It has been said that the Directory was compelled against its will to

accept the basis of barter (as if that had tended to accelerate the work

of pacification!) by the voice of all France. Had this been the case,

the Directors would have continued to listen to that voice to which it

seems they were so obedient: they would have proceeded with the

negotiation upon that basis. But the fact is, that they instantly broke

up the negotiation, as soon as they had obliged our ambassador to

violate all the principles of treaty, and weakly, rashly, and

unguardedly to expose, without any counter proposition, the whole of our

project with regard to ourselves and our allies, and without holding out

the smallest hope that they would admit the smallest part of our

pretensions.

When they had thus drawn from us all that they could draw out, they

expelled Lord Malmesbury, and they appealed, for the propriety of their

conduct, to that very France which we thought proper to suppose had

driven them to this fine concession: and I do not find that in either

division of the family of thieves, the younger branch, or the elder, or

in any other body whatsoever, there was any indignation excited, or any

tumult raised, or anything like the virulence of opposition which was

shown to the king's ministers here, on account of that transaction.

Notwithstanding all this, it seems a hope is still entertained that the

Directory will have that tenderness for the carcass of their country, by

whose very distemper, and on whose festering wounds, like vermin, they

are fed, that these pious patriots will of themselves come into a more

moderate and reasonable way of thinking and acting. In the name of

wonder, what has inspired our ministry with this hope any more than with

their former expectations?

Do these hopes only arise from continual disappointment? Do they grow

out of the usual grounds of despair? What is there to encourage them, in

the conduct or even in the declarations of the ruling powers in France,

from the first formation of their mischievous republic to the hour in

which I write? Is not the Directory composed of the same junto? Are they

not the identical men who, from the base and sordid vices which belonged

to their original place and situation, aspired to the dignity of

crimes,--and from the dirtiest, lowest, most fraudulent, and most

knavish of chicaners, ascended in the scale of robbery, sacrilege, and

assassination in all its forms, till at last they had imbrued their

impious hands in the blood of their sovereign? Is it from these men that

we are to hope for this paternal tenderness to their country, and this

sacred regard for the peace and happiness of all nations?

But it seems there is still another lurking hope, akin to that which

duped us so egregiously before, when our delightful basis was accepted:

we still flatter ourselves that the public voice of France will compel

this Directory to more moderation. Whence does this hope arise? What

public voice is there in France? There are, indeed, some writers, who,

since this monster of a Directory has obtained a great, regular,

military force to guard them, are indulged in a sufficient liberty of

writing; and some of them write well, undoubtedly. But the world knows

that in France there is no public,--that the country is composed but of

two descriptions, audacious tyrants and trembling slaves. The contests

between the tyrants is the only vital principle that can be discerned in

France. The only thing which there appears like spirit is amongst their

late associates, and fastest friends of the Directory,--the more furious

and untamable part of the Jacobins. This discontented member of the

faction does almost balance the reigning divisions, and it threatens

every moment to predominate. For the present, however, the dread of

their fury forms some sort of security to their fellows, who now

exercise a more regular and therefore a somewhat less ferocious tyranny.

Most of the slaves choose a quiet, however reluctant, submission to

those who are somewhat satiated with blood, and who, like wolves, are a

little more tame from being a little less hungry, in preference to an

irruption of the famished devourers who are prowling and howling about

the fold.

This circumstance assures some degree of permanence to the power of

those whom we know to be permanently our rancorous and implacable

enemies. But to those very enemies who have sworn our destruction we

have ourselves given a further and far better security, by rendering the

cause of the royalists desperate. Those brave and virtuous, but

unfortunate adherents to the ancient Constitution of their country,

after the miserable slaughters which have been made in that body, after

all their losses by emigration, are still numerous, but unable to exert

themselves against the force of the usurpation evidently countenanced

and upheld by those very princes who had called them to arm for the

support of the legal monarchy. Where, then, after chasing these fleeting

hopes of ours from point to point of the political horizon, are they at

last really found? Not where, under Providence, the hopes of Englishmen

used to be placed, in our own courage and in our own virtues, but in the

moderation and virtue of the most atrocious monsters that have ever

disgraced and plagued mankind.

The only excuse to be made for all our mendicant diplomacy is the same

as in the case of all other mendicancy, namely, that it has been founded

on absolute necessity. This deserves consideration. Necessity, as it has

no law, so it has no shame. But moral necessity is not like

metaphysical, or even physical. In that category it is a word of loose

signification, and conveys different ideas to different minds. To the

low-minded, the slightest necessity becomes an invincible necessity.

