LACK OF AN AMERICAN PROGRAMME
Having reviewed the radical differences between the President and myself
in regard to the League of Nations and the inclusion of the Covenant in
the Treaty of Peace with Germany, it is necessary to revert to the early
days of the negotiations at Paris in order to explain the divergence of
our views as to the necessity of a definite programme for the American
Commission to direct it in its work and to guide its members in their
intercourse with the delegates of other countries.
If the President had a programme, other than the general principles and
the few territorial settlements included in his Fourteen Points, and the
generalities contained in his "subsequent addresses," he did not show a
copy of the programme to the Commissioners or advise them of its
contents. The natural conclusion was that he had never worked out in
detail the application of his announced principles or put into concrete
form the specific settlements which he had declared ought to be in the
terms of peace. The definition of the principles, the interpretation of
the policies, and the detailing of the provisions regarding territorial
settlements were not apparently attempted by Mr. Wilson. They were in
large measure left uncertain by the phrases in which they were
delivered. Without authoritative explanation, interpretation, or
application to actual facts they formed incomplete and inadequate
instructions to Commissioners who were authorized "to negotiate peace."
An examination of the familiar Fourteen Points uttered by the President
in his address of January 8, 1918, will indicate the character of the
declarations, which may be, by reason of their thought and expression,
termed "Wilsonian" (Appendix IV, p. 314). The first five Points are
announcements of principle which should govern the peace negotiations.
The succeeding eight Points refer to territorial adjustments, but make
no attempt to define actual boundaries, so essential in conducting
negotiations regarding territory. The Fourteenth Point relates to the
formation of "a general association of the nations for the purpose of
affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial
integrity to great and small nations alike."
It is hardly worth while to say that the Fourteen Points and the four
principles declared in the address of February 11, 1918 (Appendix V), do
not constitute a sufficient programme for negotiators. Manifestly they
are too indefinite in specific application. They were never intended for
that purpose when they were proclaimed. They might have formed a general
basis for the preparation of instructions for peace commissioners, but
they omitted too many of the essentials to be considered actual
instructions, while the lack of definite terms to-be included in a
treaty further deprived them of that character. Such important and
practical subjects as reparations, financial arrangements, the use and
control of waterways, and other questions of a like nature, are not even
mentioned. As a general statement of the bases of peace the Fourteen
Points and subsequent declarations probably served a useful purpose,
though some critics would deny it, but as a working programme for the
negotiation of a treaty they were inadequate, if not wholly useless.
Believing in the autumn of 1918 that the end of the war was approaching
and assuming that the American plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference
would have to be furnished with detailed written instructions as to the
terms of the treaty to be signed, I prepared on September 21, 1918, a
memorandum of my views as to the territorial settlements which would
form, not instructions, but a guide in the drafting of instructions for
the American Commissioners. At the time I had no intimation that the
President purposed to be present in person at the peace table and had
not even thought of such a possibility. The memorandum, which follows,
was written with the sole purpose of being ready to draft definite
instructions which could be submitted to the President when the time
came to prepare for the negotiation of the peace. The memorandum
follows:
"The present Russian situation, which is unspeakably horrible and
which seems beyond present hope of betterment, presents new problems
to be solved at the peace table.
"The Pan-Germans now have in shattered and impotent Russia the
opportunity to develop an alternative or supplemental scheme to their
'Mittel-Europa' project. German domination over Southern Russia would
offer as advantageous, if not a more advantageous, route to the
Persian Gulf than through the turbulent Balkans and unreliable
Turkey. If both routes, north and south of the Black Sea, could be
controlled, the Pan-Germans would have gained more than they dreamed
of obtaining. I believe, however, that Bulgaria fears the Germans and
will be disposed to resist German domination possibly to the extent
of making a separate peace with the Allies. Nevertheless, if the
Germans could obtain the route north of the Black Sea, they would
with reason consider the war a successful venture because it would
give them the opportunity to rebuild the imperial power and to carry
out the Prussian ambition of world-mastery.
"The treaty of peace must not leave Germany in possession directly or
indirectly of either of these routes to the Orient. There must be
territorial barriers erected to prevent that Empire from ever being
able by political or economic penetration to become dominant in
those regions.
"With this in view I would state the essentials for a stable peace as
follows, though I do so in the most tentative way because conditions
may change materially. These 'essentials' relate to territory and
waters, and do not deal with military protection.
"_First._ The complete abrogation or denouncement of the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty and all treaties relating in any way to Russian
territory or commerce; and also the same action as to the Treaty of
Bucharest. This applies to all treaties made by the German Empire or
Germany's allies.
"_Second._ The Baltic Provinces of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia
should be autonomous states of a Russian Confederation.
"_Third_. Finland raises a different question and it should be
carefully considered whether it should not be an independent state.
"_Fourth_. An independent Poland, composed of Polish provinces of
Russia, Prussia, and Austria, and in possession of the port
of Danzig.
"_Fifth_. An independent state, either single or federal composed of
Bohemia, Slovakia, and Moravia (and possibly a portion of Silesia)
and possessing an international right of way by land or water to a
free port.
"_Sixth_. The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to
which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
in which the Ruthenians predominate.
"_Seventh_. Roumania, in addition to her former territory, should
ultimately be given sovereignty over Bessarabia, Transylvania, and
the upper portion of the Dobrudja, leaving the central mouth of the
Danube as the boundary of Bulgaria, or else the northern half. (As to
the boundary there is doubt.)
"_Eighth_. The territories in which the Jugo-Slavs predominate,
namely Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, should
be united with Serbia and Montenegro forming a single or a federal
state. The sovereignty over Trieste or some other port should be
later settled in drawing a boundary line between the new state and
Italy. My present view is that there should be a good Jugo-Slav port.
"_Ninth_. Hungary should be separated from Austria and possess rights
of free navigation of the Danube.
"_Tenth_. Restoration to Italy of all the Italian provinces of
Austria. Italy's territory to extend along the northern Adriatic
shore to the Jugo-Slav boundary. Certain ports on the eastern side of
the Adriatic should be considered as possible naval bases of Italy.
(This last is doubtful.)
"_Eleventh._ Reduction of Austria to the ancient boundaries and title
of the Archduchy of Austria. Incorporation of Archduchy in the
Imperial German Confederation. Austrian outlet to the sea would be
like that of Baden and Saxony through German ports on the North Sea
and the Baltic.
"_Twelfth_. The boundaries of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece to follow
in general those established after the First Balkan War, though
Bulgaria should surrender to Greece more of the Aegean coast and
obtain the southern half only of the Dobrudja (or else as far as the
Danube) and the Turkish territory up to the district surrounding
Constantinople, to be subsequently decided upon.
"_Thirteenth_. Albania to be under Italian or Serbian sovereignty or
incorporated in the Jugo-Slav Confederation.
"_Fourteenth._ Greece to obtain more of the Aegean littoral at the
expense of Bulgaria, the Greek-inhabited islands adjacent to Asia
Minor and possibly certain ports and adjoining territory in
Asia Minor.
"_Fifteenth._ The Ottoman Empire to be reduced to Anatolia and have
no possessions in Europe. (This requires consideration.)
"_Sixteenth_. Constantinople to be erected into an international
protectorate surrounded by a land zone to allow for expansion of
population. The form of government to be determined upon by an
international commission or by one Government acting as the mandatory
of the Powers. The commission or mandatory to have the regulation and
control of the navigation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus as
international waterways.
"_Seventeenth._ Armenia and Syria to be erected into protectorates of
such Government or Governments as seems expedient from a domestic as
well as an international point of view; the guaranty being that both
countries will be given self-government as soon as possible and that
an 'Open-Door' policy as to commerce and industrial development will
be rigidly observed.
"_Eighteenth._ Palestine to be an autonomous state under a general
international protectorate or under the protectorate of a Power
designated to act as the mandatory of the Powers.
"_Nineteenth._ Arabia to receive careful consideration as to the full
or partial sovereignty of the state or states established.
"_Twentieth_. Great Britain to have the sovereignty of Egypt, or a
full protectorate over it.
"_Twenty-first._ Persia to be freed from all treaties establishing
spheres of influence. Rigid application of the 'Open-Door' policy in
regard to commercial and industrial development.
"_Twenty-second._ All Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France
without conditions.
"_Twenty-third._ Belgium to be restored to full sovereignty.
"_Twenty-fourth._ A consideration of the union of Luxemburg to
Belgium. (This is open to question.)
"_Twenty-fifth._ The Kiel Canal to be internationalized and an
international zone twenty miles from the Canal on either side to be
erected which should be, with the Canal, under the control and
regulation of Denmark as the mandatory of the Powers. (This last is
doubtful.)
"_Twenty-sixth._ All land north of the Kiel Canal Zone to be ceded to
Denmark.
"_Twenty-seventh._ The fortifications of the Kiel Canal and of
Heligoland to be dismantled. Heligoland to be ceded to Denmark.
"_Twenty-eighth._ The sovereignty of the archipelago of Spitzbergen
to be granted to Norway.
"_Twenty-ninth._ The disposition of the colonial possessions formerly
belonging to Germany to be determined by an international commission
having in mind the interests of the inhabitants and the possibility
of employing these colonies as a means of indemnification for wrongs
done. The 'Open-Door' policy should be guaranteed.
"While the foregoing definitive statement as to territory contains my
views at the present time (September 21, 1918), I feel that no
proposition should be considered unalterable, as further study and
conditions which have not been disclosed may materially change
some of them.
"Three things must constantly be kept in mind, the natural stability
of race, language, and nationality, the necessity of every nation
having an outlet to the sea so that it may maintain its own merchant
marine, and the imperative need of rendering Germany impotent as a
military power."
Later I realized that another factor should be given as important a
place in the terms of peace as any of the three, namely, the economic
interdependence of adjoining areas and the mutual industrial benefit to
their inhabitants by close political affiliation. This factor in the
territorial settlements made more and more impression upon me as it was
disclosed by a detailed study of the numerous problems which the Peace
Conference had to solve.
I made other memoranda on various subjects relating to the general peace
for the purpose of crystallizing my ideas, so that I could lay them in
concrete form before the President when the time came to draft
instructions for the American plenipotentiaries charged with the
negotiation of the Treaty of Peace. When the President reached the
decision to attend the Conference and to direct in person the
negotiations, it became evident that, in place of the instructions
customarily issued to negotiators, a more practical and proper form of
defining the objects to be sought by the United States would be an
outline of a treaty setting forth in detail the features of the peace,
or else a memorandum containing definite declarations of policy in
regard to the numerous problems presented. Unless there was some
framework of this sort on which to build, it would manifestly be very
embarrassing for the American Commissioners in their intercourse with
their foreign colleagues, as they would be unable to discuss
authoritatively or even informally the questions at issue or express
opinions upon them without the danger of unwittingly opposing the
President's wishes or of contradicting the views which might be
expressed by some other of their associates on the American Commission.
A definite plan seemed essential if the Americans were to take any part
in the personal exchanges of views which are so usual during the
progress of negotiations.
Prior to the departure of the American delegation from the United States
and for two weeks after their arrival in Paris, it was expected that the
President would submit to the Commissioners for their guidance a
_projet_ of a treaty or a very complete programme as to policies.
Nothing, however, was done, and in the conferences which took place
between the President and his American associates he confined his
remarks almost exclusively to the League of Nations and to his plan for
its organization. It was evident--at least that was the natural
inference--that President Wilson was without a programme of any sort or
even of a list of subjects suitable as an outline for the preparation of
a programme. How he purposed to conduct the negotiations no one seemed
to know. It was all very uncertain and unsatisfactory.
