"The Government of National Defence ... imagined that the fall

of the Empire would simplify the cruel position of France

towards the enemy. The Dynasty which had declared war being

reversed, and the men now in power having been throughout

opposed to war and in favour of German unity, and now

demanding nothing but peace, what motive could the King of

Prussia have to continue the invasion of France? It was

further to be considered that free France would defend her

integrity to the last drop of her blood; that she would

voluntarily give up neither an inch of her territory nor a

stone of her fortresses. Such were the ideas which the new

Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Jules Favre, expressed on the

6th of September, in a circular addressed to the French agents

in foreign countries. The Cabinet of Berlin was not slow in

disabusing him of these convictions. Far from accepting the

view that the Emperor Napoleon was the sole promoter of war,

Count Bismarck, in two despatches of the 13th and of the 16th

of September, threw the responsibility of the conflict on the

French nation. He stated that the vast majority of the

Chambers had voted for war, and that the Emperor was justified

in assuring the King that he had been forced into a war to

which he was personally averse. ... In order to be secure

against future aggression, Germany would ask for guarantees

from the French nation itself, and not from a transitory

Government. ... In any case, Germany would require Strasburg

and Metz. Thus the accession to power of the Republican

Government did not modify the reciprocal positions of the two

belligerents. Nevertheless, hope was entertained in Paris that

the friendly intervention of the great powers might induce the

victor to soften his rigour;" but intervention was declined by

the Berlin Cabinet and not undertaken. "On the 19th of

September the investment of Paris was completed. At the desire

of the French Government, the English Cabinet applied to the

German head-quarters, with the object of obtaining for M.

Jules Favre an interview with Count Bismarck. This request

having been granted, the two statesmen held conferences, on

the 19th and 20th of September, at Ferrières, a castle of

Baron Rothschild near Meaux. During these interviews the

French Minister was sentimental and the German Minister coldly

logical. They could not come to an agreement on any single

point. ... The Government of Paris ... again proclaimed that

France would not cede an inch of her territory. Meanwhile, in

consequence of the investment of Paris, the Government of

National Defence was divided into two parts; some of its

Delegates withdrew to Tours, forming a delegation of the

central Government which remained in Paris. The German armies

had continued their onward march, as well as their operations

against the fortresses. Toul capitulated on the 23rd and

Strasburg on the 28th of September. On the 5th of October,

King William had established his headquarters at Versailles."

Meantime "the Government of National Defence made a last

attempt to secure allies, or at least the help of powerful

mediators. With this object M. Thiers, who had placed himself

at the disposal of the Administration of the 4th of September,

was sent on a mission to the European Courts. From the 12th of

September till the 20th of October, the old statesman visited

in succession London, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Florence. In

none of these cities were his measures attended with happy

results." At St. Petersburg and at London he was told--and he

was himself convinced--"that the King of Prussia was

compelled to consider the public opinion of Germany, and that

France would have to resign herself to territorial

sacrifices." He returned to France to advise, and to procure

authority for, a conference with the German Chancellor. But

events had already occurred which aggravated the forlorn

condition of France. "The youngest and most enterprising

member of the Government of Paris, M. Gambetta, had left the

Capital on the 8th of October in a balloon for Tours. It was

his intention to organise national defence in the Provinces.

The day after his arrival at Tours, he issued a fiery

Proclamation to the French people. ... With an energy that

called forth universal admiration, the Government of Tours,

over which Gambetta presided as Dictator, organised

resistance, formed a new army, and gathered together every

possible resource for defence both in men and in materials.

All these efforts could not arrest the progress of the

invasion. From the 11th to the 31st of October, the Germans

took successively Orleans, Soissons, Schlestadt and Dijon.

Round Paris they repulsed the sallies of Malmaison, Champigny,

and le Bourget. But all these defeats of heroic soldiers waned

when compared to the appalling and decisive catastrophe of

Metz. After the battle of Gravelotte, Marshal Bazaine had

unsuccessfully attempted several sallies. ... On the 7th of

October, after an unfortunate battle at Woippy, lasting nine

hours, Bazaine considered the situation desperate. His only

thought was to obtain the most favourable conditions he could,

and with this object he sent General Boyer to the headquarters

at Versailles." After two weeks of negotiation, "on the 21st

of October, the army encamped within the walls of Metz found

itself without provisions. ... Negotiations with Prince

Frederick Charles, nephew of the King and Commander-in-chief

of the besieging Army, were opened on the 25th, and terminated

on the 27th of October. The conditions were identical with

those of Sedan: capitulation of the town and its forts with

all the material of war, all the army of the Rhine to be

prisoners and the officers to be liberated on parole."

