Marignano], the Swiss took the road back to their mountains.
Francis I. entered Milan in triumph. Maximilian Sforza took
refuge in the castle, and twenty days afterwards on the 4th of
October, surrendered, consenting to retire to France, with a
pension of 30,000 crowns, and the promise of being recommended
for a cardinal's hat, and almost consoled for his downfall 'by
the pleasure of being delivered from the insolence of the
Swiss, the exactions of the Emperor Maximilian, and the
rascalities of the Spaniards.' Fifteen years afterwards, in
June, 1530, he died in oblivion at Paris.
{1188}
Francis I. regained possession of all Milaness, adding
thereto, with the pope's consent, the duchies of Parma and
Piacenza, which had been detached from it. ... Two treaties,
one of November 7, 1515, and the other of November 29, 1516,
re-established not only peace, but perpetual alliance, between
the King of France and the thirteen Swiss Cantons, with
stipulated conditions in detail. Whilst these negotiations
were in progress, Francis I. and Leo X., by a treaty published
at Viterbo, on the 13th of October, proclaimed their hearty
reconciliation. The pope guaranteed to Francis I. the duchy of
Milan, restored to him those of Parma and Piacenza, and
recalled his troops which were still serving against the
Venetians." At the same time, arrangements were made for a
personal meeting of the pope and the French king, which took
place at Bologna in December, 1515. "Francis did not attempt
to hide his design of reconquering the kingdom of Naples,
which Ferdinand the Catholic had wrongfully usurped, and he
demanded the pope's countenance. The pope did not care to
refuse, but he pointed out to the king that everything
foretold the very near death of King Ferdinand; and 'Your
Majesty,' said he, 'will then have a natural opportunity for
claiming your rights; and as for me, free, as I shall then be,
from my engagements with the King of Arragon in respect of the
crown of Naples, I shall find it easier to respond to your
majesty's wish.' The pope merely wanted to gain time. Francis,
putting aside for the moment the kingdom of Naples, spoke of
Charles VII.'s Pragmatic Sanction [see above: A. D. 1438], and
the necessity of putting an end to the difficulties which had
arisen on this subject between the court of Rome and the Kings
of France, his predecessors. 'As to that,' said the pope, 'I
could not grant what your predecessors demanded; but be not
uneasy; I have a compensation to propose to you which will
prove to you how dear your interests are to me.' The two
sovereigns had, without doubt, already come to an
understanding on this point, when, after a three days'
interview with Leo X., Francis I. returned to Milan, leaving
at Bologna, for the purpose of treating in detail the affair
of the Pragmatic Sanction, his chancellor, Duprat, who had
accompanied him during all this campaign as his adviser and
negotiator. ... The popes ... had all of them protested since
the days of Charles VII. against the Pragmatic Sanction as an
attack upon their rights, and had demanded its abolition. In
1461, Louis XI. ... had yielded for a moment to the demand of
Pope Pius II., whose countenance he desired to gain, and had
abrogated the Pragmatic; but, not having obtained what he
wanted thereby, and having met with strong opposition in the
Parliament of Paris to his concession, he had let it drop
without formally retracting it. ... This important edict,
then, was still vigorous in 1515, when Francis I., after his
victory at Melegnano and his reconciliation with the pope,
left Chancellor Duprat at Bologna to pursue the negotiation
reopened on that subject. The 'compensation,' of which Leo X.,
on redemanding the abolition of the Pragmatic Sanction, had
given a peep to Francis I., could not fail to have charms for
a prince so little scrupulous, and for his still less
scrupulous chancellor. The pope proposed that the Pragmatic,
once for all abolished, should be replaced by a Concordat
between the two sovereigns, and that this Concordat, whilst
putting a stop to the election of the clergy by the faithful,
should transfer to the king the right of nomination to
bishoprics and other great ecclesiastical offices and
benefices, reserving to the pope the right of presentation of
prelates nominated by the king. This, considering the
condition of society and government in the 16th century, in
the absence of political and religious liberty, was to take
away from the church her own existence, and divide her between
two masters, without giving her, as regarded either of them,
any other guarantee of independence than the mere chance of
their dissensions and quarrels. ... Francis I. and his
chancellor saw in the proposed Concordat nothing but the great
increment of influence it secured to them, by making all the
dignitaries of the church suppliants at first and then clients
of the kingship. After some difficulties as to points of
detail, the Concordat was concluded and signed on the 18th of
August, 1516. Five months afterwards, on the 5th of February,
1517, the king repaired in person to Parliament, to which he
had summoned many prelates and doctors of the University. The
Chancellor explained the points of the Concordat. ... The king
ordered its registration, 'for the good of his kingdom and for
quittance of the promise he had given the pope.'" For more
than a year the Parliament of Paris resisted the royal order,
and it was not until the 22d of March, 1518, that it yielded
to the king's threats and proceeded to registration of the
Concordat, with forms and reservations "which were evidence of
compulsion. The other Parliaments of France followed with more
or less zeal ... the example shown by that of Paris. The
University was heartily disposed to push resistance farther
than had been done by Parliament."
