Through a singular aberration, the dismemberment of Turkey and the
Turks’ eviction from Europe were being advocated at a time when the
idea of the restoration of Russia had not yet been given up, for the
various States now detached from the former Russian Empire had not
yet been definitely recognised; and among the promoters or supporters
of this policy were many defenders of old Russia under a more or less
transparent disguise.
Though, from the point of view of European policy, the situation of
the two countries widely differed, by dismembering Turkey before the
Russian question was settled, at least in its solvable part—viz., with
regard to the heterogeneous peoples—the Allies made a mistake of the
same kind, or at least of the same magnitude, as the one they had made
when they dismembered the Dual Monarchy and yet did not destroy German
unity, or rather Prussian hegemony.
Russia had already taken possession of several Turkish territories, and
not so long ago she plainly declared she had not given up her ambitious
designs on Constantinople.
This open hostility of the Russians toward the Turks is of very long
standing.
The first Russian attacks against Turkey, as explained in the early
part of this book, date back to 1672. After the victory of Poltava,
in 1709, which the next year gave him Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia,
Peter the Great turned against the Turks, the allies of Charles XII,
King of Sweden. But Charles XII, who had sought shelter at Bender, in
Turkey, after the battle of Poltava, brought over the Grand Vizier
Baltaji Mohammed to his views, and induced him to declare war on
Turkey. Peter the Great, encircled by the Turks at Hush, between the
Pruth and the marshes, was going to capitulate when Catherine I, in
order to save him, made peace by bribing the Grand Vizier, who soon
after was exiled to Mytilene. The Turks only demanded the restitution
of Azov in 1711. In 1732 Peter the Great took from Persia the provinces
of Daghestan, Derbend, Shirwan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. At that time,
while Villeneuve was ambassador at Constantinople (1728-41) and Austria
and Russia began to turn greedy eyes on Turkey, France declared “the
existence of Turkey was necessary to the peace of Christendom,” and
later on Choiseul-Gouffier, who was the French king’s last ambassador
from 1784 to 1792, strove to save the Turks from the ambitious designs
of Catherine II.
Catherine, taking advantage of the intrigues carried on in the Morea
with two Greeks, Papas-Oghlou and Benaki, dispatched a fleet to the
Mediterranean to bring about a Greek rising against Turkey; the Ottoman
fleet which sought shelter at Tchesmé, on the coast of Asia Minor, was
burnt by Russian fireships on July 7, 1770.
After the 1770-74 war, the Porte, which was Poland’s ally, lost
Bukovina and Lesser Tatary, whose independence was recognised by the
treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji on July 21, 1774, but which became a Russian
province in 1783. The treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji ceded Kinburn and
Yenikale to Russia, left to the Christians the principalities lying to
the north of the Danube, and guaranteed the Orthodox Greeks’ liberty
under the patronage of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople.
Catherine II also compelled the Turks by the same treaty not to defend
the independence of Poland, threatened by Russia with the complicity of
the Great Powers, and to give her a right of intervention in their home
affairs. The Tatars of the Crimea and Kuban, detached from Turkey, soon
after fell under the Russian sway, in 1783. The Sultan even had to sign
a treaty granting a right of free navigation in the Black Sea and in
the rivers of his empire.
About the same time the European Powers began to interfere in
Turkey: that was the beginning of the “Eastern question.” In
opposition to the Austro-Russian alliance of Catherine and Joseph II,
England, dissatisfied with Russia’s attitude in the American War of
Independence, and wishing to find allies in Germany to counterbalance
Russian influence in Europe, concluded an alliance with Prussia,
Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. The death of Frederic II soon put an end to
this coalition, and Russia’s unfriendly attitude, her encroachments in
Caucasus, and her territorial claims in Bessarabia, compelled Turkey
on August 16, 1787, to declare war on Catherine, and Joseph II entered
into the war in 1788. The Austrians took Khotin; the Turkish fleet was
destroyed at Otchakov; Belgrade fell on October 8, 1789. Then Leopold,
Joseph II’s brother, left the Turks and made peace with Turkey at
Sistova on August 4, 1791. The Russians, who had defeated the Turks
at Machin, were about to invade the Empire when, as a result of the
intervention of England and Prussia, a treaty of peace was signed at
Jassy, by which the Dniester became the new frontier between the two
States. Thus Russia, who owing to the perturbed state of Europe was
preparing to dismember Poland, was compelled to give up her dream of
restoring the Byzantine Empire.
After the 1809-12 war, Turkey lost the provinces lying between the
Dnieper and the Danube which were ceded to Russia by the treaty of
Bukharest.
Russia, who, by the convention of Akkerman in October, 1826,
had compelled Turkey to recognise the autonomy of Serbia and
Moldo-Wallachia and cede her the ports of the coast of Circassia
and Abkasia, declared war on her again on April 26, 1828, after the
manifesto she had issued to her Moslem subjects on December 28,
1827. The Russians took Braila, advanced as far as Shumla, captured
Varna, and laid siege to Silistria, but the plague and food shortage
compelled them to make a disastrous retreat. In Asia they took Kars,
Akhalzikel, and Bayazid. The next year they entered Erzerum; Diebitch
captured Silistria, outflanked the Grand Vizier’s army shut up in
Shumla, crossed the Balkan mountains, and laid siege to Adrianople. On
September 14, 1820, Turkey signed a treaty in the latter town, which
put Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia under Russian protectorate, and by
which she ceded to Russia all the coast of Transcaucasia, granted her
the free passage of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and promised to
pay a war contribution of 137 million francs.
In 1833 Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, who, not having been able to
obtain the Morea through the Powers’ support, wanted to capture Syria,
defeated the Turks at Konia and threatened Constantinople. The Tsar,
Nicholas I, who hoped he could turn Turkey into a kind of Russian
protectorate, then sent Mouraviev to Mahmoud to offer to put at his
disposal a fleet and an army to fight with Mehemet Ali. A Russian fleet
came and cast anchor before Constantinople, and a Russian detachment
landed in the town. But then France, Austria, and Prussia, perhaps
foreseeing the danger of a Russian occupation which might pave the
way to a definite possession, asked the Sultan to make the necessary
concessions to his vassal, and the latter to accept them. The treaty of
Kutahia, signed on May 4, 1833, gave the Pasha of Egypt the whole of
Syria and the province of Adana. Russia withdrew her troops, but did
not lay down arms, and thus Count Orlov compelled the Porte to sign
the treaty of Unkiar-i-Skelessi, which stipulated an offensive and
defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey, and the closing of the
Dardanelles to the other Powers. Turkey was now under Russian tutelage.
