to voting and rejecting as a whole the laws submitted to it by
the Executive; there was no such thing as criticism or control
of the general policy of the reign: but the year 1860 opened a
period of development in the direction of liberty; by a decree
of the November of that year the Emperor permitted the
Deputies to draw up an address in answer to his speech, giving
them thereby the opportunity to criticise his policy; by that
of December 1861 he allowed them to vote the budget by
sections, that is to say, to discuss and, if desirable, reject
its items; by that of January 1867 he substituted for the
Address the right of questioning the Ministers, who might be
delegated to the Chamber by the Emperor to take part in
certain definite discussions; lastly, by that of September
1869 he gave to the Legislative Body the right of initiating
laws, removed the restrictions hitherto retained on the right
of amendment and of questions, and made the Ministers
responsible to the Chamber. Thus the Constitution was
deliberately modified, by the initiative of the Emperor
himself, from the form of imperial despotism to that of
parliamentary monarchy: this modified Constitution was
submitted to a plebiscite in May 1870, and once more the
people ratified the Empire by over seven million votes against
a million and a half."
_G. L. Dickinson,
Revolution and Reaction in Modern France,
chapter 7, section 8._
FRANCE: A. D.1861-1867.
Intervention in Mexico and its humiliating failure.
See MEXICO: A. D. 1861-1867.
FRANCE: A. D. 1862.
Commercial treaty with Germany.
See TARIFF LEGISLATION (GERMANY): A. D. 1853-1892.
FRANCE: A. D. 1866.
Withdrawal of troops from Rome.
See ITALY: A. D. 1862-1866.
FRANCE: A. D. 1866-1870.
Territorial concessions demanded from Germany.
The Luxemburg question.
War temporarily averted.
See GERMANY. A.D. 1866-1870.
FRANCE: A. D. 1867.
Last defense of Papal sovereignty at Rome.
Defeat of Garibaldi at Mentana.
See ITALY: A.D. 1867-1870.
FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (June-July).
"The Hohenzollern incident."
Unjustifiable declaration of war against Prussia.
"Towards the last of June, 1870, there arose what is known as
the 'Hohenzollern incident,' which assumed so much importance,
as it led up to the Franco-German War. In June, 1868, Queen
Isabella had been chased from Spain, and had sought refuge in
France. The Spanish Cortes, maintaining the monarchical form,
offered the Crown of Spain to Prince Hohenzollern, a relation
of the King of Prussia.
See SPAIN: A. D. 1866-1878.
The French Minister at Madrid telegraphed that Prince Leopold
Hohenzollern had been nominated to the throne of Spain, and
had accepted. This produced the utmost excitement and
indignation among the French people. The Paris press teemed
with articles more or less violent, calling on the government
to prevent this outrage, even at the cost of war. The journals
of all shades were unanimous in the matter, contending that it
was an insult and a peril to France, and could not be
tolerated. The Opposition in the Chamber made the incident an
occasion for attacking the government, alleging that it was
owing to its weak and vacillating policy that France was
indebted to her fresh humiliation. The government journals,
however, laid the whole blame upon the ambition of Count
Bismarck, who had become to them a bête noire. ... Both
parties vied with each other in showing the extent of their
dislike to the great Prussian Chancellor. Much pressure was
soon brought to bear in the proper quarters; the result of
this was the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy.
Explanations were made, better counsels seemed to prevail, and
all immediate trouble appeared averted. It seemed quite
certain that all danger of a war between France and Germany
was at an end, and all being quiet on the banks of the Seine,
on the 3d of July I left Paris in pursuit of health and
recreation at the healing waters of Carlsbad, of far-off
Bohemia. I was in excellent relations with the Duke de
Gramont, and everything appeared to be serene. I had hardly
reached Carlsbad, when scanty news was received of a somewhat
threatening character. I could hardly believe that anything
very serious was likely to result; yet I was somewhat uneasy.
