TENSION BETWEEN EMPEROR AND CZAR[39]
[Footnote 39: References: Bernhardi, Geschichte Russlands,
II. Ranke, Hardenberg u. Preussen (vol. 48 of his complete
works, 1879). Lefebvre, Histoire des Cabinets de l'Europe.
Vandal, Napoleon et Alexandre Ier, parts of Vols. II and
III.]
Menaces of War -- Napoleon's "Extraordinary Domain" -- Rupture of
the Concordat -- The Prospect of War -- The Empire Prepared for a
Commercial Siege -- Napoleon's Self-deception -- The Empires of
Ocean and Continent -- The Czar's Humiliation -- Poland and the
French Empire -- Alexander's Approach to Francis -- Spurious
Negotiations.
[Sidenote: 1811]
Among other bodies which sent deputations to congratulate the Emperor
on the birth of his child was the Paris Chamber of Commerce. Their
address was sufficiently adulatory, but it contained a suggestion that
the trade and commerce of the country were not all that could be
desired. Napoleon replied in language which attracted attention
throughout Europe. There was some irritability in his tone, but there
was an unqualified assurance with regard to the future. He said, among
other things, that England was depressed. This was true; the new
measures taken to enforce the Continental system had told. British
harbors were glutted with the products of all the colonies--not only
of her own, but of those she had seized during the Napoleonic wars.
The storehouses could hold no more; and as colonial trade was
conducted by barter, all the products of English industry must remain
at home for lack of an export market. Business was at a standstill,
and the specter of English bankruptcy stalked abroad. As to France,
the Emperor declared that he was in no sense the successor of either
Louis XIV or Louis XV, but of Charles the Great; for the present
Empire was but the continuation of the old Frankish dominion. In four
years, he said in substance, I shall have a navy. When my fleets shall
have been three or four years at sea we can hold our own with the
English. I know I may lose three or four battles; very good, I will
lose them. But we are ever courageous, ever booted and spurred, and we
shall succeed. Before ten years have expired I shall have beaten
England. No state of Europe will any longer have intercourse with her.
It is my customhouses which do the greatest harm to the English. Her
blockade has injured herself the most by teaching us how to get on
without her products, her sugar, her indigo. A few years longer, and
we shall be thoroughly accustomed to it. I shall soon have enough
beet-root sugar to supply all Europe; for your manufactures there is
an open market in France, Italy, Naples, and Germany. At the close he
added words to this effect: The Bank of France is full of silver,
while that of England has not a white sou [five francs]. Since 1806 I
have taken over a milliard francs in contributions. I alone have
money. Austria is already bankrupt, and Russia and England will be.
There exist three versions of this famous allocution. In one of them
are the words: "I showed mercy to the Emperor of Russia at Tilsit in
return for promises of help; but if those promises are not kept, I
will go, if need be, to Riga, to Moscow, to St. Petersburg."
Three points of the utmost significance demand attention in this, a
typical deliverance of the "imperator," uttered at the flood-tide of
imperial success: two of them, both negative, are ominous; the third
is positive and plain. There is no reference to the financial
condition of France, or to the ecclesiastical situation. Russia was
openly threatened. The boast of wealth referred to Napoleon's own
"extraordinary domain." About this time Metternich reported to his
government that France was the richest country in Europe, but that her
treasury was empty. The budget of 1811 had nine hundred millions on
the credit side, but it had also nine hundred and fifty-four millions
on the debit. The previous year had required five hundred and ten
millions for army and navy, the present required six hundred and fifty
millions. It was a fixed principle of the Emperor to make each
generation pay its own expenses. The only source of supply he could
find was an increase of the indirect taxes and the institution of a
state monopoly in tobacco. His remedy would have been adequate but for
two causes--the drought of the ensuing summer and Russia's hostile
attitude in regard to French silks and wines. The year 1811 closed
with a deficit of forty-eight millions. This fact had a bearing on the
political situation because in general the Emperor's remedy for an
empty treasury was a new war.
The ecclesiastical situation had now become acute. As one bishopric
after another had fallen vacant, bishops had been nominated by the
Emperor; but the Pope, who was still sitting in captivity at Savona,
had from the moment of his incarceration steadily refused to institute
them. For a time, as has been explained, the difficulty had been
ingeniously avoided by the process of ecclesiastical law, according to
which the chapters of the various dioceses elected the imperial
candidates as vicars capitular, and thus enabled them to perform
episcopal functions without regard to institution. But this could not
go on forever, and every effort had been made to induce the prisoner
of Savona to yield. In response he took a firmer stand, and indicated
to the chapters both of Italy and France that they should no longer
elect the imperial nominees as vicars capitular. This was a rupture of
the Concordat, and was so regarded by Napoleon. The attitude of all
pious Catholics was becoming uneasy, and this new declaration of war
by the Church could only serve to heighten the bellicose humor of the
Emperor. The Pope was eventually brought to terms, partly by
increasing the rigors of his imprisonment, partly by terrorizing his
agents in France, but chiefly through the representations made to him
by the ablest ecclesiastics of the realm, and by the summoning of a
church council, which turned out nearly as subservient to the secular
authority as the Jewish Sanhedrim had been.