After the defection of Ahmed Pasha, who led the Turkish fleet
at Alexandria, Great Britain, lest Russia should establish her
protectorate over Turkey, offered to France, through Lord Palmerston,
to participate in a naval demonstration, but France declined
the offer. Metternich then suggested a conference between the
representatives of the five Great Powers, in order to substitute their
guarantee for a Turkish protectorate. On July 27, 1839, the ambassadors
handed the Sublime Porte a note communicating their agreement, and
advising that no definite decision should be taken without their
co-operation. Then England, having no further fear of Russian
intervention, turned against Mehemet Ali, and Baron de Brunov even
proposed an Anglo-Russian agreement.
Owing to the intervention of Austria, which was averse to a war with
France, the question of Egypt was only settled on July 13, 1841, by
a hatti-sherif, which gave Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession of
Egypt, and by the treaty of London, which guaranteed the neutrality
of the Straits, as Russia wanted to control the Straits and conquer
Constantinople to free the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula from
the so-called Ottoman tyranny, and “relight the tapers which had been
put out by the Turks” in St. Sophia, restored to Orthodoxy. France,
following the old traditions of her foreign policy and in agreement
with England, confined the Russians within the Black Sea by the
convention of the Straits in 1841, and thus secured, not the integrity,
but the existence of the Turkish Empire.
But the Tsar, Nicholas I, who was bent on defending the Greek faith
within the Ottoman Empire, was anxious to see Turkey pursue the work
of the Tanzimat—_i.e._, the new régime—confirmed by the promulgation
by Abdul Mejid of the hatti-sherif of Gulhané on November 3, 1839. In
1844 he made overtures concerning the partition of Turkey, to England,
to which the latter country turned a deaf ear. Thanks to the support of
Great Britain and France, the Turkish troops, which had been sent to
Moldavia and Wallachia after the riots which had broken out after the
revolution, compelled the Tsar in 1849-51 to withdraw his army beyond
the Pruth.
In 1850 France protested against the encroachments of Russia in the
East, who, in order to protect the Greek monks living in Palestine and
secure her own religious domination, wanted to deprive the Roman monks
of their time-honoured rights over the Christian sanctuaries.
In 1853 the Tsar sent Prince Menshikov to Constantinople in order to
demand a formal treaty granting the Greek Church religious independence
and temporal privileges. The Sublime Porte, backed by France and
England, rejected the ultimatum. The latter Powers then sent a
fleet to the Dardanelles, and the next month—on July 4, 1853—Russia
occupied Moldavia and Wallachia. At the instigation of Austria, the
Powers assembled at Vienna on the 24th of the same month drew up a
conciliatory note, which was rejected by Russia. Then the English
fleet sailed up the Dardanelles, and on October 4 Turkey declared war
on Russia. Austria tried again, at the Vienna Conference which she
reopened in December, 1853, to bring about an understanding between
Russia and Turkey. But Nicholas I declared that he meant to treat
only with England and Prussia to restore peace in the East, which
Turkey looked upon as an affront. He also rejected Napoleon III’s
mediation on January 29, 1854, and the Franco-English summons on
February 27, upon which France declared war on him. Notwithstanding
the political views which unfortunately are still held by most of the
present diplomatists, and in pursuance of which the Powers had already
checked Mehemet Ali’s success and prevented Turkey resuming her former
state, France and England realised the dangerous consequences of the
Russian threat and backed Turkey. In consequence of the manœuvres of
Austria and the unwillingness of Prussia, who had declared “she would
never fight against Russia,” the Allies, who were at Varna, instead
of attacking the principalities, decided to launch into the Crimean
expedition. Finally, after the ultimatum drawn up by Austria, to which
the Emperor Alexander submitted at the instigation of Prussia, a treaty
of peace signed in Paris on March 30, 1856, recognised the integrity
of Turkey, abolished the Russian protectorate over the principalities,
and guaranteed the independence of Serbia, Moldavia, and Wallachia,
under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. Our diplomats seem then
to have partly realised the extent of the danger constituted by the
Slavs, and to have understood that the Turks, by driving back the Slavs
and keeping them away from Western and Mediterranean Europe since the
fourteenth century, had enabled Western civilisation to develop.
As the influence of France in Turkey was imperilled after her defeat
in 1870, Russia took advantage of this to declare she would no longer
submit to the most important clauses of the London treaty of March
13, 1871. Russia, whose ambassador in Turkey at that time was General
Ignatiev, took in hand the cause of the independence of the Bulgarian
Church, for which, in 1870, she had obtained the creation of a national
exarchate with its own hierarchy, which had exasperated the Phanar at
Constantinople and brought about deadly encounters between Turks and
Bulgarians.
In 1875 Russia, alarmed at the reforms instituted by Turkey, and
fearing the European organisation she was attempting to introduce
into the Empire might strengthen it and thus prove an obstacle to the
realisation of her designs, fomented a Christian rising in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which was a pretext for her to declare war on Turkey.
Russia, backed by the Bulgarians, obliged Turkey to agree to an
armistice and to an International Conference at Constantinople. In
consequence of the rejection by Turkey of the protocol of London and
the Russian comminatory note which followed it, Russia carried on the
hostilities which, after the defeat of Plevna in Europe and the capture
of Kars in Asia, led to the negotiations of San Stefano, on March 3,
1878.
Lastly, in the same year, on the occasion of the treaty of Berlin,
which gave Kars to Russia and modified the San Stefano preliminaries
by cancelling several of the advantages Russia hoped to obtain,
France, pursuing her time-honoured policy, showed clearly her sympathy
for Turkey, by bringing to bear on her behalf the influence she had
regained since 1871.
By so doing, France incurred Germany’s anger, for we have already
shown the latter country’s sympathy for Slavism. As recent events have
proved once more, an alliance with Russia could only be brought about
by a corresponding understanding with Germany, since Russia, where
German influence has been replaced by Slavonic influence, is now being
invincibly drawn towards Germany, where Slavonic influence is now
prevalent. This twofold understanding could only be brought about by
sacrificing the whole of Western Europe and all her old civilisation.
The Europe “which ends on the Elbe,” as has been said, would become
more and more insignificant in such a political concept, and there
would only remain in the world, standing face to face for a decisive
struggle, the Germano-Russians and the Anglo-Saxons.
Spurred on by the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to Bulgaria, consequent
on the rising of September 18, 1885, at Philippopolis, the Macedonian
Slavs carried on an agitation the next year, in 1886, in favour of
their union with Bulgaria, and resorted to an insurrection in 1895-96.
Lastly, the two Balkan wars of 1912-13, notwithstanding the complexity
and intricacy of the interests at stake, may be looked upon to a
certain extent as a fresh outcome of the Slavonic pressure and the
ambitions of Orthodoxy.
* * * * *
The Russians, who had driven back the Turanian peoples to Turkistan,
began the conquest of this country in 1815. From 1825 to 1840 they
subdued the Khirgiz. They took Khiva in 1854, and in 1864 conquered
the lower valley of the Syr Daria. In 1863 they occupied Tashkent, and
in 1867 grouped the territories they had conquered under the authority
of the Governor-General of Turkistan. In 1873 they occupied all the
country lying between the Caspian Sea and the Aral Sea, and in 1876
took Kokand.