Going to drink the water at one of the health-giving springs,
early in the morning of July 15th, my Alsatian valet brought
me the startling news, that a private telegram, received at
midnight, gave the intelligence that France had declared war
against Germany. The news fell upon the thousands of visitors
and the people of Carlsbad, like a clap of thunder in a
cloudless sky, and the most intense excitement prevailed. The
nearest railroad station to Carlsbad, at that time, was Eger.
... I rode all night from Carlsbad to Eger. Taking the
railroad from Eger to Paris, and passing through Bavaria,
Baden, Darmstadt and the valley of the Rhine, the excitement
was something prodigious, recalling to me the days at home of
the firing upon Sumter, in 1861. The troops were rushing to
the depots; the trains were all blocked, and confusion
everywhere reigned supreme. After great delays, and much
discomfort, and a journey of fifty-two hours, I reached Paris
at ten o'clock at night, July 18th. The great masses of
people, naturally so excitable and turbulent, had been
maddened by the false news so skilfully disseminated, that
King William, at Ems, had insulted the French nation through
its Ambassador. ... It soon turned out that all the reports
which had been spread over Paris, that King William had
insulted the French Ambassador were utterly false, and had not
the slightest foundation. The French Ambassador, M. Benedetti,
denied that he had received the least indignity from the
Emperor. The plain truth seemed to be that the French
Ambassador courteously approached the Emperor, while walking
in the garden of the Kursaal, and spoke to him in relation to
the pending difficulties then existing between the two
countries. The good old king was kind and polite, as he always
is to every one with whom he comes in contact, and when M.
Benedetti commenced talking in relation to matters of such a
grave character, he politely stated that he would have to talk
upon such questions with the German Foreign Office. All that
was very proper, and nobody thought of it, or supposed that
there was any indignity, as there was not the slightest
intended. ...
{1381}
The exaggerations in Paris and France of this simple incident
surpassed all bounds, and they were apparently made to inflame
the people still more. It really appeared that the Government
of France had determined to have war with Germany, coûte que
coûte [at all costs]. The alleged causes growing out of the
talk that Germany was to put a German prince on the throne of
Spain were but a mere pretext. The Hohenzollern candidature
had been withdrawn, and there was no necessity or sense in any
further trouble. But the truth was that, after eighteen years
of peace, the courtiers and adventurers who surrounded the
Emperor seemed to think that it was about time to have a war,
to awaken the martial spirit of the French people, to plant
the French eagles in triumph in the capital of some foreign
country, and, as a consequence, to fix firmly on the throne
the son of Napoleon the Third, and restore to the Imperial
crown the lustre it had lost."
_E. B. Washburne,
Recollections of a Minister to France,
volume 1, chapter 2._
ALSO IN:
_W. Müller,
Political History of Recent Times,
section 25._
_G. B. Malleson,
The Refounding of the German Empire,
chapter 11;_
_W. Rüstow,
The War for the Rhine Frontier, 1870,
chapter 6 (volume 1)._
FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (July-August).
Disastrous opening of the war.
Defeats at Wörth, Spichern and Gravelotte.
Bazaine's army shut up in Metz.
"July 23d Napoleon intrusted the regency to the empress for
the period of his absence from Paris. ... On the 28th, ...
accompanied by his son, [he] left for Metz, to assume command
of the army. ... The army consisted of eight corps. Of these,
the 1st, under Marshal MacMahon, was stationed at Strasburg;
the 2d, under General Frossard, at St. Avold; the 3d, under
Marshal Bazaine, at Metz; the 4th, under General Ladmirault,
at Diedenhofen (Thionville); the 5th, under General Failly, at
Bitsch; the 6th, under Marshal Canrobert, in the camp at
Châlons; the 7th, under General Felix Douay, at Belfort; the
8th,--the Imperial Guard--under General Bourbaki, at Nancy.
Accordingly, the French forces were divided into two groups,
the larger stationed on the Moselle, and the smaller in
Alsace. To the latter belonged the 1st and 7th corps, both of
which were placed under the command of Marshal MacMahon, with
orders to prevent the crown prince's army from entering
Alsace. The larger group comprised the 2d, 3d, and 4th corps.
