THE TRANSFORMATION OF AUSTRIA[29]
[Footnote 29: See Metternich: Nachgelassene Papiere (English
translation as Memoirs). Mazade: Alexandre Ier et le Prince
Czartoryski. Duncker: Friedr. Wilhelm im Jahre 1809. Ranke:
Hardenberg und die Geschichte des preussischen Staates von
1793-1813. Rapp: Memoires.]
Dangers in Napoleon's Rear -- The State of Paris -- Austria
Warlike -- The Czar's Policy -- National Movements in Germany --
Napoleon's True Position -- Talleyrand's Responsibility -- The
Needs of France -- The Conscription again Anticipated -- The
Archduke Charles -- War Declared by Austria -- Charles's Appeals
to National Sentiment -- Imperial Excess and Dynastic Moderation
-- The Uprising of the Tyrol -- Austria's Successes.
[Sidenote: 1809]
The news from central Europe which reached Napoleon in Spain was of a
most alarming character, and made certain considerations so emphatic
that all others became insignificant. It mattered not that he must
leave behind him a half-accomplished task; that while his strategy had
been successful, he had lost the opportunity to annihilate the
English, which, though he did not know it at the time, he had really
had in the tardy arrival of their transports at Corunna; that the
national uprising was not suppressed by his carefully devised
measures; that the oaths of allegiance sworn to Joseph and the
constitution had been sworn under compulsion by a minority, who, pious
as the people were, did not, for that reason, consider even themselves
as bound, much less the nation as a whole--all this was serious
enough, but it was paltry when compared with what had taken place in
German lands while he had been absent from Paris.
During the campaign of Marengo there had been a knot of active,
self-seeking, and traitorous men who, having risen by Bonaparte's
help, schemed how best to sustain themselves in case of his death.
This same group, under the leadership of Talleyrand and Fouche, had
been again arranging plans for their guidance should misfortune
overwhelm Napoleon in Spain. Such was their activity that even
Metternich had been deceived into the belief that they had a large
party of French patriots behind them, who, weary of the Emperor's
incessant calls on France for aid in enterprises foreign to her
welfare, would gladly be rid of him. So grave did the Austrian
ambassador consider the crisis that late in November he left his post
and set out for Vienna. Vincent's reports about the friction at Erfurt
had already found credence in the Austrian capital among the war
party, and the belief was spreading that the Franco-Russian alliance
was hollow.
Stein's absence from North Germany had only intensified the sympathy
of the people with his policy. Even at Koenigsberg, the seat of
government, public opinion demanded the measures he had desired.
Prussia was not only strong once more, but was ardent to redeem its
disgrace. The reflex influence of the popular movements in Prussia and
Austria upon one another had intensified both, until the more advanced
leaders in the two countries cared little whether the process of
German regeneration was begun under Hohenzollern or Hapsburg
leadership. Into this surcharged atmosphere came Metternich with his
exaggerated statements about the great reactionary party in France.
The effect was to raise the elements. He declared, besides, that the
Spanish war had absorbed so much of Napoleon's effective military
strength that not more than two hundred thousand men were available
for use in central Europe, and that Austria alone, with her new
armaments, would be a match for any army the French emperor could lead
against her, at least in the first stages of a war. Austria had been
negotiating for an English subsidy, without which her troops, fine as
they were, could not be maintained; but Great Britain refused a grant
until they should actually take the field. This fact was an inducement
so strong as to put a climax on the already hostile inclinations of
the Emperor Francis; and as his minister Stadion had long felt that
Napoleon's power must not be allowed time for further consolidation,
the government concluded to strike while the difficulties in Spain
were at their height.
Although the Czar had left Erfurt in an anxious mood, he was
nevertheless clear in his mind that through Napoleon alone could his
ambitions be gratified. He was equally convinced that, while the
European system should not be further upturned, it must for the
present be maintained as it now was. On his homeward journey he had
time to reflect on the situation, and as he passed through Koenigsberg
the warlike temper of Prussia was so manifest that he thought
Frederick William, for a while at least, should be removed from its
influence. Accordingly he pressed the King to pay a visit to St.
Petersburg. The invitation was accepted, and the Czar's efforts were
so successful that when his visitor left for home his feeling was as
unwarlike as it had ever been. He informed Austria that his interests
were those of Russia, that there should be no offensive warfare, and
that any conflict must be confined to repelling an attack. The Czar
declared on March second, in response to an inquiry from Vienna, that
if Austria should begin a war he would fulfil his obligations to
Napoleon; but six weeks later, seeing how determined was the war
sentiment at Vienna, and how complete were the preparations of
Francis, it seemed best to throw an anchor to windward, and he so far
modified his attitude as to explain that in the event of war he would
not put his strength into any blow he might aim at Austria.