_F. P. Guizot,
Popular History of France,
chapter 28 (volume 4)._
"The execution of the Concordat was vigorously contested for
years afterwards. Cathedrals and monastic chapters proceeded
to elect bishops and abbots under the provisions of the
Pragmatic Sanction; and every such case became a fresh source
of exasperation between the contending powers. ... But the
Parliament, though clamouring loudly for the 'Gallican
liberties,' and making a gallant stand for national
independence as against the usurpations of Rome, was unable to
maintain its ground against the overpowering despotism of the
Crown. The monarchical authority ultimately achieved a
complete triumph. In 1527 a peremptory royal ordinance
prohibited the courts of Parliament from taking further
cognisance of causes affecting elections to consistorial
benefices and conventual priories; and all such matters were
transferred to the sole jurisdiction of the Council of State.
After this the agitation against the Concordat gradually
subsided. But although, in virtue of its compulsory
registration by the Parliament, the Concordat became part of
the law of the land, it is certain that the Gallican Church
never accepted this flagrant invasion of its liberties."
_W. H. Jervis,
History of the Church of France,
volume 1, pages 109-110._
{1189}
FRANCE: A. D. 1515-1547.
The institution of the Court.
Its baneful influence.
"Francis I. instituted the Court, and this had a decisive
influence upon the manners of the nobility. Those lords, whose
respect royalty had difficulty in keeping when they were at
their castles, having come to court, prostrated themselves
before the throne, and yielded obedience with their whole
hearts. A few words will describe this Court. The king lodged
and fed in his own large palace, which was fitted for the
purpose, the flower of the French nobility. Some of these
lords were in his service, under the title of officers of his
household--as chamberlains, purveyors, equerries, &c. Large
numbers of domestic offices were created solely as an excuse
for their presence. Others lived there, without duties, simply
as guests. All these, besides lodging and food, had often a
pension as well. A third class were given only a lodging, and
provided their own table; but all were amused and entertained
with various pleasures, at the expense of the king. Balls,
carousals, stately ceremonials, grand dinners, theatricals,
conversations inspired by the presence of fair women, constant
intercourse of all kinds, where each could choose for himself,
and where the refined and literary found a place as well as
the vain and profligate,--such was court life, a truly
different thing from the monotonous and brutal existence of
the feudal lord at his castle in the depths of his province.
So, from all sides, nobles flocked to court, to gratify both
the most refined tastes and the most degraded passions. Some
came hoping to make their fortune, a word from the king
sufficing to enrich a man; others came to gain a rank in the
army, a lucrative post in the finance department, an abbey, or
a bishopric. From the time kings held court, it became almost
a law, that nothing should be granted to a nobleman who lived
beyond its pale. Those lords who persisted in staying on their
own estates were supposed to rail against the administration, or,
as we of the present would express it, to be in opposition.
'They must indeed be men of gross minds who are not tempted by
the polish of the court; at all events it is very insolent in
them to show so little wish to see their sovereign, and enjoy
the honor of living under his roof.' Such was almost precisely
the opinion of the king in regard to the provincial nobility.
... Ambition drew the nobles to court; ambition, society, and
dissipation kept them there. To incur the displeasure of their
master, and be exiled from court was, first, to lose all hope
of advancement, and then to fall from paradise into purgatory.