In the circumstances, which seemed to be due to the President's failure
to appreciate the necessity for a definite programme, I felt that
something ought to be done, as the probable result would be that the
terms of the Treaty, other than the provisions regarding a League of
Nations, would be drafted by foreign delegates and not by the President.
Impressed by the unsatisfactory state of affairs and desirous of
remedying it if possible, I asked Dr. James Brown Scott and Mr. David
Hunter Miller, the legal advisers of the American Commission, to prepare
a skeleton treaty covering the subjects to be dealt with in the
negotiations which could be used in working out a complete programme.
After several conferences with these advisers concerning the subjects to
be included and their arrangement in the Treaty, the work was
sufficiently advanced to lay before the Commissioners. Copies were,
therefore, furnished to them with the request that they give the
document consideration in order that they might make criticisms and
suggest changes. I had not sent a copy to the President, intending to
await the views of my colleagues before doing so, but during the
conference of January 10, to which I have been compelled reluctantly to
refer in discussing the Covenant of the League of Nations, I mentioned
the fact that our legal advisers had been for some time at work on a
"skeleton treaty" and had made a tentative draft. The President at once
showed his displeasure and resented the action taken, evidently
considering the request that a draft be prepared to be a usurpation of
his authority to direct the activities of the Commission. It was this
incident which called forth his remark, to which reference was made in
Chapter VIII, that he did not propose to have lawyers drafting
the Treaty.
In view of Mr. Wilson's attitude it was useless for Dr. Scott and Mr.
Miller to proceed with their outline of a treaty or for the
Commissioners to give consideration to the tentative draft already made.
It was a disagreeable situation. If the President had had anything,
however crude and imperfect it might have been, to submit in place of
the Scott-Miller draft, it would have been a different matter and
removed to an extent the grounds for complaint at his attitude. But he
offered nothing at all as a substitute. It is fair to assume that he had
no programme prepared and was unwilling to have any one else make a
tentative one for his consideration. It left the American Commission
without a chart marking out the course which they were to pursue in the
negotiations and apparently without a pilot who knew the channel.
Six days after the enforced abandonment of the plan to prepare a
skeleton treaty as a foundation for a definite and detailed programme, I
made the following note which expresses my views on the situation at
that time:
"_January_ 16, 1919
"No plan of work has been prepared. Unless something is done we will
be here for many weeks, possibly for months. After the President's
remarks the other day about a draft-treaty no one except the
President would think of preparing a plan. He must do it himself, and
he is not doing it. He has not even given us a list of subjects to be
considered and of course has made no division of our labors.
"If the President does not take up this matter of organization and
systematically apportion the subjects between us, we may possibly
have no peace before June. This would be preposterous because with
proper order and division of questions we ought to have a treaty
signed by April first.
"I feel as if we, the Commissioners, were like a lot of skilled
workmen who are ordered to build a house. We have the materials and
tools, but there are no plans and specifications and no
master-workman in charge of the construction. We putter around in an
aimless sort of way and get nowhere.
"With all his natural capacity the President seems to lack the
faculty of employing team-work and of adopting a system to utilize
the brains of other men. It is a decided defect in an executive. He
would not make a good head of a governmental department. The result
is, so far as our Commission is concerned, a state of confusion and
uncertainty with a definite loss and delay through effort being
undirected."
On several occasions I spoke to the President about a programme for the
work of the Commission and its corps of experts, but he seemed
indisposed to consider the subject and gave the impression that he
intended to call on the experts for his own information which would be
all that was necessary. I knew that Colonel House, through Dr. Mezes,
the head of the organization, was directing the preparation of certain
data, but whether he was doing so under the President's directions I did
not know, though I presumed such was the case. Whatever data were
furnished did not, however, pass through the hands of the other
Commissioners who met every morning in my office to exchange information
and discuss matters pertaining to the negotiations and to direct the
routine work of the Commission.
It is difficult, even with the entire record of the proceedings at Paris
before one, to find a satisfactory explanation for the President's
objection to having a definite programme other than the general
declarations contained in the Fourteen Points and his "subsequent
addresses." It may be that he was unwilling to bind himself to a fixed
programme, since it would restrict him, to an extent, in his freedom of
action and prevent him from assuming any position which seemed to him
expedient at the time when a question arose during the negotiations. It
may be that he did not wish to commit himself in any way to the contents
of a treaty until the Covenant of the League of Nations had been
accepted. It may be that he preferred not to let the American
Commissioners know his views, as they would then be in a position to
take an active part in the informal discussions which he apparently
wished to handle alone. None of these explanations is at all
satisfactory, and yet any one of them may be the true one.
Whatever was the chief reason for the President's failure to furnish a
working plan to the American Commissioners, he knowingly adopted the
policy and clung to it with the tenacity of purpose which has been one
of the qualities of mind that account for his great successes and for
his great failures. I use the adverb "knowingly" because it had been
made clear to him that, in the judgment of others, the Commissioners
ought to have the guidance furnished by a draft-treaty or by a definite
statement of policies no matter how tentative or subject to change the
draft or statement might be.
On the day that the President left Paris to return to the United States
(February 14, 1919) I asked him if he had any instructions for the
Commissioners during his absence concerning the settlements which should
be included in the preliminary treaty of peace, as it was understood
that the Council of Ten would continue its sessions for the
consideration of the subjects requiring investigation and decision. The
President replied that he had no instructions, that the decisions could
wait until he returned, though the hearings could proceed and reports
could be made during his absence. Astonished as I was at this wish to
delay these matters, I suggested to him the subjects which I thought
ought to go into the Treaty. He answered that he did not care to discuss
them at that time, which, as he was about to depart from Paris, meant
that everything must rest until he had returned from his visit to
Washington.
Since I was the head of the American Commission when the President was
absent and became the spokesman for the United States on the Council of
Ten, this refusal to disclose his views even in a general way placed me
in a very awkward position. Without instructions and without knowledge
of the President's wishes or purposes the conduct of the negotiations
was difficult and progress toward actual settlements practically
impossible. As a matter of fact the Council did accomplish a great
amount of work, while the President was away, in the collection of data
and preparing questions for final settlement. But so far as deciding
questions was concerned, which ought to have been the principal duty of
the Council of Ten, it simply "marked time," as I had no power to decide
or even to express an authoritative opinion on any subject. It showed
very clearly that the President intended to do everything himself and to
allow no one to act for him unless it was upon some highly technical
matter. All actual decisions in regard to the terms of peace which
involved policy were thus forced to await his time and pleasure.
Even after Mr. Wilson returned to Paris and resumed his place as head of
the American delegation he was apparently without a programme. On March
20, six days after his return, I made a note that "the President, so far
as I can judge, has yet no definite programme," and that I was unable to
"find that he has talked over a plan of a treaty even with Colonel
House." It is needless to quote the thoughts, which I recorded at the
time, in regard to the method in which the President was handling a
great international negotiation, a method as unusual as it was unwise. I
referred to Colonel House's lack of information concerning the
President's purposes because he was then and had been from the beginning
on more intimate terms with the President than any other American. If he
did not know the President's mind, it was safe to assume that no
one knew it.
I had, as has been stated, expressed to Mr. Wilson my views as to what
the procedure should be and had obtained no action. With the
responsibility resting on him for the conduct and success of the
negotiations and with his constitutional authority to exercise his own
judgment in regard to every matter pertaining to the treaty, there was
nothing further to be done in relieving the situation of the American
Commissioners from embarrassment or in inducing the President to adopt a
better course than the haphazard one that he was pursuing.
It is apparent that we differed radically as to the necessity for a
clearly defined programme and equally so as to the advantages to be
gained by having a draft-treaty made or a full statement prepared
embodying the provisions to be sought by the United States in the
negotiations. I did not attempt to hide my disapproval of the vagueness
and uncertainty of the President's method, and there is no doubt in my
own mind that Mr. Wilson was fully cognizant of my opinion. How far this
lack of system in the work of the Commission and the failure to provide
a plan for a treaty affected the results written into the Treaty of
Versailles is speculative, but my belief is that they impaired in many
particulars the character of the settlements by frequent abandonment of
principle for the sake of expediency.
The want of a programme or even of an unwritten plan as to the
negotiations was further evidenced by the fact that the President,
certainly as late as March 19, had not made up his mind whether the
treaty which was being negotiated should be preliminary or final. He had
up to that time the peculiar idea that a preliminary treaty was in the
nature of a _modus vivendi_ which could be entered into independently by
the Executive and which would restore peace without going through the
formalities of senatorial consent to ratification.
The purpose of Mr. Wilson, so far as one could judge, was to include in
a preliminary treaty of the sort that he intended to negotiate, the
entire Covenant of the League of Nations and other principal
settlements, binding the signatories to repeat these provisions in the
final and definitive treaty when that was later negotiated. By this
method peace would be at once restored, the United States and other
nations associated with it in the war would be obligated to renew
diplomatic and consular relations with Germany, and commercial
intercourse would follow as a matter of course. All this was to be done
without going through the American constitutional process of obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate to the Covenant and to the
principal settlements. The intent seemed to be to respond to the popular
demand for an immediate peace and at the same time to checkmate the
opponents of the Covenant in the Senate by having the League of Nations
organized and functioning before the definitive treaty was laid before
that body.
When the President advanced this extraordinary theory of the nature of a
preliminary treaty during a conversation, of which I made a full
memorandum, I told him that it was entirely wrong, that by whatever name
the document was called, whether it was "armistice," "agreement,"
"protocol," or "_modus_," it would be a treaty and would have to be sent
by him to the Senate for its approval. I said, "If we change the
_status_ from war to peace, it has to be by a ratified treaty. There is
no other way save by a joint resolution of Congress." At this statement
the President was evidently much perturbed. He did not accept it as
conclusive, for he asked me to obtain the opinion of others on the
subject. He was evidently loath to abandon the plan that he had
presumably worked out as a means of preventing the Senate from rejecting
or modifying the Covenant before it came into actual operation. It seems
almost needless to say that all the legal experts, among them Thomas W.
Gregory, the retiring Attorney-General of the United States, who chanced
to be in Paris at the time, agreed with my opinion, and upon being so
informed the President abandoned his purpose.
It is probable that the conviction, which was forced upon Mr. Wilson,
that he could not independently of the Senate put into operation a
preliminary treaty, determined him to abandon that type of treaty and to
proceed with the negotiation of a definitive one. At least I had by
March 30 reached the conclusion that there would be no preliminary
treaty as is disclosed by the following memorandum written on that day:
"I am sure now that there will be no preliminary treaty of peace, but
that the treaty will be complete and definitive. This is a serious
mistake. Time should be given for passions to cool. The operations of
a preliminary treaty should be tested and studied. It would hasten a
restoration of peace. Certainly this is the wise course as to
territorial settlements and the financial and economic burdens to be
imposed upon Germany. The same comment applies to the organization of
a League of Nations. Unfortunately the President insists on a
full-blown Covenant and not a declaration of principles. This has
much to do with preventing a preliminary treaty, since he wishes to
make the League an agent for enforcement of definite terms.
"When the President departed for the United States in February, I
assumed and I am certain that he had in mind that there would be a
preliminary treaty. With that in view I drafted at the time a
memorandum setting forth what the preliminary treaty of peace should
contain. Here are the subjects I then set down:
"1. Restoration of Peace and official relations.
"2. Restoration of commercial and financial relations subject to
conditions.
"3. Renunciation by Germany of all territory and territorial rights
outside of Europe.
"4. Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be
fixed in the Definitive Treaty.
"5. Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms
and munitions.
"6. Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany
with time limits for payment and delivery.
"7. German property and territory to be held as security by the
Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified.
"8. Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations.
