he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to
weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had taken
place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was
opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am not
disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering
what had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, such
as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I would
still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty,
provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. While
Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there
was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of
little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial,
his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be
undone. I am inclined to think that he was right.
My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr.
Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is
as follows:
"The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German
plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish
rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a
complete document.
"The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and
of depression. The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and
humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance.
"The League of Nations created by the Treaty is relied upon to
preserve the artificial structure which has been erected by
compromise of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and to
prevent the germination of the seeds of war which are sown in so many
articles and which under normal conditions would soon bear fruit. The
League might as well attempt to prevent the growth of plant life in a
tropical jungle. Wars will come sooner or later.
"It must be admitted in honesty that the League is an instrument of
the mighty to check the normal growth of national power and national
aspirations among those who have been rendered impotent by defeat.
Examine the Treaty and you will find peoples delivered against their
wills into the hands of those whom they hate, while their economic
resources are torn from them and given to others. Resentment and
bitterness, if not desperation, are bound to be the consequences of
such provisions. It may be years before these oppressed peoples are
able to throw off the yoke, but as sure as day follows night the time
will come when they will make the effort.
"This war was fought by the United States to destroy forever the
conditions which produced it. Those conditions have not been
destroyed. They have been supplanted by other conditions equally
productive of hatred, jealousy, and suspicion. In place of the Triple
Alliance and the Entente has arisen the Quintuple Alliance which is
to rule the world. The victors in this war intend to impose their
combined will upon the vanquished and to subordinate all interests to
their own.
"It is true that to please the aroused public opinion of mankind and
to respond to the idealism of the moralist they have surrounded the
new alliance with a halo and called it 'The League of Nations,' but
whatever it may be called or however it may be disguised it is an
alliance of the Five Great Military Powers.
"It is useless to close our eyes to the fact that the power to compel
obedience by the exercise of the united strength of 'The Five' is the
fundamental principle of the League. Justice is secondary. Might
is primary.
"The League as now constituted will be the prey of greed and
intrigue; and the law of unanimity in the Council, which may offer a
restraint, will be broken or render the organization powerless. It is
called upon to stamp as just what is unjust.
"We have a treaty of peace, but it will not bring permanent peace
because it is founded on the shifting sands of self-interest."
In the views thus expressed I was not alone. A few days after they were
written I was in London where I discussed the Treaty with several of the
leading British statesmen. I noted their opinions thus: "The consensus
was that the Treaty was unwise and unworkable, that it was conceived in
intrigue and fashioned in cupidity, and that it would produce rather
than prevent wars." One of these leaders of political thought in Great
Britain said that "the only apparent purpose of the League of Nations
seems to be to perpetuate the series of unjust provisions which were
being imposed."
The day following my return from London, which was on May 17, I received
Mr. Bullitt's letter of resignation and also letters from five of our
principal experts protesting against the terms of peace and stating that
they considered them to be an abandonment of the principles for which
Americans had fought. One of the officials, whose relations with the
President were of a most intimate nature, said that he was in a quandary
about resigning; that he did not think that the conditions in the Treaty
would make for peace because they were too oppressive; that the
obnoxious things in the Treaty were due to secret diplomacy; and that
the President should have stuck rigidly to his principles, which he had
not. This official was evidently deeply incensed, but in the end he did
not resign, nor did the five experts who sent letters, because they were
told that it would seriously cripple the American Commission in the
preparation of the Austrian Treaty if they did not continue to serve.
Another and more prominent adviser of the President felt very bitterly
over the terms of peace. In speaking of his disapproval of them he told
me that he had found the same feeling among the British in Paris, who
were disposed to blame the President since "they had counted upon him to
stand firmly by his principles and face down the intriguers."
It is needless to cite other instances indicating the general state of
mind among the Americans and British at Paris to show the views that
were being exchanged and the frank comments that were being made at the
time of my interview with Mr. Bullitt. In truth I said less to him in
criticism of the Treaty than I did to some others, but they have seen
fit to respect the confidential nature of our conversations.
It is not pertinent to the present subject to recite the events between
the delivery of the Treaty to the Germans on May 7 and its signature on
June 28. In spite of the dissatisfaction, which even went so far that
some of the delegates of the Great Powers threatened to decline to sign
the Treaty unless certain of its terms were modified, the supreme
necessity of restoring peace as soon as possible overcame all obstacles.
It was the appreciation of this supreme necessity which caused many
Americans to urge consent to ratification when the Treaty was laid
before the Senate.
My own position was paradoxical. I was opposed to the Treaty, but signed
it and favored its ratification. The explanation is this: Convinced
after conversations with the President in July and August, 1919, that he
would not consent to any effective reservations, the politic course
seemed to be to endeavor to secure ratification without reservations. It
appeared to be the only possible way of obtaining that for which all the
world longed and which in the months succeeding the signature appeared
absolutely essential to prevent the widespread disaster resulting from
political and economic chaos which seemed to threaten many nations if
not civilization itself. Even if the Treaty was bad in certain
provisions, so long as the President remained inflexible and insistent,
its ratification without change seemed a duty to humanity. At least that
was my conviction in the summer and autumn of 1919, and I am not yet
satisfied that it was erroneous. My views after January, 1920, are not
pertinent to the subject under consideration. The consequences of the
failure to ratify promptly the Treaty of Versailles are still uncertain.
They may be more serious or they may be less serious than they appeared
in 1919. Time alone will disclose the truth and fix the responsibility
for what occurred after the Treaty of Versailles was laid before the
Senate of the United States.
CONCLUSION
The narration of my relations to the peace negotiations as one of the
American Commissioners to the Paris Conference, which has been confined
within the limits laid down in the opening chapter of this volume,
concludes with the recital of the views which I held concerning the
terms of the Treaty of Peace with Germany and which were brought to the
attention of Mr. Wilson through the press reports of William C.
Bullitt's statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
September 12, 1919.
The endeavor has been to present, as fully as possible in the
circumstances, a review of my association with President Wilson in
connection with the negotiations at Paris setting forth our differences
of opinion and divergence of judgment upon the subjects coming before
the Peace Conference, the conduct of the proceedings, and the terms of
peace imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles.
It is evident from this review that, from a time prior to Mr. Wilson's
departure from the United States on December 4, 1918, to attend the
Peace Conference up to the delivery of the text of the Treaty to the
German plenipotentiaries on May 7, 1919, there were many subjects of
disagreement between the President and myself; that he was disposed to
reject or ignore the advice and suggestions which I volunteered; and
that in consequence of my convictions I followed his guidance and obeyed
his instructions unwillingly.
While there were other matters of friction between us they were of a
personal nature and of minor importance. Though they may have
contributed to the formality of our relations they played no real part
in the increasing difficulty of the situation. The matters narrated
were, in my opinion, the principal causes for the letters written by
President Wilson in February, 1920; at least they seem sufficient to
explain the origin of the correspondence, while the causes specifically
stated by him--my calling together of the heads of the executive
departments for consultation during his illness and my attempts to
anticipate his judgment--are insufficient.
