they have not broken. This position is so connected with that of the
sales of provinces and kingdoms, with the negotiation of universal
distraction in every part of India, that a very minute detail may well
be spared on this point. It has not yet been contended, by any enemy to
the reform, that they have observed any public agreement. When I hear
that they have done so in any one instance, (which hitherto, I confess,
I never heard alleged,) I shall speak to the particular treaty. The
Governor General has even amused himself and the Court of Directors in
a very singular letter to that board, in which he admits he has not been
very delicate with regard to public faith; and he goes so far as to
state a regular estimate of the sums which the Company would have lost,
or never acquired, if the rigid ideas of public faith entertained by his
colleagues had been observed. The learned gentleman[55] over against me
has, indeed, saved me much trouble. On a former occasion, he obtained no
small credit for the clear and forcible manner in which he stated, what
we have not forgot, and I hope he has not forgot, that universal,
systematic breach of treaties which had made the British faith
proverbial in the East.
It only remains, Sir, for me just to recapitulate some heads.--The
treaty with the Mogul, by which we stipulated to pay him 260,000_l._
annually, was broken. This treaty they have broken, and not paid him a
shilling. They broke their treaty with him, in which they stipulated to
pay 400,000_l._ a year to the Subah of Bengal. They agreed with the
Mogul, for services admitted to have been performed, to pay Nudjif Cawn
a pension. They broke this article with the rest, and stopped also this
small pension. They broke their treaties with the Nizam, and with Hyder
Ali. As to the Mahrattas, they had so many cross treaties with the
states-general of that nation, and with each of the chiefs, that it was
notorious that no one of these agreements could be kept without grossly
violating the rest. It was observed, that, if the terms of these several
treaties had been kept, two British armies would at one and the same
time have met in the field to cut each other's throats. The wars which
desolate India originated from a most atrocious violation of public
faith on our part. In the midst of profound peace, the Company's troops
invaded the Mahratta territories, and surprised the island and fortress
of Salsette. The Mahrattas nevertheless yielded to a treaty of peace by
which solid advantages were procured to the Company. But this treaty,
like every other treaty, was soon violated by the Company. Again the
Company invaded the Mahratta dominions. The disaster that ensued gave
occasion to a new treaty. The whole army of the Company was obliged in
effect to surrender to this injured, betrayed, and insulted people.
Justly irritated, however, as they were, the terms which they prescribed
were reasonable and moderate, and their treatment of their captive
invaders of the most distinguished humanity. But the humanity of the
Mahrattas was of no power whatsoever to prevail on the Company to attend
to the observance of the terms dictated by their moderation. The war was
renewed with greater vigor than ever; and such was their insatiable lust
of plunder, that they never would have given ear to any terms of peace,
if Hyder Ali had not broke through the Ghauts, and, rushing like a
torrent into the Carnatic, swept away everything in his career. This was
in consequence of that confederacy which by a sort of miracle united the
most discordant powers for our destruction, as a nation in which no
other could put any trust, and who were the declared enemies of the
human species.
It is very remarkable that the late controversy between the several
presidencies, and between them and the Court of Directors, with relation
to these wars and treaties, has not been, which of the parties might be
defended for his share in them, but on which of the parties the guilt
of all this load of perfidy should be fixed. But I am content to admit
all these proceedings to be perfectly regular, to be full of honor and
good faith; and wish to fix your attention solely to that single
transaction which the advocates of this system select for so
transcendent a merit as to cancel the guilt of all the rest of their
proceedings: I mean the late treaties with the Mahrattas.
I make no observation on the total cession of territory, by which they
surrendered all they had obtained by their unhappy successes in war, and
almost all they had obtained under the treaty of Poorunder. The
restitution was proper, if it had been voluntary and seasonable. I
attach on the spirit of the treaty, the dispositions it showed, the
provisions it made for a general peace, and the faith kept with allies
and confederates,--in order that the House may form a judgment, from
this chosen piece, of the use which has been made (and is likely to be
made, if things continue in the same hands) of the trust of the federal
powers of this country.