"The President's obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to
everything else. An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the
adoption of the Covenant. The whole world wants peace. The President
wants his League. I think that the world will have to wait."
The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to the
President's attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the United
States and which he said he did not care to discuss.
The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are those
that I have continued to hold. The President was anxious to have the
Treaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed rather
than general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations. With
that view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and the
articles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion and
unquestionably delay the peace. To restore the peaceful intercourse
between the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce,
and to give to the war-stricken peoples of Europe opportunity to resume
their normal industrial life seemed to me the first and greatest task to
be accomplished. It was in my judgment superior to every other object of
the Paris negotiations. Compared with it the creation of a League of
Nations was insignificant and could well be postponed. President Wilson
thought otherwise. We were very far apart in this matter as he well
knew, and he rightly assumed that I followed his instructions with
reluctance, and, he might have added, with grave concern.
As a matter of interest in this connection and as a possible source from
which the President may have acquired knowledge of my views as to the
conduct of the negotiations, I would call attention again to the
conference which I had with Colonel House on December 17, 1918, and to
which I have referred in connection with the subject of international
arbitration. During that conference I said to the Colonel "that I
thought that there ought to be a preliminary treaty of peace negotiated
without delay, and that all the details as to a League of Nations,
boundaries, and indemnities should wait for the time being. The Colonel
replied that he was not so sure about delaying the creation of a League,
as he was afraid that it never could be put through unless it was done
at once. I told him that possibly he was right, but that I was opposed
to anything which delayed the peace." This quotation is from my
memorandum made at the time of our conversation. I think that the same
reason for insisting on negotiating the Covenant largely influenced the
course of the President. My impression at the time was that the Colonel
favored a preliminary treaty provided that there was included in it the
full plan for a League of Nations, which to me seemed to be
impracticable.
There can be little doubt that, if there had been a settled programme
prepared or a tentative treaty drafted, there would have been a
preliminary treaty which might and probably would have postponed the
negotiations as to a League. Possibly the President realized that this
danger of excluding the Covenant existed and for that reason was
unwilling to make a definite programme or to let a draft-treaty be
drawn. At least it may have added another reason for his proceeding
without advising the Commissioners of his purposes.
As I review the entire negotiations and the incidents which took place
at Paris, President Wilson's inherent dislike to depart in the least
from an announced course, a characteristic already referred to, seems to
me to have been the most potent influence in determining his method of
work during the Peace Conference. He seemed to think that, having marked
out a definite plan of action, any deviation from it would show
intellectual weakness or vacillation of purpose. Even when there could
be no doubt that in view of changed conditions it was wise to change a
policy, which he had openly adopted or approved, he clung to it with
peculiar tenacity refusing or merely failing to modify it. Mr. Wilson's
mind once made up seemed to become inflexible. It appeared to grow
impervious to arguments and even to facts. It lacked the elasticity and
receptivity which have always been characteristic of sound judgment and
right thinking. He might break, but he would not bend. This rigidity of
mind accounts in large measure for the deplorable, and, as it seemed to
me, needless, conflict between the President and the Senate over the
Treaty of Versailles. It accounts for other incidents in his career
which have materially weakened his influence and cast doubts on his
wisdom. It also accounts, in my opinion, for the President's failure to
prepare or to adopt a programme at Paris or to commit himself to a draft
of a treaty as a basis for the negotiations, which failure, I am
convinced, not only prevented the signature of a short preliminary
treaty of peace, but lost Mr. Wilson the leadership in the proceedings,
as the statesmen of the other Great Powers outlined the Treaty
negotiated and suggested the majority of the articles which were written
into it. It would have made a vast difference if the President had known
definitely what he sought, but he apparently did not. He dealt in
generalities leaving, but not committing, to others their definition and
application. He was always in the position of being able to repudiate
the interpretation which others might place upon his declarations of
principle.
CHAPTER XVII
SECRET DIPLOMACY
Another matter, concerning which the President and I disagreed, was the
secrecy with which the negotiations were carried on between him and the
principal European statesmen, incidental to which was the willingness,
if not the desire, to prevent the proceedings and decisions from
becoming known even to the delegates of the smaller nations which were
represented at the Peace Conference.
Confidential personal interviews were to a certain extent unavoidable
and necessary, but to conduct the entire negotiation through a small
group sitting behind closed doors and to shroud their proceedings with
mystery and uncertainty made a very unfortunate impression on those who
were not members of the secret councils.
At the first there was no Council of the Heads of States (the so-called
Council of Four); in fact it was not recognized as an organized body
until the latter part of March, 1919. Prior to that time the directing
body of the Conference was the self-constituted Council of Ten composed
of the President and the British, French, and Italian Premiers with
their Secretaries or Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and two Japanese
delegates of ambassadorial rank. This Council had a membership identical
with that of the Supreme War Council, which controlled the armistices,
their enforcement, and other military matters. It assumed authority over
the negotiations and proceedings of the Conference, though it was never
authorized so to do by the body of delegates. The Council of Four, when
later formed, was equally without a mandate from the Conference. They
assumed the authority and exercised it as a matter of right.
From the time of his arrival in Paris President Wilson held almost daily
conversations with the leading foreign statesmen. It would be of little
value to speculate on what took place at these interviews, since the
President seldom told the American Commission of the meetings or
disclosed to them, unless possibly to Colonel House, the subjects which
were discussed. My conviction is, from the little information which the
President volunteered, that these consultations were--certainly at
first--devoted to inducing the European leaders to give their support to
his plan for a League of Nations, and that, as other matters relating to
the terms of peace were in a measure involved because of their possible
relation to the functions of the League, they too became more and more
subjects of discussion.
The introduction of this personal and clandestine method of negotiation
was probably due to the President's belief that he could in this way
exercise more effectively his personal influence in favor of the
acceptance of a League. It is not unlikely that this belief was in a
measure justified. In Colonel House he found one to aid him in this
course of procedure, as the Colonel's intimate association with the
principal statesmen of the Allied Powers during previous visits to
Europe as the President's personal envoy was an asset which he could
utilize as an intermediary between the President and those with whom he
wished to confer. Mr. Wilson relied upon Colonel House for his knowledge
of the views and temperaments of the men with whom he had to deal. It
was not strange that he should adopt a method which the Colonel had
found successful in the past and that he should seek the latter's aid
and advice in connection with the secret conferences which usually took
place at the residence of the President.
Mr. Wilson pursued this method of handling the subjects of negotiation
the more readily because he was by nature and by inclination secretive.
He had always shown a preference for a private interview with an
individual. In his conduct of the executive affairs of the Government at
Washington he avoided as far as possible general conferences. He talked
a good deal about "taking common counsel," but showed no disposition to
put it into practice. He followed the same course in the matter of
foreign affairs. At Paris this characteristic, which had often been the
subject of remark in Washington, was more pronounced, or at least more
noticeable. He was not disposed to discuss matters with the American
Commission as a whole or even to announce to them his decisions unless
something arose which compelled him to do so. He easily fell into the
practice of seeing men separately and of keeping secret the knowledge
acquired as well as the effect of this knowledge on his views and
purposes. To him this was the normal and most satisfactory method of
doing business.
From the time that the President arrived in Paris up to the time that
the Commission on the League of Nations made its report--that is, from
December 14, 1918, to February 14, 1919--the negotiations regarding the
League were conducted with great secrecy. Colonel House, the President's
collaborator in drafting the Covenant, if he was not, as many believed,
the real author, was the only American with whom Mr. Wilson freely
conferred and to whom he confided the progress that he was making in his
interviews with the foreign statesmen, at many of which interviews the
Colonel was present. It is true that the President held an occasional
conference with all the American Commissioners, but these conferences
were casual and perfunctory in nature and were very evidently not for
the purpose of obtaining the opinions and counsel of the Commissioners.
There was none of the frankness that should have existed between the
Chief Executive and his chosen agents and advisers. The impression made
was that he summoned the conferences to satisfy the _amour propre_ of
the Commissioners rather than out of any personal wish to do so.
The consequence was that the American Commissioners, other than Colonel
House, were kept in almost complete ignorance of the preliminary
negotiations and were left to gather such information as they were able
from the delegates of other Powers, who, naturally assuming that the
Americans possessed the full confidence of the President, spoke with
much freedom. As Mr. Wilson never held a conference with the American
Commission from the first meeting of the Commission on the League of
Nations until its report was printed, his American colleagues did not
know, except indirectly, of the questions at issue or of the progress
that was being made. The fact is that, as the Commission on the League
met in Colonel House's office at the Hôtel Crillon, his office force
knew far more about the proceedings than did the three American
Commissioners who were not present. As the House organization made no
effort to hide the fact that they had inside information, the
representatives of the press as a consequence frequented the office of
the Colonel in search of the latest news concerning the Commission on
the League of Nations.
But, in addition to the embarrassment caused the American Commissioners
and the unenviable position in which they were placed by the secrecy
with which the President surrounded his intercourse with the foreign
statesmen and the proceedings of the Commission on the League of
Nations, his secret negotiations caused the majority of the delegates to
the Conference and the public at large to lose in a large measure their
confidence in the actuality of his devotion to "open diplomacy," which
he had so unconditionally proclaimed in the first of his Fourteen
Points. If the policy of secrecy had ceased with the discussions
preliminary to the organization of the Conference, or even with those
preceding the meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations,
criticism and complaint would doubtless have ceased, but as the
negotiations progressed the secrecy of the conferences of the leaders
increased rather than decreased, culminating at last in the organization
of the Council of Four, the most powerful and most seclusive of the
councils which directed the proceedings at Paris. Behind closed doors
these four individuals, who controlled the policies of the United
States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, passed final judgment on the
mass of articles which entered into the Treaties of Peace, but kept
their decisions secret except from the committee which was drafting
the articles.
The organization of the Council of Four and the mystery which enveloped
its deliberations emphasized as nothing else could have done the
secretiveness with which adjustments were being made and compromises
were being effected. It directed attention also to the fact that the
Four Great Powers had taken supreme control of settling the terms of
peace, that they were primates among the assembled nations and that they
intended to have their authority acknowledged. This extraordinary
secrecy and arrogation of power by the Council of Four excited
astonishment and complaint throughout the body of delegates to the
Conference, and caused widespread criticism in the press and among the
people of many countries.
A week after the Council of Ten was divided into the Council of the
Heads of States, the official title of the Council of Four, and the
Council of Foreign Ministers, the official title of the Council of Five
(popularly nick-named "The Big Four" and "The Little Five"), I made the
following note on the subject of secret negotiations:
"After the experience of the last three months [January-March, 1919]
I am convinced that the method of personal interviews and private
conclaves is a failure. It has given every opportunity for intrigue,
plotting, bargaining, and combining. The President, as I now see it,
should have insisted on everything being brought before the Plenary
Conference. He would then have had the confidence and support of all
the smaller nations because they would have looked up to him as their
champion and guide. They would have followed him.
"The result of the present method has been to destroy their faith and
arouse their resentment. They look upon the President as in favor of
a world ruled by Five Great Powers, an international despotism of the
strong, in which the little nations are merely rubber-stamps.
"The President has undoubtedly found himself in a most difficult
position. He has put himself on a level with politicians experienced
in intrigue, whom he will find a pretty difficult lot. He will sink
in the estimation of the delegates who are not within the inner
circle, and what will be still more disastrous will be the loss of
confidence among the peoples of the nations represented here. A
grievous blunder has been made."