The reasons given in the President's letter of February 11, the
essential portions of which have been quoted, for stating that my
resignation as Secretary of State would be acceptable to him, are the
embarrassment caused him by my "reluctance and divergence of judgment"
and the implication that my mind did not "willingly go along" with his.
As neither of these reasons applies to the calling of Cabinet meetings
or to the anticipation of his judgment in regard to foreign affairs, the
unavoidable conclusion is that these grounds of complaint were not the
real causes leading up to the severance of our official association.
The real causes--which are the only ones worthy of consideration--are to
be found in the record of the relations between President Wilson and
myself in connection with the peace negotiations. Upon that record must
rest the justification or the refutation of Mr. Wilson's implied charge
that I was not entirely loyal to him as President and that I failed to
perform my full duty to my country as Secretary of State and as a
Commissioner to Negotiate Peace by opposing the way in which he
exercised his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign affairs of
the United States.
THE END
APPENDIX I
THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL DRAFT OF THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
LAID BEFORE THE AMERICAN COMMISSION ON JANUARY 10, 1919
PREAMBLE
In order to secure peace, security, and orderly government by the
prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by
the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the
actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of
justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the
dealings of organized peoples with one another, the Powers signatory to
this covenant and agreement jointly and severally adopt this
constitution of the League of Nations.
ARTICLE I
The action of the Signatory Powers under the terms of this agreement
shall be effected through the instrumentality of a Body of Delegates
which shall consist of the ambassadors and ministers of the contracting
Powers accredited to H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. The
meetings of the Body of Delegates shall be held at the seat of
government of H. and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of H. shall be the
presiding officer of the Body.
Whenever the Delegates deem it necessary or advisable, they may meet
temporarily at the seat of government of B. or of S., in which case the
Ambassador or Minister to H. of the country in which the meeting is held
shall be the presiding officer _pro tempore_.
It shall be the privilege of any of the contracting Powers to assist its
representative in the Body of Delegates by any method of conference,
counsel, or advice that may seem best to it, and also to substitute upon
occasion a special representative for its regular diplomatic
representative accredited to H.
ARTICLE II
The Body of Delegates shall regulate their own procedure and shall have
power to appoint such committees as they may deem necessary to inquire
into and report upon any matters that lie within the field of
their action.
It shall be the right of the Body of Delegates, upon the initiative of
any member, to discuss, either publicly or privately as it may deem
best, any matter lying within the jurisdiction of the League of Nations
as defined in this Covenant, or any matter likely to affect the peace of
the world; but all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the
exercise of the functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant
shall be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council, which
shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and which shall
consist of the representatives of the Great Powers together with
representatives drawn in annual rotation from two panels, one of which
shall be made up of the representatives of the States ranking next after
the Great Powers and the other of the representatives of the minor
States (a classification which the Body of Delegates shall itself
establish and may from time to time alter), such a number being drawn
from these panels as will be but one less than the representatives of
the Great Powers; and three or more negative votes in the Council shall
operate as a veto upon any action or resolution proposed.
All resolutions passed or actions taken by the Body of Delegates upon
the recommendation of the Executive Council, except those adopted in
execution of any direct powers herein granted to the Body of Delegates
themselves, shall have the effect of recommendations to the several
governments of the League.
The Executive Council shall appoint a permanent Secretariat and staff
and may appoint joint committees chosen from the Body of Delegates or
consisting of specially qualified persons outside of that Body, for the
study and systematic consideration of the international questions with
which the Council may have to deal, or of questions likely to lead to
international complications or disputes. It shall also take the
necessary steps to establish and maintain proper liaison both with the
foreign offices of the signatory powers and with any governments or
agencies which may be acting as mandatories of the League of Nations in
any part of the world.
ARTICLE III
The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political
independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between
them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future
become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and
aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to
the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial
readjustments as may in the judgment of three fourths of the Delegates
be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples
concerned, may be effected if agreeable to those peoples; and that
territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The
Contracting Powers accept without reservation the principle that the
peace of the world is superior in importance to every question of
political jurisdiction or boundary.
ARTICLE IV
The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that the establishment
and maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national
armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and the
enforcement by common action of international obligations; and the
Delegates are directed to formulate at once plans by which such a
reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall be binding
when, and only when, unanimously approved by the Governments signatory
to this Covenant.
As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the Powers
subscribing to the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant constitutes a
part hereby agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of
compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of
defence and of international action shall consist of militia or
volunteers, whose numbers and methods of training shall be fixed, after
expert inquiry, by the agreements with regard to the reduction of
armaments referred to in the last preceding paragraph.
The Body of Delegates shall also determine for the consideration and
action of the several governments what direct military equipment and
armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces
laid down in the programme of disarmament; and these limits, when
adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Body of
Delegates.
The Contracting Powers further agree that munitions and implements of
war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise or for private
profit, and that there shall be full and frank publicity as to all
national armaments and military or naval programmes.
ARTICLE V
The Contracting Powers jointly and severally agree that, should disputes
or difficulties arise between or among them which cannot be
satisfactorily settled or adjusted by the ordinary processes of
diplomacy, they will in no case resort to armed force without previously
submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or
to inquiry by the Executive Council of the Body of Delegates or until
there has been an award by the arbitrators or a decision by the
Executive Council; and that they will not even then resort to armed
force as against a member of the League of Nations who complies with the
award of the arbitrators or the decision of the Executive Council.
The Powers signatory to this Covenant undertake and agree that whenever
any dispute or difficulty shall arise between or among them with regard
to any questions of the law of nations, with regard to the
interpretation of a treaty, as to any fact which would, if established,
constitute a breach of international obligation, or as to any alleged
damage and the nature and measure of the reparation to be made therefor,
if such dispute or difficulty cannot be satisfactorily settled by the
ordinary processes of negotiation, to submit the whole subject-matter to
arbitration and to carry out in full good faith any award or decision
that may be rendered.
In case of arbitration, the matter or matters at issue shall be referred
to three arbitrators, one of the three to be selected by each of the
parties to the dispute, when there are but two such parties, and the
third by the two thus selected. When there are more than two parties to
the dispute, one arbitrator shall be named by each of the several
parties, and the arbitrators thus named shall add to their number others
of their own choice, the number thus added to be limited to the number
which will suffice to give a deciding voice to the arbitrators thus
added in case of a tie vote among the arbitrators chosen by the
contending parties. In case the arbitrators chosen by the contending
parties cannot agree upon an additional arbitrator or arbitrators, the
additional arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by the Body of
Delegates.
On the appeal of a party to the dispute the decision of the arbitrators
may be set aside by a vote of three-fourths of the Delegates, in case
the decision of the arbitrators was unanimous, or by a vote of
two-thirds of the Delegates in case the decision of the arbitrators was
not unanimous, but unless thus set aside shall be finally binding and
conclusive.
When any decision of arbitrators shall have been thus set aside, the
dispute shall again be submitted to arbitrators chosen as heretofore
provided, none of whom shall, however, have previously acted as
arbitrators in the dispute in question, and the decision of the
arbitrators rendered in this second arbitration shall be finally binding
and conclusive without right of appeal.
