The Conduct of the War
It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which
began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several
campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions
under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods
into which it may be divided.
From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked
severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order
to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a
soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for
a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and
"severely punished" for a third. [395]
On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing
his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be
liable to capital punishment, [396] which in practice was frequently
inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.
Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service
on the payment of cash.
The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless
abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities,
as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They
grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.
"The documents of this period show that the insurgent troops driven
from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring
towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost
all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was
not for some days that control was regained." [397]
Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent
officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was
grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed
it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who
removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple. [398]
Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at
another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes
coöperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly
and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders, [399]
and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.
There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed
brigandage with a heavy hand, [400] but many of them were indifferent,
even if not in alliance with the evil doers.
The Visayas
Feeling between Tagálog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly
more bitter, and before many months had passed they fell to killing
each other. The highest officers of the "Regional Revolutionary
Government of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo, [401]
but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.
On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a
significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing
with them. [402]
In Luzón General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens
of his province of committing "robberies, assaults, kidnappings and
crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes." [403]
That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively
shown by the record of Aguinaldo's government for February 24, 1899,
when it decided--
"that the president of the council shall study such measures
as will put an end to the continual discord and friction
between the civil and military authorities of every province,
in order that fatal consequences may be avoided."
With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was
to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and
that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with
barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated. [404] American
soldiers were trapped, poisoned [405] and murdered in other ways. [406]
It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers
were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.
I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent
prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and
kindness.
A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the
most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American
soldiers. I have elsewhere described [407] the fate that overtook
Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane
treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.
Not only did some of those who did this forfeit their lives, but
newspaper articles, military orders, and proclamations issued by civil
officers informed the people that the American soldiers stole, burned,
robbed, raped and murdered. Especial stress was laid on their alleged
wholesale violations of women, partly to turn the powerful influence of
the women as a whole against them, and partly to show that they were
no better than the Insurgents themselves, who frequently committed
rape. [408]
These horrible tales were at first believed even by some of the
responsible Insurgent officers in remote regions, [409] but all such
men soon learned the truth, which was known to most of them from
the start.
In official correspondence between them, not intended for the public,
orders were given to use women as bearers of despatches for the
reason that Americans did not search them. [410] More significant
yet, when conditions became bad in the provinces, Insurgent officers
sent their women and children to seek American protection in Manila
or elsewhere. Cartload after cartload of them came in at Angeles,
shortly after General Jacob H. Smith took that place. Aguinaldo himself
followed this procedure, as is shown by the following extracts from
Villa's famous diary: [411]--
"_December 22._--It was 7 A.M. when we arrived in
Ambayuan. Here we found the women worn out from the painful
journey they had suffered. They were seated on the ground. In
their faces were observed indications of the ravages of
hunger; but they are always smiling, saying they would prefer
suffering in these mountains to being under the dominion of
the Americans, and that such sacrifices are the duties of
every patriot who loves his country.
"We secured some camotes in this settlement, cooked them
immediately, and everybody had breakfast. Our appetites
were satisfied.
"The honorable president had already decided some days before
to send all the women to Manila, including his family, and
this was his motive in hurrying his family forward with him.
"_December 24._--We find ourselves still in Talubin. About 8
o'clock this morning a report came saying the Americans had
arrived at Bontoc, the provincial capital, the nearest town
to Talubin, and distant from it two hours by the road. An
immediate decision was made. The honourable president told
his family and the other women that they should remain in the
settlement and allow themselves to be caught by the Americans,
and he named Señors Sytiar and Paez to remain also, with the
obligation of conducting the women to Manila. As soon as the
arrangement was effected, the honourable president prepared
himself for the march. The parting was a very sad one for
himself and for his family.
