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LESSONS OF THE WAR
Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of Ladysmith
by
SPENSER WILKINSON
Westminster
Archibald Constable & Company
Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company.
1900
PREFACE
The history of a war cannot be properly written until long after its
close, for such a work must be based upon a close study of the military
correspondence of the generals and upon the best records, to be had of
the doings of both sides. Nor can the tactical lessons of a war be fully
set forth until detailed and authoritative accounts of the battles are
accessible.
But for the nation the lessons of this war are not obscure, at any rate
not to those whose occupations have led them to indulge in any close
study of war.
Since the middle of December I have written a daily introduction to the
telegrams for one of the morning papers. Before I contemplated that work
I had undertaken for my friend Mr. Locker, the Editor of _The London
Letter_, to write a weekly review of the war.
Many requests have been made to me by publishers for a volume on the
history of the war, with which, for the reasons given above, it is
impossible at present to comply; but to the proposal of my old friends,
Messrs. Archibald Constable and Co., to reprint my weekly reviews from
_The London Letter_, the same objections do not hold.
In revising the articles, I have found but few alterations necessary.
My views have not changed, and to make the details of the battles
accurate would hardly be practicable without more information than is
likely to be at hand until after the return of the troops.
S.W.
March 9th, 1900
CONTENTS
THE EVE OF WAR
THE MILITARY ISSUES
A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN
PLAYING WITH FIRE
HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY
TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?
BULLER'S PROBLEM
FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS
THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS
THE NATION'S PROBLEM
MORE AWAKENING
THE NATION'S BUSINESS
WANTED, THE MAN
THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR
THE DECISIVE BATTLE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
THE ELEVENTH HOUR
TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN
A COMMANDER
CRONJE'S SEDAN
THE BOER DEFEATS
THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER
THE EVE OF WAR
The next six weeks will be an anxious time for the British Empire. The
war which begins as I write between three and four on Wednesday
afternoon, October 11th, 1899, is a conflict for supremacy in South
Africa between the Boer States, their aiders and abettors, and the
British Empire. In point of resources the British Empire is so
incomparably stronger than the Boer States that there ought to be no
possibility of doubt about the issue. But the Boer States with all their
resources are actually in the theatre of war, which is, separated by the
wide oceans from all the sources of British power, from Great Britain,
from India, from the Australian and Canadian colonies. The
reinforcements ordered on September 8th have not yet all arrived,
though the last transports are due to arrive during the next four or
five days. After that no further reinforcements can be expected for a
month, so that during the next few weeks the whole strength of the
Boers, so far as it is available at all, can be employed against a mere
fragment of the British power. To the gravity of this situation it would
be folly to shut our eyes. It contains the possibility of disaster,
though what the consequences of disaster now would involve must for the
present be left unsaid. Yet it may be well to say one word on the origin
of the unpleasant situation which exists, in order to prevent needless
misgivings in case the first news should not be as favourable as we all
hope. There is no sign of any mistake or neglect in the military
department of the Army. The quantity and character of the force required
to bring the war to a successful issue has been most carefully estimated
in advance; every preparation which forethought can suggest has been
thought out, so that the moment the word was given by the supreme
authority, the Cabinet, the mobilisation and despatch of the forces
could begin and proceed without a hitch. The Army was never in better
condition either as regards the zeal and skill of its officers from the
highest to the lowest, the training and discipline of the men, or the
organisation of all branches of the service. Nor is the present
condition of the Army good merely by comparison with what it was twenty
years ago. A very high standard has been attained, and those who have
watched the Army continuously for many years feel confident that all
ranks and all arms will do their duty. The present situation, in which
the Boers start favourably handicapped for five weeks certain, is the
foreseen consequence of the decision of the Cabinet to postpone the
measures necessary for the defence of the British colonies and for
attack upon the Boer States. This decision is not attributable to
imperfect information. It was regarded as certain so long ago as
December last, by those in a position to give the best forecast, that
the Boers of both States meant war with the object of establishing Boer
supremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly and deliberately taken
upon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In this
deliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping that
the risks are not so great as they seem.
