There may be many who will read all this not only with surprise, but

with skepticism. They live their intellectually clean lives, dwell in

safe, comfortable houses of the intellect and move on well-paved

educational streets, and never see or hear anything of those

inhabitants of the intellectual slums. If ever a letter like those

which pour in hundreds to the desk of the psychologist were to stray

into their mail, they would feel sure that they had to do with a

lunatic who belongs in an asylum under a physician's care. They have

no idea that not only their furnaceman and washwoman, but also their

tailor and their watchmaker, or perhaps the teacher of their children,

and, if they examine more carefully, three of their last dinner

guests, are strolling for hours or for a night, or living for seasons,

if not for a lifetime, in that world of superstition and

anti-intellectual mentality. Such people are not ill; they are

personally not even cranks; they are simply confused and unable to

live an ordered intellectual life. Their character and temperament and

their personality in every other respect may be faultless, but their

ideas are chaotic. They bring together the contradictory and make

contrasts out of the identical, and, far from any sound religious

belief or any true metaphysical philosophy, they simply mix any

mystical whims into the groups of thought which civilization has

brought into systematic order. Instead of trying to learn, they are

always longing for some illegitimate intellectual profit; they are

always trying to pick the pocket of the absolute.

It is not difficult to recognize the social conditions from which this

tendency springs. The fundamental one, after all, is the widely spread

lack of respect for the expert. Such a lack easily results from

democratic life, as democracy encourages the belief that every one can

judge about everything and can decide from his own resources what

ought to be thought and what ought to be done. Yet no one can claim

that it is truly a part of democracy itself and that the democratic

spirit would suffer if this view were suppressed. On the contrary,

democracy can never be fully successful and can never be carried

through in consistent purity until this greatest danger of the

democratic spirit of society is completely overcome and repressed by

an honest respect for the expert and a willing subordination of

judgment to his better knowledge. Another condition which makes our

country a favourite playground for fantastic vagaries is the strong

emphasis on the material sides of life, on business and business

success. The result is a kind of contrast effect. As the surface of

such a rushing business life lacks everything which would satisfy the

deeper longings of the soul, the effort to create an inner world is

readily pushed to mystical extremes in which all contact with the

practical world is lost, and finally all solid knowledge disregarded

and caricatured. The newspapers have their great share, too. Any

absurdity which a crank anywhere in the world brings forth is heralded

with a joy in the sensational impossibilities which must devastate the

mind of the naïve reader.

But whatever the sources of this prevailing superstition may be, there

ought to be no disagreement about its intellectual sinfulness and its

danger to society. We see some alarming consequences in the growth of

the revolt against scientific medicine. Millions of good Americans do

not want to know anything about physicians who have devoted their

lives to the study of medicine, but prefer any quack or humbug, any

healer or mystic. Yet for a queer reason the case of the treatment of

diseases shows the ruinous results of this social procedure very

slowly. Every scientific physician knows that many diseases can be

cured by autosuggestion in emotional excitement, and if this belief in

the quack produces the excitement and the suggestion, the patient may

really be cured, not on account but in spite of the quack who treats

him. The whole misery of this antimedical movement is therefore

somewhat veiled and alleviated. But this is not so in the fields of

real culture and knowledge. The belief in the absurdities there has

not even an autosuggestive value. It is simply destructive to the life

of civilized society. It is absurd for us to put our best energies to

work to build up a splendid system of education for the youth of the

whole nation, and at the same time to allow its structure to be

undermined by the millionfold intellectual depravity.

Of course it may be difficult to say what ought to be done. I feel

sure that society ought to suppress with relentless energy all those

parlours of the astrologists and palmists, of the scientific mediums

and spiritualists, of the quacks and prophets. Their announcements by

signs or in the public press ought to be stopped, and ought to be

treated by the postal department of the government as the

advertisements of other fraudulent enterprises are treated. A large

rôle in the campaign would have to be played by the newspapers, but

their best help would be rendered by negative action, by not

publishing anything of a superstitious and mystical type. The most

important part of the fight, however, is to recognize the danger

clearly, to acknowledge it frankly, and to see with open eyes how

alarmingly the evil has grown around us. No one will fancy that any

social schemes can be sufficient to bring superstition to an end, any

more than any one can expect that the present fight against city vice

will forever put a stop to sexual immorality. But that surely cannot

be an argument for giving up the battle against the moral perversities

of metropolitan life. The fact that we cannot be entirely successful

ought still less to be an argument for any leniency with the

intellectual perversities and the infectious diseases the germs of

which are disseminated in our world of honest culture by the

inhabitants of the cultural underworld.

