

The clause being added, it was agreed to fill the blank so as to read

the first day of June, 1796.

_Ordered_, That the said bill, with the amendments, be engrossed, and

read the third time to-day.[24]

MONDAY, May 18.

_Resolved_, That leave be given to bring in a bill

concerning the importation of certain persons into the

United States, prior to the year 1808, and that Mr. PARKER,

Mr. SINNICKSON, and Mr. MUHLENBERG, do prepare and bring in

the same.

TUESDAY, May 19.

_Executive Departments._

On motion of Mr. BOUDINOT, the House resolved itself into a Committee of

the whole House on the state of the Union. Mr. TRUMBULL in the chair.

Mr. BOUDINOT.--I rise, Mr. Chairman, with diffidence, to introduce a

subject to the consideration of the committee, which I had hopes would

have been brought forward by an abler hand; the pressing necessity of it

must alone be my excuse. The great executive departments which were in

existence under the late confederation, are now at an end, at least so

far as not to be able to conduct the business of the United States. If

we take up the present constitution, we shall find it contemplates

departments of an executive nature in aid of the President: it then

remains for us to carry this intention into effect, which I take it will

be best done by settling principles for organizing them in this place,

and afterwards appoint a select committee to bring in a bill for the

same.

I need say little to convince gentlemen of the necessity which presses

us into a pursuit of this measure. They know that our national debt is

considerable; the interest on our foreign loans, and the instalments

due, amount to two millions of dollars. This arrearage, together with

the domestic debt, is of great magnitude, and it will be attended with

the most dreadful consequences to let these affairs run into confusion

and ruin, for want of proper regulations to keep them in order.

I shall move the committee therefore to come to some such resolution as

this: That an officer be established for the management of the finances

of the United States, at the head of which shall be an officer to be

denominated the Secretary of Finance. I am not tenacious of the style,

perhaps some other may be proper, but the object I have in view is to

establish the department; after which we may go on to narrate the duties

of the officer, and accommodate the name to the acts he is to perform.

The departments under the late constitution are not to be models for us

to form ours upon by reason of the essential change which has taken

place in the Government, and the new distribution of legislative,

executive, and judicial powers.

If gentlemen then agree with me so far, I shall proceed to restrain the

Secretary of Finance, and all persons under him, from being concerned in

trade or commerce, and make it his duty to superintend the treasury and

the finances of the United States, examine the public debts and

engagements, inspect the collection and expenditure of the revenue, and

to form and digest plans for its improvement. There may be other duties

which gentlemen may add, as I do not pretend to have perfectly

enumerated them all. After this point is settled, we may then go to the

consideration of the War Department, and the Department of Foreign

Affairs; but, for the present, I would wish to confine ourselves to the

Department of Finance.

Mr. BENSON wished the committee to consider what he judged to be a

previous question, namely, how many departments there should be

established? He approved of the division mentioned by the gentleman; but

would, with his leave, move that there be established in aid of the

Chief Magistrate, three executive departments, to be severally

denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, Treasury, and War. After

determining this question, if it was a proper division, the committee

might proceed to enumerate the duties which should be attached to each.

Mr. BOUDINOT said, he could apologize for not bringing the business on

in another way. It seemed to be a settled point in the House that a

Committee of the Whole was the proper place for determining principles

before they were sent elsewhere; he had therefore adopted that mode on

the present occasion, though his own judgment would incline him to

pursue that last mentioned by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BLAND.)

He conceived the necessity of having such an office was indisputable;

the Government could not be carried on without it; but there may be a

question with respect to the mode in which the business of the office

shall be conducted; there may also be a question respecting the

constitution of it, but none with respect to the establishment of either

of the three departments he had mentioned.

Mr. BENSON said, his motion was founded upon the constitutional division

of these powers; the constitution contemplated them, because it gave the

President the right of requiring the opinion of the principal officer in

each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the

duties of their respective offices. If gentlemen were inclined to waive

the determination for the present, he had no objection; it was certainly

a subject of great importance, and required time for consideration.