The two Boer Republics are well supplied with money, arms, and
ammunition, and I believe have collected large stores of supplies. Their
armies consist of their burghers, with a small nucleus of professional
artillery, officers, and men. The total number of burghers of both
States is about fifty thousand, and that number is swollen by the
addition of non-British Uitlanders who have been induced to take arms by
the offer of burghership. The two States are bound by treaty to stand or
fall together, and the treaty gives the Commander-in-Chief of both
armies to the Transvaal Commander-in-Chief, who is however, bound to
consult his subordinate colleague of the Orange Free State. The whole of
the fifty thousand burghers cannot take the field. Some must remain to
watch the native population, which far outnumbers the burghers and is
not well affected. Some must be kept to watch the Basutos, who are
anxious to raid the Free State, and there will be deductions for sick
and absentees as well as for the necessary duties of civil
administration. The forts of Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfontein
require permanent garrisons. In the absence of the accurate data
obtainable in the case of an army regularly organised into tactical and
administrative units, the most various estimates are current of the
force that the two States can put into the field as a mobile army
available for attack as well as for defence. I think thirty-five
thousand men a safer estimate than twenty-five thousand. The Boers are
fighting for their political existence, which to their minds is
identical with their monopoly of political rights, and therefore their
States will and must exert themselves to the uttermost. This view is
confirmed by the action of the British military authorities, who
estimate the British force necessary to disarm the Boer States at over
seventy thousand men, a number which would seem disproportionate to a
Boer field force of only twenty-five thousand. The British forces now in
South Africa are in two separate groups. In Natal Sir George White has
some ten thousand regular troops and two thousand volunteers, the
regulars being eight or nine infantry battalions, four regiments of
cavalry, six field batteries, and a mounted battery. He appears to have
no horse artillery. In the Cape Colony there are seven British
battalions and, either landed or on passage, three field batteries. A
part of this force is scattered in small garrisons of half a battalion
each at points on the railways leading to the Free State--Burghersdrop,
Naauwpoort, and Kimberley. At Mafeking Colonel Baden-Powell has raised a
local force and has fortified the place as well as its resources
permit. A force of Rhodesian volunteers is moving from Buluwayo towards
Tuli, on the northern border of the Transvaal. There are volunteer corps
in the Cape Colony with a total of some seven thousand men, but it is
not clear whether the Schreiner Ministry, whose sympathies with the
Boers are undisguised, has not prevented the effective arming of these
corps.
The reports of the distribution of the Boer forces on the frontiers must
be taken with caution. Apparently there are preparations for the attack
of Mafeking and of Kimberley, and it is open for the Boers to bring
against either or both of these places forces largely outnumbering their
defenders. Both places are prepared for defence against ordinary field
forces. The actions at these places cannot very greatly affect the
general result. Their nearness to the frontier makes it likely that the
first engagements will take place on this border. On the other side of
the theatre of war the Boers may be expected to invade Natal and to
attack Sir George White, whose forces a few days ago were divided
between positions near Ladysmith and Glencoe, places nearly thirty-five
miles apart. The bulk of the Boer forces are deployed on two sides of
the angle formed by the Natal border, where it meets the frontiers of
the Transvaal and of the Free State. From the Free State border
Ladysmith is about twenty-five miles distant in a straight line, and
from the Transvaal border near Vryheid to Ladysmith is about twice that
distance. If the Boers move on Thursday morning they would be able
easily to collect their whole force at Ladysmith on Sunday morning,
supposing the country contained no British troops. By Sunday, therefore,
the Boer commander, if he knows his business, ought to be able to attack
Sir George White with a force outnumbering the British by something like
two to one.
If I were a Cabinet Minister I should not sleep for the next few days,
but as an irresponsible citizen I trust that the Boers will be shocked
to find how much better the British soldier shoots in 1899 than he did
in 1881.
THE MILITARY ISSUES
_October 18th_, 1899
When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand
British troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six
weeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not be
substantially increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement of
the dispute satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory to
themselves they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we are
bound to do, that they had really faced the situation and thought it
out, they must have had in their minds some course of action by which if
they should begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gain
their end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. They
could hardly expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, but
they might hope to make the occupation of their country so difficult
that Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment of
success. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than
to gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple
Great Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power
might interfere.