... The 6th and 8th were to have formed the reserve; but the
greatly superior numbers of Prince Frederic Charles and
Steinmetz, who were advancing against this larger group,
necessitated the immediate bringing of those corps to the
front. The connection between the two groups was to be
maintained by the 5th corps, stationed at Bitsch. Skirmishing
of the advanced posts and collisions between reconnoitering
parties began on the 19th of July. The most important of these
minor engagements was that at Saarbrücken, on the 2d of August
[the French claiming a victory]. ... August 4th the crown
prince crossed the French frontier and attacked the town of
Weissenburg, on the little river Lauter. ... Weissenburg was
successfully carried by Prussian and Bavarian battalions
combined, and the Geisberg by sixteen battalions of Prussians
alone. ... August 5th MacMahon with his corps took up his
position at Wörth, fortifying the heights westward from
Sauerbach, together with the villages of Froschweiler and
Elsasshausen, in the intention of meeting at that place the
advancing columns of the crown prince, whose attack he
expected on the 7th. To strengthen his army sufficiently for
the task required of it he endeavored to bring up General
Felix Douay's corps from Belfort and Mühlhausen, and that of
General Failly from Bitsch; but only one division of the
former arrived in time, and a division of the latter which was
sent to his support did not reach the neighborhood of the
battle-field until the evening of the 6th, in time to afford a
partial protection on the retreat. Consequently, MacMahon was
left with not more than 45,000 men to face the crown prince's
whole army. ... On the morning of the 6th the advance guard of
the 5th corps became involved in a sharp action with the
enemy," and "from a mere skirmish of the advance guard
resulted the decisive battle of Wörth. ... After Wörth itself
had been carried, the fighting was most severe around the
fortified village of Froschweiler. This was finally taken, and
a desperate charge of the French cuirassiers repulsed.
Thereupon MacMahon's army broke and fled in wild confusion,
some toward the passes of the Vosges, others to Strasburg or
Bitsch. ... The trophies of victory were numerous and
valuable: 200 officers and 9,000 men prisoners. ... The French
lost 6,000 dead and wounded; the German loss was 489 officers
and 10,153 men--a loss greater than that of Sadowa. ...
MacMahon, with about 15,000 of his defeated troops, reached
Zabern on the morning of the 7th, and set out thence for
Châlons, whither Generals Douay and Failly were also directed
to lead their forces. A new army was to be formed at that
point, and northern Alsace was abandoned to the crown prince's
victorious troops. The Badish division received orders to march
against Strasburg, and by the 9th the whole corps was
assembled before that city, Hagenau having been taken by the
cavalry on the way. ... Preparations for a siege were made, a
regular siege corps being formed ... and placed under the
command of General Werder. With the remainder of the third
army the crown prince left Wörth on the 8th of August, marched
through the unguarded passes of the Vosges, and entered Nancy
on the 16th. ... Detachments were left behind to blockade
Bitsch and Pfalzburg. At Nancy the prince rested for a few
days and waited for decisive news from the Saar and Moselle. A
second victory was won on the 6th of August at Spichern [or
Forbach]. Like the battle of Wörth, this action was not the
result of a strategical combination, but rather of a
misunderstanding. ... Frossard [whose corps was encountered at
Spichern] fell back on Metz by way of Saargemünd. Bazaine, who,
although not more than seven or eight miles from the field of
battle, had made no attempt to come to Frossard's assistance,
led his corps to the same place. In this battle, owing to the
unfavorable nature of the ground, the losses of the conquerors
were heavier than those of the conquered. The Germans had 223
officers and 4,648 men dead, wounded, and missing; while the
French, according to their own reports, lost 249 officers and
3,829 men, 2,000 of whom were taken prisoners. August 7th the
victors continued their forward march, capturing great stores
of provisions in Forbach. On the 9th St. Avold was taken, and
foraging parties advanced almost to Metz.
