Opposite is a sketch by a Japanese officer of the sinking of the King
Yuen, which was a small Chinese ironclad. There is a great deal of
mystery in all the histories as to how that ship really did go down.
The Japanese account of it is that “she was on fire, and apparently the
fire could not be put out; she began to roll very much indeed—first
very heavily over one way and then very heavily over the other way; she
continued rolling like that, and one time she rolled and did not come
back.”
She had a sister ship, the Lai Yuen. This ship was set on fire at an
early stage of the action, and the Chinese apparently did not trouble
to put the fire out. The consequence was it got a large hold and burnt
every scrap of woodwork in the ship. But the extraordinary thing is
that her people managed to go on fighting. Of her deck nothing was left
but twisted beams. The ship was nearly white-hot, and a number of men
got roasted to death in her; but she was still in fighting condition
when the battle ended. Probably only Chinamen could have fought in such
conditions.
The Ching Yuen was set on fire, but not badly hit in any way.
There were two other Chinese ships lost, the Tchao Yung and the
Yang Wei. These were set on fire at a very early stage, and most of
the accounts that we hear of the danger of fire in action are based
upon these two particular ships. It appears that their captains were
economical men, who liked to make a little money; so when the ships
were painted they did not scrape off the old paint, and as the ships
were about twelve years old the paint got very thick. Moreover, as they
found kerosine cheaper than linseed oil, they mixed the paint always
with kerosine. The ships, therefore, were of a somewhat inflammable
nature. When they got hit, the men trying to put the fire out got hit
also, and the ships were then simply left to blaze away. That is the
true cause of most of the fire scares that happened just after Yalu.
The Chinese shell were very defective indeed. They had very few shell
with any charges; nearly all they had to fire with were solid shot or
cement shell, the very worst possible thing for firing at cruisers
with; and this fact that they had no good shell must, perhaps, account
for the survival of the Japanese fleet. For although just after Yalu
the Japanese said that their shooting was 15 per cent. and the Chinese
10 per cent., they have since stated that the Chinese hits were
something like 25 per cent. and their own about 12 per cent., and they
say that in the early stages of the battle the Chinese never missed a
single shot with their big guns—they hit every ship that they fired
at; and they describe them as being some of the best gunners in the
world—that these No. 1 Chinese gunners were born shots; but gradually,
as the battle went on, the Japanese 3-pounders and machine guns playing
on the Chinese ships took off the heads of those men, and they were
replaced by other men who were not such good shots, and this went on
until, towards the end of the battle, practically no hitting at all was
done by the Chinese. But in the early part of the fight their shooting
was very good indeed.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF YALU: FOURTH STAGE.]
The Japanese in their fleet had three enormous guns, each of 66 tons,
which would penetrate something like double the thickness of any
armour opposed to them. Only one of those guns seems to have been in
a condition to fire. In the excitement of the battle the Japanese got
something wrong with the gear, and had to manipulate them by hand;
and the consequence was that two of those guns fired about once each,
and the third once an hour. It is unfortunate that these guns did not
secure at least one fair and square hit—the data of it would have been
extremely valuable.
After the battle of Yalu the Chinese ships were patched up. The Tche
Yuen, which had already taken part in the battle of Asan, took part in
Yalu, but was then knocked about and ran away. Although she had been
so badly hit in the battle of Asan, when she was doing the strategical
movement at the rear, she only took eight days to patch up, and she was
then able to go out to sea again. After Yalu she was very quickly got
ready once more.
The first conclusion one is forced to is that penetration does not
seem to have done anything in this battle. Where a gun was matched
against some very inferior armour, it went through and smashed it up,
but wherever the armour that it ought to penetrate was anything like
equal to the gun, the result was failure.
The second point is the astonishing amount of hitting that all these
ships seem to have been able to stand. There are many cases of quite
little ships that in theory one single shell would finish, but it has
taken five or six shells to disable them at all, and in a week or two
they have been fit to go out fighting again. The Saikio-maru, and the
way she was hammered and still managed to go on fighting and remain in
a fairly good condition, is a particular case in point. Although the
upper works may be knocked about and splintered, and so on, it does not
seem much good splintering the upper works and making a mess of the
ship unless there is a gun near it, and somebody to be disabled. Now,
this conclusion is dead against the “moral effect” theory. It is almost
a gospel that if the upper works are shelled enough the crew somewhere
else will get demoralised. I do not believe it; they will not in a
modern war be aware of it. I think this point should be laid to heart
and thought over by those who have 6-in. guns to attack ships with. To
do harm, they must fire those guns with all the intelligence they can
bring to bear.
On the other hand, it is well to remember, as in the case of the King
Yuen and Chih Yuen, that hits in the upper works caused the loss of
these ships by affecting stability, so far as can be gathered in the
absence of the hulls now at the bottom of the Yellow Sea.
[Illustration: [_Official photo._