General the Marquis de la Fayette, have determined to erect his bust in
their Capital. Desirous to place a like monument of his worth, and of
their sense of it, in the country to which they are indebted for his
birth, they have hoped that the city of Paris will consent to become the
depository of this second testimony of their gratitude. Being charged by
them with the execution of their wishes, I have the honor to solicit of
Messieurs le Prevot des Marchands et Echevins, on behalf of the city,
their acceptance of a bust of this gallant officer, and that they will
be pleased to place it where, doing most honor to him, it will most
gratify the feelings of an allied nation.
It is with true pleasure that I obey the call of that commonwealth, to
render just homage to a character so great in its first developements,
that they would honor the close of any other. Their country covered by
a small army against a great one, their exhausted means supplied by his
talents, their enemies finally forced to that spot whither their allies
and confederates were collecting to receive them, and a war which had
spread its miseries into the four quarters of the earth thus reduced
to a single point, where one blow should terminate it, and through the
whole, an implicit respect paid to the laws of the land; these are facts
which would illustrate any character, and which fully justify the warmth
of those feelings, of which I have the honor, on this occasion, to be
the organ.
It would have been more pleasing to me to have executed this office in
person, to have mingled the tribute of private gratitude with that of my
country, and, at the same time, to have had an opportunity of presenting
to your honorable body, the homage of that profound respect which I have
the honor to bear them. But I am withheld from these grateful duties,
by the consequences of a fall, which confine me to my room. Mr. Short,
therefore, a citizen of the State of Virginia, and heretofore a member
of its Council of State, will have the honor of delivering you this
letter, together with the resolution of the General Assembly of
Virginia. He will have that, also, of presenting the bust at such time
and place, as you will be so good as to signify your pleasure to receive
it. Through him, I beg to be allowed the honor of presenting those
sentiments of profound respect and veneration, with which I am,
Gentlemen, your most obedient and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER XXIII.--TO COLONEL MONROE, July 9, 1786
TO COLONEL MONROE.
Paris, July 9, 1786.
Dear Sir,
I wrote you last on the 10th of May; since which your favor of May the
11th has come to hand. The political world enjoys great quiet here. The
King of Prussia is still living, but like the snuff of a candle, which
sometimes seems out, and then blazes up again. Some think that his death
will not produce any immediate effect in Europe. His kingdom like a
machine, will go on for some time with the winding up he has given it.
The King’s visit to Cherbourg has made a great sensation in England
and here. It proves to the world, that it is a serious object to this
country, and that the King commits himself for the accomplishment of
it. Indeed, so many cones have been sunk, that no doubt remains of the
practicability of it. It will contain, as is said, eighty ships of
the line, be one of the best harbors in the world, and by means of two
entrances, on different sides, will admit vessels to come in and go out
with every wind. The effect of this, in another war with England, defies
calculation. Having no news to communicate, I will recur to the subjects
of your letter of May the 11th.
With respect to the new States, were the question to stand simply in
this form, How may the ultramontane territory be disposed of, so as to
produce the greatest and most immediate benefit to the inhabitants of
the maritime States of the Union? the plan would be more plausible, of
laying it off into two or three States only. Even on this view, however,
there would still be something to be said against it, which might render
it at least doubtful. But that is a question, which good faith forbids
us to receive into discussion. This requires us to state the question in
its just form, How may the territories of the Union be disposed of, so
as to produce the greatest degree of happiness to their inhabitants?