The cabinet of Vienna was perfectly aware that neither Alexander nor
Frederick William represented the national feeling of their respective
peoples. They knew that Austria's opportunity to lead a great revolt
against Napoleon was to be found in the support of the powerful
conservatives of Russia, in the enthusiasm of all Prussia, where Arndt
was already crying, "Freedom and Austria!" and in the passionate
loyalty of her own peoples, not excepting the sturdy Tyrolese, who,
chafing under Napoleon's yoke, were ready for insurrection. On March
eighteenth, 1809, the French minister at Vienna wrote to Paris that in
1805 the government, but neither army nor nation, had desired war;
that now the government, the army, and the people all desired it. The
Austrian plenipotentiary was ordered, in requesting a subsidy from
Great Britain, to state that in the event of victory his government
hoped to secure such internal vigor as Austria had enjoyed before the
treaty of Presburg. As to the neighboring states, she desired some
minor rectifications of her own frontier, with indemnifications to the
younger branches of her dynasty for their lost domains. These might be
found either in Germany or in Italy, and if she should succeed in
destroying Napoleon's system of tributary powers, she meant to restore
all their territories to their rightful owners, not excepting those of
the German princes who had been hostile.
To suppose, as many do, that no inkling of all the stupendous schemes
reached Napoleon in Spain is preposterous. Bavaria was his faithful
subordinate, and Poland still hoped everything from his successes.
Both were in the heart of Germany, and through a carefully organized
system of spies, information of the most reliable nature was regularly
received in both countries. The same historians who assert that after
Marengo Bonaparte left Italy for Paris to cloak his defeat, and that
he fled to Malmaison to conceal his direct connection with Enghien's
death, expect us to believe that Napoleon fled from Spain merely to
throw the responsibility of failure on Joseph. Most men in any crisis
act from mixed motives. Such a charge displays skill in combining
facts, but Marengo, whether a defeat or a victory, secured France to
the general who commanded there; the retreat to Malmaison did not
induce the Consul to deny his responsibility for the execution at
Vincennes; and it would have been simply an intervention of the
supernatural if Napoleon, for purely subjective reasons, had left
Spain to return to Paris just at the very instant when his presence
was absolutely essential there, not only to check those who, although
ostensibly his supporters, were in reality his deadly foes, but also
for the warlike preparations to meet the storm which was about to
burst. His secretary has asserted that the letters which reached him
at Astorga contained all this disquieting news, and there is
absolutely no proof that they did not. The probability is all on the
side of the account which was universally accepted until attacked by
the group of over-credulous French historians whose zeal for the
Revolution is such that they feel bound to deny every statement of the
equally biased school of Napoleonic advocates.
[Illustration: From the collection of W. C. Crane. Engraved by S. W.
Reynolds.
JOSEPH BONAPARTE.
Painted by J. Goubaud, January 30, 1831, Point-Breeze, U. S. A.]
Moreover, it was from Spain that the Emperor warned the princes
composing the Confederation of the Rhine to have their contingents
ready. His language is guarded--whether the cabinet of Vienna had
drunk from the waters of Lethe or from those of the Danube, he
himself would be ready. Besides, his actions could have but one
meaning. The moment he reached Paris, significant looks and conduct
warned Talleyrand to beware. "Is Joseph," the Emperor said, in an
interview with Roederer, "to talk like an Englishman or behave like
Talleyrand? I have covered this man with honors, riches, and diamonds;
he has used them all against me. At the first opportunity he had, he
has betrayed me as much as he could. He has declared during my absence
that he kneeled in supplication to prevent my enterprise in Spain; for
two years he tormented me to undertake it.... It was the same with
regard to Enghien. I did not even know him; it was Talleyrand who
brought him to my notice. I did not know where he was; it was
Talleyrand who told me the spot, and after having advised the
execution he has groaned over it with every acquaintance."
At the same time the columns of the "Moniteur" were filled with
half-true accounts of the Emperor's success in Spain, and the French
people knew everything that was favorable; but there was a complete
suppression of all the rest. As Austria desired war to secure her
subsidies from England, so France was again in need of funds which her
own resources could not provide. Because of the failure to paralyze
Spain by a single blow, Napoleon had, for the first time in his
history, returned after a "successful" campaign without an enormous
war indemnity. Once again, after temporary patching, French finances
were in disorder, and there was urgent need to repair them. The people
desired peace for their enterprises, but the continental blockade so
hampered commerce that any peace which did not include a pacification
of the seas would avail them little. It was a customary formality of
Napoleon's to put the entire responsibility of war on the enemy, and
it was announced in February that negotiations with Austria had
failed. This was in a large sense true, although the particular effort
referred to was perfunctory, and was intended technically to secure
the help of Russia, which was to fight only in case Austria should be
the aggressor.
Gradually, therefore, the war spirit revived in France. No one
remonstrated when once more recourse was had to the fatal policy of
anticipating the annual conscription. Not only were the conscripts for
1810 called out, but the number was stretched to the utmost, and those
who from immaturity or other causes had been unavailable in 1806,
1807, 1808, and 1809 were now collected. The total of the youths thus
swept together was not less than a hundred and sixty thousand. To
render available their slender efficiency, they were divided among the
various regiments already in the field, in each of which these raw and
boyish recruits constituted a fifth battalion.
