of Boer invasion in. Natal and to relieve Sir George White. For this
purpose he is none too strong with three out of the six infantry
brigades that make up the Army Corps. The remaining three brigades could
not carry out the original programme of sweeping through the Free State,
and meantime the Boers have overrun the great district between Colesberg
and Barkly East, between the Orange River and the Stormberg range.
General Gatacre with a weak brigade at Queenstown is watching this
invasion which as yet he seems hardly strong enough to repel. The rest
of the troops are required in the protection of the railways, of the
depôt of stores at De Aar, and the bridge at Orange River. But
Kimberley was invested and Mafeking in danger, and the effect of the
fall of either of them upon the Cape Dutch might be serious. Something
must be done. Accordingly Lord Methuen with two brigades set out towards
Kimberley. His task is both difficult and dangerous; he has not merely
to break the Boer resistance by sheer hard fighting, but to run the risk
that Boer forces from other quarters, perhaps from the army invading
Cape Colony, may be brought up in his rear, and that he may in this way
be turned, enveloped, and invested. The scattering of forces is due to
the initial error of sending too small a force to Natal, and of making
no provision for its reinforcement until after a six weeks' interval.
The consequence is that instead of our generals being able to attack the
Boers with the advantage of superior numbers, with the concomitant power
of combining flank and frontal attacks, and with the possibility of thus
making their victories decisive by enveloping tactics or by effective
pursuit, the British Army has to make attack after attack against
prepared fronts, which though they prove its valour can lead to no
decisive results, except at the cost of quite disproportionate losses.
It is possible, and indeed we all hope that the Boer forces, at first
under-estimated, may now be over-estimated, and that Sir Kedvers Buller,
whose advance is probably now beginning, will not have to deal with
superior numbers. In that case his blows will shatter the Boer army in
Natal, so that by the time he has joined hands with Sir George White the
enemy will feel himself overmastered, will lose the initiative, and
begin to shrink from the British attacks. That state of things in Natal
would lighten Lord Methuen's work. But it would be rash to assume such
favourable conditions. We must be prepared for the spectacle of hard and
prolonged fighting in Natal, and for the heavy losses that accompany it.
The better our troops come out of their trials the more are we bound to
ask ourselves how it came about that they were set to fight under
difficulties, usually against superior numbers, though the British force
devoted to the war was larger than the whole Boer army? The cause of
this is that a small force was sent out on September 8th, and nothing
more ordered until October 7th, and the cause of that arrangement was
that the Government, as Mr. Balfour has naively told us, never believed
that there would be a war, or that the Free State would join the
Transvaal, until the forces of both States were on the move. Our
statesmen negotiated through June, July, and August, talked in July of
"putting their hands to the plough," and yet took no step to meet the
possibility that the Boers would prove in earnest and attack the British
colonies until the Boer riflemen were assembling at Standerton and
patrolling into Natal. Does not this argue a defect in the training of
our public men, a defect which may be described as ignorance of the
nature of war and of the way in which it should be provided for? Mr.
Balfour admits that his eyes have been opened, but does not that imply
that they had been shut when they ought to have been open? If the
members of the Government failed to take the situation seriously in
June, what is to be thought of the members of the Opposition, some of
whom even now cannot see that the choice was between abandoning Empire
and coercing the Boers? The moral is that we should, if possible,
strengthen the Government by sending to Parliament representatives of
the younger school, which is National and Imperialist rather than
Conservative or Liberal.
THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS
_December 7th_, 1899
The conditions in South Africa are still critical; indeed, more so than
ever. There are three campaigns in progress, and, though there are good
grounds for hoping that in each case the balance will turn in favour of
the British, the hope rests rather upon faith than upon that numerical
superiority which it is the first duty of a Government to give to its
generals.
Lord Methuen's advance came to a pause after the battle of Modder River,
now nine days ago. There appear to have been good reasons for the delay.