Mr. VINING thought the gentleman should have added another department,

viz: the Home Department. The territorial possessions of the United

States, and the domestic affairs, would be objects of the greatest

magnitude, and he suspected would render it essentially requisite to

establish such a one.

Mr. BOUDINOT wished to confine the question to the Department of

Finance.

A motion was made by Mr. BLAND for the committee's rising.

Mr. MADISON hoped they would not rise until the principles were settled.

He thought it much better to determine the outlines of all business in a

Committee of the Whole. He was satisfied it would be found, on

experience, to shorten their deliberations. If the gentlemen who had

offered motions to the committee would withdraw them, he would offer one

which he judged likely to embrace the intentions of both gentlemen.

Mr. BENSON withdrew his motion, and Mr. MADISON moved, that it is the

opinion of this committee, that there shall be established an Executive

Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, at the

head of which there shall be an officer, to be called the Secretary to

the Department of Foreign Affairs, who shall be appointed by the

President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and to be

removable by the President.

That there shall be a Treasury Department, &c.

That there shall be a War Department, &c.

Mr. VINING seconded the motion, and offered to amend it, by adding the

Domestic Department, _mutatis mutandis_. He said this department, in his

opinion, was of absolute necessity, more requisite than either of the

other three, except the Department of Finance; the present and

increasing duties of such a department will oblige them to make the

establishment.

Mr. LIVERMORE was not prepared to decide on the question even as now

brought forward, nor did he see a reason why the Department of Foreign

Affairs was placed at the head of the list. He thought the Treasury

Department of more importance, and consequently deserved the precedence.

As to the Domestic Department just mentioned by the gentleman from

Delaware, he thought its duties might be blended with the others, and

thereby save the United States the expense of one grand department. If

the gentleman, therefore, would wait to see what were the duties

assigned to them severally, he would be able to judge respecting his

motion with greater propriety.

Mr. VINING withdrew his motion for the present.

And the committee agreed to the establishment of the Department of

Foreign Affairs, and placing at the head thereof an officer to be called

the Secretary of Foreign Affairs; but when they came to the mode of

appointing the officer,

Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) moved to strike out the words "who shall

be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the

Senate." He conceived the words to be unnecessary; besides, it looked as

if they were conferring power, which was not the case, for the

constitution had expressly given the power of appointment in the words

there used. He also objected to the subsequent part of this paragraph,

because it declared the President alone to have the power of removal.

Mr. PAGE saw no impropriety in passing an act to carry into execution

the views of the constitution, and therefore had no objection to repeat

those words in the resolution. He thought if the committee stopped

there, they would be under no difficulty respecting the propriety of

their measure, but if they went further they might meet with

considerable embarrassment.

Mr. MADISON remarked, that as there was a discretionary power in the

Legislature to give the privilege to the President alone of appointing

inferior officers, there could be no injury in declaring in the

resolution the constitutional mode of appointing the heads of

departments; however, if gentlemen were uneasy, he would not object to

strike it out.

Mr. LEE thought this officer was an inferior officer; the President was

the great and responsible officer of the Government; this was only to

aid him in performing his executive duties; hence he conceived the power

of appointing to be in the gift of the Legislature, and therefore the

words were proper.

Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina.)--This officer is at the head of a

department, and one of those who are to advise the President; the

inferior officers mentioned in the constitution are clerks and other

subordinate persons. The words are only a repetition of the words in the

constitution, and are consequently superfluous.

The question was taken on striking out those words, and carried in the

affirmative.

The committee proceeded to the discussion of the power of the President

to remove this officer.

Mr. SMITH said, he had doubts whether the officer could be removed by

the President. He apprehended he could only be removed by an impeachment

before the Senate, and that, being once in office, he must remain there

until convicted upon impeachment. He wished gentlemen would consider

this point well before they decided it.

Mr. MADISON did not concur with the gentleman in his interpretation of

the constitution. What, said he, would be the consequence of such

construction? It would in effect establish every officer of the

Government on the firm tenure of good behavior; not the heads of

departments only, but all the inferior officers of those departments,

would hold their offices during good behavior, and that to be judged of

by one branch of the Legislature only on the impeachment of the other.

