As early as 1916 the Allies seem to have come to an agreement over the
principle of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In their answer to
President Wilson they mentioned among their war aims “to enfranchise
the populations enslaved to the sanguinary Turks,” and “to drive out
of Europe the Ottoman Empire, which is decidedly alien to Western
civilisation.”
According to the conventions about the impending partition of Turkey
concluded between the Allies in April and May, 1916, and August, 1917,
Russia was to take possession of the whole of Armenia and Eastern
Anatolia, Constantinople, and the Straits. In virtue of the treaty
signed in London on May 16, 1916, fixing the boundaries of two zones of
British influence and two zones of French influence, France and England
were to share Mesopotamia and Syria, France getting the northern part
with Alexandretta and Mosul, and England the southern part with Haïfa
and Baghdad. According to the treaty of August 21, 1917, Italy was
to have Western Asia Minor with Smyrna and Adalia. Palestine was to
be internationalised and Arabia raised to the rank of an independent
kingdom.
But, following the breakdown of Russia and the entrance of America
into the war, the conventions of 1916 and 1917 were no longer held
valid. President Wilson declared in the fourteenth of his world-famous
points that: “The Turkish parts of the present Ottoman Empire should be
assured of secure sovereignty, but the other nations now under Turkish
rule should be assured security of life and autonomous development.”
It follows that the partition of Turkish territories such as
Mesopotamia or Syria between Powers that had no right to them, as was
foreshadowed in the conventions of 1916, was no longer admitted; and
the Conference in February, 1919, decided, at Mr. Wilson’s suggestion,
that all territories that belonged to the Ottoman Empire before should
be put under the control of the League of Nations, which was to assign
mandates to certain Great Powers.
According to the decisions taken at that time, and at the special
request of M. Venizelos, the Greeks obtained all the western coast
of Asia Minor between Aivali and the Gulf of Kos, with Pergamus,
Smyrna, Phocœa, Magnesia, Ephesus, and Halicarnassus, and a hinterland
including all the vilayet of Aidin, except the sanjak of Denizli and
part of that of Mentesha (Mughla).
The Italian delegation thought fit to make reservations about the
assignment of Smyrna to Greece.
It seems that in the course of the conversations at
St-Jean-de-Maurienne—Greece being still neutral at the time—M. Ribot
asked Baron Sonnino whether Italy, to facilitate the conclusion of
a separate peace with Austria-Hungary, would eventually consent to
give up Trieste in exchange for Smyrna. The Italian delegation had
merely noted down the offer, without giving an answer. The Italian
diplomats now recalled that offer as an argument, not so much to lay
a claim to Smyrna—as their subsequent attitude showed—as to prevent a
change to Italy’s disadvantage in the balance of power in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and an infringement of the London treaty that guaranteed
her definite possession of the Dodecanese.
Moreover, according to Article 9 of the London treaty, in case of a
partition of Asia Minor, or merely in case zones of influence should
be marked out in it, Italy was to have the same share as the other
Powers and receive, together with the province of Adalia, where she had
acquired a paramount influence and obtained a recognition of her rights
from Turkey in 1912, the neighbouring regions. In accordance with this
article, the Conference seemed inclined to give Italy an international
mandate for all the part of Asia Minor that was to be left to the
Turks—namely, all the Anatolian plateau, including the vilayets of
Kastamuni, Brusa, Angora, Konia, and Sivas. It is obvious that the
difficulties raised by the assignment of Smyrna to Greece could not
but be aggravated by the new political situation in case this mandate
should be given to the Italians.
Consequently, when the Italians saw Smyrna assigned to Greece, they
were all the more anxious to give to their new zone of influence in
Asia Minor an outlet to the sea that should not depend on the great
port of Western Asia Minor. After considering Adalia, Makri, and
Marmaris, which are good harbours but do not communicate with the
interior and are not connected with the chief commercial routes of
the continent, their attention was drawn to Kush-Adassi, called by the
Greeks New Ephesus and by themselves Scala Nuova, a port that numbered
about 6,000 souls before the war, lying opposite to Samos, in the Gulf
of Ephesus, about ten miles from the ruin of the old town of the same
name and the Smyrna-Aidin railway.
This port, which is situated on the mouth of the Meander, might easily
be connected by a few miles of railroad with the main railway line
to the south of Ayasaluk which brings towards the Ægean Sea all the
produce of Asia Minor; then it would divert from Smyrna much of the
trade of Aidin, Denizli, and the lake region. To the merchants of
Asia Minor—who deal with Syria, Egypt, Greece, Italy, and all Western
Europe, excepting those who trade with the Black Sea—the Kush-Adassi
line would be both faster and cheaper, if this port was as well
equipped as Smyrna.
But, as Kush-Adassi happened to be in the zone which at first had been
assigned to Greece and whose frontier goes down to the south as far as
Hieronda Bay, Italy endeavoured in every way to carry farther to the
north the boundaries of the Italian zone, in order to include this port
in it. For this purpose, Italy took advantage of the troubled condition
of the area round Aidin, Sokia, and Cape Mycale to send a police
force up the Meander and the railway line along it, in order to carry
her control up to the Gulf of Ephesus. Of course the territory lying
between Hieronda and Kush-Adassi still remained part of the Greek zone
of occupation, but, all the same, Italy set foot in it. Her diplomats
soon turned this fact into a right of possession.
M. Tittoni soon after agreed to play the part of arbiter in the
question of the southern frontier of Bulgaria; and in July, 1919, it
was announced that after some conversations between M. Venizelos and
M. Tittoni an understanding had been reached about Thrace and Northern
Epirus, whereby Greece agreed to enlarge the northern part of the
Italian zone of occupation in Asia Minor, and gave up to Italy the
valley of the Meander. So, though on the whole M. Tittoni’s arbitration
was in favour of Greece, Italy obtained the territorial triangle
included between Hieronda, Nazili, and Kush-Adassi, the control over
the Meander, and to a certain extent over the railway. In return for
this, Italy promised to cede to Greece the Dodecanese except one,
captured by Italy in 1912 during her war with Turkey, together with the
Isle of Rhodes, though she had a right to keep the latter for at least
five years. In case England should grant the inhabitants of Cyprus the
right to pass under Greek sovereignty, Italy was to hold a plebiscite
in Rhodes and let the native population become Greeks if they wished.
By supporting the Greek claims in Thrace, Italy won the sympathies of
Greece at a time when the latter both consolidated the rights of Italy
on the continent and strengthened her own situation in the Dodecanese.
The control over the eastern part of Asia Minor which was to fall to
the lot of the Armenians and included the vilayets of Erzerum, Van,
Bitlis, Kharput, Diarbekir, and probably Trebizond—the population
of the latter vilayet consisting chiefly of Moslems with a Greek
minority—was to be assumed, so the Great Powers thought, by the United
States.
It should be remembered that the question of the eastern vilayets
was raised for the first time by the Tsars of Russia, and gave them
a pretext for intervening in the domestic affairs of Turkey and thus
carrying out their plans of expansion in Asia Minor. As a matter of
fact, those vilayets were not really Armenian. The Armenians were in a
minority there, except in two or three districts where, as throughout
the Ottoman Empire, they were mixed up with Turks. They had lived
peaceably together till the Powers thought fit to support the claims
of the Armenians and incite them to rebel, in order to further their
own aims in Turkey, by a misuse of the privileges granted them by the
Capitulations.
Constantinople and the Straits seemed likely to be internationalised.
Lastly, the Arabian part of the Turkish Empire was to be cut off from
it, though nobody could tell expressly in what manner, but in a way
which it was easy to foresee.
