THE TERRAIN
The terrain over which the plan of the allies was to be tested must next
be grasped if we are to understand the causes which led to its ultimate
failure.
That terrain is most conveniently described as an oblong standing up
lengthways north and south, and corresponding to the sketch map overleaf.
That oblong has a base of twenty miles from east to west, a length from
north to south of thirty-five.
These dimensions are sufficient to show upon what a scale the great plan
of the allies for cutting off Souham at Courtrai was designed.
At its south-eastern corner the reader will perceive the town of St Amand,
the furthest point south from which the combined movements of the allies
began; while somewhat to the left of its top or northern edge, at the
point marked "A," the northern-most body connected with that plan, the
body commanded by Clerfayt, was posted at the origin of the movement.
[Illustration]
The object of the whole convergence from the Scheldt on one hand, and from
Clerfayt's northern position upon the other, being to cut off the French
forces which lay at and south of Courtrai from Lille, and the main line of
the French army, it is evident that the actual fighting and the chances of
success or disaster would take place within a smaller interior oblong,
which I have also marked upon the sketch map. This smaller or interior
oblong measures about sixteen miles at its base by about twenty-five miles
in length, and includes all the significant points of the action.
The points marked 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respectively are the points at which
the five columns advancing from the Scheldt valley northward were to find
themselves before dawn on the morning of Saturday the 17th of May. We are
already acquainted with them. They are Warcoing, Bailleul, Templeuve,
Froidmont, and Pont-a-Marcq respectively; while the point marked 6 is
Wervicq, from which Clerfayt was to start simultaneously with the five
southern columns with the object of meeting his fellows round Tourcoing.
The town of Courtrai will be perceived to lie in the north-eastern angle
of this inner oblong, the town of Lille rather below the middle of its
western side. In all the country round Courtrai, and especially to the
south of it, within the triangle X Y Z, lay the mass of Souham's command
of 40,000 men. There were many posts, of course, scattered outside that
triangle, and connecting Courtrai with Lille; but the links were weak, and
the main force was where I have indicated it to be.
A large body of French troops being encamped just under the walls of Lille
at B (by which letter I mark Sainghin camp), and that fortress also
possessing a garrison, the plan of cutting both these off from the 40,000
French that lay in the country near Courtrai involved getting the main
part of the allies up from these points of departure on the south, and
Clerfayt's body down from its point of departure on the north to meet upon
the line drawn between Lille and Courtrai. Upon this line (which also
roughly corresponds to the only main road between the two cities) may be
perceived, lying nearer Lille than the centre of such line, the small town
of Tourcoing and the village of Mouveaux. It was upon these two points
that four of the five southern columns were to converge northward, the
second and third column reaching them first, the fourth and fifth marching
up from the left in aid; and it was also, of course, upon these two points
that Clerfayt was to march southward from the post at Wervicq, that had
been given _him_ as _his_ point of departure before dawn upon that
Saturday morning. If everything went perfectly, the great mass of the
allied army should have found itself, by noon of Saturday the 17th, as I
have said, astraddle of the Lille-Courtrai road, and effectively cutting
off the French troops to the north.
What was the nature of the wide countryside over which these various
movements were to take place?
It was part of that great plain of Flanders which stretches from the River
Scheldt almost unbroken to the Straits of Dover and the North Sea. In the
whole of the great oblong represented by my sketch map there is hardly a
point 150 feet above the water level of the main river valleys, while the
great mass of that territory is diversified by no more than very broad and
very shallow rolls of land, the crests of which are sometimes and
exceptionally as much as fifty feet above the troughs, but the greater
part thirty, twenty, or even less. Here and there an isolated hummock
shows upon the landscape, but the general impression of one who walks
across from the valley of the Lys to that of the Scheldt is of a flat,
monotonous land in which one retains no memory of ascent or descent, and
in which the eye but rarely perceives, and that only from specially chosen
points, any wide horizon.
To-day the greater part of this country suffers from the curse of
industrialism and repeats--of course, with far less degradation--the
terrible aspect of our own manufacturing towns. Roubaix and Tourcoing in
particular are huge straggling agglomerations of cotton-spinners and their
hands. A mass of railways and tramways cut the countryside, and the evil
presence of coal-smoke mars it everywhere: at least within the region of
Lille, Tourcoing, and Roubaix.