If for any reason it should prove impracticable to refer any matter in
dispute to arbitration, the parties to the dispute shall apply to the
Executive Council to take the matter under consideration for such
mediatory action or recommendation as it may deem wise in the
circumstances. The Council shall immediately accept the reference and
give notice to the other party or parties, and shall make the necessary
arrangements for a full hearing, investigation, and consideration. It
shall ascertain all the facts involved in the dispute and shall make
such recommendations as it may deem wise and practicable based on the
merits of the controversy and calculated to secure a just and lasting
settlement. Other members of the League shall place at the disposal of
the Executive Council any and all information that may be in their
possession which in any way bears upon the facts or merits of the
controversy; and the Executive Council shall do everything in its power
by way of mediation or conciliation to bring about a peaceful
settlement. The decisions of the Executive Council shall be addressed to
the disputants, and shall not have the force of a binding verdict.
Should the Executive Council fail to arrive at any conclusion, it shall
be the privilege of the members of the Executive Council to publish
their several conclusions or recommendations; and such publications
shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by either or any of the
disputants.
ARTICLE VI
Should any contracting Power break or disregard its covenants under
ARTICLE V, it shall thereby _ipso facto_ commit an act of war with all
the members of the League, which shall immediately subject it to a
complete economic and financial boycott, including the severance of all
trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between
their subjects and the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the
prevention, so far as possible, of all financial, commercial, or
personal intercourse between the subjects of the covenant-breaking State
and the subjects of any other State, whether a member of the League of
Nations or not.
It shall be the privilege and duty of the Executive Council of the Body
of Delegates in such a case to recommend what effective military or
naval force the members of the League of Nations shall severally
contribute, and to advise, if it should think best, that the smaller
members of the League be excused from making any contribution to the
armed forces to be used against the covenant-breaking State.
The covenant-breaking State shall, after the restoration of peace, be
subject to perpetual disarmament and to the regulations with regard to a
peace establishment provided for new States under the terms of
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE IV.
ARTICLE VII
If any Power shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any hostile
step short of war, against another Power before submitting the dispute
involved to arbitrators or consideration by the Executive Council as
herein provided, or shall declare war or begin hostilities, or take any
hostile step short of war, in regard to any dispute which has been
decided adversely to it by arbitrators chosen and empowered as herein
provided, the Contracting Powers hereby bind themselves not only to
cease all commerce and intercourse with that Power but also to unite in
blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to commerce or
intercourse with any part of the world and to use any force that may be
necessary to accomplish that object.
ARTICLE VIII
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
Contracting Powers or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the
League of Nations and to all the Powers signatory hereto, and those
Powers hereby reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed
wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.
It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each
of the nations signatory or adherent to this Covenant to draw the
attention of the Body of Delegates to any circumstances anywhere which
threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding
between nations upon which peace depends.
The Delegates shall meet in the interest of peace whenever war is
rumored or threatened, and also whenever the Delegate of any Power shall
inform the Delegates that a meeting and conference in the interest of
peace is advisable.
The Delegates may also meet at such other times and upon such other
occasions as they shall from time to time deem best and determine.
ARTICLE IX
In the event of a dispute arising between one of the Contracting Powers
and a Power not a party to this Covenant, the Contracting Power involved
hereby binds itself to endeavour to obtain the submission of the dispute
to judicial decision or to arbitration. If the other Power will not
agree to submit the dispute to judicial decision or to arbitration, the
Contracting Power shall bring the matter to the attention of the Body of
Delegates. The Delegates shall in such a case, in the name of the League
of Nations, invite the Power not a party to this Covenant to become _ad
hoc_ a party and to submit its case to judicial decision or to
arbitration, and if that Power consents it is hereby agreed that the
provisions hereinbefore contained and applicable to the submission of
disputes to arbitration or discussion shall be in all respects
applicable to the dispute both in favour of and against such Power as if
it were a party to this Covenant.
In case the Power not a party to this Covenant shall not accept the
invitation of the Delegates to become _ad hoc_ a party, it shall be the
duty of the Executive Council immediately to institute an inquiry into
the circumstances and merits of the dispute involved and to recommend
such joint action by the Contracting Powers as may seem best and most
effectual in the circumstances disclosed.
ARTICLE X
If hostilities should be begun or any hostile action taken against the
Contracting Power by the Power not a party to this Covenant before a
decision of the dispute by arbitrators or before investigation, report
and recommendation by the Executive Council in regard to the dispute, or
contrary to such recommendation, the Contracting Powers shall thereupon
cease all commerce and communication with that Power and shall also
unite in blockading and closing the frontiers of that Power to all
commerce or intercourse with any part of the world, employing jointly
any force that may be necessary to accomplish that object. The
Contracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance of the
Contracting Power against which hostile action has been taken, combining
their armed forces in its behalf.
ARTICLE XI
In case of a dispute between states not parties to this Covenant, any
Contracting Power may bring the matter to the attention of the
Delegates, who shall thereupon tender the good offices of the League of
Nations with a view to the peaceable settlement of the dispute.
If one of the states, a party to the dispute, shall offer and agree to
submit its interests and causes of action wholly to the control and
decision of the League of Nations, that state shall _ad hoc_ be deemed a
Contracting Power. If no one of the states, parties to the dispute,
shall so offer and agree, the Delegates shall, through the Executive
Council, of their own motion take such action and make such
recommendation to their governments as will prevent hostilities and
result in the settlement of the dispute.
ARTICLE XII
Any Power not a party to this Covenant, whose government is based upon
the principle of popular self-government, may apply to the Body of
Delegates for leave to become a party. If the Delegates shall regard the
granting thereof as likely to promote the peace, order, and security of
the World, they may act favourably on the application, and their
favourable action shall operate to constitute the Power so applying in
all respects a full signatory party to this Covenant. This action shall
require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Delegates.
ARTICLE XIII
The Contracting Powers severally agree that the present Covenant and
Convention is accepted as abrogating all treaty obligations _inter se_
which are inconsistent with the terms hereof, and solemnly engage that
they will not enter into any engagements inconsistent with the
terms hereof.
In case any of the Powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to
the League of Nations shall, before becoming a party to this Covenant,
have undertaken any treaty obligations which are inconsistent with the
terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Power to take
immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.
_SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS_
I
In respect of the peoples and territories which formerly belonged to
Austria-Hungary, and to Turkey, and in respect of the colonies formerly
under the dominion of the German Empire, the League of Nations shall be
regarded as the residuary trustee with sovereign right of ultimate
disposal or of continued administration in accordance with certain
fundamental principles hereinafter set forth; and this reversion and
control shall exclude all rights or privileges of annexation on the part
of any Power.
These principles are, that there shall in no case be any annexation of
any of these territories by any State either within the League or
outside of it, and that in the future government of these peoples and
territories the rule of self-determination, or the consent of the
governed to their form of government, shall be fairly and reasonably
applied, and all policies of administration or economic development be
based primarily upon the well-considered interests of the people
themselves.
II
Any authority, control, or administration which may be necessary in
respect of these peoples or territories other than their own
self-determined and self-organized autonomy shall be the exclusive
function of and shall be vested in the League of Nations and exercised
or undertaken by or on behalf of it.
It shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority,
control, or administration of any such people or territory to some
single State or organized agency which it may designate and appoint as
its agent or mandatory; but whenever or wherever possible or feasible
the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved by
the autonomous people or territory.
III
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by
the mandatary State or agency shall in each case be explicitly defined
by the League in a special Act or Charter which shall reserve to the
League complete power of supervision and of intimate control, and which
shall also reserve to the people of any such territory or governmental
unit the right to appeal to the League for the redress or correction of
any breach of the mandate by the mandatary State or agency or for the
substitution of some other State or agency, as mandatary.
The mandatary State or agency shall in all cases be bound and required
to maintain the policy of the open door, or equal opportunity for all
the signatories to this Covenant, in respect of the use and development
of the economic resources of such people or territory.
The mandatary State or agency shall in no case form or maintain any
military or naval force in excess of definite standards laid down by the
League itself for the purposes of internal police.
IV
No new State arising or created from the old Empires of Austria-Hungary,
or Turkey shall be recognized by the League or admitted into its
membership except on condition that its military and naval forces and
armaments shall conform to standards prescribed by the League in respect
of it from time to time.
As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered,
directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations
_inter se_ of all new independent States arising or created out of the
Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating and
composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance of
settled order and the general peace.
V
The Powers signatory or adherent to this Covenant agree that they will
themselves seek to establish and maintain fair hours and humane
conditions of labour for all those within their several jurisdictions
who are engaged in manual labour and that they will exert their
influence in favour of the adoption and maintenance of a similar policy
and like safeguards wherever their industrial and commercial
relations extend.
VI
The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as
a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous
States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their
several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and security, both in
law and in fact, that is accorded the racial or national majority of
their people.
APPENDIX II
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
(_Plan of Lord Robert Cecil_[1])
I
ORGANIZATION
The general treaty setting up the league of nations will explicitly
provide for regular conferences between the responsible representatives
of the contracting powers.
These conferences would review the general conditions of international
relations and would naturally pay special attention to any difficulty
which might seem to threaten the peace of the world. They would also
receive and as occasion demanded discuss reports as to the work of any
international administrative or investigating bodies working under
the League.
These conferences would constitute the pivot of the league. They would
be meetings of statesmen responsible to their own sovereign parliaments,
and any decisions taken would therefore, as in the case of the various
allied conferences during the war, have to be unanimous.
The following form of organization is suggested:
I. _The conference_. Annual meeting of prime ministers and foreign
secretaries of British Empire, United States, France, Italy, Japan, and
any other States recognized by them as great powers. Quadrennial meeting
of representatives of all States included in the league. There should
also be provision for the summoning of special conferences on the demand
of any one of the great powers or, if there were danger of an outbreak
of war, of any member of the league. (The composition of the league will
be determined at the peace conference. Definitely untrustworthy and
hostile States, e.g., Russia, should the Bolshevist government remain in
power, should be excluded. Otherwise it is desirable not to be too rigid
in scrutinizing qualifications, since the small powers will in any case
not exercise any considerable influence.)
2. For the conduct of its work the interstate conference will require a
permanent secretariat. The general secretary should be appointed by the
great powers, if possible choosing a national of some other country.
3. _International bodies_. The secretariat would be the responsible
channel of communication between the interstate conference and all
international bodies functioning under treaties guaranteed by the
league. These would fall into three classes:
_(a)_ Judicial; i.e., the existing Hague organization with any additions
or modifications made by the league.
_(b)_ International administrative bodies. Such as the suggested transit
commission. To these would be added bodies already formed under existing
treaties (which are very numerous and deal with very important
interests, e.g., postal union, international labor office, etc.).
_(c)_ International commissions of enquiry: e.g., commission on industrial
conditions (labor legislation), African commission, armaments
commission.
4. In addition to the above arrangements guaranteed by or arising out of
the general treaty, there would probably be a periodical congress of
delegates of the parliaments of the States belonging to the league, as a
development out of the existing Interparliamentary Union. A regular
staple of discussion for this body would be afforded by the reports of
the interstate conference and of the different international bodies. The
congress would thus cover the ground that is at present occupied by the
periodical Hague Conference and also the ground claimed by the Socialist
International.
For the efficient conduct of all these activities it is essential that
there should be a permanent central meeting-place, where the officials
and officers of the league would enjoy the privileges of
extra-territoriality. Geneva is suggested as the most suitable place.
II
PREVENTION OF WAR
The covenants for the prevention of war which would be embodied in the
general treaty would be as follows:
(1) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war
until they had submitted the questions at issue to an international
conference or an arbitral court, and until the conference or court had
issued a report or handed down an award.
(2) The members of the league would bind themselves not to go to war
with any member of the league complying with the award of a court or
with the report of a conference. For the purpose of this clause, the
report of the conference must be unanimous, excluding the litigants.
(3) The members of the league would undertake to regard themselves, as
_ipso facto_, at war with any one of them acting contrary to the above
covenants, and to take, jointly and severally, appropriate military,
economic and other measure against the recalcitrant State.
(4) The members of the league would bind themselves to take similar
action, in the sense of the above clause, against any State not being a
member of the league which is involved in a dispute with a member of
the league.
(This is a stronger provision than that proposed in the Phillimore
Report.)
The above covenants mark an advance upon the practice of international
relations previous to the war in two respects: (i) In insuring a
necessary period of delay before war can break out (except between two
States which are neither of them members of the league); (2) In securing
public discussion and probably a public report upon matters in dispute.
It should be observed that even in cases where the conference report is
not unanimous, and therefore in no sense binding, a majority report may
be issued and that this would be likely to carry weight with the public
opinion of the States in the league.
APPENDIX III
THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS IN THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES
ARTICLE I
The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of the
Signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant and also such
of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without
reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a
Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the
coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all
other Members of the League.
Any fully self-governing State, Dominion, or Colony not named in the
Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by
two thirds of the Assembly, provided that it shall give effective
guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international
obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by
the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and
armaments.
Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention
so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international
obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been
fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.
ARTICLE 2
The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through
the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent
Secretariat.
ARTICLE 3
The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the Members of the
League.
The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as
occasion may require at the Seat of the League or at such other place as
may be decided upon.
The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere
of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have one
vote, and may have not more than three Representatives.
ARTICLE 4
The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and
Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members
of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the
Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of
the Representatives of the four Members of the League first selected by
the Assembly, Representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece
shall be members of the Council.
With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name
additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be
members of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the
number of Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for
representation on the Council.
The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at
least once a year, at the Seat of the League, or at such other place as
may be decided upon.
The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere
of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.
Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited
to send a Representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the
Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the
interests of that Member of the League.
At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represented on the
Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one
Representative.
ARTICLE 5
Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the
terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or
of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the
League represented at the meeting.
All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council,
including the appointment of Committees to investigate particular
matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and may be
decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at
the meeting.
The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the Council
shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.
ARTICLE 6
The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the Seat of the
League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such
secretaries and staff as may be required.
The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the Annex;
thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the Council with
the approval of the majority of the Assembly.
The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed by the
Secretary General with the approval of the Council.
The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the
Assembly and of the Council.