If before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers could
destroy a considerable fraction of the British forces now in South
Africa, their chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatly
improved. These forces were in two groups. There was the small army of
Sir George White in Natal, something more than fifteen thousand men, and
there were the detached parties holding points on the colonial railway
system, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, Kimberley and Mafeking. These
detachments, however, are largely made up of local levies, and the total
number of British troops among them can hardly amount to three
thousand. The whole set might be captured or otherwise swept from the
board without any material improvement in the Boer position. Sir Redvers
Buller is not tied to the line of railway which most of the detachments
guard, and the disappearance both of the railway and of its protectors
would be merely a temporary inconvenience to the British. But if during
the six weeks' respite it were possible to destroy Sir George White's
force the position would be very substantially changed. The confidence
of the Boers would be so increased as to add greatly to their fighting
power, the difficulties of Sir Redvers Buller would be multiplied, the
probability of outside intervention might be brought nearer, and the
Army of invasion to be eventually resisted would be weaker by something
like a quarter. For these reasons I think Sir George White's force the
centre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it their
case is hopeless; if they can crush it they may have hopes of ultimate
success. That was the bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago,
and it still holds good. The week's news does not enable us to judge
whether the Boers have grasped it. You can never be too strong at the
decisive point, and a first-rate general never lets a single man go away
from his main force except for a necessary object important enough to be
worth the risk of a great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of
Kimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers
for failure in Natal. Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich
would be likely to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I should
therefore have expected the Boers merely to watch these places with
parties hardly larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energy
into a determined attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sent
considerable bodies, in each case several thousand men, against both
Mafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have a
superabundance of force at their disposal or that they have failed to
grip the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and their
troops upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to be
the true interpretation.
If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive
blow, its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you
can, for in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy
to judge whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission.
When the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border line
of the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would
concentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not
been resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of the
combined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, while
the bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movement
has not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult--marches through a
mountainous country and in bad weather always take incomparably longer
than is expected--the delay may be due not to lack of energy but to the
inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws no light
on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity in the
decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with the
Army, the country, and the weather.
Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until Sir
Redvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent the
Boers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could be
gained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of the
Boer party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly Sir
George White may be expected to take the first opportunity of showing
the Boers that his men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagement
such as might commit a fraction of his force against the Boer main body.
The detachment which was a few days ago near Glencoe may be expected, as
the Boer advance continues, to act as a rear guard, of which the
business is to delay the enemy without running too great a risk of being
itself cut off, or as an advance guard, which is to be reinforced so
soon as the general drift of the Boer movements has been made out. The
next few days can hardly pass without an engagement in this quarter of
Natal, and the first serious engagement will throw a flood of light upon
the aims of both generals and upon the quality of the troops of both
sides. Meantime the incidents of last week, the wreck of the armoured
train, and the attacks which have probably been made upon Mafeking and
Kimberley, are of minor importance.
A very serious piece of news, if it should be confirmed, is that the
Basutos have begun to attack the Free State. The British authorities
have exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent this and to keep the
Kaffir population quiet. The mere fact of the existence all over South
Africa of a Kaffir population outnumbering Boers and British together
made it an imperative duty of both white races to come to a peaceful
settlement. This was as well known to the Boers as to the British, and
forms an essential factor in any judgment on the action which has caused
and precipitated the conflict.
A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN
_October 25th_, 1899
The Boer Commander-in-Chief has beyond doubt grasped the situation. His
total force seems to be larger than was usually expected and to exceed
my own rough estimate of thirty-five thousand men, the balance to his
advantage being due probably to the British efforts to keep the Basutos
from attacking the Free State. Thus the Boers have been able to overrun
their western and southern borders in force sufficient to make a
pretence of occupying a large extent of territory in which only the
important posts specially prepared by the British for defence continue
to hold out. Of these posts, however, Mafeking and Kimberley are as yet
the only ones that have been attacked or threatened.
For operations in the northern corner of Natal the Boer commander was
able to collect some thirty thousand men, who on the eve of hostilities
were posted in separate columns upon the various routes leading from the
Free State and from the Transvaal into the triangle of northern Natal.
This triangle is like a letter _A_, the cross-stroke being the range of
hills known as the Biggarsberg, which is intersected near the centre on
a north and south line by the head-stream of the Waschbank River forming
a pass through which run the railway and the Dundee-Ladysmith road.
North of the Biggarsberg the gates of the frontier are Muller's Pass,
Botha's Pass, the Charlestown road, Wool's Drift, and De Jager's Drift,
of which Landman's Drift is a wicket-gate. At each of these points,
except perhaps Muller's Drift, of which I have seen no specific mention,
the Boers had a column waiting. South of the Biggarsberg are on the
east Rorke's Drift, and on the west the passes of Ollivier's Hoek,
Bezuidenhout, Tintwa, Van Reenen, De Beers, Bramkock, and Collins. At
all these points there were Boer gatherings, though on the west the Free
Staters, having their headquarters at Albertina, were likely to put
their main column on the road leading through Van Reenen's Pass to
Ladysmith.
By Thursday morning the Boer advance had developed. The columns from
Botha's Pass, Charlestown, and Wool's Drift had advanced through
Newcastle, where they had converged, and moved south along the main
road. The Landman's Drift column had moved towards Dundee, the Rorke's
Drift column had pushed some distance towards the west, and the forces
from Albertina had showed the heads of their columns on the Natal side
of the passes.