We shall deal later on with the negotiations that took place during
the war between the British Government and Hussein, Grand Sherif of
Mecca, the Emir Feisal’s father, and we have already mentioned the
help given to the British army by the Emir Feisal’s troops, after the
aforesaid negotiations. These facts throw a light on the policy pursued
by England later on; and besides, immediately after the hostilities,
in a speech made in London on Friday, November 1, 1918, Mr. Barnes, a
Labour member of the British Cabinet, while speaking on the armistice
with Turkey, acknowledged:
“We could have signed it before, for we held the Turks at our
discretion. For the last fortnight the Turks had been suing for
peace, but we were on the way to Aleppo, which is to be the capital
of the future independent Arab State, established in an Arab
country and governed by Arabs. So we did not want to have done with
the Turks till we had taken Aleppo.”
Such was the condition of the Turkish problem when the Peace Conference
took it in hand for the first time.
Rivalries naturally soon arose.
The Emir Feisal, supported by England, laid claim not only to the
whole of Arabia, but also to Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia to
make up a huge Arab Empire, under his father’s rule. France, who
opposed that plan, convened a Syrian Congress in Marseilles, to raise
a protest against the partition of Syria as had been laid down by the
Franco-English agreement of 1916.
Soon after the landing of Greek troops in Smyrna on the morning of May
15, 1919, brought about a serious conflict.
It is noteworthy that after General Allenby’s victories in Palestine
and the resignation and flight of Talaat, Enver, and Jemal, General
Izzet Pasha, who had been appointed Grand Vizier, had signed, on
October 31, 1918, a convention of armistice, which put Turkish ports
and railways under the Allies’ provisional control and allowed them “in
case things should become alarming for them” to occupy “all strategic
points.” This armistice had been concluded on the basis of Mr. Wilson’s
principle that “to the Turkish regions of the Ottoman Empire an
unqualified sovereignty should be ensured.” In no respect had the
Turks broken the agreement when the Allies infringed it by allowing
the Greeks to occupy Smyrna. This occupation, carried on in spite of
France, who was not energetic enough, and one might almost say in spite
of Italy, created a very serious situation.
Indeed, no good reason could be given in support of this decision. By
the help of misleading or false information cleverly worded and widely
distributed by a propaganda which overwhelmed the Press—and was only
equalled by the propaganda carried on by Poland—political manœuvres
induced the Allies to allow Greece, who wished to become “Greater
Greece” and wanted Epirus, Thrace, Constantinople, Smyrna, Trebizond,
and Adana, to occupy a region belonging to Anatolia, where the Turkish
element predominates more than in all the rest of the Ottoman Empire,
for there are only 300,000 Greeks against about 1,300,000 Turks. This
permission granted to Greece was the more surprising as it seems to
have been obtained because the Greek Government had informed the
Supreme Council that the disorder prevailing in the vilayet of Smyrna
was a danger to the non-Turkish populations.
Now the report of the Inter-allied Commission about the Greek
occupation of Smyrna and the neighbouring territories which was sent
later on and was dated from Constantinople, October 12, 1919, began as
follows:
“The inquiry has proved that since the armistice the general
condition of the Christians of the vilayet of Aidin has been
satisfactory, and their security has not been threatened.
“If the occupation of Smyrna was ordered by the Peace Conference
owing to inaccurate information, the primary responsibility lies
with the individuals or governments that gave or transmitted
inconsiderately such information as is mentioned in No. 1 of the
established facts.
“It is obvious, therefore, that this occupation was not at all
justifiable, and violated the terms of the armistice concluded
between the Powers and Turkey.”
Moreover, to quote the very words of that report, the Greek occupation,
“far from appearing as carrying out a civilising mission, has
immediately put on the aspect of a conquest and a crusade.”
This inquiry, on the one hand, acknowledged that the responsibility
for the events that took place at Smyrna on May 15 and 16 and in the
immediate neighbourhood during the first days following the landing,
lay with the Greek headquarters and some officers who did not perform
their duty. On the other hand it stated that part of the responsibility
rested with the Turkish authorities at Smyrna, who took no step to
prevent the escape and arming of common law prisoners before the coming
of the Greeks. Then it went on as follows:
“In the person of the high civil authority that represents it
at Smyrna, the Greek Government is responsible for the serious
disturbances that ended in bloodshed in the interior of the country
during the advance of the Greek troops.... The Greeks alone are
responsible for the bloodshed at Menemen.... The Greek officers who
were at Menemen quite neglected their duty.”
And the Commission wound up its report with this:
“In the occupied region, putting aside the towns of Smyrna—where
the number of Christians is high, but the number of Greek
Christians much inferior to that of the Turks—and Aivali, the
predominance of the Turkish element over the Greek element is
undeniable.”
So we easily understand the violent and justifiable indignation felt by
the Turks when the Greek troops landed, for they could not forget that
now there were no Turks in Thessaly, where they numbered 150,000 in
1878, or in the Morea, where there had once been 300,000, and that in
Greece only about 20,000 were left of the 100,000 that had once lived
there.
M. Venizelos, in a letter addressed on May 29 to the President of the
Conference, thought it his duty to give particulars about the way
the occupation had been effected. After setting right what he styled
“the wrong and misleading information given by newspapers,” he stated
that the Greeks had “arrived at Aidin, on the southern side, east
of Nymphaton and north of the River Ermos.” The Great Powers having
asked the Greek Government, as he said expressly in his letter, “to
occupy Smyrna and its environs” without stating exactly how far the
environs of Smyrna reached, he thought he had a right to look upon this
operation—which had been attended with a few incidents and had not
been received everywhere with unmixed joy—as the outcome of a settled
policy. After this occupation public meetings of protest took place in
Constantinople.
An important Crown Council was held in the afternoon of May 26 at
Yildiz-Kiosk, in order to enable the various political groups to
express their opinion concerning the recent events.
The Sultan, attended by the princes of the Imperial Family, opened the
meeting, and stated it had been thought necessary to call together the
most eminent men of Turkey that they might express their opinion about
the critical condition of the country.
The Grand Vizier, after recalling the events that had taken place in
Turkey since the beginning of the war, asked the audience to let him
have their opinions.
The Unionist group said they were dissatisfied with the composition of
the Ministry, and demanded a Coalition Government, in which all parties
should be represented.
Another political group asked the Crown Council to form itself into a
National Assembly.
Somebody else showed the inanity of such suggestions and proposed
to entrust the mandate of the administration of Turkey to a Great
Power—without mentioning which Power. He added: “Otherwise Turkey will
be dismembered, which would be her ruin.”
As the assembly had merely consultative powers, no decision was reached.
At the beginning of June, 1919, the Ottoman League sent from Geneva to
Mr. Montagu, British Secretary for India, the following note:
“The Ottoman League has examined the statements which your
Excellency was so kind as to make at the Peace Conference,
regarding the subsequent fate of the Ottoman Empire.
“We have always been convinced that His Britannic Majesty’s
Government in its relations with our country would resume its
traditional policy, which was started and advocated by the most
famous English statesmen, and that, after obtaining the guarantees
required for the safety of its huge dominions, it would refuse to
countenance any measure aiming at the oppression and persecution of
Moslems.
“The British Government can realise better than any other Power the
disastrous consequences that would necessarily follow throughout
Islam on the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and any blow struck at
its vital parts, especially at its capital, the universally revered
seat of the Khilafat, where the best works of Moslem civilisation
have been gathered for centuries.
“We feel certain that your Excellency will also realise better
than anybody else of what importance would be to Great Britain the
loyalty, not only of the Ottoman Moslems without any distinction of
race, but of all the Mohammedans whose destiny is presided over by
His Britannic Majesty.”
At last, about the end of the month, the treaty with Turkey was drafted
by the Conference, and on June 11 the Turkish representatives were
brought to France on board the French ironclad _Démocratie_.
The delegation included Tewfik Pasha, Riza Tewfik Bey, with Reshid Bey,
former Minister of the Interior, as adviser. At its head was Damad
Ferid Pasha, the Sultan’s brother-in-law, who, after the resignation of
the Tewfik Pasha Cabinet at the beginning of March, 1919, had formed a
new Ministry.