With reference to the third point, it seems impossible to determine
whether the menace to Russia was actually made, as one version of the
reply has it, or whether a later speech, at the opening of the
legislature in June, and the report on the situation of France, issued
in the same month, have not both been confused with the Emperor's talk
in March. In either case the result was identical, for France and
Europe instinctively took in the situation, and clearly understood
that the Emperor was not indisposed toward the renewal of war in
northern Europe. This third point was of course the most noteworthy of
the three, for it could be only a question of time when the storm
should burst.
If it were possible at that epoch of the world's history to
distinguish between Napoleon the man and Napoleon the embodied
political force of Europe, the aspect of the former would abound in
human interest. Filled with paternal tenderness, his sole ambition
appeared for a time to be that of retaining what he had gained, the
leadership of a Western empire as splendid as that of Charles the
Great. To make sure of this acquisition and hand it on to his heir,
he seems for a moment to have dreamed of standing forth as the
pacificator of Europe. He actually withdrew the mass of his troops
from Germany for use in Spain, leaving only enough to watch Prussia
and guard Westphalia; with the former power he finally formulated his
pecuniary demands, as if thus to put an end to strife. The "rebellion"
in Spain he intended to crush out by the pacific operations of a
commercial warfare with England, which he felt certain would bring
Great Britain to terms, now that for the first time since the outbreak
of hostilities the blood of her soldiers "was flowing in a stream." He
was probably strengthened in this conviction by the reluctant consent
of the cabinet of St. James to open negotiations for the exchange of
prisoners on the very basis he had suggested long before. Believing,
moreover, that European princes had by this time lost their delicate
sensibility, it seemed no monstrous crime to consolidate his empire
for its commercial siege by the simple expedient of removing the Duke
of Oldenburg from his hereditary domains which bordered on the ocean
and offering him the inland sovereignty of Erfurt, or by adopting the
alternative expedient of leaving him to enjoy the former under French
protection. It seems presumptuous to attempt any revelation of his
feelings, but surely he might hope that then, controlling every inlet
to European commerce from Corfu around by Triest, Italy, Spain, and
the Texel as far as Luebeck, his wall of protection for French
manufactures would do its work, that in a few years France would be
the industrial and commercial center of continental Europe. With Paris
the capital of a new Western empire, the true relation between the
secular and ecclesiastical heads of the world would be reestablished,
as it could not be while the papacy had its seat at Rome, and all
things would work together under a strong hand to humble the island
empire of England, destroy her ascendancy on the mainland, and thus
bring in a moral and material millennium for the civilized world.
But alas for such self-deception, if, indeed, it ever existed. Nature
is too complex and habit too strong for such sudden sublimations of
purpose. Had the true, complex Napoleon in his supposed communing
asked the question, What then? sincerity would have compelled him to
reply, More beyond. Men remembered to have heard him use the
expression, "Emperor of the Continent," in these very days, jocularly,
perhaps, but still with significance. Orders were issued in March,
1811, to fit out vessels for two expeditions, one against Sicily and
Egypt, one against Ireland; if these were successful he could then
work his will at the Cape of Good Hope and ultimately in the East and
West Indies. "They want to know where we are going, where I shall
plant the new Pillars of Hercules," he said. "We will make an end of
Europe, and then, as robbers fling themselves on others less bold, we
will fling ourselves on India, which the latter class have mastered."
About the same time the Bavarian minister, pleading for peace,
received the retort: "Three years more, and I am lord of the
universe." When Mollien advised against war, on account of the fiscal
disorders, the reply was: "On the contrary, the finances are falling
into disorder, and for that very reason need war." Behind Napoleon the
father was the ambitious and haughty statesman combined with the
self-reliant general, the embodiment of French ambitions as they had
consolidated in the old regime, and had been transmitted through the
Revolution, the Directory, and the Consulate to the Empire.
