PART VI

THE ACTION

At about ten o'clock in the morning of Friday the 16th of May, Clerfayt,

in his positions right up north beyond the Lys--positions which lay at and

in front of the town of Thielt, with outposts well to the south and west

of that town,--received the orders of the Emperor.

These orders were what we know them to be: he was to march southward and

westward and strike the Lys at Wervicq. He was to arrive at that point at

or before nightfall, for in the very first hours of the morrow, Saturday,

and coincidently with the beginning of the advance of the five columns

from their southern posts, he was to cross the Lys and to proceed to join

hands with those columns in the following forenoon, when the heads of them

would have reached the neighbourhood of Tourcoing and Mouveaux.

Bussche, with the first column, his 4000 Hanoverians, had no task during

that day but to proceed the mile and a half which separated Warcoing from

the little village of St Leger, and, with the head of his column in that

village, prepare to pass the night and be ready to march forward long

before dawn the next day.

Field-Marshal Otto, with the second column, was similarly and leisurely

occupied marshalling his 10,000 Austrians and his contingent of British

cavalry, so that the head of his column was at Bailleul ready also to

advance with the early, dark, small hours of the ensuing morning.

The Duke of York, with his third column of similar numbers, or somewhat

less, was performing a precisely similar task, and ordering his men so

that the head of that column should reach Templeuve by evening and be

ready to march at the same moment as the others did, shortly after

midnight.

All these three, then, were absolutely ready, fresh from fatigue and in

good order, upon that Friday evening at their appointed posts.

It is here necessary, as we are chiefly concerned with the British forces,

to detail the composition of this third column which the Duke of York

commanded.

It consisted of twelve battalions and ten squadrons, with a further

reserve of sixteen British squadrons under General Erskine, which cavalry

lay somewhat south of Templeuve, but ready to follow up the advance when

it should begin. It was made of two portions, about equal in numbers,

British and foreign. The foreign half was composed of four squadrons of

Austrian Hussars and seven battalions of infantry, two Hessian and five

Austrian. The British half was composed of a Brigade of Guards counting

four battalions, with portions of the 14th, 37th, and 53rd Foot, while the

British cavalry accompanying it (apart from the squadrons under Erskine)

were six squadrons drawn from the 7th, 15th, and 16th Light Dragoons. It

is to the credit of the young commander[4] that this third column was the

best organised, the most prompt, and, as the event proved, the most

successful during the advance and the most tenacious in the subsequent

defeat.

The fourth column, under Kinsky, about 11,000 strong, was also ready on

that Friday, the 16th of May, concentrated at its point of departure,

Froidmont, and ready to move at the same moment as all the others, shortly

after midnight. But unlike the other three commanders upon his right,

Kinsky was unfortunately handicapped by the position of the fifth column,

that great body of 18,000 to 20,000 men, under the Arch-Duke Charles,

which lay at St Amand, which was to advance next day parallel with Kinsky

and upon his left, and which it was his duty to keep in touch with, and to

link up with the Duke of York's upon the other side. He was handicapped, I

say, by the situation of the fifth column, under the Arch-Duke Charles,

the heavy strain already imposed upon which, and the accumulating

difficulties it was about to encounter, largely determining the

unfortunate issue of the battle.

Kinsky got news on that Friday from the Arch-Duke at St Amand that it was

hardly possible for his great body of men to reach the appointed post of

Pont-a-Marcq at the arranged hour of daybreak the next morning. I have

already suggested that this delay cannot only have been due to the very

long march which had been imposed upon the Arch-Duke's command when it had

been hurriedly summoned up from the south to St Amand, forty-eight hours

before. It must also have been due to the fact that not all its units

reached St Amand by the evening of Thursday the 15th. It seemed certain

that there must have been stragglers or bad delays on the morning of the

16th, for it was not until long after nightfall--indeed not until ten

o'clock in the evening--of Friday the 16th that the Arch-Duke was able to

set out from St Amand and take the Pont-a-Marcq road. This unfortunate

body, therefore, the fifth column, which had all the hardest work before

it, which had but one road by which to march (although it was double any

of the others in size), was compelled, after the terrible fatigue of the

preceding days, to push forward sixteen miles through the night in a vain

attempt to reach Pont-a-Marcq, not indeed by daybreak, for that was

obviously impossible, but as soon after as haste and anxiety could

command. Kinsky was tied to Froidmont and unable to move forward until

that fifth column upon his left was at least approaching its goal. For he

had Bonnaud's 20,000 Frenchmen at Sainghin right in front of him, and

further, if he had moved, his left flank would have been exposed, and,

what is more, he would have failed in his purpose, which was to link up

the Arch-Duke on one side with the Duke of York upon the other.

This first mishap, then, must be carefully noted as one prime lack of

synchrony in the origins of the combined movement, and a first clear cause

of the misfortune that was to attend the whole affair. The delay of the

fifth column was the chief cause of the disaster.

Meanwhile, another failure to synchronise, and that a most grave one, was

taking place miles away in the north with Clerfayt's command beyond the

Lys.

It is self-evident that where one isolated and distant body is being asked

to co-operate with comrades who are in touch with the commander-in-chief,

and with each other, the exact observation of orders on the part of that

isolated body is of supreme importance to the success of the combination.

_They_, all lying in much the same region and able to receive and transmit

orders with rapidity, may correct an error before it has developed evil

consequences. But the isolated commander co-operating from a distance, and

receiving orders from headquarters only after a long delay, is under no

such advantage. Thus the tardiness of the fifth column was, as we have

seen, communicated to the fourth, and the third, second, and first, all in

one line, could or should have easily appreciated the general situation

along the Scheldt. But the sixth body, under Clerfayt, which formed the

keystone of the whole plan, and without whose exact co-operation that plan

must necessarily fail, enjoyed no such advantage, and, if it indulged in

the luxuries of delay or misdirection, could not have its errors corrected

in useful time. A despatch, to reach Clerfayt from headquarters and from

the five columns that were advancing northward from the valley of the

Scheldt, must make a circuit round eastward to the back of Courtrai, and

it was a matter of nearly half a day to convey information from the

Emperor or his neighbouring subordinates in the region of Tournai to this

sixth corps which lay north of the Lys.

Now it so happened that Clerfayt, though a most able man, and one who had

proved himself a prompt and active general, woefully miscalculated the

time-table of his march and the difficulties before him.

He got his orders, as I have said, at ten o'clock on the Friday morning.

Whether to give his men a meal, or for whatever other reason, he did not

break up until between one and two. He then began ploughing forward with

his sixteen thousand men and more, in two huge columns, through the sandy

country that forms the plain north of the River Lys. He ought to have

known the difficulty of rapid advance over such a terrain, but he does not

seem to have provided for it with any care, and when night fell, so far

from finding himself in possession of Wervicq and master of the crossing

of the river there, the heads of his columns had only reached the great

highway between Menin and Ypres, nearly three miles short of his goal.

Three miles may sound a short distance to the civilian reader, but if he

will consider the efforts of a great body of men and vehicles, pushing

forward through the late hours of an afternoon by wretched lanes full of

loose sand, and finding the darkness upon them with that distance still to

do, he would perceive the importance of the gap. If he further considers

that it was only the heads of the columns that had reached the high road

by dark, and that two great bodies of men were stretched out two miles and

more behind, and if he will add to all this the fact that fighting would

have to be done before Wervicq, three miles away, could be occupied, let

alone the river crossed, he will discover that Clerfayt had missed his

appointment not by three miles only in space, but by the equivalent of

half a day in time.