As was stated in the Allies’ answer to the Porte in the letter
addressed to the Turkish Premier, Damad Ferid Pasha, Turkey had not
attempted in the memorandum handed to the Conference to excuse the
Germano-Turkish intrigues which had paved the way for her to take part
in the war on the side of the Germans; neither had she attempted to
clear herself of all the crimes she was charged with. Damad Ferid Pasha
had simply pleaded that only the “Young Turks” of the Committee of
Union and Progress were responsible for the Ottoman policy during the
last five years, and that, if they had governed the Empire, as it were,
in the name of the Germans, the whole Turkish nation could not be held
responsible for this.
The Allies pointed out in their reply that they could not accept the
distinction which cast all the blame on the Government and alleged the
misdeeds were not imputable to the Turkish people merely because these
misdeeds were abhorrent to Turkish ideas, as shown in the course of
centuries. So the Allies informed the delegation they could not grant
their request to restore Ottoman sovereignty over territories that had
been taken away from them before.
Yet the Council, though they declared they could not accept such views
or enter upon such a controversy, launched into considerations on
Turkish ideas and Turkish influence in the world which, to say the
least, were most questionable, as will be seen later on.
They stated, for instance, that no section of the Turkish people had
ever been able to build up a lasting political organisation, the huge
Empires of the Hioung-nous, the Ouigours, and the Kiptchaks having been
of short duration. The Supreme Council also asserted that the lack
of stability of the Ottoman Empire—which was represented as unable
to develop—was due to the various origins of its elements. But other
influences were laid aside, which have been at work, especially during
the modern period, since the beginning of the decline. It should be
borne in mind that three centuries ago the civilisation and prosperity
of the Ottoman Empire were not inferior to those of the Western
nations, and its inferiority appeared only nowadays, when Germany
and Italy founded their unity, while the European States did not do
anything in Turkey to improve—or even did much to aggravate—a condition
of things that left to Turkey no possibility of recovery. If Moslem
civilisation is quite different from Western civilisation, it does not
follow necessarily that it is inferior to it. For several centuries
its religious and social ideals safeguarded and ruled, to their
satisfaction, the lives of numerous populations in the Levant, whereas
more modern ideals in the West have not yet succeeded in bringing about
conditions of life that can meet the requirements of man’s mind and
physical nature. As to the so-called combativeness of the Turks and
their supposed fanaticism—which may be only due, considering they were
nomads at first, to their quick and headstrong nature—they both were
certainly lessened by their intercourse and especially intermarriages
with the Mongols, a quiet and peaceful people largely influenced by
Buddhism and Lamaism, which they all profess, except a few Bouriate
tribes that are still Shamanist. Moreover, even if such suppositions
were true, their mixing with Western people could only have a good
influence in soothing their original nature, whereas their eviction to
Asia, by depriving them of any direct and close contact with Europe,
would have the effect of reviving their former propensities.
Finally, the aforesaid document, though it was really superficial and
rather vague on this point, purposed to give a crushing answer to the
arguments of the Ottoman memorandum about the religious rivalries; yet
these arguments were well grounded and most important, as appeared when
the Protestant campaign broke out and Anglo-American opinion demanded
the ejection of the Turks.
On June 27, 1919, the President of the Peace Conference in Paris
addressed a second letter to Damad Ferid Pasha to inform him that the
solution of the Turkish problem was postponed.
After stating that the declarations made before the Peace Conference
by the Ottoman delegation “have been, and will continue to be,
examined most attentively, as they deserve to be,” the letter went
on to say that “they involve other interests than those of Turkey,
and raise international questions, the immediate solution of which is
unfortunately impossible; and it ended thus:
“Therefore, though the members of the Supreme Council
are eager to restore peace definitely and fully realise it is a
dangerous thing to protract the present period of uncertainty,
yet a sound study of the situation has convinced them that
some delay is unavoidable.
“They are of opinion, therefore, that a longer stay in Paris of the
Ottoman delegation, which the Ottoman Government had asked to be
allowed to send to France, would not be conducive to any good.
“Yet a time will come when an exchange of views will be profitable
again; then the Allied and Associated Powers will not fail to
communicate with the Ottoman Government as to the best means to settle
the question easily and rapidly.”
One of the reasons given for this adjournment was the protest handed to
Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, by the Maharaja of Bikanir
in the name of the Moslems of India, a protest which is supposed to
have shaken the decisions already taken by the British Government.
At any rate, instead of maintaining the negotiations on a sound basis,
and dealing squarely with the difficulties of the Turkish question,
which would have made it possible to reach a better and more permanent
solution, the Allies seemed to wish to break off the debates, or
at least to postpone the discussion, in order to manœuvre and gain
time. Perhaps they did it on purpose, or the negotiations came to an
untimely end because, among the men who had assumed the charge of
European affairs, some meant to intervene in them all the more eagerly
because they did not know anything about them. They were not aware
or had forgotten that in dealing with Eastern affairs or in pursuing
negotiations with people of ancient civilisation, a great deal of
delicacy, discretion, and shrewdness is required at the same time,
and that generally diplomatists must expect plenty of haggling and
procrastination, must avoid clashing with the adversary, and be able
repeatedly to drop and resume a discussion smoothly, sometimes after
long delays.
Somebody then quoted the words of the well-known French traveller
Chardin in regard to Chevalier Quirini who, about 1671, carried on
negotiations in Constantinople with the Vizier Ahmed Küprüli on behalf
of the Republic of Venice:
“I heard M. Quirini say, when I had the honour of calling upon
him, that the policy of the Turks far excelled that of the
Europeans; that it was not restrained by maxims and regulations,
but was wholly founded on, and regulated by, discernment. This
policy, depending on no art or principles, was almost beyond
anybody’s reach. So he candidly confessed that the vizier’s conduct
was an utter mystery to him, and he was unable to fathom its
discrimination, depth, secrecy, shrewdness, and artfulness.”
It is noteworthy that the same vizier was also able to cope
successively with three ambassadors of Louis XIV.
The direction taken from the outset by the deliberations of the
Conference, and the standpoint it took to settle the Turkish question,
showed it was about to give up the traditional policy of the French
kings in the East, which had been started by Francis I, and the last
representatives of which had been the Marquis de Villeneuve, Louis XV’s
ambassador, and the Comte de Bonneval.
As early as the end of the eighteenth century Voltaire, though he
extolled Turkish tolerance throughout his “Essai sur la tolérance,”
and wrote that “two hundred thousand Greeks lived in security
in Constantinople,” advocated quite a different policy in his
“Correspondance,” and took sides with the Russians against the Turks.
After confessing that “he had no turn for politics,” and stating in
“Candide” that he only cared for the happiness of peoples, he wrote to
Frederick II:
“I devoutly hope the barbarous Turks will be driven out of the
land of Xenophon, Socrates, Plato, Sophocles, and Euripides. If
Europe really cared, that would soon be done. But seven crusades of
superstition were once undertaken, and no crusade of honour will
ever be undertaken; all the burden will be left to Catherine.”
He did not conceal how highly pleased he was with the events of
1769-71, and he wrote to the “Northern Semiramis,” as he styled her:
“It is not sufficient to carry on a fortunate war against such
barbarians; it is not enough to humble their pride; they ought to
be driven away to Asia for ever. Your Imperial Majesty restores me
to life by killing the Turks. It has always been my opinion that if
their empire is ever destroyed, it will be by yours.”
Indeed, some people maliciously hinted at the time that Voltaire’s
opinion of the Turks was due to his disappointment at the failure
of his play “Mahomet, ou le fanatisme,” and that it was for the same
reason he wrote in his “Essai sur les mœurs et l’esprit des nations”
while he was Madame du Chatelet’s guest:
“Force and rapine built up the Ottoman Empire, and the quarrels
between Christians have kept it up. Hardly any town has ever been
built by the Turks. They have allowed the finest works of antiquity
to fall to decay; they rule over ruins.”