_E. Simon,

The Emperor William and his Reign,

chapter 13 (volume 2)._

"The French Army of the Rhine at the time of the surrender

still numbered 173,000 men, inclusive of 6,000 officers and

20,000 men remaining temporarily in Metz as sick or

convalescent."

_The Franco-German War: German Official Account,

part 2, volume 1, page 201._

ALSO IN:

_A. Forbes,

My Experiences of the War between France and Germany,

part 2 (volume 1)._

FRANCE: A. D. 1870-1871.

The war in the provinces.

Unsuccessful attempts to relieve the capital.

Distress in Paris.

Capitulation and armistice.

"The surrender of Metz and the release of the great army of

Prince Frederick Charles by which it was besieged fatally

changed the conditions of the French war of national defence.

Two hundred thousand of the victorious troops of Germany under

some of their ablest generals were set free to attack the

still untrained levies on the Loire and in the north of

France, which, with more time for organisation, might well

have forced the Germans to raise the siege of Paris. The army

once commanded by Steinmetz was now reconstituted, and

despatched under General Manteuffel towards Amiens; Prince

Frederick Charles moved with the remainder of his troops

towards the Loire. Aware that his approach could not long be

delayed, Gambetta insisted that Aurelle de Paladines should

begin the march on Paris.

{1388}

The general attacked Tann at Coulmiers on the 9th of November,

defeated him, and re-occupied Orleans, the first real success

that the French had gained in the war. There was great alarm

at the German headquarters at Versailles; the possibility of a

failure of the siege was discussed; and 40,000 troops were

sent southwards in haste to the support of the Bavarian

general. Aurelle, however, did not move upon the capital: his

troops were still unfit for the enterprise; and he remained

stationary on the north of Orleans, in order to improve his

organisation, to await reinforcements, and to meet the attack

of Frederick Charles in a strong position. In the third week

of November the leading divisions of the army of Metz

approached, and took post between Orleans and Paris. Gambetta

now insisted that the effort should be made to relieve the

capital. Aurelle resisted, but was forced to obey. The

garrison of Paris had already made several unsuccessful

attacks upon the lines of their besiegers, the most vigorous

being that of Le Bourget on the 30th of October, in which

bayonets were crossed. It was arranged that in the last days

of November General Trochu should endeavour to break out on

the southern side, and that simultaneously the army of the

Loire should fall upon the enemy in front of it and endeavour

to force its way to the capital. On the 28th the attack upon

the Germans on the north of Orleans began. For several days

the struggle was renewed by one division after another of the

armies of Aurelle and Prince Frederick Charles. Victory

remained at last with the Germans; the centre of the French

position was carried; the right and left wings of the army

were severed from one another and forced to retreat, the one

up the Loire, the other towards the west. Orleans on the 5th

of December passed back into the hands of the Germans. The

sortie from Paris, which began with a successful attack by

General Ducrot upon Champigny beyond the Marne, ended after

some days of combat in the recovery by the Germans of the

positions which they had lost, and in the retreat of Ducrot

into Paris. In the same week Manteuffel, moving against the

relieving army of the north, encountered it near Amiens,

defeated it after a hard struggle, and gained possession of

Amiens itself. After the fall of Amiens, Manteuffel moved upon

Rouen. This city fell into his hands without resistance. ...

But the Republican armies, unlike those which the Germans had

first encountered, were not to be crushed at a single blow.

Under the energetic command of Faidherbe the army of the north

advanced again upon Amiens. Goeben, who was left to defend the

line of the Somme, went out to meet him, defeated him on the

23rd of December, and drove him back to Arras. But again,

after a week's interval, Faidherbe pushed forward. On the 3rd

of January he fell upon Goeben's weak division at Bapaume, and

handled it so severely that the Germans would on the following

day have abandoned their position, if the French had not

themselves been the first to retire. Faidherbe, however, had

only fallen back to receive reinforcements. After some days'