"The slothful man saith, There is a lion in the way, and I shall be

devoured in the streets." But when the necessity pleaded is not in the

nature of things, but in the vices of him who alleges it, the whining

tones of commonplace beggarly rhetoric produce nothing but indignation:

because they indicate a desire of keeping up a dishonorable existence,

without utility to others, and without dignity to itself; because they

aim at obtaining the dues of labor without industry, and by frauds would

draw from the compassion of others what men ought to owe to their own

spirit and their own exertions.

I am thoroughly satisfied, that, if we degrade ourselves, it is the

degradation which will subject us to the yoke of necessity, and not that

it is necessity which has brought on our degradation. In this same

chaos, where light and darkness are struggling together, the open

subscription of last year, with all its circumstances, must have given

us no little glimmering of hope: not (as I have heard it was vainly

discoursed) that the loan could prove a crutch to a lame negotiation

abroad, and that the whiff and wind of it must at once have disposed the

enemies of all tranquillity to a desire for peace. Judging on the face

of facts, if on them it had any effect at all, it had the direct

contrary effect; for very soon after the loan became public at Paris,

the negotiation ended, and our ambassador was ignominiously expelled. My

view of this was different: I liked the loan, not from the influence

which it might have on the enemy, but on account of the temper which it

indicated in our own people. This alone is a consideration of any

importance; because all calculation formed upon a supposed relation of

the habitudes of others to our own, under the present circumstances, is

weak and fallacious. The adversary must be judged, not by what we are,

or by what we wish him to be, but by what we must know he actually is:

unless we choose to shut our eyes and our ears to the uniform tenor of

all his discourses, and to his uniform course in all his actions. We may

be deluded; but we cannot pretend that we have been disappointed. The

old rule of _Ne te quæsiveris extra_ is a precept as available in policy

as it is in morals. Let us leave off speculating upon the disposition

and the wants of the enemy. Let us descend into our own bosoms; let us

ask ourselves what are our duties, and what are our means of discharging

them. In what heart are you at home? How far may an English minister

confide in the affections, in the confidence, in the force of an English

people? What does he find us, when he puts us to the proof of what

English interest and English honor demand? It is as furnishing an answer

to these questions that I consider the circumstances of the loan. The

effect on the enemy is not in what he may speculate on our resources,

but in what he shall feel from our arms.

The circumstances of the loan have proved beyond a doubt three capital

points, which, if they are properly used, may be advantageous to the

future liberty and happiness of mankind. In the first place, the loan

demonstrates, in regard to instrumental resources, the competency of

this kingdom to the assertion of the common cause, and to the

maintenance and superintendence of that which it is its duty and its

glory to hold and to watch over,--the balance of power throughout the

Christian world. Secondly, it brings to light what, under the most

discouraging appearances, I always reckoned on: that, with its ancient

physical force, not only unimpaired, but augmented, its ancient spirit

is still alive in the British nation. It proves that for their

application there is a spirit equal to the resources, for its energy

above them. It proves that there exists, though not always visible, a

spirit which never fails to come forth, whenever it is ritually

invoked,--a spirit which will give no equivocal response, but such as

will hearten the timidity and fix the irresolution of hesitating

prudence,--a spirit which will be ready to perform all the tasks that

shall be imposed upon it by public honor. Thirdly, the loan displays an

abundant confidence in his Majesty's government, as administered by his

present servants, in the prosecution of a war which the people consider,

not as a war made on the suggestion of ministers, and to answer the

purposes of the ambition or pride of statesmen, but as a war of their

own, and in defence of that very property which they expend for its

support,--a war for that order of things from which everything valuable

that they possess is derived, and in which order alone it can possibly

be maintained.

I hear, in derogation of the value of the fact from which I draw

inferences so favorable to the spirit of the people and to its just

expectation from ministers, that the eighteen million loan is to be

considered in no other light than as taking advantage of a very

lucrative bargain held out to the subscribers. I do not in truth believe

it. All the circumstances which attended the subscription strongly spoke

a different language. Be it, however, as these detractors say. This with

me derogates little, or rather nothing at all, from the political value

and importance of the fact. I should be very sorry, if the transaction

was not such a bargain; otherwise it would not have been a fair one. A

corrupt and improvident loan, like everything else corrupt or prodigal,

cannot be too much condemned; but there is a short-sighted parsimony

still more fatal than an unforeseeing expense. The value of money must

be judged, like everything else, from its rate at market. To force that

market, or any market, is of all things the most dangerous. For a small

temporary benefit, the spring of all public credit might be relaxed

forever. The moneyed men have a right to look to advantage in the

investment of their property. To advance their money, they risk it; and

the risk is to be included in the price. If they were to incur a loss,

that loss would amount to a tax on that peculiar species of property. In

effect, it would be the most unjust and impolitic of all

things,--unequal taxation. It would throw upon one description of

persons in the community that burden which ought by fair and equitable

distribution to rest upon the whole. None on account of their dignity

should be exempt; none (preserving due proportion) on account of the

scantiness of their means. The moment a man is exempted from the

maintenance of the community, he is in a sort separated from it,--he

loses the place of a citizen.

