an adult strength of abuse, and of wealth and influence growing out of
that abuse, his Majesty's Commons had, in the last Parliament, and still
have, to struggle. We are sensible that the influence of that wealth, in
a much larger degree and measure than at any former period, may have
penetrated into the very quarter from whence alone any real reformation
can be expected.[68]
If, therefore, in the arduous affairs recommended to us, our proceedings
should be ill adapted, feeble, and ineffectual,--if no delinquency
should be prevented, and no delinquent should be called to account,--if
every person should be caressed, promoted, and raised in power, in
proportion to the enormity of his offences,--if no relief should be
given to any of the natives unjustly dispossessed of their rights,
jurisdictions, and properties,--if no cruel and unjust exactions should
be forborne,--if the source of no peculation or oppressive gain should
be cut off,--if, by the omission of the opportunities that were in our
hands, our Indian empire should fall into ruin irretrievable, and in its
fall crush the credit and overwhelm the revenues of this country,--we
stand acquitted to our honor and to our conscience, who have reluctantly
seen the weightiest interests of our country, at times the most critical
to its dignity and safety, rendered the sport of the inconsiderate and
unmeasured ambition of individuals, and by that means the wisdom of his
Majesty's government degraded in the public estimation, and the policy
and character of this renowned nation rendered contemptible in the eyes
of all Europe.
* * * * *
It passed in the negative.
FOOTNOTES:
[59] See King's Speech, Dec. 5, 1782, and May 19, 1784.
[60] "I shall never submit to the doctrines I have heard this day from
the woolsack, that the other House [House of Commons] are the only
representatives and guardians of the people's rights. I boldly maintain
the contrary. I say this House [House of Lords] _is equally the
representatives of the people_."--Lord Shelburne's Speech, April 8,
1778. _Vide_ Parliamentary Register, Vol. X. p. 892.
[61] In that Parliament the House of Commons by two several resolutions
put an end to the American war. Immediately on the change of ministry
which ensued, in order to secure their own independence, and to prevent
the accumulation of new burdens on the people by the growth of a civil
list debt, they passed the Establishment Bill. By that bill thirty-six
offices tenable by members of Parliament were suppressed, and an order
of payment was framed by which the growth of any fresh debt was rendered
impracticable. The debt on the civil list from the beginning of the
present reign had amounted to one million three hundred thousand pounds
and upwards. Another act was passed for regulating the office of the
Paymaster-General and the offices subordinate to it. A million of public
money had sometimes been in the hands of the paymasters: this act
prevented the possibility of any money whatsoever being accumulated in
that office in future. The offices of the Exchequer, whose emoluments in
time of war were excessive, and grew in exact proportion to the public
burdens, were regulated,--some of them suppressed, and the rest reduced
to fixed salaries. To secure the freedom of election against the crown,
a bill was passed to disqualify all officers concerned in the collection
of the revenue in any of its branches from voting in elections: a most
important act, not only with regard to its primary object, the freedom
of election, but as materially forwarding the due collection of revenue.
For the same end, (the preserving the freedom of election,) the House
rescinded the famous judgment relative to the Middlesex election, and
expunged it from the journals. On the principle of reformation of their
own House, connected with a principle of public economy, an act passed
for rendering contractors with government incapable of a seat in
Parliament. The India Bill (unfortunately lost in the House of Lords)
pursued the same idea to its completion, and disabled all servants of
the East India Company from a seat in that House for a certain time, and
until their conduct was examined into and cleared. The remedy of
infinite corruptions and of infinite disorders and oppressions, as well
as the security of the most important objects of public economy,
perished with that bill and that Parliament. That Parliament also
instituted a committee to inquire into the collection of the revenue in
all its branches, which prosecuted its duty with great vigor, and
suggested several material improvements.
[62] If these speculations are let loose, the House of Lords may quarrel
with their share of the legislature, as being limited with regard to the
origination of grants to the crown and the origination of money bills.
The advisers of the crown may think proper to bring its negative into
ordinary use,--and even to dispute, whether a mere negative, compared
with the deliberative power exercised in the other Houses, be such a
share in the legislature as to produce a due balance in favor of that
branch, and thus justify the previous interference of the crown in the
manner lately used. The following will serve to show how much foundation
there is for great caution concerning these novel speculations. Lord
Shelburne, in his celebrated speech, April 8th, 1778, expresses himself
as follows. (_Vide_ Parliamentary Register, Vol. X.)
"The noble and learned lord on the woolsack, in the debate which opened
the business of this day, asserted that your Lordships were incompetent
to make any alteration in a money bill or a bill of supply, I should be
glad to see the matter fairly and fully discussed, and the subject
brought forward and argued upon precedent, as well as all its collateral
relations. I should be pleased to see the question fairly committed,
were it for no other reason but to hear the sleek, smooth contractors
from the other House come to this bar and declare, that they, and they
only, _could frame a money bill_, and they, and they _only_, could
dispose of the _property of the peers of Great Britain_. Perhaps some
arguments more plausible than those I heard this day from the woolsack,
to show that the Commons have an uncontrollable, unqualified right to
bind your Lordships' property, may be urged by them. At present, I beg
leave to differ from the noble and learned lord; for, until the claim,
after a solemn discussion of this House, is openly and directly
relinquished, I shall continue to be of opinion that your Lordships have
a right to after, _amend_, or reject a money bill."