The British force was divided between Dundee and Ladysmith. The
Biggarsberg range, the cross-line of the A, is about fifty miles long.
It is traversed from north to south by three passes. In the centre runs
the railway through a defile. Twelve miles to the west of the railway
runs the direct Newcastle-Ladysmith road; eight miles to the east runs
the road Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee-Helpmakaar. A third road runs from
De Jager's Drift through Dundee to Glencoe and thence follows the
railway to Ladysmith. Dundee is about five miles from Glencoe on a spur
of the Biggarsberg range. Between the two places by the Craigie Burn was
the camp of Sir Penn Symons, who had under him the eighth brigade (four
battalions), three batteries, the 18th Hussars, and a portion of the
Natal Mounted Volunteers, in all about four thousand men. Thirty-five
miles away at Ladysmith, the junction of the Natal and Free State
railways, as well as of the Natal and Free State road systems, Sir
George White had a larger force, the seventh brigade, three field
batteries, a mountain battery, the Natal battery, two or three cavalry
regiments, the newly-raised Imperial Light Horse, and some Natal
Mounted Volunteers. It is not clear whether there were more infantry
battalions and it seems probable that one battalion and perhaps a
battery were at Pietermaritzburg. The Ladysmith force was at least six
thousand five hundred strong, and its total may have been as high as
eight thousand.
The Boer plan was dictated by the configuration of the frontier and of
the obstacles and communications in Northern Natal. The various columns
to the north of the Biggarsberg had only to move forward in order to
effect their junction on the Newcastle-Dundee road, and their advance
southwards on that road would enable them at Dundee to meet the column
from Landman's Drift. The movement, if well timed, must lead to an
enveloping attack upon Sir Penn Symons, whose brigade would thus have to
resist an assault delivered in the most dangerous form by a force of
twenty thousand men. From the point of view of the Boer
Commander-in-Chief, the danger was that the Glencoe and Dundee force
should escape his blow by retiring to Ladysmith, or should be reinforced
by the bulk of the Ladysmith force before his own combined blow could be
delivered. It was essential for him to keep Sir George White at
Ladysmith and also to cut the communications between Glencoe and
Ladysmith. Accordingly, on Wednesday, the 18th, the Free State forces
from Albertina, the heads of whose columns had been shown on Tuesday,
moved forward towards Acton Homes and Bester's Station, and led Sir
George White to hope for the opportunity to strike a blow at them on
Thursday, the 18th. At the same time a detachment from the main column
was pushed on southwards, and was able on Thursday, while Sir George
White was watching the Free State columns, to reach the
Glencoe-Ladysmith line near Elandslaagte, to break it up, and to take
position to check any northward movement from Ladysmith. Everything was
thus ready for the blow to be struck at Dundee, but by some want of
concert the combination was imperfect. On Friday morning the Landman's
Drift column, which had been reinforced during the previous days by a
part of the Newcastle column, was in position on the two hills to the
east of Dundee, and began shelling the British camp at long range. At
the same time the column from the north was within an easy march from
the British position. Sir Penn Symons decided promptly to attack the
Landman's Drift column and to check the northern column's advance. Three
battalions and a couple of batteries were devoted to the attack of the
Boer position, while a battalion and a battery were sent along the north
road to delay the approaching column. Both measures were successful. The
attack on the Boer position of Talana or Smith's Hill was a sample of
good tactical work, in which the three arms, or if mounted infantry may
be considered a special arm, the four arms, were alike judiciously and
boldly handled. The co-operation of rifle and gun, of foot and horse,
was well illustrated, and the Boer force was after a hard fight driven
from its position and pursued to the eastward. Unhappily, Sir Penn
Symons, who himself took charge of the fight, was mortally wounded at
the moment of victory, leaving the command of the force in the hands of
the brigadier, Lieut.-Colonel Yule. The northern Boer column seems to
have disappeared early in the day. Possibly only its advance guard was
within striking distance and had no orders to make an independent attack
on the British delaying force.
On Saturday morning Sir George White sent a small force of cavalry and
artillery to reconnoitre along the line of the interrupted railway. Some
two thousand Boers were found in position near Elandslaagte, and
accordingly during the day the British were reinforced by road and rail
from Ladysmith, until in the afternoon the Boer position could be
attacked by two battalions, three batteries, two cavalry regiments, and
a regiment and a half of mounted infantry--about three thousand five
hundred men. The Boers were completely crushed and a large number of
prisoners taken, including the commander and the commanding officer of
the German contingent. The British loss, however, as at Glencoe, was
heavy, especially in officers. The force returned on Sunday to
Ladysmith.
