THE PRESIDENT'S PLAN AND THE CECIL PLAN
I immediately began an examination and analysis of the President's plan
for a League, having in mind Colonel House's suggestion that I consider
a way to modify it so that it would harmonize with my views. The more I
studied the document, the less I liked it. A cursory reading of the
plan, which is printed in the Appendix (page 281), will disclose the
looseness of the language and the doubtful interpretation of many of the
provisions. It showed an inexpertness in drafting and a fault in
expression which were chargeable to lack of appreciation of the need of
exactness or else to haste in preparation. This fault in the paper,
which was very apparent, could, however, be cured and was by no means a
fatal defect. As a matter of fact, the faults of expression were to a
certain extent removed by subsequent revisions, though some of the
vagueness and ambiguity of the first draft persisted and appeared in the
final text of the Covenant.
The more serious defects of the plan were in the principles on which it
was based and in their application under the provisions of the articles
proposed. The contemplated use of force in making good the guaranty of
sovereign rights and the establishment of a primacy of the Great Powers
were provided for in language which was sufficiently explicit to admit
of no denial. In my opinion these provisions were entirely out of
harmony with American ideals, policies, and traditions. Furthermore, the
clauses in regard to arbitration and appeals from arbitral awards, to
which reference has been made, the lack of any provision for the
establishment of a permanent international judiciary, and the
introduction of the mandatory system were strong reasons to reject the
President's plan.
It should be borne in mind that, at the time that this document was
placed in my hands, the plan of General Smuts for a League of Nations
had, as I have said, been printed in the press and in pamphlet form and
had been given wide publicity. In the Smuts plan, which gave first place
to the system of mandates, appeared the declaration that the League of
Nations was to acquire the mandated territories as "the heir of the
Empires." This clever and attractive phrase caught the fancy of the
President, as was evident from his frequent repetition and approval of
it in discussing mandates under the League. Just as General Smuts had
adopted the President's "self-determination," Mr. Wilson seized upon the
Smuts idea with avidity and incorporated it in his plan. It
unquestionably had a decided influence upon his conception of the right
way to dispose of the colonial possessions of Germany and of the proper
relation of the newly created European states to the League of Nations.
As an example of the way in which President Wilson understood and
applied General Smuts's phrase to the new states, I quote the following
from the "Supplementary Agreements" forming part of the first printed
draft of the President's Covenant, but which I believe were added to the
typewritten draft after the President had examined the plan of the South
African statesman:
"As successor to the Empires, the League of Nations is empowered,
directly and without right of delegation, to watch over the relations
_inter se_ of all new independent states arising or created out of
the Empires, and shall assume and fulfill the duty of conciliating
and composing differences between them with a view to the maintenance
of settled order and the general peace."
There is a natural temptation to a student of international agreements
to analyze critically the composition and language of this provision,
but to do so would in no way advance the consideration of the subject
under discussion and would probably be interpreted as a criticism of the
President's skill in accurately expressing his thoughts, a criticism
which it is not my purpose to make.
Mr. Wilson's draft also contained a system of mandates over territories
in a form which was, to say the least, rudimentary if not inadequate. By
the proposed system the League of Nations, as "the residuary trustee,"
was to take sovereignty over "the peoples and territories" of the
defeated Empires and to issue a mandate to some power or powers to
exercise such sovereignty. A "residuary trustee" was a novelty in
international relations sufficient to arouse conjecture as to its
meaning, but giving to the League the character of an independent state
with the capacity of possessing sovereignty and the power to exercise
sovereign rights through a designated agent was even more extraordinary.
This departure from the long accepted idea of the essentials of
statehood seemed to me an inexpedient and to a degree a dangerous
adventure. The only plausible excuse for the proposal seemed to be a
lack of knowledge as to the nature of sovereignty and as to the
attributes inherent in the very conception of a state. The character of
a mandate, a mandatory, and the authority issuing the mandate presented
many legal perplexities which certainly required very careful study
before the experiment was tried. Until the system was fully worked out
and the problems of practical operation were solved, it seemed to me
unwise to suggest it and still more unwise to adopt it. While the
general idea of mandates issuing from the proposed international
organization was presumably acceptable to the President from the first,
his support was doubtless confirmed by the fact that it followed the
groove which had been made in his mind by the Smuts phrase "the heir of
the Empires."
