CHAPTER XIII

THE FAILURE OF THE SPANISH CAMPAIGN[28]

[Footnote 28: See Jomini: Napoleon, III. Cevallos: Exposicion

de los hechos y maquinaciones que han preparado la usurpation

de la corona de Espana, y los medios que el emperador de los

franzeses ha puesto en obra para realizarla. Suchet: Memoires

sur ses campagnes en Espagne, 1808-1814. Rocca: Memoirs,

1808-1812. Also Memoirs of Godoy, Marbot, Massena, and

Murat.]

The Grand Army in France -- Their Entrance to Spain -- The

Opposing Forces -- Napoleon's Strategic Plan -- French Victories

-- Sir John Moore -- The British and the Spaniards -- Napoleon's

Advance to Madrid -- His Return Northward -- Moore's Retreat --

Napoleon at Paris -- Death of Moore -- The Napoleonic

Constitution for Spain -- Spanish Resistance -- Joseph's Weakness

-- Establishment of the New Monarchy.

[Sidenote: 1808-09]

While Alexander was hastening the preparations for his sister's

marriage, Napoleon was hurrying toward Spain, whither, too, the

legions of the grand army, released by the evacuation of Prussia, had

already been ordered. Baylen and Cintra must be retrieved at any cost.

As the splendid array of soldiers passed through France they were

received like men who had already conquered. The civil authorities

spread banquets for them, compliments rained from the honeyed lips of

chosen orators, poets sang sweet strains on the theme of their

glories. This appeared a spontaneous outburst to the troops, and they

marched with the elasticity of enthusiasm to their task. The curious

may read to-day what the army could not know--that by Napoleon's

personal decree the ministry of war had prepared every detail of that

triumph, that the prefects acted under stringent orders, that three

sets of warlike songs were written by commission in Paris, and

forwarded one each to various points, so that, as the Emperor wrote,

"the soldier may not hear the same thing twice." The success of the

plan was complete, and the jubilations had every appearance of being

genuine.

It was therefore not a tired and disheartened army which was gathered

under the walls of Burgos early in November, but a body of picked and

energetic veterans. Joseph, to be sure, had done little in the

interval to take advantage of the foolish and careless tumult into

which the joy of victory had thrown the Spanish people. In spite of

the minute directions which had been received almost daily from

Napoleon, Jourdan, who, having been the King's military adviser in

Naples, had come in the same capacity to Spain, gradually lost every

advantage of position. But the French boys who had fought in the

summer were older and more experienced. The defensive attitude of

their leader had given them the training of camp life, and had secured

the recuperation of their strength. When, therefore, they were mingled

with the newcomers, they might be considered almost as good soldiers

as those who had arrived from Germany.

Moreover, the best generals were now in command: Victor was at

Amurrio, Bessieres at Miranda on the Ebro, Moncey at Tafalla, Lefebvre

near Bilbao, Ney at Logrono on the Ebro, Saint-Cyr at La Junquera,

each with a corps, the smallest of twenty, the largest of thirty

thousand men. Duhesme was shut up in Barcelona with ten thousand.

There was a reserve of thirty-five thousand, the guard and cavalry, at

Tolosa and Vitoria. Mortier's corps of twenty-four thousand was in the

rear, and Junot, who had been better received in Paris than he

expected, was coming up with nineteen thousand more. In all, there

were about two hundred and forty thousand troops. Napoleon, reaching

Bayonne on November third, had it announced that there were between

three and four hundred thousand! With such a numerous and efficient

fighting force, there was no need of exaggeration. To oppose it Blake

had thirty-two thousand Spaniards at Valmaseda as the left wing of the

Spanish army, and La Romana, having disembarked at Santander, soon

arrived with eight thousand more; the center, twenty-five thousand

strong, lay between Calahorra and Tudela under Castanos; the right

seventeen thousand in number, was at and near Saragossa under Palafox.

Before Barcelona was Vives, with twenty thousand, and near Burgos was

a reserve of eighteen thousand under Belvedere--about a hundred and

twenty thousand men, all told. In addition to this regular army, there

was another irregular one of vast but vague dimensions, consisting of

the entire nation.

[Illustration: Map of the Spanish Campaign.]

Amid the exciting cares of Erfurt, Napoleon had still found time to

study the military situation in Spain with minuteness, and he finally

wrote to Joseph that he was coming in person to end the war by one

skilful stroke. This hope was founded on the position held by Blake,

advanced as it was beyond the Spanish line, and remote enough to be

exposed. By a swift blow that general's army might therefore be cut

off from its support, and annihilated; the center and right would

successively meet the same fate. This plan had been jeopardized by the

rashness of Lefebvre. On October thirty-first Blake had advanced from

Durango for an attack. He had not only been routed, but in the heat of

victory had been thrown far back to Valmaseda by the over-zealous

French general. Although the Emperor had hoped for something quite

different, having given orders to draw him forward toward Biscay and

Navarre, he still did not abandon his strategic plan. The Spaniards

had grown warlike in a day, but their victories had intoxicated

them, and of military science they had only what they had learned by

experience. There was no harmony among the generals--not even a

preconcerted plan of operation. Accordingly the mass of the French

army was directed toward Burgos to cut off and overwhelm Blake, while

two corps under Soult were directed to intercept his retreat.