The British force at Dundee-Glencoe was thus still isolated, and until
now no detailed account of its movements has reached England. On
Saturday it was again attacked and, there is reason to believe, it again
repulsed a large Boer force, probably the main northern column. On
Sunday also the attack seems to have been renewed, this time apparently
by two columns, one of which may have been composed of Free State troops
from Muller's Pass. Either on Sunday or Monday General Yule determined
to withdraw from a position in which he could hardly hope without
destruction to resist the overwhelming numbers brought to bear against
him, especially as the Boer forces, either from the direction of
Muller's Pass or from Bester's Station, were threatening his line of
retreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road. Accordingly, leaving in hospital
at Dundee those of his wounded who could not be moved, he retired along
the Helpmakaar road, which he followed as far as Beith, about fourteen
miles from Dundee, and near there he bivouacked on Monday night. On
Tuesday he continued his march from Beith towards Ladysmith, expecting
to reach Sunday's River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George White,
informed of this movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force to
the west of the Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning to
interpose between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smart
attack at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat of
General Yule's brigade.
The Boer Commander-in-Chief has thus, apparently, failed in his attempt
to crush one wing of the British force, and has accomplished no more
than bringing about its return to the main body, which must have been a
part of the original British plan, unless it was thought that a British
brigade was capable of defeating four times its own number of Boers.
The net result hitherto seems to be that the Boers have had the
strategical and the British the tactical advantage. The British troops
have proved their superiority; the Boers have shown that even against
troops of better training, spirit, and discipline, numbers must tell,
especially if directed according to a sound though not always
perfectly-executed plan.
PLAYING WITH FIRE
_November 1st_, 1899
The first week's campaign, dimly seen through scanty information, gives
a peculiar impression of the two armies. The British force seems like an
athlete in fine training but without an idea except that of
self-preservation, while the Boer army resembles a burly labourer,
clumsy in his movements, but knowing very well what he wants. The
British force at first is divided upon a front of forty miles, each of
its halves looking away from the other, so that there is little
attention to the weak point of such a front, the communication between
its parts. The first event is the cutting of this communication (on the
19th), and not until the 21st is there an attempt to clear it, and that
attempt, though it leads to a severe blow against the interposing Boer
force (Elandslaagte), is not successful, for the communication has
eventually to be sought on another route behind the direct one. The Boer
idea is, after severing the connection between the British halves, to
crush the weaker Dundee portion; but the execution is imperfect, so that
Sir Penn Symons has the opportunity, which he seizes instantly, to
defeat and drive off one of the columns before the other can assist it.
His successor, General Yule, the heir to his design, is no sooner
convinced by this move to Glencoe that his line of junction with
Ladysmith is threatened with attack by a great superiority than he sets
out by the nearest way still open to him to rejoin the main body. The
Ladysmith force covers this march by a shielding movement (Reitfontein)
and the junction of the two British halves is effected. From Dundee to
Ladysmith is forty miles, and General Joubert unopposed would have
covered the distance in three days. He was before Dundee on Saturday,
the 21st, and there was no sign of him before Ladysmith until Saturday,
the 28th, or Sunday, the 29th. The original division of the British
force and the Battle of Glencoe thus produced a delay of several days in
the Boer advance: more could not have been expected from it. This first
impression ought to be supplemented by a consideration of Sir George
White's peculiarly difficult position, on which I will venture a word or
two.