"The honourable president left Talubin at 11 o'clock in the
morning, his family and the other women remaining behind with
two gentlemen charged with conducting them to Manila." [412]
In this, as in all other similar cases, the women were kindly treated
and safely conducted to their destination. Aguinaldo and his fellows
knew the happy fate of the members of his own family, as is shown by
a later entry:--
"_February 6._--We have been informed that the mother and son
of the honourable president are at Manila, living in the house
of Don Benito Legarda, and that they reached that capital long
before the wife and sister of the honourable president. We have
also learned that Señor Buencamino, and Tirona, and Concepcion
are prisoners of the American authorities in Manila. With
reference to the wife and sister of the honourable president
and the two Leyba sisters, it is said that they went to Vigan
and from there went by steamer to Manila." [413]
The mother and son, accompanied by Buencamino, had allowed themselves
to be captured at an earlier date. What shall we say of a leader who
would turn his mother, wife, sister and son over to American soldiers
for safekeeping, and then continue to denounce the latter as murderers,
and violaters of women? Aguinaldo did just this. That the Insurgent
leaders were early and fully aware of the treatment accorded their
wounded is shown by the following extract from a letter to General
Moxica of Leyte, dated March 2, 1900, giving instructions as to what
should be done with wounded men:--
"If by chance any of our men are wounded on the field or
elsewhere, efforts must be made to take away the rifles and
ammunition at once and carry them away as far as possible,
so that they may not be captured by the enemy; and if the
wounded cannot be immediately removed elsewhere or retreat
from the place, let them be left there, because it is better
to save the arms than the men, as there are many Filipinos
to fill up the ranks, but rifles are scarce and difficult to
secure for battle; and besides the Americans, coming upon
any wounded, take good care of them, while the rifles are
destroyed; therefore, I repeat, they must endeavour to save
the arms rather than the men." [414]
There were some rare individual instances in which uninjured Filipinos
were treated with severity, and even with cruelty, by American
soldiers. They occurred for the most part late in the war when the
"water cure" in mild form was sometimes employed in order to compel
persons who had guilty knowledge of the whereabouts of firearms to
tell what they knew, to the end that the perpetration of horrible
barbarities on the common people, and the assassination of those who
had sought American protection, might the more promptly cease. Usually
the sufferers were themselves bloody murderers, who had only to tell
the truth to escape punishment. The men who performed these cruel
acts knew what treatment was being commonly accorded to Filipinos,
and in some instances to their own comrades. I mention these facts to
explain, not to excuse, their conduct. Cruel acts cannot be excused,
but those referred to seldom resulted in any permanent injury to the
men who suffered them, and were the rare and inevitable exceptions
to the general rule that the war was waged, so far as the Americans
were concerned, with a degree of humanity hitherto unprecedented under
similar conditions. The Insurgents violated every rule of civilized
warfare, yet oathbreakers, spies and men fighting in citizens' clothes
not only were not shot by the Americans, as they might very properly
have been, but were often turned loose with a mere warning not to
offend again.
The false news circulated to aid the Insurgent cause was by no means
limited to such matters. Every time their troops made a stand they were
promptly defeated and driven back, but their faltering courage was
bolstered up by glorious tidings of wonderful, but wholly imaginary,
victories won elsewhere. It was often reported that many times more
Americans had fallen in some insignificant skirmish than were actually
killed in the whole war, while generals perished by the dozen and
colonels by the thousand. Our losses on March 27, 1899, in fighting
north of Manila, were said to be twenty-eight thousand. In reality
only fifty-six Americans were killed in all northern Luzón during
the entire month.
On April 26, 1899, the governor of Iloilo published the following
remarkable news items among others:--
"_Pavia_, April 6th, 1899.
"The Liberating Army of the Visayan Islands to the Local
Presidents of the towns shown on the margin:
"_Towns:_ Santa Barbara, Pavia, Leganes, Zárraga, Dumangas,
Batac Viejo, Tuilao, Batac Nuevo, Banate.
* * * * *
"Santa Ana taken by Americans burning town our troops advancing
to Rosario and Escolta Americans request parley account death
General and officers and many soldiers.
* * * * *
"At 3 P.M. of the 14th battle at Santolan 500 American
prisoners who are to be taken to Malolos.
"At 9.45 P.M. Commissioner Laguna details 6000 more Americans
dead and 600 prisoners.
"Otis requests parley, and our representatives being present,
he tells them to request peace and conditions, to which they
replied that he, and not they, should see to that, so the
parley accomplished nothing.
"To-day, Wednesday, a decisive battle will be fought.
"Among the 5000 prisoners there are two generals. Tomorrow
7.15 Pasig in our power. Americans little by little leaving
for Manila.
"General Malbar to Provincial Chief Batangas.
"According to reports by telegraph hostilities have commenced
and all at Santa Mesa have fallen into our hands, also Pasay
and Maytubig.
"American boat surrendered at Laguna de Bay many prisoners
taken.