IV

THOUGHT TRANSFERENCE

The harmony and soundness of society depend upon its inner unity of

mind. Social organization does not mean only an external fitting

together, but an internal equality of mind. Men must understand one

another in order to form a social unit, and such understanding

certainly means more than using the same words and the same grammar.

They must be able to grasp other men's point of view, they must have a

common world in which to work, and this demands that they mould the

world in the same forms of thought. If one calls green what another

calls sour, and one feels as noise what another feels as toothache,

they cannot enter into a social group. Yet it is no less confusing and

no less antisocial if the world which one sees as a system of causes

and effects is to another a realm of capricious, causeless, zigzag

happenings. The mental links which join society are threatened if some

live with their thoughts in a world of order and natural law, and

others in a mystical chaos.

This has nothing to do with differences of opinion. Society profits

from contrasting views, from discussion and struggle. The opposing

parties in a real debate understand each other well and are working

with the same logic and the same desire for order of thought. This

contrast between order and mysticism has still less to do with the

difference of knowledge and belief in a higher religious and

philosophical sense. There is no real antagonism between science and

religion, between experience and philosophical speculation. They point

to each other, they demand each other, and no social question is

involved when the interests of one man emphasize more the scholarly

search for scientific truth, and those of another concentrate

throughout his lifework on the emotional wisdom of religion. It is

quite different with mysticism and science; they are not two parties

of a debate on equal terms. They exclude each other, as the mystic

projects his feeling interests into those objects which the scientist

tries to analyze and to understand as effects of causes. Nothing is a

safer test of the cultural development of a society than the instinct

for the difference between religion and superstition. Mysticism is a

systematized superstition. It never undermines the true interests of

society more than when it goes to work with pseudo-scientific tools.

Its most repellent form, that of sheer spiritualism, has in recent

years declined somewhat, and the organizations for antilogical,

psychical research eke out a pitiable existence nowadays. But the

community of the silent or noisy believers in telepathy, mystical

foresight, clairvoyance, and wonder workers seems to increase.

The scientific psychologist might have a twofold contact with such

movements. His most natural interest is that of studying the mental

makeup of those who chase this will-o'-the-wisp. Their mental vagaries

and superstitious fancies are quite fascinating material for his

dissection. But for the interests of society an entirely different

effort is, after all, more consequential. The psychologist has no

right to avoid the trouble of examining conspicuous cases which

superficially seem to endorse the fantastic theories of the mentally

untrained. Such an investigation is his share, as indeed mental

occurrences generally stand in the centre of the alleged wonderful

facts. From this feeling of social responsibility some years ago I

approached the hysterical trickster, Madame Palladino, who had so much

inflamed the mystical imagination of the country, and from this

interest in the social aspect I undertook again recently a research

into the mental powers of Beulah Miller, who was well on the way to

bewilder the whole nation and thus to stir up the always latent mystic

inclinations of the community. It is a typical specimen of those cases

which can easily upset the loosely reasoning public and do tremendous

harm to the mental unity of the social organism. It seems worth while

to illuminate it in full detail.

Indeed, since the days when Madame Eusapia Palladino stirred the whole

country with her marvellous mystic powers, no case of psychical

mystery has engaged the interest of the nation as that of little

Beulah Miller in Warren, Rhode Island, has done. The story of her

wonderful performances has become a favourite feature of the Sunday

papers, and the small New England town for the first time in its long

history has been in the limelight. The reporters have made their

pilgrimages, and every one has returned bewildered and amazed. Here at

last the truth of telepathy was proved. Sworn affidavits of reliable

persons removed the last doubts; and I myself, with my long training

as a scientist, had to confess, when for the first time I had spent a

few hours with Beulah Miller, that I was as deeply startled and

overcome with wonder as I was after the first night with Eusapia

Palladino. Yet what a contrast! There the elderly, stout Italian woman

at a midnight hour, in dimly lighted rooms, in disreputable New York

quarters, where the palmists and mediums live in their world of sham

psychology, sitting in a trance state at a table surrounded by

spiritualistic believers who had to pay their entrance fees; here a

little, naïve, ten-year-old girl among her toys in the kitchen of her

parents' modest white cottage in a lovely country village! I never

felt a more uncanny, nerve-irritating atmosphere than in Palladino's

squalid quarters, and I do not remember more idyllic, peaceful

surroundings than when I sat between Beulah and her sister through

bright sunny mornings in their mother's home with their cat beside

them and the pet lamb coming into the room from the meadow. There

everything suggested fraud, and when at my second séance her foot was

caught behind the curtain and the whole humbug exposed, it was exactly

what I had expected. But here everything breathed sincerity and

naïveté and absence of fraud--yet my mere assurance cannot convince a

skeptic; we must examine the case carefully.