In any event it seemed to me the course of wise statesmanship to
postpone the advocacy of mandates, based on the assumption that the
League of Nations could become the possessor of sovereignty, until the
practical application of the theory could be thoroughly considered from
the standpoint of international law as well as from the standpoint of
policy. The experiment was too revolutionary to be tried without
hesitation and without consideration of the effect on established
principles and usage. At an appropriate place this subject will be more
fully discussed.
As to the organization and functions of the League of Nations planned by
Mr. Wilson there was little that appealed to one who was opposed to the
employment of force in compelling the observance of international
obligations and to the establishment of an international oligarchy of
the Great Powers to direct and control world affairs. The basic
principle of the plan was that the strong should, as a matter of right
recognized by treaty, possess a dominant voice in international
councils. Obviously the principle of the equality of nations was ignored
or abandoned. In the face of the repeated declarations of the Government
of the United States in favor of the equality of independent states as
to their rights in times of peace, this appeared to be a reversal of
policy which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain in a
satisfactory way. Personally I could not subscribe to this principle
which was so destructive of the American theory of the proper relations
between nations.
It was manifest, when I read the President's plan, that there was no
possible way to harmonize my ideas with it. They were fundamentally
different. There was no common basis on which to build. To attempt to
bring the two theories into accord would have been futile. I, therefore,
told Colonel House that it was useless to try to bring into accord the
two plans, since they were founded on contradictory principles and that
the only course of procedure open to me was to present my views to the
President in written form, hoping that he would give them consideration,
although fearing that his mind was made up, since he had ordered his
plan to be printed.
In the afternoon of the same day (January 7), on which I informed the
Colonel of the impossibility of harmonizing and uniting the two plans,
President Wilson held a conference with the American Commissioners
during which he declared that he considered the affirmative guaranty
absolutely necessary to the preservation of future peace and the only
effective means of preventing war. Before this declaration could be
discussed M. Clemenceau was announced and the conference came to an end.
While the President did not refer in any way to the "self-denying
covenant" which I had proposed as a substitute, it seemed to me that he
intended it to be understood that the substitute was rejected, and that
he had made the declaration with that end in view. This was the nearest
approach to an answer to my letter of December 23 that I ever received.
Indirect as it was the implication was obvious.
Although the settled purpose of the President to insist on his form of
mutual guaranty was discouraging and his declaration seemed to be
intended to close debate on the subject, I felt that no effort should be
spared to persuade him to change his views or at least to leave open an
avenue for further consideration. Impelled by this motive I gave to the
President the articles which I had drafted and asked him if he would be
good enough to read them and consider the principles on which they were
based. The President with his usual courtesy of manner smilingly
received them. Whether or not he ever read them I cannot state
positively because he never mentioned them to me or, to my knowledge, to
any one else. I believe, however, that he did read them and realized
that they were wholly opposed to the theory which he had evolved,
because from that time forward he seemed to assume that I was hostile to
his plan for a League of Nations. I drew this conclusion from the fact
that he neither asked my advice as to any provision of the Covenant nor
discussed the subject with me personally. In many little ways he showed
that he preferred to have me direct my activities as a Commissioner into
other channels and to keep away from the subject of a League. The
conviction that my counsel was unwelcome to Mr. Wilson was, of course,
not formed at the time that he received the articles drafted by me. It
only developed after some time had elapsed, during which incidents took
place that aroused a suspicion which finally became a conviction.
Possibly I was over-sensitive as to the President's treatment of my
communications to him. Possibly he considered my advice of no value,
and, therefore, unworthy of discussion. But, in view of his letter of
February 11, 1920, it must be admitted that he recognized that I was
reluctant in accepting certain of his views at Paris, a recognition
which arose from my declared opposition to them. Except in the case of
the Shantung settlement, there was none concerning which our judgments
were so at variance as they were concerning the League of Nations. I
cannot believe, therefore, that I was wrong in my conclusion as to
his attitude.
On the two days succeeding the one when I handed the President my draft
of articles I had long conferences with Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel
House. Previous to these conferences, or at least previous to the second
one, I examined Lord Robert's plan for a League. His plan was based on
the proposition that the Supreme War Council, consisting of the Heads of
States and the Secretaries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Five
Great Powers, should be perpetuated as a permanent international body
which should meet once a year and discuss subjects of common interest.