It seems that the members of the Supreme Council, in their answer to
the Turkish delegation, only harped upon this old theme, and amplified
it, and that in their settlement of the question they were inspired
by similar considerations, evincing the same misunderstanding of
Turkey and the same political error. The Supreme Council might have
remembered J. J. Rousseau’s prophecy in his “Contrat Social,” which
might very well be fulfilled now: “The Russian Empire will endeavour to
subjugate Europe, but will be subjugated. The Tatars, its subjects and
neighbours, will become its masters and ours too.”[15]
* * * * *
The negotiations which had just been broken off could only have been
usefully carried on if the Allies had quite altered their policy and
had realised the true condition of the Ottoman Empire and the interests
of the Western nations, especially those of France.
The condition of the Ottoman Empire, as will be seen later on, when
we shall dwell upon the slow and deep disintegration which had taken
place among the Turkish and Arabian populations, was on the whole as
follows: The Young Turk revolution, on which great hopes were built,
had ended lamentably: the Austrians had wrested Bosnia-Herzegovina from
Turkey; the Turco-Italian war had taken from her another slice of her
territory; then the coalition of the Balkan States had arisen, which
seems to have been prepared and supported by England and by the other
nations which followed her policy. Finally, the treaty of Bukharest
confirmed the failure of the principle—once solemnly proclaimed by
France and England—of the territorial integrity of Turkey. So the Turks
no longer had any confidence in Europe, and, being sacrificed once more
in the Balkan war, and as they could no longer trust England, they were
necessarily thrown into the arms of Germany.
After Abdul Hamid, Mehmed V, with his weak, religious mind, allowed
himself to be led by Enver, and his reign, disturbed by three wars,
cost Turkey huge territorial losses. Mehmed VI, being more energetic
and straightforward, tried to restore order in the State, and to put an
end to the doings of the Committee of Union and Progress.
Then, too, the Crown Prince, Abdul Mejid, a man about fifty, who
speaks French very well, evinces the same turn of mind. After seeing
what Germany could do with the Turkish Empire, such men, who had not
kept aloof from modern ideas, and to whom European methods were not
unfamiliar, had made up their mind that the Turks should not be driven
out of Europe. But Mejid Effendi was soon deprived of influence through
intrigues, and henceforth engaged in his favourite hobby, painting, in
his palace on Skutari Hill, and kept away from politics.
Mustafa Kemal, who had been sent to Amasia as Inspector-General of the
Eastern army, had secretly raised an army on his own account, with the
help of Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine in the Izzet Cabinet. When
recalled to Constantinople by the Turkish Government in July, 1919, he
had refused to obey, and had proclaimed himself his own master. Though
he had once gone to Berlin with the Sultan, who was only Crown Prince
at the time, the latter degraded him and deprived him of the right of
wearing his decorations—which could only have been a political measure
intended to show that the throne and the Government could not openly
countenance the movement that was taking place in Anatolia.
Mustafa Kemal, brought up at Salonika, had only become well known in
Constantinople during the Revolution of 1908. During the war in the
Balkan Peninsula he had distinguished himself at Chatalja, and after
being promoted colonel he was sent as military attaché to Sofia, and
then charged with a mission in Paris. He came back to Constantinople in
1914, a short time before war broke out.
Of course, when he had started his career a long time previously,
Mustafa Kemal had been connected indirectly with the Union and
Progress party, as he was at the head of the revolutionary group
in which this association originated, but he was never a member of
the Merkez-i-Oumimi, the central seat of the Committee of Union and
Progress. He was a good officer, very fond of his profession, and, as
he loathed politics, he had soon kept away from them, and consequently
never played any part in them, and was hardly ever influenced by them.
Yet the supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress, who have
made great mistakes, but have always been patriots, have necessarily
been compelled lately to co-operate with him, though they did not like
to do so at the outset.
Mustafa Kemal was undoubtedly the real leader of the movement which had
already spread over the whole of Anatolian Turkey. As his influence
was enormous and he had an undeniable ascendancy over the Turkish
troops he had recruited, his power was soon acknowledged from Cartal,
close to Constantinople to the Persian frontier. He had compelled
Liman von Sanders to give him command of a sector at a moment when the
Turks seemed to be in a critical situation during the attack of the
Anglo-French fleet in the Dardanelles, and by not complying with his
orders he had saved the Turkish army by the victory of Anafarta, and
perhaps prevented the capture of Constantinople, for two hours after
the Allies, whose casualties had been heavy, retired.
But he had soon come into conflict with Enver Pasha. Their disagreement
had begun during the war of Tripoli; it had increased during the Balkan
war, and had now reached an acute state. The chief reason seems to be
that they held quite different opinions about the organisation of the
army and the conduct of the war operations. Mustafa Kemal having always
refused to take part in politics after the Young Turk revolution of
1908, it seems difficult to believe this hostility could be accounted
for by political reasons, though the situation had now completely
changed. As to Mustafa Kemal’s bickerings and petty quarrels with
several German generals during the war, they seem to have had no other
cause than a divergence of views on technical points.
In consequence of this disagreement Mustafa Kemal was sent to
Mesopotamia in disgrace. He came back to Constantinople a few weeks
before the armistice. After the occupation of Smyrna he was appointed
Inspector-General of Anatolia, where he organised the national movement.
By Mustafa Kemal’s side there stood Reouf Bey, once Minister of Marine,
who, during the Balkan war, as commander of the cruiser _Hamidié_,
had made several raids in Greek waters, had then been one of the
signatories of the Moudros armistice, and now was able to bring over
to the Anatolian movement many naval officers and sailors, and General
Ali Fuad Pasha, the defender of Fort Pisani at Janina during the Balkan
war, who had a great prestige among the troops.
Bekir Sami Bey, once Governor-General, and Ahmed Rustem Bey, formerly
ambassador at Washington, were the first political men of note who
joined the nationalist movement. On Mustafa Kemal’s arrival at Erzerum,
Kiazim Karabekir, together with the other commanders, acknowledged
him as their chief, and pledged themselves to support him against
Constantinople.
Mustafa Kemal openly charged the Government with betraying Turkey to
the Allies, and asked all those who wanted to defend their country
and their religion to join him. At that time he only had at his
disposal two divisions of regular troops; he sent an appeal to the
populations of Sivas and Ushak, and many volunteers joined his colours.
Colonel Bekir Sami, who commanded the Panderma-Smyrna line and all the
district, also rebelled against the Constantinople Government, and soon
his 10,000 soldiers joined the troops of Mustafa Kemal, who assumed the
general command of all the insurgent troops. On the other hand, Kiazim
Bey threatened to resume hostilities, in case too heavy conditions
should be forced on Turkey. Mustafa Kemal, as he refused to make any
concessions to the victors of Turkey, and opposed any separatist idea
or the cession of any Ottoman territories, of course had with him
a large section of public opinion, which was roused by the Allies’
threat to take from Turkey half her possessions, Thrace, Smyrna, and
Kurdistan, and to drive the Sultan into Asia.
On July 23, a Congress of the committees which had been established in
various parts of the Empire for the defence of the national rights was
held at Erzerum.
The proceedings were secret, but at the end of the congress an
official report was sent to the High Commissioners of the Allies in
Constantinople.
An “Anatolian and Rumelian League for the Defence of the National
Rights” was formed, which later on was called the “National
Organisation.” According to what has become known about the sittings
of the Congress, the principles that were to control the action of
the National Organisation and to constitute its programme were the
following: (1) Grouping of the various Moslem nationalities of the
Empire into a whole politically and geographically indivisible and
administered so as to ensure the respect of their ethnic and social
differences. (2) Equality of rights for non-Moslem communities so
far as consistent with the principle of the political unity of the
State. (3) Integrity of the Empire within the boundaries of Turkish
sovereignty as they were in September, 1918, when the armistice was
concluded—which are almost the same as the ethnic boundaries of Turkey.