First of all, it is necessary that when, or soon after, Kimberley is
reached the railway to De Aar should be available both for the removal
of non-combatants, and for the transport of provisions, ammunition and
guns. This involves the repair in some way of the bridge at Modder
River. Next, it was proved-by that battle, in which the Boer force was
large enough to make the victory most difficult, and by the arrival
after the battle of fresh Boer forces, that Lord Methuen's force was not
strong enough for its work. If a whole day and heavy loss were needed to
bring about the retreat of eleven thousand Boers from a prepared
position it might be impracticable for Lord Methuen without more force
to drive away fifteen or eighteen thousand Boers from a prepared
position at Spytfontein, and the possibility of such a body of Boers
being at that point had to be reckoned with. Lord Methuen needed more
infantry, more artillery, and more cavalry. Of none of the three arms
had General Forestier-Walker any abundant supply. If he has sent on,
besides a cavalry regiment, the whole of the Highland brigade and three
batteries of artillery, Lord Methuen would be none too strong. It is
essential that, having started, he should defeat the Boers again and
reach Kimberley, for a failure would be a disaster. I have great
confidence in Lord Methuen and his troops; what determination and
bravery can do they will accomplish, and I feel pretty sure that in a
day or two we shall have news of another victory and of the relief of
Kimberley. But why has the paramount power in South Africa sent a fine
general and splendid troops to face heavy odds and to run the risk of
finding themselves over-tasked by superior numbers?
If we put the most liberal construction on General Walker's account of
what he has done to reinforce Lord Methueh there are now fifteen
battalions, five batteries, and two cavalry regiments north of De Aar.
To protect the great depôt of military stores at De Aar and the railway
from that point to the Cape a considerable force is needed, and to stem
the tide of Boer invasion and Dutch disaffection, which has spread from
the Orange River to Tarkastad and Dordrecht, from Colesberg to Barkly
East, a further large force is badly wanted. But in the whole of Cape
Colony south of the Orange River there appear to be only nine
battalions, perhaps a couple of regiments of cavalry, and on the most
favourable assumption five batteries. Of these battalions Sir William
Gatacre has half-a-dozen on the lines running north from Algoa Bay and
East London, the greater part at Putters Kraal, north of Queenstown.
This is a tiny force with which to clear an invaded and disaffected area
of twelve thousand square miles. We may be perfectly certain that Sir
William Gatacre will do the best that can be done with his force, and
if that should be more than his numbers alone would lead us to expect
the reason will be that Lord Methuen's victories will have made the Free
State Boers uneasy about their road home. A fresh victory near Kimberley
and the effectual relief of that place will lighten Sir William
Gatacre's load.
The centre of gravity is in Natal, where the greater part of the Boer
army and the greater part of the British force in South Africa are
confronting one another. There are three British divisions, strong in
infantry but weak in artillery, and there is cavalry enough for a strong
division. But one of the divisions has been invested and bombarded with
more or less persistence since the beginning of November, and the other
two are not yet known to be quite ready to move. Sir George White's
force is reported to be on short rations, and some of the messages from
correspondents in Ladysmith declared a week ago that it was high time
for relief to come. The force can hardly be as yet near the limit of its
resisting powers, but it is evidently nearing the stage when after
relief it will need rest and recuperation instead of being ready for a
vigorous and prolonged advance. General Buller with two divisions will
shortly set out to force the passage of the Tugela and to fight his way
round Ladysmith, either on the east or on the west, so as to cut off
either the retreat to the Free State or that to the Transvaal of the
Boer army. If Sir Redvers Buller can in this way win a victory in which
the enemy is not merely pushed back, but controlled in his choice of the
direction of his retirement, the issue of the campaign in Natal will be
settled, and the British Commander will be able to consider his great
purpose--the crushing of the Boer armies. The long wrestle between Sir
George White and the Boers has no doubt produced a state of exhaustion
on both sides, and by the time the decision comes exhaustion will be
turned into collapse. If, as we trust, it should be a Boer collapse, Sir
Redvers Buller's best policy, if practicable, will be to follow up a
success with the utmost promptitude and vigour, to push on through the
mountains, and open a doorway into the country beyond them. A check to
Sir Redvers Buller's advance would be disastrous. He can take no more
troops from the Cape. The fifth division can hardly be at his disposal
before Christmas, for the first transport did not start till November
24th, and the last has not yet left. But a check means insufficient
force, and is as a rule to be made good only by reinforcement. It is
clear, then, that Sir Redvers Buller must not be checked; he must cross
the Tugela and must win his battle. I think that with his twenty
thousand men he may be trusted to do both, even if the Boer force is as
large as the highest estimates that have been given.