{1382}
Marching through the Rhenish Palatinate, part of Prince
Frederic Charles's army directed its course toward Metz by way
of Saarbrücken, and part through Saargemünd. ... In the
imperial head-quarters at Metz the greatest consternation
prevailed. ... It was [finally] decided to concentrate five
army corps on the right bank of the Moselle, at Metz, and to
form a second army, consisting of four corps, under MacMahon's
command, in the camp at Châlons. The first line of defence on
the Rhine and Saar had been abandoned, and France was to be
defended on the Moselle. By this decision Alsace and Lorraine
were surrendered to the foe at the very outset." On the 9th of
August the French emperor transferred the chief command from
himself to Marshal Bazaine, while Lebœuf at the same time
withdrew from the direction of the staff. Simultaneously, at
Paris, the Grammont-Ollivier ministry resigned, and was
succeeded by a cabinet formed under the presidency of Count
Palikao (General Montauban). "New levies were called into the
field, comprising all unmarried men between the ages of 25 and
30 not already enrolled in the 'garde mobile.' ... In the
German head-quarters ... it was resolved in some way to make
Bazaine's army harmless, either by shutting him up in Metz or
by pushing him northward to the Belgian frontier. ... The task
was a difficult one. ... All depended upon what course Bazaine
might conclude to pursue, and the energy with which he
executed his plans. It was his purpose to leave Metz with the
field army and join MacMahon at Châlons. There would then be
300,000 French at that place to block the German march to
Paris. In that event the Germans would have to leave 60,000
men before Metz ... and Diedenhofen, and would not have enough
left to venture an attack on the united and well-intrenched
armies at Châlons. Accordingly, the union of those two armies
must be prevented at any price, and Bazaine be attacked before
Metz. The execution of this plan led to the severe fighting
near that city--the battle of Colombey-Nouilly (Borny), on the
14th, Vionville on the 16th, and Gravelotte on the 18th." The
battle of Gravelotte was "the first battle in the war in which
a pre-arranged plan [Moltke's] was actually carried out. ... It
was a brilliant victory, and followed by important results.
Bazaine's army was shut up in the fortress and among the
outlying forts, and rendered unavailable for further service
in the field. The losses of the French amounted to about
13,000 men, including 600 officers; the German loss was 899
officers and 19,260 men, of whom 328 officers and 4,909 men
were killed outright. The number of combatants on the side of
the French was about 140,000, on the side of the Germans
178,818, the former having 550, and the latter 822 cannon. It
must be remembered, however, that the French occupied a
position very much of the nature of a fortress, which had to
be carried by storm."
_W. Müller,
Political History of Recent Times,
section 25._
ALSO IN:
_Count H. von Moltke,
The Franro-German War of 1870-71,
section 1._
_Colonel A. Borbstaedt and Major F. Dwyer,
The Franco-German War,
chapters 10-29._
FRANCE: A. D. 1870 (August-September).
Investment of Metz by the Germans.
Disastrous attempt of MacMahon to rescue Bazaine.
The catastrophe at Sedan.
"The huge, stubborn, vehement and bloody conflict waged in the
rural tract between the northern edges of the Bois de Vaux and
the Forest of Jaumont, which the French Marshal called the
'Defence of the Lines of Amanvillers,' the French Army, 'the
Battle of St. Privat,' and the Germans the battle of
'Gravelotte--St. Privat,' established the mastery of the
latter over 'the Army of the Rhine.' Marshal Bazaine had not
proved strong enough to extricate the Army he was suddenly
appointed to command from the false position in which it had
been placed by the errors and hesitations of the Emperor and
Marshal Lebœuf. ... The German leaders forthwith resolved, and
acted on the resolve, to take the largest advantage of success.
