the regular Turkish Army, had been recruited at Mustafa Kemal’s
instigation. A French officer had been sent to Marash for the first
time to watch over the Jebel Bereket district, which commands all the
tunnels of the Baghdad Railway between Mamurah and Islahie. In December
one of those armed bands, numbering about 200 men, occupied the road
leading from Islahie to Marash, and intercepted the mail.
As the conditions that were likely to be enforced upon Turkey were
becoming known, discontent increased. General Dutieux, commanding
the French troops of Cilicia, determined to send a battalion as
reinforcement. The battalion set off at the beginning of January and
arrived at Marash on the 10th, after some pretty sharp fighting on
the way at El Oglo. As the attacks were getting more numerous and the
Nationalist forces increased in number, a new French detachment, more
important than the first, and provided with artillery, was dispatched
to Islahie, which it reached on the 14th. This column met with no
serious incident on the way from Islahie to Marash; it reached Marash
on the 17th, at which date it was stated that all the district of Urfa,
Aintab, Antioch, Marash, and Islahie was pacified.
That was a mistake, for it soon became known that the chiefs of
Bazarjik, a place lying halfway between Marash and Aintab, had gone
over to the Kemalists, and had just sent an ultimatum to the French
commander demanding the evacuation of the country.
On February 3 the French troops at Marash were attacked by Turkish and
Arabian troops coming from the East, who intended to drive them away,
and join the main body of the Arabian army.
A French column under the command of Colonel Normand reached Marash,
and after a good deal of hard fighting with the Nationalists, who were
well armed, relieved the French. But Armenian legionaries had most
imprudently been sent; and after some squabbles, which might have been
foreseen, between Moslems and Armenians, the French commander had
bombarded the town, and then had been compelled to evacuate it. These
events, later on, led to the recall of Colonel Brémond, whose policy,
after the organisation of the Armenian legions, had displeased the
Moslem population.
Two months after the Marash affair on February 10 the tribes in the
neighbourhood of Urfa, which the French, according to the Anglo-French
agreement of 1916, had occupied at the end of 1919 after about a year
of British occupation, attacked the stations of the Baghdad Railway
lying to the south, and cut off the town from the neighbouring posts.
The French detachment was first blocked up in the Armenian quarter, was
then attacked, and after two months’ fighting, being on the verge of
starvation, had to enter into a parley with the Turkish authorities and
evacuate the town on April 10. But while the French column retreated
southwards, it was assailed by forces far superior in number, and
had to surrender; some men were slaughtered, others marched back to
Urfa or reached the French posts lying farther south of Arab Punar or
Tel-Abiad.
On April 1—that is to say, nearly at the same time—the Turks attacked
the American mission at Aintab. French troops were sent to their help
as soon as the American consul-general at Beyrut asked for help. They
arrived on April 17, and, after resisting for eighteen days, the few
members of the American mission were able to withdraw to Aleppo, where
they met with American refugees from Urfa, with the French column sent
to relieve them.
In a speech made in the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies about the
validation of the mandate of the members for Adana, Mersina, and other
districts of Asia Minor, Reouf Bey, a deputy and former Minister of
Marine, maintained that the occupation of Cilicia had not been allowed
in the armistice, and so the occupation of this province by the French
was a violation of the treaty.
In the middle of February the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs handed the Allied representatives a memorandum drawn up by the
Government to expound the situation brought about by the postponement
of the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and chiefly requested:
(1) That the Turkish inhabitants, in the districts where they were in
a majority, should be left under Turkish sovereignty, and that their
rights should be guaranteed.
(2) That the position of the regions occupied by the Allies should be
altered.
(3) That the Turkish delegation should be heard before irrevocable
decisions were taken.
The Allies, too, felt it was necessary to come to a settlement; and
as they had waited too long since they had dismissed the Turkish
delegation in July of the previous year, the situation was getting
critical now. As the United States, which took less and less interest
in European affairs, did not seem anxious to intervene in the solution
of the Eastern problem, Mr. Lloyd George, on Thursday, December 18,
1919, in an important speech in which he gave some information about
the diplomatic conversations that were taking place in London, came to
the Turkish question and stated that the terms of the treaty would soon
be submitted to Turkey.
“My noble friend said: Why could you not make peace with Turkey,
cutting out all the non-Turkish territories, and then leaving
Constantinople and Anatolia to be dealt with?’ I think on
consideration he will see that is not possible. What is to be done
with Constantinople? What is to be done with the Straits?... If
those doors had been open, and if our fleet and our merchant ships
had been free to go through ... the war would have been shortened
by two or three years. They were shut treacherously in our faces.
We cannot trust the same porter. As to what will remain much
depended on whether America came in.... Would America take a share,
and, if so, what share? France has great burdens, Britain has great
burdens, Italy has great burdens. Much depended on whether America,
which has no great extraneous burdens, and which has gigantic
resources, was prepared to take her share.... But until America
declared what she would do, any attempt to precipitate the position
might have led to misunderstandings with America and would have
caused a good deal of suspicion, and we regard a good understanding
with America as something vital. That is the reason why we could
not make peace with Turkey....
“We are entitled to say now: ‘We have waited up to the very limits
we promised, and we have waited beyond that.’ The decision of
America does not look promising.... Therefore we consider now,
without any disrespect to our colleagues at the Peace Conference,
and without in the least wishing to deprive the United States of
America of sharing the honour of guardianship over these Christian
communities, that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with
Turkey, and we propose to do so at the earliest possible moment.
We have had some preliminary discussions on the subject. As far as
they went they were very promising. They will be renewed, partly in
this country, partly probably in France, in the course of the next
few days, and I hope that it will be possible to submit to Turkey
the terms of peace at an early date.”
But as the Allies, instead of dictating terms of peace to Turkey at
the end of 1918, had postponed the settlement of the Turkish question
for fourteen months, as they had dismissed the Ottoman delegation
after summoning it themselves, and as the question was now about to be
resumed under widely different circumstances and in quite another frame
of mind, the Paris Conference found itself in an awkward situation.
* * * * *
About the end of the first half of February, 1920, the Peace Conference
at last resumed the discussion of the Turkish question.
The task of working out a first draft of the treaty of peace with
Turkey had been entrusted by the Supreme Council to three commissions.
The first was to draw up a report on the frontiers of the new Republic
of Armenia; the second was to hold an inquiry into the Ottoman debt and
the financial situation of Turkey; and the third was to examine the
claims of Greece to Smyrna.
It had been definitely settled that the Dardanelles should be placed
under international control, and the Conference was to decide what kind
of control it would be, what forces would be necessary to enforce it,
and what nationalities would provide these forces. There remained for
settlement what the boundaries of the Constantinople area would be, and
what rights the Turks would have over Adrianople.
The discussion of the Turkish question was resumed in an untoward way,
which at first brought about a misunderstanding. The English wanted
the debate to be held in London, and the French insisted upon Paris.
Finally it was decided that the principles should be discussed in
London, and the treaty itself should be drawn up in Paris.
At the first meetings of the Allies concerning Constantinople, the
English strongly urged that the Turks should be turned out of Europe,
and the French held the contrary opinion. Later on a change seems to
have taken place in the respective opinions of the two Allies. The
English, who were far from being unanimous in demanding the eviction of
the Turks, gradually drew nearer to the opinion of the French, who now,
however, did not plead for the Turks quite so earnestly as before.
This change in the English point of view requires an explanation.