"General Ricarte to Provincial Chief of Batangas: Battle
stopped by truce Japan and Germany intervene to learn who
provoked war.
"Foreigners favor parley one American general and chiefs and
officers dead." [415]
Santa Ana is a suburb of Manila. The Rosario and Escolta are the main
business streets of the city.
Apparently the Insurgents must have thought that colonels were as
numerous in our army as in theirs, for they reported two thousand of
them killed on February 6, 1899, and threw in one general for good
measure. [416]
* * * * *
We learn from the _Filipino Herald_ for February 23, 1899, that on that
day the Filipino army captured and occupied the suburbs of Manila,
while American troops were besieged in the outskirts of the city,
at La Loma, and in the neighbouring town of Caloocan. [417]
But why continue. No tale concerning American losses in the Philippines
was too fantastic to be told by the leaders and believed by the
soldiery and the populace. The American soldiers were even said to
be refusing to fight, and great prisons were being constructed in
order properly to punish them.
General MacArthur and his entire staff were captured before March 2,
1900, according to a letter sent to General Moxica of Leyte on that
date. [418]
And what of conditions in the United States during this troubled
period? We learn from the Insurgent records that prior to January 15,
1900, "the Union Army" had met with a new disaster, as a result of
which President McKinley tendered his resignation, being succeeded
by Mr. Bryan. Philippine independence was to be proclaimed on
February 4, 1899. On January 20, "General Otis's successor, John
Waterly, of the democratic party," arrived at Manila with papers and
instructions relative to proclaiming the Philippine Republic. [419]
Things now went from bad to worse. The trouble between democrats
and republicans resulted in an insurrection. Before August, 1901,
President McKinley had brought about strained relations between
Germany and the United States by bribing an anarchist to assassinate
the German Emperor. [420] Before September 15, 1901, he had been
killed by a member of the Democratic party, and the Filipinos could
acclaim their independence. [421]
The first period of the war, which we may term the period of organized
armed resistance, drew rapidly to its close, and there followed the
second period, characterized by guerrilla tactics on the part of
the Insurgents.
On September 14, 1899, Aguinaldo accepted the advice of General Pío
del Pilar, ex-bandit, if indeed he had ever ceased to rob and murder,
and authorized this man, whom he had been again and again asked to
remove, to begin guerrilla warfare in Bulacan. Guerrilla tactics
were duly authorized for, and had been adopted by, Insurgent forces
everywhere before the end of November.
Of this style of fighting Taylor has truly said:--
"If war in certain of its aspects is a temporary reversion
to barbarism, guerrilla warfare is a temporary reversion to
savagery. The man who orders it assumes a grave responsibility
before the people whose fate is in his hands, for serious
as is the material destruction which this method of warfare
entails, the destruction to the orderly habits of mind and
thought which, at bottom, are civilization, is even more
serious. Robbery and brigandage, murder and arson follow in
its wake.
Guerrilla warfare means a policy of destruction, a policy of
terror, and never yet, however great may have been the injury
caused by it, however much it may have prolonged the war
in which it has been employed, has it secured a termination
favorable to the people who have chosen it." [422]
The case under discussion furnished no exception to the general rule.
Such semblance of discipline as had previously existed among the
Insurgent soldiers rapidly disappeared. Conditions had been very
bad under the "Republic" and worse during the first period of the
war. During the second period they rapidly became unendurable in
many regions, and the common people were driven into the arms of
the Americans, in spite of threats of death, barbarously carried out
by Insurgent officers, soldiers and agents in thousands of cases. I
have described at some length the conditions which now arose in the
chapter on Murder as a Governmental Agency, to which the reader is
referred for details. [423]
In the effort to protect the towns which showed themselves friendly,
the American forces were divided, subdivided and subdivided again. On
March 1, 1901, they were occupying no less than five hundred two
stations. By December of the same year the number had increased
to six hundred thirty-nine, with an average of less than sixty men
to a post. As a result of the protection thus afforded and of the
humane conduct of our troops, the people turned to us in constantly
increasing numbers.
