"The Emperor of Russia ... visited Berlin, when the feelings

of Prussia, and indeed of all the neighbouring states, were in

this fever of excitement. He again urged Frederick William to

take up arms in the common cause, and offered to back him with

all the forces of his own great empire. The English

government, taking advantage of the same crisis, sent Lord

Morpeth to Berlin, with offers of pecuniary supplies--about

the acceptance of which, however, the anxiety of Prussia on

the subject of Hanover created some difficulty. Lastly,

Buonaparte, well informed of what was passing in Berlin, and

desirous, since war must be, to hurry Frederick into the field

ere the armies of the Czar could be joined with his, now

poured out in the 'Moniteur' such abuse on the persons and

characters of the Queen, Prince Louis, and every illustrious

patriot throughout Prussia, that the general wrath could no

longer be held in check. War-like preparations of every kind

filled the kingdom during August and September. On the 1st of

October the Prussian minister at Paris presented a note to

Talleyrand, demanding, among other things, that the formation

of a confederacy in the north of Germany should no longer be

thwarted by French interference, and that the French troops

within the territories of the Rhenish League should recross

the Rhine into France, by the 8th of the same month of

October. But Napoleon was already in person on the German side

of the Rhine; and his answer to the Prussian note was a

general order to his own troops, in which he called on them to

observe in what manner a German sovereign still dared to

insult the soldiers of Austerlitz. The conduct of Prussia, in

thus rushing into hostilities without waiting for the advance

of the Russians, was as rash as her holding back from Austria

during the campaign of Austerlitz had been cowardly. As if

determined to profit by no lesson, the Prussian council also

directed their army to advance towards the French, instead of

lying on their own frontier--a repetition of the great leading

blunder of the Austrians in the preceding year. The Prussian

army accordingly invaded the Saxon provinces, and the Elector

... was compelled to accept the alliance which the cabinet of

Berlin urged on him, and to join his troops with those of the

power by which he had been thus insulted and wronged. No

sooner did Napoleon know that the Prussians had advanced into

the heart of Saxony, than he formed the plan of his campaign;

and they, persisting in their advance, and taking up their

position finally on the Saale, afforded him, as if studiously,

the means of repeating, at their expense, the very manœvres which

had ruined the Austrians in the preceding campaign." The flank

of the Prussian position was turned,--the bridge across the

Saale, at Saalfield, having been secured, after a hot

engagement with the corps of Prince Louis of Prussia who fell

in the fight,--"the French army passed entirely round them;

Napoleon seized Naumburg and blew up the magazines

there,--announcing, for the first time, by this explosion, to

the King of Prussia and his generalissimo the Duke of

Brunswick, that he was in their rear. From this moment the

Prussians were isolated, and cut off from all their resources,

as completely as the army of Mack was at Ulm, when the French

had passed the Danube and overrun Suabia. The Duke of

Brunswick hastily endeavoured to concentrate his forces for

the purpose of cutting his way back again to the frontier

which he had so rashly abandoned. Napoleon, meantime, had

posted his divisions so as to watch the chief passages of the

Saale, and expected, in confidence, the assault of his

outwitted opponent. It was now that he found leisure to answer

the manifesto of Frederick William. ... His letter, dated at

Gera, is written in the most elaborate style of insult. ...

The Prussian King understood well, on learning the fall of

Naumburg, the imminent danger of his position; and his army

was forthwith set in motion, in two great masses; the former,

where he was in person present, advancing towards Naumburg;

the latter attempting, in like manner, to force their passage

through the French line in the neighbourhood of Jena. The

King's march was arrested at Auerstadt by Davoust, who, after

a severely contested action, at length repelled the assailant.

Napoleon himself, meanwhile, was engaged with the other great

body of the Prussians. Arriving on the evening of the 13th

October at Jena, he perceived that the enemy were ready to

attempt the advance next morning, while his own heavy train

was still six-and-thirty hours' march in his rear. Not

discouraged with this adverse circumstance, the Emperor

laboured all night in directing and encouraging his soldiery

to cut a road through the rocks, and draw up by that means

such light guns as he had at command to a position on a lofty

plateau in front of Jena, where no man could have expected

beforehand that any artillery whatever should be planted. ...

Lannes commanded the centre, Augereau the right, Soult the

left, and Murat the reserve and cavalry. Soult had to sustain

the first assault of the Prussians, which was violent--and

sudden; for the mist lay so thick on the field that the armies

were within half-gunshot of each other ere the sun and wind

rose and discovered them, and on that instant Mollendorf

charged. The battle was contested well for some time on this

point; but at length Ney appeared in the rear of the Emperor

with a fresh division; and then the French centre advanced to

a general charge, before which the Prussians were forced to

retire. They moved for some space in good order; but Murat now

poured his masses of cavalry on them, storm after storm, with

such rapidity and vehemence that their rout became inevitable.