Even before the war, as has already been seen, Russia had turned her
attention in the East towards Armenia, who, owing to her situation,
could best serve her policy of expansion in Asia Minor. According to
the plans of the Imperial Russian Government set forth on June 8, 1813,
Armenia was to be converted into an autonomous province under the power
of a governor-general, including the vilayets of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis,
Diarbekir, Kharput, and Sivas, with the exception of a few territories
whose boundaries had not yet been fixed. But in a memorandum presented
at the same time, the Imperial Russian Government insisted upon “the
close connection between the Armenian question and the problems the
Russian administration had to solve in Transcaucasia.” These plans lay
in abeyance, for they were opposed by the German policy, which was
hostile to any Russian encroachment on Turkish territories; and Russia,
on the other hand, prevented Germany obtaining the concession of a
railway line which was to connect the Turkish ports on the Black Sea,
Samsun and Trebizond, with the Baghdad Railway and the Mediterranean
Sea at Alexandretta, and settling down on the coast of the Black Sea.
As the Entente had given Russia a free hand, the latter country, as
has been seen, resumed the realisation of her plans as soon as war
broke out. Russia, who had begun the conquest of Caucasus in 1797 and
of the Transcaspian isthmus from 1828 to 1878, occupied Upper Armenia
in 1914-15. The Young Turks, who believed in the triumph of Germany,
expected that, thanks to the latter, they could hold in check the
Russian designs, and for this reason stood by her side.
Meanwhile the Russian policy with regard to Turkey asserted itself more
and more energetically, especially in reference to Constantinople, so
that the antagonism of the two nations, created by Muscovite ambition,
had grown into a deep and lasting hostility.
It was recommended in the testament which is supposed to have been
written by Peter the Great—
“Article 9. To draw as close as possible to Constantinople and
India, for he who rules over that city will rule over the world.
It is advisable, therefore, to bring about continual wars, now in
Turkey, now in Persia, to establish shipbuilding yards on the Black
Sea, gradually to get the mastery of that sea and of the Baltic
Sea—the possession of these two seas being absolutely necessary
for the triumph of our plans—to hurry on the decay of Persia, to
advance as far as the Persian Gulf, to restore the once thriving
Eastern trade, if possible through Syria, and to advance as far as
India, the emporium of the world.
“When once we are there, we shall no longer be dependent on English
gold.
“Article 11. To show the House of Austria it has an interest in
ejecting the Turks from Europe, and to neutralise her jealousy when
we shall conquer Constantinople, either by bringing about a war
between her and the old European States, or by giving her a share
of the conquest—and take it back from her later on.”
Russia never gave up this policy; indeed, she did not carry out her
plans by force of arms, for the other Powers would have opposed
them; but she resorted to all possible means to ensure its triumph.
She constantly aimed at the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by
supporting and grouping the Christian elements included in this empire,
especially those of Slavonic race and Orthodox faith; and thus she
really partitioned the Empire and bound to herself the old Ottoman
provinces now raised to the rank of autonomous States. She acted most
cautiously, and in order to carry out her plans peacefully she sought
to dismember Turkey gradually and weaken her in order to finally rule
over her. It has been rightly said that as early as 1770 the Russians
opened the Eastern question exactly as it stands to-day, and already
advocated the solution they have always insisted upon.[45]
A century ago Alexander I declared it was time to drive the Turks out
of Europe. Talleyrand, in the account he gave of the conversations
between that Emperor and the French ambassador, relates that he said
one day:
“Now is the time to give the plans laid down by us at Tilsit the
liberal aspect that befits the deeds of enlightened sovereigns. Our
age, still more than our policy, requires that the Turks be driven
into Asia; it will be a noble deed to free these beautiful lands.
Humanity wants the eviction of those barbarians; civilisation
demands it.”
But Napoleon had fully understood the Russian policy, for at the end
of his life he said at St. Helena: “I could have shared Turkey with
Russia; many a time did I speak about it with the Emperor, Alexander
I, but every time Constantinople proved the stumbling-block. The Tsar
demanded it, and I could not cede it; for it is too precious a key; it
is worth an empire.”
At the memorable sitting of the House of Commons of March 29, 1791,
some speakers expressed the anxiety felt in Great Britain, just
after Catherine II had annexed the Crimea, lest the Russians should
capture the whole of the East. But Fox, the leader of the Liberal
party, declared he saw no ground for fear in the constant increase of
Muscovite power; he did his best to please the Tsarina, who, on her
side, continued to flatter him to obtain what she wanted from England;
he recalled that the British themselves had opened the Mediterranean to
Russian ships twenty years before, and he had told the French Minister
Vergennes, who desired him to protest against the annexation of the
Crimea, that Great Britain did not wish to raise any difficulty with
Catherine II.
Unfortunately, the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s ambassador, and
the Comte de Bonneval, who had been converted to Islam, had been
the last Frenchmen who had supported the Sublime Porte against the
Russian Tsar’s hostility and endeavoured to use Islam as the protector
of the liberty of peoples imperilled by the Tsars; and yet this old
policy of France had the advantage both of benefiting French trade and
counterbalancing the power of the enemies of France.[46] On the other
hand, at the Congress of Sistovo in 1791, Sir Robert Murray Keith, who
acted as mediator in the conclusion of the Austro-Turkish treaty of
peace, recommended his fellow-countrymen “to let the Turks dwindle
down in their own dull way.” So now French policy and English policy
were going the same way.
During the reign of Charles X, the Polignac Cabinet was willing to
sacrifice Constantinople to the Russians in return for the left bank
of the Rhine, and in 1828 Chateaubriand, French ambassador at Rome,
favoured an alliance with the Tsar in order to obtain the revision of
the 1815 treaties, at the cost of Constantinople. Moreover, Admiral Sir
Edward Codrington, by destroying the Turco-Egyptian fleet at Navarino
on October 20, 1827, with the combined fleets of Great Britain, France,
and Russia, furthered the Russian Tsar’s plans.
As the direct capture of the Straits was bound to raise diplomatic
difficulties, Nicholas I, on September 4, 1892, summoned a secret
council to discuss what policy Russia was to pursue on this point.
The opinion which prevailed was expressed in a memorandum drawn up
by a former diplomatist, Dimitri Dashkov, then Minister of Justice,
and in a draft partition of the Turkish Empire penned by a Greek,
Capodistria. This secret committee, dreading the opposition of the
Western States, decided to postpone the partition lest, as Great
Britain and France refused their consent, it should not finally benefit
the designs of Russia and Greece on Constantinople. These secret
debates have been summed up in a book published in 1877;[47] and M.
Goriainov, in the book he wrote on this question in 1910,[48] thought
it proper to praise the consistent magnanimity of the Tsars towards the
Turks—whereas the policy which maintained that no reforms would ever
be instituted by Turkey of her own free-will if they were not urged
on by diplomatic intrigues or international interference, and that
“the sick man” could only be restored to health by the intervention of
Christendom and under the Orthodox tutelage, was the real cause of the
decay of Turkey and the origin of all the intricacies of the Eastern
problem.