The views, which I expressed in this note in regard to the unwisdom of
the President's course, were not new at the time that I wrote them. Over
two months before I had watched the practice of secret negotiation with
apprehension as to what the effect would be upon the President's
influence and standing with the delegates to the Conference. I then
believed that he was taking a dangerous course which he would in the end
regret. So strong was this conviction that during a meeting, which the
President held with the American Commissioners on the evening of January
29, I told him bluntly--perhaps too bluntly from the point of view of
policy--that I considered the secret interviews which he was holding
with the European statesmen, where no witnesses were present, were
unwise, that he was far more successful in accomplishment and less
liable to be misunderstood if he confined his negotiating to the Council
of Ten, and that, furthermore, acting through the Council he would be
much less subject to public criticism. I supported these views with the
statement that the general secrecy, which was being practiced, was
making a very bad impression everywhere, and for that reason, if for no
other, I was opposed to it. The silence with which the President
received my remarks appeared to me significant of his attitude toward
this advice, and his subsequent continuance of secret methods without
change, unless it was to increase the secrecy, proved that our judgments
were not in accord on the subject. The only result of my
representations, it would seem, was to cause Mr. Wilson to realize that
I was not in sympathy with his way of conducting the negotiations. In
the circumstances I think now that it was a blunder on my part to have
stated my views so frankly.
Two days after I wrote the note, which is quoted (April 2, 1919), I made
another note more general in character, but in which appears the
following:
"Everywhere there are developing bitterness and resentment against a
secretiveness which is interpreted to mean failure. The patience of
the people is worn threadbare. Their temper has grown ragged. They
are sick of whispering diplomats.
"Muttered confidences, secret intrigues, and the tactics of the
'gum-shoer' are discredited. The world wants none of them these days.
It despises and loathes them. What the world asks are honest
declarations openly proclaimed. The statesman who seeks to gain his
end by tortuous and underground ways is foolish or badly advised. The
public man who is sly and secretive rather than frank and bold, whose
methods are devious rather than obvious, pursues a dangerous path
which leads neither to glory nor to success.
"Secret diplomacy, the bane of the past, is a menace from which man
believed himself to be rid. He who resurrects it invites
condemnation. The whole world will rejoice when the day of the
whisperer is over."
This note, read at the present time, sounds extravagant in thought and
intemperate in expression. It was written under the influence of
emotions which had been deeply stirred by the conditions then existing.
Time usually softens one's judgments and the passage of events makes
less vivid one's impressions. The perspective, however, grows clearer
and the proportions more accurate when the observer stands at a
distance. While the language of the note might well be changed and made
less florid, the thought needs little modification. The public criticism
was widespread and outspoken, and from the expressions used it was very
evident that there prevailed a general popular disapproval of the way
the negotiations were being conducted. The Council of Four won the
press-name of "The Olympians," and much was said of "the thick cloud of
mystery" which hid them from the anxious multitudes, and of the secrecy
which veiled their deliberations. The newspapers and the correspondents
at Paris openly complained and the delegates to the Conference in a more
guarded way showed their bitterness at the overlordship assumed by the
leading statesmen of the Great Powers and the secretive methods which
they employed. It was, as may be gathered from the note quoted, a
distressing and depressing time.
As concrete examples of the evils of secret negotiations the "Fiume
Affair" and the "Shantung Settlement" are the best known because of the
storm of criticism and protest which they caused. As the Shantung
Settlement was one of the chief matters of difference between the
President and myself, it will be treated later. The case of Fiume is
different. As to the merits of the question I was very much in accord
with the President, but to the bungling way in which it was handled I
was strongly opposed believing that secret interviews, at which false
hopes were encouraged, were at the bottom of all the trouble which later
developed. But for this secrecy I firmly believe that there would have
been no "Fiume Affair."
The discussion of the Italian claims to territory along the northern
boundary of the Kingdom and about the head of the Adriatic Sea began as
soon as the American Commission was installed at Paris, about the middle
of December, 1918. The endeavor of the Italian emissaries was to induce
the Americans, particularly the President, to recognize the boundary
laid down in the Pact of London. That agreement, which Italy had
required Great Britain and France to accept in April, 1915, before she
consented to declare war against the Austro-Hungarian Empire, committed
the Entente Powers to the recognition of Italy's right to certain
territorial acquisitions at the expense of Austria-Hungary in the event
of the defeat of the Central Empires. By the boundary line agreed upon
in the Pact, Italy would obtain certain important islands and ports on
the Dalmatian coast in addition to the Austrian Tyrol and the Italian
provinces of the Dual Monarchy at the head of the Adriatic.
When this agreement was signed, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was
not in contemplation, or at least, if it was considered, the possibility
of its accomplishment seemed very remote. It was assumed that the
Dalmatian territory to be acquired under the treaty to be negotiated in
accordance with the terms of the Pact would, with the return of the
Italian provinces, give to Italy naval control over the Adriatic Sea and
secure the harborless eastern coast of the Italian peninsula against
future hostile attack by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The boundary laid
down in the agreement was essentially strategic and based primarily on
considerations of Italian national safety. As long as the Empire existed
as a Great Power the boundary of the Pact of London, so far as it
related to the Adriatic littoral and islands, was not unreasonable or
the territorial demands excessive.
But the close of active warfare in the autumn of 1918, when the
armistice went into effect, found conditions wholly different from those
upon which these territorial demands had been predicated. The
Austro-Hungarian Empire had fallen to pieces beyond the hope of becoming
again one of the Great Powers. The various nationalities, which had long
been restless and unhappy under the rule of the Hapsburgs, threw off the
imperial yoke, proclaimed their independence, and sought the recognition
and protection of the Allies. The Poles of the Empire joined their
brethren of the Polish provinces of Russia and Prussia in the
resurrection of their ancient nation; Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia
united in forming the new state of Czecho-Slovakia; the southern Slavs
of Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia announced their
union with their kindred of the Kingdom of Serbia; and Hungary declared
the severance of her political union with Austria. In a word the Dual
Empire ceased to exist. It was no longer a menace to the national safety
of Italy. This was the state of affairs when the delegates to the Peace
Conference began to assemble at Paris.
The Italian statesmen realized that these new conditions might raise
serious questions as to certain territorial cessions which would come to
Italy under the terms of the Pact of London, because their strategic
necessity had disappeared with the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. While
they had every reason to assume that Great Britain and France would live
up to their agreement, it was hardly to be expected that under the
changed conditions and in the circumstances attending the negotiation
and signature of the Pact, the British and French statesmen would be
disposed to protest against modifications of the proposed boundary if
the United States and other nations, not parties to the agreement,
should insist upon changes as a matter of justice to the new state of
the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It apparently was considered expedient,
by the Italian representatives, in view of the situation which had
developed, to increase rather than to reduce their claims along the
Dalmatian coast in order that they might have something which could be
surrendered in a compromise without giving up the boundaries laid down
in the Pact of London.
It is probable, too, that these additional claims were advanced by Italy
in order to offset in a measure the claims of the Jugo-Slavs, who
through the Serbian delegates at Paris were making territorial demands
which the Italians declared to be extravagant and which, if granted,
would materially reduce the proposed cessions to Italy under the Pact of
London. Furthermore, the Italian Government appeared to be by no means
pleased with the idea of a Jugo-Slav state so strong that it might
become a commercial, if not a naval, rival of Italy in the Adriatic. The
Italian delegates in private interviews showed great bitterness toward
the Slavs, who, they declared, had, as Austrian subjects, waged war
against Italy and taken part in the cruel and wanton acts attendant upon
the invasion of the northern Italian provinces. They asserted that it
was unjust to permit these people, by merely changing their allegiance
after defeat, to escape punishment for the outrages which they had
committed against Italians and actually to profit by being vanquished.
This antipathy to the Slavs of the former Empire was in a measure
transferred to the Serbs, who were naturally sympathetic with their
kinsmen and who were also ambitious to build up a strong Slav state with
a large territory and with commercial facilities on the Adriatic coast
which would be ample to meet the trade needs of the interior.
While there may have been a certain fear for the national safety of
Italy in having as a neighbor a Slav state with a large and virile
population, extensive resources, and opportunity to become a naval power
in the Mediterranean, the real cause of apprehension seemed to be that
the new nation would become a commercial rival of Italy in the Adriatic
and prevent her from securing the exclusive control of the trade which
her people coveted and which the complete victory over Austria-Hungary
appeared to assure to them.
The two principal ports having extensive facilities for shipping and
rail-transportation to and from the Danubian provinces of the Dual
Empire were Trieste and Fiume. The other Dalmatian ports were small and
without possibilities of extensive development, while the precipitous
mountain barrier between the coast and the interior which rose almost
from the water-line rendered railway construction from an engineering
standpoint impracticable if not impossible. It was apparent that, if
Italy could obtain both the port of Trieste and the port of Fiume, the
two available outlets for foreign trade to the territories lying north
and east of the Adriatic Sea, she would have a substantial monopoly of
the sea-borne commerce of the Dalmatian coast and its hinterland. It was
equally apparent that Italian possession of the two ports would place
the new Slav state at a great disadvantage commercially, as the
principal volume of its exports and imports would have to pass through a
port in the hands of a trade rival which could, in case of controversy
or in order to check competition, be closed to Slav ships and goods on
this or that pretext, even if the new state found it practicable to
maintain a merchant marine under an agreement granting it the use of
the port.
In view of the new conditions which had thus arisen through the
dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the union of the Southern
Slavs, the Italian delegates at Paris began a vigorous campaign to
obtain sovereignty, or at least administrative control, over Fiume and
the adjacent coasts and islands, it having been generally conceded that
Trieste should be ceded to Italy. The Italian demand for Fiume had
become real instead of artificial. This campaign was conducted by means
of personal interviews with the representatives of the principal Powers,
and particularly with those of the United States because it was
apparently felt that the chief opposition to the demand would come from
that quarter, since the President was known to favor the general
proposition that every nation should have free access to the sea and, if
possible, a seaport under its own sovereignty.
The Italian delegates were undoubtedly encouraged by some Americans to
believe that, while the President had not actually declared in favor of
Italian control of Fiume, he was sympathetic to the idea and would
ultimately assent to it just as he had in the case of the cession to
Italy of the Tyrol with its Austrian population. Convinced by these
assurances of success the Italian leaders began a nationwide propaganda
at home for the purpose of arousing a strong public sentiment for the
acquisition of the port. This propaganda was begun, it would seem, for
two reasons, first, the political advantage to be gained when it was
announced that Signor Orlando and his colleagues at Paris had succeeded
in having their demand recognized, and, second, the possibility of
influencing the President to a speedy decision by exhibiting the
intensity and unity of the Italian national spirit in demanding the
annexation of the little city, the major part of the population of which
was asserted to be of Italian blood.
The idea, which was industriously circulated throughout Italy, that
Fiume was an Italian city, aroused the feelings of the people more than
any political or economic argument could have done. The fact that the
suburbs, which were really as much a part of the municipality as the
area within the city proper, were inhabited largely by Jugo-Slavs was
ignored, ridiculed, or denied. That the Jugo-Slavs undoubtedly exceeded
in numbers the Italians in the community when it was treated as a whole
made no difference to the propagandists who asserted that Fiume was
Italian. They clamored for its annexation on the ground of
"self-determination," though refusing to accept that principle as
applicable to the inhabitants of the Austrian Tyrol and failing to raise
any question in regard to it in the case of the port of Danzig. The
Italian orators and press were not disturbed by the inconsistency of
their positions, and the Italian statesmen at Paris, when their
attention was called to it, replied that the cases were not the same, an
assertion which it would have been difficult to establish with facts or
support with convincing arguments.