The Government, by its action in the first half of September, decided
that Sir George White must defend Natal for about five weeks[A] with
sixteen thousand men against the bulk of the Boer army, which was
likely to be double his own force. It was evidently expected that he
should hold his ground near Ladysmith and thereby cover Natal to the
south of the Tugela. This double task was quite disproportionate to his
force. If Ladysmith had been a fortress, secure for a month or two
against assault, and able to take care of itself, the field force using
it as a base could no doubt have covered Natal. But in the absence of a
strong place there were only two ways by which a small force could delay
the Boer invasion. The force might let itself be invested and thereby
hold a proportion of the Boer army, leaving the balance to raid where it
could, or the campaign must be conducted as a retreat from position to
position. For a general with ten thousand men and only two hundred miles
of ground behind him to carry on a retreat in the face of a force double
his own so as to make it last five, weeks and to incur no disaster would
be a creditable achievement. Sir John Moore is thought to have shown
judgment and character by his decision to retreat before a greatly
superior force, commanded it is true by Napoleon himself. Moore when he
decided to retreat was about as far from Corunna as Dundee is from
Durban, and Moore's retreat took nineteen days. He had the sympathy if
not the effective help of the population, and was thought to have been
clever to get out of the trap laid for him. Sir George White seems to
have been expected as a matter of course to resist the Boer army, to
prevent the overrunning of Natal by the Boers, and to preserve his own
force from the beginning of October to the middle of November.[B] The
Government expected the Boers to attack as soon as they should hear of
the calling out of the Reserves, that being the reason why the Reserves
were not called out earlier. Therefore Sir George White's campaign was
timed to last from October 9th to November 15th (December 15th). I
conclude that the force to be given to Sir George White was fixed by
Lord Lansdowne at haphazard, and that the calculations of the military
department were put on one side, this unbusinesslike way of playing with
National affairs and with soldier's lives being veiled from the
Secretary of State's mind by the phrase, "political reasons." But the
"political reason" for exposing a Nation's troops to unreasonable risks
and to needless loss must be bad reason and bad policy. Mr. Wyndham has
had the courage to assert that there was no haphazard, that his chief
knew quite well what he was doing, and that "the policy which the
Government adopted was deliberately adopted with the fullest knowledge
of possible consequences." If these words in Mr. Wyndham's speech of
October 20th mean anything, they mean that Lord Lansdowne and Mr.
Wyndham intended Sir George White to be left for a month to fight
against double his number of Boers; that they looked calmly forward to
the terrible losses and all the risks inseparable from such conditions.
That being the case, it seems to me that it is Mr. Wyndham's duty, and
if he fails, Lord Lansdowne's duty, to tell the country plainly whether
in that deliberate resolve Lord Wolseley was a partner or an overruled
protester. Ministers have a higher duty than that to their party. The
Nation has as much confidence in Lord Rosebery as in Lord Salisbury and
the difference in principle between the two men is a vanishing quantity.
A change of ministry would be an inconvenience, but no more. But if the
public comes to believe, what I am sure is untrue, that the military
department at the War Office has blundered, the consequences will be so
grave that I hardly care to use the word which would describe them.
I accept the maxim that it is no use crying over spilt milk or even over
spilt blood, but the maxim does not hold when the men whose decision
seems inexplicable are in a position to repeat it on a grander scale.
The temper of the Boers as early as June left no doubt in any South
African mind that if equality of rights and British supremacy were to
be secured it would have to be by the sword. The Government alone among
those who cared for the Empire failed to realise this in time. That has
been admitted. The excess of hope for peace has been condoned and is
being atoned for on the battlefields of Natal. But to-day the temper of
Europe leaves no room for doubt that, in case of a serious reverse in
Natal, Europe if it can will interfere. Have Mr. Goschen and Lord
Lansdowne worked out that problem, or is there to be a repetition in the
case of the continental Powers--an adversary very different from the
Boers--of patience, postponement, and haphazard? It is not the situation
in South Africa that gives its gravity to the present aspect of things,
but the situation in Europe. Upon the next fortnight's fighting in Natal
may turn the fate not merely of Natal and of South Africa, but of the
British Empire. That this must be the case was plain enough at
Christmas, and has been said over and over again. Yet this was the
crisis which was met by sending to the decisive point a reinforcement
of ten thousand men to do the best they could along with the six
thousand already there during a five weeks' campaign.
After reconnaissance on Friday and Saturday (October 27th-8th) Sir
George White, finding a large Boer force in front of him at Ladysmith,
determined to hit out on Monday. Suppose Ladysmith to be the centre of a
compass card, the Boers were spread across the radii from N. to E. Sir
George meaning to clear the Boers from a position near N.E. prepared to
move forward towards N.E. and towards E., sending in each direction
about a brigade of infantry and a brigade division of field artillery.
He sent two battalions and a mounted battery towards N. The party sent
to N. started after dark on Sunday; the other parties, making ready in
the night, set forward at dawn. There was no enemy in position at N.E.
The force sent towards E. pushed back a Boer force, which retreated only
to enable a second Boer force to take the British E. column in
flank--apparently its left flank. The N.E. column had to be brought up
to cover the retirement of the E. column. When these two columns
returned to Ladysmith the N. column was still out. Long after dark Sir
George White learned that the N. column, which had lost its battery and
its reserve rifle ammunition by a stampede of the mules, had been
surrounded by a far stronger Boer force, had held its ground until the
last cartridge was gone, and that then the survivors had accepted
quarter and surrendered.