If the constitution means this by its declarations to be the case, we

must submit; but I should lament it as a fatal error interwoven in the

system, and one that would ultimately prove its destruction. I think the

inference would not arise from a fair construction of the words of that

instrument.

It is very possible that an officer who may not incur the displeasure of

the President, may be guilty of actions that ought to forfeit his place.

The power of this House may reach him by the means of an impeachment,

and he may be removed even against the will of the President; so that

the declaration in the constitution was intended as a supplemental

security for the good behavior of the public officers. It is possible

the case I have stated may happen. Indeed, it may, perhaps, on some

occasion, be found necessary to impeach the President himself; surely,

therefore, it may happen to a subordinate officer, whose bad actions may

be connived at or overlooked by the President. Hence the people have an

additional security in this constitutional provision.

I think it absolutely necessary that the President should have the

power of removing from office; it will make him, in a peculiar manner,

responsible for their conduct, and subject him to impeachment himself,

if he suffers them to perpetrate with impunity high crimes or

misdemeanors against the United States, or neglects to superintend their

conduct, so as to check their excesses. On the constitutionality of the

declaration I have no manner of doubt.

Mr. BENSON.--If we refer to the constitution for light on this subject,

it will appear evident that the objection is not well founded. The

objection is this, that an officer ought not to be removed but by

impeachment; then every officer is appointed during good behavior. Now,

the constitution expressly declares, that the Judges, both of the

Supreme and Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good

behavior. If it is declared, that they are to hold their offices by this

particular tenure, it follows that the other officers of the Government

should hold them only at pleasure. He thought this an important

question, and one in which they were obliged to take the constitution by

construction. For although it detailed the mode of appointing to office,

it was not explicit as to the supersedure; this clause, therefore, would

be a mere declaration of the legislative construction on this point. He

thought the importance and necessity of making the declaration, that the

Chief Magistrate might supersede any civil officer was evident, and he

should therefore vote in favor of the clause as it stood.

Mr. VINING said, there were no negative words in the constitution to

preclude the President from the exercise of this power; but there was a

strong presumption that he was invested with it: because it was

declared, that all executive power should be vested in him, except in

cases where it is otherwise qualified; as, for example, he could not

fully exercise his executive power in making treaties, unless with the

advice and consent of the Senate--the same in appointing to office.

He viewed the power of removal, by impeachment, as a supplementary

security to the people against the continuance of improper persons in

office; but it did not consist with the nature of things, that this

should be the only mode of removal; it was attended with circumstances

that would render it insufficient to secure the public safety, which was

a primary object in every Government. Witness a transatlantic instance

of its incompetency--he meant the famous case of Mr. Hastings. With what

difficulty was that prosecution carried on! What a length of time did it

take to determine! What is to be done while the impeachment is

depending? For, according to the ideas of the gentleman from South

Carolina, (Mr. SMITH,) he cannot be removed but on conviction. If he

cannot be removed, I should suppose he cannot be suspended; and what

security have the people against the machinations of a bad man in

office? He had no doubt but the constitution gave this power to the

President; but if doubts were entertained, he thought it prudent to

make a legislative declaration of the sentiments of Congress on this

point. He was therefore in favor of the clause.

Mr. BLAND thought the power given by the constitution to the Senate,

respecting the appointment to office, would be rendered almost nugatory

if the President had the power of removal. If the first nomination of

the President should be disapproved by the Senate, and the second agreed

to, he had nothing to do but wait the adjournment of Congress, and then

fill the vacancy with his favorite; who, by thus getting into the

possession of the office, would have a considerable chance of permanency

in it. He thought it consistent with the nature of things, that the

power which appointed should remove; and would not object to a

declaration in the resolution, if the words were added, that the

President shall remove from office, by and with the advice and consent

of the Senate. He agreed that the removal by impeachment was a

supplementary aid favorable to the people; but he was clearly of

opinion, that the same power that appointed had, or ought to have, the

power of removal.

Mr. JACKSON wished the motion had been referred to a sub-committee to

digest: it seemed to him they were building the house before the plan

was drawn. He wished to see the system reduced to writing, that he might

leisurely judge of the necessity and propriety of each office and its

particular duties.