While the propaganda went forward in Italy with increasing energy,
additional assurances, I was informed by one of the Italian group, were
given to Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino that President Wilson was
almost on the point of conceding the justice of the Italian claim to
Fiume. It was not until the latter part of March, 1919, that these
statesmen began to suspect that they had been misinformed and that the
influence of their American friends was not as powerful with Mr. Wilson
as they had been led to believe. It was an unpleasant awakening. They
were placed in a difficult position. Too late to calm the inflamed
temper of the Italian people the Italian leaders at Paris had no
alternative but to press their demands with greater vigor since the
failure to obtain Fiume meant almost inevitable disaster to the
Orlando Ministry.
Following conversations with Baron Sonnino and some others connected
with the Italian delegation, I drew the conclusion that they would go so
far as to refuse to make peace with Germany unless the Adriatic Question
was first settled to their satisfaction. In a memorandum dated March 29,
I wrote: "This will cause a dangerous crisis," and in commenting on the
probable future of the subject I stated:
"My fear is that the President will continue to rely upon private
interviews and his powers of persuasion to induce the Italians to
abandon their extravagant claim. I am sure that he will not be able
to do it. On the contrary, his conversations will strengthen rather
than weaken Italian determination. He ought to tell them _now_ that
he will not consent to have Fiume given to Italy. It would cause
anger and bitterness, but nothing to compare with the resentment
which will be aroused if the uncertainty is permitted to go on much
longer. I shall tell the President my opinion at the first
opportunity. [I did this a few days later.]
"The future is darkened by the Adriatic situation and I look to an
explosion before the matter is settled. It is a good thing that the
President visited Italy when he did and when blessings rather than
curses greeted him. Secret diplomacy is reaping a new harvest of
execrations and condemnations. Will the practice ever cease?"
During the first three weeks of April the efforts to shake the
determination of the President to support the Jugo-Slav claims to Fiume
and the adjacent territory were redoubled, but without avail. Every form
of compromise as to boundary and port privileges, which did not deprive
Italy of the sovereignty, was proposed, but found to be unacceptable.
The Italians, held by the pressure of the aroused national spirit, and
the President, firm in the conviction that the Italian claim to the port
was unjust, remained obdurate. Attempts were made by both sides to reach
some common ground for an agreement, but none was found. As the time
approached to submit the Treaty to the German plenipotentiaries, who
were expected to arrive at Paris on April 26, the Italian delegates let
it be known that they would absent themselves from the meeting at which
the document was to be presented unless a satisfactory understanding in
regard to Fiume was obtained before the meeting. I doubt whether this
threat was with the approval and upon the advice of the American friends
of the Italians who had been industrious in attempting to persuade the
President to accept a compromise. An American familiar with Mr. Wilson's
disposition would have realized that to try to coerce him in that manner
would be folly, as in all probability it would have just the contrary
effect to the one desired.
The Italian delegates did not apparently read the President's temper
aright. They made a mistake. Their threat of withdrawal from the
Conference resulted far differently from their expectation and hope.
When Mr. Wilson learned of the Italian threat he met it with a public
announcement of his position in regard to the controversy, which was
intended as an appeal to the people of Italy to abandon the claim to
Fiume and to reject their Government's policy of insisting on an unjust
settlement. This declaration was given to the press late in the
afternoon of April 23, and a French newspaper containing it was handed,
it was said, to Signor Orlando at the President's residence where the
Council of Four were assembled. He immediately withdrew, issued a
counter-statement, and the following day left Paris for Rome more on
account of his indignation at the course taken by the President than
because of the threat which he had made. Baron Sonnino also departed
the next day.
It is not my purpose to pursue further the course of events following
the crisis which was precipitated by the President's published statement
and the resulting departure of the principal Italian delegates. The
effect on the Italian people is common knowledge. A tempest of popular
fury against the President swept over Italy from end to end. From being
the most revered of all men by the Italians, he became the most
detested. As no words of praise and admiration were too extravagant to
be spoken of him when he visited Rome in January, so no words of insult
or execration were too gross to characterize him after his public
announcement regarding the Adriatic Question. There was never a more
complete reversal of public sentiment toward an individual.
The reason for reciting the facts of the Fiume dispute, which was one of
the most unpleasant incidents that took place at Paris during the
negotiations, is to bring out clearly the consequences of secret
diplomacy. A discussion of the reasons, or of the probable reasons, for
the return of the Italian statesmen to Paris before the Treaty was
handed to the Germans would add nothing to the subject under
consideration, while the same may be said of the subsequent occupation
of Fiume by Italian nationalists under the fanatical D'Annunzio, without
authority of their Government, but with the enthusiastic approval of the
Italian people.
Five days after the Italian Premier and his Minister of Foreign Affairs
had departed from Paris I had a long interview with a well-known Italian
diplomat, who was an intimate friend of both Signor Orlando and Baron
Sonnino and who had been very active in the secret negotiations
regarding the Italian boundaries which had been taking place at Paris
since the middle of December. This diplomat was extremely bitter about
the whole affair and took no pains to hide his views as to the causes of
the critical situation which existed. In the memorandum of our
conversation, which I wrote immediately after he left my office, appears
the following:
"He exclaimed: 'One tells you one thing and that is not true; then
another tells you another thing and that too is not true. What is one
to believe? What can one do? It is hopeless. So many secret meetings
with different persons are simply awful'--He threw up his hands--'Now
we have the result. It is terrible!'
"I laughed and said, 'I conclude that you do not like secret
diplomacy.'
"'I do not; I do not,' he fervently exclaimed. 'All our trouble comes
from these secret meetings of four men [referring to the Big Four],
who keep no records and who tell different stories of what takes
place. Secrecy is to blame. We have been unable to rely on any one.
To have to run around and see this man and that man is not the way to
do. Most all sympathize with you when alone and then they desert you
when they get with others. This is the cause of much bitterness and
distrust. _Secret diplomacy is an utter failure._ It is too hard to
endure. Some men know only how to whisper. They are not to be
trusted. I do not like it.'
"'Well,' I said, 'you cannot charge me with that way of doing
business.'
"'I cannot,' he replied, 'you tell me the truth. I may not like it,
but at least you do not hold out false hopes.'"
The foregoing conversation no doubt expressed the real sentiments of the
members of the Italian delegation at that time. Disgust with
confidential personal interviews and with relying upon personal
influence rather than upon the merits of their case was the natural
reaction following the failure to win by these means the President's
approval of Italy's demands.
The Italian policy in relation to Flume was wrecked on the rock of
President Wilson's firm determination that the Jugo-Slavs should have a
seaport on the Adriatic sufficient for their needs and that Italy should
not control the approaches to that port. With the wreck of the Fiume
policy went in time the Orlando Government which had failed to make good
the promises which they had given to their people. Too late they
realized that secret diplomacy had failed, and that they had made a
mistake in relying upon it. It is no wonder that the two leaders of the
Italian delegation on returning to Paris and resuming their duties in
the Conference refrained from attempting to arrange clandestinely the
settlement of the Adriatic Question. The "go-betweens," on whom they had
previously relied, were no longer employed. Secret diplomacy was
anathema. They had paid a heavy price for the lesson, which they
had learned.
When one reviews the negotiations at Paris from December, 1918, to June,
1919, the secretiveness which characterized them is very evident.
Everybody seemed to talk in whispers and never to say anything worth
while except in confidence. The open sessions of the Conference were
arranged beforehand. They were formal and perfunctory. The agreements
and bargains were made behind closed doors. This secrecy began with the
exchange of views concerning the League of Nations, following which came
the creation of the Council of Ten, whose meetings were intended to be
secret. Then came the secret sessions of the Commission on the League
and the numerous informal interviews of the President with one or more
of the Premiers of the Allied Powers, the facts concerning which were
not divulged to the American Commissioners. Later, on Mr. Wilson's
return from the United States, dissatisfaction with and complaint of the
publicity given to some of the proceedings of the Council of Ten induced
the formation of the Council of Four with the result that the secrecy of
the negotiations was practically unbroken. If to this brief summary of
the increasing secretiveness of the proceedings of the controlling
bodies of the Peace Conference are added the intrigues and personal
bargainings which were constantly going on, the "log-rolling"--to use a
term familiar to American politics--which was practiced, the record is
one which invites no praise and will find many who condemn it. In view
of the frequent and emphatic declarations in favor of "open diplomacy"
and the popular interpretation placed upon the phrase "Open covenants
openly arrived at," the effect of the secretive methods employed by the
leading negotiators at Paris was to destroy public confidence in the
sincerity of these statesmen and to subject them to the charge of
pursuing a policy which they had themselves condemned and repudiated.
Naturally President Wilson, who had been especially earnest in his
denunciation of secret negotiations, suffered more than his foreign
colleagues, whose real support of "open diplomacy" had always been
doubted, though all of them in a measure fell in public estimation as a
consequence of the way in which the negotiations were conducted.
The criticism and condemnation, expressed with varying degrees of
intensity, resulted from the disappointed hopes of the peoples of the
world, who had looked forward confidently to the Peace Conference at
Paris as the first great and decisive change to a new diplomacy which
would cast aside the cloak of mystery that had been in the past the
recognized livery of diplomatic negotiations. The record of the Paris
proceedings in this particular is a sorry one. It is the record of the
abandonment of principle, of the failure to follow precepts
unconditionally proclaimed, of the repudiation by act, if not by word,
of a new and better type of international intercourse.
It is not my purpose or desire to fix the blame for this perpetuation of
old and discredited practices on any one individual. To do so would be
unjust, since more than one preferred the old way and should share the
responsibility for its continuance. But, as the secrecy became more and
more impenetrable and as the President gave silent acquiescence or at
least failed to show displeasure with the practice, I realized that in
this matter, as in others, our judgments were at variance and our views
irreconcilable. As my opposition to the method of conducting the
proceedings was evident, I cannot but assume that this decided
difference was one that materially affected the relations between Mr.
Wilson and myself and that he looked upon me as an unfavorable critic of
his course in permitting to go unprotested the secrecy which
characterized the negotiations.
The attention of the delegates to the Peace Conference who represented
the smaller nations was early directed to their being denied knowledge
of the terms of the Treaty which were being formulated by the principal
members of the delegations of the Five Great Powers. There is no doubt
that at the first their mental attitude was one of confidence that the
policy of secrecy would not be continued beyond the informal meetings
preliminary to and necessary for arranging the organization and
procedure of the Conference; but, as the days lengthened into weeks and
the weeks into months, and as the information concerning the actual
negotiations, which reached them, became more and more meager, they
could no longer close their eyes to the fact that their national rights
and aspirations were to be recognized or denied by the leaders of the
Great Powers without the consent and even without the full knowledge of
the delegates of the nations vitally interested.
Except in the case of a few of these delegates, who had been able to
establish intimate personal relations with some of the "Big Four," the
secretiveness of the discussions and decisions regarding the Treaty
settlements aroused amazement and indignation. It was evident that it
was to be a "dictated peace" and not a "negotiated peace," a peace
dictated by the Great Powers not only to the enemy, but also to their
fellow belligerents. Some of the delegates spoke openly in criticism of
the furtive methods that were being employed, but the majority held
their peace. It can hardly be doubted, however, that the body of
delegates were practically unanimous in disapproving the secrecy of the
proceedings, and this disapproval was to be found even among the
delegations of the Great Powers. It was accepted by the lesser nations
because it seemed impolitic and useless to oppose the united will of the
controlling oligarchy. It was natural that the delegates of the less
influential states should feel that their countries would suffer in the
terms of peace if they openly denounced the treatment accorded them as
violative of the dignity of representatives of independent
sovereignties. In any event no formal protest was entered against their
being deprived of a knowledge to which they were entitled, a deprivation
which placed them and their countries in a subordinate, and, to an
extent, a humiliating, position.