The Duke of Richmond also, in his letter to the volunteers of Ireland,
speaks of several of the powers exercised by the House of Commons in the
light of usurpations; and his Grace is of opinion, that, when the people
are restored to what he conceives to be their rights, in electing the
House of Commons, the other branches of the legislature ought to be
restored to theirs.--_Vide_ Remembrancer, Vol. XVI.
[63] By an act of Parliament, the Directors of the East India Company
are restrained from acceptance of bills drawn, from India, beyond a
certain amount, without the consent of the Commissioners of the
Treasury. The late House of Commons, finding bills to an immense amount
drawn upon that body by their servants abroad, and knowing their
circumstances to be exceedingly doubtful, came to a resolution
providently, cautioning the Lords of the Treasury against the acceptance
of these bills, until the House should otherwise direct. The Court Lords
then took occasion to declare against the resolution as illegal, by the
Commons undertaking to direct in the execution of a trust created by act
of Parliament. The House, justly alarmed at this resolution, which went
to the destruction of the whole of its superintending capacity, and
particularly in matters relative to its own province of money, directed
a committee to search the journals, and they found a regular series of
precedents, commencing from the remotest of those records, and carried
on to that day, by which it appeared that the House interfered, by an
authoritative advice and admonition, upon every act of executive
government without exception, and in many much stronger cases than that
which the Lords thought proper to quarrel with.
[64] "I observe, at the same time, that there is _no charge or
complaint_ suggested against my present ministers."--The King's Answer,
25th February, 1784, to the Address of the House of Common. _Vide_
Resolutions of the House of Commons, printed for Debrett, p. 31.
[65] The territorial possessions in the East Indies were acquired to the
Company, in virtue of grants from the Great Mogul, in the nature of
offices and jurisdictions, to be held under _him_, and dependent upon
_his_ crown, with the express condition of being obedient to orders from
_his_ court, and of paying an annual tribute to _his_ treasury. It is
true that no obedience is yielded to these orders, and for some time
past there has been no payment made of this tribute. But it is under a
grant so conditioned that they still hold. To subject the King of Great
Britain as tributary to a foreign power by the acts of his subjects; to
suppose the grant valid, and yet the condition void; to suppose it good
for the king, and insufficient for the Company; to suppose it an
interest divisible between the parties: these are some few of the many
legal difficulties to be surmounted, before the Common Law of England
can acknowledge the East India Company's Asiatic affairs to be a subject
matter of _prerogative_, so as to bring it within the verge of English
jurisprudence. It is a very anomalous species of power and property
which is held by the East India Company. Our English prerogative law
does not furnish principles, much less precedents, by which it can be
defined or adjusted. Nothing but the eminent dominion of Parliament over
every British subject, in every concern, and in every circumstance in
which he is placed, can adjust this new, intricate matter. Parliament
may act wisely or unwisely, justly or unjustly; but Parliament alone is
competent to it.
[66] The attempt upon charters and the privileges of the corporate
bodies of the kingdom in the reigns of Charles the Second and James the
Second was made by the _crown_. It was carried on by the ordinary course
of law, in courts instituted for the security of the property and
franchises of the people. This attempt made by the _crown_ was attended
with complete success. The corporate rights of the city of London, and
of all the companies it contains, were by solemn judgment of law
declared forfeited, and all their franchises, privileges, properties,
and estates were of course seized into the hands of the _crown_. The
injury was from the crown: the redress was by Parliament. A bill was
brought into the _House of Commons_, by which the judgment against the
city of London, and against the companies, was reversed: and this bill
passed the House of Lords without any complaint of trespass on their
jurisdiction, although the bill was for a reversal of a judgment in law.
By this act, which is in the second of William and Mary, chap. 8, the
question of forfeiture of that charter is forever taken out of the power
of any court of law: no cognizance can be taken of it except in
Parliament.
Although the act above mentioned has declared the judgment against the
corporation of London to be _illegal_ yet Blackstone makes no scruple of
asserting, that, "perhaps, in strictness of law, the proceedings in most
of them [the Quo Warranto causes] were sufficiently regular," leaving it
in doubt, whether this regularity did not apply to the corporation of
London, as well as to any of the rest; and he seems to blame the
proceeding (as most blamable it was) not so much on account of
illegality as for the crown's having employed a legal proceeding for
political purposes. He calls it "an exertion of _an act of law_ for the
purposes of the state."