The claims are very simple: Here is a school child of ten years who is

able to read in the mind of any one present anything of which he is

thinking. If you take a card from a pack and look at it, and still

better if several people look at it, and best of all if her mother or

sister looks at it, too, Beulah will say at once which card it is,

although she may stand in the farthest corner of the room. She will

give you the date on any coin which you have in hand; in a book she

will tell you the particular word at which you are looking. Indeed, a

sworn affidavit reports still more surprising feats. Beulah gave

correctly the name of the reporter whom nobody else knew and the name

of the New York paper for which she is writing. At school she reads

words written on the blackboard with her back turned to it. At home

she knows what any visitor is hiding in his pocket.

The serious-minded man who is disgusted with spiritualistic charlatans

and their commercial humbug is naturally inclined here, too, at once

to offer the theory that all is fraud and that a detective would be

the right man to investigate the case. When the newspapers discovered

that I had begun to study the girl, I received from many sides letters

with suggestions to look for certain devices with which stage

performers carry out such tricks, such as marked cards and the

equipment of the magician. But whoever thinks of fraud here

misunderstands the whole situation. The psychical powers of Beulah

Miller were not brought before the public by the child or her family;

there was no desire for notoriety, and in spite of the very modest

circumstances in which this carpenter's family has to live, the facts

became known before any commercial possibility suggested itself.

The mother was startled by Beulah's psychical gifts because she

noticed two years ago that when the family was playing "Old Maid"

Beulah always knew in whose hands the dangerous queen was to be found.

Then they began to experiment with cards in the family circle, and her

ability to know of what the mother or the sister was thinking became

more and more interesting to them. Slowly her school friends began to

notice it, and children in the Sunday-school told the minister about

Beulah's queer mind-reading. All this time no newspaper had known

about it. One day the minister, when he passed the house, entered and

inquired whether those rumours were true. He had a little glass full

of honey in his pocket, and Beulah spelled the word honey at once. He

made some tests with coins, and every one was successful. This

minister, Rev. H. W. Watjen, told this to his friend Judge Mason, who

has lived in Warren for more than thirty years, and then both the

minister and the judge visited repeatedly the village where the

Millers live, performed a large number of experiments with cards and

coins and words, and became the friendly advisers of the mother, who

was still troubled by her doubt whether these supernatural gifts of

the child came from God or from the devil. Only through the agency of

these two well-known men, the Baptist minister and the judge, was the

public informed that a mysterious case existed in the neighbourhood of

Warren, and when the newspapers began to send their reporters and

strangers came to see the wonder, these two men decided who should see

the child. Of course, commercial propositions, invitations to give

performances on the vaudeville stage, soon began to pour in, but with

indignation the mother refused to listen to any such idea. Because of

my scientific interest in such psychological puzzles, the judge and

the minister turned to me to investigate the case. It is evident that

this whole social situation lacks every conceivable motive for fraud.

But this impression was strongly heightened by the behaviour of the

family and of the child during the study which I carried on in the

three weeks following. The mother, the twelve-year-old sister Gladys,

and Beulah herself were most willing to agree to anything which would

make the test difficult, and they themselves asked to have everything

tried with no member of the family in the room. Beulah was quite happy

to show her art under unaccustomed conditions like having her eyes

covered with thick bandages. When inadvertently some one turned a card

so that she could see it, she was the first to break out into childish

laughter at her having seen it. In short, everything indicated such

perfect sincerity, and the most careful examination yielded so

absolutely no trace of intentional fraud, that I can vouch for the

honesty of the intentions of all concerned in the experiments carried

on so far.

If fraud and humbug may certainly be excluded, the wiseacres will say

that the results must then have been a matter of chance coincidence.

No one can deny that chance may sometimes bring surprising results.

Dreams of far-distant accidents come true, and yet no one who

considers those millions of dreams which do not come true and which

therefore remain disregarded will acknowledge any prophetic power in

sleep. It may happen, if you are asked to call a name or a figure of

which another man is thinking, that you will strike the right one.

Moreover, recent experiments have shown that there is much natural

uniformity in the thoughts of men. Certain figures or names or things

more readily rush to the mind than others. Hence the chances that two

persons will be thinking of the same figure are much larger than would

appear from the mere calculation of probabilities. Yet even if we

make the largest possible concession to happy coincidences, there

cannot remain the slightest doubt that the experiments carried on

under standard conditions yielded results the correctness of which

endlessly surpasses any possible accidental outcome. We may take a

typical illustration: I drew cards which she could not possibly see,

while they were shown to the mother and sister sitting next to me,

Beulah sitting on the other side of the room. The first was a nine of

hearts; she said nine of hearts. The next was six of clubs, to which

she said first six of spades; when told it was not spades, she

answered clubs. The next was two of diamonds; her first figure was

four; when told that it was wrong, she corrected herself two, and

added diamonds. The next was nine of clubs, which she gave correctly;

seven of spades, she said at first seven of diamonds, then spades;

jack of spades, she gave correctly at once, and so on.