With respect to the question before the House he was of opinion that if

the House had the power of removal by the constitution, they could not

give it out of their hands; because every power recognized by the

constitution must remain where it was placed by that instrument. But the

words in the constitution declare, in positive terms, that all civil

officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction

of, high crimes and misdemeanors; and however long it may take to

decide, in this way it must be done. He did not think the case of Mr.

Hastings ought to be brought forward as a precedent for conducting such

business in the United States. He believed, whenever an impeachment was

brought before the Senate, they would proceed with all imaginable speed

to its termination. He should, in case of impeachment, be willing to go

so far as to give the power of suspension to the President, and he

thought this all the security which the public safety required; it would

prevent the party from doing further mischief. He agreed with the

gentleman in the general principle, that the body who appointed ought to

have the power of removal, as the body which enacts laws can repeal

them; but if the power is deposited in any particular department by the

constitution, it is out of the power of the House to alter it.

Mr. MADISON did not conceive it was a proper construction of the

constitution to say, that there was no other mode of removing from

office than that by impeachment; he believed this, as applied to the

Judges, might be the case, but he could never imagine it extended in the

manner which gentlemen contended for. He believed they would not assert,

that any part of the constitution declared, that the only way to remove

should be by impeachment; the contrary might be inferred, because

Congress may establish offices by law; therefore, most certainly, it is

in the discretion of the Legislature to say upon what terms the office

shall be held, either during good behavior or during pleasure. Under

this construction, the principles of the constitution would be

reconcilable in every part; but under that of the gentleman from South

Carolina, it would be incongruous and faulty. He wondered how the

gentleman from Georgia (Mr. JACKSON) would reconcile his principles so

far as to permit the President to suspend the officer. He begged his

colleague (Mr. BLAND) to consider the inconvenience his doctrine would

occasion, by keeping the Senate constantly sitting, in order to give

their assent to the removal of an officer; they might see there would be

a constant probability of the Senate being called upon to exercise this

power, consequently they could not be a moment absent. Now, he did not

believe the constitution imposed any such duty upon them; why, then,

said he, shall we enjoin it, especially at such an expense of the public

treasure?

Mr. BOUDINOT would by no means infringe the constitution by any act of

his, for if he thought this motion would lead the committee beyond the

powers assigned to the Legislature, he would give it a decided negative;

but, on an impartial examination of that instrument, he could not see

the least foundation for such an objection; however, he was glad the

question had come forward, because he wished to give a legislative

construction to this part of the constitution.

The gentlemen who denied the power of the President to remove from

office, founded their opinion upon the fourth section of the second

article of the constitution, where it is declared, that all officers

shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of,

treason or bribery. If their construction is admissible, and no officer

whatever is to be removed in any other way than by impeachment, we shall

be in a deplorable situation indeed. Consider the extent of the United

States, and the difficulty of conducting a prosecution against an

officer, who, with the witnesses, resides a thousand miles from the seat

of Government. But suppose the officer should, by sickness, or some

other accident, be rendered incapable of performing the functions of the

office, must he be continued? And yet it is to be apprehended, that such

a disability would not furnish any good ground for impeachment; it could

not be laid as treason or bribery, nor perhaps as a high crime or

misdemeanor. Would gentlemen narrow the operation of the constitution in

this manner, and render it impossible to be executed?

Mr. WHITE thought no office under the Government was to be held during

pleasure, except those which are to be constituted by law; but all the

heads of departments are to be appointed by the President, by and with

the advice and consent of the Senate. He conceived that, in all cases,

the party who appointed ought to judge of the removal, except in those

cases which by the constitution are excepted; and in those cases

impeachment and conviction are the only mode by which they can be

removed.

Mr. THATCHER asked, why the Judges were particularly mentioned in the

constitution as holding their offices during good behavior, if it was

not supposed that, without this express declaration in their favor,

they, in common with all other officers not immediately chosen by the

State Legislatures and the people, would hold them during pleasure? The

clause respecting impeachments was particularly calculated for removing

unworthy officers of the other description. Holding this construction of

the constitution to be right, he was in favor of the clause as it stood.