But there were two other gladiators in the arena: England, hard
pressed but still undaunted in her mastery of the seas which flowed
around her majestic colonial empire; Russia, grimly determined to hold
an even balance with France in Europe while reestablishing by the
overthrow of Turkey the eastern counterpoise to Napoleon's western
dominion. The Czar of Muscovy would fain have passed for a
philosopher. Fourteen years earlier, when in his eighteenth year, he
had fallen under the charm of Prince Adam Czartoryski, a youth of
about his own age, whom the Empress Catherine had taken as a hostage
after the final dismemberment of Poland in 1795. Trained by his
grandmother to play her own role of enlightened despot, the young
ruler, still in those early years when generous impulses rule,
conversed with his friend, the representative of a downtrodden land,
about the possibility of a restored and regenerated Poland, avowing
his secret detestation of all that he was compelled in public to
profess. We may picture the joy of the noble Pole at the thought of
his country made whole once more, even though it were destined to be
but semi-autonomous as a member of the Russian empire. But years
rolled by, and Czartoryski, though preferred to place and honor by the
Czar, heard less and less of the young philosopher's scheme. In 1805
he finally wrung from Alexander a promise that he would begin to act;
but it was very soon withdrawn, and Czartoryski retired to his
estates. The realities and selfishness of life eclipsed the man of
sensibility and developed the despot. For a time, however, he essayed
the role of European mediator, with what success Tilsit is the
witness.
Disgusted from the practical point of view with the old dynasties and
their chicanery, Alexander had not only eschewed the idea of a
reconstructed Poland, but had become indifferent to the territorial
lines of all ancient Europe, and momentarily dreamed of Napoleon as
his twin emperor. To this end he too must likewise be a conqueror.
Finland he had gained, but at the price of adhesion to a commercial
system which was gradually ruining his people. The exhausting,
slow-moving war with Turkey was still dragging on, and neither
Moldavia nor Wallachia was yet acquired. Oldenburg was incorporated
into France. The grand duchy of Warsaw was not merely the specter of a
restored Poland: the addition of Galicia to its territories had given
it solidity and substance. The Franco-Austrian alliance was a menace
to all the Czar's aspirations on the Balkan peninsula. It was clear
that he must choose between keeping his engagements to the letter and
an open rupture. He had been beaten and humiliated at his own game.
The first steps toward a rupture had already been taken before
Napoleon's second marriage. In the last days of 1809 Alexander had
negotiated with Caulaincourt, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg,
a treaty requiring from his ally a formal promise that Poland should
never be restored and the name never officially used. It is certain,
from the language used at the time, that the two questions of Poland
and the Russian marriage were not connected; the former he could raise
merely as an ally with a just expectation of a favorable reply. It is
of course possible that Alexander hoped Napoleon might connect them,
and thus sign the Polish treaty in the hope that his request for the
grand duchess would be granted as a return. In that case the Russian
emperor could still have refused his sister's hand, putting his ally's
compliance in regard to Poland on the ground of existing political
relations. He might then have laughed in his sleeve at his outwitted
dupe. Be that as it may, Napoleon was the craftier. He replied that he
would sign, not this document, but one slightly different, though
quite as satisfactory to Russia. Accordingly he drew up, executed, and
forwarded to Russia a counter-project promising "never to give help or
assistance to any power, or to any internal rising whatsoever, looking
to a restoration of the kingdom of Poland." A few days after its
arrival at St. Petersburg came the news of the Austrian marriage.
Two courses were now open to the Czar. One was to take advantage of
the strong Russian party which existed among the Poles in Warsaw,
promise a restoration of Poland with himself as king, and enter on an
offensive campaign against France. This scheme is contained in an
extant letter addressed to him by Prince Galitzin. The other was to
negotiate further and await events. After dallying for a time with the
former idea, the Czar at length told Czartoryski that he could never
consider giving up provinces already incorporated into Russia,--which
meant of course that he would not restore the integrity of
Poland,--but that he might accept the crown of the grand duchy of
Warsaw as it was, including Galicia. Secret agents were thereupon
despatched to sound the Austrian court. If the partition of Turkey
should take place, as was already determined, could not Russia and
Austria join hands to secure each her own interests against France? In
view of the fact that Napoleon had rejected the idea of destroying
Turkey because Russia had displayed jealousy of Austria and had
refused her any share in the Turkish lands, this was a virtual
declaration of hostilities.
Alexander's overture was unheeded at Vienna, at least for the moment,
because Metternich was in Paris wooing Napoleon's good will.
Simultaneously and openly, therefore, the fencing between Paris and
St. Petersburg went on. A rejoinder to the counter-project was laid
on Napoleon's desk, containing the identical words, "that the kingdom
of Poland shall never be restored." This persistence angered the
recipient, and seemed capable of but one interpretation. If Alexander
did not consider the guarantees given by France after Friedland and
Wagram to be sufficient, could Napoleon see in this reiterated demand
anything more or less than a determination of the Czar not to abide by
the engagements of Russia unless new ones were given by himself? He
returned therefore a softly worded, non-committal reply, and began to
make unmistakable preparations: a journey to Flanders for the purpose
of rousing public opinion on his behalf, the strengthening of certain
fortresses, and a general rapprochement to Austria in all his
relations. The negotiations continued a little longer, Russia
insisting on the phrase as first written, France declaring that its
use would be a confession of the insinuation contained in it, and
therefore incompatible with her dignity. Any other equivalent language
she would use, but not that.