The English, who are prone to believe only what affects them, did not
seem to dread the Bolshevist peril for Europe, perhaps because they
fancied England was quite secure from it; on the contrary, they thought
this peril was more to be dreaded for the populations of Asia, no doubt
because it could have an easier access to the English possessions. The
success of Bolshevism with the Emir of Bokhara, close to the frontiers
of India, seemed to justify their fears. Bolshevism, however, is
something quite special to the Russian mind; other nations may be led
astray or perverted by it for a time, but on the whole they cannot
fully adhere to it permanently. Besides, it appears that Bolshevism has
been wrongly looked upon as something Asiatic. Of course, it has been
welcomed by the Slavs on the confines of Europe, and seems to agree
with their mentality; but in fact it does not come from Asia, but from
Europe. Lenin and Trotsky, who were sent by Germany from Berlin to St.
Petersburg in a sealed railway-carriage and had lived before in Western
Europe, imported no Asiatic ideas into Russia. They brought with them a
mixture of Marxist socialism and Tolstoist catholicism, dressed up in
Russian style to make it palatable to the moujik, and presented to the
intellectual class, to flatter Slav conceit, as about to renovate the
face of Europe.
The English did not realise that their own policy, as well as that
of their Allies, had run counter to their own aims, that they had
actually succeeded in strengthening the position of the Soviets, and
that if they kept on encroaching upon the independence and territorial
integrity of the heterogeneous Eastern populations of Russia and
the peoples of Asia Minor, they would definitely bring them over to
Bolshevism. Of course, these peoples were playing a dangerous game, and
ran the risk of losing their liberty in another way, but they clung
to any force that might uphold them. Mustafa Kemal was thus induced
not to reject the offers the Moscow Government soon made him, but it
did not seem likely he would be so foolish as to keep in the wake of
the Soviets, for the latter are doomed to disappear sooner or later,
unless they consent to evolution, supposing they have time to change.
The Allies, on the other hand, especially the English, forgot that
their policy risked giving Constantinople indirectly to Russia, where
Tsarist imperialism had been replaced by Bolshevist imperialism, both
of which are actuated by the same covetous spirit.
The fear of Bolshevism, however, had a fortunate consequence later
on, as it brought about in 1920 a complete change in British ideas
concerning Turkey and Constantinople. The London Cabinet realised
that the Turks were the first nation that the Bolshevist propaganda
could reach, and to which the Moscow Government could most easily and
effectually give its support against British policy in Asia Minor,
which would make the situation in the East still more complicated. So,
in order not to drive the Ottoman Government into open resistance,
England first showed an inclination to share the view, held by France
from the outset, that the Turks should be allowed to remain in
Constantinople.
So the British Government instructed Admiral de Robeck, British High
Commissioner in Constantinople, to bring to the knowledge of the Turks
that the Allies had decided not to take Constantinople from them, but
also warn them that, should the Armenian persecutions continue, the
treaty of peace with Turkey might be remodelled.
The Turkish Press did not conceal its satisfaction at seeing that
Constantinople was likely to remain the capital of the Empire, and
was thankful to France for proposing and supporting this solution.
Meanwhile a new party, “the Party of Defence and Deliverance of the
Country,” to which a certain number of deputies adhered, and which was
supposed to be accepted and supported by the whole nation, had solemnly
declared that no sacrifice could be made concerning the independence
of the Ottoman Empire, and the integrity of Constantinople and the
coast of the Marmora, merely recognising the freedom of passage of the
Straits for all nations. This party now held great demonstrations.
At the end of February the Minister of the Interior at Constantinople
addressed to all the public authorities in the provinces the following
circular:
“I have great pleasure in informing you that Constantinople,
the capital of the Khilafat and Sultanate, will remain ours, by
decision of the Peace Conference.
“God be praised for this! This decision implies that, as we
earnestly hope, our rights will be safeguarded and maintained.
“You should do the utmost in your power and take all proper
measures to prevent at all times and especially at the present
delicate juncture untoward incidents against the non-Moslem
population. Such incidents might lead to complaints, and affect the
good dispositions of the Allies towards us.”
In the comments of the Ottoman Press on the deliberations of the
Peace Conference regarding the peace with Turkey, the more moderate
newspapers held the Nationalists responsible for the stern decisions
contemplated by the Powers, and asked the Government to resist them
earnestly.
Great was the surprise, therefore, and deep the emotion among the
Turks, when, after the aforesaid declarations, on February 29, the
English fleet arrived and a large number of sailors and soldiers
marched along the main streets of Pera, with fixed bayonets, bands
playing, and colours flying.
A similar demonstration took place at Stambul on the same day, and
another on the following Wednesday at Skutari.
* * * * *
A sudden wave of discussion spread over Great Britain at the news that
the Turks were going to keep Constantinople, and made an impression
on the Conference, in which there were still some advocates of the
eviction of the Turks.
A memorandum signed by Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. J. H. Thomas,
requiring that the Turks should be driven out of Europe, raised some
discussion in the House of Commons. In answer to this memorandum some
members sent a circular to their colleagues, to ask them to avoid,
during the sittings of the Peace Conference, all manifestations that
might influence its decisions concerning foreign affairs. Another
group, in an appeal to Mr. Lloyd George, reminded him that in his
declaration of January 5, 1918, he had stated that the English did not
fight to wrest her capital from Turkey, and that any departure from
this policy would be deeply resented in India.
Lord Robert Cecil and Lord Bryce proved the most determined adversaries
of the retention of the Turks in Europe.
According to the _Daily Mail_, even within the British Cabinet widely
different views were held about Constantinople. One section of the
Cabinet, led by Lord Curzon, asked that the Turks should be evicted
from Europe; and another, led by Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary,
favoured the retention of the Turks in Constantinople, provided they
should give up their internal struggles and submit to the decisions of
the Allies.
_The Times_ severely blamed the Government for leaving the Turks in
Constantinople; it maintained it was not too late to reconsider their
decision; and it asked that Constantinople should in some way be placed
under international control.
The _Daily Chronicle_ also stated that it would have been better if
the Turks had been evicted from Constantinople, and expressed the hope
that at any rate public opinion would not forget the Armenian question.
At the same time—_i.e._, at the end of February, 1920—American leaders
also asked that the Turks should be compelled to leave Constantinople,
and a strong Protestant campaign started a powerful current of opinion.
On Sunday evening, February 29, a meeting of so-called “non-sectarians”
was held in New York, with the support of the dignitaries of St. John’s
Cathedral.
The Bishop of Western Pennsylvania, after holding France responsible
for the present situation because it owned millions of dollars of
Turkish securities, declared: “Though I love England and France, we
must let these two countries know that we will not shake hands with
them so long as they hold out their hands to the sanguinary Turk.”
Messages from Senator Lodge, the presidents of Harvard and Princeton
Universities, M. Myron, T. Herrick, and other Americans of mark were
read; asking President Wilson and the Supreme Council that the Ottoman
rule in Constantinople should come to an end. Motions were also carried
requesting that the Turks should be expelled from Europe, that the
Christians should no longer be kept under Moslem sway, and that the
Allies should carry out their engagements with regard to Armenia.
Another movement, similar in character to the American one, was started
in England at the same time.
The Archbishop of Canterbury, with the other Anglican bishops and some
influential men, addressed a similar appeal to the British Government.
Twelve bishops belonging to the Holy Synod of Constantinople sent a
telegram to the Archbishop of Canterbury, entreating his support that
no Turk might be left in Constantinople. In his answer, the Archbishop
assured the Holy Synod that the Anglican Church would continue to do
everything conducive to that end.
The Bishop of New York also telegraphed to the Archbishop of Canterbury
on behalf of about a hundred American bishops, to thank him for
taking the lead in the crusade against the retention of the Turks in
Constantinople. The Archbishop replied that he hoped America would
assume a share in the protection of the oppressed nationalities in the
East.