With respect to the maritime States, little or nothing remains to
be done. With respect, then, to the ultramontane States, will their
inhabitants be happiest, divided into States of thirty thousand square
miles, not quite as large as Pennsylvania, or into States of one hundred
and sixty thousand square miles each, that is to say, three times as
large as Virginia within the Allegany? They will not only be happier in
States of moderate size, but it is the only way in which they can exist
as a regular society. Considering the American character in general,
that of those people particularly, and the energetic nature of our
governments, a State of such extent as one hundred and sixty thousand
square miles, would soon crumble into little ones. These are the
circumstances, which reduce the Indians to such small societies. They
would produce an effect on our people, similar to this. They would not
be broken into such small pieces, because they are more habituated to
subordination, and value more a government of regular law. But you
would surely reverse the nature of things, in making small States on
the ocean, and large ones beyond the mountains. If we could, in our
consciences, say, that great States beyond the mountains will make the
people happiest, we must still ask, whether they will be contented to be
laid off into large States. They certainly will not: and if they decide
to divide themselves, we are not able to restrain them. They will end by
separating from our confederacy, and becoming its enemies. We had better
then look forward, and see what will be the probable course of things.
This will surely be a division of that country into States, of a small,
or, at most, of a moderate size. If we lay them off into such, they will
acquiesce; and we shall have the advantage of arranging them, so as to
produce the best combinations of interest. What Congress have already
done in this matter, is an argument the more, in favor of the revolt of
those States against a different arrangement, and of their acquiescence
under a continuance of that. Upon this plan, we treat them as
fellow-citizens; they will have a just share in their own government;
they will love us, and pride themselves in an union with us. Upon
the other, we treat them as subjects; we govern them, and not they
themselves; they will abhor us as masters, and break off from us in
defiance. I confess to you, that I can see no other turn that these two
plans would take. But I respect your opinion, and your knowledge of the
country, too much, to be over-confident in my own.
I thank you sincerely for your communication, that my not having sooner
given notice of the _Arrêts_ relative to fish, gave discontent to some
persons. These are the most friendly offices you can do me, because they
enable me to justify myself, if I am right, or correct myself, if wrong.
If those who thought I might have been remiss, would have written to me
on the subject, I should have admired them for their candor, and thanked
them for it: for I have no jealousies nor resentments at things of this
kind, where I have no reason to believe they have been excited by a
hostile spirit; and I suspect no such spirit in a single member of
Congress. You know there were two _Arrêts_; the first of August the
30th, 1784, the second of the 18th and 25th of September, 1785. As to
the first, it would be a sufficient justification of myself, to say,
that it was in the time of my predecessor, nine months before I came
into office, and that there was no more reason for my giving information
of it, when I did come into office, than of all the other transactions,
which preceded that period. But this would seem to lay a blame on Dr.
Franklin for not communicating it, which I am confident he did not
deserve. This government affects a secrecy in all its transactions
whatsoever, though they be of a nature not to admit a perfect secrecy.
Their _Arrêts_ respecting the islands go to those islands, and are
unpublished and unknown in France, except in the bureau where they are
formed. That of August, 1784, would probably be communicated to the
merchants of the seaport towns also. But Paris having no commercial
connections with them, if any thing makes its way from a seaport town
to Paris, it must be by accident. We have, indeed, agents in these
seaports; but they value their offices so little, that they do not
trouble themselves to inform us of what is passing there. As a proof
that these things do not transpire here, nor are easily got at,
recollect that Mr. Adams, Dr. Franklin, and myself were all here on the
spot together, from August, 1784, to June, 1785, that is to say, ten
months, and yet not one of us knew of the _Arrêt_ of August, 1784.
September the 18th and 25th, 1785, the second was passed. And here alone
I became responsible. I think it was about six weeks before I got notice
of it, that is, in November. On the 20th of that month, writing to Count
de Vergennes on another subject, I took occasion to remonstrate to him
on that. But from early in November, when the Fitzhughs went to America.
I had never a confidential opportunity of writing to Mr. Jay from hence,
directly, for several months. In a letter of December the 14th, to
Mr. Jay, I mentioned to him the want of an opportunity to write to him
confidentially, which obliged me at that moment to write by post via
London, and on such things only, as both post-offices were welcome to
see. On the 2nd of January, Mr. Bingham setting out for London, I wrote
to Mr. Jay, sending him a copy of my letter to Count de Vergennes, and
stating something, which had passed in conversation on the same subject.