The climax of this policy of secrecy toward the body of delegates came
on the eve of the delivery of the Treaty of Peace to the German
representatives who were awaiting that event at Versailles. By a
decision of the Council of the Heads of States, reached three weeks
before the time, only a digest or summary of the Treaty was laid before
the plenary session of the Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace on
the day preceding the delivery of the full text of the Treaty to the
Germans. The delegates of the smaller belligerent nations were not
permitted to examine the actual text of the document before it was seen
by their defeated adversaries. Nations, which had fought valiantly and
suffered agonies during the war, were treated with no more consideration
than their enemies so far as knowledge of the exact terms of peace were
concerned. The arguments, which could be urged on the ground of the
practical necessity of a small group dealing with the questions and
determining the settlements, seem insufficient to justify the
application of the rule of secrecy to the delegates who sat in the
Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace. It is not too severe to say
that it outraged the equal rights of independent and sovereign states
and under less critical conditions would have been resented as an insult
by the plenipotentiaries of the lesser nations. Even within the
delegations of the Great Powers there were indignant murmurings against
this indefensible and unheard-of treatment of allies. No man, whose mind
was not warped by prejudice or dominated by political expediency, could
give it his approval or become its apologist. Secrecy, and intrigues
which were only possible through secrecy, stained nearly all the
negotiations at Paris, but in this final act of withholding knowledge of
the actual text of the Treaty from the delegates of most of the nations
represented in the Conference the spirit of secretiveness seems to
have gone mad.
The psychological effects of secrecy on those who are kept in ignorance
are not difficult to analyze. They follow normal processes and may be
thus stated: Secrecy breeds suspicion; suspicion, doubt; doubt,
distrust; and distrust produces lack of frankness, which is closely akin
to secrecy. The result is a vicious circle, of which deceit and intrigue
are the very essence. Secrecy and its natural consequences have given to
diplomacy a popular reputation for trickery, for double-dealing, and in
a more or less degree for unscrupulous and dishonest methods of
obtaining desired ends, a reputation that has found expression in the
ironic definition of a diplomat as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for
the good of his country."
The time had arrived when the bad name which diplomacy had so long borne
could and should have been removed. "Open covenants openly arrived at"
appealed to the popular feeling of antipathy toward secret diplomacy, of
which the Great War was generally believed to be the product. The Paris
Conference appeared to offer an inviting opportunity to turn the page
and to begin a new and better chapter in the annals of international
intercourse. To do this required a fixed purpose to abandon the old
methods, to insist on openness and candor, to refuse to be drawn into
whispered agreements. The choice between the old and the new ways had to
be definite and final. It had to be made at the very beginning of the
negotiations. It was made. Secrecy was adopted. Thus diplomacy, in spite
of the announced intention to reform its practices, has retained the
evil taint which makes it out of harmony with the spirit of good faith
and of open dealing which is characteristic of the best thought of the
present epoch. There is little to show that diplomacy has been raised to
a higher plane or has won a better reputation in the world at large than
it possessed before the nations assembled at Paris to make peace. This
failure to lift the necessary agency of international relations out of
the rut worn deep by centuries of practice is one of the deplorable
consequences of the peace negotiations. So much might have been done;
nothing was done.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE SHANTUNG SETTLEMENT
The Shantung Settlement was not so evidently chargeable to secret
negotiations as the crisis over the disposition of Fiume, but the
decision was finally reached through that method. The controversy
between Japan and China as to which country should become the possessor
of the former German property and rights in the Shantung Peninsula was
not decided until almost the last moment before the Treaty with Germany
was completed. Under pressure of the necessity of making the document
ready for delivery to the German delegates, President Wilson, M.
Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George, composing the Council of the Heads of
States in the absence of Signor Orlando in Rome, issued an order
directing the Drafting Committee of the Conference to prepare articles
for the Treaty embodying the decision that the Council had made. This
decision, which was favorable to the Japanese claims, was the result of
a confidential arrangement with the Japanese delegates by which, in the
event of their claims being granted, they withdrew their threat to
decline to sign the Treaty of Peace, agreed not to insist on a proposed
amendment to the Covenant declaring for racial equality, and orally
promised to restore to China in the near future certain rights of
sovereignty over the territory, which promise failed of confirmation in
writing or by formal public declaration.
It is fair to presume that, if the conflicting claims of Japan and China
to the alleged rights of Germany in Chinese territory had been settled
upon the merits through the medium of an impartial commission named by
the Conference, the Treaty provisions relating to the disposition of
those rights would have been very different from those which "The Three"
ordered to be drafted. Before a commission of the Conference no
persuasive reasons for conceding the Japanese claims could have been
urged on the basis of an agreement on the part of Japan to adhere to the
League of Nations or to abandon the attempt to have included in the
Covenant a declaration of equality between races. It was only through
secret interviews and secret agreements that the threat of the Japanese
delegates could be successfully made. An adjustment on such a basis had
nothing to do with the justice of the case or with the legal rights and
principles involved. The threat was intended to coerce the arbiters of
the treaty terms by menacing the success of the plan to establish a
League of Nations--to use an ugly word, it was a species of "blackmail"
not unknown to international relations in the past. It was made possible
because the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and the
conversations concerning Shantung were secret.
It was a calamity for the Republic of China and unfortunate for the
presumed justice written into the Treaty that President Wilson was
convinced that the Japanese delegates would decline to accept the
Covenant of the League of Nations if the claims of Japan to the German
rights were denied. It was equally unfortunate that the President felt
that without Japan's adherence to the Covenant the formation of the
League would be endangered if not actually prevented. And it was
especially unfortunate that the President considered the formation of
the League in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant to be
superior to every other consideration and that to accomplish this object
almost any sacrifice would be justifiable. It is my impression that the
departure of Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino from Paris and the
uncertainty of their return to give formal assent to the Treaty with
Germany, an uncertainty which existed at the time of the decision of the
Shantung Question, had much to do with the anxiety of the President as
to Japan's attitude. He doubtless felt that to have two of the Five
Great Powers decline at the last moment to accept the Treaty containing
the Covenant would jeopardize the plan for a League and would greatly
encourage his opponents in the United States. His line of reasoning was
logical, but in my judgment was based on the false premise that the
Japanese would carry out their threat to refuse to accept the Treaty and
enter the League of Nations unless they obtained a cession of the German
rights. I did not believe at the time, and I do not believe now, that
Japan would have made good her threat. The superior international
position, which she held as one of the Five Great Powers in the
Conference, and which she would hold in the League of Nations as one of
the Principal Powers in the constitution of the Executive Council, would
never have been abandoned by the Tokio Government. The Japanese
delegates would not have run the risk of losing this position by
adopting the course pursued by the Italians.
The cases were different. No matter what action was taken by Italy she
would have continued to be a Great Power in any organization of the
world based on a classification of the nations. If she did not enter the
League under the German Treaty, she certainly would later and would
undoubtedly hold an influential position in the organization whether her
delegates signed the Covenant or accepted it in another treaty or by
adherence. It was not so with Japan. There were reasons to believe that,
if she failed to become one of the Principal Powers at the outset,
another opportunity might never be given her to obtain so high a place
in the concert of the nations. The seats that her delegates had in the
Council of Ten had caused criticism and dissatisfaction in certain
quarters, and the elimination of a Japanese from the Council of the
Heads of States showed that the Japanese position as an equal of the
other Great Powers was by no means secure. These indications of Japan's
place in the international oligarchy must have been evident to her
plenipotentiaries at Paris, who in all probability reported the
situation to Tokio. From the point of view of policy the execution of
the threat of withdrawal presented dangers to Japan's prestige which the
diplomats who represented her would never have incurred if they were as
cautious and shrewd as they appeared to be. The President did not hold
this opinion. We differed radically in our judgment as to the sincerity
of the Japanese threat. He showed that he believed it would be carried
out. I believed that it would not be.
It has not come to my knowledge what the attitude of the British and
French statesmen was concerning the disposition of the Shantung rights,
although I have read the views of certain authors on the subject, but I
do know that the actual decision lay with the President. If he had
declined to recognize the Japanese claims, they would never have been
granted nor would the grant have been written into the Treaty.
Everything goes to show that he realized this responsibility and that
the cession to Japan was not made through error or misconception of the
rights of the parties, but was done deliberately and with a full
appreciation that China was being denied that which in other
circumstances would have been awarded to her. If it had not been for
reasons wholly independent and outside of the question in dispute, the
President would not have decided as he did.
It is not my purpose to enter into the details of the origin of the
German lease of Kiao-Chau (the port of Tsingtau) and of the economic
concessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany. Suffice it
to say that, taking advantage of a situation caused by the murder of
some missionary priests in the province, the German Government in 1898
forced the Chinese Government to make treaties granting for the period
of ninety-nine years the lease and concessions, by which the sovereign
authority over this "Holy Land" of China was to all intents ceded to
Germany, which at once improved the harbor, fortified the leased area,
and began railway construction and the exploitation of the Shantung
Peninsula.
The outbreak of the World War found Germany in possession of the leased
area and in substantial control of the territory under the concession.
On August 15, 1914, the Japanese Government presented an _ultimatum_ to
the German Government, in which the latter was required "to deliver on a
date not later than September 15 to the Imperial Japanese authorities,
without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of
Kiao-Chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China."
On the German failure to comply with these demands the Japanese
Government landed troops and, in company with a small British
contingent, took possession of the leased port and occupied the
territory traversed by the German railway, even to the extent of
establishing a civil government in addition to garrisoning the line with
Japanese troops. Apparently the actual occupation of this Chinese
territory induced a change in the policy of the Imperial Government at
Tokio, for in December, 1914, Baron Kato, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, declared that the restoration of Tsingtau to China "is to be
settled in the future" and that the Japanese Government had made no
promises to do so.
This statement, which seemed in contradiction of the _ultimatum_ to
Germany, was made in the Japanese Diet. It was followed up in January,
1915, by the famous "Twenty-one Demands" made upon the Government at
Peking. It is needless to go into these demands further than to quote
the first to which China was to subscribe.
"The Chinese Government agrees that when the Japanese Government
hereafter approaches the German Government for the transfer of all
rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the
Province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other
manner, China shall give her full assent thereto."
The important point to be noted in this demand is that Japan did not
consider that the occupation of Kiao-Chau and the seizure of the German
concessions transferred title to her, but looked forward to a future
transfer by treaty.
The "Twenty-one Demands" were urged with persistency by the Japanese
Government and finally took the form of an _ultimatum_ as to all but
Group V of the "Demands." The Peking Government was in no political or
military condition to resist, and, in order to avoid an open rupture
with their aggressive neighbor, entered into a treaty granting the
Japanese demands.
China, following the action which the United States had taken on
February 3, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with Germany on March 14,
and five months later declared war against her announcing at the same
time that the treaties, conventions, and agreements between the two
countries were by the declaration abrogated. As to whether a state of
war does in fact abrogate a treaty of the character of the Sino-German
Treaty of 1898 some question may be raised under the accepted rules of
international law, on the ground that it was a cession of sovereign
rights and constituted an international servitude in favor of Germany
over the territory affected by it. But in this particular case the
indefensible duress employed by the German Government to compel China to
enter into the treaty introduces another factor into the problem and
excepts it from any general rule that treaties of that nature are merely
suspended and not abrogated by war between the parties. It would seem as
if no valid argument could be made in favor of suspension because the
effect of the rule would be to revive and perpetuate an inequitable and
unjustifiable act. Morally and legally the Chinese Government was right
in denouncing the treaty and agreements with Germany and in treating the
territorial rights acquired by coercion as extinguished.