The same security which was given to the city of London, would have been
extended to all the corporations, if the House of Commons could have
prevailed. But the bill for that purpose passed but by a majority of one
in the Lords; and it was entirely lost by a prorogation, which is the
act of the crown. Small, indeed, was the security which the corporation
of London enjoyed before the act of William and Mary, and which all the
other corporations, secured by no statute, enjoy at this hour, if strict
law was employed against them. The use of strict law has always been
rendered very delicate by the same means by which the almost unmeasured
legal powers residing (and in many instances dangerously residing) in
the crown are kept within due bounds: I mean, that strong superintending
power in the House of Commons which inconsiderate people have been
prevailed on to condemn as trenching on prerogative. Strict law is by no
means such a friend to the rights of the subject as they have been
taught to believe. They who have been most conversant in this kind of
learning will be most sensible of the danger of submitting corporate
rights of high political importance to these subordinate tribunals. The
general heads of law on that subject are vulgar and trivial. On them
there is not much question. But it is far from easy to determine what
special acts, or what special neglect of action, shall subject
corporations to a forfeiture. There is so much laxity in this doctrine,
that great room is left for favor or prejudice, which might give to the
crown an entire dominion over those corporations. On the other hand, it
is undoubtedly true that every subordinate corporate right ought to be
subject to control, to superior direction, and even to forfeiture upon
just cause. In this reason and law agree. In every judgment given on a
corporate right of great political importance, the policy and prudence
make no small part of the question. To these considerations a court of
law is not competent; and, indeed, an attempt at the least intermixture
of such ideas with the matter of law could have no other effect than
wholly to corrupt the judicial character of the court in which such a
cause should come to be tried. It is besides to be remarked, that, if,
in virtue of a legal process, a forfeiture should be adjudged, the court
of law has no power to modify or mitigate. The whole franchise is
annihilated, and the corporate property goes into the hands of the
crown. They who hold the new doctrines concerning the power of the House
of Commons ought well to consider in such a case by what means the
corporate rights could be revived, or the property could be recovered
out of the hands of the crown. But Parliament can do what the courts
neither can do nor ought to attempt. Parliament is competent to give due
weight to all political considerations. It may modify, it may mitigate,
and it may render perfectly secure, all that it does not think fit to
take away. It is not likely that Parliament will ever draw to itself the
cognizance of questions concerning ordinary corporations, farther than
to protect them, in case attempts are made to induce a forfeiture of
their franchises.
The case of the East India Company is different even from that of the
greatest of these corporations. No monopoly of trade, beyond their own
limits, is vested in the corporate body of any town or city in the
kingdom. Even within these limits the monopoly is not general. The
Company has the monopoly of the trade of half the world. The first
corporation of the kingdom has for the object of its jurisdiction only a
few matters of subordinate police. The East India Company governs an
empire, through all its concerns and all its departments, from the
lowest office of economy to the highest councils of state,--an empire to
which Great Britain is in comparison but a respectable province. To
leave these concerns without superior cognizance would be madness; to
leave them to be judged in the courts below, on the principles of a
confined jurisprudence, would be folly. It is well, if the whole
legislative power is competent to the correction of abuses which are
commensurate to the immensity of the object they affect. The idea of an
absolute power has, indeed, its terrors; but that objection lies to
every Parliamentary proceeding; and as no other can regulate the abuses
of such a charter, it is fittest that sovereign authority should be
exercised, where it is most likely to be attended with the most
effectual correctives. These correctives are furnished by the nature and
course of Parliamentary proceedings, and by the infinitely diversified
characters who compose the two Houses. In effect and virtually, they
form a vast number, variety, and succession of judges and jurors. The
fulness, the freedom, and publicity of discussion leaves it easy to
distinguish what are acts of power, and what the determinations of
equity and reason. There prejudice corrects prejudice, and the different
asperities of party zeal mitigate and neutralize each other. So far from
violence being the general characteristic of the proceedings of
Parliament, whatever the beginnings of any Parliamentary process may be,
its general fault in the end is, that it is found incomplete and
ineffectual.
[67] The purpose of the misrepresentation being now completely answered,
there is no doubt but the committee in this Parliament, appointed by the
ministers themselves, will justify the grounds upon which the last
Parliament proceeded, and will lay open to the world the dreadful state
of the Company's affairs, and the grossness of their own calumnies upon
this head. By delay the new assembly is come into the disgraceful
situation of allowing a dividend of eight per cent by act of Parliament,
without the least matter before them to justify the granting of any
dividend at all.
[68] This will be evident to those who consider the number and
description of Directors and servants of the East India Company chosen
into the present Parliament. The light in which the present ministers
hold the labors of the House of Commons in searching into the disorders
in the Indian administration, and all its endeavors for the reformation
of the government there, without any distinction of times, or of the
persons concerned, will appear from the following extract from a speech
of the present Lord Chancellor. After making a high-flown panegyric on
those whom the House of Commons had condemned by their resolutions, he
said:--"Let us not be misled by reports from committees of _another_
House, to which, I again repeat, _I pay as much attention as I would do
to the history of Robinson Crusoe,_ Let the conduct of the East India
Company be fairly and fully inquired into. Let it be acquitted or
condemned by evidence brought to the bar of the House. Without entering
very deeply into the subject, let me reply in a few words to an
observation which fell from a noble and learned lord, that the Company's
finances are distressed, and that they owe at this moment a million
sterling to the nation. When such a charge is brought, will Parliament
in its justice forget that the Company is restricted from employing
_that credit which its great and flourishing situation_ gives to it?"
END OF VOL. II.