It was the wish of almost every Englishman that the Mahratta peace might
lead to a general one; because the Mahratta war was only a part of a
general confederacy formed against us, on account of the universal
abhorrence of our conduct which prevailed in every state, and almost in
every house in India. Mr. Hastings was obliged to pretend some sort of
acquiescence in this general and rational desire. He therefore
consented, in order to satisfy the point of honor of the Mahrattas, that
an article should be inserted to admit Hyder Ali to accede to the
pacification. But observe, Sir, the spirit of this man,--which, if it
were not made manifest by a thousand things, and particularly by his
proceedings with regard to Lord Macartney, would be sufficiently
manifest by this. What sort of article, think you, does he require this
essential head of a solemn treaty of general pacification to be? In his
instruction to Mr. Anderson, he desires him to admit "a _vague_ article"
in favor of Hyder. Evasion and fraud were the declared basis of the
treaty. These _vague_ articles, intended for a more vague performance,
are the things which have damned our reputation in India.
Hardly was this vague article inserted, than, without waiting for any
act on the part of Hyder, Mr. Hastings enters into a negotiation with
the Mahratta chief, Scindia, for a partition of the territories of the
prince who was one of the objects to be secured by the treaty. He was to
be parcelled out in three parts: one to Scindia; one to the Peishwa of
the Mahrattas; and the third to the East India Company, or to (the old
dealer and chapman) Mahomet Ali.
During the formation of this project, Hyder dies; and before his son
could take any one step, either to conform to the tenor of the article
or to contravene it, the treaty of partition is renewed on the old
footing, and an instruction is sent to Mr. Anderson to conclude it in
form.
A circumstance intervened, during the pendency of this negotiation, to
set off the good faith of the Company with an additional brilliancy, and
to make it sparkle and glow with a variety of splendid faces. General
Matthews had reduced that most valuable part of Hyder's dominions called
the country of Biddanore. When the news reached Mr. Hastings, he
instructed Mr. Anderson to contend for an alteration in the treaty of
partition, and to take the Biddanore country out of the common stock
which was to be divided, and to keep it for the Company.
The first ground for this variation was its being a separate conquest
made before the treaty had actually taken place. Here was a new proof
given of the fairness, equity, and moderation of the Company. But the
second of Mr. Hastings's reasons for retaining the Biddanore as a
separate portion, and his conduct on that second ground, is still more
remarkable. He asserted that that country could not be put into the
partition stock, because General Matthews had received it on the terms
of some convention which might be incompatible with the partition
proposed. This was a reason in itself both honorable and solid; and it
showed a regard to faith somewhere, and with some persons. But in order
to demonstrate his utter contempt of the plighted faith which was
alleged on one part as a reason for departing from it on another, and to
prove his impetuous desire for sowing a new war even in the prepared
soil of a general pacification, he directs Mr. Anderson, if he should
find strong difficulties impeding the partition on the score of the
subtraction of Biddanore, wholly to abandon that claim, and to conclude
the treaty on the original terms. General Matthews's convention was just
brought forward sufficiently to demonstrate to the Mahrattas the
slippery hold which they had on their new confederate; on the other
hand, that convention being instantly abandoned, the people of India
were taught that no terms on which they can surrender to the Company are
to be regarded, when farther conquests are in view.
Next, Sir, let me bring before you the pious care that was taken of our
allies under that treaty which is the subject of the Company's
applauses. These allies were Ragonaut Row, for whom we had engaged to
find a throne; the Guickwar, (one of the Guzerat princes,) who was to be
emancipated from the Mahratta authority, and to grow great by several
accessions of dominion; and, lastly, the Rana of Gohud, with whom we had
entered into a treaty of partition for eleven sixteenths of our joint
conquests. Some of these inestimable securities called _vague_ articles
were inserted in favor of them all.