It ended in the complete breaking up of the army--horse and

foot all flying together, in the confusion of panic, upon the

road to Weimar. At that point the fugitives met and mingled

with their brethren flying, as confusedly as themselves, from

Auerstadt. In the course of this disastrous day 20,000

Prussians were killed or taken, 300 guns, 20 generals, and 60

standards. The Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Brunswick,

being wounded in the face with a grape-shot, was carried early

off the field, never to recover. ... The various routed

divisions roamed about the country, seeking separately the

means of escape: they were in consequence destined to fall an

easy prey. ... The Prince of Hohenlohe at length drew together

not less than 50,000 of these wandering soldiers," and retreated

towards the Oder; but was forced, in the end, to lay down his

arms at Prentzlow. "His rear, consisting of about 10,000,

under the command of the celebrated General Blucher, was so

far behind as to render it possible for them to attempt

escape. Their heroic leader traversed the country with them

for some time unbroken, and sustained a variety of assaults,

from far superior numbers, with the most obstinate resolution.

{1510}

By degrees, however, the French, under Soult, hemmed him in on

one side, Murat on the other, and Bernadotte appeared close

behind him. He was thus forced to throw himself into Lubeck,

where a severe action was fought in the streets of the town,

on the 6th of November. The Prussian, in this battle, lost

4,000 prisoners, besides the slain and wounded: he retreated

to Schwerta, and there, it being impossible for him to go

farther without violating the neutrality of Denmark, on the

morning of the 7th, Blucher at length laid down his arms. ...

The strong fortresses of the Prussian monarchy made as

ineffectual resistance as the armies in the field. ...

Buonaparte, in person, entered Berlin on the 25th of October;

and before the end of November, except Konigsberg--where the

King himself had found refuge, and gathered round, him a few

thousand troops ... --and a few less important fortresses, the

whole of the German possessions of the house of Brandenburg

were in the hands of the conqueror. Louis Buonaparte, King of

Holland, meanwhile had advanced into Westphalia and occupied

that territory also, with great part of Hanover, East

Friesland, Embden, and the dominions of Hesse-Cassel."

_J. G. Lockhart,

Life of Napoleon,

chapter 20._

ALSO IN:

_C. Adams,

Great Campaigns in Europe from 1796 to 1870,

chapter. 4._

_Baron Jomini,

Life of Napoleon,

chapter 9 (volume 2),_

_Memoirs of Napoleon dictated at St. Helena,

volume 6, pages 60-72._

_Sir A. Alison,

History of Europe, 1789-1815,

chapter 43 (volume 10)._

_Duke of Rovigo,

Memoirs,

volume 1, part 2, chapters 21-23._

GERMANY: A. D. 1806 (October-December).

Napoleon's ungenerous use of his victory.

His insults to the Queen of Prussia.

The kingdom governed as conquered territory.

The French advance into Poland, to meet the Russians.

Saxony made a kingdom.

"Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The

old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his

achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable

wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and

who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of

Jena, recommending his subjects to his generosity, was in an

especial manner the object of invective. His states were

overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile

tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge

his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the

total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the

language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence

inspired, that the wounded general was compelled, with great

personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon

after died. The Queen, whose spirit in prosperous and

constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her

subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was

pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms; and a

heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been

an excess of patriotic ardour, was compared to Helen, whose

faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities

consequent on the siege of Troy. The whole dominions of the

Elector of Hesse Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who

had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he

could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his

dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions.

... The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of

Prussia, ... shared the same fate: while to the nobles of

Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering

to his own reputation than theirs,--'I will render that

noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their

bread.' ... Meanwhile the French armies, without any further

resistance, took possession of the whole country between the

Rhine and the Oder; and in the rear of the victorious bands

appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the revolutionary

armies, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to

maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be

its theatre, Napoleon had taken only 24,000 francs in specie

across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon

appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the

day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation,

directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of

159,000,000 francs (£6,300,000) on the countries at war with

France, of which 100,000,000 was to be borne by the Prussian

states to the west of the Vistula, 25,000,000 by the Elector

of Saxony [who had already detached himself from his alliance

with Prussia], and the remainder by the lesser states in the

Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden ... was levied with

unrelenting severity. ... Nor was this all. The whole civil

authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were

compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French

Emperor,--an unprecedented step, which clearly indicated the

intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great

nation. ... Early in November there appeared an elaborate

ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation

and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to

the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided

into four departments; those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of

Stettin, and of Custrin; the military and civil government of

the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a

governor-general at Berlin, having under him eight commanders

of provinces into which it was divided. ... The same system of

government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states

of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse

towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by

grievous contributions. ... The Emperor openly announced his

determination to retain possession of all these states till

England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty

of the seas. ... Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of

a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. ...