The personality of the promoters plainly showed that religious
interests were the leading factors in this opposition, and played a
paramount part in it, for the instigators of the movement availed
themselves of the wrongs Turkey had committed in order to fight against
Islam and further their own interests under pretence of upholding the
cause of Christendom.
So, in February, after the formidable campaign started in Great Britain
and the United States, at the very time when the treaty of peace with
Turkey was going to be discussed again, and definitely settled, the
retention of the Turkish Government in Constantinople was still an open
question.
On February 12 the Anglo-Ottoman Society addressed to Mr. Lloyd George
an appeal signed by Lord Mowbray, Lord Lamington, General Sir Bryan
Mahon, Professor Browne, Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, and several other
well-known men, referring to the pledge he had made on January 5, 1918,
to leave Constantinople to the Turks. The appeal ran as follows:
“We, the undersigned, being in touch with Oriental opinion, view with
shame the occupation of the vilayet of Aidin, a province ‘of which the
population is predominantly Turkish,’ by Hellenic troops; and have
noticed with alarm the further rumours in the Press to the effect that
part of Thrace—and even Constantinople itself—may be severed from the
Turkish Empire at the peace settlement, in spite of the solemn pledge
or declaration aforesaid, on the one hand, and, on the other, the
undeniable growth of anti-British feeling throughout the length and
breadth of Asia, and in Egypt, owing to such facts and rumours.
“We beg you, in the interests not only of England or of India but of
the peace of the world, to make good that solemn declaration not to
deprive Turkey of Thrace and Asia Minor, with Constantinople as her
capital.”
The next week a memorandum was handed to Mr. Lloyd George and printed
in the issue of _The Times_ of February 23. It was signed by, among
others, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishop of London,
Lord Robert Cecil, Mr. A. G. Gardiner (late editor of the _Daily
News_), the socialist leader Hyndman, Lord Bryce (formerly ambassador
to the United States), the well-known writer Seton-Watson, Dr. Burrows,
Principal of King’s College, Professor Oman, and many professors
of universities. In it the same desires lurked behind the same
religious arguments, under cover of the same social and humanitarian
considerations—viz., that the Turks should no longer be allowed
to slaughter the Armenians, and that they should be expelled from
Constantinople.
“As to Constantinople itself, it will be a misfortune and indeed
a scandal if this city is left in Turkish hands. It has been for
centuries a focus of intrigue and corruption; and it will so
continue as long as the Turkish Government has power there. If
Constantinople were transferred to the control of the League of
Nations, there would be no offence to genuine Moslem sentiment.
For the Khilafat is not, and never has been, attached to
Constantinople. The Sultan, if he retains the Khilafat, will be
just as much a Khalifa, in the eyes of Moslems all over the world,
at Brusa or Konia, as at Stambul.”
Now the absurdity of such arguments is patent to all those who know
that “the focus of intrigue and corruption” denounced in this document
is the outcome of the political intrigues carried on by foreigners in
Constantinople, and kept up by international rivalries. As to the exile
of the Sultan to Brusa or Konia, it could only have raised a feeling of
discontent and resentment among Moslems and roused their religious zeal.
Such a movement was resented by the Turks all the more deeply as,
it must be remembered, they have great reverence for any religious
feeling. For instance, they still look upon the Crusades with respect,
because they had a noble aim, a legitimate one for Catholics—viz., the
conquest of the Holy Places; though later on behind the Crusaders,
as behind all armies, there came all sorts of people eager to derive
personal profit from those migrations of men. But they cannot entertain
the least consideration or regard for a spurious religious movement,
essentially Protestant, behind which Anglo-Saxon covetousness is
lurking, and the real aim of which is to start huge commercial
undertakings.
Moreover, the Greek claims which asserted themselves during the
settlement of the Turkish question partly originated in the connection
between the Orthodox Church, not with Hellenism in the old and
classical sense of the word, as has been wrongly asserted, but
with Greek aspirations. For the Œcumenical Patriarch, whose see is
Constantinople, is the head of the Eastern Church, and he still enjoys
temporal privileges owing to which he is, in the Sultan’s territory,
the real leader of the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Though the
countries of Orthodox faith in Turkey have long enjoyed religious
autonomy, their leaders keep their eyes bent on Constantinople, for in
their mind the religious cause is linked with that of the Empire, and
the eventual restoration of the Greek Empire in Constantinople would
both consolidate their religious faith and sanction their claims.
In spite of what has often been said, it seems that the Christian
Church did not so much protect Hellenism against the Turks as the
Orthodox Church enhanced the prosperity of the Greeks within the
Turkish Empire. The Greek Church, thanks to the independence it enjoyed
in the Ottoman Empire, was a sort of State within the State, and had
a right to open and maintain schools which kept up moral unity among
the Greek elements. So it paved the way to the revolutionary movement
of 1821, which was to bring about the restoration of the Greek kingdom
with Athens as its capital; and now it serves the plans of the
advocates of Greater Greece. Let us add that nowadays the Greek Church,
like the Churches of all the States that have arisen on the ruins of
Turkey, has its own head, and has freed itself from the tutelage of the
Patriarch for the administration of its property.
Lord Robert Cecil, who had taken the lead in that politico-religious
movement, wrote on February 23 in the _Evening Standard_ a strong
article in which he said something to this purpose: “Constantinople is
a trophy of victories, not the capital of a nation. From Constantinople
the Turks issue cruel orders against the Christian population. From the
point of view both of morality and of prudence, the Stambul Government
must not be strengthened by such an exorbitant concession on the part
of the Allies.”
In the debate which took place on Wednesday, February 25, 1920,
in the House of Commons regarding the retention of the Turks in
Constantinople, after a question of Lord Edmund Talbot, Sir Donald
Maclean, who spoke first, urged that if the Turks were not expelled
from Constantinople all the worst difficulties of the past would occur
again, and would endanger the peace of the world.
“The decision of the Peace Conference was a great surprise to most
people. We owed nothing to the Turks. They came into the war gladly
and without any provocation on our part. They became the willing
and most useful ally of Germany. If the Turks were left in the
gateway of the world, they would be at their old game again.”[16]
Sir Edward Carson said just the reverse:
“It was suggested that we should drive the Turks out of
Constantinople.... If the Allies wanted to drive the Turks out of
Constantinople, ... they would have to commence another war, and
it would not be a small war. You must not talk of cutting down the
Army and the Navy, and at the same moment censure the Government
because they had not settled the question of driving the Turks
out.”[17]
Mr. Lloyd George, speaking after them both, began thus:
“This is not a decision, whichever way you go, which is free from
difficulty and objection. I do not know whether my right hon.
friend is under the impression that if we decided to expel the
Turk from Constantinople the course would be absolutely clear.
As a matter of fact, it is a balancing of the advantages and the
disadvantages, and it is upon that balance and after weighing very
carefully and for some time all the arguments in favour and all
the arguments against, all the difficulties along the one path
and all the difficulties you may encounter on the other, and all
the obstacles and all the perils on both sides, that the Allied
Conference came to the conclusion that on the whole the better
course was to retain the Turk in Constantinople for achieving a
common end.”
Then he explained that the agreement concerning the substitution of
the Russians for the Turks in Constantinople had become null and void
after the Russian revolution and the Brest-Litovsk peace, and that
at the present date the Bolshevists were not ready to assume such a
responsibility, should it be offered to them.
“I will deal with two other pledges which are important. My right
hon. friend referred to a pledge I gave to the House in December
last, that there would not be the same gate-keeper, but there would
be a different porter at the gates.... It would have been the
height of folly to trust the guardianship of these gates to the
people who betrayed their trust. That will never be done. They will
never be closed by the Turk in the face of a British ship again....