Mr. SYLVESTER thought the constitution ought to have a liberal

construction, and therefore was of opinion that the clause relative to

the removal by impeachment was intended as a check upon the President,

as already mentioned by some gentlemen, and to secure to the people, by

means of their representatives, a constitutional mode of obtaining

justice against peculators and defaulters in office, who might be

protected by the persons appointing them. He apprehended the doctrine

held out by the gentleman from South Carolina would involve the

Government in great difficulties, if not in ruin, and he did not see it

was a necessary construction of the constitution. Why, then, should the

House search for a meaning, to make the constitution inconsistent with

itself, when a more rational one is at hand? He, however, inclined at

present to the sentiments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BLAND,)

who thought the Senate ought to be joined with the President in the

removal, as they were joined by the constitution in the appointment to

office.

Mr. GOODHUE was decidedly against combining the Senate in this business.

He wished to make the President as responsible as possible for the

conduct of the officers who were to execute the duties of his own branch

of the Government. If the removal and appointment were placed in the

hands of a numerous body, the responsibility would be lessened. He

admitted there was a propriety in allowing the Senate to advise the

President in the choice of officers; this the constitution had ordained

for wise purposes; but there could be no real advantage arising from the

concurrence of the Senate to the removal, but great disadvantages. It

might beget faction and party, which would prevent the Senate from

paying proper attention to the public business. Upon the whole, he

concluded the community would be served by the best men when the Senate

concurred with the President in the appointment; but if any oversight

was committed, it could best be corrected by the superintending agent.

It was the peculiar duty of the President to watch over the executive

officers; but of what avail would be his inspection, unless he had a

power to correct the abuses he might discover.

Mr. GERRY.--The constitution provides for the appointment of the public

officers in this manner: The President shall nominate, and by and with

the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other

public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other

officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein

otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. Now, if

there be no other clause respecting the appointment, I shall be glad to

see how the heads of departments are to be removed by the President

alone. What clause is it that gives this power in express terms? I

believe there is none such. If there is a power of removal, besides that

by impeachment, it must vest somewhere. It must vest in the President,

or in the President and Senate, or in the President, Senate, and House

of Representatives. Now, there is no clause which expressly vests it in

the President. I believe no gentleman contends it is in this House,

because that would be that mingling of the executive and legislative

powers gentlemen deprecate. I presume, then, gentlemen will grant, that

if there is such a power, it vests with the President, by and with the

advice and consent of the Senate, who are the body that appoints. I

think we ought to be cautious how we step in between the President and

the Senate, to abridge the power of the one, or increase the other. If

the power of removal vests where I suppose, we, by this declaration,

undertake to transfer it to the President alone.

It has been mentioned, that it is proper to give this power to the

President, in order to make him more fully responsible for this officer.

I am for supporting the President to the utmost of my power, and making

him as responsible as possible. I would therefore vest every gift of

office, in the power of the Legislature, in the President alone; but I

cannot think we ought to attempt to give him authority to remove from

office, in cases where the constitution has placed it in other hands.

Mr. LIVERMORE considered this as a constitutional question, and was of

opinion, that the same power which appointed an officer, had the right

of removal also, unless it was restrained by an express declaration to

the contrary. As the President, by and with the advice and consent of

the Senate, is empowered to appoint ambassadors, certainly they have a

right to remove them and appoint others. In the case of the judges, they

must be appointed for life, or during good behavior. He had no idea,

that it could ever enter into the heart of any man living, that all

officers appointed under the constitution were to have a perpetuity in

office. The judges themselves would not have had this right, if it had

not been expressly given by the constitution, but would be removable in

like manner with ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. He

took it, therefore, in the present case, that the President and the

Senate would have the power of removing the Secretary of Foreign

Affairs. The only question, therefore, which appears to be before the

committee is, whether we shall give this power to the President alone?

And with that he thought they had nothing to do. He supposed, if the

clause was left out, the President and the Senate would proceed, as

directed by the constitution, to appoint the officer; and hereafter, if

they judged it necessary, would remove him; but if they neglected to do

so, when it was necessary, by reason of his misdemeanors, this House

would impeach him, and so get rid of him on conviction.