The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the Members of the
League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the
International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.
ARTICLE 7
The Seat of the League is established at Geneva.
The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the League shall be
established elsewhere.
All positions under or in connection with the League, including the
Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.
Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of the League
when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities.
The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials
or by Representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable.
ARTICLE 8
The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace
requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point
consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of
international obligations.
The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and
circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction
for the consideration and action of the several Governments.
Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least
every ten years.
After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments,
the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the
concurrence of the Council.
The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private
enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave
objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon
such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the
necessities of those Members of the League which are not able to
manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for
their safety.
The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank
information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval
and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries as are
adaptable to warlike purposes.
ARTICLE 9
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the
execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval
and air questions generally.
ARTICLE 10
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the
Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be
fulfilled.
ARTICLE 11
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the
Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to
the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any
such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request
of any Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of the
League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any
circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens
to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations
upon which peace depends.
ARTICLE 12
The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them
any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter
either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no
case to resort to war until three months after the award by the
arbitrators or the report by the Council.
In any case under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be
made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be
made within six months after the submission of the dispute.
ARTICLE 13
The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise
between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to
arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy,
they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration.
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of
international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established
would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the
extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are
declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission
to arbitration.
For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to
which the case is referred shall be the Court agreed on by the parties
to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.
The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good
faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to
war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the
event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall
propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.
ARTICLE 14
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for
adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of
International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and
determine any dispute of an international character which the parties
thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon
any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by
the Assembly.
ARTICLE 15
If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute likely
to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in
accordance with Article 13, the Members of the League agree that they
will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may
effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute
to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a
full investigation and consideration thereof.
For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the
Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case
with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith
direct the publication thereof.
The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dispute, and
if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving
such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of
settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.
If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by
a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement
of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed
just and proper in regard thereto.
Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make public a
statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions
regarding the same.
If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members
thereof other than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to
the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will not go to
war with any party to the dispute which complies with the
recommendations of the report.
If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by
the members thereof, other than the Representatives of one or more of
the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve to
themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider
necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.
If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is
found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by international
law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the
Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its
settlement.
The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the
Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either
party to the dispute, provided that such request be made within fourteen
days after the submission of the dispute to the Council.
In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of this Article
and of Article 12 relating to the action and powers of the Council shall
apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report
made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those
Members of the League represented on the Council and of a majority of
the other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the
Representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force
as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other
than the Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.
ARTICLE 16
Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its
covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall _ipso facto_ be deemed
to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League,
which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all
trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between
their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and
the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse
between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals
of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.
It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the
several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air
force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed
forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.
The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually
support one another in the financial and economic measures which are
taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and
inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will
mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at
one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will
take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to
the forces of any of the Members of the League which are cooperating to
protect the covenants of the League.
Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League
may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the
Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of
the League represented thereon.
ARTICLE 17
In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State
which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of
the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be
invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the
purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem
just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to
16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed
necessary by the Council.
Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute
an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such
action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.
If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of
membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall
resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article
16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.
If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the
obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such
dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such
recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the
settlement of the dispute.
ARTICLE 18
Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any
Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat
and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or
international engagement shall be binding until so registered.
ARTICLE 19
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members
of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the
consideration of international conditions whose continuance might
endanger the peace of the world.
ARTICLE 20
The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted
as abrogating all obligations or understandings _inter se_ which are
inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they
will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the
terms thereof.
In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member of the
League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of
this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such Member to take immediate
steps to procure its release from such obligations.
ARTICLE 21
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of
international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional
understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance
of peace.
ARTICLE 22
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war
have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly
governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there
should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of
such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for
the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.
The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the
tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by
reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical
position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to
accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as
Mandatories on behalf of the League.
The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the
development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory,
its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have
reached a stage of development where their existence as independent
nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage
that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the
territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience
and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and
morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms
traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment
of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training
of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of
territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and
commerce of other Members of the League.
There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the
South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their
population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of
civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the
Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the
laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to
the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous
population.
In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an
annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.
The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by
the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the
League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the
annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all
matters relating to the observance of the mandates.
ARTICLE 23
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international
conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of
the League:
_(a)_ will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions
of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and
in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations
extend, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary
international organisations;
_(b)_ undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of
territories under their control;
_(c)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision over the
execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and
children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs;
_(d)_ will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade
in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this
traffic is necessary in the common interest;
_(e)_ will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of
communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce
of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special
necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall
be borne in mind;
_(f)_ will endeavour to take steps in matters of international concern
for the prevention and control of disease.
ARTICLE 24
There shall be placed under the direction of the League all
international bureaux already established by general treaties if the
parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaux and all
commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest
hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.
In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general
conventions but which are not placed under the control of international
bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to
the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and
distribute all relevant information and shall render any other
assistance which may be necessary or desirable.
The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the
expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction
of the League.
ARTICLE 25
The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the
establishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red
Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the
prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout
the world.
ARTICLE 26
Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the
Members of the League whose Representatives compose the Council and by a
majority of the Members of the League whose Representatives compose the
Assembly. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which
signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a
Member of the League.
APPENDIX IV
THE FOURTEEN POINTS[2]
The program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program; and that
program, the only possible program, as we see it, is this:
I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall
be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy
shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in
whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of
international covenants.
III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be
reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims
of the government whose title is to be determined.
VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all
questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest
cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an
unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent
determination of her own political development and national policy and
assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under
institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance
also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The
treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come
will be the acid test of their good-will, of their comprehension of her
needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their
intelligent and unselfish sympathy.
VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and
restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys
in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as
this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws
which they have themselves set and determined for the government of
their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole
structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.
VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions
restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter
of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for
nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more
be made secure in the interest of all.
IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along
clearly recognizable lines of nationality.
X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish
to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest
opportunity of autonomous development.
XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied
territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea;
and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined
by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance
and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and
economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan
states should be entered into.
XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and
an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.
XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include
the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which
should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose
political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be
guaranteed by international covenant.
XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
APPENDIX V
PRINCIPLES DECLARED BY PRESIDENT WILSON IN HIS ADDRESS OF FEBRUARY 11,
1918
The principles to be applied are these:
_First_, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the
essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as
are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;
_Second_, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a
game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of
power; but that
_Third_, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made
in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and
not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst
rival states; and
_Fourth_, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded
the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing
new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be
likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of
the world.
APPENDIX VI
THE ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES RELATING TO SHANTUNG
ARTICLE 156
Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and
privileges--particularly those concerning the territory of Kiaochow,
railways, mines, and submarine cables--which she acquired in virtue of
the Treaty concluded by her with China on March 6, 1898, and of all
other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung.
All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch
lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations,
shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the
exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together
with all rights and privileges attaching thereto.
The German State submarine cables from Tsingtao to Shanghai and from
Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties
attaching thereto, are similarly acquired by Japan, free and clear of
all charges and encumbrances.
ARTICLE 157
The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the
territory of Kiaochow, as well as all the rights which Germany might
claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the
expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with
this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all
charges and encumbrances.