“The second pledge, given in January, 1918, was given after full
consultation with all parties, and the right hon. member for
Paisley and Lord Grey acquiesced. There was a real desire to make
a national statement of war aims, a statement that would carry all
parties along with it, and they all agreed. It was a carefully
prepared declaration, which I read out, as follows: ‘Nor are we
fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its
capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and
Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race. Outside Europe
we believe that the same principle should be applied.... While
we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the
homeland of the Turkish race, with its capital in Constantinople,
the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being
internationalised and neutralised’ (as they will be), ‘Arabia,
Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment
entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions.’
That declaration was specific, unqualified, and deliberate. It was
made with the consent of all parties in the community....
“The effect of the statement in India was that recruiting went up
appreciably from that very moment....
“Now we are told: ‘That was an offer you made to Turkey, and they
rejected it, and therefore you were absolutely free.’ It was more
than that. It was a statement of our war aims for the workers
of this country, a statement of our war aims for India. It is
too often forgotten that we are the greatest Mohammedan Power in
the world. One-fourth of the population of the British Empire is
Mohammedan.... We gave a solemn pledge and they accepted it, and
they are disturbed at the prospect of our not abiding by it....
There is nothing which would damage British power in Asia more than
the feeling that you could not trust the British word. That is the
danger. Of course it would be a fatal reputation for us....
“When the peace terms are published there is no friend of the
Turk, should there be any left, who will not realise that he has
been terribly punished for his follies, his blunders, his crimes,
and his iniquities. Stripped of more than half his Empire, his
country under the Allied guns, deprived of his army, his navy,
his prestige—the punishment will be terrible enough to satisfy
the bitterest foe of the Turkish Empire, drastic enough for the
sternest judge. My right hon. friend suggested that there was a
religious issue involved. That would be the most dangerous of all,
and the most fatal. I am afraid that underneath the agitation
there is not only the movement for the expulsion of the Turk, but
there is something of the old feeling of Christendom against the
Crescent. If it is believed in the Mohammedan world that our terms
are dictated by the purpose of lowering the flag of the Prophet
before that of Christendom, it will be fatal to our government
in India. It is an unworthy purpose to achieve by force. It is
unworthy of Britain, and it is unworthy of our faith.
“Let us examine our legitimate peace aims in Turkey. The first
is the freedom of the Straits. I put that first for two reasons,
which I shall refer to later on. It was put first by my right
hon. friend, and I accept it. The second is the freeing of the
non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman sway; the preservation
for the Turk of self-government in communities which are mainly
Turkish, subject to two most important reservations. The first
is that there must be adequate safeguards within our power for
protecting the minorities that have been oppressed by the Turk in
the past. The second is that the Turk must be deprived of his power
of vetoing the development of the rich lands under his rule which
were once the granary of the Mediterranean....
“You can get the great power of Constantinople from its
geographical situation. That is the main point. It is the main
point for two reasons. The first is, when you consider the future
possibilities of the Black Sea. You have there six or seven
independent communities or nations to whom we want access. It
is essential that we should have a free road, a right-of-way to
these countries, whatever the opinion of the Turk may be. His
keeping of the gates prolonged the war, and we cannot have that
again. Therefore, for that reason, it is coming to an end. The
second reason why the guardianship of the gates is important is
because of its effect upon the protection of minorities. How do
we propose that that should be achieved? Turkey is to be deprived
entirely of the guardianship of the gates. Her forts are to be
dismantled. She is to have no troops anywhere within reach of these
waters. More than that, the Allies mean to garrison those gates
themselves.... I was going to say that we have been advised that,
with the assistance of the Navy, we shall be able to garrison the
Dardanelles and, if necessary, the Bosphorus, with a much smaller
force because of the assistance to be given by the Navy for that
purpose. Turkey will not be allowed a navy. What does she want with
a navy? It was never of the slightest use to her when she had it.
She never could handle it. That is the position in regard to the
Straits.
“What is the alternative to that proposal? The alternative to
that proposal is international government of Constantinople and
the whole of the lands surrounding the Straits. It would mean
a population of 1,500,000 governed by the Allies—a committee
representing France, Italy, Great Britain, and, I suppose, some
day Russia might come in, and, it might be, other countries.
America, if she cared to come in. Can anyone imagine anything more
calculated to lead to that kind of mischievous intriguing, rivalry,
and trouble in Constantinople that my right hon. friend deprecated
and, rightly, feared? How would you govern it? Self-government
could not be conferred under those conditions. It would have to
be a military government.... It would require, according to every
advice we have had, a very considerable force, and it would add
very considerably to the burdensome expenditure of these countries,
and it would be the most unsatisfactory government that anyone
could possibly imagine.
“We had hoped that two of the great countries of the world would
have been able to help us in sharing the responsibility for the
government of this troubled country; but for one reason or another
they have fallen out. There was first of all Russia. She is out of
the competition for a very unpleasant task. Then there was America.
We had hopes, and we had good reason for hoping, that America would
have shared these responsibilities. She might probably have taken
the guardianship of the Armenians, or she might have taken the
guardianship of Constantinople. But America is no claimant now, and
I am not going to express an opinion as to whether she ever will
be, because it would be dangerous to do so; but for the moment we
must reckon America as being entirely out of any arrangement which
we contemplate for the government of Turkey and for the protection
of the Christian minorities in that land.... I ask my noble friend,
if he were an Armenian would he feel more secure if he knew that
the Sultan and his Ministers were overlooked by a British garrison
on the Bosphorus, and that British ships were there within reach,
than if the Sultan were at Konia, with hundreds of miles across
the Taurus Mountains to the nearest Allied garrison, and the sea
with its great British ships and their guns out of sight and out of
mind? I know which I would prefer if I were an Armenian with a home
to protect.”[18]
The Prime Minister concluded his speech by saying that the Allies
chiefly desired to take from the Turks the government of communities of
alien race and religion, which would feel adequately protected when
they knew that their former persecutors must sign the decree for their
liberation under the threat of English, French, and Italian guns. Yet
he could not dissemble his own misgivings.
In the discussion that followed Lord Robert Cecil said that, in any
settlement with regard to Armenia, he trusted there would not only be a
considerable increase in the present area of the Armenian Republic, but
that Armenia would be given some access to the Black Sea in the north.
Without that he was satisfied that the Armenian Republic would have the
greatest difficulty in living. He earnestly hoped that every influence
of the British Government would be used to secure that Cilicia
should be definitely removed from Turkish sovereignty. He repeated
once more that he was sorry the Turks were going to be retained in
Constantinople, but that—
“No one wished to turn the Sultan out; the central thing was to get
rid of the Sublime Porte as the governor of Constantinople. That
did not mean turning anybody out; it merely meant that we were not
to hand back Constantinople to the Turkish Government.”
He had the greatest regard for the feelings of the Indians in
that matter, but was surprised they insisted upon the retention
of the Sultan in Constantinople. He thought that there was not
the slightest ground for maintaining the Sultan as Caliph of
Mohammedanism, and, even if there were, there was nothing at all
vital about his remaining in Constantinople. So far as the Turks
were concerned, what was Constantinople? It was not a national
capital; it had been occupied by the Turks as their great trophy
of victory. He entirely approved of the statement of 1918, and,
in the same circumstances, he would make it again. It seemed to
him perfectly fantastic to say that ever since 1918 we had held
out to our Indian fellow-subjects an absolute undertaking that
Constantinople should remain in the hands of the Turks.