It killed some people. But life was much more expensive at
court than in the castles. As in all society where each is
constantly in the presence of his neighbor, there was
unbounded rivalry as to who should be most brilliant, most
superb. The old revenues did not suffice, while, at the same
time, the inevitable result of the absence of the lords was to
decrease them. Whilst the expenses of the noblemen at Chambord
or Versailles were steadily on the increase, his intendant,
alone and unrestrained upon the estate, filled his own
pockets, and sent less money every quarter, so that, to keep
up the proper rank, the lord was forced to beg a pension from
the king. Low indeed was the downfall of the old pride and
feudal independence! The question was how to obtain these
pensions, ranks, offices, and favors of all kinds. The virtues
most prized and rewarded by the kings were not civic
virtues,--capacity, and services of value for the public
good; what pleased them was, naturally, devotion to their
person, blind obedience, flattery, and subservience."
_P. Lacombe,
A Short History of the French People,
chapter 23._
FRANCE: A. D. 1516-1517.
Maximilian's attempt against Milan.
Diplomatic intrigues.
The Treaty of Noyon.
After Francis I. had taken possession of Milan, and while Pope
Leo X. was making professions of friendship to him at Bologna,
a scheme took shape among the French king's enemies for
depriving him of his conquest, and the pope was privy to it.
"Henry VIII. would not openly break the peace between England
and France, but he offered to supply Maximilian with Swiss
troops for an attack upon Milan. It was useless to send money
to Maximilian, who would have spent it on himself"; but troops
were hired for the emperor by the English agent, Pace, and "at
the beginning of March [1516] the joint army of Maximilian and
the Swiss assembled at Trent. On March 24 they were within a
few miles of Milan, and their success seemed sure, when
suddenly Maximilian found that his resources were exhausted
and refused to proceed; next day he withdrew his troops and
abandoned his allies. ... The expedition was a total failure;
yet English gold had not been spent in vain, as the Swiss were
prevented from entirely joining the French, and Francis I. was
reminded that his position in Italy was by no means secure.
Leo X., meanwhile, in the words of Pace, 'had played
marvellously with both hands in this enterprise.' ... England
was now the chief opponent of the ambitious schemes of France,
and aimed at bringing about a league with Maximilian, Charles
[who had just succeeded Ferdinand of Spain, deceased January
23, 1516], the Pope, and the Swiss. But Charles's ministers,
chief of whom was Croy, lord of Chievres, had a care above all
for the interests of Flanders, and so were greatly under the
influence of France. ... France and England entered into a
diplomatic warfare over the alliance with Charles. First,
England on April 19 recognised Charles as King of Spain,
Navarre, and the Two Sicilies; then Wolsey strove to make
peace between Venice and Maximilian as a first step towards
detaching Venice from its French alliance." On the other hand,
negotiations were secretly carried on and (August 13) "the
treaty of Noyon was concluded between Francis I. and Charles.
Charles was to marry Louise, the daughter of Francis I., an
infant of one year old, and receive as her dower the French
claims on Naples; Venice was to pay Maximilian 200,000 ducats
for Brescia and Verona; in case he refused this offer and
continued the war, Charles was at liberty to help his
grandfather, and Francis I. to help the Venetians, without any
breach of the peace now made between them. ... In spite of the
efforts of England, Francis I. was everywhere successful in
settling his difficulties. On November 29 a perpetual peace
was made at Friburg between France and the Swiss Cantons; on
December 3 the treaty of Noyon was renewed, and Maximilian was
included in its provisions. Peace was made between him and
Venice by the provision that Maximilian was to hand over
Verona to Charles, who in turn should give it up to the King
of France, who delivered it to the Venetians; Maximilian in
return received 100,000 ducats from Venice and as much from
France. The compact was duly carried out: 'On February 8,
1517,' wrote the Cardinal of Sion, 'Verona belonged to the
Emperor; on the 9th to the King Catholic; on the 15th to the
French; on the 17th to the Venetians.' Such was the end of the
wars that had arisen from the League of Cambrai. After a struggle
of eight years the powers that had confederated to destroy
Venice came together to restore her to her former place.
Venice might well exult in this reward of her long constancy,
her sacrifices and her disasters."
_M. Creighton,
History of the Papacy, during the Period
of the Reformation,
book 5, chapter 19 (volume 4)._
ALSO IN:
_J. S. Brewer,
The Reign of Henry VIII.,
chapters 4-6 (volume 1)._
{1190}
FRANCE: A. D. 1519.