I prayed Mr. Bingham to take charge of the letter, and either to send it
by a safe hand, or carry it himself, as circumstances should render most
advisable. I believe he kept it, to carry himself. He did not sail from
London till about the 12th of March, nor arrive in America till the
middle of May. Thus you see, that causes had prevented a letter, which
I had written on the 20th of November, from getting to America till the
month of May. No wonder, then, if notice of this _Arrêt_ came first to
you by the way of the West Indies: and, in general, I am confident, that
you will receive notice of the regulations of this country, respecting
their islands, by the way of those islands, before you will from hence.
Nor can this be remedied, but by a system of bribery, which would end
in the corruption of your own ministers, and produce no good adequate
to the expense. Be so good as to communicate these circumstances to the
persons who you think may have supposed me guilty of remissness on this
occasion.
I will turn to a subject more pleasing to both, and give you my sincere
congratulations on your marriage. Your own dispositions, and the
inherent comforts of that state, will insure you a great addition of
happiness. Long may you live to enjoy it, and enjoy it in full measure.
The interest I feel in every one connected with you, will justify my
presenting my earliest respects to the lady, and of tendering her the
homage of my friendship. I shall be happy at all times to be useful to
either of you, and to receive your commands. I enclose you the bill of
lading of your _Encyclopédie_. With respect to the remittance for it,
of which you make mention, I beg you not to think of it. I know, by
experience, that on proceeding to make a settlement in life, a man has
need of all his resources; and I should be unhappy, were you to lessen
them by an attention to this trifle. Let it lie till you have nothing
else to do with your money. Adieu, my Dear Sir, and be assured of the
esteem with which I am your friend and servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER XXIV.--TO JOHN ADAMS, July 11, 1786
TO JOHN ADAMS.
Paris, July 11, 1786.
Dear Sir,
Our instructions relative to the Barbary States having required us to
proceed by way of negotiation to obtain their peace, it became our
duty to do this to the best of our power. Whatever might be our private
opinions, they were to be suppressed, and the line marked out to us
was to be followed. It has been so, honestly and zealously. It was,
therefore, never material for us to consult together on the best plan
of conduct towards these States. I acknowledge I very, early thought it
would be best to effect a peace through the medium of war. Though it
is a question with which we have nothing to do, yet as you propose
some discussion of it, I shall trouble you with my reasons. Of the four
positions laid down in your letter of the 3rd instant, I agree to the
three first, which are, in substance, that the good offices of our
friends cannot procure us a peace, without paying its price, that they
cannot materially lessen that price; and that paying it, we can have the
peace in spite of the intrigues of our enemies. As to the fourth, that
the longer the negotiation is delayed, the larger will be the demand;
this will depend on the intermediate captures: if they are many and
rich, the price may be raised; if few and poor, it will be lessened.
However, if it is decided, that we shall buy a peace, I know no reason
for delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be
hastened: but I should prefer the obtaining it by war.
1. Justice is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will
procure us respect in Europe; and respect is a safeguard to interest. 4.