Then Mr. Bonar Law rose, and declared that it would be easier
to have control over the Turkish Government if it was left in
Constantinople, instead of transferring it to Konia,
“Our fleet at Constantinople would be a visible emblem of power.
The Allies believed that the pressure they would be able to
exercise would have an effect throughout the Turkish Empire, but it
would not be so if we sent the Turks to Konia. An hon. member had
said that some Armenians had told him that they desired the Turks
to be sent out of Constantinople. Let the Armenians consider the
facts as they now were.
“If there was one thing which more than another was likely to make
the League of Nations a failure it was to hand over this question
to them. In 1917 it was arranged that if we were victorious in the
war, Russia would become the possessor of Constantinople. But all
that fell to the ground, and in 1918 a new situation arose, and
a solemn document was put before the British people in which it
was stated that one of our war aims was not to turn the Turks out
of Constantinople. Overwhelming reasons were required to justify
departure from that declaration, and those overwhelming reasons had
not been forthcoming. When it was hoped and expected that America
would accept a mandate in regard to Turkey there was no question of
turning the Turks out of Constantinople.”[19]
The debate, which came to an end after this statement by Mr. Bonar Law,
was not followed by a vote.
Mr. Montagu, Secretary for India, stated in an interview printed in the
_Evening Standard_, February 25:
“If one of the results of the war must needs be to take away
Constantinople from the Turks, I should take the liberty of
respectfully telling Lord Robert Cecil, as president, of the Indian
delegation in the Peace Conference, that we ought not to have
asked Indians to take part in the war against Turkey. Throughout
India, all those who had to express their opinion on this subject,
whatever race or religion they may belong to, are of opinion that
Constantinople must remain the seat of the Khilafat if the internal
and external peace of India is to be preserved.
“The Turks, who are the chief part of the population in
Constantinople, have certainly as much right as any other community
to the possession of that city. So we have to choose between
the Turks and an international régime. Now in the history of
Constantinople examples have occurred of the latter régime, and
the results were not so good that it cannot be said a Turkish
government would not have done better.”
This opinion was upheld by a good many British newspapers,
notwithstanding Lord Robert Cecil’s campaign.
Yet under the pressure of a section of public opinion and the agitation
let loose against Turkey, England seemed more and more resolved to
occupy Constantinople, and _The Times_, though it had never been averse
to the eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, now showed some
anxiety:
“We cannot imagine how the greatest lovers of political
difficulties in Europe should have ever dreamt that Constantinople
should be occupied exclusively by British troops, or that such a
decision may have been taken without previously taking the Allies’
advice.
“As things now stand, we are not at all surprised that such stories
may have given birth to a feeling of distrust towards us. These are
the fruits of a policy tainted with contradiction and weakness. The
Allied countries refuse to sacrifice any more gold or human lives,
unless their honour is concerned. They will not consent to go to
war in order to safeguard the interests of a few international
financiers, who want to dismember Turkey-in-Asia.”
This movement was brought about by the explosion of very old feelings
which had been smouldering for nearly forty years, had been kept alive
by the Balkan war, and had been roused by the last conflict. Even at
the time of Catherine II the merchants of the City of London merely
looked upon Russia as a first-rate customer to whom they sold European
and Indian goods, and of whom in return they bought raw materials which
their ships brought to England. So they felt inclined to support the
policy of Russia, and, to quote the words of a French writer in the
eighteenth century, the English ambassador at Constantinople was “le
chargé d’affaires de la Russie.” So a party which took into account
only the material advantages to be drawn from a closer commercial
connection with Russia arose and soon became influential. William Pitt
inveighed against this party when, in one of his speeches, he refused
to argue with those who wanted to put an end to the Ottoman Empire. But
the opinion that England can only derive economic advantages from the
dismemberment of Turkey in favour of Russia soon found a new advocate
in Richard Cobden, the leader of the Manchester school, who expounded
it in a little book, _Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer_, printed
at Edinburgh in 1835. This dangerous policy was maintained, in spite
of David Urquhart’s campaign against the Tsarist policy in the East
in a periodical, _The Portfolio_, which he had founded in 1833, and,
notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made by Blacque, a Frenchman,
editor of _The Ottoman Monitor_, to show that Europe was being cheated
by Russia, and was going the wrong way in her attitude towards Turkey.
And the same foolish policy consistently pursued by Fox, Gladstone, and
Grey towards Tsardom is still carried on by Britain towards Bolshevism.
The same narrowly utilitarian views, the typical economic principles
of the Manchester School, linked with Protestant ideas, and thus
strengthened and aggravated by religious feeling, seem still to inspire
the Russian policy of Britain as they once inspired the old “bag and
baggage” policy of Mr. Gladstone, the “Grand Old Man,” that the Turks
should be expelled from Constantinople with bag and baggage. Indeed,
this policy may be looked upon as an article of faith of the English
Liberal party. Mr. Gladstone’s religious mind, which was alien to the
Islamic spirit, together with the endeavours of the economists who
wanted to monopolise the Russian market, brought about an alliance with
Holy Orthodox Russia, and within the Anglican Church a movement for
union with the Holy Synod had even been started.
That campaign was all the more out of place as the Turks have
repeatedly proclaimed their sympathy for England and turned towards
her. Just as after the first Balkan war the Kiamil Cabinet had made
overtures to Sir Edward Grey, after the armistice of November 11 Tewfik
Pasha, now Grand Vizier, had also made open proposals. England had
already laid hands on Arabia and Mesopotamia, but could not openly lay
claim to Constantinople without upsetting some nations with whom she
meant to keep on good terms, though some of her agents and part of
public opinion worked to that end. Generally she showed more diplomacy
in conforming her conduct with her interests, which she did not defend
so harshly and openly.
But religious antagonism and religious intolerance were at the bottom
of that policy, and had always instigated and supported it. The
Anglicans, and more markedly the Nonconformists, had taken up the cry,
“The Turk out of Europe,” and it seems certain that the religious
influence was paramount and brought on the political action. Mr.
Lloyd George, who is a strong and earnest Nonconformist, must have
felt it slightly awkward to find himself in direct opposition to his
co-religionists on political grounds. Besides, the British Government,
which in varied circumstances had supported contradictory policies,
was in a difficult situation when brought face to face with such
contradictions.
It also seems strange at first that the majority of American public
opinion should have suffered itself to be led by the campaign of
Protestant propaganda, however important the religious question
may be in the United States. Though since 1831 American Protestant
missionaries have defrayed the expenses of several centres of
propaganda among the Nestorians (who have preserved the Nazarene
creed), paid the native priests and supported the schools, America
has no interests in those countries, unless she thus means to support
her Russian policy. But her economic imperialism, which also aims at
a spiritual preponderance, would easily go hand in hand with a cold
religious imperialism which would spread its utilitarian formalism over
the life and manners of all nations.
At any rate, the plain result of the two countries’ policy was
necessarily to reinforce the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian movements.
Of course, Mr. Wilson’s puritanism and his ignorance of the complex
elements and real conditions of European civilisation could not
but favour such a movement, and on March 5 the _New York World_, a
semi-official organ, plainly said that Mr. Wilson would threaten again,
as he had already done about Italy, to withdraw from European affairs,
if the treaty of peace with Turkey left Constantinople to the Turks,
and gave up all protection of the Christian populations in Turkey.
The traditional hostility of America towards Turkey—one of the
essential reasons of which has just been given—demanded that Turkey
should be expelled from Europe, and the Empire should be dismembered.