ARTICLE 158
Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months from the coming
into force of the present Treaty the archives, registers, plans,
title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating
to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or
other, of the territory of Kiaochow.
Within the same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all
treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or
privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles.
[Footnote 1: Reprinted from Senate Doc. No. 106, 66th Congress, 1st
Session, p. 1163.]
[Footnote 2: From the address of President Wilson delivered at a Joint
Session of Congress on January 8, 1918.]
INDEX
Abrogation of treaties contrary to the League, in Wilson's original
draft; in Treaty,
Affirmative guaranty of territory and independence, plan; Wilson adopts,
in Fourteen Points; Lansing's opposition; constitutional and
political arguments against; Lansing's "self-denying covenant" as
substitute; in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty; as continuing
balance of power; Wilson adheres to; not in Cecil plan; in Lansing's
resolution of principles; other substitute; as reason for rejection
of Treaty by Senate; retained in reported Covenant; and dominance of
Great Powers. _See also_ Equality of nations; League;
Self-denying covenant.
Albania, disposition.
Alliances. _See_ French alliance.
Alsace-Lorraine, to be restored to France.
Amendment of League, provision for.
American Bar Association, Lansing's address.
American Commission, members; ignored in League negotiations; conference
of January 10; ignorant of preliminary negotiations; question of
resignation over Shantung settlement; shares in Shantung
negotiations. _See also_ Bliss; House; Lansing; White; Wilson.
American Peace Society.
American programme, lack of definite, as subject of disagreement;
Fourteen Points announced; not worked out; insufficiency of Fourteen
Points; Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; effect of
President's attendance at Conference; embarrassment to delegates of
lack; _projet_ of treaty prepared for Lansing; President resents it;
no system or team-work in American Commission; reason for President's
attitude; no instructions during President's absence; results of
lack; and Preliminary Treaty; influence of lack on Wilson's
leadership; text of Fourteen Points.
Annunzio, Gabriele d', at Fiume.
Arabia, disposition. _See also_ Near East.
Arbitral Tribunal, in Lansing's plan.
Arbitration, as form of peace promotion; in Lansing's plan; in Wilson's
original draft; in Cecil plan; in Treaty. _See also_ Diplomatic
adjustment; Judicial settlement.
Armenia, mandate for; protectorate. _See also_ Near East.
Armistice, American conference on.
Article X. _See_ Affirmative guaranty.
Assembly (Body of Delegates), in Wilson's original draft; analogous body
in Cecil plan; in Treaty.
Auchincloss, Gordon, and drafting of League.
Austria, Archduchy and union with Germany, outlet to sea.
Austria-Hungary, dissolution; Fourteen Points on subject people.
Azerbaidjan, Wilson and.
Baker, Ray Stannard, and Shantung.
Balance of power, Clemenceau advocates; Wilson denounces; and Cecil
plan; League and. _See also_ Affirmative guaranty; Equality of
nations.
Balfour, Arthur, signs French alliance.
Balkans, Fourteen Points on. _See also_ states by names.
Belgium, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, full sovereignty,
Bessarabia disposition,
Bliss, Tasker H. American delegate, opposes affirmative guaranty, and
Covenant as reported, and proposed French alliance, and Shantung,
letter to President, _See also_ American Commission; American
programme.
Body of Delegates. _See_ Assembly.
Boers, and self-determination,
Bohemia, disposition,
Bolshevism, peace as check to spread,
Bosnia, disposition,
Boundaries, principles in drawing,
Bowman, Isaiah, Commission of Inquiry
Brest-Litovsk Treaty, to be abrogated,
Bucharest Treaty, to be abrogated,
Buffer state on the Rhine,
Bulgaria, boundaries,
Bullitt, William C., on revision of Covenant, testimony on Lansing
interview, Lansing's telegram to President on testimony, no reply
received, and Wilson's western speeches,
Canada, Papineau Rebellion and self-determination,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Cecil, Lord Robert, plan for League, Wilson opposes it, text of plan,
Central Powers, Wilson and need of defeat, hope in Wilson's attitude,
peace or Bolshevism, _See also_ Mandates, and states by name.
China. _See_ Shantung.
Chinda, Viscount, and Shantung,
Civil War, and self-determination,
Clemenceau, Georges, Supreme War Council, advocates balance of power,
and Cecil plan, and Franco-American alliance, _See also_ Council of
Four.
Codification of international law, in Lansing's plan,
Colonies, disposition of, in Lansing's plan, Fourteen Points on, _See
also_ Mandates.
Commerce. _See_ Non-intercourse; Open Door.
Commission of Inquiry, work,
Commission on the League of Nations, appointed, and Wilson's return to
United States, meets, Wilson's draft as groundwork, meetings and
report, Wilson's address, character of report and work, secrecy,
Wilson's domination,
Constantinople, disposition,
Constitutional objections, to affirmative guaranty, and to Cecil plan,
Council of Foreign Ministers, established, nickname,
Council of Four, self-constituted, secrecy, "Olympians," gives only
digest of Treaty to other delegates, Shantung bargain, _See also_
Secret diplomacy.
Council of Ten, and Lansing's substitute resolution on League, during
Wilson's absence, self-constituted organization, and Supreme War
Council, divided, and secrecy,
Council of the Heads of States. _See_ Council of Four.
Council (Executive Council) of the League, in Wilson's original draft,
analogous body in Cecil plan, in Treaty,
Covenant. _See_ League of Nations.
Croatia, disposition,
Czecho-Slovakia, erection,
Dalmatia, in Pact of London,
Danzig, for Poland,
Dardanelles, Fourteen Points on,
Declaration of war, affirmative guaranty and power over,
Denmark, Schleswig-Holstein, Heligoland,
Diplomacy. _See_ Secret diplomacy.
Diplomatic adjustment, as basis of Covenant, exalted, Lansing on
judicial settlement and, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty, _See
also_ Judicial settlement.
Disarmament, not touched in Lansing's plan; in Lansing's resolution of
principles; in Wilson's original draft; in Treaty.
Dobrudja, disposition.
East Indians, and self-determination.
Economic influence on boundary lines.
Economic interdependence, importance in peace negotiations.
Economic pressure. _See_ Non-intercourse.
Egypt, and self-determination; disposition.
Election of 1918, as rebuke to Wilson.
Entangling alliances. _See_ Isolation.
Equality of nations, sacrifice in Wilson's draft of League; in Lansing's
form for League; ignored in Cecil plan; primacy of Great Powers
retained in reported Covenant; violation by Treaty; and secret
diplomacy at Conference.
Esthonia, Wilson and; autonomy.
Ethnic influence on boundary lines. _See also_ Racial minorities;
Self-determination.
Finland, question of independence.
Fiume affair, Lansing's attitude; Pact of London in light of dissolution
of Austria-Hungary; resulting increase in Italian claims as basis for
compromise; attitude of Italy toward Jugo-Slavia; commercial
importance of Fiume to Jugo-Slavia; campaign of Italian delegates for
Fiume; Italian public sentiment; character of population,
self-determination question; efforts to get Wilson's approval; threat
to retire from Conference; Wilson's statement against Italian claim;
withdrawal of delegation; Italian resentment against Wilson; as
lesson on secret diplomacy; delegation returns; and Shantung.