In 1830 Lord Holland, Fox’s nephew—it will be remembered that on
March 29, 1791, Fox had said in the House of Commons he was proud of
supporting Russia’s advance to the East, in opposition to William
Pitt, who wanted to admit Turkey into the European concert—declared he
was sorry, as “a citizen of the world,” that the Russians had not yet
settled down in the Golden Horn.
Besides, whereas the Tories felt some anxiety at the territorial
development of Russia—without thinking of making use of Turkey to
consolidate the position in the East—the Whigs, on the contrary, to use
the words of Sir Robert Adair in 1842, thought they could bring the
Muscovite Empire into the wake of the United Kingdom.
In June, 1844, the Tsar himself came to London in order to induce Great
Britain to approve his Eastern policy, and Russian diplomacy felt so
confident she could rely on the support of the English Liberal Cabinet
that in 1853 Nicholas I, in the overtures made to Sir Hamilton Seymour,
expressed his conviction that he could settle the Turkish problem in
ten minutes’ conversation with Lord Aberdeen.
On June 4, 1878, Lord Beaconsfield, who looked upon the part of England
in the East as that of a moral protectorate over Islam and a mediator
between Europe and Asia, by ensuring the institution of a system of
reforms, signed a treaty of alliance with Turkey, by which England
pledged herself to protect the Porte against Russian greediness in
Asia. Unfortunately, Mr. Gladstone, under the influence of the ideas we
have already expounded,[49] soon reversed the Eastern policy of England
and unconsciously made his country the Tsar’s ally against Turkey.
Russia, to whom it was now impossible, since the Bulgarians and
Rumanians were no longer under Ottoman dominion, to reach the shores
of the Bosphorus through Thrace and to conquer Constantinople and the
Straits, which had been the aim of her policy for centuries, then
turned her designs towards Turkish Armenia and Anatolia, as we have
just seen, in order to reach Constantinople through Asia.
Tiutshev, in one of his poems entitled _Russian Geography_, said:
“Moscow, Peter’s town, and Constantine’s town, are the three sacred
capitals of the Russian Empire. But how far do its frontiers extend
to the north and the east, to the south and the west? Fate will
reveal it in the future. Seven inland seas and seven great rivers,
from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China, from the Volga
to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian
Empire, and it will last through untold centuries! So did the
Spirit predict. So did Daniel prophesy!”
And in another place:
“Soon will the prophecy be fulfilled and the fateful time come!
And in regenerated Byzantium the ancient vaults of St. Sophia will
shelter Christ’s altar again. Kneel down before that altar, thou
Russian Tsar, and rise, thou Tsar of all the Slavs.”
The manœuvres in which Great Britain and Russia indulged during the
first Balkan crisis in regard to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
are another striking proof of the rivalry between these two nations
concerning the Straits, for they plainly show that their possession
was still the chief ambition of Russia, and that Great Britain, on the
other hand, was still determined to control the Straits directly or
indirectly, as she could not possibly seize them openly.
At the time of that annexation, the Western Powers and Russia had
proposed that a conference should be summoned to decide the fate of
that country. But this proposal did not please Germany, who, though
she had a right to be angry with Austria, who had neither consulted
nor warned her, yet wanted to reconcile the patronising attitude she
had assumed towards Turkey with her obligations as an ally of the Dual
Monarchy. So Russia was obliged to submit to the annexation, and the
idea of a conference was given up after Prince von Bülow had stated
that Germany would back Austria, but that in regard to the indemnity
claimed by Turkey as a compensation for the loss of her suzerainty
over Bosnia-Herzegovina she would support Turkey. Meanwhile, M. de
Tschirschkly, German ambassador at Vienna, did his best both to isolate
Austria and to bring her to rely more and more on German friendship
by striving to disturb the traditional friendly intercourse between
London and Vienna; and he took advantage of the disappointment caused
in Austria by the breaking off of the negotiations with Turkey to make
England responsible for their failure and embitter the enmity already
prevailing between Austria and Russia.
Now at this juncture Russia is reported to have declared her
willingness to support Turkey, in return for which she wanted her
to open up the Straits to her ships. This secret understanding was
revealed to the British Government by Kiamil Pasha, a friend of
England, who, at the suggestion of the British embassy, asked Russia
whether, in case war should break out, she would take up arms in favour
of Turkey. At the same time England hinted to the St. Petersburg
Cabinet that she was aware it had opened negotiations, and that, should
these negotiations bring about an understanding between Turkey and
Russia, the relations between their two countries would be severely
strained, and the situation would become critical. And so it turned out
that Turkey too submitted to the annexation, and did not insist upon
the meeting of the Conference.
Meanwhile Russia had no thought of giving up her designs on
Constantinople, as is proved by the revelations made in the Memoirs of
Count Witte, the well-known Russian diplomatist and ex-Prime Minister,
which were published in the _Daily Telegraph_ in January, 1921. In one
of his articles, concerning Nicholas II’s character, we read that a
Russo-Turkish war had been planned at the suggestion of M. de Nelidov,
at that time Russian ambassador to Turkey.
“In the latter period of the year 1896, writes Count Witte, there
was a massacre of Armenians in Constantinople, preceded by a
similar massacre in Asia Minor. In October, His Majesty returned
from abroad, and Nelidov, our ambassador to Turkey, came to St.
Petersburg. His arrival gave rise to rumours about various measures
which were going to be taken against Turkey. These rumours forced
me to submit to His Majesty a memorandum, in which I stated my
views on Turkey, and advised against the use of force. On November
21 (December 3) I received a secret memoir drafted by Nelidov. The
ambassador spoke in vague terms about the alarming situation in
Turkey, and suggested that we should foment incidents which would
create the legal right and the physical possibility of seizing the
Upper Bosphorus. Nelidov’s suggestion was discussed by a special
conference presided over by His Majesty. The ambassador insisted
that a far-reaching upheaval was bound to occur in the near future
in the Ottoman Empire, and that to safeguard our interests we must
occupy the Upper Bosphorus. He was naturally supported by the War
Minister and the Chief of Staff, General Oberouchev, for whom the
occupation of the Bosphorus and, if possible, of Constantinople,
was a veritable _idée fixe_. The other Ministers refrained from
expressing their opinion on the subject, so that it fell to my lot
to oppose this disastrous project, which I did with vigour and
determination. I pointed out that the plan under consideration
would eventually precipitate a general European war, and shatter
the brilliant political and financial position in which Emperor
Alexander III left Russia.