President Wilson, in Article 12 of his programme, had mentioned the
recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire; yet the American
leaders, though they pointed out that a state of war had never existed
between the United States and Turkey, were the first to demand the
eviction of the Turks; and the _Chicago Tribune_ of March 8 hinted
that an American cruiser might be sent to the Bosphorus. On March 6
Senator Kling criticised in the Senate the Allies’ proposals aiming at
tolerating Turkish sway in Asia Minor. The United States even backed
the Greek claims, and on the same day Mr. Lodge moved that the Peace
Conference should give to Greece Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, and
the western coast of Asia Minor.
Mr. Morgenthau, too, criticised the terms of the settlement which
allowed Constantinople to remain a Turkish city; he maintained that
such a solution could only be another inducement for America to keep
away from European affairs, and declared that Europe would fail
to do her duty if she did not punish Turkey. Yet at the same time
America, and shortly after England, were endeavouring to mitigate the
responsibility of Germany, objecting, not to her punishment, which had
never been demanded by France, but to the complete execution of the
most legitimate measures of reparation, and made concessions on all
points that did not affect their own interests. In fact, they merely
wanted to resume business with Germany at any cost and as soon as
possible.
English newspapers printed an appeal to French and British public
opinion drawn up by some eminent American citizens, asking for the
eviction of the Turks from Constantinople and the autonomy of Armenia.
The British Press, however, remarked that it was not sufficient to
express wishes, and it would have been better if the Americans had
assumed a share of responsibility in the reorganisation of Asia Minor.
Now, why did a section of British and American public opinion want to
punish Turkey, whereas it refused to support the French and Belgian
claims to reparation? In order to form an impartial judgment on Turkey,
one should look for the motives and weigh the reasons that induced her
to take part in the war, and then ascertain why some members of her
political parties most preposterously stood by the side of Germany.
If the latter pursued such a policy, perhaps it was because Germany,
who aimed at extending her influence over the whole of Eastern Asia,
displayed more ability and skill than the Allies did in Turkey, and
because the policy of the Powers and their attitude towards the
Christians raised much enmity against them.
On such a delicate point, one cannot do better than quote the words of
Suleyman Nazif Bey in a lecture delivered in honour of Pierre Loti at
the University of Stambul on January 23, 1920:
“When we linked our fate with that of Germany and Austria, the
Kaiser’s army had already lost the first battle of the Marne. It
is under such untoward and dangerous circumstances that we joined
the fray. No judicious motive can be brought forward to excuse
and absolve the few men who drove us lightheartedly into the
conflagration of the world war.
“If Kaiser Wilhelm found it possible to fool some men among us, and
if these men were able to draw the nation behind them, the reason
is to be found in the events of the time and in the teachings of
history. Russia, who, for the last two and a half centuries has
not given us a moment of respite, did not enter into the world war
in order to take Alsace-Lorraine from Prussia and give it back to
France. The Muscovites thought the time had come at last to carry
out the dream that had perpetually haunted the Tsars ever since
Peter the Great—that is to say, the conquest of Anatolia and the
Straits.
“It is not to Europe but to our own country that we must be held
responsible for having entered into the war so foolishly, and still
more for having conducted it so badly, with so much ignorance
and deceit. The Ottoman nation alone has a right to call us to
account—the Great Powers had paid us so little regard, nay, they
had brought on us such calamities, that the shrewd Kaiser finally
managed to stir up our discontent and make us lay aside all
discretion and thoughtfulness by rousing the ancient legitimate
hatred of the Turks.
“Read the book that the former Bulgarian Premier, Guéchoff, wrote
just after the Balkan war. You will see in it that the Tsar
Nicholas compelled, as it were by force, the Serbs and Bulgars, who
had been enemies for centuries, to conclude an alliance in order
to evict us from Europe. Of course, Montenegro followed suit.
France approved, then even urged them to do so; and then one of the
leading figures of the times intervened to make Greece join that
coalition intended to drive the Turks out of Europe. The rest is
but too well known. The Bulgarian statesman who owns all this is
noted for his hatred of Turkey.
“Let us not forget this: so long as our victory was considered as
possible, the Powers declared that the principle of the _status quo
ante bellum_ should be religiously observed. As soon as we suffered
a defeat, a Power declared this principle no longer held good; it
was the ally of the nation that has been our enemy for two and a
half centuries, and yet it was also most adverse to the crafty
policy that meant to cheat us....
“Every time Europe has conferred some benefit upon us we have been
thankful for it. I know the history of my country full well; in her
annals, many mistakes and evil doings have occurred, but not one
line relates one act of ingratitude. After allowing the Moslems
of Smyrna to be slaughtered by Hellenic soldiers and after having
hushed up this crime, Europe now wants—so it seems at least—to
drive us out of Constantinople and transfer the Moslem Khilafat
to an Anatolian town, as if it were a common parcel, or shelve it
inside the palace of Top-Kapu (the old Seraglio) like the antique
curios of the Museum. When the Turks shall have been expelled from
Constantinople, the country will be so convulsed that the whole
world will be shaken. Let nobody entertain any doubt about this: if
we go out of Constantinople a general conflagration will break out,
that will last for years or centuries, nobody knows, and will set
on fire the whole of the globe.
“At the time when Sultan Mohammed entered the town of
Constantinople, which had been praised and promised by Mohammed
to his people, the Moslem Empire of Andalusia was falling to
decay—that is to say, in the south-east of Europe a Moslem State
arose on the ruins of a Christian State, while in the south-west
of Europe a Christian State was putting an end to the life of a
Moslem State. The victor of Constantinople granted the Christian
population he found there larger religious privileges than those
granted to it by the Greek Empire. The ulcer of Phanar is still
the outcome of Sultan Mohammed’s generosity. What did Spain do
when she suppressed the Moslem State in the south-west of Europe?
She expelled the other religions, burning in ovens or sending to
the stake the Moslems and even the Jews who refused to embrace
Christianity. I mention this historical fact here, not to
criticise or blame the Spaniards, but to give an instance of the
way in which the Spaniards availed themselves of the conqueror’s
right Heaven had awarded them. And I contrast the Christians’
cruelty with the Turks’ gentleness and magnanimity when they
entered Constantinople!”
To adopt the policy advocated by Anglo-American Protestants was
tantamount to throwing Islam again towards Germany, who had already
managed to derive profit from its defence. Yet Islamism has no natural
propensity towards Germanism; on the contrary, Islam in the sixteenth
century, at the time of its modern development, intervened in our
culture as the vehicle of Eastern influences. That policy also hurt the
religious feelings of the Mussulmans and roused their fanaticism not
only in Turkey, but even in a country of highly developed intellectual
life like Egypt, and in this respect it promoted the cause of the most
spirited and most legitimate Nationalism.
Besides, in the note which the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs
handed in January, 1920, to the High Commissioners of the Allies,
together with a scheme of judicial reforms, it was said notably:
“The Ottoman Government fully realises the cruel situation of
Turkey after the war, but an unfortunate war cannot deprive a
nation of her right to political existence, this right being based
on the principles of justice and humanity confirmed by President
Wilson’s solemn declaration and recognised by all the belligerents
as the basis of the peace of the world. It is in accordance with
these principles that an armistice was concluded between the Allied
Powers and Turkey. It ensues from this that the treaty to intervene
shall restore order and peace to the East.
“Any solution infringing upon Ottoman unity, far from ensuring
quietude and prosperity, would turn the East into a hotbed of
endless perturbation. Therefore the only way to institute stability
in the new state of things is to maintain Ottoman sovereignty.
“Let us add that, if the reforms Turkey tried to institute at
various times were not attended with the results she expected, this
is due to an unfavourable state of things both abroad and at home.