Sir George White manfully takes upon himself the blame for this
misfortune. His portentous blunders were in sending out the party to a
distance and in taking no steps to keep in communication with it or to
support it. The detachment of a small party to a distant point is a
habit of Indian warfare. It is out of place against an enemy of European
race, for the detachment is sure to be destroyed if the enemy has a
capable commander. Every man in the Ladysmith force will have felt on
Tuesday that the commander had make mistakes which he ought not to have
made. The question is what effect this consciousness will have upon the
spirits of the force.
Sir George White was reinforced before and during the action, a
battalion of rifles having arrived in the morning and a party of
bluejackets with heavy quick-firers coming up during the day. Further
reinforcements were sent towards him from the squadron after the action,
so that his force is still about sixteen thousand. If he does not elect
to retreat, a course which might demoralise the troops, he may well be
able to defend Ladysmith until relieved; but the first business of the
troops now on their way out will be to relieve him, and until that has
been arranged for, it is to be feared that Mafeking and Kimberley must
wait.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote A: Thirteen weeks, as we now (March) know from the official
correspondence.]
[Footnote B: I should have said December.]
HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY
_November 8th_, 1899
The war is doing us good. It is giving us the beginnings of political
education in a department that has been utterly neglected. It may be
worth while to review the whole situation of to-day, and to ask how the
man in the street can lend a helping hand.
The British Government, primarily representing the people of Great
Britain, has for many years been an affair of party; the dominant idea
of the party leaders has been when out of office to get in, and when in
to stay. The way to manage this was to cajole the man in the street, and
as he was a busy man getting his living and not much concerned about
watching the whole globe, the party leaders made bids for his support;
votes to be distributed on the principle that one man was as good as
another; taxation to be made light for him, and, consequently, as the
money had to be found, heavy for some one else. Each party offered what
it sincerely believed to be for the general good; but the kind of
general good thought of was the personal improvement or comfort of each
individual or of a mass of individuals. While this was going on in
British towns and counties, something was happening on the neglected
globe. There was a large part of the British Nation living on other
continents without votes in any British town or county, yet looking to
the British Government to champion something they loved, which has come
to be called the Empire. There were also great nations emulating the
British in the notion that the world was their inheritance, and that
they would take possession of a fair share of it. Their quarrels had
driven them to perfect their armies and to build navies. Each of them
was annoyed to find that in the scramble for the heritage some one had
been before them. On the best plots the British flag was flying, yet
Great Britain had not much Army and was very careless about her Navy.
The strong powers began to elbow her a little. The British Government
was not disturbed by these hints from the globe. A Government made by a
Parliament in which every member represented a town or a county or a
scrap of a town or county, and in which no one represented the Nation,
no one the Empire, and no one the Globe, felt bound to keep its eye upon
towns and counties, the Opposition benches, and the next election. Why
should it stand up for the British outside, and why concern itself about
other Powers looking round the globe for claims to peg out? The
colonists who looked to the British Government for championship were
snubbed; the foreign Powers working for elbow-room were politely made
way for, or if they brushed against the British coat-sleeve and caused
an exclamation received a meek apology. This was the normal frame of
mind of British party leaders and ministers, from which they have never
quite emerged. They were asleep, dreaming of a parochial millennium.
But outside of cabinets there were a few men who used their eyes. Sir
Charles Dilke took a turn round the globe, and when he came back said
"Greater Britain." That was an idea, and ideas are like the plague--they
are catching. Sir John Seeley took a tour through the history of the
last three centuries, and said "Expansion of England"; that meant
continuity in the Nation's life not merely in space but in time.
Whatever the cause, a few years ago there set in an epidemic of fresh
ideas, tending to reveal the Nation as more than a crowd of individuals
and the Empire as the Nation's work and the Nation's cause. The
Government did all it could to resist the infection. Instead of standing
up for the Empire it was bent on passing measures in the sense of its
own party. It ran away from Russia, from France, and from Germany. But
the new ideas grew; every globetrotter became a Nationalist and an
Imperialist, and shed his party skin. Then came Fashoda, and Lord
Rosebery's action in that matter killed what was left of party.
The case of the British in South Africa cried aloud for British action.