Fourteen Points, announced; affirmative guaranty in; insufficient as
programme; text.
France, Alsace-Lorraine; restoration. _See also_ Clemenceau; French
alliance; Great Powers.
Freedom of the seas, in Fourteen Points.
French alliance, as subject of disagreement; provisions of treaty;
relation to League; and removal of certain French demands from Treaty
of Peace; and French adherence to League; Lansing's opposition;
drafted, signed; Lansing and signing; arguments for.
Geographic influence on boundary lines.
Georgia, Wilson and.
Germany, buffer state on the Rhine; and Russian route to the East;
Lansing's memorandum on territorial settlements; military impotence.
_See also_ Central Powers; French alliance; Mandates.
Ginn Peace Foundation.
Great Britain, and clause on self-determination; Egypt. _See also_
French alliance; Great Powers; Lloyd George.
Great Powers, and mandates. _See also_ Balance of power; Council of
Four; Equality of nations.
Greece, territory.
Gregory, Thomas W., and Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea.
Guaranty. _See_ Affirmative; Self-denying.
Hague Conventions, and international peace.
Hague Tribunal, and Lansing's plan; Wilson's contempt; recognition in
Cecil plan.
Hands Off, as basis of Lansing's plan.
Health, promotion in Treaty.
Heligoland, dismantlement, disposition.
Herzegovina, disposition.
Historic influence on boundary lines.
Hostilities. _See_ Prevention of war.
House, Edward M., joins Supreme War Council; conference on armistice
terms; selection as peace negotiator and President as delegate,
Commission of Inquiry, and drafting of League, and international
court, and "self-denying covenant," and balance of power, of
Commission on the League of Nations, and mandates, and data, ignorant
of Wilson's programme, and Preliminary Treaty with detailed Covenant,
and private consultations, _See also_ American Commission.
Hungary, separation from Austria.
Immoral traffic, prevention in Treaty,
Immunities of League representatives,
Indemnities, and mandates,
India, German routes to,
International commissions, in Cecil plan, in Treaty,
International court. _See_ Judicial settlement.
International enforcement. _See_ Affirmative guaranty.
International military force, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty,
International military staff, proposal,
Interparliamentary Congress, in Cecil plan,
Inviolability of League property,
Irish, and self-determination,
Isolation, policy, and affirmative guaranty, and mandates, and French
alliance,
Italy, and Cecil plan, territory, _See also_ Fiume; Great Powers.
Japan, and Cecil plan, in Council of Ten, _See also_ Great Powers;
Shantung.
Judicial settlement of international disputes, Lansing's plan,
subordinated in Wilson's draft, Lansing on diplomatic adjustment and,
Lansing urges as nucleus of League, in Lansing's resolution of
principles, Lansing's appeal for, in Covenant, arbitrators of
litigant nations, difficulties in procedure, cost, elimination from
Covenant of appeal from arbitral awards, how effected, Lansing's
appeal ignored, in Cecil plan, _See also_ Arbitration; Diplomatic
adjustment.
Jugo-Slavia, and Anglo-Franco-American alliance, port, erected, _See
also_ Fiume.
Kato, Baron, and Shantung,
Kiao-Chau. _See_ Shantung.
Kiel Canal, internationalization,
Koo, V.K. Wellington, argument on Shantung,
Labor article, in Wilson's original draft, in Treaty,
Lansing, Robert, resignation asked and given, divergence of judgment
from President, reasons for retaining office, reasons for narrative,
imputation of faithlessness, personal narrative, subjects of
disagreement, attitude toward duty as negotiator, policy as to advice
to President, President's attitude towards opinions, method of
treatment of subject, conference on armistice terms, selected as a
negotiator, opposition to President being a delegate, President's
attitude toward this opposition, and Commission of Inquiry, arrival
in Paris, and balance of power, and paramount need of speedy peace,
opposition to mandates, opposition to French alliance treaty, signs
it, personal relations with President, memorandum on American
programme (1918), has _projet_ of treaty prepared, Wilson resents it,
on lack of organization in American Commission, and lack of
programme, and American Commission during President's absence, on
Wilson's _modus vivendi_ idea, opposition to secret diplomacy, effect
on Wilson, and Fiume, and Shantung, Bullitt affair, views on Treaty
when presented to Germans, and ratification of Treaty _See also_
American Commission; League; Wilson.
Latvia Wilson and autonomy
League of Nations principles as subject of disagreement as object of
peace negotiations as reason for President's participation in
Conference Wilson's belief in necessity American support of idea,
earlier plans and associations divergence of opinion on form
political and juridical forms of organization Wilson's belief in
international force and affirmative guaranty affirmative guaranty in
Fourteen Points Phillimore's report preparation of Wilson's original
draft, House as author Lansing not consulted, reason Lansing's
opposition to affirmative guaranty Lansing and non-intercourse peace
plan draft impracticable and equality of nations Lansing's
"self-denying covenant" Lansing accepts guaranty as matter of
expediency diplomatic adjustment as basis of Wilson's draft guaranty
in first draft, later draft, and Treaty Lansing's substitute, his
communications not acknowledged, incorporation of detailed Covenant
in Treaty irreconcilable differences between Wilson's and Lansing's
plans Lansing on diplomatic adjustment versus judicial settlement
Lansing urges international court as nucleus three doctrines of
Lansing's plan Lansing's first view of Wilson's draft his opinion of
its form of its principles Wilson considers affirmative guaranty
essential, effect on Treaty American Commission ignored on matters
concerning Cecil plan Wilson's opposition to it question of
self-determination Lansing's proposed resolution of principles in
Treaty and later detailing detailed Covenant or speedy peace Wilson
utilizes desire for peace to force acceptance of League Lansing
proposes resolution to Wilson and to Council of Ten drafted
resolution of principles Commission on the League of Nations
appointed, American members resolution and Wilson's return to United
States Wilson's draft before Commission Wilson pigeonholes resolution
revision of Wilson's draft Lansing's appeal for international court
it is ignored elimination of appeal from arbitral awards, how
effected report of Commission, Wilson's address character of report
and work of Commission, main principles unaltered Wilson and American
opposition (Feb.) American Commission and report amendments to
placate American opinion reaction in Europe due to American
opposition change in character and addition of functions to preserve
it summary of Lansing's objections and French alliance in a
preliminary treaty as a _modus vivendi_ as subject of Wilson's
private consultations secrecy in negotiations and Shantung bargain
Bullitt's report of Lansing's attitude and carrying out of the Treaty
as merely a name for the Quintuple Alliance text of Wilson's original
draft of Cecil plan in Treaty _See also_ Mandates.
League to Enforce Peace Wilson's address
Lithuania Wilson and autonomy
Lloyd George, David, Supreme War Council, 14 and French alliance _See
also_ Council of Four.
Log-rolling at Conference
London, Pact of
Makino, Baron and Shantung
Mandates, in Smuts plan, Wilson adopts it Lansing's criticism retained
in reported Covenant political difficulties Wilson's attitude legal
difficulties usefulness questioned as means of justifying the League
and indemnities altruistic, to be share of United States in Wilson's
original draft in Treaty.