“Feeling it is absolutely necessary to put an end to an unbearable
situation and wishing sincerely and eagerly to modernise its
administration so as to open up an era of prosperity and
progress in the East, the Sublime Porte has firmly resolved, in
a broadminded spirit, to institute a new organisation, including
reforms in the judicial system, the finance, and the police, and
the protection of the minorities.
“As a token that these reforms will be fully and completely
carried out, the Ottoman Government pledges itself to accept
the co-operation of one of the Great Powers on condition its
independence shall not be infringed upon and its national pride
shall not be wounded.”
* * * * *
As soon as it was known in what spirit the treaty of peace with Turkey
was going to be discussed between the Powers, and what clauses were
likely to be inserted in it, a clamour of protest arose throughout the
Moslem world.
That treaty could not but affect the most important group of
Mohammedans, the Indian group, which numbers over 70 million men and
forms nearly one-fourth of the population of India. As soon as the
conditions that were to be forced on Turkey were known in India, they
roused deep resentment, which reached its climax after the Amritsar
massacre. Some of the clauses which the Allies meant to insert in the
treaty plainly ran counter to the principles of Mohammedanism; and as
they hurt the religious feelings of the Moslems and disregarded the
religious guarantees given to the Hindus and all the Moslem world by
the present British Cabinet and its predecessors, they could not but
bring on new conflicts in the future. Besides, the blunders of the
last five years had united Hindus and Mohammedans in India, as they
united Copts and Mohammedans in Egypt later on, and it was also feared
that the Arabs, whose hopes had been frustrated, would side with the
Turkish Nationalists.
At the end of 1918, Dr. Ansari, M.D., M.S., chairman of the Committee
of the All-India Muslim League, in the course of the session held at
Delhi at that time, set forth the Muslim grievances. But the address he
read could not receive any publicity owing to the special repressive
measures taken by the Government of India.
In September, 1919, a Congress of Mohammedans, who had come from all
parts of India and thus represented Muslim opinion as a whole, was
held at Lucknow, one of the chief Muslim centres. In November another
congress for the defence of the Caliphate met at Delhi; it included
some Hindu leaders, and thus assumed a national character. Next month a
third congress, held at Amritsar, in the Punjab, was presided over by
Shaukat Ali, founder and secretary of the Society of the Servants of
the Ka’ba, who had been imprisoned like his brother Mohammed Ali and
released three days before the congress; it was attended by over 20,000
Hindus and Mussulmans.
This meeting confirmed the resolution taken by the previous congress to
send to Europe and America a delegation from India for the defence of
the Caliphate. On January 19, 1920, a deputation of Indian Mussulmans
waited upon the Viceroy of India at Delhi, to request that a delegation
might repair to Europe and America, according to the decision of the
congress, in order to expound before the allied and associated nations
and their governments the Moslems’ religious obligations and Muslim and
Indian sentiment on the subject of the Caliphate and cognate questions,
and to be their representatives at the Peace Conference.
The non-Mussulman Indians supported the claims which the 70 millions of
Indian Mussulmans, their fellow-countrymen, considered as a religious
obligation. In an address drawn up by the great Hindu leader, the
Mahatma Gandhi, and handed on January 19, 1920, by the deputation of
the General Congress of India for the Defence of the Caliphate to His
Excellency Baron Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor of India, in order to
lay their aims before him, they declared they raised a formal protest
lest the Caliphate should be deprived of the privilege of the custody
and wardenship of the Holy Places, and lest a non-Muslim control, in
any shape or form whatever, should be established over the Island of
Arabia, whose boundaries, as defined by Muslim religious authorities,
are: the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian
Gulf, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, thus including Syria, Palestine,
and Mesopotamia, beside the Peninsula of Arabia.
This General Congress of India, according to the manifesto it adopted
during its sittings at Bombay on February 15, 16, and 17, 1920, gave to
the delegation sent to Europe the following mandate, with respect to
the Muslim claims regarding the Caliphate and the “Jazirat-ul-Arab”:
“With respect to the Khilafat it is claimed that the Turkish Empire
should be left as it was when the war broke out; however, though
the alleged maladministration of Turks has not been proved, the
non-Turkish nationalities might, if they wished, have within the
Ottoman Empire all guarantees of autonomy compatible with the
dignity of a sovereign State.”
And the manifesto continued thus:
“The slightest reduction of the Muslim claims would not only hurt
the deepest religions feelings of the Moslems, but would plainly
violate the solemn declarations and pledges made or taken by
responsible statesmen representing the Allied and Associated Powers
at a time when they were most anxious to secure the support of the
Moslem peoples and soldiers.”
The anti-Turkish agitation which had been let loose at the end of
December, 1919, and had reached its climax about March, 1920, had
an immediate repercussion not only in India, where the Caliphate
Conference, held at Calcutta, decided to begin a strike on March 19 and
boycott British goods, if the agitation for the expulsion of the Turks
from Constantinople did not come to an end in England.
At Tunis, on March 11, after a summons had been posted in one of the
mosques calling upon the Muslim population to protest against the
occupation of Constantinople, a demonstration took place before the
Residency. M. Etienne Flandin received a delegation of native students
asking him that France should oppose the measures England was about
to take. The minister, after stating what reasons might justify the
intervention, evaded the question that was put him by declaring that
such measures were mere guarantees, and stated that even if France
were to take a share in them, the Mussulmans should feel all the more
certain that their religious creed would be respected.
The measures that were being contemplated could not but raise much
anxiety and indignation among the Moslem populations and might have had
disastrous consequences for France in Northern Africa. This was clearly
pointed out by M. Bourgeois, President of the Committee of Foreign
Affairs, in his report read to the Senate when the conditions of the
peace that was going to be enforced on Turkey came under discussion.
“We cannot ignore the deep repercussions which the intended
measures in regard to Turkey may have among the 25 million Moslems
who live under our rule in Northern Africa. Their reverence and
devotion have displayed themselves most strikingly in the course of
the war. Nothing must be done to alter these feelings.”
Indeed, as M. Mouktar-el-Farzuk wrote in an article entitled “France,
Turkey, and Islam,” printed in the _Ikdam_, a newspaper of Algiers, on
May 7, 1920—
“If the French Moslems fought heroically for France and turned
a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany, they still
preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey, and they would be greatly
distressed if the outcome of the victory in which they have had a
share was the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire.
“That sympathy is generally looked upon in Europe as a
manifestation of the so-called Moslem fanaticism or Pan-Islamism.
Yet it is nothing of the kind. The so-called Moslem fanaticism
is a mere legend whose insanity has been proved by history.
Pan-Islamism, too, only exists in the mind of those who imagined
its existence. The independent Moslem populations, such as the
Persians and the Afghans, are most jealous of their independence,
and do not think in the least of becoming the Sultan’s subjects.
As to those who live under the dominion of a European Power, they
have no wish to rebel against it, and only aim at improving their
material and moral condition, and of preserving their personality
as a race.
“The true reasons of the Moslems’ sympathy for the Ottoman Empire
are historical, religious, and sentimental reasons.”
The delegation of the Moslems of India for the defence of the Caliphate
sent to the Peace Conference was headed by Mohammed Ali, who, in 1914,
on behalf of the Government of India, had written to Talaat, Minister
of the Interior, to ask him not to side with the Central Empires,
and to show him how difficult the situation of the Indian Mussulmans
would be if Turkey entered into the war against England. On landing in
Venice, he told the correspondent of the _Giornale d’Italia_ that the
object of his journey was to convince the Allies that the dismemberment
of the Ottoman Empire would be a danger to the peace of the world.