When the broadening day showed that the French were encamped
under the guns of the fort, and that they did not betray the
faintest symptom of fighting for egress on any side, the place
was deliberately invested. ... Soon the blockade was so far
completed that only adventurous scouts were able at rare
intervals to work their way through the German lines. As early
as the forenoon of the 19th, the King had decided to form what
came to be called the 'Army of the Meuse' out of the Corps
which were not needed to uphold the investment of Metz, and
thus place himself in a condition to assail the French Army
collecting at Chalons. ... This formidable force was put under
the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, who had shown
himself to be an able soldier. Consequently, there remained
behind to invest Bazaine, seven Corps d'Armée and a Division
of Reserve under General von Kummer. ... One Army had been
literally imprisoned, another remained at large, and behind it
were the vast resources of France. Three Marshals were cooped
up in the cage on the Moselle; one, MacMahon, and the Emperor
were still in the field; and upon the forces with them it was
resolved to advance at once, because prudence required that
they should be shattered before they could be completely
organized, and while the moral effect of the resounding blows
struck in Alsace and Lorraine had lost none of its terrible
power. Therefore the King and General von Moltke started on
the morrow of victory to march on Paris through the plains of
Champagne."
_G. Hooper,
The Campaign of Sedan,
chapter 10._
"While the German invasion had thus been rolling from Lorraine
into the flats of Champagne, the shattered right wing of the
army of the Rhine, with reinforcements sent off from Paris,
had been drawn together in the well-known plains made
memorable by the defeat of Attila. By 20 August the first and
fifth French corps marched rapidly from the Upper Moselle to
the Marne, had been joined by the seventh corps from Belfort
and by the twelfth formed in and despatched from Paris; and
this force, numbering perhaps 130,000 men, with from 400 to
500 guns, had been concentrated round the great camp of
Châlons. Macmahon was given the supreme command, and the first
operations of the experienced chief showed that he understood
the present state of affairs, and were in accord with the
rules of strategy. Bazaine, he knew, was in peril near Metz,
and certainly had not attained the Meuse; and he was at the
head of the last army which France could assemble for the
defence of her capital.
{1383}
In these circumstances, impressed perhaps by the grand
memories of the campaign of 1814, he most properly resolved to
fall back towards Paris; but as Bazaine was possibly not far
distant, and a position on the flank of the German advance
might afford a favourable opportunity to strike, he withdrew
northwards on the 21st to Rheims, in the double hope that he
would approach his colleague and threaten the communications
of the advancing enemy. This, we repeat, was following the art
of war, and had Macmahon firmly adhered to his purpose, there
would have been no Sedan and no treaty of Frankfort. Unhappily
the marshal, a hero in the field, was deficient in real
strength of character, and at this critical moment evil
counsels and false information shook, and at last changed, a
resolve that ought to have never faltered. A new
administration had been formed in Paris, and Palikao, the
minister of war, devoted to the Empire, and especially bent on
satisfying the demands of the excited capital, which
passionately insisted on the relief of Bazaine, had conceived
a project by which he hoped that this great object would be
effected and the 'dynasty' be restored in popular opinion. The
army of the Meuse, he argued, was near that stream, round
Verdun; the third army was far away to the south; there was a
considerable interval between the two masses; and the army of
Châlons, then at Rheims, was not far from the Upper Meuse. In
those circumstances it was quite practicable, should Macmahon
rapidly advance to the Meuse, to overpower with his largely
superior force the army of the Meuse before support could be
sent from the distant third army; and the enemy in his path
being swept aside, the marshal could then descend on Metz,
fall with the collected strength of the army of Châlons on the
divided fragments of the investing force, and triumphantly
effect his junction with Bazaine, having routed, perhaps, the
first and second armies before the third could appear on the
scene. The defiles and woods of the Argonne and the Ardennes,
stretching between the French and the German armies, Palikao
insisted, would form a screen to conceal the advance of the
army of Chãlons, and would greatly facilitate the proposed
movement. This project reached Macmahon on 21 August, and may
be pronounced one of the most reckless ever designed by a
desperate gambler in war. ... Macmahon at first refused to
listen to what he condemned as a hopeless project; but bad
advisers found their way to him, and his resolution was
already yielding when a calamitous event fixed his shifting
purpose. A despatch from Bazaine, obscure and untrue,
announced that he was on his way northward. Macmahon inferred
that his beleaguered colleague had left Metz and eluded his
foes, and, thinking that he would reach Bazaine before long,
in an evil hour for France and for himself, he consented to
attempt the march to the Meuse."
_W. O'C. Morris,
The Campaign of Sedan
(English Historical Review., April, 1888)._