The severity of the terms demanded, as well as ... express

assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead

to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to

retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might

have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations.

Desperate as the fortunes of Prussia were, ... the King ...

declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of

Russia [who was vigorously preparing to fulfil his promise of

help to the stricken nation]. This refusal was anticipated by

Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on

his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter

vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.

{1511}

To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree

[see FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810] of the 21st November against the

commerce of Great Britain. ... Napoleon ... at Posen, in

Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy

kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its

once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite

hopes which his subsequent conduct never realised. ... While

the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid

strides from the Oder to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious

to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile

bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the

flanks of the invading force. ... The whole of the north of

Germany was overrun by French troops, while 100,000 were

assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the

heart of Poland. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such

prodigious efforts, over so great an extent of surface,

rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was

ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor

80,000 were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the

military age in 1807. ... A treaty, offensive and defensive,

between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these

successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed

at Posen, on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector

of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was

admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his

contingent fixed at 20,000 men. By a separate article, it was

provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom

of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign:

a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military

outpost of the great nation--while, by a subsidiary treaty,

signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes

of the House of Saxony were also admitted into the

Confederacy."

_Sir A. Alison,

History of Europe, 1789-1815,

chapter 43, sections 87-99 (volume 10)._

ALSO IN:

_P. Lanfrey,

History of Napoleon,

volume 2, chapter 16._

_Mrs. S. Austin,

Germany from 1760 to 1814,

page 294, and after._

_E. H. Hudson,

Life and Times of Louisa,

Queen of Prussia, volume 2, chapters 8-9._

GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1807.

Opening of Napoleon's campaign against the Russians.

The deluding of the Poles.

indecisive battle of Eylau.

The campaign against the Russians "opened early in the winter.

The 1st of November, the Russians and French marched towards

the Vistula, the former from the Memel, the latter from the

Oder. Fifty thousand Russians pressed forward under General

Benningsen; a second and equal army followed at a distance

with a reserve force. Some of the Russian forces on the

Turkish frontier were recalled, but were still remote. The

first two Russian armies, with the remaining Prussians,

numbered about 120,000. England made many promises and kept

few of them, thinking more of conquering Spanish and Dutch

colonies than of helping her allies. Her aid was limited to a

small reinforcement of the Swedes guarding Swedish Pomerania,

the only portion of Northern Germany not yet in French power.

Gustavus II., the young King of Sweden, weak and impulsive,

rushed headlong, without a motive, into the ... alliance

[against Napoleon], destined to be so fatal to Sweden. ...

Eighty thousand men under Murat crossed the Oder and entered

Prussian Poland, and an equal number stood ready to sustain

them. November 9, Davout's division entered Posen, the

principal town of the Polish provinces still preserving the

national sentiment, and whose people detested Prussian rule

and resented the treachery with which Prussia dismembered

Poland after swearing alliance with her. All along the road,

the peasants hastened to meet the French; and at Posen, Davout

was hailed with an enthusiasm which moved even him, cold and

severe as he was, and he urged Napoleon to justify the hopes

of Poland, who looked to him as her savior. The Russian

vanguard reached Warsaw before the French, but made no effort

to remain there, and recrossed the Vistula. November 28,

Davout and Murat entered the town, and public delight knew no

bounds. It would be a mere illusion to fancy that sentiments

of right and justice had any share in Napoleon's resolve, and

that he was stirred by a desire to repair great wrongs. His

only question was whether the resurrection of Poland would

increase his greatness or not; and if he told the Sultan that

he meant to restore Poland, it was because he thought Turkey

would assist him the more willingly against Russia. He also

offered part of Silesia to Austria, if she would aid him in

the restoration of Poland by the cession of her Polish

provinces; but it was not a sufficient offer, and therefore

not serious. The truth was that he wanted promises from the

Poles before he made any to them. ... Thousands of Poles

enlisted under the French flag and joined the Polish legions

left from the Italian war. Napoleon established a provisional

government of well-known Poles in Warsaw, and required nothing

but volunteers of the country. He had seized without a blow

that line of the Vistula which the Prussian king would not

barter for a truce, and might have gone into winter-quarters

there; but the Russians were close at hand on the opposite

shore, in two great divisions 100,000 strong, in a wooded and

marshy country forming a sort of triangle, whose point touches

the union of the Narew and Ukra rivers with the Vistula, a few

leagues below Warsaw. The Russians communicated with the sea

by a Prussian corps stationed between them and Dantzic.