(4) No infringement whatever on the sovereignty of the Turkish Empire.
A special article expressed the sincere wish on the part of the Turkish
nation, with a view to the general restoration of Turkey, to accept the
support of any Western country, providing the latter did not aim at an
economic or political subjection of any kind.
This programme was sanctioned in the course of a second Congress which
was held at Sivas at the beginning of September, 1919, to allow the
local committees which had not been able to send delegates to Erzerum
to give their approbation to it and to adhere to the national movement.
The executive functions of the Congress were entrusted to a
representative committee presided over by Mustafa Kemal, and consisting
of members chosen by the Congress, who were: Reouf Bey, Bekir Sami Bey,
Hoja Raif Effendi, Mazhar Bey, once vali of Bitlis, and later on Ahmed
Rustem Bey, once Turkish ambassador at Washington, Haidar Bey, once
vali of Kharput, and Hakki Behij Bey.
The local militias which had been raised took the name of national
forces; and when they had been linked with the regular army, they were
put by Mustafa Kemal under the command of Kara Bekir Kiazim Pasha, who
became commander-in-chief in Eastern Anatolia, and Ali Fuad Pasha, who
had the command of the forces of Western Anatolia.
Two delegates of the “Liberal Entente,” some leaders of which group
seemed open to foreign influence, were sent to Constantinople to ask
the Central Committee what attitude was to be taken, and were prudently
ordered to enjoin the supporters of the Liberal Entente to be most
careful.
But though part of the Constantinople Press seemed to deny any
importance to the Anatolian movement, the Stambul Government deemed it
proper to send missions to Trebizond, Angora, and Eskishehr, headed by
influential men, in order to restore order in those regions. It also
directed two of its members to go to the rebellious provinces to see
how things stood, and come to terms with Mustafa Kemal. Some of these
missions never reached the end of their journey; most of them had to
retrace their steps, some did not even set out. In September, 1919,
Marshal Abdullah Pasha, who had instructions to reach Mustafa Kemal at
Trebizond, and enjoin him to give up his self-assumed command, did not
stir from Constantinople. The Government also sent General Kemal Pasha,
commander of the gendarmerie, to scatter the nationalist irregular
troops, but nothing was heard of him after a while, and he was supposed
to have been taken prisoner by, or gone over to, the rebels. The
Anatolian valis and commanders who had been summoned to Constantinople
did not come, protesting they could not do so or were ill.
On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal sent back to Constantinople Jemal
Bey, vali of Konia, and a few functionaries, who had remained loyal
to the Stambul Government. Ismaïl Bey, vali of Brusa, one of the most
important leaders of the Liberal Entente, was driven out of office by
both Governments.
In addition, the cleavages already existing in the Ottoman Empire,
which since 1913 only included the prominently Moslem provinces, had
widened, and endangered the unity of the Empire. In the provinces where
the Arabic-speaking Moslems were in a majority the authority of the
Turkish Government dwindled every day; they meant to shake off the
Ottoman yoke, and at the same time to keep off any Western influence;
they also wished more and more eagerly to part from the provinces
where the Turks and Ottoman Kurds—who aim at uniting together—are in a
majority.
* * * * *
For the last four centuries France had enjoyed an exceptional situation
in Turkey. Her intellectual influence was paramount; French was not
only known among the upper classes, but it was also in current use in
politics and business, and even a good many clerks in post-offices and
booking-offices at Constantinople understood it.
French schools, owing to their very tolerant spirit, were very popular
among nearly all classes of the Turkish population, and the sympathies
we had thus acquired and the intellectual prestige we enjoyed were
still more important than our material interests. Nearly 25,000
children attended the French elementary schools, most of them religious
schools, which bears witness both to the confidence the Mahommedans
had in us, and the tolerance they showed. The Grammar School of
Galata-Serai, established in 1868 by Sultan Abdul Aziz with the
co-operation of Duruy, French Minister of Public Education, and several
other secondary schools which are now closed, diffused French culture
and maintained sympathy between the two peoples. The Jesuits’ school of
medicine at Beyrut also spread our influence.
The material interests of France in Turkey were also of great
importance; and it was, therefore, a great mistake for France to
follow a policy that was bound to ruin the paramount influence she
had acquired. The other Western States had as important interests as
France; and it was necessary to take all these facts into account if an
equitable settlement of the Turkish question was to be reached.
France, England, and Germany were, before the war, the three Powers
that owned the most important financial concerns in Turkey, France
easily holding the premier position, owing to the amount of French
capital invested in Turkish securities, Government stocks, and private
companies.
From 1854 to 1875 thirteen loans—almost one every year—were issued by
the Ottoman Government, ten being entrusted to the care of French banks
or financial establishments controlled by French capital.
These thirteen loans have only an historical interest now, except the
three loans issued in 1854, 1855, and 1871, secured on the Egyptian
tribute, which still exist with some modifications, but may be looked
upon as Egyptian or rather English securities, and were not included
in the settlement effected in 1881 which converted them into new bonds,
and the 1870-71 loan, styled “Lots Turcs,” the whole of which at the
time was subscribed by Baron Hirsch in return for the concession of
railways in Europe. To them let us add another financial operation
effected about 1865, consisting in the unification of the various bonds
of the interior debt and their conversion into bonds representing a
foreign debt.
Most of these operations were controlled by the Imperial Ottoman Bank,
founded by the most influential English and French financial groups, to
which the Ottoman Government by its firmans of 1863 and 1875 granted
the privilege of being the State bank. It thus has the exclusive right
of issuing banknotes, and has the privilege of being the general
paymaster of the Empire and the financial agent of the Government, both
at home and abroad.
The financial activity of the French companies was only interrupted by
the 1870 war. The only competition met with was that of a few English
banks, which no doubt intended to second the views of the British
Government in Egypt, and of an Austrian syndicate for the building
of the Balkan railways which, later on, furthered the penetration of
Austria-Hungary in Eastern Europe.
In 1875 the nominal capital of the Ottoman debt rose to 5,297,676,500
francs. The Ottoman Government, finding it impossible to pay the
interest on the Government stocks, announced its decision on October
6, 1875, to give only one-half in cash in the future. The Imperial
Ottoman Bank, which was practically under French control owing to the
importance of the French capital invested in it, raised a protest on
behalf of the bondholders.
The Porte then agreed to make arrangements with the French, the
Italians, the Austrians, the Germans, and the Belgians. The claims
of the bondholders were laid before the plenipotentiaries who had
met at Berlin to revise the preliminaries of San Stefano, and were
sanctioned by the Berlin treaty signed on July 13, 1878. They had three
chief objects: First, to secure the right of first mortgage which the
creditors of the Empire held from the loans secured on the Russian war
indemnity; secondly, to appoint the contributive share of the Ottoman
debt incumbent on the provinces detached from the Empire; thirdly, to
decide what was to be done to restore Turkish finance.
After the conversations with the plenipotentiaries assembled at Berlin,
and chiefly owing to the intervention of the French representative, M.
Waddington, the Congress embodied the following clauses in the treaty
in order to protect the interests of the bond-holders: Bulgaria was to
pay the Sultan a tribute; part of the revenue of Eastern Rumelia was
to be assigned to the payment of the Ottoman Public Debt; Bulgaria,
Serbia, and Montenegro were to assume a part of the Ottoman debt
proportionately to the Turkish territories annexed by each of them; all
the rights and duties of the Porte relating to the railways of Eastern
Rumelia were to be wholly maintained; finally, the Powers advised the
Sublime Porte to establish an international financial commission in
Constantinople.