Candidacy of Francis I. for Imperial crown.
See GERMANY: A. D. 1519.
FRANCE: A. D. 1520-1523.
Rivalry of Francis I. and Charles V.
The Emperor's successes in Italy and Navarre.
Milan again taken from France.
The wrongs and the treason of the Constable of Bourbon.
"With their candidature for the Imperial crown, burst forth
the inextinguishable rivalry between Francis I. and Charles V.
The former claimed Naples for himself and Navarre for Henry
d'Albret: the Emperor demanded the Milanese as a fief of the
Empire, and the Duchy of Burgundy. Their resources were about
equal. If the empire of Charles were more extensive the
kingdom of France was more compact. The Emperor's subjects
were richer, but his authority more circumscribed. The
reputation of the French cavalry was not inferior to that of
the Spanish infantry. Victory would belong to the one who
should win over the King of England to his side. ... Both gave
pensions to his Prime Minister, Cardinal Wolsey; they each asked
the hand of his daughter Mary, one for the dauphin, the other
for himself. Francis I. obtained from him an interview at
Calais, and forgetting that he wished to gain his favour,
eclipsed him by his elegance and magnificence [see FIELD OF
THE CLOTH OF GOLD]. Charles V., more adroit, had anticipated
this interview by visiting Henry VIII. in England. He had
secured Wolsey by giving him hopes of the tiara. ...
Everything succeeded with the Emperor. He gained Leo X. to his
side and thus obtained sufficient influence to raise his
tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, to the papacy [on the death of Leo,
Dec. 1, 1521]. The French penetrated into Spain, but arrived
too late to aid the rising there [in Navarre, 1521]. The
governor of the Milanese, Lautrec, who is said to have exiled
from Milan nearly half its inhabitants, was driven out of
Lombardy [and the Pope retook Parma and Placentia]. He met
with the same fate again in the following year: the Swiss, who
were ill-paid, asked either for dismissal or battle, and allowed
themselves to be beaten at La Bicoque [April 29, 1522]. The
money intended for the troops had been used for other purposes
by the Queen-mother, who hated Lautrec. At the moment when
Francis I. was thinking of re-entering Italy, an internal
enemy threw France into the utmost danger. Francis had given
mortal offence to the Constable of Bourbon, one of those who
had most contributed to the victory of Marignan. Charles,
Count of Montpensier and Dauphin of Auvergne, held by virtue
of his wife, a granddaughter of Louis XI., the Duchy of
Bourbon, and the counties of Clermont, La Marche and other
domains, which made him the first noble in the kingdom. On the
death of his wife, the Queen-mother, Louise of Savoy, who had
wanted to marry the Constable and had been refused by him,
resolved to ruin him. She disputed with him this rich
inheritance and obtained from her son that the property should
be provisionally sequestered. Bourbon, exasperated, resolved
to pass over to the Emperor (1523). Half a century earlier,
revolt did not mean disloyalty. The most accomplished knights
in France, Dunois and John of Calabria, had joined the 'League
for the public weal.' ... But now it was no question of a
revolt against the king; such a thing was impossible in France
at this time. It was a conspiracy against the very existence
of France that Bourbon was plotting with foreigners. He
promised Charles V. to attack Burgundy as soon as Francis I.
had crossed the Alps, and to rouse into revolt five provinces
of which he believed himself master; the kingdom of Provence
was to be re-established in his favour, and France,
partitioned between Spain and England, would have ceased to
exist as a nation. He was soon able to enjoy the reverses of
his country."
_J. Michelet,
Summary of Modern History,
chapter 6._
"Henry VIII. and Charles V. were both ready to secure the
services of the ex-Constable. He decided in favour of Charles
as the more powerful of the two. ... These secret negotiations
were carried on in the spring of 1523, while Francis I.
(having sent a sufficient force to protect his northern
frontier) was preparing to make Italy the seat of war. With
this object the king ordered a rendezvous of the army at
Lyons, in the beginning of September, and having arranged to
pass through Moulins on his way to join the forces, called
upon the Constable to meet him there and to proceed with him
to Lyons. Already vague rumours of an understanding between
the Emperor and Bourbon had reached Francis, who gave no
credence to them; but on his way M. de Brézé, Seneschal of
Normandy, attached to the Court of Louise of Savoy, sent such
precise details of the affair by two Norman gentlemen in the
Constable's service that doubt was no longer possible."