rest he once more sought to gain the road to Paris, advancing

this time by the eastward line through St. Quentin. In front

of this town Goeben attacked him. The last battle of the army

of the North was fought on the 19th of January. The French

general endeavoured to disguise his defeat, but the German

commander had won all that he desired. Faidherbe's army was

compelled to retreat northwards in disorder; its part in the

war was at an end. During the last three weeks of December

there was a pause in the operations of the Germans on the

Loire. ... Gambetta ... had ... determined to throw the army

of Bourbaki, strengthened by reinforcements from the south,

upon Germany itself. The design was a daring one, and had the

... French armies been capable of performing the work which

Gambetta required of them, an inroad into Baden, or even the

reconquest of Alsace, would most seriously have affected the

position of the Germans before Paris. But Gambetta

miscalculated the power of young, untrained troops,

imperfectly armed, badly fed, against a veteran army. In a

series of hard-fought struggles the army of the Loire under

General Chanzy was driven back at the beginning of January

from Vendôme to Le Mans. On the 12th, Chanzy took post before

this city and fought his last battle. While he was making a

vigorous resistance in the centre of the line, the Breton

regiments stationed on his right gave way; the Germans pressed

round him, and gained possession of the town. Chanzy retreated

towards Laval, leaving thousands of prisoners in the hands of the

enemy, and saving only the debris of an army. Bourbaki in the

meantime, with a numerous but miserably equipped force, had

almost reached Belfort. ... Werder had evacuated Dijon and

fallen back upon Vesoul; part of his army was still occupied

in the siege of Belfort. As Bourbaki approached he fell back

with the greater part of his troops in order to cover the

besieging force, leaving one of his lieutenants to make a

flank attack upon Bourbaki at Villersexel. This attack, one of

the fiercest in the war, delayed the French for two days, and

gave Werder time to occupy the strong positions that he had

chosen about Montbéliard. Here, on the 15th of January, began

a struggle which lasted for three days. The French, starving

and perishing with cold, though far superior in number to

their enemy, were led with little effect against the German

entrenchments. On the 18th Bourbaki began his retreat. Werder

was unable to follow him; Manteuffel with a weak force was

still at some distance, and for a moment it seemed possible

that Bourbaki, by a rapid movement westwards, might crush this

isolated foe. Gambetta ordered Bourbaki to make the attempt:

the commander refused to court further disaster with troops

who were not fit to face an enemy, and retreated towards

Pontarlier in the hope of making his way to Lyons. But

Manteuffel now descended in front of him; divisions of

Werder's army pressed down from the north; the retreat was cut

off; and the unfortunate French general, whom a telegram from

Gambetta removed from his command, attempted to take his own

life. On the 1st of February, the wreck of his army, still

numbering 85,000 men, but reduced to the extremity of weakness

and misery, sought refuge beyond the Swiss frontier. The war

was now over. Two days after Bourbaki's repulse at Montbéliard

the last unsuccessful sortie was made from Paris. There now

remained provisions only for another fortnight; above 40,000

of the inhabitants had succumbed to the privations of the

siege; all hope of assistance from the relieving armies before

actual famine should begin disappeared.

{1389}

On the 23rd of January Favre sought the German Chancellor at

Versailles in order to discuss the conditions of a general

armistice and of the capitulation of Paris. The negotiations

lasted for several days; on the 28th an armistice was signed

with the declared object that elections might at once be

freely held for a National Assembly, which should decide

whether the war should be continued, or on what conditions

peace should be made. The conditions of the armistice were

that the forts of Paris and all their material of war should

be handed over to the German army; that the artillery of the

enceinte should be dismounted; and that the regular troops in

Paris should, as prisoners of war, surrender their arms. The

National Guard were permitted to retain their weapons and

their artillery. Immediately upon the fulfilment of the first

two conditions all facilities were to be given for the entry

of supplies of food into Paris. The articles of the armistice

were duly executed, and on the 30th of January the Prussian

flag waved over the forts of the French capital."

_C. A. Fyffe,

History of Modern Europe,

volume 3, chapter 6._

ALSO IN:

_H. Murdock,

The Reconstruction of Europe,

chapters 29-30._

_Daily News Correspondence of the War

chapters 13-21._

_Cassell's History of the War,

volume 1, chapter 36,

volume 2; chapters 1-18._

_Comte d'Herrison,

Journal of a Staff Officer in Paris._

_E. B. Washburne,

Recollections of a Minister to France,

volume 1, chapters 5-10._

_J. A. O'Shea,

An Iron-bound City._

_F. T. Marzials,

Life of Gambetta,

chapter 5._

_H. von Moltke,

The Franco-German War of 1870-71,

sections 3-7._

_T. G. Bowles,

The Defence of Paris._

_W. Rüstow,

The War for the Rhine Frontier, 1870,

volume 3._

FRANCE: A. D. 1871 (January-May).

Preliminaries of Peace signed at Versailles.

The Treaty of Frankfort.

Cession of Alsace and one-fifth of Lorraine.

Five milliards of indemnity.