It would appear, therefore, that, as the Japanese Government recognized
that the rights in the Province of Shantung had not passed to Japan by
the forcible occupation of Kiao-Chau and the German concessions, those
rights ceased to exist when China declared war against Germany, and that
China was, therefore, entitled to resume full sovereignty over the area
where such rights previously existed.
It is true that subsequently, on September 24, 1918, the Chinese and
Japanese Governments by exchange of notes at Tokio entered into
agreements affecting the Japanese occupation of the Kiao-Chau Tsinan
Railway and the adjoining territory, but the governmental situation at
Peking was too precarious to refuse any demands made by the Japanese
Government. In fact the action of the Japanese Government was very
similar to that of the German Government in 1898. An examination of
these notes discloses the fact that the Japanese were in possession of
the denounced German rights, but nothing in the notes indicates that
they were there as a matter of legal right, or that the Chinese
Government conceded their right of occupation.
This was the state of affairs when the Peace Conference assembled at
Paris. Germany had by force compelled China in 1898 to cede to her
certain rights in the Province of Shantung. Japan had seized these
rights by force in 1914 and had by threats forced China in 1915 to agree
to accept her disposition of them when they were legally transferred by
treaty at the end of the war. China in 1917 had, on entering the war
against Germany, denounced all treaties and agreements with Germany, so
that the ceded rights no longer existed and could not legally be
transferred by Germany to Japan by the Treaty of Peace, since the title
was in China. In fact any transfer or disposition of the rights in
Shantung formerly belonging to Germany was a transfer or disposition of
rights belonging wholly to China and would deprive that country of a
portion of its full sovereignty over the territory affected.
While this view of the extinguishment of the German rights in Shantung
was manifestly the just one and its adoption would make for the
preservation of permanent peace in the Far East, the Governments of the
Allied Powers had, early in 1917, and prior to the severance of
diplomatic relations between China and Germany, acceded to the request
of Japan to support, "on the occasion of the Peace Conference," her
claims in regard to these rights which then existed. The representatives
of Great Britain, France, and Italy at Paris were thus restricted, or at
least embarrassed, by the promises which their Governments had made at a
time when they were in no position to refuse Japan's request. They might
have stood on the legal ground that the Treaty of 1898 having been
abrogated by China no German rights in Shantung were in being at the
time of the Peace Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to take
that position. Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which they
could not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; or
possibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt of
Japanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of the
Japanese Government in regard to China. There can be little doubt that
political, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude of
the European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question.
President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previous
commitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of the
Japanese Government. The subject had been frequently considered during
the early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergence
of views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to the
resumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the lease
and the concessions to Germany. These views were further strengthened by
the presentation of the question before the Council of Ten. On January
27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinese
delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo spoke
on behalf of China. In a note on the meeting I recorded that "he simply
overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument." I believe that that opinion
was common to all those who heard the two presentations. In fact it made
such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates
called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by
declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support
Japan's contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directly
to China. He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard to
the matter. It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the
friendly relations between the two countries if Japan's claim
was denied.
The sessions of the Commission on the League of Nations and the absence
of President Wilson from Paris interrupted further consideration of the
Shantung Question until the latter part of March, when the Council of
Four came into being. As the subject had been fully debated in January
before the Council of Ten, final decision lay with the Council of Four.
What discussions took place in the latter council I do not know on
account of the secrecy which was observed as to their deliberations. But
I presume that the President stood firmly for the Chinese rights, as the
matter remained undecided until the latter part of April.
On the 21st of April Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda called upon me in
regard to the question, and I frankly told them that they ought to prove
the justice of the Japanese claim, that they had not done it and that I
doubted their ability to do so. I found, too, that the President had
proposed that the Five Powers act as trustees of the former German
rights in Shantung, but that the Japanese delegates had declared that
they could not consent to the proposition, which was in the nature of a
compromise intended to bridge over the existing situation that, on
account of the near approach of the completion of the Treaty, was
becoming more and more acute.
On April 26 the President, at a conference with the American
Commissioners, showed deep concern over the existing state of the
controversy, and asked me to see the Japanese delegates again and
endeavor to dissuade them from insisting on their demands and to induce
them to consider the international trusteeship proposed. The evening of
the same day the two Japanese came by request to my office and conferred
with Professor E.T. Williams, the Commission's principal adviser on Far
Eastern affairs, and with me. After an hour's conversation Viscount
Chinda made it very clear that Japan intended to insist on her "pound of
flesh." It was apparent both to Mr. Williams and to me that nothing
could be done to obtain even a compromise, though it was on the face
favorable to Japan, since it recognized the existence of the German
rights, which China claimed were annulled.
On April 28 I gave a full report of the interview to Mr. White and
General Bliss at our regular morning meeting. Later in the morning the
President telephoned me and I informed him of the fixed determination of
the Japanese to insist upon their claims. What occurred between the time
of my conversation with the President and the plenary session of the
Conference on the Preliminaries of Peace in the afternoon, at which the
Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted, I do not actually know,
but the presumption is that the Japanese were promised a satisfactory
settlement in regard to Shantung, since they announced that they would
not press an amendment on "racial equality" at the session, an amendment
upon which they had indicated they intended to insist.
After the meeting of the Conference I made the following memorandum of
the situation:
"At the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference this afternoon Baron
Makino spoke of his proposed amendment to the Covenant declaring
'racial equality,' but said he would not press it.
"I concluded from what the President said to me that he was disposed
to accede to Japan's claims in regard to Kiao-Chau and Shantung. He
also showed me a letter from ---- to Makino saying he was sorry their
claims had not been finally settled before the Session.
"From all this I am forced to the conclusion that a bargain has been
struck by which the Japanese agree to sign the Covenant in exchange
for admission of their claims. If so, it is an iniquitous agreement.
"Apparently the President is going to do this to avoid Japan's
declining to enter the League of Nations. It is a surrender of the
principle of self-determination, a transfer of millions of Chinese
from one foreign master to another. This is another of those secret
arrangements which have riddled the 'Fourteen Points' and are
wrecking a just peace.
"In my opinion it would be better to let Japan stay out of the League
than to abandon China and surrender our prestige in the Far East for
'a mess of pottage'--and a mess it is. I fear that it is too late to
do anything to save the situation."
Mr. White, General Bliss, and I, at our meeting that morning before the
plenary session, and later when we conferred as to what had taken place
at the session, were unanimous in our opinions that China's rights
should be sustained even if Japan withdrew from the Peace Conference. We
were all indignant at the idea of submitting to the Japanese demands and
agreed that the President should be told of our attitude, because we
were unwilling to have it appear that we in any way approved of acceding
to Japan's claims or even of compromising them.
General Bliss volunteered to write the President a letter on the
subject, a course which Mr. White and I heartily endorsed.
The next morning the General read the following letter to us and with
our entire approval sent it to Mr. Wilson:
"_Hôtel de Crillon, Paris_
"_April 29, 1919_
"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
"Last Saturday morning you told the American Delegation that you
desired suggestions, although not at that moment, in regard to the
pending matter of certain conflicting claims between Japan and China
centering about the alleged German rights. My principal interest in
the matter is with sole reference to the question of the moral right
or wrong involved. From this point of view I discussed the matter
this morning with Mr. Lansing and Mr. White. They concurred with me
and requested me to draft a hasty note to you on the subject.
"Since your conference with us last Saturday, I have asked myself
three or four Socratic questions the answers to which make me,
personally, quite sure on which side the moral right lies.
"_First._ Japan bases certain of her claims on the right acquired by
conquest. I asked myself the following questions: Suppose Japan had
not succeeded in her efforts to force the capitulation of the Germans
at Tsing-Tsau; suppose that the armistice of November 11th had found
her still fighting the Germans at that place, just as the armistice
found the English still fighting the Germans in South-East Africa. We
would then oblige Germany to dispose of her claims in China by a
clause in the Treaty of Peace. Would it occur to any one that, as a
matter of right, we should force Germany to cede her claims to Japan
rather than to China? It seems to me that it would occur to every
American that we would then have the opportunity that we have long
desired to force Germany to correct, in favor of China, the great
wrong which she began to do to the latter in 1898. What moral right
has Japan acquired by her conquest of Shantung assisted by the
British? If Great Britain and Japan secured no moral right to
sovereignty over various savages inhabiting islands in the Pacific
Ocean, but, on the other hand, we held that these peoples shall be
governed by mandates under the League of Nations, what moral right
has Japan acquired to the suzerainty (which she would undoubtedly
eventually have) over 30,000,000 Chinese in the sacred province
of Shantung?
"_Second._ Japan must base her claims either on the Convention with
China or on the right of conquest, or on both. Let us consider her
moral right under either of these points.
"_a)_ If the United States has not before this recognized the
validity of the rights claimed by Japan under her Convention with
China, what has happened since the Armistice that would justify us in
recognizing their validity now?
"_b)_ If Germany had possessed territory, in full sovereignty, on the
east coast of Asia, a right to this territory, under international
law, could have been obtained by conquest. But Germany possessed no
such territory. What then was left for Japan to acquire by conquest?
Apparently nothing but a lease extorted under compulsion from China
by Germany. I understand that international lawyers hold that such a
lease, or the rights acquired, justly or unjustly, under it, cannot
be acquired by conquest.
"_Third._ Suppose Germany says to us, 'We will cede our lease and all
rights under it, but we will cede them back to China.' Will we
recognize the justice of Japan's claims to such an extent that we
will threaten Germany with further war unless she cedes these rights
to Japan rather than to China?
"Again, suppose that Germany, in her hopelessness of resistance to
our demands, should sign without question a clause ceding these
rights to Japan, even though we know that this is so wrong that we
would not fight in order to compel Germany to do it, what moral
justification would we have in making Germany do this?
"_Fourth._ Stripped of all words that befog the issue, would we not,
under the guise of making a treaty with Germany, really be making a
treaty with Japan by which we compel one of our Allies (China) to
cede against her will these things to Japan? Would not this action be
really more unjustifiable than the one which you have refused to be a
party to on the Dalmatian Coast? Because, in the latter case, the
territory in dispute did not belong to one of the Allies, but to one
of the Central Powers; the question in Dalmatia is as to which of two
friendly powers we shall give territory taken from an enemy power; in
China the question is, shall we take certain claimed rights from one
friendly power in order to give them to another friendly power.
"It would seem to be advisable to call particular attention to what
the Japanese mean when they say that they will return Kiao-chow to
China. They _do not_ offer to return the railway, the mines or the
port, i.e., Tsingtau. The leased territory included a portion of land
on the north-east side of the entrance of the Bay and another on the
south-west and some islands. It is a small territory. The 50
Kilometer Zone was not included. That was a _limitation_ put upon the
movement of German troops. They could not go beyond the boundary of
the zone. Within this zone China enjoyed all rights of sovereignty
and administration.
"Japan's proposal to abandon the zone is somewhat of an impertinence,
since she has violated it ever since she took possession. She kept
troops all along the railway line until recently and insists on
maintaining in the future a guard at Tsinan, 254 miles away. The zone
would restrict her military movements, consequently she gives it up.
"The proposals she makes are (1) to open the whole bay. It is from 15
to 20 miles from the entrance to the northern shore of the bay. (2)
To have a Japanese exclusive concession _at a-place_ to be designated
by her, i.e., she can take just as much as she likes of the territory
around the bay. It may be as large as the present leased territory,
but more likely it will include only the best part of Tsingtau. What
then does she give up? Nothing but such parts of the leased territory
as are of no value.
"The operation then would amount chiefly to an exchange of two pieces
of paper--one cancelling the lease for 78 years, the other granting a
more valuable concession which would amount to a permanent title to
the port. Why take two years to go through this operation?