Francis accordingly entered Moulins with a considerable force,
and went straight to Bourbon, who feigned illness. The
Constable stoutly denied to the king all the charges which the
latter revealed to him, and Francis, who was strongly urged to
order his arrest, refused to do so. But a few days later, when
the king had gone forward to Lyons, Bourbon, pretending to
follow him, rode away to his strong castle of Chantelles, from
whence he wrote letters demanding the restitution of his
estates. As soon as his flight was known, Francis sent forces
to seize him; but the Constable, taking one companion with
him, made his way out of the kingdom in disguise. Escaping to
Italy, he was there placed in command of the imperial army.
_C. Coignet,
Francis I. and his Times,
chapter 4._
ALSO IN:
_Miss Pardoe,
The Court and Reign of Francis I.,
volume 1, chapters 14-19._
See, also, AUSTRIA: A. D. 1519-1555.
FRANCE: A. D. 1521.
Invasion of Navarre.
See NAVARRE: A. D. 1442-1521.
FRANCE: A. D. 1521-1525.
Beginning of the Protestant Reform movement.
See PAPACY: A. D. 1521-1535.
FRANCE: A. D. 1523-1524.
First undertakings in the New World.
Voyages of Verrazano.
See AMERICA: A. D. 1523-1524.
{1191}
FRANCE: A. D. 1523-1525.
The death of Bayard.
Second invasion of Italy by Francis I.
His defeat and capture at Pavia.
"Bonnivet, the personal enemy of Bourbon, was now entrusted
with the command of the French army. He marched without
opposition into the Milanese, and might have taken the capital
had he pushed on to its gates. Having by irresolution lost it,
he retreated to winter quarters behind the Tesino. The
operations of the English in Picardy, of the imperialists in
Champagne, and of the Spaniards near the Pyrenees, were
equally insignificant. The spring of 1524 brought on an
action, if the attack of one point can be called such, which
proved decisive for the time. Bonnivet advanced rashly beyond
the Tesino. The imperialists, commanded by four able generals,
Launoi, Pescara, Bourbon, and Sforza, succeeded in almost
cutting off his retreat. They at the same time refused
Bonnivet's offer to engage. They hoped to weaken him by
famine. The Swiss first murmured against the distress
occasioned by want of precaution. They deserted across the
river; and Bonnivet, thus abandoned, was obliged to make a
precipitate and perilous retreat. A bridge was hastily flung
across the Sessia, near Romagnano; and Bonnivet, with his best
knights and gensdarmerie, undertook to defend the passage of
the rest of the army. The imperialists, led on by Bourbon,
made a furious attack. Bonnivet was wounded, and he gave his
place to Bayard, who, never entrusted with a high command, was
always chosen for that of a forlorn hope. The brave Vandenesse
was soon killed; and Bayard himself received a gun-shot
through the reins. The gallant chevalier, feeling his wound
mortal, caused himself to be placed in a sitting posture
beneath a tree, his face to the enemy, and his sword fixed in
guise of a cross before him. The constable Bourbon, who led
the imperialists, soon came up to the dying Bayard, and
expressed his compassion. 'Weep not for me,' said the
chevalier, 'but for thyself. I die in performing my duty; thou
art betraying thine.' Nothing marks more strongly the great
rise, the sudden sacro-sanctity of the royal authority in
those days, than the general horror which the treason of
Bourbon excited. ... The fact is, that this sudden horror of
treason was owing, in a great measure, to the revived study of
the classics, in which treason to one's country is universally
mentioned as an impiety and a crime of the deepest dye.
Feudality, with all its oaths, had no such horror of treason.