The four decisions pending--at Kimberley, north of Queenstown, at
Ladysmith, and on the Tugela--are here represented as all doubtful. I do
not expect any of them to go wrong, but it is wise before a fight to
reckon with possibilities, and where the enemy, stubborn, well-armed,
and skilful, has also the advantage of numbers, it would be folly not to
consider the possibility that he may hold his ground. There are elements
of success on the British side that should not be forgotten. The British
soldier to-day, as in the past, proves to be a staunch support to any
general. To-day, however, he has leaders who, taking them all round, are
probably better qualified than any of their predecessors. The divisional
generals are all picked for their known grip of the business of war;
among the brigadiers there are such devoted students of their profession
as Lyttelton and Hildyard, and the younger officers of to-day are more
zealous in their business and better instructed than at any previous
period. There should be less in this war than in any that the British
Army has waged of that incompetence of the subordinates which in past
campaigns has often caused the commanders more anxiety than all the
enemy's doings.
Yet at every point the Boers appear to outnumber our troops. The
question arises how this came about; either the Government has not sent
troops enough, or the force given to the Commander-in-Chief has been
wrongly distributed. Sir Redvers Buller has done the best he could in
difficult conditions. Ladysmith had to be relieved, and he has taken
more than half of his force for the purpose. He might have wished to
take a third division, but if he had done so Kimberley might have
fallen, and the rising at the Cape have spread so fast and so far that
the defeat of Joubert would not have restored the balance. Accordingly
the smaller half of the force was left in the Cape Colony. Here also
there were two tasks. To push back the invasion was a slow business, and
if meantime Kimberley had fallen, the insurrection would have become
general. Accordingly a minimum force was set to stem the invasion and a
maximum force devoted to the relief of Kimberley. The difficulties,
therefore, arose not merely from the strategy in South Africa but from
the delay of the Government to send enough troops in time. The fact that
Sir George White with a small force was left for two months unsupported
produced the rising at the Cape, and compelled the division of the
British Army Corps, in, consequence of which the whole force is reduced
to a perilous numerical weakness at each of four points. But the Army
Corps, the cavalry division, and the force for the line of
communications, have now to wait three weeks before they can be
strengthened. It was known to the Government before the end of October
that Ladysmith would be invested and need relief, that the Cape Dutch
would rise, and that unless Kimberley were helped the rising would
become dangerous. Yet the despatch of the first transport of the fifth
division was delayed until November 24th. Has the Government even now
begun to take the war seriously? Do the members of the Cabinet at this
eleventh hour understand that failure to crush the Boers means
breakdown for the Empire, and that a prolonged struggle with them
carries with it grave danger of the intervention of other Powers? Does
Lord Lansdowne continue to direct the movement of reinforcements
according to his own unmilitary judgment modified by that of one or more
of his unmilitary colleagues? I decline to believe that Lord Wolseley
has arranged or accepted without protest this new system of sending out
the Army in fragments, each of which may be invested or used up before
the next can arrive.
THE NATION'S PROBLEM
_December 14th_, 1899
The failure of Lord Methuen's attack at Magersfontein has brought home
to every mind the extreme gravity of the situation in South Africa, and
it seems most likely that in the western theatre of war the crisis has
issued in a decision unfavourable to the British cause.