As to the first, the unhappy abdicated Peishwa, and pretender to the
Mahratta throne, Ragonaut Row, was delivered up to his people, with an
article for safety, and some provision. This man, knowing how little
vague the hatred of his countrymen was towards him, and well apprised of
what black crimes he stood accused, (among which our invasion of his
country would not appear the least,) took a mortal alarm at the security
we had provided for him. He was thunderstruck at the article in his
favor, by which he was surrendered to his enemies. He never had the
least notice of the treaty; and it was apprehended that he would fly to
the protection of Hyder Ali, or some other, disposed or able to protect
him. He was therefore not left without comfort; for Mr. Anderson did him
the favor to send a special messenger, desiring him to be of good cheer
and to fear nothing. And his old enemy, Scindia, at our request, sent
him a message equally well calculated to quiet his apprehensions.
By the same treaty the Guickwar was to come again, with no better
security, under the dominion of the Mahratta state. As to the Rana of
Gohud, a long negotiation depended for giving him up. At first this was
refused by Mr. Hastings with great indignation; at another stage it was
admitted as proper, because he had shown himself a most perfidious
person. But at length a method of reconciling these extremes was found
out, by contriving one of the usual articles in his favor. What I
believe will appear beyond all belief, Mr. Anderson exchanged the final
ratifications of that treaty by which the Rana was nominally secured in
his possessions, in the camp of the Mahratta chief, Scindia, whilst he
was (really, and not nominally) battering the castle of Gwalior, which
we had given, agreeably to treaty, to this deluded ally. Scindia had
already reduced the town, and was at the very time, by various
detachments, reducing, one after another, the fortresses of our
protected ally, as well as in the act of chastising all the rajahs who
had assisted Colonel Camac in his invasion. I have seen in a letter from
Calcutta, that the Rana of Gohud's agent would have represented these
hostilities (which went hand in hand with the protecting treaty) to Mr.
Hastings, but he was not admitted to his presence.
In this manner the Company has acted with their allies in the Mahratta
war. But they did not rest here. The Mahrattas were fearful lest the
persons delivered to them by that treaty should attempt to escape into
the British territories, and thus might elude the punishment intended
for them, and, by reclaiming the treaty, might stir up new disturbances.
To prevent this, they desired an article to be inserted in the
supplemental treaty, to which they had the ready consent of Mr.
Hastings, and the rest of the Company's representatives in Bengal. It
was this: "That the English and Mahratta governments mutually agree not
to afford refuge to any _chiefs, merchants, or other persons_, flying
for protection to the territories of the other." This was readily
assented to, and assented to without any exception whatever in favor of
our surrendered allies. On their part a reciprocity was stipulated which
was not unnatural for a government like the Company's to ask,--a
government conscious that many subjects had been, and would in future
be, driven to fly from its jurisdiction.
To complete the system of pacific intention and public faith which
predominate in those treaties, Mr. Hastings fairly resolved to put all
peace, except on the terms of absolute conquest, wholly out of his own
power. For, by an article in this second treaty with Scindia, he binds
the Company not to make any peace with Tippoo Sahib without the consent
of the Peishwa of the Mahrattas, and binds Scindia to him by a
reciprocal engagement. The treaty between France and England obliges us
mutually to withdraw our forces, if our allies in India do not accede to
the peace within four months; Mr. Hastings's treaty obliges us to
continue the war as long as the Peishwa thinks fit. We are now in that
happy situation, that the breach of the treaty with France, or the
violation of that with the Mahrattas, is inevitable; and we have only to
take our choice.
My third assertion, relative to the abuse made of the right of war and
peace, is, that there are none who have ever confided in us who have not
been utterly ruined. The examples I have given of Ragonaut Row, of
Guickwar, of the Rana of Gohud, are recent. There is proof more than
enough in the condition of the Mogul,--in the slavery and indigence of
the Nabob of Oude,--the exile of the Rajah of Benares,--the beggary of
the Nabob of Bengal,--the undone and captive condition of the Rajah and
kingdom of Tanjore,--the destruction of the Polygars,--and, lastly, in
the destruction of the Nabob of Arcot himself, who, when his dominions
were invaded, was found entirely destitute of troops, provisions,
stores, and (as he asserts) of money, being a million in debt to the
Company, and four millions to others: the many millions which he had
extorted from so many extirpated princes and their desolated countries
having (as he has frequently hinted) been expended for the ground-rent
of his mansion-house in an alley in the suburbs of Madras. Compare the
condition of all these princes with the power and authority of all the
Mahratta states, with the independence and dignity of the Subah of the
Deccan, and the mighty strength, the resources, and the manly struggle
of Hyder Ali,--and then the House will discover the effects, on every
power in India, of an easy confidence or of a rooted distrust in the
faith of the Company.