... Bonnivet had evacuated Italy after this defeat at
Romagnano. Bourbon's animosity stimulated him to push his
advantage. He urged the emperor to invade France, and
recommended the Bourbonnais and his own patrimonial provinces
as those most advisable to invade. Bourbon wanted to raise his
friends in insurrection against Francis; but Charles descried
selfishness in this scheme of Bourbon, and directed Pescara to
march with the constable into the south of France and lay
siege to Marseilles. ... Marseilles made an obstinate
resistance," and the siege was ineffectual. "Francis, in the
meantime, alarmed by the invasion, had assembled an army. He
burned to employ it, and avenge the late affront. The king of
England, occupied with the Scotch, gave him respite in the
north; and he resolved to employ this by marching, late as the
season was, into Italy. His generals, who by this time were
sick of warring beyond the Alps, opposed the design; but not
even the death of his queen, Claude, could stop Francis. He
passed Mount Cenis; marched upon Milan, whose population was
spiritless and broken by the plague, and took it without
resistance. It was then mooted whether Lodi or Pavia should be
besieged. The latter, imprudently, as it is said, was
preferred. It was at this time that Pope Clement VII., of the
house of Medici, who had lately succeeded Adrian, made the
most zealous efforts to restore peace between the monarchies.
He found Charles and his generals arrogant and unwilling to
treat. The French, said they, must on no account be allowed a
footing in Italy. Clement, impelled by pique towards the
emperor, or generosity to Francis, at once abandoned the
prudent policy of his predecessors, and formed a league with
the French king, to whom, after all, he brought no accession
of force. This step proved afterwards fatal to the city of
Rome. The siege of Pavia was formed about the middle of
October [1524]. Antonio de Leyva, an experienced officer,
supported by veteran troops, commanded in the town. The
fortifications were strong, and were likely to hold for a
considerable time. By the month of January the French had made
no progress; and the impatient Francis despatched a
considerable portion of his army for the invasion of Naples,
hearing that the country was drained of troops. This was a
gross blunder, which Pescara observing, forbore to send any
force to oppose the expedition. He knew that the fate of Italy
would be decided before Pavia. Bourbon, in the mean time,
disgusted with the jealousies and tardiness of the imperial
generals, employed the winter in raising an army of
lansquenets on his own account. From the duke of Savoy he
procured funds; and early in the year 1525 the constable
joined Pescara at Lodi with a fresh army of 12,000
mercenaries. They had, besides, some 7,000 foot, and not more
than 1,500 horse. With these they marched to the relief of
Pavia. Francis had a force to oppose to them, not only
inferior in numbers, but so harassed with a winter's siege,
that all the French generals of experience counselled a
retreat. Bonnivet and his young troop of courtiers were for
fighting; and the monarch hearkened to them. Pavia, to the
north of the river, was covered in great part by the chateau
and walled park of Mirabel. Adjoining this, and on a rising
ground, was the French camp, extending to the Tesino. Through
the camp, or through the park, lay the only ways by which the
imperialists could reach Pavia. The camp was strongly
entrenched and defended by artillery, except on the side of
the park of Mirabel, with which it communicated." On the night
of February 23, the imperialists made a breach in the park
wall, through which they pressed next morning, but were driven
back with heavy loss. "This was victory enough, could the
French king have been contented with it. But the impatient
Francis no sooner beheld his enemies in rout, than he was
eager to chase them in person, and complete the victory with
his good sword. He rushed forth from his entrenchments at the
head of his gensdarmerie, flinging himself between the enemy
and his own artillery, which was thus masked and rendered
useless. The imperialists rallied as soon as they found
themselves safe from the fire of the cannon," and the French
were overwhelmed. "The king ... behind a heap of slain,
defended himself valiantly; so beaten and shattered, so
begrimed with blood and dust, as to be scarcely
distinguishable, notwithstanding his conspicuous armour. He
had received several wounds, one in the forehead; and his
horse, struck with a ball in the head, reared, fell back, and
crushed him with his weight: still Francis rose, and laid
prostrate several of the enemies that rushed upon him." But
presently he was recognized and was persuaded to surrender his
sword to Lannoi, the viceroy of Naples. "Such was the signal
defeat that put an end to all French conquests and claims in
Italy."
_E. E. Crowe,
History of France,
volume 1, chapter 6._
ALSO IN:
_W. Robertson,
History of the Reign of Charles V.,
book 4 (volume 2)._
_J. S. Brewer,
Reign of Henry VIII.,
chapter 21 (volume 2)._
_H. G. Smith,
Romance of History,
chapter 6._
{1192}
FRANCE: A. D. 1525-1526.
The captivity of Francis I. and his deliberate perfidy in the
Treaty of Madrid.