“The Emperor at first confined himself to questioning the members
of the Conference. When the discussion was closed he declared that
he shared the ambassador’s view. Thus the matter was settled, at
least in principle—namely, it was decided to bring about such
events in Constantinople as would furnish us with a serious pretext
for landing troops and occupying the Upper Bosphorus. The military
authorities at Odessa and Sebastopol were instructed immediately
to start the necessary preparations for the landing of troops
in Turkey. It was also agreed that at the moment which Nelidov
considered opportune for the landing he would give the signal by
sending a telegram to our financial agent in London, requesting
him to purchase a stated amount of grain. The dispatch was to be
immediately transmitted to the Director of the Imperial Bank and
also to the Minister of the Navy.”
M. de Nelidov went back to Constantinople to carry out this plan, and
war seemed so imminent that one of the secretaries of the director of
the Imperial Bank “kept vigil all night long, ready to receive the
fateful telegram,” and was instructed to transmit it to the director.
“Fearing the consequences of the act, I could not refrain from
sharing my apprehensions with several persons very intimate
with the Emperor, notably Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich and
Pobiedonostzev.... I do not know whether it was the influence of
these men or the influence of that Power which rules the whole
world and which we call God, but His Majesty changed his mind
and instructed Nelidov, soon after the latter’s departure for
Constantinople, to give up his designs.”
After the attack by the Turkish ships on October 29 and 30, the
Emperor Nicholas, on November, 1914, issued a manifesto to his people,
which, though sibylline in tone, plainly asserted Russia’s designs
on Constantinople and showed that she meant to avail herself of
circumstances to carry them out.
“The Turkish fleet, led by Germans, has dared treacherously to
attack our Black Sea coast. We, with all the peoples of Russia,
feel quite confident that Turkey’s rash intervention will only
hurry on her doom, and open to Russia the way to the solution of
the historical problem bequeathed to us by our forefathers on the
shores of the Black Sea.”[50]
In the course of an audience which Nicholas II granted to M. Maurice
Paléologue, French ambassador, at Tsarkoie-Selo on November 21,
1914, and in the course of which he laid down the main lines of the
peace which he thought should be dictated to the Central Powers, he
considered how the settlement of the war would affect the other
nations, and declared:
“In Asia Minor I shall have naturally to take care of the
Armenians; I could not possibly replace them under the Turkish
yoke. Shall I have to annex Armenia? I will annex it only if the
Armenians expressly ask me to do so. Otherwise, I will grant them
an autonomous régime. Lastly, I shall have to ensure for my Empire
the free passage of the Straits....
“I have not quite made up my mind on many points; these are such
fateful times! Yet I have arrived at two definite conclusions:
first, that the Turks must be driven out of Europe; secondly,
that Constantinople should henceforth be a neutral town, under an
international régime. Of course, the Mussulmans would have every
guarantee for the protection of their sanctuaries and shrines.
Northern Thrace, up to the Enos-Midia line, would fall to Bulgaria.
The rest of the country, between this line and the coast, with
the exception of the Constantinople area, would be assigned to
Russia.”[51]
About the end of 1914, according to M. Maurice Paléologue, public
opinion in Russia was unanimous on this point, that—
“The possession of the Straits is of vital interest to the Empire
and far exceeds in importance all the territorial advantages
Russia might obtain at the expense of Germany and Austria.... The
neutralisation of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles would be an
unsatisfactory, mongrel compromise, pregnant with dangers for the
future.... Constantinople must be a Russian town.... The Black Sea
must become a Russian lake.”[52]
In the formal statement of the Government policy read on February 9,
1915, at the opening of the Duma, after mention had been made of the
victories gained by the Russian armies over Turkey, the following
sentence occurred: “Brighter and brighter does the radiant future of
Russia shine before us in yonder place, on the shores of the sea which
washes the battlements of Constantinople.”
Sazonov only hinted at the question of the Straits in the speech which
followed, but he declared: “The day is drawing near when the economic
and political problems arising from the necessity for Russia to have
free access to the open sea will be solved.”
Evgraf Kovalevsky, deputy of Moscow, stated in his turn: “The Straits
are the key of our house, so they must be handed over to us, together
with the Straits area.”
Then, M. Miliukov, after thanking M. Sazonov for his declaration,
concluded his speech in these terms:
“We are happy to hear that our national task will soon be
completed. We now feel confident that the possession of
Constantinople and the Straits will be ensured in due time, through
diplomatic and military channels.”
The question of Constantinople captivated public opinion at that time,
and in February, 1915, it engrossed the minds of all prominent men in
Russia. Public feeling agreed with the declarations we have just read,
that a victorious peace must give Constantinople to Russia.
At the beginning of March, M. Sazonov could not refrain from raising
this question with the ambassadors of France and Great Britain, and
asked them to give him an assurance that the Governments of London and
Paris would consent after the war to the annexation of Constantinople
by Russia.[53]
On March 3, at the dinner given in honour of General Pau, Nicholas
II talked on the same subject to M. Paléologue. The Emperor, after
recalling the conversation he had had with him in November of the
previous year, in the course of which he had said France could rely
upon Russia, and telling him he had not altered his mind, said:
“There is a point, however, about which recent events compel me to
say a few words; I mean Constantinople. The question of the Straits
engrosses the Russian mind more and more every day. I consider I
have no right to impose on my people the dreadful sacrifices of
the present war without granting as a reward the fulfilment of
their age-long aspirations. So I have made up my mind, sir. I do
not want half-measures to solve the problem of Constantinople and
the Straits. The solution I pointed out to you in November last
is the only possible one, the only practical one. The city of
Constantinople and Southern Thrace must be incorporated into my
Empire; yet I have no objection, as far as the administration of
the city is concerned, to a special régime making allowance for
foreign interests. You know that England has already sent me her
approval. If any minor difficulties should arise, I rely on your
Government to help me to smooth them.”[54]
On March 8, M. Paléologue told M. Sazonov that he had just received
a telegram from M. Delcassé, and was in a position to give him the
assurance that he could rely on the French Government’s friendly
offices in settling the questions of Constantinople and the Straits
according to the wishes of Russia. M. Sazonov thanked him very warmly,
and added these significant words: “Your Government has done the
Alliance a priceless service ... a service the extent of which perhaps
you do not realise.”[55] On the 15th the French Government, having
examined the conditions of peace which the Allies meant to impose on
Turkey, informed the Russian Government of the compensations France
required in Syria.
On March 16, after being received by the Emperor at the General
Headquarters at Baranovitchi, the Grand Duke Nicholas, speaking as
commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, had a formal conversation
with M. Paléologue, speaking as French ambassador, and requested him
to inform his Government that he considered the immediate military
co-operation of Rumania and Italy as an imperative necessity. The
French ambassador suggested that the Russian claims on Constantinople
and the Straits would, perhaps, prevent Rumania and Italy joining the
Allies. Upon which the Grand Duke answered: “That’s the business of
diplomacy. I won’t have anything to do with it.”[56]
Finally, the following letter of M. Koudashev to M. Sazonov, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, printed in the collection of secret documents of
the Russian Foreign Office published in December, 1917,[57] shows how
deeply the leaders of Russia and the Russian people had this question
at heart, that it commanded all their foreign policy, and that they
were determined to use any means, to resort to any artifice, in order
to solve it in conformity with their wishes. No wonder, then, as we
pointed out at the beginning of this book, that Turkey, being fully
aware of the Russian enmity, should have consented to stand by the side
of Germany in a war in which her very existence was at stake.
IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS,
_February_ 5, 1916 (o.s.).
“Most honoured Serguey Dmitrievich,—At the request of General
Alexiev, I waited on him to discuss how the capture of Erzerum
could be best exploited.
“Such an event obviously points to a certain state of mind in
Turkey which we should turn to account. If a separate peace with
Turkey was to be contemplated, it should be borne in mind that
such favourable circumstances are not likely to occur again within
a long time. It would undoubtedly be our advantage to start the
negotiations after a victory which the enemy rightly or wrongly
fears will be attended with a new catastrophe.
“Considering that our forces on the secondary front of Caucasus
are insignificant and it is impossible to take away one soldier
from the chief centre of operations, it would be most difficult, in
General Alexiev’s opinion, to derive full profit from the glorious
success of our Caucasian army in a strictly military sense.
“Though he does not wish to advocate an immediate peace with
Turkey, the general desires me to bring to your knowledge some of
his views concerning this eventuality that the situation created by
our recent success may be carefully considered and fully utilised.
“According to him, it would be most important to specify the war
aims of Russia. Though the brigadier-general is fully aware this
is a question to be settled by the Government, yet he thinks his
opinion might be of some weight.
“In the course of our conversation, we have come to the following
conclusions:
“Whatever may have been our prospects at the time when Turkey
entered into the war, of securing compensations at the cost of
the latter country when peace is concluded, we must own that our
expectations will not be fulfilled during the present war. The
longer the war lasts, the more difficult it will be for us to
secure the possession of the Straits. General Alexiev and General
Danilov agree on this point. I refer you to my letters of December,
1914, and January, 1915, as to Danilov’s opinion.
“The defeat of the chief enemy and the restoration of the parts
of the Empire we have lost should be our chief war aim. Our most
important enemy is Germany, for there cannot be any question that
at the present time it is more important for us to recover the
Baltic Provinces than take possession of the Straits. We must
by all means defeat Germany. It is a difficult task, which will
require great efforts and sacrifices. The temporary abandonment of
some of our hopes should be one of these sacrifices.
“Considering the advantages a separate peace with Turkey would
bring us, we might offer it to her without injuring our real
‘interests’—the occupation of the Straits being merely postponed—on
the basis of the _status quo ante bellum_, including the
restoration of the Capitulations and the other rights acquired by
the treaties. We should also demand the dismissal of the Germans,
with a promise on our side to defend Turkey in case of German
reprisals. If a separate peace could be concluded with Turkey on
such a basis, all our Caucasian army would be available. We could
send it to Bessarabia and thus—who knows?—bring Rumania to our
side, or, if Turkey asks for it, send it to defend Constantinople.
England would heave a sigh of relief when the dangers of the
Egyptian campaign and of the Muslim movement thus vanished. She
would then be able to send her Egyptian army—nine divisions—to
Salonika and Kavala, bar the way definitely to the Bulgarians and
liberate Serbia with the help of the French, the Italians, and the
reconstituted Serbian Army. If Turkey were no longer our enemy,
the situation in the Balkans would be quite altered, and we should
be able to keep in touch with our Allies by clearing the southern
route of Europe. In short, the advantages of a separate peace with
Turkey are innumerable. The chief result would be the defeat of
Germany, the only common war aim of all the Allies. No doubt, we
all—they as well as we—will have to waive some of our cherished
schemes. But we are not bound to give them up for ever. If we carry
on the war with Turkey, we delude ourselves with the hope our ideal
can be fulfilled. If we interrupt the war with that country, we
postpone for a time the fulfilment of our wishes. But in return
for this, we shall defeat Germany, the only thing which can secure
a lasting peace for all the Allies and a political, military, and
moral superiority for Russia. If a victory over Germany gives us
back the paramount situation we enjoyed after the Napoleonic wars,
why could not the glorious period of the treaties of Adrianople and
Hunkiar-i-Skelessi occur again? In concluding that treaty we should
have only to take care not to offend the Western Powers, and yet
meet the requirements of Russia.
“Perhaps I have stated General Alexiev’s opinions too unreservedly,
as I wished to give this report a definite form. Though the
brigadier-general does not wish to be the advocate or promoter of
the idea of a separate peace with Turkey, I am sure he looks upon
this as a highly profitable scheme.
“Of course, many difficulties will have to be overcome in the
conclusion of such a peace; but is not every matter of importance
attended with difficulties? Public opinion should be warned that
we cannot possibly secure the fulfilment of all our wishes at
once, that it is impossible for us to shake off German hegemony,
reconquer the shores of the Baltic, and the other provinces now in
the hands of the enemy, and at the same time take Constantinople.
The conquest of Tsarigrad in the present circumstances must
necessarily raise many a political and moral question. The Turks,
too, will have to be convinced. But they may be influenced both
by logical and pecuniary arguments. If once the question of the
loss of their capital is waived, it will be pretty easy for us to
convince them that the Germans merely want their help for selfish
purposes without any risk to themselves. If some of them turned a
deaf ear to logical arguments, we might resort to more substantial
arguments, as has always been the way with Turkey.
“But the discussion of such details is still premature. For the
present, the important points are:
“1. Plainly to define our real war aim.
“2. To decide, in connection with this aim, whether a separate
peace with Turkey should not be contemplated at once.
“3. To prepare public opinion—the Duma is to meet tomorrow—and our
Allies for such a turn of events.
“I want to conclude this long letter by stating that General
Alexiev and I share the feelings of all Russians in regard
to Constantinople, that we do not disregard the ‘historical
call of Russia,’ in the solution of the Eastern question,
but that we are actuated by the sincere wish to clarify the
situation by distinguishing what is possible at the present time
from those aspirations whose fulfilment is momentarily—only
momentarily—impossible.”
It is obvious that if, at the beginning of the war, General Kuropatkine
maintained that it was a military necessity to occupy part of Turkey,
it was because the only aim of Russia in entering into the conflict was
the conquest of Constantinople.
In an article entitled “_La Neutralisation des Dardanelles et du
Bosphore_,” which was written at the beginning of the war, M. Miliukov
confirmed the Russian designs on the Black Sea and consequently on
all the part of Europe and Asia Minor contiguous to it. He recalled
that, by the former treaties concluded with Russia before the European
nations had interfered in the Eastern question—those of 1798, 1805,
and 1833—the Porte had granted Russian warships the free passage of
the Straits, though the Black Sea was still closed to the warships of
any other Power, and that when the treaties of 1841, 1856, and 1871
had laid down the principle of the closure of the Straits, Russia had
always preferred this state of things to the opening of the Black Sea
to the warships of all nations. This article throws a light on the
policy pursued by Russia and the propaganda she is still carrying on
in the hope of bringing about the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire.