That is, he proposed the formation of a Quintuple Alliance which would
constitute itself primate over all nations and the arbiter in world
affairs, a scheme of organization very similar to the one proposed by
General Smuts.
Lord Robert made no attempt to disguise the purpose of his plan. It was
intended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control of
international relations and the direction in large measure of the
foreign policies of all nations. It was based on the power to compel
obedience, on the right of the powerful to rule. Its chief merit was its
honest declaration of purpose, however wrong that purpose might appear
to those who denied that the possession of superior might conferred
special rights upon the possessor. It seemed to provide for a rebirth of
the Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb of
democracy. It could only be interpreted as a rejection of the principle
of the equality of nations. Its adoption would mean that the destiny of
the world would be in the hands of a powerful international oligarchy
possessed of dictatorial powers.
There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, although
he was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order. An
examination of his plan (Appendix) shows it to be a substantial revival
of the old and discredited ideas of a century ago. There could be no
doubt that a plan of this sort, materialistic and selfish as it was,
would win the approval and cordial support of M. Clemenceau, since it
fitted in with his public advocacy of the doctrine of "the balance of
power." Presumably the Italian delegates would not be opposed to a
scheme which gave Italy so influential a voice in international affairs,
while the Japanese, not averse to this recognition of their national
power and importance, would unquestionably favor an alliance of this
nature. I think that it is fair to assume that all of the Five Great
Powers would have readily accepted the Cecil plan--all except the
United States.
This plan, however, did not meet with the approval of President Wilson,
and his open opposition to it became an obstacle which prevented its
consideration in the form in which it was proposed. It is a matter of
speculation what reasons appealed to the President and caused him to
oppose the plan, although the principle of primacy found application in
a different and less radical form in his own plan of organization.
Possibly he felt that the British statesman's proposal too frankly
declared the coalition and oligarchy of the Five Powers, and that there
should be at least the appearance of cooperation on the part of the
lesser nations. Of course, in view of the perpetual majority of the Five
Powers on the Executive Council, as provided in the President's plan,
the primacy of the Five was weakened little if at all by the minority
membership of the small nations. The rule of unanimity gave to each
nation a veto power, but no one believed that one of the lesser states
represented on the Council would dare to exercise it if the Great Powers
were unanimous in support of a proposition. In theory unanimity was a
just and satisfactory rule; in practice it would amount to nothing. The
President may also have considered the council proposed by Lord Robert
to be inexpedient in view of the political organization of the United
States. The American Government had no actual premier except the
President, and it seemed out of the question for him to attend an annual
meeting of the proposed council. It would result in the President
sending a personal representative who would unavoidably be in a
subordinate position when sitting with the European premiers. I think
this latter reason was a very valid one, but that the first one, which
seemed to appeal especially to the President, had little real merit.
In addition to his objection to the Cecil plan of administration,
another was doubtless of even greater weight to Mr. Wilson and that was
the entire omission in the Cecil proposal of the mutual guaranty of
political independence and territorial integrity. The method of
preventing wars which was proposed by Lord Robert was for the nations to
enter into a covenant to submit disputes to international investigation
and to obtain a report before engaging in hostilities and also a
covenant not to make war on a disputant nation which accepted a report
which had been unanimously adopted. He further proposed that the members
of the League should undertake to regard themselves as _ipso facto_ at
war with a member violating these covenants and "to take, jointly and
severally, appropriate military, economic, and other measures against
the recalcitrant State," thus following closely the idea of the League
to Enforce Peace.
Manifestly this last provision in the Cecil plan was open to the same
constitutional objections as those which could be raised against the
President's mutual guaranty. My impression is that Mr. Wilson's
opposition to the provision was not based on the ground that it was in
contravention of the Constitution of the United States, but rather on
the ground that it did not go far enough in stabilizing the terms of
peace which were to be negotiated. The President was seeking permanency
by insuring, through the threat or pressure of international force, a
condition of changelessness in boundaries and sovereign rights, subject,
nevertheless, to territorial changes based either on the principle of
"self-determination" or on a three-fourths vote of the Body of
Delegates. He, nevertheless, discussed the subject with Lord Robert
Cecil prior to laying his draft of a Covenant before the American
Commissioners, as is evident by comparing it with the Cecil plan, for
certain phrases are almost identical in language in the two documents.