In this way the Berlin treaty laid down the principles on which every
financial reorganisation was to be based whenever a province should be
detached from the Ottoman Empire.
Then the mandatories of the bondholders began to negotiate directly
with the Ottoman Empire, but as the various schemes that were proferred
failed, the Imperial Ottoman Bank, supported by the Galata bankers,
proposed an arrangement that was sanctioned by the Convention of
November 10 to 22, 1879. In this way the administration of the Six
Contributions was created, to which were farmed out for a period of
ten years the revenues derived from stamp duties, spirits in some
provinces, the fisheries of Constantinople and the suburbs, and the
silk tax within the same area and in the suburbs of Adrianople,
Brusa, and Samsun; it was also entrusted with the collection and
administration of the revenues proceeding from the monopolies in salt
and tobacco.
At the request of the Imperial Ottoman Bank the revenues of this
administration, first allocated to the Priority Bonds, of which
she owned the greater part, were divided later on between all the
bondholders.
In this way the important agreement known as the decree of Muharrem, in
which the French played a paramount part, was made possible (December
8 to 20, 1881), according to which the original capital of the foreign
Turkish loans was brought down to the average price of issue, plus 10
per cent. of this new capital as a compensation for the interest that
had not been paid since 1876. The old bonds were stamped, converted,
and exchanged for new bonds called Bonds of the Unified Converted
Debt, except the “Lots Turcs,” which, being premium bonds, were
treated separately.
The interest of the Converted Debt was fixed at from 1 to 4 per cent.
of the new capital.
As to the amortisation, the decree divided the various foreign
loans into several series according to the value of the mortgage;
this classification stated in what order they would be subject to
amortisation.
The outcome of these negotiations, the decree of Muharrem, also
established a set of concessions which could not be revoked before the
extinction of the debt, and organised the administration of the Ottoman
Public Debt, which was to collect and administer, on behalf of the
Ottoman bondholders, the revenues conceded as guarantee of the debt.
The Ottoman Government pledged itself to allocate to the payment
of the interest and to the amortisation of the reduced debt till
its extinction the following revenues: the monopolies in salt and
tobacco; the Six Contributions (tobacco, salt, spirits, stamps,
fisheries, silk); any increase in the customs duties resulting from
the modification of the commercial treaties; any increase of the
revenues resulting from new regulations affecting patents and licences
(_temettu_); the tribute of the principality of Bulgaria; any surplus
of the Cyprus revenues; the tribute of Eastern Rumelia; the produce of
the tax on pipe tobacco (_tumbeki_); any sums which might be fixed as
contributions due from Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro for the
service of the debt.
The administration of the Ottoman Public Debt was entrusted to “the
Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt,” commonly
known as “the Public Debt,” consisting of delegates of Ottoman
bondholders of all nations. The French owned by far the greater part
of the debt. The English represented the Belgians in the Council, the
shares of these two countries in the debt being about equal.
This international council, who attended to the strict execution of
the provisions of the decree, deducted all the sums required for
the interest and the sinking fund, and made over the balance to the
Imperial treasury.
The decree of Muharrem also entrusted to the Public Debt the control
of the cultivation and the monopoly of the sale of tobacco throughout
the Turkish Empire. Later on, in 1883, the Public Debt farmed out its
rights to an Ottoman limited company, the “Régie Co-intéressée des
Tabacs de l’Empire,” formed by a financial consortium including three
groups: the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was a Franco-English concern;
the German group of the B. Bleichröder Bank; and the Austrian group of
the Kredit Anstalt with a capital of 100 million francs. Only one-half
of this capital was paid up—_i.e._, 50 million francs—which was cut
down to 40 million francs on November 28, 1899, to make up for the
losses of the first three years. It is thought in French financial
circles that half this capital—viz., 20 million francs—is French, and
the rest chiefly Austrian.
The “Régie,” whose activities extend throughout the Empire, may be
looked upon as one of the most important financial concerns of the
Ottoman Empire. It has branches in all the chief centres, controls
the cultivation of tobacco, records the production, buys native and
foreign tobaccos, issues licences for the sale of tobacco, and advances
money to the growers; its chief factories are at Samsun, Aleppo, Adana,
Smyrna, etc. In return for the monopoly it enjoys, it owes the Public
Debt a fixed yearly payment, and has to divide a fixed proportion of
its net profits between the Public Debt and the Ottoman Government.
The share of France in the Council of the Public Debt, in which French
was the official language, gave her a paramount influence and prestige
in the Ottoman Empire. Owing to the importance and extent of the part
played by the Council of the Debt, in which the influence of France
was paramount, the latter country indirectly acquired an influence in
the administration of the _Malié_—_i.e._, in the administration of
the Turkish treasury—and in this way Turkey was obliged on several
occasions to call for the advice of French specialists for her
financial reorganisation.
But the Ottoman Government, in order to consolidate its floating debt,
which had not been included in the previous liquidation, was soon
compelled to borrow money abroad. Besides, it wanted to construct a
system of railways at that time.
The loan guaranteed by the customs duties in 1886, the Osmanie loan in
1890, the 4 per cent. Tombac preferential loan in 1893, the Eastern
Railway loan in 1894, the 5 per cent. 1896 loan, and the 4 per cent.
1901 loan, were all floated in France, and the English had no share in
the financial operations between 1881 and 1904.
During the same period Germany, through the Deutsche Bank, took up the
Fishery loan in 1888 and the 4 per cent. Baghdad Railway loan in 1903.
Later on the German financial companies, together with the Deutsche
Bank, gave Turkey as much support as the French banks, in order to
promote Pan-Germanism in the East and oust French influence. The chief
financial operations carried on by these companies were the Baghdad
Railway loan, the Tejhizat loan for the payment of military supplies,
and the 1911 loan, which were both a guarantee and an encouragement
for the German policy of penetration in Turkey, and paved the way to a
Germano-Ottoman understanding.
France continued to subscribe all the same, from 1903 to 1914, to six
of the twelve Turkish loans raised by the Ottoman Government; four
others were taken up by Germany, another by England, and the sixth—the
4 per cent. 1908 loan—was issued one-half in France, one-fourth in
Germany, and one-fourth in England. In 1914, as a reward for issuing
a loan of 800 million francs in Paris—the first slice being 500
million—France obtained the settlement of several litigious cases and
new concessions of railways and ports.
At the outbreak of the war, the external debt of Turkey, including the
Unified Debt and other loans, amounted to 3½ milliards of francs,
whereas the Turkish revenue hardly exceeded 500 million francs.
One-third of this sum went to the sinking fund of the external debt,
of which, roughly speaking, France alone owned nearly 60 per cent.,
Germany nearly 26 per cent., and England a little more than 14 per cent.
In addition to this, in the sums lent to Turkey by private companies,
the share of France was about 50 per cent.—_i.e._, over 830 million
francs; that of Germany rose to 35 per cent.; and that of England a
little more than 14 per cent.
Foreign participation in the great works and the various economic or
financial concerns in Turkey may be summed up as follows:
-------------------------+----------+----------+----------
| _France._|_England._|_Germany._
-------------------------+----------+----------+----------
Banks | 37·7 | 33·3 | 28·0
Railways | 46·9 | 10·4 | 46·6
Ports and wharves | 67·9 | 12·2 | 19·7
Water | 88·6 | — | 11·3
Mines | 100·0 | — | —
Various concerns | 62·8 | 24·1 | 13·0
-------------------------+----------+----------+----------
Total per cent. | 50·5 | 14·3 | 35·0
Capital (million Francs) | 830 | 235 | 575
-------------------------+----------+----------+----------
Not only had France an important share in the organisation of Turkish
finances, but had opened three banks while the English established
but one, the National Bank of Turkey, which holds no privilege from
the State, and is merely a local bank for business men. Two German
banks—the Deutsche Orient Bank and the Deutsche Palästina Bank, founded
almost as soon as Germany began to show her policy regarding Turkish
Asia—had turned their activity towards Turkey, as we have just seen.