So the writer recognised that it was the duty of Russia to oppose the
dispossession of Turkey and that, if the Straits passed under Russian
sovereignty, they ought not to be neutralised.
Taking up this question again in an interview with a correspondent of
_Le Temps_ in April, 1917, M. Miliukov stated that the map of Eastern
Europe, as it ought to be drawn up by the Allies, involved “the
liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe, the liberation of
the peoples living in Asia Minor, the independence of Arabia, Armenia,
and Syria, and finally, the necessity of recognising Turkey’s right
to the possession of the Straits.” Nobody knows what was to become
of the Turks in such a solution, or rather it is only too plain that
“the liquidation of the Turkish possessions in Europe” meant that
Russia would take possession of the Straits and rule over the Turkish
territories in Asia Minor.
Though both the Conservatives and the Bolshevists in Russia were
plainly drawing nearer to Germany, M. Miliukov, who seemed to forget
the pro-German leaning of Tsardom and the tendency he himself openly
displayed, came to this conclusion:
“The Straits to Russia—that, in my opinion, is the only way out of the
difficulty. The neutralisation of the Straits would always involve
many serious dangers to peace, and Russia would be compelled to keep
up a powerful war fleet in the Black Sea to defend our coasts. It
would give the warships of all countries a free access to our inland
sea, the Black Sea, which might entail untold disasters. Germany wants
the Straits in order to realise her dreams of hegemony, for her motto
is ‘Berlin-Baghdad,’ and we, Russians, want the Straits that our
importation and exportation may be secure from any trammels or threats
whatever. Nobody can entertain any doubt, therefore, as to which Power
is to own the Straits; it must be either Germany or Russia.”
Prince Lvov, M. Sazonov, M. Chaikovsky, and M. Maklakov, in a
memorandum addressed to the President of the Peace Conference on July
5, 1919, on behalf of the Provisional Government of Russia, stated the
Russian claims with regard to Turkey, and the solution they proposed
to the question of the Straits and Constantinople was inspired by the
agreements of 1915 and showed they had not given up anything of their
ambition. For, though they had no real mandate to speak of the rights
of New Russia they declared:
“New Russia has, undoubtedly, a right to be associated in the task
of regeneration which the Allied and Associated Powers intend to
assume in the former Turkish territories.
“Thus, the question of the Straits would be most equitably settled
by Russia receiving a mandate for the administration of the Straits
in the name of the League of Nations. Such a solution would
benefit both the interests of Russia and those of the whole world,
for the most suitable régime for an international road of transit
is to hand over its control to the Power which is most vitally
interested in the freedom of this transit.
“This solution is also the only one which would not raise any of
the apprehensions which the Russian people would certainly feel if
the aforesaid mandate were given to any other Power or if a foreign
military Power controlled the Straits.
“For the moment, Russia, in her present condition, would be
satisfied if the control of the Straits were assigned to a
provisional international administration which might hand over its
powers to her in due time, and in which Russia in the meantime
should hold a place proportionate to the part she is called upon to
play in the Black Sea.
“As to Constantinople, Russia cannot think for one moment of ceding
this city to the exclusive administration of any other Power. And
if an international administration were established, Russia should
hold in it the place that befits her, and have a share in all that
may be undertaken for the equipment, exploitation, and control of
the port of Constantinople.”
Some documents, which were found by the Bolshevists in the Imperial
Record Office, concerning the conferences of the Russian Staff in
November, 1913, and which have just been made public, testify to the
continuity of the aforesaid policy and the new schemes Russia was
contemplating. It clearly appears from these documents that M. Sazonov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, had represented to the Tsar the necessity
of preparing not only plans of campaign, but a whole organisation for
the conveyance by rail and sea of the huge forces which were necessary
to capture Constantinople, and that the Crown Council was of opinion
this plan should be carried out in order to bring the Russians to
Constantinople and secure the mastery of the Straits.
At the present time, forty or fifty thousand[58] Russian emigrants,
fleeing before the Bolshevists, have reached Pera and have settled
down in it; others are arriving there every day, who belong to the
revolutionary socialist party—an exiled party temporarily—or who are
more or less disguised Bolshevist agents. It is obvious that all these
Russians will not soon leave Constantinople, which they have always
coveted, especially as the Bolshevists have by no means renounced the
designs of the Tsars on this city or their ambitions in the East.
Not long ago, according to the _Lokal Anzeiger_,[59] a prominent member
of the Soviet Government declared that, to safeguard the Russian
interests in the East and on the Black Sea, Constantinople must fall to
Russia.
Being thus invaded by Russian elements of all kinds, Constantinople
seems doomed to be swallowed up by Russia as soon as her troubles are
over, whether she remains Bolshevist or falls under a Tsar’s rule
again; then she will turn her ambition towards the East, which we have
not been able to defend against the Slavs, and England will find her
again in her way in Asia and even on the shores of the Mediterranean
Sea.
On the other hand, as Germany is endeavouring to come to an
understanding with Russia and as the military Pan-Germanist party has
not given up hope of restoring the Kaiser to the throne, if the Allies
dismembered Turkey—whose policy is not historically linked with that of
Germany, and who has no more reason for being her ally now, provided
the Allies alter their own policy—they would pave the way to a union of
the whole of Eastern Europe under a Germano-Russian hegemony.
Again, the Turks, who originally came from Asia, are now a
Mediterranean people owing to their great conquests and their wide
extension in the fifteenth century, and though in some respects these
conquests may be regretted, they have on the whole proved beneficial
to European civilisation, by maintaining the influence of the culture
of antiquity. Though they have driven back the Greeks to European
territories, they have not, on the whole, attempted to destroy the
traditions bequeathed to us by antiquity, and the Turk has let the
quick, clever Greek settle down everywhere. His indolence and fatalism
have made him leave things as they were. What would have happened if
the Slavs had come down to the shores of the Mediterranean Sea? The
Bulgars and Southern Slavs, though they were subjected to Greco-Latin
influences, displayed much more activity and were proof against most
of these influences. But the Turks checked the Slavs’ advance to the
south; and, were it only in this respect, they have played and still
play a salutary part of which they should not be deprived.
The new policy pursued by France towards Turkey becomes the more
surprising—coming after her time-honoured Turkish policy and after the
recent mistakes of her Russian policy—as we see history repeat itself,
or at least, similar circumstances recur. Even in the time of the
Romans the events of Syria and Mesopotamia were connected with those of
Central Europe; as Virgil said: “Here war is let loose by Euphrates,
there by Germany.” Long after, Francis I, in order to check the
ambitious designs of Charles V, Emperor of Germany, who, about 1525,
dreamt of subduing the whole of Europe, sought the alliance of Soliman.
The French king, who understood the Latin spirit so well and the great
part it was about to play in the Renaissance, had foreseen the danger
with which this spirit was threatened by Germany.
