If it should be seen that his ministers may continue in their offices

without any signification to them of his Majesty's displeasure at any of

their measures, whilst persons considerable for their rank, and known to

have had access to his Majesty's sacred person, can with impunity abuse

that advantage, and employ his Majesty's name to disavow and counteract

the proceedings of his official servants, nothing but distrust, discord,

debility, contempt of all authority, and general confusion, can prevail

in his government.

This we lay before his Majesty, with humility and concern, as the

inevitable effect of a spirit of intrigue in his executive government:

an evil which we have but too much reason to be persuaded exists and

increases. During the course of the last session it broke out in a

manner the most alarming. This evil was infinitely aggravated by the

unauthorized, but not disavowed, use which has been made of his

Majesty's name, for the purpose of the most unconstitutional, corrupt,

and dishonorable influence on the minds of the members of Parliament

that ever was practised in this kingdom. No attention even to exterior

decorum, in the practice of corruption and intimidation employed on

peers, was observed: several peers were obliged under menaces to retract

their declarations and to recall their proxies.

The Commons have the deepest interest in the purity and integrity of the

Peerage. The Peers dispose of all the property in the kingdom, in the

last resort; and they dispose of it on their honor, and not on their

oaths, as all the members of every other tribunal in the kingdom must

do,--though in them the proceeding is not conclusive. We have,

therefore, a right to demand that no application shall be made to peers

of such a nature as may give room to call in question, much less to

attaint, our sole security for all that we possess. This corrupt

proceeding appeared to the House of Commons, who are the natural

guardians of the purity of Parliament, and of the purity of every branch

of judicature, a most reprehensible and dangerous practice, tending to

shake the very foundation of the authority of the House of Peers; and

they branded it as such by their resolution.

The House had not sufficient evidence to enable them legally to punish

this practice, but they had enough to caution them against all

confidence in the authors and abettors of it. They performed their duty

in humbly advising his Majesty against the employment of such ministers;

but his Majesty was advised to keep those ministers, and to dissolve

that Parliament. The House, aware of the importance and urgency of its

duty with regard to the British interests in India, which were and are

in the utmost disorder, and in the utmost peril, most humbly requested

his Majesty not to dissolve the Parliament during the course of their

very critical proceedings on that subject. His Majesty's gracious

condescension to that request was conveyed in the royal faith, pledged

to a House of Parliament, and solemnly delivered from the throne. It was

but a very few days after a committee had been, with the consent and

concurrence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, appointed for an inquiry

into certain accounts delivered to the House by the Court of Directors,

and then actually engaged in that inquiry, that the ministers,

regardless of the assurance given from the crown to a House of Commons,

did dissolve that Parliament. We most humbly submit to his Majesty's

consideration the consequences of this their breach of public faith.

Whilst the members of the House of Commons, under that security, were

engaged in his Majesty's and the national business, endeavors were

industriously used to calumniate those whom it was found impracticable

to corrupt. The reputation of the members, and the reputation of the

House itself, was undermined in every part of the kingdom.

In the speech from the throne relative to India, we are cautioned by the

ministers "not to lose sight of the effect any measure may have on the

Constitution of our country." We are apprehensive that a calumnious

report, spread abroad, of an attack upon his Majesty's prerogative by

the late House of Commons, may have made an impression on his royal

mind, and have given occasion to this unusual admonition to the present.

This attack is charged to have been made in the late Parliament by a

bill which passed the House of Commons, in the late session of that

Parliament, for the regulation of the affairs, for the preservation of

the commerce, and for the amendment of the government of this nation, in

the East Indies.

That his Majesty and his people may have an opportunity of entering into

the ground of this injurious charge, we beg leave humbly to acquaint his

Majesty, that, far from having made any infringement whatsoever on any

part of his royal prerogative, that bill did, for a limited time, give

to his Majesty certain powers never before possessed by the crown; and

for this his present ministers (who, rather than fall short in the

number of their calumnies, employ some that are contradictory) have

slandered this House, as aiming at the extension of an unconstitutional

influence in his Majesty's crown. This pretended attempt to increase the

influence of the crown they were weak enough to endeavor to persuade his

Majesty's people was amongst the causes which excited his Majesty's

resentment against his late ministers.

Further, to remove the impressions of this calumny concerning an attempt

in the House of Commons against his prerogative, it is proper to inform

his Majesty, that the territorial possessions in the East Indies never

have been declared by any public judgment, act, or instrument, or any

resolution of Parliament whatsoever, to be the subject matter of his

Majesty's prerogative; nor have they ever been understood as belonging

to his ordinary administration, or to be annexed or united to his crown;

but that they are acquisitions of a new and peculiar description,[65]

unknown to the ancient executive constitution of this country.