So it is in all _taxation_. But in a _bargain_, when terms of loss are

looked for by the borrower from the lender, compulsion, or what

virtually is compulsion, introduces itself into the place of treaty.

When compulsion may be at all used by a state in borrowing the occasion

must determine. But the compulsion ought to be known, and well defined,

and well distinguished; for otherwise treaty only weakens the energy of

compulsion, while compulsion destroys the freedom of a bargain. The

advantage of both is lost by the confusion of things in their nature

utterly unsociable. It would be to introduce compulsion into that in

which freedom and existence are the same: I mean credit. The moment that

shame or fear or force are directly or indirectly applied to a loan,

credit perishes.

There must be some impulse, besides public spirit, to put private

interest into motion along with it. Moneyed men ought to be allowed to

set a value on their money: if they did not, there could be no moneyed

men. This desire of accumulation is a principle without which the means

of their service to the state could not exist. The love of lucre, though

sometimes carried to a ridiculous, sometimes to a vicious excess, is the

grand cause of prosperity to all states. In this natural, this

reasonable, this powerful, this prolific principle, it is for the

satirist to expose the ridiculous,--it is for the moralist to censure

the vicious,--it is for the sympathetic heart to reprobate the hard and

cruel,--it is for the judge to animadvert on the fraud, the extortion,

and the oppression; but it is for the statesman to employ it as he finds

it, with all its concomitant excellencies, with all its imperfections on

its head. It is his part, in this case, as it is in all other cases,

where he is to make use of the general energies of Nature, to take them

as he finds them.

After all, it is a great mistake to imagine, as too commonly, almost

indeed generally, it is imagined, that the public borrower and the

private lender are two adverse parties, with different and contending

interests, and that what is given to the one is wholly taken from the

other. Constituted as our system of finance and taxation is, the

interests of the contracting parties cannot well be separated, whatever

they may reciprocally intend. He who is the hard lender of to-day

to-morrow is the generous contributor to his own payment. For example,

the last loan is raised on public taxes, which are designed to produce

annually two millions sterling. At first view, this is an annuity of two

millions dead charge upon the public in favor of certain moneyed men;

but inspect the thing more nearly, follow the stream in its meanders,

and you will find that there is a good deal of fallacy in this state of

things.

I take it, that whoever considers any man's expenditure of his income,

old or new, (I speak of certain classes in life,) will find a full third

of it to go in taxes, direct or indirect. If so, this new-created income

of two millions will probably furnish 665,000_l._ (I avoid broken

numbers) towards the payment of its own interest, or to the sinking of

its own capital. So it is with the whole of the public debt. Suppose it

any given sum, it is a fallacious estimate of the affairs of a nation to

consider it as a mere burden. To a degree it is so without question, but

not wholly so, nor anything like it. If the income from the interest be

spent, the above proportion returns again into the public stock;

insomuch that, taking the interest of the whole debt to be twelve

million three hundred thousand pound, (it is something more,) not less

than a sum of four million one hundred thousand pound comes back again

to the public through the channel of imposition. If the whole or any

part of that income be saved, so much new capital is generated,--the

infallible operation of which is to lower the value of money, and

consequently to conduce towards the improvement of public credit.

I take the expenditure of the _capitalist_, not the value of the

capital, as my standard; because it is the standard upon which, amongst

us, property, as an object of taxation, is rated. In this country, land

and offices only excepted, we raise no faculty tax. We preserve the

faculty from the expense. Our taxes, for the far greater portion, fly

over the heads of the lowest classes. They escape too, who, with better

ability, voluntarily subject themselves to the harsh discipline of a

rigid necessity. With us, labor and frugality, the parents of riches,

are spared, and wisely too. The moment men cease to augment the common

stock, the moment they no longer enrich it by their industry or their

self-denial, their luxury and even their ease are obliged to pay

contribution to the public; not because they are vicious principles, but

because they are unproductive. If, in fact, the interest paid by the

public had not thus revolved again into its own fund, if this secretion

had not again been absorbed into the mass of blood, it would have been

impossible for the nation to have existed to this time under such a

debt. But under the debt it does exist and flourish; and this

flourishing state of existence in no small degree is owing to the

contribution from the debt to the payment. Whatever, therefore, is taken

from that capital by too close a bargain is but a delusive advantage: it

is so much lost to the public in another way. This matter cannot, on the

one side or the other, be metaphysically pursued to the extreme; but it

is a consideration of which, in all discussions of this kind, we ought

never wholly to lose sight.