"On the afternoon of January 28 [1871] the capitulation of

Paris was signed, and an armistice agreed upon to expire on

February 19 at noon. The provinces occupied by the armies of

Bourbaki and Munteuffel were alone excluded from this

agreement. On January 29 the German troops quietly took

possession of the Paris forts. The regulars and mobiles became

prisoners of war, with the exception of 12,000 men who were

left under arms to preserve order. At the earnest request of

Favre the National Guard were allowed to retain their arms. If

Favre urged this as a measure to counteract the imperialistic

ideas supposed to be still cherished by the prisoners

returning from Germany, it was a political crime as well as a

military folly. The National Guard became the armed Commune.

... While the armies withdrew to the lines stipulated in the

armistice, the elections went quietly forward. The assembly

convened at Bordeaux, and manifested a spirit that won for it

universal respect. On February 17 M. Thiers was appointed

chief of the executive power, and having named his ministry,

he repaired to Versailles to arrange the preliminaries of

peace. The conferences that followed with the German

chancellor were perhaps the most trying ordeals to which the

Frenchman had ever been subjected. No peace was possible save

on the basis of the cession of miles of territory and the

strongest of fortresses. France must also pay a war indemnity

of no less than five milliards of francs. Bismarck, it is

true, thought Thiers 'too sentimental for business, ... hardly

fit indeed to buy or sell a horse,' but no diplomatist,

however astute, could have made better terms for stricken

France. So thought the assembly at Bordeaux; and when Thiers

announced the result of his mission with a quivering lip, he

had its sympathy and support. On the 2d of March the assembly

formally ratified the peace preliminaries by a vote of 546 to

107. It had been stipulated in the armistice that the German

troops should not occupy Paris. The extension of time granted

by the Germans entitled them to some compensation, and the

entry of Paris was the compensation claimed. The troops

detailed for this purpose were not chosen at random. To the

Frenchman who on the 1st day of March beheld them pass along

the Avenue de Malakoff or the Champs Elysées it was an ominous

pageant. It was a German and not a Prussian army that he

beheld. ... That night the Hessians smoked their pipes on the

Trocadéro, and the Bavarians stacked their arms in the Place

de la Concorde, while the lights blazing from the palace of

the Elysée announced the German military headquarters. On the

third day of the month, the Bordeaux Assembly having ratified

the peace preliminaries, the German troops marched out, and

Paris was left to herself again. The war was over. Beyond the

Rhineland, in Bavaria and Würtemberg as well as in the north,

all was joy and enthusiasm over the return of the army that

had answered before the world the question, 'What is the

German Fatherland?' On the 10th of May the definite treaty of

peace was signed at Frankfort by which France ceded Alsace and

a portion of Lorraine, including the fortresses of Metz and

Strasburg, to her conqueror."

_H. Murdock,

The Reconstruction of Europe,

chapter 30._

The following are the heads of the Preliminary Treaty

concluded at Versailles, to which the final Treaty of

Frankfort conformed:

"1. France renounces in favour of the German Empire the

following rights: the fifth part of Lorraine including Metz

and Thionville, and Alsace less Belfort.

2. France will pay the sum of five milliards of francs, of

which one milliard is to be paid in 1871 and the remaining

four milliards by instalments extending over three years.

3. The German troops will begin to evacuate the French

territory as soon as the Treaty is ratified. They will then

evacuate the interior of Paris and some departments lying in

the western region. The evacuation of the other departments

will take place gradually after payment of the first milliard,

and proportionately to the payment of the other four

milliards. Interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum

will be paid on the amount remaining due from the date of the

ratification of the Treaty.

4. The German troops will not levy any requisitions in the

departments occupied by them, but will be maintained at the

cost of France. A delay will be granted to the inhabitants of

the territories annexed to choose between the two

nationalities.

6. Prisoners of war will be immediately set at liberty.

7. Negotiations for a definitive Treaty of Peace will be

opened at Brussels after the ratification of this Treaty.

8. The administration of the departments occupied by the

German troops will be entrusted to French officials, but under

the control of the chiefs of the German Corps of occupation.

9. The present Treaty confers upon the Germans no rights

whatever in the portions of territories not occupied.

10. This Treaty will have to be ratified by the

National Assembly of France."

_C. Lowe,

Prince Bismarck,

volume 1, chapter 9._

ALSO IN:

_E. Hertslet,

The Map of Europe by Treaty,

volume 3, numbers 438 and 446._

{1390}

FRANCE: A. D. 1871 (March-May).

Insurrection of the Communists of Paris.

Second siege and reduction of the capital.

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