Even so he should have pushed on and have found himself at least in

contact with the French posts before his advance was halted. He did not do

so. He passed the night in bivouac with the heads of his columns no

further south than the great high road.

So much for Clerfayt. The Republic would have cut off his head.

While Clerfayt was thus mishandling his distant and all-important

department of the combined scheme, the corresponding advance from the

valley of the Scheldt northward was proceeding in a manner which is best

appreciated by taking the five columns seriatim and in three groups: the

first group consisting of the first column (Bussche), the second group of

the second and third columns (Otto and York), the third group of the

fourth and fifth (Kinsky and the Arch-Duke).

I

THE FIRST COLUMN UNDER BUSSCHE

This column, as we have seen, consisted of only 4000 men, Hanoverians. Its

function and general plan was to give the French the impression that they

were being attacked by considerable forces at the very extremity of their

advanced wedge, and thus to "hold" them there while the great bulk of the

allies were really encircling them to the south and cutting them off from

Lille.

When we bear this object in view, we shall see that Bussche with his

little force did not do so badly. His orders were to advance with

two-thirds of his men against Mouscron, a little place about five miles in

front of the village of St Leger where he was concentrated; the remaining

third going up the high road towards Courtrai. This last decision, namely,

to detach a third of his troops, has been severely criticised, especially

by English authorities, but the criticism is hardly just if we consider

what Bussche had been sent out to do. He was, of course, to take Mouscron

if he could and hold it, and if that had been the main object of the

orders given him, it would indeed have been folly to weaken his already

weak body by the detaching of a whole third of it four miles away upon the

high road to the eastward. But the capture of Mouscron was not the main

object set before Bussche. The main object was to "hold" the large French

forces in the Courtrai district and to give them the impression of a main

attack coming in that direction, and with _that_ object in view it was

very wise so to separate his force as to give Souham the idea that the

French northern extremity was being attacked in several places at once.

With the early morning, then, of Saturday the 17th, Bussche sent rather

less than 1500 men up the high road towards Courtrai, and, with rather

more than 2500, marched boldly up against Mouscron, where, considering the

immensely superior forces that the French could bring against him, it is

not surprising that he was badly hammered. Indeed, but for the fact that

the French were unprepared (as we saw in the section "The Preliminaries of

the Battle"), he could not have done as much as he did, which was, at the

first onslaught, to rush Mouscron and to hold it in the forenoon of that

day. But the French, thoroughly alarmed by the event (which was precisely

what the plan of the allies intended they should be), easily brought up

overwhelming reinforcements, and Bussche's little force was driven out of

the town. It was not only driven out of the town, it was pressed hard down

the road as far as Dottignies within a mile or two of the place from which

it had started; but there it rallied and stood, and for the rest of the

day kept the French engaged without further misfortune. A student of the

whole action, careful to keep its proportions in mind and not to

exaggerate a single instance, will not regard Bussche's gallant attempt

and failure before Mouscron as any part of the general breakdown. On the

contrary, the stand which his little force made against far superior

numbers, and the active cannonade which he kept up upon this extreme edge

of the French front, would have been one of the major conditions

determining the success of the allies if their enormously larger forces in

other parts of the field had all of them kept their time-table and done

what was expected of them.

II

THE SECOND AND THIRD COLUMNS UNDER OTTO AND THE DUKE OF YORK

On turning to the second group (the second column under Otto and the third

under York), we discover a record of continuous success throughout the

whole of that day, Saturday the 17th of May, which deserved a better fate

than befell them upon the morrow.

(A) THE SECOND COLUMN UNDER OTTO

The second column under Otto, consisting of twelve battalions and ten

squadrons, certain of the latter being English horse, and the whole

command numbering some 10,000 men, advanced with the early morning of that

same Saturday the 17th simultaneously with Bussche from Bailleul to Leers.

It drove the French outposts in, carried Leers, and advanced further to

Wattrelos. It carried Wattrelos.

It continued its successful march another three miles, still pressing in

and thrusting off to its right the French soldiers of Compere's command,

until it came to what was then the little market-town of Tourcoing. It

carried Tourcoing and held it. This uninterrupted series of successes had

brought Otto's troops forward by some eight miles from their

starting-point, and had filled the whole morning, and Otto stood during

the afternoon in possession of this advanced point, right on the line

between Courtrai and Lille, and having fully accomplished the object which

his superiors had set him.

From the somewhat higher roll of land which his cavalry could reach, and

from which they could observe the valley of the Lys four miles beyond,

they must have strained their eyes to catch some hint of Clerfayt's

troops, upon whose presence across the river on their side they had so

confidently calculated, and which, had Clerfayt kept to his time-table and

crossed the Lys at dawn, would now have been in the close neighbourhood of

Tourcoing and in junction with this successful second column.

But there was no sign of any such welcome sight. The dull rolling plain,

with its occasional low crests falling towards the river, betrayed the

presence of troops in more than one position to the north and west. But

those troops were not moving: they were holding positions, or, if moving,

were obviously doing so with the object of contesting the passage of the

river. They were French troops, not Austrian, that thus showed distinctly

in rare and insufficient numbers along the southern bank of the Lys, and

indeed, as we know, Clerfayt, during the whole of that afternoon of the

17th, was painfully bringing up his delayed pontoons, and was, until it

was far advanced, upon the wrong side of the river.

Otto maintained his position, hoped against hope that Clerfayt might yet

force his way through before nightfall, and was still master of Tourcoing

and the surrounding fields when darkness came.

(B) THE THIRD COLUMN UNDER YORK

Meanwhile York, with his 10,000 half British and half Austro-Hessian, had

marched with similar success but against greater obstacles parallel with

Otto, and to his left, and had successively taken every point in his

advance until he also had reached the goal which had been set before him.

Details of that fine piece of work deserve full mention.

Delayed somewhat by a mist in the dark hours before dawn, York's command

had marched north-westward up the road from Templeuve, where now runs the

little tramway reaching the Belgian frontier.

The French troops in front of him, as much as those who had met Otto a

mile or two off to the right, and Bussche still further off at Mouscron,

were taken aback by the suddenness and the strength of the unexpected

blow. They stood at Lannoy. York cannonaded that position, sent certain of

the British Light Dragoons round to the left to turn it, and attacked it

in front with the Brigade of Guards. The enemy did not stand, and the

British forces poured through Lannoy and held it just as Otto in those

same hours was pouring into and holding Leers and Wattrelos. Beyond

Lannoy, a matter of two miles or so, and still on that same road, was the

small town, now swollen to a great industrial city, called Roubaix. The

Duke of York left a couple of battalions of his allied troops (Hessians)

to hold Lannoy, and with the rest of the column pursued his march.

Roubaix offered far more serious resistance than Lannoy had done. The

element of surprise was, of course, no longer present. The French forces

were concentrating. The peril they were in of being cut off was by this

time thoroughly seized at their headquarters, and the roll of land

immediately before Roubaix was entrenched and held by a sufficient force

well gunned. A strong resistance was offered to the British advance, but

once more the Brigade of Guards broke down that resistance and the place

was taken with the bayonet.

York's next objective, and the goal to which his advance had been ordered,

was Mouveaux. Mouveaux is a village standing upon a somewhat higher roll

of land rather more than two miles from the centre of Roubaix, in

continuation of the direction which York's advance had hitherto pursued.

From Mouveaux the eye could overlook the plain reaching to the Lys and to

Wervicq, some seven odd miles away, a plain broken by one or two slight

hummocks of which the least inconspicuous holds the village of Linselles.