It remained to stamp out the dying embers of insurrection, while
continuing to seek to protect those who put their trust in us. Further
subdivision of the troops in order to garrison more points was hardly
possible, but field operations were actively pushed. One after another
the Insurgent leaders were captured or voluntarily surrendered. Most
officers of importance issued explanatory statements to the people
shortly after giving up active field operations, whether they
surrendered voluntarily or were taken prisoners. Aguinaldo himself
was captured on March 23, 1901, at Palanan, the northernmost point
on the east coast of Luzon inhabited by civilized people. No place
in the islands, inhabited by Filipinos, is more completely isolated,
and he had long been almost entirely cut off from his followers,
many of whom believed him to be dead. On April 19, 1901, he issued
an address to the Filipino people, in which he clearly recognized
the fact that they wanted peace. He said:--
"_Manila_, April 19, 1901.
"To the Filipino People:--
"I believe that I am not in error in presuming that the
unhappy fate to which my adverse fortune has led me is not
a surprise to those who have been familiar day by day with
the progress of the war. The lessons thus taught, the full
meaning of which has recently come to my knowledge, suggested
to me with irresistible force that the complete termination
of hostilities and a lasting peace are not only desirable
but absolutely essential to the welfare of the Philippines.
"The Filipinos have never been dismayed by their weakness,
nor have they faltered in following the path pointed out by
their fortitude and courage. The time has come, however, in
which they find their advance along the path impeded by an
irresistible force--a force which, while it restrains them,
yet enlightens the mind and opens another course by presenting
to them the cause of peace. This cause has been joyfully
embraced by a majority of our fellow-countrymen, who have
already united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the
United States. In this banner they repose their trust in the
belief that under its protection our people will attain all the
promised liberties which they are even now beginning to enjoy.
"The country has declared unmistakably in favor of peace; so
be it. Enough of blood; enough of tears and desolation. This
wish cannot be ignored by the men still in arms if they are
animated by no other desire than to serve this noble people
which has thus clearly manifested its will.
"So also do I respect this will now that it is known to me,
and after mature deliberation resolutely proclaim to the world
that I cannot refuse to heed the voice of a people longing for
peace, nor the lamentations of thousands of families yearning
to see their dear ones in the enjoyment of the liberty promised
by the generosity of the great American nation.
"By acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the United
States throughout the entire Archipelago, as I now do without
any reservation whatsoever, I believe that I am serving thee,
my beloved country. May happiness be theirs.
"_Emilio Aguinaldo_. [424]
"_Manila_, April 19, 1901."
This announcement of Aguinaldo, published in Spanish, Tagálog and
English, undoubtedly hastened the end of the war, but it did not lead
to immediate general surrender, for as Taylor has very truly said:--
"A force like Aguinaldo's could not be surrendered. It had been
torn by internal dissensions and the bonds of discipline had
always been very lax. It had originally been held together
by a lively expectation of the advantages to be obtained
from the pillage of Manila. That hope had disappeared, and
the leaders had become the lords of life and property each
in his own province. It was a force which could disintegrate,
but which could not surrender. Only armies can do that. Forces
over which their leaders have lost all except nominal control
when beaten do not surrender. They disintegrate by passing
through the stages of guerrilla warfare, of armed bands of
highwaymen, of prowling groups of thieves, of sturdy beggars
who at opportune moments resort to petty larceny." [425]
Aguinaldo's forces now passed through these several stages. Some of
his more important subordinates had previously been captured or had
surrendered. Others, still remaining in the field, now acted on his
advice, more or less promptly. A few remained obdurate for a time,
but as a rule not for long, and soon there remained in the field only
a very limited number of real military leaders, like General Malvar in
Batangas and General Lukban in Samar, and a very considerable number
of bandit chiefs, some of whom had posed as Insurgents. The forces
of the latter were now materially and rapidly augmented by men who
had been Insurgent officers or soldiers and while serving in this
capacity had become so enamoured of a lawless life that they were now
unwilling to settle down and work for their daily bread, preferring
to continue to live off their long-suffering fellow-countrymen,
whom they robbed and murdered more mercilessly than ever.
The war was practically over. The insurrection had failed. In my
opinion no Filipino who held out to the end for independence compared
in intellectual power with Mabini, and I deem his views as to why
it failed worthy of special attention. At the time of his death,
he left behind a memoir from which I quote the following:--
"The revolution failed because it was poorly led, because
its head conquered his place, not by meritorious, but by
reprehensible actions, because in place of supporting the men
most useful to the people, he rendered them useless because he
was jealous of them. Believing that the aggrandizement of the
people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement,
he did not judge the merits of men by their capacity,
character, or patriotism, but by the degree of friendship
and relationship which bound them to him; and wishing to have
his favorites always ready to sacrifice themselves for him,
he showed himself complaisant to their faults. Having thus
secured the people, the people deserted him. And the people
having deserted him, he had to fall like a wax idol melted
by the heat of adversity. God forbid that we should forget
so terrible a lesson learned at the cost of unspeakable
sufferings." [426]
These are by no means the only reasons why the revolution failed,
but they foredoomed it to failure.