These are some of my reasons, grounded on the abuse of the external
political trust of that body, for thinking myself not only justified,
but bound, to declare against those chartered rights which produce so
many wrongs. I should deem myself the wickedest of men, if any vote of
mine could contribute to the continuance of so great an evil.
Now, Sir, according to the plan I proposed, I shall take notice of the
Company's internal government, as it is exercised first on the dependent
provinces, and then as it affects those under the direct and immediate
authority of that body. And here, Sir, before I enter into the spirit of
their interior government, permit me to observe to you upon a few of the
many lines of difference which are to be found between the vices of the
Company's government and those of the conquerors who preceded us in
India, that we may be enabled a little the better to see our way in an
attempt to the necessary reformation.
The several irruptions of Arabs, Tartars, and Persians into India were,
for the greater part, ferocious, bloody, and wasteful in the extreme:
our entrance into the dominion of that country was, as generally, with
small comparative effusion of blood,--being introduced by various frauds
and delusions, and by taking advantage of the incurable, blind, and
senseless animosity which the several country powers bear towards each
other, rather than by open force. But the difference in favor of the
first conquerors is this. The Asiatic conquerors very soon abated of
their ferocity, because they made the conquered country their own. They
rose or fell with the rise or fall of the territory they lived in.
Fathers there deposited the hopes of their posterity; and children there
beheld the monuments of their fathers. Here their lot was finally cast;
and it is the natural wish of all that their lot should not be cast in a
bad land. Poverty, sterility, and desolation are not a recreating
prospect to the eye of man; and there are very few who can bear to grow
old among the curses of a whole people. If their passion or their
avarice drove the Tartar lords to acts of rapacity or tyranny, there was
time enough, even in the short life of man, to bring round the ill
effects of an abuse of power upon the power itself. If hoards were made
by violence and tyranny, they were still domestic hoards; and domestic
profusion, or the rapine of a more powerful and prodigal hand, restored
them to the people. With many disorders, and with few political checks
upon power, Nature had still fair play; the sources of acquisition were
not dried up; and therefore the trade, the manufactures, and the
commerce of the country flourished. Even avarice and usury itself
operated both for the preservation and the employment of national
wealth. The husbandman and manufacturer paid heavy interest, but then
they augmented the fund from whence they were again to borrow. Their
resources were dearly bought, but they were sure; and the general stock
of the community grew by the general effort.
But under the English government all this order is reversed. The Tartar
invasion was mischievous; but it is our protection that destroys India.
It was their enmity; but it is our friendship. Our conquest there, after
twenty years, is as crude as it was the first day. The natives scarcely
know what it is to see the gray head of an Englishman. Young men (boys
almost) govern there, without society and without sympathy with the
natives. They have no more social habits with the people than if they
still resided in England,--nor, indeed, any species of intercourse, but
that which is necessary to making a sudden fortune, with a view to a
remote settlement. Animated with all the avarice of age and all the
impetuosity of youth, they roll in one after another, wave after wave;
and there is nothing before the eyes of the natives but an endless,
hopeless prospect of new flights of birds of prey and passage, with
appetites continually renewing for a food that is continually wasting.
Every rupee of profit made by an Englishman is lost forever to India.
With us are no retributory superstitions, by which a foundation of
charity compensates, through ages, to the poor, for the rapine and
injustice of a day. With us no pride erects stately monuments which
repair the mischiefs which pride had produced, and which adorn a country
out of its own spoils. England has erected no churches, no
hospitals,[56] no palaces, no schools; England has built no bridges,
made no high-roads, cut no navigations, dug out no reservoirs. Every
other conqueror of every other description has left some monument,
either of state or beneficence, behind him. Were we to be driven out of
India this day, nothing would remain to tell that it had been possessed,
during the inglorious period of our dominion, by anything better than
the orang-outang or the tiger.