Mouveaux was the point to which Clerfayt was expected to advance from his

side. It was on a level with Tourcoing, and lay, as Tourcoing did,

precisely upon the line between Courtrai and Lille. To reach Mouveaux,

therefore, and not to be content with the capture of Roubaix, was

consistent with and necessary to the general plan of the allies. Moreover,

as Otto with the second column had taken Tourcoing, it was necessary that

the third column should proceed to Mouveaux, unless Otto's left or

southern flank was to remain exposed and in peril. One may say, in

general, that until Mouveaux was occupied the chance of joining hands with

Clerfayt (supposing that General to have kept to his time-table and to be

across the Lys and marching up to meet the columns from the Scheldt) was

in peril. Therefore, until one has learnt what was happening to the fourth

and the fifth columns, it is difficult to understand why the Duke of York,

after the difficult capture of Roubaix, desired to make that point the

utmost limit of his advance and for the moment to proceed no further.

Without anticipating the story of the fourth and fifth columns, it is

enough to say that the Duke of York's desire not to advance beyond Roubaix

was sufficiently excused by the aspect of the country to the west and

south upon his left.

Roubaix overlooks from a slight elevation the valley of the Marque. Lest

the word "valley" be misleading, let me hasten to add that that stream

here flows at the bottom of a very slight and very broad depression. But,

at any rate, from Roubaix one overlooks that depression for some miles;

one sees five miles distant the fortifications of Lille, and the

intervening country is open enough to betray the presence of troops.

Indeed, once Roubaix was captured, the English commander could see across

those fields, a couple of hours' march away, the tents of the great French

camp at Sainghin under the walls of the fortress.

Now, along that river valley and across those fields there should have

been apparent in those mid hours of the day, when the Guards had stormed

Roubaix, the great host of the fourth and fifth columns coming up in

support of the second and third.

If the time-table had been observed, the Arch-Duke and Kinsky, over 25,000

men, should have been across the Marque before dawn, should have pushed

back the French forces outside Lille, and should, long before noon, have

been covering those fields between Roubaix and Lille with their advancing

squadrons and battalions. There was no sign of them. If, or when, the

French body near Lille were free to advance and attack the Duke of York's

left flank, there was no one between to prevent their doing so. That great

body of the third and fourth columns, more than half of all the men who

were advancing from the Scheldt to meet Clerfayt, had failed to come up to

time. That was why the Duke of York desired to push no further than

Roubaix, and even to leave only an advance guard to hold that place while

he withdrew the bulk of his command to Lannoy.

But his decision was overruled. The Emperor and his staff, who, following

up the march of this third column, were now at Templeuve, thought it

imperative that Mouveaux should be held. Only thus, in their judgment,

could the junction with Clerfayt (who, though late, must surely be now

near at hand) be accomplished. And certainly, unless Mouveaux were held,

Otto could not hold his advanced position at Tourcoing. The order was

therefore sent to York to take Mouveaux. In the disastrous issue that

order has naturally come in for sharp blame; but it must be remembered

that much of the plan was already successfully accomplished, that Clerfayt

was thought to be across the Lys, and that if the French around Courtrai,

and hitherward from Courtrai to Tourcoing, were to be cut off, it was

imperative to effect the junction with Clerfayt without delay. Had

Clerfayt been, as he should have been at that hour in the afternoon of

Saturday the 17th, between the Lys and the line Mouveaux-Tourcoing, the

order given by the Austrian staff to the Duke of York would not only have

been approved by the military opinion of posterity, but any other order

would have been thought a proof of indecision and bad judgment.

Upon receiving this order to take Mouveaux, York obeyed. The afternoon was

now far advanced, very heavy work had been done, a forward march of nearly

six miles had been undertaken, accompanied by continual

fighting--latterly, outside Roubaix, of a heavy sort. But if Mouveaux was

to be held before nightfall, an immediate attack must be made, and York

ordered his men forward.

Mouveaux stands upon one of those very slight crests which barely

diversify the flat country in which Roubaix and Tourcoing stand. The

summit of that crest is but little more than fifty feet higher than the

bottom of the low, broad depression between it and the centre of Roubaix,

of which swollen town it is to-day a western suburb. Slight as is the

elevation, it does, as I have said, command a view towards the Lys and

Wervicq; and the evenness and length of the very gentle slope upon the

Roubaix side make it an excellent defensive position.

I have pointed out how the columns of attack as they advanced could not

fail to find an increasing resistance. Roubaix had held out more strongly

than Lannoy, Mouveaux was to hold out more strongly than Roubaix. The

position was palisaded and entrenched. Redoubts had even been hastily

thrown up by the French at either end of it, but the weight of the

attacking column told. It was again the Guards who were given the task of

carrying the trenches at the bayonet, and after a sharp struggle they were

successful. The French, as they retired, set fire to the village (which

stands upon the very summit of that roll of land), and were charged in

their retirement by Abercromby with the English Dragoons. They left three

hundred upon the field, and three field-pieces as well. Despite the great

superiority of numbers which York's columns still commanded over the enemy

immediately before him, it was a brilliant feat, especially when one

considers that it came at the very end of a day that was hot for the

season, that had begun before one o'clock in the morning, and that had

involved the carrying of three positions, each more stoutly defended than

the last, within an advance of over seven miles.

Mouveaux thus carried, the head of York's column was on a line with the

head of Otto's, which held Tourcoing just two miles away. The heads of

either column now occupied the main road between Lille and Courtrai (which

passes through Mouveaux and Tourcoing), and the heads of either column

also held the slight crests from which the belated advance of Clerfayt

from the Lys could be watched and awaited.

But though there was evidence of heavy fighting down in the river valley

five miles to the north and west, and though it seemed probable from the

sound of the firing that Clerfayt with the sixth body had crossed the Lys

at Wervicq and was now on the right side of it, upon the southern bank,

there was no sign of his advancing columns in those empty fields towards

Linselles and the river over which the setting sun glared.

Neither, as his troops prepared to bivouac for the night upon the slopes

of Mouveaux, could York, looking southward, find any indication of the

fourth and fifth columns under Kinsky and the Arch-Duke which should have

come up to this same position at Mouveaux by noon seven hours before. The

flat and marshy fields upon either bank of the Marque were anxiously

scanned in vain as the twilight deepened. Down there, far off, the cannon

had been heard all that afternoon round the French camp at Sainghin, but

nothing had come through.

It was therefore under a sense of isolation and of confusion, with the

knowledge that their left flank was open, that Clerfayt in front of them

was not yet in reach, that the second and third columns, which had so

thoroughly accomplished their task, established their posts under the

early summer night to await the chances of the morning.

III

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH COLUMNS UNDER KINSKY AND THE ARCH-DUKE CHARLES

Now what had happened to the fourth and fifth columns under Kinsky and the

Arch-Duke? I must describe their fortunes, show why they had failed to

come up, and thus complete the picture of the general advance from the

Scheldt, before I turn to conclude the explanation of the disaster by

detailing the further adventures of Clerfayt after he had crossed the Lys.

(A) THE FOURTH COLUMN UNDER KINSKY

Kinsky with his 11,000 men had been delayed, as we have seen, at Froidmont

by the message which the Arch-Duke had sent him from St Amand, to the

effect that the fifth column could not hope to be at Pont-a-Marcq before

dawn upon the 17th.

At the moment, therefore, when in the small hours of Saturday the 17th

Otto and the Duke of York started out simultaneously from Bailleul and

Templeuve, Kinsky was still pinned to Froidmont. But he knew that the

Arch-Duke had started with his great column some time after dark in the

Friday night from St Amand, and when he estimated that they had proceeded

far enough along the road to Pont-a-Marcq to be up level with him upon his

left, Kinsky set his men in march and made for the Bridge of Bouvines,

which was the crossing of the Marque immediately in front of him.