From time to time, therefore, Parliament provided for their government

according to its discretion, and to its opinion of what was required by

the public necessities. We do not know that his Majesty was entitled,

by prerogative, to exercise any act of authority whatsoever in the

Company's affairs, or that, in effect, such authority has ever been

exercised. His Majesty's patronage was not taken away by that bill;

because it is notorious that his Majesty never originally had the

appointment of a single officer, civil or military, in the Company's

establishment in India: nor has the least degree of patronage ever been

acquired to the crown in any other manner or measure than as the power

was thought expedient to be granted by act of Parliament,--that is, by

the very same authority by which the offices were disposed of and

regulated in the bill which his Majesty's servants have falsely and

injuriously represented as infringing upon the prerogative of the crown.

Before the year 1773 the whole administration of India, and the whole

patronage to office there, was in the hands of the East India Company.

The East India Company is not a branch of his Majesty's prerogative

administration, nor does that body exercise any species of authority

under it, nor indeed from any British title that does not derive all its

legal validity from acts of Parliament.

When a claim was asserted to the India territorial possessions in the

occupation of the Company, these possessions were not claimed as parcel

of his Majesty's patrimonial estate, or as a fruit of the ancient

inheritance of his crown: they were claimed for the public. And when

agreements were made with the East India Company concerning any

composition for the holding, or any participation of the profits, of

those territories, the agreement was made with the public; and the

preambles of the several acts have uniformly so stated it. These

agreements were not made (even nominally) with his Majesty, but with

Parliament: and the bills making and establishing such agreements always

originated in this House; which appropriated the money to await the

disposition of Parliament, without the ceremony of previous consent from

the crown even so much as suggested by any of his ministers: which

previous consent is an observance of decorum, not indeed of strict

right, but generally paid, when a new appropriation takes place in any

part of his Majesty's prerogative revenues.

In pursuance of a right thus uniformly recognized and uniformly acted

on, when Parliament undertook the reformation of the East India Company

in 1773, a commission was appointed, as the commission in the late bill

was appointed; and it was made to continue for a term of years, as the

commission in the late bill was to continue; all the commissioners were

named in Parliament, as in the late bill they were named. As they

received, so they held their offices, wholly independent of the crown;

they held them for a fixed term; they were not removable by an address

of either House or even of both Houses of Parliament, a precaution

observed in the late bill relative to the commissioners proposed

therein; nor were they bound by the strict rules of proceeding which

regulated and restrained the late commissioners against all possible

abuse of a power which could not fail of being diligently and zealously

watched by the ministers of the crown, and the proprietors of the stock,

as well as by Parliament. Their proceedings were, in that bill, directed

to be of such a nature as easily to subject them to the strictest

revision of both, in case of any malversation.

In the year 1780, an act of Parliament again made provision for the

government of those territories for another four years, without any sort

of reference to prerogative; nor was the least objection taken at the

second, more than at the first of those periods, as if an infringement

had been made upon the rights of the crown: yet his Majesty's ministers

have thought fit to represent the late commission as an entire

innovation on the Constitution, and the setting up a new order and

estate in the nation, tending to the subversion of the monarchy itself.

If the government of the East Indies, other than by his Majesty's

prerogative, be in effect a fourth order in the commonwealth, this order

has long existed; because the East India Company has for many years

enjoyed it in the fullest extent, and does at this day enjoy the whole

administration of those provinces, and the patronage to offices

throughout that great empire, except as it is controlled by act of

Parliament.

It was the ill condition and ill administration of the Company's affairs

which induced this House (merely as a temporary establishment) to vest

the same powers which the Company did before possess, (and no other,)

for a limited time, and under very strict directions, in proper hands,

until they could be restored, or farther provision made concerning them.

It was therefore no creation whatever of a new power, but the removal of

an old power, long since created, and then existing, from the management

of those persons who had manifestly and dangerously abused their trust.

This House, which well knows the Parliamentary origin of all the

Company's powers and privileges, and is not ignorant or negligent of the

authority which may vest those powers and privileges in others, if

justice and the public safety so require, is conscious to itself that it

no more creates a new order in the state, by making occasional trustees

for the direction of the Company, than it originally did in giving a

much more permanent trust to the Directors or to the General Court of

that body. The monopoly of the East India Company was a derogation from

the general freedom of trade belonging to his Majesty's people. The

powers of government, and of peace and war, are parts of prerogative of

the highest order. Of our competence to restrain the rights of all his

subjects by act of Parliament, and to vest those high and eminent

prerogatives even in a particular company of merchants, there has been

no question. We beg leave most humbly to claim as our right, and as a

right which this House has always used, to frame such bills for the

regulation of that commerce, and of the territories held by the East

India Company, and everything relating to them, as to our discretion

shall seem fit; and we assert and maintain that therein we follow, and

do not innovate on, the Constitution.