But the Government was still hidebound in bad traditions, thinking that
democracy means the tail wagging the dog, not seeing that if the
statesman leads straight along the path of duty the Nation is sure to
follow him. Happily, a statesman was sent to Cape Town, probably because
the Cabinet hardly realised how big a man he was. Sir Alfred Milner
mastered his case, thought out his cause, and at the opportune moment
put it before the Government. The first result was the Bloemfontein
conference. There, with the prescience and the strength of a Cavour or a
Bismarck, Milner put the issue: either the minimum concession which will
secure the political equality of the two races or war. Kruger's
obstinate refusal of the concessions required showed plainly that it
would be war. There was only one possible way of averting war; if fifty
thousand men had been at once sent to South Africa, Kruger and his
people would have known where they were, and might have accepted
possible terms, those offered at Bloemfontein. The moment of the
breaking off of the conference was the crisis, and to appreciate men you
must watch them in a crisis. Mr. Balfour expressed his unbounded
confidence in Kruger's sweet reasonableness and in the justice of the
British cause; he could not believe there would be war. Mr. Chamberlain
entered into ambiguous negotiations, beginning in a way that made
everyone, especially Kruger, imagine that the Government would accept
less than the Bloemfontein minimum. Of preparing to coerce the Boers
there was no sign. The Boers began to get their forces in order. In
England big speeches were made; "hands" were "put to the plough"; but at
the end of July no military force was made ready. At length, when Natal
appealed for protection against the Boer army, ten thousand men were
ordered so as to bring up the garrison of the colony to some seventeen
thousand. After the ten thousand not another man was sent until October
20th.
The present situation is the necessary outcome of the Government's
action between the beginning of June and October 7th, when the orders
for calling out the Reserves and for mobilisation were issued. The
Cabinet's decisions involved that Sir George White with his small force
should have to bear the brunt of the Boer attack from the outbreak of
hostilities until the time when the Army Corps should be landed and
ready to move. That was at least five weeks[C] of which three have
elapsed, and in the three weeks Sir George White, after one or two
initial mishaps of no great consequence by themselves, is invested at
Ladysmith, while Mafeking and Kimberley are waiting for relief, and the
Free State Boers are invading the northern provinces of Cape Colony and
trying to enlist the doubtful Dutch farmers. This is not a pleasant
situation for the Nation that declares itself the paramount Power in
South Africa. Three questions may be discussed with regard to it: What
are the risks still run, what are the probabilities, and how can we help
to prevent such a situation from recurring?
To see what has been risked on the chance that the force under Sir
George White may hold its own we must look from the Boer side. The Boer
commander hopes, or ought to hope, to destroy Sir George White's force
before it can be relieved. He has a chance of succeeding in this, for an
investing force has with modern arms a great advantage over the force it
surrounds. The outside circle is so much larger than the inside one that
it can bring many more rifles into play; it exposes no flanks, and the
interior force cannot attack it without exposing one or both flanks.
With anything like equal skill and determination the surrounding force
is sure to win in time. But if the time is limited the surrounding force
must hurry the result by assaults, in which it loses the advantage of
the defensive. If Joubert and his men have the courage and determination
to make repeated assaults it may go hard with the defenders of
Ladysmith. But the defenders hitherto have had the counterbalancing
advantage of a superior artillery. I think it reasonable to expect that
with the better discipline of his force, its greater cohesion and
mobility and the high spirit which animates it, Sir George White will be
able to defy the Boers for many weeks. But suppose the unexpected to
happen, as it sometimes does in war, and Sir George White's resistance
to be overcome? Such a victory would have a tremendous effect upon the
hopes and spirits of the Boers. It would almost double the fighting
value of their army, and would probably bring to their side many of
their colonial kinsmen. Joubert would become more daring, and, if Sir
Redvers Buller had divided his force, would attack its nearest portion
with a prospect of success. The failure of Sir Redvers Buller would
then not be outside the bounds of possibility. What that would involve
there is no need to expound--the Empire would be in peril of its
existence. We may feel pretty sure that things will not come to such a
pass; that another week will show Sir George White well holding his own
and a part of the Army Corps preparing to move. Yet it would be prudent
to guard against accidents by sending further troops to the Cape. Ten
thousand men ordered now would be at Cape Town by the middle of
December; but every delay in ordering them will mean, in case they
should in December be wanted, a period of suspense like that through
which we are now passing.
The moral of the present situation seems to me to be that we should
scrutinise our political personages, noting which of them have betrayed
their inability to see what was happening and to look ahead, bringing
down their figures in our minds to their natural size, and exalting
those who have shown themselves equal to their tasks. The man in the
street might do well to consider whether the great departments of
Government, such as the War Office and the Army, should for ever be
entrusted to men who have not even a nodding acquaintance with the
business which their departments have to transact, the business called
War. Success in that as in other business depends on putting knowledge
in power.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote C: We now know that the time was thirteen weeks.]
TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?
_November 15th,_ 1899