The Bridge of Bouvines lay right in front of the great French camp. It was

strongly held, and the hither side of the river, as Kinsky approached it,

was found to be entrenched. His men drove the French from those

entrenchments, they retired over the bridge, and as they retired they

broke it down. Upon the far side of the river in front of their camp the

French further established a battery of heavy guns upon that slight slope

which is now crowned by the Fort of Sainghin, and Kinsky could not force

the passage until the fifth column, or at any rate the head of it, should

begin to appear upon his left.

It will be seen upon the frontispiece map that when the Arch-Duke's men

reached Pont-a-Marcq and crossed the river there, they would take the

French camp and the main French forces there in reserve, weaken the power

of the French resistance at the Bridge of Bouvines, afford Kinsky the

opportunity of crossing at that point, and that, immediately after that

crossing, Kinsky and the Arch-Duke, having joined hands, would be in

sufficient strength to push back the French from Sainghin and to march up

north together towards Mouveaux. The appearance of their combined force at

Mouveaux by noon would fulfil the time-table, and at mid-day of Saturday,

if the time-table were thus fulfilled, the whole combined force of the

second, third, fourth, and fifth columns would have been astraddle of the

Lille-Courtrai Road, would have cut off Souham's corps from Lille, and

could await Clerfayt if he had not yet arrived. When, therefore, the

Arch-Duke and the fifth column should have crossed the Marque at

Pont-a-Marcq, the fortunes of the fourth column would have blended with

it, and the story of the two would have been one. We may therefore leave

Kinsky still waiting anxiously in front of the broken bridge at Bouvines

for news of the Arch-Duke, and conclude the picture of the whole advance

from the Scheldt by describing what had happened and was happening to that

Commander and his great force of 17,000 to 18,000 men.

(B) THE FIFTH COLUMN UNDER THE ARCH-DUKE CHARLES

When the Arch-Duke Charles had let Kinsky know upon the day before, the

Friday, that he could not be at the appointed post of Pont-a-Marcq by the

next daybreak, he had implied that somewhere in the early morning of that

Saturday, at least, he would be there. Exactly how early neither he nor

Kinsky could tell. His troops had sixteen full miles to march; they had

but one road by which to advance, and they were fatigued with the enormous

exertion of that hurried march northward to St Amand, which has already

been set down.

Such were the delays at St Amand in preparing that advance, that the night

was far gone before the fifth column took the road to Pont-a-Marcq, and

the effort that was to be demanded of it was more than should have been

justly demanded of any troops. Indeed, the idea that a body of this great

size, tied to one road, could suffer the severe effort of the rush from

the south to St Amand, followed by a night-march, that march to be

followed by heavy fighting during the ensuing morning and a further

advance of eight or nine miles during the forenoon, was one of the weakest

points in the plan of the allies. No such weakness would have been

apparent if the main body of the Austrians under the Arch-Duke had been

called up on the 12th instead of the 14th, and had been given two more

days in which to cover the great distance. But, as it was, the delay of

the Emperor and his staff in calling up that main body had gravely

weakened its effective power.

The league-long column thrust up the road through the darkness hour upon

hour, with its confusion of vehicles and that difficulty in marshalling

all units which is the necessary handicap of an advance in the darkness.

Long before their task was so much as half accomplished, it was apparent

not only that Pont-a-Marcq would not be reached at dawn, but that the mass

of the infantry would not be at that river-crossing until the morning was

far spent.

When day broke, though cavalry had been set forward at greater speed, the

heads of the infantry column were but under the Hill of Beuvry. It was

long after six before the force had passed through Orchies, and though

Kinsky learnt, in the neighbourhood of eight o'clock, that the cavalry of

the fifth column were up on a level with him and had reached the river,

the main force of the fifth column was not available for crossing

Pont-a-Marcq until noon, and past noon.

Kinsky, thus tied to the broken Bridge of Bouvines until Pont-a-Marcq

should be forced, saw mid-day come and pass, and still his force and that

of the Arch-Duke upon his left were upon the wrong side of the stream.

Yet another hour went by. His fourth column and the fifth should already

have been nine miles up north, by Mouveaux, and they were not yet even

across the Marque!

It was not until two o'clock that the passage of the river at Pont-a-Marcq

was forced by the Arch-Duke Charles, and that, as the consequence of that

passage of the stream, the French were taken in reverse in their camp at

Sainghin and were compelled to fall back northward, leaving the passage at

Bouvines free. Kinsky repaired the bridge, and was free to bring his

11,000 over, and the two extreme columns, the fourth and the fifth, would

then have joined forces in the mid-afternoon of the Saturday, having

accomplished their object of forcing the Marque and uniting for the common

advance northward in support of Otto and the Duke of York.

Now, had the Arch-Duke Charles' men been machines, this section of the

general plan would yet have failed by half a day to keep its time-table:

and by more than half a day: by all the useful part of a working day. By

the scheme of time upon which the plan was based, the fifth column should

have been across the Marque at dawn; by six, or at latest by seven o'clock

the French should have been compelled to fall back from Sainghin, and the

combined fourth and fifth columns should have been upon their northward

march for Mouveaux. It was not seven o'clock, it was _between three and

four_ o'clock by the time the Arch-Duke was well across the Marque and the

French retired; but still, if the men of this fifth column had been

machines, Kinsky was now free to effect his junction across the Bridge of

Bouvines, and the combined force would have reached the neighbourhood of

Mouveaux and Tourcoing by nightfall, or shortly after dark.

But the men of the fifth column were not machines, and at that hour of the

mid-afternoon of Saturday they had come to the limits of physical

endurance. It was impossible to ask further efforts of them, or, if those

efforts were demanded, to hope for success. In the Arch-Duke's column by

far the greater part of the 17,000 or 18,000 men had been awake and

working for thirty-six hours. All had been on foot for at least

twenty-four; they had been actually marching for seventeen, and had been

fighting hard at the end of the effort and after sixteen miles of road.

There could be no question of further movement that day: they bivouacked

just north of the river, near where the French had been before their

retirement, and Kinsky, seeing no combined movement could be made that

day, kept his men also bivouacked near the Bridge of Bouvines.[5]

Thus it was that when night fell upon that Saturday the left wing of the

advance from the Scheldt had failed. And that is why those watching from

the head of the successful third column at Mouveaux and Roubaix, under the

sunset of that evening, saw no reinforcement coming up the valley of the

Marque, caught no sign of their thirty thousand comrades advancing from

the south, and despaired of the morrow.

SUMMARY OF SITUATION ON THE SOUTH BY THE EVENING OF SATURDAY, MAY 17th.

If we take stock of the whole situation, so far as the advance of the five

columns from the Scheldt was concerned, when darkness fell upon that

Saturday we can appreciate the peril in which the second and third column

under Otto and York lay.

The position which the plan had assigned to the four columns, second,

third, fourth, and fifth, by noon of that Saturday (let alone by

nightfall), is that marked upon the map by the middle four of the six

oblongs in dotted lines marked B. Of these, the two positions on the

_right_ were filled, for the second and third columns had amply

accomplished their mission. But the two on the _left_, so far from being

filled, were missed by miles of space and hours of time. At mid-day, or a

little after, when Kinsky and the Arch-Duke should have been occupying the

second and third dotted oblong respectively, neither of them was as yet

even across the Marque. Both were far away back at E, E: and these

hopeless positions, E, E, right away behind the line of positions across

the Courtrai-Lille road which the plan expected them to occupy by

Saturday noon, Kinsky and the Arch-Duke pacifically maintained up to and

including the night between Saturday and Sunday!