Napoleon would not permit them to hold this post, and resolved

to strike a blow, before going into winter-quarters, which

should cut them off from the sea and drive them back towards

the Memel and Lithuania. He crossed the Vistula, December 23,

and attacked the Russians between the Narew and the Ukra. A

series of bloody battles followed [the most important being at

Pultusk and Golymin, December 26] in the dense forests and deep

bogs of the thawing land. Napoleon said that he had discovered

a fifth element in Poland,--mud. Men and horses stuck in the

swamp and the cannons could not be extricated. Luckily the

Russians were in the incompetent hands of General Kamenski,

and both parties fought in the dark, the labyrinth of swamps

and woods preventing either army from guessing the other's

movements. The Russians were finally driven, with great loss,

beyond the Narew towards the forests of Belostok, and a

Prussian corps striving to assist them was driven back to the

sea. ... The grand army did not long enjoy the rest it so much

needed; for the Russians, whose losses were more than made up

by the arrival of their reserves, suddenly resumed the

offensive.

{1512}

General Benningsen, who gave a fearful proof of his sinister

energy by the murder of Paul I., had been put in command in

Kamenski's place. Marching round the forests and traversing

the line of lakes which divide the basin of the Narew from

those watercourses flowing directly to the sea, he reached the

maritime part of old Prussia, intending to cross the Vistula

and drive the French from their position in Poland. He had

hoped to surprise the French left wing, lying between the

Passarge and Lower Vistula, but arrived too late. Ney and

Bernadotte rapidly concentrated their forces and fought with a

bravery which arrested the Russians (January 25 and 27).

Napoleon came to the rescue, and having once driven the enemy

into the woods and marshes of the interior, now strove to turn

those who meant to turn him, by an inverse action forcing them

to the sea-coast. ... Benningsen then halted beyond Eylau, and

massed his forces to receive battle next day [February 8]. He

had about 70,000 men, twice the artillery of Napoleon (400

guns against 200), and hoped to be joined betimes by a

Prussian corps. Napoleon could only dispose of 60,000 out of

his 300,000 men,--Ney being some leagues away and Bernadotte

out of reach. ... The battlefield was a fearful sight next

day. Twelve thousand Russians and 10,000 French lay dying and

dead on the vast fields of snow reddened with blood. The

Russians, besides, carried off 15,000 wounded. 'What an

ineffectual massacre" cried Ney, as he traversed the scene of

carnage. This was too true; for although Napoleon drove the

Russians to the sea, it was not in the way he desired.

Benningsen succeeded in reaching Konigsberg, where he could

rest and reinforce his army, and Napoleon was not strong

enough to drive him from this last shelter."

_H. Martin,

Popular History of France from 1789,

volume 2, chapter 11._

ALSO IN:

_Baron Jomini,

Life of Napoleon,

chapter 10 (volume 2)._

_C. Joyneville,

Life and Times of Alexander I.,

volume 1, chapter 8._

_J. C. Ropes,

The First Napoleon,

lecture 3._

_Baron de Marbot,

Memoirs,

volume 1, chapters 29-30._

GERMANY: A. D. 1806-1810.

Commercial blockade by the English Orders in Council and

Napoleon's Decrees.

See FRANCE: A. D. 1806-1810.

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (February-June).

Closer alliance of Prussia and Russia.

Treaty of Bartenstein.

Napoleon's victory at Friedland.

End of the campaign.

The effect produced in Europe by the doubtful battle of Eylau

"was unlucky for France; in Paris the Funds fell. Bennigsen

boldly ordered the Te Deum to be sung. In order to confirm his

victory, re-organise his army, reassure France, re-establish

the opinion of Europe, encourage the Polish insurrection, and

to curb the ill-will of Germany and Austria, Napoleon remained

a week at Eylau. He negotiated: on one side he caused

Talleyrand to write to Zastrow, the Prussian foreign minister,

to propose peace and his alliance; he sent Bertrand to Memel

to offer to re-establish the King of Prussia, on the condition

of no foreign intervention. He also tried to negotiate with

Bennigsen; to which the latter made answer, 'that his master

had charged him to fight, and not negotiate.' After some

hesitation, Prussia ended by joining her fortunes to those of

Russia. By the convention of Bartenstein (25th April, 1807)

the two sovereigns came to terms on the following points:

1. The re-establishment of Prussia within the limits of 1805.

2. The dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine.

3. The restitution to Austria of the Tyrol and Venice.

4. The accession of England to the coalition, and the

aggrandisement of Hanover.