It is well to keep the whole before our eyes even when examining a part,
so I begin with a bird's-eye view. In Natal Sir Redvers Buller seems to
be ready, and to be about to strike, for the advance of Barton's brigade
towards Colenso must be the prelude to the advance of the main body to
the right or the left to cross the Tugela above or below the broken
railway bridge. If Sir Redvers Buller is so fortunate as to bring the
principal Boer army to an action and to defeat it so thoroughly as
seriously to impair its fighting power, the balance in the eastern
theatre of war will have turned, and attention may be concentrated upon
the restoration of the position in the west. There the balance has
turned the wrong way. General Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg would not be
a very serious matter, for his force was small, were it not that it
damages the credit of British generalship, and that it must have given a
great stimulus not only to the Free State army but to the rebellion of
the Cape Boers. For the Boers Stormberg is a great victory, which will
encourage them to fresh enterprises in a country where at least every
second Dutch farmer is their friend and ally. They may, therefore, be
expected to turn their attention as soon as they can to Lord Methuen's
communications. This probability rendered Lord Methuen's position at
Modder River doubly critical. On Sunday he was ready, and set out to
test his fate. On Tuesday he was back again in his camp, the measure of
his defeat being given by his assurance that in his camp he was in
perfect security. Those are ominous words, for they have not the air of
the man who does not know that he is beaten, and who means to try again
at once. It is, however, conceivable that, as the defeat seems to have
been caused by an inexplicable blunder, the marching of a brigade in the
dark in dense formation close up to the muzzles of the enemy's rifles,
the effort may be made to attack again with better dispositions. A
second attack would, of course, be attended with twofold risks, but if
it has no chance of success the defeat already suffered must be reckoned
a disaster. If Lord Methuen is definitely beaten, Kimberley must be set
down as lost, and the question is of the safety of Lord Methuen's
division. In that case to remain at Modder River is to court investment,
which would last for many weeks. The risk would not be justified unless
there is in the camp an ample store of supplies and ammunition, and even
then it is not clear what purpose it would serve. If, therefore, the
defeat is decisive the proper course is a retreat to a position of which
the communications can be protected, and which cannot easily be turned.
The whole situation, then, is failure in the Cape Colony on both lines,
coupled with an impending action in Natal, of which, until it is over, a
favourable result, though there is reason to hope for it, had better not
be too lightly assumed. Yet the British purpose of the war is to
establish the British power in South Africa on a firm basis: the only
way to prepare that basis being to crush the military power of the two
Republics. The British forces now in South Africa are clearly not strong
enough to do their work. What is the Nation to do in order to accomplish
the task which it has undertaken?
A nation can act only through its Government, and, as at this moment the
British Nation is united in the resolve to fight this war out, the
Government has, without looking back, to give a lead. The first thing is
for the Cabinet to convince the public that it is doing all that can be
done, and doing it in the right way. But the public does not trust its
own judgment. That much-talked-of person the man in the street does not
fancy himself a general, and is not over-fond of the military
critic--the unfortunate man whose duties have compelled him to try to
qualify himself, to form a judgment about war. There is a sound instinct
that war is a special business, and that it should be managed according
to the judgment of those who are masters of the trade; not those who
can write about it, but those who have practised it and proved their
capacity. But those men, the generals who are, believed to have a grasp
of the way to carry a war through, are all outside the Cabinet. The
Cabinet has its chosen expert adviser, the Commander-in-Chief; but
rumour or surmise hints that his advice has been by no means uniformly
followed. Surely the wisest course which the Cabinet could now adopt
would be to call Lord Wolseley to their board as an announcement and a
guarantee that in the prosecution of the war his judgment was given its
true place, and that nothing thought by him necessary or desirable was
being left undone. If the military judgment holds that more force is
required the extra force must be provided. There are, after the Regular
Army and the Marines, the whole of the Militia, the Volunteers, and
thousands of trained men in the British colonies. There is no
difficulty, seeing that the Nation is determined to keep on its course,
about drawing upon these forces to any extent that may be required. If
there are constitutional forms to be fulfilled they can be fulfilled; if
Parliamentary sanction is needed it can be had for the asking.
At the present rate of consumption the fifth division will hardly have
been landed before its energies will be absorbed, and unless Sir Redvers
Buller is peculiarly fortunate during the next few days, the fifth and
sixth divisions together will not be enough to change the present
adverse situation into one of decided British preponderance. There
should be at the Cape a reservoir of forces upon which the British
Commander should be able to draw until he can drive the enemy before
him. When that stage comes the flow of reinforcements might be
suspended, but to stay or delay it before that stage has been reached is
to court misfortune.