That his Majesty's ministers, misled by their ambition, have

endeavored, if possible, to form a faction in the country against the

popular part of the Constitution; and have therefore thought proper to

add to their slanderous accusation against a House of Parliament,

relative to his Majesty's prerogative, another of a different nature,

calculated for the purpose of raising fears and jealousies among the

corporate bodies of the kingdom, and of persuading uninformed persons

belonging to those corporations to look to and to make addresses to

them, as protectors of their rights, under their several charters, from

the designs which they, without any ground, charged the then House of

Commons to have formed against _charters in general_. For this purpose

they have not scrupled to assert that the exertion of his Majesty's

prerogative in the late precipitate change in his administration, and

the dissolution of the late Parliament, were measures adopted in order

to rescue the people and their rights out of the hands of the House of

Commons, their representatives.

We trust that his Majesty's subjects are not yet so far deluded as to

believe that the charters, or that any other of their local or general

privileges, can have a solid security in any place but where that

security has always been looked for, and always found,--in the House of

Commons. Miserable and precarious indeed would be the state of their

franchises, if they were to find no defence but from that quarter from

whence they have always been attacked![66] But the late House of

Commons, in passing that bill, made no attack upon any powers or

privileges, except such as a House of Commons has frequently attacked,

and will attack, (and they trust, in the end, with their wonted

success,)--that is, upon those which are corruptly and oppressively

administered; and this House do faithfully assure his Majesty, that we

will correct, and, if necessary for the purpose, as far as in us lies,

will wholly destroy, every species of power and authority exercised by

British subjects to the oppression, wrong, and detriment of the people,

and to the impoverishment and desolation of the countries subject to it.

The propagators of the calumnies against that House of Parliament have

been indefatigable in exaggerating the supposed injury done to the East

India Company by the suspension of the authorities which they have in

every instance abused,--as if power had been wrested by wrong and

violence from just and prudent hands; but they have, with equal care,

concealed the weighty grounds and reasons on which that House had

adopted the most moderate of all possible expedients for rescuing the

natives of India from oppression, and for saving the interests of the

real and honest proprietors of their stock, as well as that great

national, commercial concern, from imminent ruin.

The ministers aforesaid have also caused it to be reported that the

House of Commons have confiscated the property of the East India

Company. It is the reverse of truth. The whole management was a trust

for the proprietors, under their own inspection, (and it was so provided

for in the bill,) and under the inspection of Parliament. That bill, so

far from confiscating the Company's property, was the only one which,

for several years past, did not, in some shape or other, affect their

property, or restrain them in the disposition of it.

It is proper that his Majesty and all his people should be informed that

the House of Commons have proceeded, with regard to the East India

Company, with a degree of care, circumspection, and deliberation, which

has not been equalled in the history of Parliamentary proceedings. For

sixteen years the state and condition of that body has never been wholly

out of their view. In the year 1767 the House took those objects into

consideration, in a committee of the whole House. The business was

pursued in the following year. In the year 1772 two committees were

appointed for the same purpose, which examined into their affairs with

much diligence, and made very ample reports. In the year 1773 the

proceedings were carried to an act of Parliament, which proved

ineffectual to its purpose. The oppressions and abuses in India have

since rather increased than diminished, on account of the greatness of

the temptations, and convenience of the opportunities, which got the

better of the legislative provisions calculated against ill practices

then in their beginnings; insomuch that, in 1781, two committees were

again instituted, who have made seventeen reports. It was upon the most

minute, exact, and laborious collection and discussion of facts, that

the late House of Commons proceeded in the reform which they attempted

in the administration of India, but which has been frustrated by ways

and means the most dishonorable to his Majesty's government, and the

most pernicious to the Constitution of this kingdom. His Majesty was so

sensible of the disorders in the Company's administration, that the

consideration of that subject was no less than six times recommended to

this House in speeches from the throne.