It is never, therefore, wise to quarrel with the interested views of

men, whilst they are combined with the public interest and promote it:

it is our business to tie the knot, if possible, closer. Resources that

are derived from extraordinary virtues, as such virtues are rare, so

they must be unproductive. It is a good thing for a moneyed man to

pledge his property on the welfare of his country: he shows that he

places his treasure where his heart is; and revolving in this circle, we

know, that, "wherever a man's treasure is, there his heart will be

also." For these reasons, and on these principles, I have been sorry to

see the attempts which have been made, with more good meaning than

foresight and consideration, towards raising the annual interest of this

loan by private contributions. Wherever a regular revenue is

established, there voluntary contribution can answer no purpose but to

disorder and disturb it in its course. To recur to such aids is, for so

much, to dissolve the community, and to return to a state of unconnected

Nature. And even if such a supply should be productive in a degree

commensurate to its object, it must also be productive of much vexation

and much oppression. Either the citizens by the proposed duties pay

their proportion according to some rate made by public authority, or

they do not. If the law be well made, and the contributions founded on

just proportions, everything superadded by something that is not as

regular as law, and as uniform in its operation, will become more or

less out of proportion. If, on the contrary, the law be not made upon

proper calculation, it is a disgrace to the public; wisdom, which fails

in skill to assess the citizen in just measure and according to his

means. But the hand of authority is not always the most heavy hand. It

is obvious that men may be oppressed by many ways besides those which

take their course from the supreme power of the state. Suppose the

payment to be wholly discretionary. Whatever has its origin in caprice

is sure not to improve in its progress, nor to end in reason. It is

impossible for each private individual to have any measure conformable

to the particular condition of each of his fellow-citizens, or to the

general exigencies of his country. 'Tis a random shot at best.

When men proceed in this irregular mode, the first contributor is apt to

grow peevish with his neighbors. He is but too well disposed to measure

their means by his own envy, and not by the real state of their

fortunes, which he can rarely know, and which it may in them be an act

of the grossest imprudence to reveal. Hence the odium and lassitude with

which people will look upon a provision for the public which is bought

by discord at the expense of social quiet. Hence the bitter

heart-burnings, and the war of tongues, which is so often the prelude to

other wars. Nor is it every contribution, called voluntary, which is

according to the free will of the giver. A false shame, or a false

glory, against his feelings and his judgment, may tax an individual to

the detriment of his family and in wrong of his creditors. A pretence of

public spirit may disable him from the performance of his private

duties; it may disable him even from paying the legitimate contributions

which he is to furnish according to the prescript of law. But what is

the most dangerous of all is that malignant disposition to which this

mode of contribution evidently tends, and which at length leaves the

comparatively indigent to judge of the wealth, and to prescribe to the

opulent, or those whom they conceive to be such, the use they are to

make of their fortunes. From thence it is but one step to the

subversion of all property.

Far, very far, am I from supposing that such things enter into the

purposes of those excellent persons whose zeal has led them to this kind

of measure; but the measure itself will lead them beyond their

intention, and what is begun with the best designs bad men will

perversely improve to the worst of their purposes. An ill-founded

plausibility in great affairs is a real evil. In France we have seen the

wickedest and most foolish of men, the constitution-mongers of 1789,

pursuing this very course, and ending in this very event. These

projectors of deception set on foot two modes of voluntary contribution

to the state. The first they called patriotic gifts. These, for the

greater part, were not more ridiculous in the mode than contemptible in

the project. The other, which they called the patriotic contribution,

was expected to amount to a fourth of the fortunes of individuals, but

at their own will and on their own estimate; but this contribution

threatening to fall infinitely short of their hopes, they soon made it

compulsory, both in the rate and in the levy, beginning in fraud, and

ending, as all the frauds of power end, in plain violence. All these

devices to produce an involuntary will were under the pretext of

relieving the more indigent classes; but the principle of voluntary

contribution, however delusive, being once established, these lower

classes first, and then all classes, were encouraged to throw off the

regular, methodical payments to the state, as so many badges of slavery.

Thus all regular revenue failing, these impostors, raising the

superstructure on the same cheats with which they had laid the

foundation of their greatness, and not content with a portion of the

possessions of the rich, confiscated the whole, and, to prevent them

from reclaiming their rights, murdered the proprietors. The whole of the

process has passed before our eyes, and been conducted, indeed, with a

greater degree of rapidity than could be expected.

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