It will arm the federal head with the safest of all the instruments of
coercion over its delinquent members, and prevent it from using what
would be less safe. I think, that so far you go with me. But in the
next steps we shall differ. 5. I think it least expensive. 6. Equally
effectual. I ask a fleet of one hundred and fifty guns, the one half
of which shall be in constant cruise. This fleet, built, manned, and
victualled for six months, will cost four hundred and fifty thousand
pounds sterling. Its annual expense will be three hundred pounds
sterling a gun, including every thing: this will be forty-five thousand
pounds sterling a year. I take British experience for the basis of my
calculation: though we know, from our own experience, that we can do in
this way for pounds lawful, what costs them pounds sterling. Were we to
charge all this to the Algerine war, it would amount to little more than
we must pay if we buy peace. But as it is proper and necessary, that we
should establish a small marine force (even were we to buy a peace from
the Algerines), and as that force, laid up in our dock-yard, would cost
us half as much annually as if kept in order for service, we have a
right to say, that only twenty-two thousand and five hundred pounds
sterling, per annum, should be charged to the Algerine war. 6. It will
be as effectual. To all the mismanagements of Spain and Portugal, urged
to show that war against those people is ineffectual, I urge a single
fact to prove the contrary, where there is any management. About forty
years ago, the Algerines having broke their treaty with France, this
court sent Monsieur de Massiac, with one large and two small frigates:
he blockaded the harbor of Algiers three months, and they subscribed
to the terms he proposed. If it be admitted, however, that war, on the
fairest prospects, is still exposed to uncertainties, I weigh against
this the greater uncertainty of the duration of a peace bought with
money, from such a people, from a Dey eighty years old, and by a nation
who, on the hypothesis of buying peace, is to have no power on the sea
to enforce an observance of it.
So far I have gone on the supposition, that the whole weight of this war
would rest on us. But, 1. Naples will join us. The character of their
naval minister (Acton), his known sentiments with respect to the peace
Spain is officiously trying to make for them, and his dispositions
against the Algerines, give the best grounds to believe it. 2. Every
principle of reason assures,us, that Portugal will join us. I state this
as taking for granted, what all seem to believe, that they will not
be at peace with Algiers. I suppose, then, that a convention might be
formed between Portugal, Naples, and the United States, by which
the burthen of the war might be quotaed on them, according to their
respective wealth; and the term of it should be, when Algiers should
subscribe to a peace with all three on equal terms. This might be left
open for other nations to accede to, and many, if not most of the powers
of Europe (except France, England, Holland, and Spain, if her peace be
made), would sooner or later enter into the confederacy, for the sake of
having their peace with the piratical States guarantied by the whole.
I suppose, that, in this case, our proportion of force would not be the
half of what I first calculated on.
These are the reasons, which have influenced my judgment on this
question. I give them to you, to show you that I am imposed on by a
semblance of reason at least; and not with an expectation of their
changing your opinion. You have viewed the subject, I am sure, in
all its bearings. You have weighed both questions, with all their
circumstances. You make the result different from what I do. The same
facts impress us differently. This is enough to make me suspect an error
in my process of reasoning, though I am not able to detect it. It is of
no consequence; as I have nothing to say in the decision, and am ready
to proceed heartily on any other plan, which may be adopted, if my
agency should be thought useful. With respect to the dispositions of the
States, I am utterly uninformed. I cannot help thinking, however, that
on a view of all the circumstances, they might be united in either of
the plans.
Having written this on the receipt of your letter, without knowing
of any opportunity of sending it, I know not when it will go: I add
nothing, therefore, on any other subject, but assurances of the sincere
esteem and respect, with which I am,
Dear Sir, your friend and servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER XXV.--TO JOHN JAY, August 11, 1786
TO JOHN JAY.
Paris, August 11, 1786.
Sir,
Since the date of my last, which was of July the 8th, I have been
honored with the receipt of yours of June the 16th. I am to thank you,
on the part of the minister of Geneva, for the intelligence it contained
on the subject of Gallatin, whose relations will be relieved by the
receipt of it.
The enclosed intelligence, relative to the instructions of the court of
London to Sir Guy Carleton, came to me through the Count de la Touche
and Marquis de la Fayette. De la Touche is a director under the Marechal
de Castries, minister for the marine department, and possibly receives
his intelligence from him, and he from their ambassador at London.
Possibly, too, it might be fabricated here. Yet weighing the characters
of the ministry of St. James’s and Versailles, I think the former more
capable of giving such instructions, than the latter of fabricating them
for the small purposes the fabrication could answer.