[Illustration: THE ELEMENTS OF TOURCOING]

It is evident, therefore, that instead of all four columns of nearly

_sixty_ thousand men barring the road between Souham and Lille and

effecting the isolation of the French "wedge" round Courtrai, a bare,

unsupported _twenty_ thousand found themselves that night alone: holding

Roubaix, Tourcoing, Lannoy, Mouveaux, and thrust forward isolated in the

midst of overwhelmingly superior and rapidly gathering numbers.

In such an isolation nothing could save Otto and York but the abandonment

during the night of their advanced positions and a retreat upon the points

near the Scheldt from which they had started twenty hours before.

The French forces round Lille were upon one side of them to the south and

west, in number perhaps 20,000. On the other side of them, towards

Courtrai, was the mass of Souham's force which they had hoped to cut off,

nearly 40,000 strong. Between these two great bodies of men, the 20,000 of

Otto and York were in peril of destruction if the French awoke to the

position before the retirement of the second and third columns was decided

on.

It is here worthy of remark that the only real cause of peril was the

absence of Kinsky and the Arch-Duke.

Certain historians have committed the strange error of blaming Bussche for

what followed. Bussche, it will be remembered, had been driven out of

Mouscron early in the day, and was holding on stubbornly enough, keeping

up an engagement principally by cannonade with the French upon the line of

Dottignies. It is obvious that from such a position he could be of no use

to the isolated Otto and York five miles away. But on the other hand, he

was not expected to be of any use. What could his 4000 have done to shield

the 20,000 of Otto and York from those 40,000 French under Souham's

command? His business was to keep as many of the French as possible

occupied away on the far north-east of the field, and that object he was

fulfilling.

Finally, it may be asked why, in a posture so patently perilous, Otto and

York clung to their advanced positions throughout the night? The answer is

simple enough. If, even during the night, the fourth and fifth columns

should appear, the battle was half won. If Clerfayt, of whom they had no

news, but whom they rightly judged to be by this time across the Lys, were

to arrive before the French began to close in, the battle would be not

half won, but all won. Between 55,000 and 60,000 men would then be lying

united across the line which joined the 40,000 of the enemy to the north

with the 20,000 to the south. If such a junction were effected even at the

eleventh hour, so long as it took place before the 20,000 French outside

Lille and the 40,000 to the north moved upon them, the allies would have

won a decisive action, and the surrender of all Souham's command would

have been the matter of a few hours. For a force cut in two is a force

destroyed.

But the night passed without Clerfayt's appearing, and before closing the

story of that Saturday I must briefly tell why, though he had crossed the

Lys in the afternoon, he failed to advance southward through the

intervening five or six miles to Mouveaux.

CLERFAYT'S COLUMN.

Clerfayt had, in that extraordinary slow march of his, advanced by the

Friday night, as I have said, no further than the great high road between

Menin and Ypres. I further pointed out that though only three miles

separated that point from Wervicq, yet those three miles meant, under the

military circumstances of the moment, a loss of time equivalent to at

least half a day.

We therefore left Clerfayt at Saturday's dawn, as we left the Arch-Duke at

the same time, far short of the starting-point which had been assigned to

him.

Whereas the Arch-Duke, miles away over there to the south, had at least

pushed on to the best of his ability through the night towards

Pont-a-Marcq, Clerfayt did _not_ push on by night to Wervicq as he should

have done. He bivouacked with the heads of his columns no further than the

Ypres road.

Nor did he even break up and proceed over the remaining three miles during

the very earliest hours. For one reason or another (the point has never

been cleared up) the morning was fairly well advanced when he set

forth--possibly because his units had got out of touch and straggling in

the sandy country, or blocked by vehicles stuck fast. Whatever the cause

may have been, he did not exchange shots with the French outposts at

Wervicq until well after noon upon that Saturday the 17th of May.

When at last he had forced his way into the town (the great bulk of which

lies north of the river), he found the bridge so well defended that he

could not cross it, or, at any rate, that the carrying of it--the chances

of its being broken after the French should have retired and the business

of bringing his great force across, with the narrow streets of the town to

negotiate and the one narrow bridge, even if intact to use--would put him

upon the further bank at a hopelessly late hour. Therefore did he call for

his pontoons in order to solve the difficulty by bridging the river

somewhat lower down. The Lys is here but a narrow stream, and it would be

easy, with the pontoons at his disposal, to pass his troops over rapidly

upon a broader front, making, if necessary, two wide bridges. I say "with

the pontoons at his disposal." But by the time Clerfayt had taken this

decision and had sent for the pontoons, he found that they were not there!

His section of pontoons had not kept abreast with the rest of the army,

and their delay had not been notified to him. It was not until quite late

in the day that they arrived; it was not until evening that the laying of

the pontoons began,[6] nor till midnight that he was passing the first of

his troops over.

He did not get nor attempt to get the mass of his sixteen or seventeen

thousand across in the darkness. He bivouacked the remainder upon the

wrong side of the river and waited for the morrow.

* * * * *

So that Saturday ended, with Otto and York isolated at the central

meeting-place round Tourcoing-Mouveaux, which they alone had reached; with

the Arch-Duke Charles and Kinsky bivouacked miles away to the south on

either side of the Bridge of Bouvines; and with Clerfayt still, as to the

bulk of his force, on the wrong side of the Lys.

It was no wonder that the next day, Sunday, was to see the beginning of

disaster.

SUNDAY, MAY THE 18TH, 1794.

I have said that, considering the isolated position in which York and Otto

found themselves, with no more than perhaps 18,000 in the six positions of

Leers, Wattrelos, and Tourcoing, Lannoy, Roubaix, and Mouveaux, the French

had only to wake up to the situation, and Otto and York would be

overwhelmed.

The French did wake up. How thoroughly taken by surprise they had been by

the prompt and exact advance of Otto and York the day before, the reader

has already been told. Throughout Saturday they remained in some confusion

as to the intention of the enemy; and indeed it was not easy to grasp a

movement which was at once of such great size, and whose very miscarriage

rendered it the more baffling of comprehension. But by the evening of the

day, Souham, calling a council of his generals at Menin, came to a

decision as rapid as it was wise. Reynier, Moreau, and Macdonald, the

generals of divisions that were under his orders, all took part in the

brief discussion and the united resolve to which it led. "It was," in the

words of a contemporary, "one of those rare occasions in which the

decision of several men in council has proved as effective as the decision

of a single will."

Of the troops which were, it will be remembered, dispersed to the north of

the Lys, only one brigade was left upon the wrong side of the river to

keep an eye on Clerfayt; all the rest were recalled across the stream and

sent forward to take up positions north of Otto's and Kinsky's columns.

Meanwhile the bulk of the French troops lying between Courtrai and

Tourcoing were disposed in such fashion as to attack from the north and

east, south and westward. Some 40,000 men all told were ready to close in

with the first light from both sides upon the two isolated bodies of the

allies. To complete their discomfiture, word was sent to Bonnaud and

Osten, the generals of divisions who commanded the 20,000 about Lille,

ordering them to march north and east, and to attack simultaneously with

their comrades upon that third exposed side where York would receive the

shock. In other words, the 18,000 or so distributed on the six points

under Otto and York occupied an oblong the two long sides of which and the

top were about to be attacked by close upon 60,000 men. The hour from

which this general combined advance inwards upon the doomed commands of

the allies was to begin was given identically to all the French generals.