In May 1794, though a considerable industry had begun to grow up in Lille
itself, the wide, open countryside round the town was entirely
agricultural. Much of it was what soldiers call "blind" country: that is,
it was cut up into fields with numerous hedges; there were long farm walls
and a great number of small watercourses fringed with trees. But, on the
other hand, there was very little wood. Moreover, though there were few
places from which one could overlook any considerable view, the
"blindness" of the field, as a whole, has been much exaggerated in the
attempt to excuse or explain the disaster of which it was the theatre. The
southern part of it is open enough, and so is the north-eastern portion,
in which the first column operated. Of the soil no particular mention is
needed; most of the great roads were paved; the weather had created no
difficulty in the going, and the only trouble in this respect lay in the
northern part, where Clerfayt's command was condemned to advance over
patches of loose and difficult sand, which made the road, or rather rare
lanes, very heavy.
It will at once be perceived that, in view of the operations planned, one
principal obstacle exists in the terrain, the River Lys. Few bridges
crossed this stream, and for the purpose of turning the French position
and coming across the Lys from the north to the neighbourhood of Mouveaux,
there was in those days no bridge save the bridge at Wervicq (at the point
marked 6 on the plan at the beginning of this section); but this
difficulty we have seen to be lessened by the presence in Clerfayt's
command of a section of pontoons.
At first sight one might perceive no other considerable obstacle save the
Lys to the general movement of the allied army. But when the peculiar
course of the little River Marque is pointed out, and the nature of its
stream described, the reader will perceive that it exercised some little
effect upon the fortunes of the battle, and might have exercised a much
greater one to the advantage of the British troops had not the Duke of
York blundered in a fashion which will be later described.
In the first place, it should be noted that this little stream (it is no
wider than a canal, will barely allow two barges to pass in its lower
course, and will not float one to the southward of Lille) turns up quite
close to Roubaix, and at the nearest point is not a mile from the
market-place of that town.
Now the significance of such a conformation to the battlefield of
Tourcoing lay in the fact that it was impossible for any considerable
force to manoeuvre between the third column (which was marching upon
Roubaix) and the Marque River. Had the Marque not existed, Kinsky, with
the fourth column, would have been free to march parallel with York, just
as York marched parallel with Otto, while the Arch-Duke with his fifth
column, instead of having been given a rendezvous right down south at
Pont-a-Marcq (the point marked 5 on my sketch), would have gone up the
main road from St Amand to Lille, and have marched parallel with Kinsky,
just as Kinsky would have marched parallel with York. In other words, the
fourth and the fifth columns, instead of being ordered along the dotted
lines marked upon my sketch (the elbows in which lines correspond to the
crossing places of the Marque), would have proceeded along the
uninterrupted arrow lines which I have put by the side of them.
The Marque made all the difference. It compelled the fifth column to take
its roundabout road, and the fourth, detained by the delay of the fifth,
was held, as we shall see in what follows, for a whole day at one of the
crossings of the river.
The little stream has a deep and muddy bottom, and the fields upon its
banks are occasionally marshy. This feature has been exaggerated, as have
the other features I have mentioned, in order to explain or excuse the
defeat, but, at any rate, it prevented the use of crossing places other
than bridges. The Marque has no true fords, and there is no taking an
army across it, narrow as it is, save by the few bridges which then
existed. These bridges I have marked upon the sketch.
So far as the terrain is concerned, then, what we have to consider is
country, flat, but containing low defensive positions, largely cut up,
especially between the Scheldt and Roubaix, by hedges and walls, though
more open elsewhere, and particularly open towards the north: a serious
obstacle to the advance of one body in the shape of the River Lys; and
another obstacle, irritating rather than formidable in character, but
sufficient both by its course and its marshy soil to complicate the
advance, namely, the little River Marque.
* * * * *
As to the weather, it was misty but fine. The nights in bivouac were
passed without too much discomfort, and the only physical condition which
oppressed portions of the allied army consisted in the error of its
commanders, and proceeded from fatigue.