"If it be right for a policeman, who recovers your purse, to keep the
contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in returning the
empty purse, then Japan's conduct may be tolerated.
"If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an Ally, then it
cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy.
"If we support Japan's claim, we abandon the democracy of China to
the domination of the Prussianized militarism of Japan.
"We shall be sowing dragons' teeth.
"It can't be right to do wrong even to make peace. Peace is
desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice
and freedom.
"Sincerely yours
"THE PRESIDENT
"T.H. BLISS"
I have not discussed certain modifications proposed by the Japanese
delegates, since, as is clear from General Bliss's letter, they amounted
to nothing and were merely a pretense of concession and without
substantial value.
The day following the delivery of this letter to the President (April
30), by which he was fully advised of the attitude of General Bliss, Mr.
White, and myself in regard to the Japanese claims, the Council of Four
reached its final decision of the matter, in which necessarily Mr.
Wilson acquiesced. I learned of this decision the same evening. The
memorandum which I made the next morning in regard to the matter is
as follows:
"China has been abandoned to Japanese rapacity. A democratic
territory has been given over to an autocratic government. The
President has conceded to Japan all that, if not more than, she ever
hoped to obtain. This is the information contained in a memorandum
handed by Ray Stannard Baker under the President's direction to the
Chinese delegation last evening, a copy of which reached me through
Mr. ---- [of the Chinese delegation].
"Mr. ---- also said that Mr. Baker stated that the President desired
him to say that the President was very sorry that he had not been
able to do more for China but that he had been compelled to accede to
Japan's demand 'in order _to save the League of Nations._'
"The memorandum was most depressing. Though I had anticipated
something of the sort three days ago [see note of April 28 previously
quoted], I had unconsciously cherished a hope that the President
would stand to his guns and champion China's cause. He has failed to
do so. It is true that China is given the shell called 'sovereignty,'
but the economic control, the kernel, is turned over to Japan.
"However logical may appear the argument that China's political
integrity is preserved and will be maintained under the guaranty of
the League of Nations, the fact is that Japan will rule over millions
of Chinese. Furthermore it is still a matter of conjecture how
valuable the guaranty of the League will prove to be. It has, of
course, never been tried, and Japan's representation on the Council
will possibly thwart any international action in regard to China.
"Frankly my policy would have been to say to the Japanese, 'If you do
not give back to China what Germany stole from her, we don't want you
in the League of Nations.' If the Japanese had taken offense and
gone, I would have welcomed it, for we would have been well rid of a
government with such imperial designs. But she would not have gone.
She would have submitted. She has attained a high place in world
councils. Her astute statesmen would never have abandoned her present
exalted position even for the sake of Kiao-Chau. The whole affair
assumes a sordid and sinister character, in which the President,
acting undoubtedly with the best of motives, became the cat's-paw.
"I have no doubt that the President fully believed that the League of
Nations was in jeopardy and that to save it he was compelled to
subordinate every other consideration. The result was that China was
offered up as a sacrifice to propitiate the threatening Moloch of
Japan. When you get down to facts the threats were nothing
but 'bluff.'
"I do not think that anything that has happened here has caused more
severe or more outspoken criticism than this affair. I am heartsick
over it, because I see how much good-will and regard the President is
bound to lose. I can offer no adequate explanation to the critics.
There seems to be none."
It is manifest, from the foregoing recital of events leading up to the
decision in regard to the Shantung Question and the apparent reasons for
the President's agreement to support the Japanese claims, that we
radically differed as to the decision which was embodied in Articles
156, 157, and 158 of the Treaty of Versailles (see Appendix VI, p. 318).
I do not think that we held different opinions as to the justice of the
Chinese position, though probably the soundness of the legal argument in
favor of the extinguishment of the German rights appealed more strongly
to me than it did to Mr. Wilson. Our chief differences were, first, that
it was more important to insure the acceptance of the Covenant of the
League of Nations than to do strict justice to China; second, that the
Japanese withdrawal from the Conference would prevent the formation of
the League; and, third, that Japan would have withdrawn if her claims
had been denied. As to these differences our opposite views remained
unchanged after the Treaty of Versailles was signed.
When I was summoned before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
August 6, 1919, I told the Committee that, in my opinion, the Japanese
signatures would have been affixed to the Treaty containing the Covenant
even though Shantung had not been delivered over to Japan, and that the
only reason that I had yielded was because it was my duty to follow the
decision of the President of the United States.
About two weeks later, August 19, the President had a conference at the
White House with the same Committee. In answer to questions regarding
the Shantung Settlement, Mr. Wilson said concerning my statement that
his judgment was different from mine, that in his judgment the
signatures could not have been obtained if he had not given Shantung to
Japan, and that he had been notified that the Japanese delegates had
been instructed not to sign the Treaty unless the cession of the German
rights in Shantung to Japan was included.
Presumably the opinion which Mr. Wilson held in the summer of 1919 he
continues to hold, and for my part my views and feelings remain the same
now as they were then, with possibly the difference that the indignation
and shame that I felt at the time in being in any way a participant in
robbing China of her just rights have increased rather than lessened.
So intense was the bitterness among the American Commissioners over the
flagrant wrong being perpetrated that, when the decision of the Council
of Four was known, some of them considered whether or not they ought to
resign or give notice that they would not sign the Treaty if the
articles concerning Shantung appeared. The presence at Versailles of the
German plenipotentiaries, the uncertainty of the return of the Italian
delegates then in Rome, and the murmurs of dissatisfaction among the
delegates of the lesser nations made the international situation
precarious. To have added to the serious conditions and to have possibly
precipitated a crisis by openly rebelling against the President was to
assume a responsibility which no Commissioner was willing to take. With
the greatest reluctance the American Commissioners submitted to the
decision of the Council of Four; and, when the Chinese delegates refused
to sign the Treaty after they had been denied the right to sign it with
reservations to the Shantung articles, the American Commissioners, who
had so strongly opposed the settlement, silently approved their conduct
as the only patriotic and statesmanlike course to take. So far as China
was concerned the Shantung Question remained open, and the Chinese
Government very properly refused, after the Treaty of Versailles was
signed, to enter into any negotiations with Japan looking toward its
settlement upon the basis of the treaty provisions.
There was one exception to the President's usual practice which is
especially noticeable in connection with the Shantung controversy, and
that was the greater participation which he permitted the members of the
American Commission in negotiating with both the Japanese and the
Chinese. It is true he did not disclose his intentions to the
Commissioners, but he did express a wish for their advice and he
directed me to confer with the Japanese and obtain their views. Just why
he adopted this course, for him unusual, I do not know unless he felt
that so far as the equity of China's claim was concerned we were all in
agreement, and if there was to be a departure from strict justice he
desired to have his colleagues suggest a way to do so. It is possible,
too, that he felt the question was in large measure a legal one, and
decided that the illegality of transferring the German rights to Japan
could be more successfully presented to the Japanese delegates by a
lawyer. In any event, in this particular case he adopted a course more
in accord with established custom and practice than he did in any other
of the many perplexing and difficult problems which he was called upon
to solve during the Paris negotiations, excepting of course the subjects
submitted to commissions of the Conference. As has been shown, Mr.
Wilson did not follow the advice of the three Commissioners given him in
General Bliss's letter, but that does not detract from the
noteworthiness of the fact that in the case of Shantung he sought advice
from his Commissioners.
This ends the account of the Shantung Settlement and the negotiations
which led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound to
follow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached. Public
opinion in the United States was almost unanimous in condemning it and
in denouncing those responsible for so evident a departure from legal
justice and the principles of international morality. No plea of
expediency or of necessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubted
right. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to a
nation weak because of political discord and an insufficient military
establishment, in order to win favor with a nation strong because of its
military power and national unity, had much to do with increasing the
hostility to the Treaty and preventing its acceptance by the Senate of
the United States. The whole affair furnishes another example of the
results of secret diplomacy, for the arguments which prevailed with the
President were those to which he listened when he sat in secret council
with M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.
CHAPTER XIX
THE BULLITT AFFAIR
The foregoing chapters have related to subjects which were known to
President Wilson to be matters of difference between us while we were
together in Paris and which are presumably referred to in his letter of
February 11, 1920, extracts from which are quoted in the opening
chapter. The narration might be concluded with our difference of opinion
as to the Shantung Settlement, but in view of subsequent information
which the President received I am convinced that he felt that my
objections to his decisions in regard to the terms of the peace with
Germany extended further than he knew at the time, and that he resented
the fact that my mind did not go along with his as to these decisions.
This undoubtedly added to the reasons for his letter and possibly
influenced him to write as he did in February, 1920, even more than our
known divergence of judgment during the negotiations.
I do not feel, therefore, that the story is complete without at least a
brief reference to my views concerning the Treaty of Versailles at the
time of its delivery to the German delegates, which were imperfectly
disclosed in a statement made by William C. Bullitt on September 12,
1919, at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. As to the conduct of Mr. Bullitt, who had held a responsible
position with the American Commission at Paris, in voluntarily repeating
a conversation which was from its nature highly confidential, I make
no comment.
The portion of the statement, which I have no doubt deeply incensed the
President because it was published while he was in the West making his
appeals to the people in behalf of the Treaty and especially of the
League of Nations, is as follows:
"Mr. Lansing said that he, too, considered many parts of the Treaty
thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the
League of Nations. He said: 'I consider that the League of Nations at
present is entirely useless. The Great Powers have simply gone ahead
and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France have
gotten out of the Treaty everything that they wanted, and the League
of Nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the
Treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the League, and
the Great Powers will never give their consent to changes in the
interests of weaker peoples.'
"We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate.
Mr. Lansing said: 'I believe that if the Senate could only understand
what this Treaty means, and if the American people could really
understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they
will ever understand what it lets them in for.'" (Senate Doc. 106,
66th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1276.)
It does not seem an unwarranted conjecture that the President believed
that this statement, which was asserted by Mr. Bullitt to be from a
memorandum made at the time, indicated that I had been unfaithful to
him. He may even have concluded that I had been working against the
League of Nations with the intention of bringing about the rejection of
the Covenant by the Senate. If he did believe this, I cannot feel that
it was other than natural in the circumstances, especially if I did not
at once publicly deny the truth of the Bullitt statement. That I could
not do because there was sufficient truth in it to compel me to show
how, by slight variations and by omissions in the conversation, my words
were misunderstood or misinterpreted.
In view of the fact that I found it impossible to make an absolute
denial, I telegraphed the President stating the facts and offering to
make them public if he considered it wise to do so. The important part
of the telegram, which was dated September 16, 1919, is as follows:
"On May 17th Bullitt resigned by letter giving his reasons, with
which you are familiar. I replied by letter on the 18th without any
comment on his reasons. Bullitt on the 19th asked to see me to say
good-bye and I saw him. He elaborated on the reasons for his
resignation and said that he could not conscientiously give
countenance to a treaty which was based on injustice. I told him that
I would say nothing against his resigning since he put it on
conscientious grounds, and that I recognized that certain features of
the Treaty were bad, as I presumed most every one did, but that was
probably unavoidable in view of conflicting claims and that nothing
ought to be done to prevent the speedy restoration of peace by
signing the Treaty. Bullitt then discussed the numerous European
commissions provided for by the Treaty on which the United States was
to be represented. I told him that I was disturbed by this fact
because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they
understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which
was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to
have peace as soon as possible."
It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this
conversation without reference to the other side and by an omission here
and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr.
Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the
context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was,
and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed
and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of
peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might
delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification,
was to be deplored.
Having submitted to the President the question of making a public
explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at
least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so
until I received the President's approval. That was never received. The
telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State,
was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence was
that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only
one that up to the present time has been published.