There is nothing in the boys we send to India worse than in the boys
whom we are whipping at school, or that we see trailing a pike or
bending over a desk at home. But as English youth in India drink the
intoxicating draught of authority and dominion before their heads are
able to bear it, and as they are full grown in fortune long before they
are ripe in principle, neither Nature nor reason have any opportunity to
exert themselves for remedy of the excesses of their premature power.
The consequences of their conduct, which in good minds (and many of
theirs are probably such) might produce penitence or amendment, are
unable to pursue the rapidity of their flight. Their prey is lodged in
England; and the cries of India are given to seas and winds, to be blown
about, in every breaking up of the monsoon, over a remote and unhearing
ocean. In India all the vices operate by which sudden fortune is
acquired: in England are often displayed, by the same persons, the
virtues which dispense hereditary wealth. Arrived in England, the
destroyers of the nobility and gentry of a whole kingdom will find the
best company in this nation at a board of elegance and hospitality. Here
the manufacturer and husbandman will bless the just and punctual hand
that in India has torn the cloth from the loom, or wrested the scanty
portion of rice and salt from the peasant of Bengal, or wrung from him
the very opium in which he forgot his oppressions and his oppressor.
They marry into your families; they enter into your senate; they ease
your estates by loans; they raise their value by demand; they cherish
and protect your relations which lie heavy on your patronage; and there
is scarcely an house in the kingdom that does not feel some concern and
interest that makes all reform of our Eastern government appear
officious and disgusting, and, on the whole, a most discouraging
attempt. In such an attempt you hurt those who are able to return
kindness or to resent injury. If you succeed, you save those who cannot
so much as give you thanks. All these things show the difficulty of the
work we have on hand: but they show its necessity, too. Our Indian
government is in its best state a grievance. It is necessary that the
correctives should be uncommonly vigorous, and the work of men sanguine,
warm, and even impassioned in the cause. But it is an arduous thing to
plead against abuses of a power which originates from your own country,
and affects those whom we are used to consider as strangers.
I shall certainly endeavor to modulate myself to this temper; though I
am sensible that a cold style of describing actions, which appear to me
in a very affecting light, is equally contrary to the justice due to
the people and to all genuine human feelings about them. I ask pardon of
truth and Nature for this compliance. But I shall be very sparing of
epithets either to persons or things. It has been said, (and, with
regard to one of them, with truth,) that Tacitus and Machiavel, by their
cold way of relating enormous crimes, have in some sort appeared not to
disapprove them; that they seem a sort of professors of the art of
tyranny; and that they corrupt the minds of their readers by not
expressing the detestation and horror that naturally belong to horrible
and detestable proceedings. But we are in general, Sir, so little
acquainted with Indian details, the instruments of oppression under
which the people suffer are so hard to be understood, and even the very
names of the sufferers are so uncouth and strange to our ears, that it
is very difficult for our sympathy to fix upon these objects. I am sure
that some of us have come down stairs from the committee-room with
impressions on our minds which to us were the inevitable results of our
discoveries, yet, if we should venture to express ourselves in the
proper language of our sentiments to other gentlemen not at all prepared
to enter into the cause of them, nothing could appear more harsh and
dissonant, more violent and unaccountable, than our language and
behavior. All these circumstances are not, I confess, very favorable to
the idea of our attempting to govern India at all. But there we are;
there we are placed by the Sovereign Disposer; and we must do the best
we can in our situation. The situation of man is the preceptor of his
duty.
Upon the plan which I laid down, and to which I beg leave to return, I
was considering the conduct of the Company to those nations which are
indirectly subject to their authority. The most considerable of the
dependent princes is the Nabob of Oude. My right honorable friend,[57]
to whom we owe the remedial bills on your table, has already pointed out
to you, in one of the reports, the condition of that prince, and as it
stood in the time he alluded to. I shall only add a few circumstances
that may tend to awaken some sense of the manner in which the condition
of the people is affected by that of the prince, and involved in
it,--and to show you, that, when we talk of the sufferings of princes,
we do not lament the oppression of individuals,--and that in these cases
the high and the low suffer together.