Something might probably be done to block the channel through which the
enemy derives some of his resources and some of his information. The
telegraph cable at Delagoa Bay might with advantage have its shore end
lifted into a British man-of-war. There must be ways and means of
stopping all intercourse through Portuguese territory between the
Transvaal and the sea. That this is desirable is manifest, and to such
cases may be applied the maxim, "Where there is a will there is a way."
The idea seems to be spreading that this war must lead to a thorough
overhauling and recasting of the British military organisation. But if
you are to make a bigger army, an army better suited to the times and to
the needs of the Nation, you must begin by getting a competent
army-creating instrument. You cannot expect a Cabinet of twelve or
eighteen men ignorant of war to create a good war-fighting machine. You
cannot entrust the organisation of your Army to any authority but the
Government, for the body that creates your Army will govern you. The
only plan that will produce the result required is to give authority
over the making and using of the Army to a man or men who understand
War--War as it is to-day. In short, a Nation that is liable to War
requires men of War in its Government, and, in the case of Great
Britain, the place for them is in the Cabinet. The traditional practice
of having a civilian Minister inside the Cabinet with all the authority,
and a soldier with all the knowledge outside the Cabinet, was devised
for electioneering purposes, and not for war. The plan has answered its
object very well for many years, having secured Cabinets against any
intrusion of military wisdom upon their domestic party felicity. But now
that the times have changed, and that the chief business of a Cabinet is
to manage a war, it seems unwise to keep the military judgment locked
out. Party felicity was valuable some years ago when there was a demand
for it; but the fashions have changed. To-day the article in demand is
not eloquence nor the infallibility of "our side," whichever that may
be; the article in demand to-day is the organisation of victory. That is
not to be had at all the shops. Those who can supply it are very
special men, who must be found and their price paid. The Nation has
given bail for the production of this particular article, and if it is
not forthcoming in time the forfeit must be paid. The bail is the
British Empire.
MORE AWAKENING
_December 21st_, 1899
A week ago, while we were thinking over failure in the Cape Colony on
both lines of advance, we could still hope for success on what
circumstances had made the most important line, in Natal. But now there
has been failure in Natal also.
Of the battle of Colenso Sir Redvers Buller's telegraphic despatch,
though it probably does the commander less justice than he would have
received at the hands of any other narrator, gives an authoritative if
meagre account. The attack seems to have been planned rather as a
reconnaissance in force, to be followed up in case it should reveal
possibilities of victory, than as a determined effort on which
everything was to be staked. In all probability this form of action was
inevitable in the conditions. The Boers held a strong position, covered
in front by a river fordable at only two points. Such a position can
hardly be reconnoitred except by attack. It could not be turned except
by a long flank march, which, if successful would have occupied several
days, during which the camp and railhead would have to be strongly
guarded. There is reason to believe that the force in Natal has not the
transport necessary to enable it to leave the railway for several days,
during which it would be a flying column. Moreover, the Boers, being all
mounted, could always place themselves across the path of any advance.
Accordingly it is at least premature to assume that any course other
than that which he adopted was open to Sir Redvers Buller. The mishap to
a portion of the artillery will be better understood when the full
story of the battle is accessible. Meanwhile Sir Redvers Buller's
withdrawal of the troops when he saw that success was unattainable has
preserved his force, and he is now awaiting reinforcement before again
attempting an advance. The critical element in the position of affairs
in Natal lies in the fact that time runs against the British. Sir
Redvers Buller and the Government no doubt know pretty accurately the
date up to which Sir George White can hold Ladysmith. If by that date he
has neither been relieved nor succeeded in fighting his way to the
Tugela his situation will be desperate.
Lord Methuen has probably been as much hampered as Sir Redvers Buller by
want of transport. He, too, will not forget the importance of preserving
his force and his liberty of action, and will retire rather than await
investment.