France incurred an outlay of 550 million francs—not including the sums
invested in companies which were not predominantly French, such as the
Baghdad Railway—for the building of 1,500 miles of railway lines, while
the Germans built almost as many, and the English only 450 miles; and
France spent 58 million francs for the ports, whereas the English only
spent 10 million francs.
The railway concessions worked by French capital included the
Damascus-Hama line, which afterwards reached Jaffa and Jerusalem;
the tramways of Lebanon; the Mudania-Brusa line; the Smyrna-Kassaba
railway; the Black Sea railways which, according to the 1914 agreement,
were to extend from Kastamuni to Erzerum, and from Trebizond to
Kharput, and be connected with the Rayak-Ramleh line—viz., 1,600 miles
of railway altogether in Syria; the Salonika-Constantinople line.
Before the London treaty, the Eastern railways in European Turkey,
representing 600 miles, were worked by Austro-German capital, and the
Salonika-Monastir line, 136 miles in length, had a German capital of 70
million francs.
The concessions with German capital in Asia Minor formed a complete
system of railways, including the Anatolian railways, with a length of
360 miles and a capital of 344,500,000 francs; the Mersina-Tarsus-Adana
line, 42 miles, capital 9,200,000 francs; the Baghdad Railway, whose
concession was first given to the Anatolian railways but was ceded in
1903 to the Baghdad Railway Company, and which before the war was about
190 miles in length.
[Illustration: MAP OF THE RAILWAYS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE
CHIEF MINING CONCERNS UNDER FOREIGN CONTROL BEFORE THE WAR.]
As the building of this system of railways closely concerned the French
companies of the Smyrna-Kassaba and Beyrut-Damascus railways and the
English company of the Smyrna-Aidin railway, the French companies and
the Ottoman Imperial Bank concluded arrangements with the holders of
the concessions to safeguard French interests as much as possible.
Thus a French financial group took up a good many of the Baghdad bonds
(22,500 and 21,155 bonds) and numerous shares of the “Société de
construction du chemin de fer” established in 1909. On the whole, the
share of the French consortium before the war amounted to 4,000,000
francs on the one hand, and 1,950,000 francs on the other; the share of
the German consortium was 11,000,000 and 8,050,000 francs.
The concessions controlled by English capital were the Smyrna-Aidin
line, 380 miles long, with a capital of 114,693,675 francs, and the
Smyrna-Kassaba line, which was ceded later on to the company controlled
by French capital which has already been mentioned. They were the first
two railway concessions given in Turkey (1856 and 1863).
In Constantinople the port, the lighthouses, the gasworks, the
waterworks, and the tramways were planned and built by French capital
and labour.
The port of Smyrna, whose concession was given in 1867 to an English
company and two years after passed into the hands of some Marseilles
contractors, was completed by the “Société des quais de Smyrne,” a
French limited company. The diversion of the Ghedis into the Gulf of
Phocea in order to prevent the port being blocked up with sand was the
work of a French engineer, Rivet.
The Bay of Beyrut has also been equipped by a French company founded
in 1888 under the patronage of the Ottoman Bank by a group of the
chief French shareholders of the Beyrut-Damascus road and other French
financial companies.
Moreover, according to the 1914 agreements, the ports of Ineboli and
Heraclea on the Black Sea, and the ports of Tripoli, Jaffa, and Haïfa
in Syria, were to be built exclusively by French capital. So it was
with the intended concessions of the ports of Samsun and Trebizond.
At Beyrut a French group in 1909 bought up the English concession for
the building of the waterworks and pipelines, and formed a new company.
French capital, together with Belgian capital, also control the Gas
Company, Tramway Company, and Electric Company of Beyrut. Only at
Smyrna, where the gasworks are in the hands of an English company and
the waterworks are owned by a Belgian company has France not taken part
in the organisation of the municipal services.
Only the port of Haïdar-Pasha, the terminus of the Anatolian Railway,
has been ceded by this company to a financial company whose shares are
in German hands.
To these public establishments should be added such purely private
industrial or commercial concerns as the Orosdi-Back establishments;
the Oriental Tobacco Company; the Tombac Company; the “Société
nationale pour le commerce, l’industrie et l’agriculture dans l’Empire
ottoman”; the concession of Shukur-ova, the only French concession of
landed property situated in the Gulf of Alexandretta on the intended
track of the Baghdad Railway, including about 150,000 acres of Imperial
land, which represent an entirely French capital of 64 million francs;
the Oriental Carpet Company, which is a Franco-British concern; the
Joint Stock Imperial Company of the Docks, Dockyards, and Shipbuilding
Yard, which is entirely under British control, etc.
During the war, the share of France and that of England were increased,
as far as the Public Debt is concerned, by the amount of the coupons
which were not cashed by the stockholders of the Allied countries,
while the holders of Ottoman securities belonging to the Central Powers
cashed theirs.
Beyond this, Turkey borrowed of Germany about 3½ milliards of francs.
An internal loan of 400 million francs had also been raised. To these
sums should be added 2 milliards of francs for buying war supplies
and war material, and the treasury bonds issued by Turkey for her
requisitions, which cannot be cashed but may amount to about 700
million francs. As the requisitions already made during the Balkan
wars, which amounted to 300 or 400 million francs, have not yet been
liquidated, the whole Turkish debt may be valued at over 10 billion
francs.
Finally, in the settlement of the Turkish question, the war damages
borne by the French in Turkey should also be taken into account, which
means an additional sum of about 2 milliards of francs.
The French owned in Turkey great industrial or agricultural
establishments, which were wholly or partly destroyed. At
Constantinople and on the shores of the Marmora alone they had about
fifty religious or undenominational schools, which were half destroyed,
together with everything they contained, perhaps in compliance with the
wishes of Germany, who wanted to ruin French influence for ever in that
country.
In order to keep up French influence in the East, the High
Commissioner of the Republic had, in the early days of the armistice,
warned his Government it was necessary to provide a fund at once to
defray the expenses of the schools and other institutions established
by the French in Turkey in pre-war time—which sums of money were to be
advanced on the outstanding indemnity. For want of any existing law,
this request could not be complied with; but, as will be seen later on,
the Peace Treaty, though it says nothing about this urgent question,
states that the indemnities due to the subjects of the Allied Powers
for damages suffered by them in their persons or in their property
shall be allotted by an inter-Allied financial commission, which alone
shall have a right to dispose of Turkish revenue and to sanction the
payment of war damages. But all this postpones the solution of the
question indefinitely.
In the settlement of the Turkish question, the chief point is how
Turkey will be able to carry out her engagements, and so, in her
present condition, the policy which England and America, followed by
Italy and France, seem to advocate, is a most questionable one.
Javid Bey has even published an account of the condition of Turkey, in
which he finds arguments to justify the adhesion of his country to the
policy of Germany.
Nevertheless it seems that Turkey, where the average taxation is now
from 23 to 25 francs per head, can raise fresh taxes. The revenue
of the State will also necessarily increase owing to the increase
of production, as a tithe of 10 to 12 per cent. is levied on all
agricultural produce. Finally, the building of new railway lines and
the establishment of new manufactures—to which, it must be said, some
competing States have always objected for their own benefit but to the
prejudice of Turkey—would enable her to make herself the manufactured
goods she bought at a very high price before, instead of sending abroad
her raw materials: silk, wool, cotton, hemp, opium, etc.