One other series: We had little cardboard squares on each of which was

a large single letter. I drew any three, put them into the cover of a

box, and while the mother, Gladys, and I were looking at the three

letters, Beulah, sitting beside us, looked at the ceiling. The first

were R-T-O. She said R-T-I. When told it was wrong, she added O. The

next were S-U-T; she gave S-U, and then wrongly R P Q, and finally T.

The next were N-A-R; she gave G N-A-S R. The following D-W-O she gave

D-W, but could not find the last letter. It is evident that every one

of the cards gave her fifty-two chances, and not more than one in

fifty-two would have been correct if it were only guessing, and as to

the letters, not more than one among twenty-six would have been chosen

correctly by chance. The given example demonstrates that of five cards

she gave three correctly, two half correctly, and those two mistakes

were rectified after the first wrong guess. The second experiment

demanded from her four times three letters. Of these twelve letters,

six were right at the first guess and five after one or two wrong

trials. Taking only this little list of card and letter experiments

together, we can say that the probabilities are only one to many

billions that such a result would ever come by chance.

Yet such correctness was not exceptional. On the contrary, I have no

series performed under these conditions which did not yield as

favourable an outcome as this. Some were even much more startling.

Once she gave six cards in succession correctly. It was no different

with word experiments. The printed word at which the sister and I

looked was stall; she spelled E S-T-O A-R I L-L. And when the word

was steam, she spelled L S-N K T-O A E-A-M; when it was glass, S G-L-R

A-S. Whenever a letter was wrong, she was told so and was allowed a

second or a third choice, but never more than three. It is evident

from these three illustrations that she gave the right letter in the

first place six times, and that the right letter was her second choice

four times, and her third choice three times, while no letter was

missed in three choices. Cases of this type again could never occur by

mere chance. The number of successful strokes in this last experiment

might be belittled by the claim that the last letters of the word were

guessed when the first letters had been found. But this was not the

case. First, even such a guess would have been chance. The word might

have been grave instead of grass, or star instead of stall. What is

much more important, however, is that a large number of other cases

proved that she was not aware of the words at all, but spelled the

letters without reference to their forming a word. Once I wrote

Chicago on a pad. The mother and sister gazed at the word, and Beulah

spelled correctly C-H-I-C-A-G, but made eight wrong efforts before she

found the closing O. In other cases, she did not notice that the word

was completed, and was trying to fish up still other letters from her

mind. Everything showed that the word as a word did not come to her

mind, but only the single letters. I leave entirely out of

consideration the marvels of mind-reading which were secured by the

judge and the minister, the male and female newspaper reporters,

before I took charge of the study of the case. I rely only on what I

saw and of which I took exact notes. I wrote down every wrong letter

and every wrong figure, and base my calculation only on this entirely

reliable material. Nevertheless, I must acknowledge it as a fact

beyond doubt that such results as I got regularly could never possibly

have been secured by mere coincidence and chance. As chance and fraud

are thus equally out of the question, we are obliged to seek for

another explanation.

There is one explanation which offers itself most readily: We saw that

in order to succeed, some one around her, preferably the mother and

sister, who stand nearest to her heart, have to know the words or the

cards. Those visual images must be in some one's mind, and she has the

unusual power of being able to read what is in the minds of those

others. Such an explanation even seems to some a very modest claim,

almost a kind of critical and skeptical view. The judge and the

minister, for instance, in accepting this idea of her mind-reading,

felt conservative, as through it they disclaimed any belief in

mysterious clairvoyance and telepathic powers. In the newspaper

stories, where the mysteries grew with the geographical distance from

Rhode Island, Beulah was said to be able to tell names or dates or

facts which no one present knew. It was asserted that she could give

the dates on the coins which any one had in his pocket without the

possessor himself knowing them, or that she could give a word in a

book on which some one was holding his finger without reading it. No

wonder that the public felt sure that she could just as well discover

secrets which no one knows and be aware of far-distant happenings. It

is only one step from this to the belief in a prophetic foresight of

what is to come. For most unthinking people, mind-reading leads in

this fashion over to the whole world of mysticism. In sharp contrast

to such vagaries, the critical observers like the judge and the

minister insisted that there was no trace of such prophetic gifts or

of such telepathic wonders to be found, and that everything resolves

itself simply into mere mind-reading. Some one in the neighbourhood

must have the idea in mind and must fixedly think of it. Only then

will it arise in Beulah's consciousness.

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