The surrender or capture of the more respectable military element
left the unsurrendered firearms in the hands of men most of whom
were ignorant, many of whom were criminal, and nearly all of whom
were irresponsible and unscrupulous.
Strict enforcement of the rules of civilized warfare against them
was threatened, but not actually resorted to.
The situation was particularly bad in Batangas. General J. F. Bell
was put in charge there, and he found a humane and satisfactory
solution of the existing difficulties in reconcentration--not the
kind of reconcentration which made the Spaniards hated in Cuba, but
a measure of a wholly different sort. This measure and its results
have been concisely described by Taylor, as follows:--
"General Bell said he was as anxious as any one could be
to avoid making war against those who really wanted the
termination of hostilities, and it was his duty to protect
them against the vengeance of others. Over and above all
these considerations in importance, however, was the absolute
necessity of making it impossible for insurgents to procure
food by levying contributions. Therefore, in order to give
those who were pacifically inclined an opportunity to escape
hardship, as far as possible, and preserve their food supply
for themselves and their families, it was determined to
establish zones of protection with limits sufficiently near
all towns to enable the small garrisons thereof to give the
people living within these zones efficient protection against
ruinous exactions by insurgents. He accordingly, 'in order to
put an end to enforced contributions now levied by insurgents
upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios
and districts by means of intimidation and assassination,'
ordered the commanding officers of all towns in the provinces
of Batangas and Laguna to 'immediately specify and establish
plainly marked limits surrounding each town bounding a zone
within which it may be practicable, with an average-sized
garrison, to exercise sufficient supervision over and furnish
protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against
the depredation of armed insurgents. The limits may include
the barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given
protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include
some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated
that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns
will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.
"'Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once
given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the
jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision,
informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these
limits, and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying
barrios and districts, with all their movable food supplies,
including rice, _palay_, [427] chickens, live stock, etc.,
to within the limits of the zone established at their own
or nearest town, their property (found outside of said
zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or
destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses
from outlying districts should they desire to do so, or to
construct temporary shelter for themselves on any vacant
land without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be
permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so. In the
discretion of commanding officers the prices of necessities of
existence may also be regulated in the interest of those thus
seeking protection. As soon as peaceful conditions have been
reëstablished in the brigade these persons will be encouraged
to return to their homes, and such assistance be rendered
them as may be found practicable.'
"It was deemed best not to compel the people to enter these
zones; but they were warned that unless they accepted that
protection their property, which consisted almost entirely
of food supplies, would become liable to confiscation or
destruction, because it might be impossible to determine
whether it belonged to hostile or peaceful people. To put
an end to vengeance by assassination, it was determined to
make use of the right of retaliation conferred by General
Order 100 issued by President Lincoln in 1863. A circular
telegram was published announcing an intention to retaliate
by the execution of prisoners of war in case any more were
assassinated by insurgents for political reasons. It was not
found necessary to do this. Assassinations stopped at once.
"As the campaign progressed it became more and more apparent
that a large number of poor people had contributed through
fear, for the power of the insurgents to collect came to
an end after they had lost their power of intimidation. The
efficiency of the protection afforded in such zones was the
determining factor in forming the decision and attitude of
many of the natives. The protection afforded was efficient,
and from time to time many additional families entered the
zones. The sentiment for peace grew stronger steadily and
natives volunteered assistance to Americans at every hand and
in every town. When these volunteers were trustworthy they were
armed and sent out into the mountains from which they brought
back guns, and insurgents, and hundreds of half-famished
men, women, and children who, released from the intimidating
influence of the insurgents, entered the zones of protection.
"The most serious discomfort experienced by any one within
these areas was caused to the _mestizo_ ruling group, whose
members bitterly resented the blow to their prestige in being
treated like every one else. They had been accustomed to have
others work for them and obey them blindly. To a man who could
speak Spanish and who had always been the lord of his _barrio_,
[428] the possibility of having to cultivate a field with his
own hands was an unthinkable and scandalous thing. These men
suffered and suffered acutely; but it was not their bodies
which suffered--it was their pride.
"Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902. Most of the people
had turned against their once highly respected chief, and
toward the end several thousand natives of Batangas joined
the Americans in their determined hunt for the fugitive
leader. Realization of the fact that the people were against
him materially aided in forcing his surrender.
"General Bell had captured or forced to surrender some 8000 to
10,000 persons actively engaged, in one capacity or another,
in the insurrection. These prisoners were rapidly released
when they had taken the oath of allegiance. By the first week
of July no political prisoners were held in this region. They
had returned to their homes.
"The policy of concentrating the people in protected zones
and destroying the food which was used for the maintenance of
guerrilla bands was not new. There had been precedents even
in the United States. One of these is the order issued on
August 25, 1863, by Brigadier-General Ewing, commanding the
district of the border, with headquarters at Kansas City, Mo.,
in which he ordered the inhabitants of a large part of three
counties of that State to remove from their residences within
fifteen days to the protection of the military stations which
he had established. All grain and hay in that district was
ordered to be taken to those military stations. If it was not
convenient to so dispose of it, it would be burned (Rebellion
Records, Series I, Vol. XXII, Part II, p. 473). The American
commanders in the Philippines had adopted no new method of
procedure in dealing with war traitors; they had, however,
effectively employed an old one.
"The insurrection had originated among the Tagálogs and had
spread like a conflagration from the territory occupied by
them. The fire had been quenched everywhere else. General
Bell had now stamped out the embers in the Tagálog provinces.
"On July 2 the Secretary of War telegraphed that the
insurrection against the sovereign authority of the United
States in the Philippines having come to an end, and provincial
civil governments having been established throughout the
entire territory of the archipelago not inhabited by Moro
tribes, the office of military governor in the archipelago was
terminated. On July 4, 1902, the President of the United States
issued a proclamation of amnesty proclaiming, with certain
reservations, a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all
persons in the Philippine Archipelago who had participated
in the insurrection."
General Bell's motives and methods in reconcentrating the inhabitants
of this troubled region have been grossly misrepresented, and he
himself has been sadly maligned. He is the most humane of men, and
the plan which he adopted resulted in the reëstablishment of law and
order at a minimum cost of human suffering.
Many of the occupants of his reconcentration camps received there
their first lessons in hygienic living. Many of them were reluctant
to leave the camps and return to their homes when normal conditions
again prevailed.
The number of Filipinos killed during the Batangas campaign was
very small. [429] Blount has sought to make it appear that partly as
an indirect consequence of war there was dreadful mortality there,
citing by way of proof the fact that the Coast and Geodetic Atlas,
published as a part of the report of the first Philippine Commission,
gave the population of Batangas as 312,192, while the census of 1903
gave it as 257,715. [430]
The report of the United States Philippine Commission for 1903
gives the population of Manila as 221,000, while in 1900 it had been
260,000. Does this mean that there had been a holocaust in Manila? Not
at all. It means only that the thousands of Filipinos who had sought
the protection of the American forces there during the period when
they feared their own soldiers in the provinces had mostly returned
to their homes. During the disturbed period in Batangas great numbers
of people took refuge in other and more peaceful regions. Some of
them returned later; others did not.
Blount further quotes a statement in the 1901 report of the Provincial
Secretary of Batangas to the effect that:
"The mortality, caused no longer by the war, but by disease,
such as malaria and dysentery, has reduced to a little over
200,000 the more than 300,000 inhabitants which in former
years the province had." [431]
Apart from the fact that these figures, showing a mortality of a
hundred thousand from disease alone, are hardly consistent with those
quoted by Blount as showing a decrease in population during a longer
period of only fifty-four thousand four hundred and forty-seven, it is
not apparent why Americans should be charged with deaths due to malaria
or dysentery, since no systematic effort to rid Batangas of these ills
had ever previously been made, and the very thing which then prevented
the adoption of the measures subsequently so successfully put forth
to this end was the disorderly conduct of the people themselves. As a
simple matter of fact, however, there was no such dreadful mortality
from these diseases at this time. Malaria has never been especially bad
in this province, and even cholera, which swept it during the period
in question and is far more readily communicated than is dysentery,
caused only twenty-three hundred and ninety-nine known deaths.
In the end peace was established and prosperity followed in its wake.
This result was brought about in part by the efficient activity of
the armed forces of the United States and in part by the efforts of
the first and second Philippine Commissions. [432]