“The country we represent numbers 70 million Mohammedans and 230
million men belonging to other religions but agreeing with us on
this point. So we hope that if the Allies really want to establish
the peace of the world, they will take our reasons into account.
Italy has hitherto supported us, and we hope the other nations will
follow her example.”
This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher, representing
Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, to whom they explained the serious
consequences which the carrying out of the conditions of peace
contemplated for Turkey might have in their country.
Mr. Lloyd George, in his turn, received the delegation on March 19,
before it was heard by the Supreme Council. Mohammed Ali, after
pointing to the bonds that link together the Mohammedans of India
and the Caliphate, because Islam is not only a set of doctrines and
dogmas but forms both a moral code and a social polity, recalled
that, according to the Muslim doctrine, the Commander of the Faithful
must always own a territory, an army, and resources to prevent the
aggression of adversaries who have not ceased to arm themselves;
he maintained, therefore, that the seat of the Sultan’s temporal
power must be maintained in Constantinople; that Turkey must not be
dismembered; and that Arabia must be left under Turkish sovereignty.
“Islam has always had two centres, the first a personal one and
the other a local one. The personal centre is the Caliph, or the
Khalifa, as we call him—the successor of the Prophet. Because
the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his successors, or
Khalifas, continue his tradition to this day. The local centre
is the region known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of
Arabia,’ the ‘Land of the Prophets.’ To Islam, Arabia has been not
a peninsula but an island, the fourth boundary being the waters of
the Euphrates and the Tigris....
“Islam required temporal power for the defence of the Faith, and
for that purpose, if the ideal combination of piety and power
could not be achieved, the Muslims said, ‘Let us get hold of the
most powerful person, even if he is not the most pious, so long
as he places his power at the disposal of our piety.’ That is why
we agreed to accept Muslim kings, the Omayyids and the Abbasids,
as Khalifas, now the Sultans of Turkey. They have a peculiar
succession of their own. We have accepted it for the time being
because we must have the strongest Mussulman Power at our disposal
to assist us in the defence of the Faith. That is why we have
accepted it. If the Turks agreed with other Muslims, and all agreed
that the Khalifa may be chosen out of any Muslim community, no
matter who he was, the humblest of us might be chosen, as they
used to be chosen in the days of the first four Khalifas, the
Khulafa-i-Rashideen, or truly guided Khalifas.
“But of course we have to make allowances for human nature. The
Turkish Sultan in 1517 did not like to part with his power any more
than the Mamluke rulers of Egypt liked to part with their power
when they gave asylum to a scion of the Abbasids after the sack of
Baghdad in 1258.”
It follows that “the standard of temporal power necessary for the
preservation of the Caliphate must obviously, therefore, be a relative
one,” and—
“Not going into the matter more fully, we would say that after the
various wars in which Turkey has been engaged recently, and after
the Balkan war particularly, the Empire of the Khalifa was reduced
to such narrow limits that Muslims considered the irreducible
minimum of temporal power adequate for the defence of the Faith to
be the restoration of the territorial _status quo ante bellum_....
“When asking for the restoration of the territorial _status
quo ante bellum_, Muslims do not rule out changes which would
guarantee to the Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans, within the
scheme of the Ottoman sovereignty, security of life and property
and opportunities of autonomous development, so long as it is
consistent with the dignity and independence of the sovereign
State. It will not be a difficult matter. We have here an Empire
in which the various communities live together. Some already are
sufficiently independent and others hope—and here I refer to
India—to get a larger degree of autonomy than they possess at the
present moment; and consistently with our desire to have autonomous
development ourselves, we could not think of denying it to Arabs or
Jews or Christians within the Turkish Empire.”
He went on as follows:
“The third claim that the Mussulmans have charged us with putting
before you is based on a series of injunctions which require the
Khalifa to be the warden of the three sacred Harams of Mecca,
Medina, and Jerusalem; and overwhelming Muslim sentiment requires
that he should be the warden of the holy shrines of Nejef, Kerbela,
Kazimain, Samarra, and Baghdad, all of which are situated within
the confines of the ‘Island of Arabia.’
“Although Muslims rely on their religious obligations for the
satisfaction of the claims which I have specified above, they
naturally find additional support in your own pledge, Sir, with
regard to Constantinople, Thrace, and Asia Minor, the populations
of which are overwhelmingly Muslim. They trust that a pledge
so solemnly given and recently renewed will be redeemed in its
entirety. Although the same degree of sanctity cannot be claimed
for Constantinople as for the three sacred Harams—Mecca, Medina,
and Jerusalem—Constantinople is nevertheless held very sacred
by all the Muslims of the world, and the uninterrupted historic
tradition of nearly five centuries has created such an overwhelming
sentiment with regard to Islambol, or the ‘City of Islam’—a title
which no city has up to this time enjoyed—that an effort to drive
the Turks out ‘bag and baggage’ from the seat of the Khilafat is
bound to be regarded by the Muslims of the world as a challenge
of the modern Crusaders to Islam and of European rule to the
entire East, which cannot be taken up by the Muslim world or the
East without great peril to our own Empire, and, in fact, to the
Allied dominions in Asia and Africa. In this connection, Sir, I
might mention one point, that the Muslims cannot tolerate any
affront to Islam in keeping the Khalifa as a sort of hostage in
Constantinople. He is not the Pope at the Vatican, much less can
he be the Pope at Avignon, and I am bound to say that the recent
action of the Allied Powers is likely to give rise in the Muslim
world to feelings which it will be very difficult to restrain, and
which would be very dangerous to the peace of the world.”
With regard to the question of the Caliphate and temporal power, on
which the Indian delegation had been instructed to insist particularly,
M. Mohammed Ali, in order to make the Moslem point of view quite clear,
wrote as follows:[20]
“The moment this claim is put forward we are told that the West
has outgrown this stage of human development, and that people who
relieved the Head of a Christian Church of all temporal power are
not prepared to maintain the temporal power of the Head of the
Muslim Church. This idea is urged by the supporters of the Laic
Law of France with all the fanaticism of the days of the Spanish
Inquisition, and in England, too. Some of the most unprejudiced
people wonder at the folly and temerity of those who come to press
such an anachronistic claim. Others suggest that the Khalifa
should be ‘vaticanised’ even if he is to retain Constantinople,
while the Government of India, who should certainly have known
better, say that they cannot acquiesce in Muslim statements which
imply temporal allegiance to the Khilafat on the part of Indian
Muslims, or suggest that temporal power is of the essence of the
Khilafat. Where such criticisms and suggestions go astray is
in misunderstanding the very nature and ideal of Islam and the
Khilafat, and in relying on analogies from faiths which, whatever
their original ideals, have, for all practical purposes, ceased to
interpret life as Islam seeks to do.”
As he had said in the course of his official interview with the British
Premier, as Islam is not “a set of doctrines and dogmas, but a way of
life, a moral code, and a social polity,”—
“Muslims regard themselves as created to serve the one Divine
purpose that runs through the ages, owing allegiance to God in
the first place and acknowledging His authority alone in the last
resort. Their religion is not for Sabbaths and Sundays only, or
a matter for churches and temples. It is a workaday faith, and
meant even more for the market-place than the mosque. Theirs is
a federation of faith, a cosmopolitan brotherhood, of which the
personal centre is the Khalifa. He is not a Pope and is not even a
priest, and he certainly has no pretensions to infallibility. He
is the head of Islam’s Republic, and it is a mere accident, and an
unfortunate accident at that, that he happens to be a king. He is
the Commander of the Faithful, the President of their Theocratic
Commonwealth, and the Leader of all Mussulmans in all matters for
which the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet, whose successor
he is, provide guidance.”