The soil of Turkey, on the other hand, contains a good deal of mineral
and other wealth, most of which has not been exploited yet. There is a
good deal of iron in Asia Minor, though there exists but one iron-mine,
at Ayasmat, opposite to Mitylene, the yearly output of which is only
30,000 tons. The most important beds now known are those of the Berut
Hills, north of the town of Zeitun, about fifty miles from the Gulf of
Alexandretta, which may produce 300,000 tons a year. Chrome, manganese,
and antimony are also found there.
There is copper everywhere in the north, in thin but rich layers,
containing 20 per cent. of metal. The chief mine, which is at Argana,
in the centre of Anatolia, is a State property. A French company, the
Syndicate of Argana, founded for the prospecting and exploitation of
the copper concessions at Argana and Malatia, and the concessions of
argentiferous lead at Bulgar-Maden, had begun prospecting before the
war.
Lead, zinc, and silver are found, too, in the Karahissar area, where
is the argentiferous lead mine of Bukar-Dagh, once a State property.
Before the war a French company of the same type as the one above
mentioned, the Syndicate of Ak-Dagh, had obtained the right to explore
the layers of zinc and argentiferous lead in the vilayet of Angora.
The mines of Balia-Karaidin (argentiferous lead and lignite) lying
north-east of the Gulf of Adramyti in the sanjak of Karassi, are
controlled by French capital. The English syndicate Borax Consolidated
has the concession of the boracite mines in the same sandjak.
The range of Gumich-Dagh, or “Silver Mountain,” contains much emery.
At Eskishehr there are mines of meerschaum, and in the Brusa vilayet
quarries of white, pink, and old-blue marble, lapis-lazuli, etc.
A few years ago gold layers were being exploited at Mender-Aidin,
near Smyrna, and others have been found at Chanak-Kale, near the
Dardanelles. Some gold-mines had been worked in Arabia in remote ages.
There are oil-fields throughout the peninsula, lying in four parallel
lines from the north-west to the south-east. The best-known fields
are in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad, where nearly two hundred
have been identified; others have also been found near the Lake of
Van, and at Pulk, west of Erzerum, which are not inferior to those of
Mesopotamia; and others fifty miles to the south of Sinope.
There are almost inexhaustible layers of excellent asphalt at Latakieh,
on the slopes of the Libanus, and others, quite as good, at Kerkuk,
Hit, and in several parts of Mesopotamia.
Finally, some coal-mines are being worked at Heraclea which are
controlled by French capital, and coal outcrops have been found lately
in the Mosul area near the Persian frontier, between Bashkala and
Rowanduz and Zahku, close to the Baghdad Railway. But the treaty, as
will be shown later on, is to deprive Turkey of most of these sources
of wealth.
Among the other products of Turkey may be mentioned carpets, furs (fox,
weasel, marten, and otter), and, particularly, silks. The silks of
Brusa are more valuable than those of Syria—the latter being difficult
to wind; their output has decreased because many mulberry-trees
were cut down during the war, but the industry will soon resume its
importance.
Turkey also produces a great quantity of leather and hides, and various
materials used for tanning: valonia, nut-gall, acacia. It is well known
that for centuries the leather trade has been most important in the
East, numerous little tanyards are scattered about the country, and
there are large leather factories in many important towns. The Young
Turks, realising the bright prospects of that trade, had attempted to
prohibit the exportation of leathers and hides, and to develop the
leather manufacture. During the summer of 1917 the National Ottoman
Bank of Credit opened a leather factory at Smyrna, and appointed an
Austrian tanner as its director. Owing to recent events, it has been
impossible to establish other leather factories, but this scheme is
likely to be resumed with the protection of the Government, for the
leather industry may become one of the chief national industries.
* * * * *
The Peace Conference, by postponing the solution of the Turkish problem
indefinitely, endangered not only French interests in Turkey, but the
condition of Eastern Europe.
The consequences of such a policy soon became obvious, and at the
beginning of August it was reported that a strong Unionist agitation
had started. The Cabinet of Damad Ferid Pasha, after the answer given
by the Entente to the delegation he presided over, was discredited, as
it could not even give the main features of the forthcoming peace, or
state an approximate date for its conclusion. He could have remained
in office only if the Allies had supported him by quickly solving the
Turkish problem. Besides, he soon lost all control over the events that
hurried on.
In the first days of summer, the former groups of Young Turks were
reorganised in Asia Minor; some congresses of supporters of the Union
and Progress Committee, who made no secret of their determination not
to submit to the decisions that the Versailles Congress was likely to
take later on, were held at Erzerum, Sivas, and Amasia, and openly
supported motions of rebellion against the Government. At the same
time the Turkish Army was being quickly reorganised, outside the
Government’s control, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf
Bey. An openly nationalist, or rather national, movement asserted
itself, which publicly protested both against the restoration of the
old régime and the dismemberment of Turkey.
Even in Constantinople the Unionist Committee carried on an
unrestrained propaganda and plotted to overthrow Damad Ferid Pasha
and put in his place Izzet Pasha, a shrewd man, who had signed the
armistice with the Allies, and favoured a policy of compromise.
This movement had started after the resignation of the Izzet Pasha
Cabinet, when the prominent men of the Unionist party had to leave
Constantinople. First, it had been chiefly a Unionist party, but had
soon become decidedly national in character. Everywhere, but chiefly
in Constantinople, it had found many supporters, and the majority of
the cultured classes sympathised with the leaders of the Anatolian
Government.
Moreover, the Allies, by allowing the Greeks to land in Smyrna without
any valid reason, had started a current of opinion which strengthened
the nationalist movement, and raised the whole of Turkey against them.
At the beginning of October, 1919, the Sultan replaced Damad Ferid
Pasha by Ali Riza Pasha as Prime Minister. Reshid Pasha, formerly
Minister of Public Works and ambassador at Vienna, who had been
ambassador at Rome till the revolution of 1908, and had been first
Turkish delegate in the Balkan Conference in London in 1912-13, became
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Grand Vizier General Ali Riza had been Minister of War, and Reshid
Pasha Foreign Minister in the Tewfik Cabinet, which had come into
office in December, 1918, at a time when the Porte was anxious to
conciliate the Allies. Ali Riza had led the operations on the Balkan
front in 1912 and 1913, but had refused to assume any command during
the Great War, as he had always opposed the participation of Turkey in
this war. As he was rather a soldier than a diplomat, his policy seemed
likely to be led by his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, who
was said to be a friend of France.
General Jemal Pasha Kushuk, who became War Minister, was quite a
Nationalist. He was called Jemal Junior, to distinguish him from the
other Jemal who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Turkish Army
during the war. He, too, had commanded in Palestine. He was popular in
the army and among the Unionists. Rightly or wrongly, he was supposed
to be in correspondence with Kemal, the leader of the Nationalist
movement in Asia Minor, and his appointment intimated that Ali Riza did
not want to break off with Kemal, whose rebellion had brought about
Damad Ferid’s resignation.
Said Mollah, Under-Secretary of Justice, a friend of England, edited
the newspaper _Turkje Stambul_, in which he carried on a strong
pro-English propaganda. It was said he was paid by Abdul Hamid to spy
upon a former Sheik-ul-Islam, Jemal ed Din Effendi, his uncle and
benefactor. It seems that by appointing him the Sultan wished to create
a link within the new Government between the supporters of England and
those of France, in order to show that in his opinion Turkey’s interest
was, not to put these two nations in opposition to each other, but, on
the contrary, to collaborate closely with them both for the solution of
Eastern affairs.
Sultan Mehemet VI, by doing so, endeavoured to restore calm and
order in Turkey, and also to enhance his prestige and authority over
the Nationalist rebels in Anatolia who, at the Congress of Sivas,
had plainly stated they refused to make any compromise either with
the Porte or the Allies. The choice of the new Ministers marked a
concession to the Nationalist and revolutionary spirit.
About the end of 1919 there were serious indications that the
Nationalist movement was gaining ground in Cilicia, and in January,
1920, disturbances broke out in the Marash area.