Japan, having been as good as presented with the command of the sea,
swiftly moved an army into Korea. This went on till, in September,
China began to realise that if she wished to hold that country she must
use the sea as transport. At Ping Yang her land forces had suffered
a severe defeat; reinforcements were urgently required. Ting was,
therefore, ordered to convey these to the Yalu River.
On Sunday, September 1st, at 1 a.m., Ting sailed from Talien Bay,
having with him the Ting Yuen (flag), Chen Yuen, Lai Yuen, King Yuen,
Ping Yuen, battleships;[20] and the cruisers Chin Yuen, Chih Yuen,
Tche Yuen, Tchao Yong, and Yank Wei; two gunboats, Kuang Kai and Kuang
Ping; four “flat-iron” Rendel gunboats; four torpedo boats; and five
transports, carrying a thousand men each.
[20] Except in the case of the first two, only by courtesy so called.
Reaching the mouth of the Yalu on the same evening, he sent the
transports, under convoy of the Ping Yuen, Kuang Ping, and torpedo
boats, up the Yalu River, anchoring twelve miles out with his main
fleet.
Early next morning the smoke of the Japanese, burning Takashima coal,
was observed on the horizon.
It has never been clearly demonstrated whether the meeting was
accidental or designed. The balance of evidence, to my mind, is in
favour of the theory that Admiral Ito calculated that the Chinese
would, after Ping Yang, send ships to the mouth of the Yalu, conveying
troops. That certainly was Admiral Ito’s theory.
The Chinese lay with banked fires. On seeing the Japanese smoke, they
got up anchor, and adopted the prearranged battle-formation—line
abreast _en échelon_, the centre strong, the wings weak. Line abreast
was the best formation for the Chinese fleet, which was best in bow
fire, but the weak ends of the wings were a serious error. In addition,
the Yang Wei and Tcho Yong were slow at getting up anchor.
The Japanese came along in line ahead, the flying squadron leading the
main astern of it.