THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The republican character of the constitutional convention, the
qualifications of the delegates, and the extent to which they
trusted to the wisdom of the people.
The Constitutional Convention was a republican body, and not a mass
meeting. George Washington presided. He was a delegate from Virginia.
James Madison was another representative from the same state, and he
wrote the greater part of the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson was in
France, and had nothing whatever to do with drafting the great
document, or in securing its adoption. Benjamin Franklin was a delegate
from Pennsylvania. Roger Sherman was a representative of Connecticut.
New York sent no delegate, but Alexander Hamilton, who with George
Washington had early recognized that the League of Nations, or League
of Sovereign States, which means the same, and which the old Articles
of Confederation created, was proving an utter failure in practice, and
had, therefore, urged from the beginning “a more perfect union,”
attended and he was seated as a delegate from New York. His matchless
vision led him to seek the incorporation of additional safeguards
against bolshevism, as it is now called, and though his advice was not
heeded it was Hamilton, more than any other man, with John Jay and
James Madison his able supporters, who secured the ratification of the
Constitution as drafted.
These, and the other delegates, representing the people of the several
states, after much deliberation formulated the historic document
beginning, “We the people.” It provides among other things that its
ratification by _delegated conventions_ in nine of the thirteen states
shall make it binding upon the states so ratifying the same. It also
provides that it can be amended in a similar _delegated convention_
called at the request of chosen representatives in the legislatures of
two-thirds of all the states, or by joint resolutions passed by
two-thirds of the representatives of the people, in Congress assembled,
when ratified by representatives of the people in three-fourths of the
states, in their respective legislatures assembled.
Those who talk about “taking the government back to the people” would
do well to remember that the American people have never voted upon any
provision of the National Constitution, and there is no way provided by
which they can, in any direct way, express their approval or
disapproval. I repeat, the Fathers created a republic, and not a
democracy. Washington speaks of “the delegated will of the
nation”—never of the popular wish of the people.
THE FATHERS CONSULTED HISTORY
The members of the Constitutional Convention were worthy of their
seats. They were men of both learning and experience. They had read
history. They knew that many attempts at representative government had
been made and that all had failed. They also knew the path all these
republics had taken on their way to oblivion. They were fully alive to
the fact that the first step had always been from representative
government to direct government; from direct government to chaos, from
chaos to the man on horseback—the dictator; thence to monarchy. The
discussion in the convention makes it abundantly clear that the Fathers
sought to save America from the monarch, and to protect her from the
mass. They chose the middle ground between two extremes, both fraught
with danger.
They even went so far as to guarantee that no state should be cursed
with a democratic form of government, or a monarchial form of
government or any other kindred system. The provision is in this
language: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
Union a republican form of government.” That excludes every other form.
CONFIDENCE IN THE PEOPLE JUSTIFIED
The members of the Constitutional Convention, having been selected
because of their aptitude for public matters, their knowledge of public
questions and their experience in public affairs, very naturally had
confidence that men of like caliber and character would always be
selected for important representative positions. They believed the
people would choose legislators, executives and judges of aptitude, at
least, and would retain them in office until they attained efficiency
through experience.
Presumably these delegates anticipated that men would be born with no
aptitude for public positions, but they confidently believed even these
would be able to select men of aptitude. They may have realized that
some men would be unfit for Congress, who, nevertheless, would be
competent to select able congressmen. For these, as well as for other
reasons, they provided no way by which those whom no one would think of
sending to Congress, and who naturally give no attention to public
affairs, could instruct their congressmen, who alone must bear the
responsibility of legislation. Had such a thing as legislating by
referendum been thought of at that time, the Fathers certainly would
have expressly prohibited it. Legislation by representatives was
considered and express and detailed provision therefor was made.
The preceding differentiation between republic and democracy has no
reference, of course, to political parties. Long before the republican
party, as now constituted, had an existence, democratic orators grew
eloquent over “republican institutions,” meaning thereby representative
institutions.
Every protestant church in America is a republic. Its affairs are
managed by representatives—by boards. Otherwise there would be no
churches. Every bank and every corporation is a republic, managed by
boards and officers selected by stockholders. The United States Steel
Corporation, for instance, is analogous to a republic, the stockholders
being the electors, but if the stockholders were to take charge of that
corporation, and direct its management by initiative or referendum, it
would be in the hands of a receiver within ninety days.
The United States of America is a great Corporation, in which the
Stockholder is the Elector. Stockholders of financial and industrial
corporations desire dividends, which are paid in cash. Not desiring
office, the stockholders are satisfied to have the corporation managed
by representatives of aptitude and experience. The dividends paid by
political corporations like the United States and the several states
are “liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” “equality before the law,”
an army and navy for national defense, and courts of justice for the
enforcement of rights and the redress of wrongs. But stockholders in
political corporations are not always satisfied with these returns.
Some prefer office to dividends payable only in blessings.
In banks and other business corporations, stockholders are apt to
insist that representatives and officers who show aptitude and
efficiency shall be continued in office so long as dividends are
satisfactory. In political corporations the people have recently been
pursuing a very different course. They have been changing their
representatives so frequently that efficiency, which results only from
experience, is impossible.
While stockholders of a corporation would certainly wreck the
institution if they attempted to manage its affairs directly or by
referendum, it is very appropriate for stockholders, acting on the
recommendation of their representatives—the board of directors—to
determine an important measure like an issue of bonds, or whether the
scope and purpose of the concern shall be enlarged or its capital
increased. Analogous to this is the determination of governmental
policies at regular elections where the people choose between the
programs of different political parties as set forth in their
platforms. Thus the people sometimes ratify the policy of protection,
and sometimes the policy of free trade, demonstrating that they do not
always act wisely by frequently reversing themselves.
Political parties usually omit from their platforms the details of
legislation. The only exception that occurs to me was when every detail
of a financial policy was incorporated in the platform submitted for
ratification. The coinage was to be “free,” it was to be “unlimited,”
and at the “ratio of 16 to 1.” If the people had approved this at the
polls their representatives would have had no discretion. There would
have been no room for compromise. While the people are presumably
competent to choose between policies recommended in the platforms of
political parties, it is a far stretch of the imagination to suppose
that the average citizen is better prepared to determine the details of
a policy than the man he selects to represent him in the halls of
Congress. The congressman who concedes that his average constituent is
better prepared to pass upon a proposition than he is necessarily
admits in the same breath that his district committed a serious blunder
in sending him. It ought to have selected a man at least of average
intelligence.
The fact that neither stockholders _en masse_, nor employees _en masse_
are able to manage a business enterprise does not imply that the
principle of a republic may not be advantageously applied to industrial
concerns. This question is again referred to in Chapter XXX, and the
possible safe, middle course between the industrial autocracy demanded
by capital, and the industrial democracy demanded by labor, is
suggested and briefly discussed.