After this there was a lull. The Chinese battle-fleet, led by Admiral
Ting in the Ting Yuen, put to sea searching for the Japanese. Ting
was anxious to fight, and his _personnel_ was in a good state of
efficiency; his _materiel_ was otherwise. Still, at this early stage,
had he encountered the Japanese fleet, he was far more likely to have
destroyed it than he was later on.
He had, however, to reckon with Li Hung Chang and Loh Feng Lo. These
presently ordered him not to cruise east of Wei-hai-wei and the Yalu
river; and this order practically put the Chinese fleet out of the
operations. It has been stated many times that Li Hung Chang was bribed
by the Japanese to give this order, and it is possible that he was. It
is more probable, however, that for the Chinese to be defeated was a
part of his own peculiar policy.
For some time, therefore, nothing happened. The Japanese feinted at
Wei-hai-wei and Port Arthur, but for a good six weeks they spent most
of their time in sea work—drilling and preparing for battle. The
Chinese ships, on the other hand, lay inactive, steadily deteriorating
morally, as inactive ships must.
It was stated in Japan that British cruisers at this time acted as
Chinese scouts, giving information as to Japanese movements. It is
a difficult matter to authenticate or even to refer to. I have seen
Chinese official reports (translated ones) in which two cruisers
are specifically mentioned, but a Chinese official report is not
necessarily confirmation. There is no question whatever but that
the Chinese spread the rumour of British sympathy and benevolent
neutrality; it is fairly clear, too, that now and again they obtained
information as to Japanese whereabouts from British men-of-war. But
it is not proved that this was anything more than in the course of
ordinary conversation, and there is no reason whatever to believe that
the British Government had a hand in the matter.