They were to break up at three in the morning. With such an early start,

the sun would not have been long risen before the pressure upon Otto and

York would begin.

When the sun rose, the head of Otto's column upon the little height of

Tourcoing saw to the north, to the north-east, and to the east, distant

moving bodies, which were the columns of the French attack advancing from

those quarters. As they came nearer, their numbers could be distinguished.

A brigade was approaching them from the north and the Lys valley,

descending the slopes of the hillock called Mont Halhuin. It was

Macdonald's. Another was on the march from Mouscron and the east. It was

Compere's. The General who was commanding for Otto in Tourcoing itself was

Montfrault. He perceived the extremity of the danger and sent over to York

for reinforcement. York spared him two Austrian battalions, but with

reluctance, for he knew that the attack must soon develop upon his side

also. In spite of the peril, in the vain hope that Clerfayt might yet

appear, Mouveaux and Tourcoing were still held, and upon the latter

position, between five and six o'clock in the morning, fell the first

shots of the French advance. The resistance at Tourcoing could not last

long against such odds, and Montfrault, after a gallant attempt to hold

the town, yielded to a violent artillery attack and prepared to retreat.

Slowly gathering his command into a great square, he began to move

south-eastward along the road to Wattrelos. It was half-past eight when

that beginning of defeat was acknowledged.

Meanwhile York, on his side, had begun to feel the pressure. Mouveaux was

attacked from the north somewhat before seven o'clock in the morning, and,

simultaneously with that attack, a portion of Bonnaud's troops which had

come up from the neighbourhood of Lille, was driving in York's outposts to

the west of Roubaix.

How, it may be asked, did the French, in order thus to advance from Lille,

negotiate the passage of that little River Marque, which obstacle had

proved so formidable a feature in the miscarriage of the great allied plan

the day before? The answer is, unfortunately, easily forthcoming. York had

left the bridges over the Marque unguarded. Why, we do not know. Whether

from sheer inadvertence, or because he hoped that Kinsky had detached men

for the purpose, for one reason or another he had left those passages

free, and, by the bridge of Hempempont against Lannoy, by that of Breuck

against Roubaix, Bonnaud's and Osten's men poured over.

As at Tourcoing, so at Mouveaux, a desperate attempt was made to hold the

position. Indeed it was clung to far too late, but the straits to which

Mouveaux was reduced at least afforded an opportunity for something of

which the British service should not be unmindful. Immediately between

Roubaix and the River Marque, Fox, with the English battalions of the

line, was desperately trying to hold the flank and to withstand the

pressure of the French, who were coming across the river more than twice

his superiors in number. He was supported by a couple of Austrian

battalions, and the two services dispute as to which half of this

defending force was first broken. But the dispute is idle. No troops could

have stood the pressure, and at any rate the defence broke down--with this

result: that the British troops holding Mouveaux, Abercrombie's Dragoons,

and the Brigade of Guards, were cut off from their comrades in Roubaix.

Meanwhile, Tourcoing having been carried and the Austrians driven out from

thence, the eastern and western forces of the French had come into touch

in the depression between Mouveaux and Roubaix, and it seemed as though

the surrender or destruction of that force was imminent. Abercrombie saved

it. A narrow gap appeared between certain forces of the French, eastward

of the position at Mouveaux, and leaving a way open round to Roubaix. He

took advantage of it and won through: the Guards keeping a perfect order,

the rear defended by the mobility and daring of the Dragoons. The village

of Roubaix, in those days, consisted in the main of one long straight

street, though what is now the great town had already then so far

increased in size as to have suburbs upon the north and south. The

skirmishers of the French were in these suburbs. (Fox's flank command had

long ago retired, keeping its order, however, and making across country as

best it could for Lannoy.) It was about half-past nine when Abercrombie's

force, which had been saved by so astonishing a mixture of chance, skill,

coolness, and daring, filed into the long street of Roubaix. The Guards

and the guns went through the passage in perfect formation in spite of the

shots dropping from the suburbs, which were already beginning to harass

the cavalry behind them. Immediately to their rear was the Austrian horse,

while, last of all, defending the retreat, the English Dragoons were just

entering the village. In the centre of this long street a market-place

opened out. The Austrian cavalry, arrived at it, took advantage of the

room afforded them; they doubled and quadrupled their files until they

formed a fairly compact body, almost filling the square. It was precisely

at this moment that the French advance upon the eastern side of the

village brought a gun to bear down the long straight street and road,

which led from the market square to Wattrelos. The moment it opened fire,

the Austrians, after a vain attempt to find cover, pressed into the side

streets down the market-place, fell into confusion. There is no question

here of praise or blame: a great body of horsemen, huddled in a narrow

space, suddenly pounded by artillery, necessarily became in a moment a

mass of hopeless confusion. The body galloped in panic out of the village,

swerved round the sharp corner into the narrower road (where the French

had closed in so nearly that there was some bayonet work), and then came

full tilt against the British guns, which lay blocking the way because the

drivers had dismounted or cut the traces and fled. In the midst of this

intolerable confusion a second gun was brought to bear by the French, and

the whole mob of ridden and riderless horses, some dragging limbers, some

pack-horses charged, many more the dispersed and maddened fragments of the

cavalry, broke into the Guards, who had still kept their formation and

were leading what had been but a few moments before an orderly retreat.

It is at this point, I think, that the merit of this famous brigade and

its right to regard the disaster not with humiliation but with pride, is

best established. For that upon which soldiers chiefly look is the power

of a regiment to reform. The Guards, thus broken up under conditions which

made formation for the moment impossible, and would have excused the

destruction of any other force, cleared themselves of the welter,

recovered their formation, held the road, permitted the British cavalry to

collect itself and once more form a rearguard, and the retreat upon Lannoy

was resumed by this fragment of York's command in good order: in good

order, although it was subjected to heavy and increasing fire upon either

side.

It was a great feat of arms.

As for the Duke of York, he was not present with his men. He had ridden

off with a small escort of cavalry to see whether it might not be possible

to obtain some reinforcement from Otto, but the French were everywhere in

those fields. He found himself with a squadron, with a handful, and at

last alone, until, a conspicuous figure with the Star of the Garter still

pinned to his coat, he was chivied hither and thither across country,

followed and flanked by the sniping shots of the French skirmishers in

thicket and hedge; after that brief but exceedingly troubled ride,

Providence discovered him a brook and a bridge still held by some of

Otto's Hessians. He crossed it, and was in safety.

His retreating men--those of them that remained, and notably the remnant

of the Dragoons and the Guards--were still in order as they approached

Lannoy. They believed, or hoped, that that village was still in possession

of the Hessians whom York had left there. But the French attack had been

ubiquitous that morning. It had struck simultaneously upon all the flanks.

At Roubaix as at Mouveaux, at Lannoy as at Roubaix, and the Guards and the

Dragoons within musket shot of Lannoy discovered it, in the most

convincing fashion, to be in the hands of the enemy. After that check

order and formation were lost, and the remaining fragment of the Austrian

and British who had marched out from Templeuve the day before 10,000

strong, hurried, dispersed over the open field, crossed what is now the

Belgian border, and made their way back to camp.

Thus was destroyed the third column, which, of all portions of the allied

army, had fought hardest, had most faithfully executed its orders, had

longest preserved discipline during a terrible retreat and against

overwhelming numbers: it was to that discipline that the Guards in

particular owed the saving from the wreck of so considerable a portion of

their body. Of their whole brigade just under 200 were lost, killed,

wounded or taken prisoners. The total loss of the British was not quite

five times this--just under 1000,--but of their guns, twenty-eight in

number, nineteen were left in the hands of the enemy.