Since the Archduke Charles had been again at the helm of military
affairs in Austria, not only had a transformation been wrought in the
army as a fighting instrument, but the general staff had likewise been
completely reorganized. For two years, therefore, Austria's occupation
had been not only forging a sword, but practising, as well, the
wielding of it. The lessons taught her by previous experience in
Napoleonic warfare were thoroughly learned. It was consequently a very
different strategic problem which the Emperor of the French had to
solve in this campaign.
For two years the Archduke had been studying his task, and that in the
light of ample experience. The conclusion he reached was that he would
attack and overpower Davout in Saxony; then, by an appeal to their
German patriotism, raise and use the peoples of northern and central
Germany for an overwhelming assault on Napoleon. But as the time for
action grew near, the moral influence of those annihilating blows
which the French armies had struck once and again began to assert
itself and to create hesitancy. Count Stadion, the minister of state,
knew that diplomacy had reached the limit of its powers and could gain
at most only a few weeks. These he felt sure the enemy would use to
better advantage in strengthening himself than Austria in her poverty
could do. He was therefore urgent for prompt action. Charles, on the
other hand, hesitated to face the miraculous resources of Napoleon
without a finishing touch to some of his preparations which were still
incomplete. He therefore began in January to procrastinate, and
consequently it was not until February that Francis demanded an
advance. In this interval the whole plan of campaign was changed. The
main army, under Charles, was to be collected in Bohemia, ready for
action in any direction, so as to thwart whatever course Napoleon
might adopt. Hiller was to guard the line of the Inn, the Archduke
Ferdinand was to march against Warsaw, while the Archduke John was to
enter the Tyrol from Italy and excite the people to revolt. On April
ninth all these movements were well under way; Hiller had reached the
Inn, and Charles declared war.
Ostensibly this war was to be unlike any other so far waged. The
secret instructions given to the imperial Austrian envoy in London
clearly indicated that the Hapsburgs hoped by victory to restore their
influence both in Italy and Germany; for that was the meaning of
"restoration to rightful owners" and the "slight rectification of
their frontiers," or, in other words, the restoration of European
conditions to what they had been before Napoleon's advent. This was
the dynastic side; the national side was also to be used for the same
end. "The liberties of Europe have taken refuge under your banner,"
ran Charles's proclamation to the army; "your victories will break
their bonds, and your German brethren still in the enemy's ranks await
their redemption." To the German world he said, "Austria fights not
only for her own autonomy, but takes the sword for the independence
and national honor of Germany." Another manifesto, written by Gentz,
the ablest statesman in Vienna, declared that the war was to be waged
not against France, but against the persistent extension of her system
which had produced such universal disorder in Europe.
The tone and language of these papers have an audible Napoleonic echo
in them: if an upstart house, represented by a single life and without
direct descendants, could win success by appeals to the people, and
gain the support of their enthusiasm by identifying its interests with
theirs, why might not an ancient dynasty, with vigorous stock and
numerous shoots, do likewise? Moreover, Napoleon no longer respected
the limits of natural physical boundaries, or the restrictions of
birth, speech, religion, and custom, which inclosed a nation: his
empire was to disdain such influences, to found itself on the
universal brotherhood of man, and to secure the regeneration of
humanity by liberal ideas of universal validity. Austria would offset
this alluring summons by a trumpet-call to the brotherhood of Germans,
to the strong forces of national feeling, to the respect for tradition
and history which would animate her soldiers and justify her course.
If she needed a concrete illustration she could point to the Tyrolese.
Since the treaty of Presburg their chains had chafed their limbs to
the raw; at this very moment they were again in open rebellion. The
administrative reforms introduced by Maximilian of Bavaria were in
reality most salutary; his determined stand against priestly
domination over the Tyrolese people proved in the end their salvation.
But the evils of feudalism were always least among mountaineers, and
relations of patriarchal tenderness existed between the aristocracy
and the peasantry. The devotion of both classes to their institutions,
their habits, their clothes, their customs, their local names, was
intense. They had no mind to see the name of their country disappear
forever, to lose their pleasant, easy-fitting institutions, or to
submit to the conscription and join in the great leveling movement
which compelled them to serve in the ranks as ordinary soldiers. With
their local assemblies they meant to keep their military exclusiveness
as scouts, skirmishers, and sharp-shooters, in all of which lines they
excelled.
The more enlightened citizens of the towns were well pleased with
Bavarian rule, but the impulsive, ignorant, and superstitious
peasantry were the glad instruments of Austrian emissaries. When they
learned that war was inevitable and would soon be formally declared,
they at once rose, seized Innsbruck, and held it against the Bavarian
troops. When an Austrian garrison marched in, their reception was
enthusiastic. This was in the middle of April; simultaneously the
Archduke John defeated Prince Eugene in Italy and drove him back upon
the Adige, while Ferdinand overpowered all resistance in Poland, and
on the twentieth occupied Warsaw. Such successes were intoxicating;
the great general had, it seemed, been caught napping at last, and the
advantage of a successful opening appeared to be with his enemy.