Meeting-place of League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in
Treaty.
Membership in League in Wilson's original draft in Treaty withdrawal.
Mezes, Sidney E., Commission of Inquiry and data.
Miller, David Hunter and drafting of Covenant and _projet_ of a treaty.
_Modus vivendi_, Wilson and a preliminary treaty as
Monroe Doctrine and affirmative covenant preservation in Treaty
Montenegro in Jugo-Slavia Fourteen Points on
Moravia, disposition
Munitions regulation of manufacture and trade in Wilson's original draft
in Treaty
National safety, dominance of principle
Near East United States and mandates Lansing's memorandum on territorial
settlements mandates in Wilson's original draft mandates in Treaty
Fourteen points on
Negative guaranty. _See_ Self-denying covenant.
Non-intercourse as form of peace promotion constitutionality in Wilson's
original draft in Treaty
Norway, Spitzbergen
Open Door in Lansing's plan in Near East in former German colonies
principle in Wilson's original draft and in Treaty in Fourteen Points
Outlet to the sea for each nation
Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele
Palestine autonomy _See also_ Near East.
Pan-America, proposed mutual guaranty treaty
Papineau Rebellion, and self-determination
Peace, Treaty of inclusion of detailed Covenant as subject of
disagreement expected preliminary treaty speedy restoration of peace
versus detailed Covenant Wilson employs desire for, to force
acceptance of League, resulting delay, delay, delay on League causes
definitive rather than preliminary treaty subjects for a preliminary
treaty influence of lack of American programme Wilson's decision for
a definitive treaty Lansing's views of finished treaty British
opinion protests of experts and officials of American Commission
Lansing and ratification _See also_ League.
Persia, disposition
Phillimore, Lord, report on League of Nations
Poland and Anglo-Franco-American alliance independence Danzig
Postponement of hostilities as form of peace promotion in Wilson's
original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty
President as delegate as subject of disagreement Lansing's opposition
origin of Wilson's intention influence of belligerency on plan
influence of presence on domination of situation personal reasons for
attending decision to go to Paris decision to be a delegate attitude
of House League as reason for decision
Prevention of war in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in Treaty
_Sec also_ Arbitration; League.
Publication of treaties in Lansing's plan in Treaty
Publicity as basis of Lansing's plan _See also_ Secret diplomacy.
Quintuple Alliance, League of Nations as name for
Racial equality issue in Shantung bargain
Racial minorities protection, in Wilson's original draft
Ratification of Treaty Lansing's attitude
Red Cross promotion in Treaty
Rhenish Republic as buffer state
Roumania Bucharest Treaty to be abrogated territory Fourteen Points on
Russia Wilson's policy and route for Germany to the East Lansing's notes
on territorial settlement Fourteen Points on
Ruthenians and Ukraine
Schleswig-Holstein disposition
Scott, James Brown drafts French alliance treaty and _projet_ of a
treaty
Secret diplomacy as subject of disagreement in negotiation of League as
evil at Conference Lansing's opposition, its effect on Wilson
Wilson's consultations and Wilson's "open diplomacy" in Council of
Four public resentment Fiume affair as lesson on perfunctory open
plenary sessions of Conference Council of Ten effect on Wilson's
prestige responsibility effect on delegates of smaller nations
climax, text of Treaty withheld from delegates psychological effect
great opportunity for reform missed and Shantung Fourteen Points on
_See also_ Publicity
Secretariat of the League in Wilson's original draft in Cecil plan in
Treaty
"Self-denying covenant" for guaranty of territory and independence
Lansing's advocacy House and Wilson rejects suggested by others to
Wilson
Self-determination in Wilson's draft of Covenant why omitted from treaty
in theory and in practice Wilson abandons violation in the treaties
and Civil War and Fiume colonial, in Fourteen Points Wilson's
statement (Feb. 1918)
Senate of United States and affirmative guaranty opposition and Wilson's
threat plan to check opposition by a _modus vivendi_
Separation of powers Wilson's attitude
Serbia Jugo-Slavia territory Fourteen Points on
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes _See_ Jugoslavia
Shantung Settlement as subject of disagreement and secret diplomacy
bargain injustice, blackmail influence of Japanese bluff not to agree
to the League German control Japanese occupation moral effect Chinese
agreement to Japanese demands, resulting legal and moral status
status after China's declaration of war on Germany attitude of Allied
delegates attitude of American Commission, letter to Wilson argument
before Council of Ten Japanese threat to American Commission before
Council of Four value of Japanese promises questioned and Fiume
question of resignation of American Commission over China refuses to
sign Treaty Wilson permits American Commission to share in
negotiations American public opinion text of Treaty articles on
Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia
Slavonia disposition
Slovakia disposition
Small nations _See_ Equality.
Smuts, General and disarmament plan for mandates
Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes
Sonnino, Baron Sidney _See_ Fiume
Sovereignty question in system of mandates
Spitzbergen disposition
Strategic influence on boundary lines
Straus, Oscar S. favors League as reported
Supreme War Council, American members added, 14; and Cecil plan; and
Council of Ten.
Syria, protectorate. _See also_ Near East.
Taft, William H., supports League as reported.
Transylvania, disposition,
Treaty of Peace. _See_ Peace.
Treaty-making power, President's responsibility, duties of negotiators,
and affirmative guaranty,
Trieste, disposition; importance,
Turkey, dismemberment and mandates, _See also_ Near East.
Ukraine, Wilson and; autonomy, and Ruthenians.
Unanimity, requirement in League.
Violation of the League, action concerning, in Wilson's original draft,
in Cecil plan; in Treaty,
War. _See_ Arbitration; League of Nations; Prevention.
White, Henry, arrival in Paris; opposes affirmative guaranty; and
Covenant as reported and later amendments; and proposed French
alliance; and Shantung question. _See also_ American programme;
American Commission.
Wickersham, George W., supports League as reported.
Williams, E. T., and Shantung question,
Wilson, Woodrow, responsibility for foreign relations; duties of
negotiators to, and opposition, presumption of self-assurance,
conference on armistice terms; disregard of precedent; and need of
defeat of enemy; and Commission of Inquiry; open-mindedness; and
advice on personal conduct; positiveness and indecision; and election
of 1918; prejudice against legal attitude; prefers written advice,
arrives in Paris, reception abroad, on equality of nations, and
separation of powers, denounces balance of power, and
self-determination, conference of Jan. 10, contempt for Hague
Tribunal, fidelity to convictions, return to United States, return to
Paris, and mandates, and French alliance, and open rupture with
Lansing, and team-work, decides for a definitive treaty only,
rigidity of mind, secretive nature, and Fiume, Italian resentment and
Shantung, and Bullitt affair, Treaty as abandonment of his
principles, Fourteen Points, principles of peace (Feb. 1918), _See
also_ American programme; Commission on the League; Council of Four;
Lansing; League; Peace; President as delegate; Secret diplomacy.
Withdrawal from League, provision in Treaty, through failure to approve
amendments.
World Peace Foundation,
Zionism, and self-determination,
Zone system in mutual guaranty plan,