Moreover, a recent fact throws into light the connection between the
German and Russian interests in the Eastern question, and their similar
tendencies. For Marshal von der Goltz was one of the first to urge
that the Turkish capital should be transferred to a town in the centre
of Asia Minor.[60] Of course, he professed to be actuated only by
strategic or administrative motives, for he chiefly laid stress on the
peculiar geographical situation of the capital of the Empire, which,
lying close to the frontier, is directly exposed to a foreign attack.
But did he not put forward this argument merely to conceal other
arguments which concerned Germany more closely? Though the Germans
professed to be the protectors of Islam, did not the vast Austro-German
schemes include the ejection of the Turks from Europe to the benefit of
the Slavs, notwithstanding the declarations made during the war by some
German publicists—M. Axel Schmidt, M. Hermann, M. Paul Rohrbach—which
now seem to have been chiefly dictated by temporary necessities?
Thus the Turkish policy of the Allies is the outcome of their Russian
policy—which accounts for the whole series of mistakes they are still
making, after their disillusionment with regard to Russia.
For centuries, Moscow and Islam have counterpoised each other: the
Golden Horde having checked the expansion of Russia, the latter did
her best to bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. It had
formerly been admitted by the Great Powers that the territorial
integrity of the Ottoman Empire should not be infringed upon, for it
was the best barrier to Russia’s claims on the Straits and her advance
towards India. But after the events of the last war, England, reversing
her traditional policy, and the Allies, urged on by Pan-Russian
circles, have been gradually driven to recognise the Russian claims to
Constantinople in return for her co-operation at the beginning of the
war.
The outcome of this policy of the Allies has been to drive both the
new States, whose independence they persistently refused to recognise,
and the old ones, whose national aspirations they did not countenance,
towards Bolshevism, the enemy of the Allies; it has induced them,
in spite of themselves, to come to understandings with the Soviet
Government, in order to defend their independence. England in this way
runs the risk of finding herself again face to face with Russia—a new
Russia; and thus the old Anglo-Russian antagonism would reappear in
another shape, and a more critical one. Sir H. Rawlinson[61] denounced
this danger nearly half a century ago, and now once more, though in a
different way, “India is imperilled by the progress of Russia.”
However, there is no similarity between Pan-Turanianism and Bolshevism,
though an attempt has been made in press polemics or political
controversies to confound the one with the other. They have no common
origin, and the utter incompatibility between Bolshevism and the spirit
of Western Europe exists likewise to another extent and for different
reasons between Bolshevism and the spirit of the Turks, who, indeed,
are not Europeans but Moslems, yet have played a part in the history of
Europe and thus have felt its influence. The Turks—like the Hungarians,
who are monarchists and have even sought to come to an understanding
with Poland—have refused to make an alliance with the Czecho-Slovaks,
who have Pan-Slavic tendencies; and so they cannot become Bolshevists
or friendly to the Bolshevists. But, if the Allies neither modify their
attitude nor give up the policy they have pursued of late years, the
Turks, as well as all the heterogeneous peoples that have broken loose
from old Russia, will be driven for their own protection to adopt
the same policy as new Russia—the latter being considered as outside
Europe; and thus the power of the Soviet Government will be reinforced.
We have been among the first to show both the danger and the inanity of
Bolshevism; and now we feel bound to deplore that policy which merely
tends to strengthen the Bolshevists we want to crush. Our only hope is
that the influence of the States sprung from old Russia or situated
round it on Soviet Russia—with which they have been obliged to come
to terms for the sake of self-defence—will complete the downfall of
Bolshevism, which can only live within Russia and the Russian mind,
but has already undergone an evolution, owing to the mistakes of the
Allies, in order to spread and maintain itself.
As to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, it seems that far from
solving the Eastern question, it is likely to bring about many fresh
difficulties, for it is a political mistake as well as an injustice.
This dismemberment, impudently effected by England, is not likely to
turn to her advantage. Of course, owing to the treaty, British hegemony
for the present extends over Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Kurdistan,
and is likely to prevail over the international régime foreshadowed
by the same treaty; but the organisation which Great Britain wants
thus to enforce on the East, if ever it is effective, seems most
precarious. For, even without mentioning Turkey, which does not seem
likely to submit to this scheme, and where the Nationalist movement
is in open rebellion, or Armenia, whose frontiers have not been fixed
yet, the condition of Kurdistan, which England coveted and had even at
one moment openly laid claim to, is still uncertain; the Emir Feisal,
who is indebted to her for his power, is attempting to get out of her
hand; finally, by putting Persia under her tutelage, she has roused the
national feeling there too, and broken of her own accord the chain she
intended to forge all round India, after driving Germany out of Asia
Minor and capturing all the routes to her Asiatic possessions.
Now it is questionable whether Great Britain—in spite of the skill
with which her administration has bent itself to the ways of the very
various peoples and the liberal spirit she has certainly evinced in
the organisation of the Dominions belonging to the British Empire,
the largest empire that has ever existed—will be powerful enough to
maintain her sovereignty over so many peoples, each of which is proud
of its own race and history, and to organise all these countries
according to her wish.
As to France, she is gradually losing the moral prestige she once
enjoyed in the East, for the advantages she has just gained can only
injure her, and also injure the prestige she still enjoys in other
Moslem countries; whereas, by pursuing another policy, she might have
expected that the German defeat would restore and heighten her prestige.
It follows from all this that the Turkish problem, as we have
endeavoured to describe it—considering that for centuries an
intercourse has been maintained between the Moslem world and
Mediterranean Europe, and that a Moslem influence once made itself felt
on Western civilisation through Arabic culture—cannot be looked upon
as a merely Asiatic problem. It is a matter of surprise that Islam,
five centuries after Christ, should have developed in the birthplace of
Christianity, and converted very numerous populations, whose ways and
spirit it seems to suit. One cannot forget either that Islam acted as
a counterpoise to Christianity, or that it played an important part in
our civilisation by securing the continuance and penetration of Eastern
and pagan influences. So it is obvious that nowadays the Turkish
problem is still of paramount importance for the security of Western
civilisation, since it concerns all the nations round the Mediterranean
Sea, and, moreover, all the Asiatic and African territories inhabited
by Moslems, who have always been interested in European matters and are
even doubly concerned in them now.[62]
Footnotes:
45: Albert Sorel, _La Question d’Orient au XVIIIᵉ siècle_, pp. 81,
85, 277.
46: Albert Vandal, _Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis
XV_, pp. 4, 8, 331, 447.
47: Martens, _Étude historique sur la politique russe dans la
question d’Orient_, 1877.
48: Goriainov, _Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles_, 1910, pp. 25-27.
49: See _supra_, p. 114.
50: _Daily Telegraph_, January 5, 1921.
51: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, March 15, 1921, pp. 261, 262: Maurice
Paléologue. “La Russie des Tsars pendant la guerre.”
52: _Ibid._, pp. 274, 275.
53: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April 1, 1921, p. 573.
54: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April 1, 1921, pp. 574, 575.