5. The co-operation of Sweden.

6. The restoration of the house of Orange, and indemnities to

the kings of Naples and Sardinia.

This document is important; it nearly reproduces the

conditions offered to Napoleon at the Congress of Prague, in

1813. Russia and Prussia proposed then to make a more pressing

appeal to Austria, Sweden, and England; but the Emperor

Francis was naturally undecided, and the Archduke Charles,

alleging the state of the finances and the army, strongly

advised him against any new intervention. Sweden was too weak;

and notwithstanding his fury against Napoleon, Gustavus III.

had just been forced to treat with Mortier. The English

minister showed a remarkable inability to conceive the

situation; he refused to guarantee the new Russian loan of a

hundred and fifty millions, and would lend himself to no

maritime diversion. Napoleon showed the greatest diplomatic

activity. The Sultan Selim III. declared war against Russia;

General Sebastiani, the envoy at Constantinople, put the

Bosphorus in a state of defence, and repulsed the English

fleet [see TURKS: A. D. 1806-1807]; General Gardane left for

Ispahan, with a mission to cause a Persian outbreak in the

Caucasus. Dantzig had capitulated [May 24, after a long

siege], and Lefèbvre's 40,000 men were therefore ready for

service. Masséna took 36,000 of them into Italy, In the

spring, Bennigsen, who had been reinforced by 10,000 regular

troops, 6,000 Cossacks, and the Imperial Guard, being now at

the head of 100,000 men, took the offensive; Gortchakof

commanding the right and Bagration the left. He tried, as in

the preceding year, to seize Ney's division; but the latter

fought, as he retired, two bloody fights, at Gutstadt and

Ankendorff. Bennigsen, again in danger of being surrounded,

retired on Heilsberg. He defended himself bravely (June 10);

but the French, extending their line on his right, marched on

Eylau, so as to cut him off from Konigsberg. The Russian

generalissimo retreated; but being pressed, he had to draw up

at Friedland, on the Alle. The position he had taken up was

most dangerous. All his army was enclosed in an angle of the

Alle, with the steep bed of the river at their backs, which in

case of misfortune left them only one means of retreat, over

the three bridges of Friedland. ... 'Where are the Russians

concealed?' asked Napoleon when he came up. When he had noted

their situation, he exclaimed, 'It is not every day that one

surprises the enemy in such a fault.' He put Lannes and Victor

in reserve, ordered Mortier to oppose Gortchakof on the left

and to remain still, as the movement which 'would be made by

the right would pivot on the left.' As to Ney, he was to cope

on the right with Bagration, who was shut in by the angle of

the river; he was to meet them 'with his head down,' without

taking any care of his own safety. Ney led the charge with

irresistible fury; the Russians were riddled by his artillery

at 150 paces: he successively crushed the chasseurs of the

Russian Guard, the Ismaïlovski, and the Horse Guards, burnt

Friedland by shells, and cannonaded the bridges which were the

only means of retreat. ... The Russian left wing was almost

thrown into the river; Bagration, with the Semenovski and

other troops, was hardly able to cover the defeat.

{1513}

On the Russian right, Gortchakof, who had advanced to attack

the immovable Mortier, had only time to ford the Alle. Count

Lambert retired with 29 guns by the left bank; the rest fled

by the right bank, closely pursued by the cavalry. Meanwhile

Murat, Davoust, and Soult, who had taken no part in the

battle, arrived before Konigsberg. Lestocq, with 25,000 men,

tried to defend it, but on learning the disaster of Friedland

he hastily evacuated it. Only one fortress now remained to

Frederick William--the little town of Memel. The Russians had

lost at Friedland from 15,000 to 20,000 men, besides 80 guns

(June 14, 1807). ... Alexander had no longer an army. Only one

man, Barclay de Tolly, proposed to continue the war; but in

order to do this it would be necessary to re-enter Russia, to

penetrate into the very heart of the empire, to burn

everything on the way, and only present a desert to the enemy.

Alexander hoped to get off more cheaply. He wrote a severe

letter to Bennigsen, and gave him powers to treat."

_A. Rambaud,

History of Russia,

volume 2, chapter 12._

ALSO IN:

_Duke de Rovigo,

Memoirs,

volume 2, part 1, chapters 4-6._

GERMANY: A. D. 1807 (June-July).

The Treaty of Tilsit.

Its known and its unknown agreements.

History for ready reference, Volume 2, El Dorado to Greaves · 第 207 / 222 段