The result of the Parliamentary inquiries has been, that the East India

Company was found totally corrupted, and totally perverted from the

purposes of its institution, whether political or commercial; that the

powers of war and peace given by the charter had been abused, by

kindling hostilities in every quarter for the purposes of rapine; that

almost all the treaties of peace they have made have only given cause to

so many breaches of public faith; that countries once the most

flourishing are reduced to a state of indigence, decay, and

depopulation, to the diminution of our strength, and to the infinite

dishonor of our national character; that the laws of this kingdom are

notoriously, and almost in every instance, despised; that the servants

of the Company, by the purchase of qualifications to vote in the General

Court, and, at length, by getting the Company itself deeply in their

debt, have obtained the entire and absolute mastery in the body by which

they ought to have been ruled and coerced. Thus their malversations in

office are supported, instead of being checked by the Company. The whole

of the affairs of that body are reduced to a most perilous situation;

and many millions of innocent and deserving men, who are under the

protection of this nation, and who ought to be protected by it, are

oppressed by a most despotic and rapacious tyranny. The Company and

their servants, having strengthened themselves by this confederacy, set

at defiance the authority and admonitions of this House employed to

reform them; and when this House had selected certain principal

delinquents, whom they declared it the duty of the Company to recall,

the Company held out its legal privileges against all reformation,

positively refused to recall them, and supported those who had fallen

under the just censure of this House with new and stronger marks of

countenance and approbation.

The late House, discovering the reversed situation of the Company, by

which the nominal servants are really the masters, and the offenders are

become their own judges, thought fit to examine into the state of their

commerce; and they have also discovered that their commercial affairs

are in the greatest disorder; that their debts have accumulated beyond

any present or obvious future means of payment, at least under the

actual administration of their affairs; that this condition of the East

India Company has begun to affect the sinking fund itself, on which the

public credit of the kingdom rests,--a million and upwards being due to

the customs, which that House of Commons whose intentions towards the

Company have been so grossly misrepresented were indulgent enough to

respite. And thus, instead of confiscating their property, the Company

received without interest (which in such a case had been before charged)

the use of a very large sum of the public money. The revenues are under

the peculiar care of this House, not only as the revenues originate from

us, but as, on every failure if the funds set apart for the support of

the national credit, or to provide for the national strength and safety,

the task of supplying every deficiency falls upon his Majesty's faithful

Commons, this House must, in effect, tax the people. The House,

therefore, at every moment, incurs the hazard of becoming obnoxious to

its constituents.

The enemies of the late House of Commons resolved, if possible, to bring

on that event. They therefore endeavored to misrepresent the provident

means adopted by the House of Commons for keeping off this invidious

necessity, as an attack on the rights of the East India Company: for

they well knew, that, on the one hand, if, for want of proper regulation

and relief, the Company should become insolvent, or even stop payment,

the national credit and commerce would sustain a heavy blow; and that

calamity would be justly imputed to Parliament, which, after such long

inquiries, and such frequent admonitions from his Majesty, had neglected

so essential and so urgent an article of their duty: on the other hand,

they knew, that, wholly corrupted as the Company is, nothing effectual

could be done to preserve that interest from ruin, without taking for a

time the national objects of their trust out of their hands; and then a

cry would be industriously raised against the House of Commons, as

depriving British subjects of their legal privileges. The restraint,

being plain and simple, must be easily understood by those who would be

brought with great difficulty to comprehend the intricate detail of

matters of fact which rendered this suspension of the administration of

India absolutely necessary on motives of justice, of policy, of public

honor, and public safety.

The House of Commons had not been able to devise a method by which the

redress of grievances could be effected through the authors of those

grievances; nor could they imagine how corruptions could be purified by

the corrupters and the corrupted; nor do we now conceive how any

reformation can proceed from the known abettors and supporters of the

persons who have been guilty of the misdemeanors which Parliament has

reprobated, and who for their own ill purposes have given countenance to

a false and delusive state of the Company's affairs, fabricated to

mislead Parliament and to impose upon the nation.[67]

Your Commons feel, with a just resentment, the inadequate estimate which

your ministers have formed of the importance of this great concern.

They call on us to act upon the principles of those who have not

inquired into the subject, and to condemn those who with the most

laudable diligence have examined and scrutinized every part of it. The

deliberations of Parliament have been broken; the season of the year is

unfavorable; many of us are new members, who must be wholly unacquainted

with the subject, which lies remote from the ordinary course of general

information.

We are cautioned against an infringement of the Constitution; and it is

impossible to know what the secret advisers of the crown, who have

driven out the late ministers for their conduct in Parliament, and have

dissolved the late Parliament for a pretended attack upon prerogative,

will consider as such an infringement. We are not furnished with a rule,

the observance of which can make us safe from the resentment of the

crown, even by an implicit obedience to the dictates of the ministers

who have advised that speech; we know not how soon those ministers may

be disavowed, and how soon the members of this House, for our very

agreement with them, may be considered as objects of his Majesty's

displeasure. Until by his Majesty's goodness and wisdom the late example

is completely done away, we are not free.

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