The Gazette of France, of July the 28th, announces the arrival of
Peyrouse at Brazil, that he was to touch at Otaheite, and proceed to
California, and still further northwardly. This paper, as you well
know, gives out such facts as the court are willing the world should
be possessed of. The presumption is, therefore, that they will make an
establishment of some sort on the northwest coast of America.
I trouble you with the copy of a letter from Schweighauser and Dobree,
on a subject with which I am quite unacquainted. Their letter to
Congress of November the 30th, 1780, gives their state of the matter.
How far it be true and just, can probably be ascertained from Dr.
Franklin, Dr. Lee, and other gentlemen now in America. I shall be glad
to be honored with the commands of Congress on this subject. I have
inquired into the state of the arms, mentioned in their letter to
me. The principal articles were about thirty thousand bayonets, fifty
thousand gunlocks, thirty cases of arms, twenty-two cases of sabres, and
some other things of little consequence. The quay at Nantes having been
overflowed by the river Loire, the greatest part of these arms was under
water, and they are now, as I am informed, a solid mass of rust, not
worth the expense of throwing them out of the warehouse, much less that
of storage. Were not their want of value a sufficient reason against
reclaiming the property of these arms, it rests with Congress to decide,
whether other reasons are not opposed to this reclamation. They were the
property of a sovereign body, they were seized by an individual, taken
cognizance of by a court of justice, and refused, or at least not
restored by the sovereign, within whose State they had been arrested.
These are circumstances which have been mentioned to me. Doctor
Franklin, however, will be able to inform Congress, with precision, as
to what passed on this subject. If the information I have received be
any thing like the truth, the discussion of this matter can only be with
the court of Versailles. It would be very delicate, and could have but
one of two objects; either to recover the arms, which are not worth
receiving, or to satisfy us on the point of honor. Congress will judge
how far the latter may be worth pursuing against a particular ally, and
under actual circumstances. An instance, too, of acquiescence on our
part under a wrong, rather than disturb our friendship by altercations,
may have its value in some future case. However, I shall be ready to do
in this what Congress shall be pleased to direct.
I enclose the despatches relative to the Barbary negotiation, received
since my last. It is painful to me to overwhelm Congress and yourself
continually with these voluminous papers. But I have no right to
suppress any part of them, and it is one of those cases, where, from
a want of well digested information, we must be contented to examine a
great deal of rubbish, in order to find a little good matter.
The gazettes of Leyden and France, to the present date, accompany this,
which, for want of direct and safe opportunities, I am obliged to send
by an American gentleman, by the way of London. The irregularity of the
French packets has diverted elsewhere the tide of passengers who used to
furnish me occasions of writing to you, without permitting my letters
to go through the post-office. So that when the packets go now, I can
seldom write by them.
I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest esteem and
respect, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
[The annexed is a translation of the paper referred to in
the preceding letter, on the subject of the instructions
given to Sir Guy Carleton.]
_An extract of English political news, concerning North America, July
14th, 1786_.
General Carleton departs in a few days with M. de la Naudiere, a
Canadian gentleman. He has made me acquainted with the Indian Colonel
Joseph Brandt. It is certain that he departs with the most positive
instructions to distress the Americans as much as possible, and to
create them enemies on all sides.
Colonel Brandt goes loaded with presents for himself, and for several
chiefs of the tribes bordering on Canada. It would be well for the
Americans to know in time, that enemies are raised against them, in
order to derange their system of government, and to add to the confusion
which already exists in it. The new possessions of England will not only
gain what America shall lose, but will acquire strength in proportion to
the weakening of the United States.
Sooner or later, the new States which are forming will place themselves
under the protection of England, which can always communicate with them
through Canada; and which, in case of future necessity, can harass the
United States on one side, by her shipping, and on the other, by her
intrigues. This system has not yet come to maturity, but it is unfolded,
and we may rely upon the instructions given to Colonel Brandt.
LETTER XXVI.--TO COLONEL MONROE, August 11, 1786
TO COLONEL MONROE.
Paris, August 11, 1786.
Dear Sir,