There is no need to recount in detail the fate of Otto's column. As it had

advanced parallel in direction and success to the Duke of York's, it

suffered a similar and parallel misfortune. As the English had found

Lannoy occupied upon their line of retreat, so Otto's column had found

Wattrelos. As the English column had broken at Lannoy, so the Austrian at

Leers. And the second column came drifting back dispersed to camp,

precisely as the third had done. When the fragments were mustered and the

defeat acknowledged, it was about three o'clock in the afternoon.

For the rest of the allied army there is no tale to tell, save with regard

to Clerfayt's command; the fourth and the fifth columns, miles away behind

the scene of the disaster, did not come into action. Long before they

could have broken up after the breakdown through exhaustion of the day

before, the French were over the Marque and between them and York. When a

move was made at noon, it was not to relieve the second and third columns,

for that was impossible, though, perhaps, if they had marched earlier, the

pressure they would have brought to bear upon Bonnaud's men might have

done something to lessen the disaster. It is doubtful, for the Marque

stood in between and the French did not leave it unguarded.

Bussche, true to his conduct of the day before, held his positions all day

and maintained his cannonade with the enemy. It is true that there was no

severe pressure upon him, but still he held his own even when the rout

upon his left might have tempted him to withdraw his little force.

As for Clerfayt, he had not all his men across the Lys until that very

hour of seven in the morning when York at Mouveaux was beginning to suffer

the intolerable pressure of the French, and Otto's men at Tourcoing were

in a similar plight.

By the time he had got all his men over, he found Vandamme holding

positions, hastily prepared but sufficiently well chosen, and blocking his

way to the south. With a defensive thus organised, though only half as

strong as the attack, Vandamme was capable of a prolonged resistance; and

while it was in progress, reinforcements, summoned from the northern parts

of the French line beyond Lille, had had time to appear towards the west.

He must have heard from eight o'clock till noon the fire of his retreating

comrades falling back in their disastrous retreat, and, rightly judging

that he would have after mid-day the whole French army to face, he

withdrew to the river, and had the luck to cross it the next day without

loss: a thing that the French now free from the enemy to the south should

never have permitted.

So ended the Battle of Tourcoing, an action which, for the interest of its

scheme, for the weight of its results, and, above all, for the fine

display of courage and endurance which British troops showed under

conditions that should normally have meant annihilation, deserves a much

wider fame in this country than it has obtained.

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=IRISH HOME RULE.= The Last Phase. By S. G. HOBSON. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.

=NATIONAL EDUCATION.= By BARON VON TAUBE, author of "Manual Training," "In

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net. Two basic and dominating conceptions underlie the theory of education

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education is increasing daily, and this book should prove a valuable

contribution to the literature on this vitally important subject.

BELLES LETTRES

=EPISODES OF VATHEK.= By WILLIAM BECKFORD. Translated by Sir Frank T.

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net. These Episodes or Eastern Tales, related in the Halls of Eblis, were

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"Arabian Nights," into his famous Oriental story of "Vathek." The original

in French is given after the English translation, and the reader will find

this volume extremely interesting both as treasure trove and literature.

=SONNETS AND BALLATE OF GUIDO CAVALCANTI.= Translated by EZRA POUND. Crown

8vo, cloth. 3s. 6d. net. We have had many translations of the Divina

Commedia, a few of the Vita Nuova. Rosetti has translated a miscellany of

"Early Italian Poets," but in these "Sonnets and Ballate" of Guido

Cavalcanti we have a new thing, the endeavour to present a 13th century

Tuscan poet, other than Dante, as an individual. More than one Italian

critic of authority has considered Cavalcanti second to Dante alone in

their literature. Dante places him first among his forerunners.

=LEAVES OF PROSE=, interleaved with verse. By ANNIE MATHESON, with which

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of the country-side, while the lyrics scattered throughout the volume

reflect a temperament that has remained equable under the most severe

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=OFF BEATEN TRACKS IN BRITTANY.= By EMIL DAVIES. Crown 8vo, cloth. 7s. 6d.

net. In this book the author, who has already won for himself a position

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individuals who chose their route across Brittany by ruling a straight

line across the map from Brest to St. Malo--and then went another way!

=IMAGINARY SPEECHES AND OTHER PARODIES IN PROSE AND VERSE.= By JACK

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comprehensive volume of Parodies ever issued. The author is as much at his

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whilst he is as happy in his series illustrating "The Sort of Prose

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with its various amusing features.

=SHADOWS OUT OF THE CROWD.= By RICHARD CURLE. Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s. This

book consists of twelve stories of a curious and psychological kind. Some

deal with the West Indian and South American tropics, some with London,

some with Scotland, and one with South Africa. The author's sense of

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fatalistic spirit of the Russians. They have been written over a period of

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type.

=LONDON WINDOWS.= By ETHEL TALBOT. Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s. 6d. net. In this

little volume Miss Talbot, who is a well known and gifted singer in the

younger choir of England's poets, pictures London in many moods. She has

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sordid, grey, as well as magical and alluring. All who love the London of

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=SOME ASPECTS OF THACKERAY.= By LEWIS MELVILLE. Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d. net. As

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are admirably written chapters on "Thackeray as a Reader and Critic,"

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=ENGLISH LITERATURE.= 1880-1905. Pater, Wilde, and after. By J. M.

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continues with chapters on Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde, who, in their

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essayists of the time, all of whom are dealt with.

=ONLY A DOG'S LIFE.= By BARON VON TAUBE. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. This

fascinating work was originally published in German, and is now issued in

the author's own English rendering. It has been most favourably received

in Germany. A Siberian hound, whose sire was a wolf, tells his own story.

The book, in fact, is a very clever satire on human nature, a satire which

gains much charm and piquancy from its coming from the mouth of a

masterful self-respecting hound.

=SOME OLD ENGLISH WORTHIES.= Thomas of Reading, George a Green, Roger

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Medium 8vo, cloth. 10s. 6d. net.

=BY DIVERS PATHS.= By ELEANOR TYRRELL, ANNIE MATHESON, MAUDE P. KING, MAY

SINCLAIR, Professor C. H. HERFORD, Dr. GREVILLE MACDONALD, and C. C.

COTTERILL. New Edition. Crown 8vo, cloth, gilt. 3s. 6d. net. A volume of

natural studies and descriptive and meditative essays interspersed with

verse.

=IN DEFENCE OF AMERICA.= By BARON VON TAUBE. Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net.

This very remarkable book gives the American point of view in reply to

criticisms of "Uncle Sam" frequently made by representatives of "John

Bull." The author, a Russo-German, who has spent many active years in the

United States, draws up about thirty "popular indictments against the

citizens of Uncle Sam's realm," and discusses them at length in a very

original and dispassionate way, exhibiting a large amount of German

critical acumen together with much American shrewdness. Both "Uncle Sam"

and "John Bull" will find in the book general appreciations of their

several characteristics and not a few valuable suggestions.

FICTION

Crown 8vo, cloth. 6s. each

=LADY ERMYNTRUDE AND THE PLUMBER.= By PERCY FENDALL. This is a tale

fantastical and satirical, of the year 1920, its quaint humours arising

out of the fact that a Radical-Socialist Government has passed an Act of

Parliament requiring every man and woman to earn a living and to live on

their earnings. There are many admirable strokes of wit dispersed

throughout, not the least of these being the schedule of charges which the

king is permitted to make, for he also, under the Work Act, is compelled

to earn a living.

=AN EXCELLENT MYSTERY.= By Countess RUSSELL. The scene opens in Ireland

with a fascinating child, Will-o'-the-Wisp, and a doting father. A poor

mother and a selfish elder sister drive her to a marriage which has no

sound foundation. The husband turns out eccentric, unsympathetic, and even

cowardly. Will-o'-the-Wisp has to face at a tender age and with no

experience the most serious and difficult problems of sex, motherhood and

marriage. Then with the help of friends, her own good sense and

determination, and the sensible divorce law of Scotland, she escapes her

troubles. This forms the conclusion of an artless but thrilling narrative.

=A NIGHT IN THE LUXEMBOURG= (Une Nuit au Luxembourg). By REMY DE GOURMONT.

Crown 8vo, cloth. 5s. net. With preface and appendix by Arthur Ransome. M.

Remy de Gourmont is, perhaps, the greatest of contemporary French writers.

His books are translated into all languages but ours. "Une Nuit au

Luxembourg" is the first of his works to appear in English, and will be

followed by others. It will certainly arouse considerable discussion. It

moves the reader with something more than a purely aesthetic emotion.

=HUSBAND AND LOVER.= By WALTER RIDDALL. In this book is given a discerning

study of a temperament. The author has taken an average artistic man and

laid bare his feelings and impulses, his desires and innermost thoughts

under the supreme influence of sex. Frankness is the key-note of the work;

its truth will be recognised by everyone who faces the facts of his own

nature and neither blushes nor apologises for them.

=THE CONSIDINE LUCK.= By H. A. HINKSON. The Considine Luck is primarily a

story of the Union of Hearts, an English girl's love affair with an

Irishman, and the conflict of character between the self-made man who is

the charming heroine's father and the Irish environment in which he finds

himself. The writer can rollick with the best, and the Considine Luck is

not without its rollicking element. But it is in the main a delicate and

serious love story, with its setting in the green Irish country, among the

poetical, unpractical people among whom Mr. Hinkson is so thoroughly at

home.

=A SUPER-MAN IN BEING.= By LITCHFIELD WOODS. Both in its subject-matter

and craftsmanship this is an arresting piece of work. It is not, in the

usual sense, a story of love and marriage. Rather, it is the biographical

presentment of Professor Snaggs, who has lost his eyesight, but who is yet

known to the outside world as a distinguished historian. The revelation of

the Professor's home life is accomplished with a literary skill of the

highest kind, showing him to be a combination of super-man and

super-devil, not so much in the domain of action as in the domain of

intellect. An extraordinary situation occurs--a problem in psychology

intensely interesting to the reader, not so much on its emotional as on

its intellectual side, and is solved by this super-man in the domain of

intellect.

=GREAT POSSESSIONS.= By Mrs. CAMPBELL. A story of modern Americans in

America and England, this novel deals with the suffering bequeathed by the

malice of a dead man to the woman he once loved. In imposing upon her son

the temptations of leisure and great wealth he is a means of making him a

prey to inherited weakness, and the train of events thus set in motion

leads to an unexpected outcome. The author is equally familiar with life

in either country, and the book is an earnest attempt to represent the

enervating influences of a certain type of existence prevailing among the

monied classes in New York to-day.

=THE DARKSOME MAIDS OF BAGLEERE.= By WILLIAM KERSEY. A delightful novel of

Somerset farming-life. Although a tragedy of the countryside, it is at the

same time alive with racy country humour. The character drawing is clear

and strong, and the theme is handled with the restraint of great tragedy.

This book is of real literary value--in fact, it recalls to our minds the

earlier works of Thomas Hardy.

PLAYS

=THE KING.= A Daring Tragedy. By STEPHEN PHILLIPS, Crown 8vo, cloth. 2s.

6d. net. Don Carlos, heir to the throne of Spain, learns that Christina,

a young lady of the Court, with whom he is secretly in love, is really his

sister. The gloom of the tragedy is deepened by the discovery that

Christina is about to be a mother. Brother and sister, who are at the same

time husband and wife, die by the same dagger. The king, who has already

abdicated in favour of his son, whom he desired to marry the Princess of

Spain, resolves to put an end to his life also, but is persuaded by his

minister that the task of living as king will be a greater punishment for

all the misery he has created. The story is developed with skill,

reticence, simplicity, in solemn harmonies and with tragic beauty.

=SHAKESPEARE'S END AND TWO OTHER IRISH PLAYS.= By CONAL O'RIORDAN (Norreys

Connell). Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d. net. Mr. O'Riordan, who is better known by

his nom-de-guerre of "Norreys Connell," which has served him for twenty

years, has brought together in this volume the three plays in which he has

given expression to his view of the relation between England and Ireland.

In a prefatory letter to Mr. Joseph Conrad he presents a synthesis of the

trilogy, and explains why this, of his several books, is the first which

he wishes to associate with his proper name.

UNCLASSIFIED

=OH, MY UNCLE!= By W. TEIGNMOUTH SHORE, author of "The Talking Master,"

"D'Orsay," etc. Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net. Wit, fun, frolic, fairy tale,

nonsense verses, satire, comedy, farce, criticism; a touch of each, an

_olla podrida_ which cannot be classified. It certainly is not history,

yet cannot fairly be put under the heading fiction; it is not realism, yet

fairy-taleism does not fully describe it; it deals with well-known folk,

yet it is not a "romance with a key"; it is not a love story, yet there is

love in it; in short, again, it cannot be classified. It is a book for

those who love laughter, yet it is not merely frivolous. It deals with the

lights of life, with just a touch now and again of delicate shadow. One

thing may safely be said--Miss Blue-Eyes and Uncle Daddy will make many

friends.

STEPHEN SWIFT & CO., LTD.

Footnotes:

[1] These dates are important in another aspect of the matter--the

authorship of the plan. I will, therefore, return to them in more detail

at the close of this section.

[2] I pay no attention to the ridiculous suggestion that the delay was due

to the contemporary peril in Poland, and to Thugut's anxiety to have

Austrian troops in the east rather than on the western frontier. People

who write modern history thus seem to forget that the electric telegraph

did not exist in the eighteenth century. The more reasonable pretension

that the Austrians hesitated between marching north to effect the plan

against Souham, and marching east to relieve the pressure upon Kaunitz,

who was hard pressed upon the Sambre, deserves consideration. But

Kaunitz's despatch, telling how he had been forced to fall back, did not

reach headquarters until the 12th, and if immediate orders had been given

for the northern march, that march would have begun before the news of

Kaunitz's reverse had arrived. The only reasonable explanation in this as

in most problems in human history, is the psychological one. You have to

explain the delay of George III.'s son, and Joseph II.'s nephew. To anyone

not obsessed by the superstition of rank, the mere portraits of these

eminent soldiers would be enough to explain it.

[3] Fortescue, vol. iv., part i., p. 255.

[4] After so many allusions to his youth, I may as well give the date of

his birth. Frederick, Duke of York, the second son of King George III. of

England, was not yet thirty when he suffered at Tourcoing, having been

born in 1765. He had the misfortune to die in 1827.

[5] The reader not indifferent to comedy will hear with pleasure that,

among various accounts of Kinsky's communication with the Arch-Duke

Charles at this juncture, one describes that Royalty as inaccessible after

the fatigue of the day. His colleague is represented as asking in vain for

an interview, and receiving from a servant the reply "that his Imperial

Highness must not be disturbed, as he was occupied in having a fit."

[6] At a point somewhat below Wervicq: much where the private ferry now

plies.

Transcriber's Notes:

Passages in italics are indicated by _underscore_.

Passages in bold are indicated by =bold=.