Burgos fell almost without opposition on November tenth; Blake was

defeated the next day at Espinosa, and his scattered columns, turned

but not captured by Soult, fled into Asturias, where they joined the

force of La Romana. Without a moment's hesitation Ney was now

despatched to the southeast in order to fall on Castanos's rear, while

Lannes was to unite Moncey's corps with Lagrange's division and attack

his front. The Spanish general was posted, as has been said, on the

Ebro between Calahorra and Tudela. Before the twentieth the two moves

had been executed and all was in readiness. The Spaniards fled before

Lannes's attack on the twenty-third, but Ney with his cavalry remained

inexplicably stationary, and did not cut off their retreat. They were

therefore able to reassemble at Siguenza, while Palafox withdrew to

Saragossa. This was seemingly an easy triumph for Napoleon's matchless

strategy; his plan worked without real resistance, for his

self-sufficient and ignorant enemy was scattered. Nevertheless, it

will be observed that the execution was deficient and the result

disproportionate. Neither Soult on the right nor Ney on the left

showed such vigor or promptness as of old; there was no general

surrender by the Spaniards, nor was any portion of their force

annihilated. All that was gained--and for a common general it would

have been much--was the ability to take another step.

The capitulation at Cintra, the affair at Bayonne, and the uprising of

the Spaniards had combined to intensify rebellion in Portugal. She was

now in full sympathy with Spain, and her people were scarcely less

bitter or less active than the Spaniards. The easy terms secured by

Junot had infuriated England, and not only Dalrymple and Burrard, but

Wellesley himself, had been recalled to give an account of their

conduct. The last was triumphantly vindicated; but while the others

were not convicted of dereliction in duty, they were virtually

withdrawn from active life. Sir John Moore was now in command of the

English troops in the Peninsula. He had been reinforced with ten

thousand men, and feeling sure of Portugal, had advanced into Spain.

To Napoleon it seemed evident that his intention was to seize Madrid.

This was a mistake. The jubilant Spaniards, expecting to treat

Napoleon as they had treated Dupont, had summoned the English to join

them. Moore's orders were to assist them, and he prepared to obey,

although he well knew what would be the consequences of Spanish

hallucination. With one column he reached Salamanca on November

thirteenth; the head of the other was at Astorga. His own division

numbered only fifteen thousand men; the other was even smaller--ten

thousand at the most. It was on that date that he learned of

Napoleon's victories. Accordingly he halted to await the next move of

the French. That move was against Madrid. Saragossa was besieged by

Moncey, Lefebvre was thrown out to guard the right flank, and Ney to

protect the left of the advancing columns; the march began on November

twenty-eighth.

The first obstacle was the mountain-range of Guadarrama, which had to

be crossed by the pass of Somosierra. This defile was found to be

strongly guarded; there were not only infantry stationed on the

heights, but artillery also, sixteen guns being below the turn of the

pass in a most advantageous position. In the early morning of the

thirtieth the French infantry began to climb the cliffs on each side

of the narrow gorge, and as the mists were heavy their movements were

successfully concealed until the Spanish bivouacs were reached

surprised, and dislodged. Simultaneously a regiment of Polish light

horse was launched against the battery. Their charge was magnificent,

and the gunners could fire only a single round before they were

overpowered. By the ordinary breakfast hour the pass was free. On the

evening of December second the whole army--infantry, cavalry, and

artillery--was united on the heights of Chamartin before the gates of

Madrid. Two days later, after a gallant resistance by its little

garrison and the undaunted inhabitants, the city yielded to the

superior strength of Napoleon, and proposed terms. After some parley

these were accepted, but under the circumstances the Emperor felt that

mildness must be seasoned by menace. There were disorders in the

streets, incident to the new occupation by the French, and that fact

he used as a plea to declare the capitulation null and the Spanish

officers prisoners of war. Their men had escaped the day before.

The military operations of the campaign were of course not yet ended,

for Moore had not appeared in the valley of the Tagus, marching, as it

was believed he would, toward Madrid. The first task was to find him.

The different corps were sent out in all directions, but it was not

until the middle of the month that the British position was even

approximately ascertained. Napoleon was surprised by what he learned,

and concluded that the English were about to abandon Portugal in order

to secure Ferrol as a base of supplies. His first impulse was to

march out himself and prevent such a disaster; on the twentieth half

of his army set forth from Madrid, and on the twenty-second he led

them through the snows of the Guadarrama.

Meanwhile Moore had made his decision. It was to attract the attention

of the French, draw them toward him, and then slowly retreat

northward, thus leaving Andalusia free from interference, and giving

the southern Spaniards time to organize once more and equip themselves

for a second Baylen. To this end he prepared on the twenty-third to

attack Soult, but, learning of Napoleon's rapid advance, he promptly

changed his plan and began his retreat; three days later he led his

troops safely across the Esla. Then began a famous chase. The Emperor

hurried forward, marching on foot through cold and snow to encourage

his tired men. He was eager to strike a blow at his enemy's rear

before they should get too far away, and Soult was urged onward to

Mansilla, to flank the retreating column. On the twenty-ninth the

French cavalry reached the Esla and were driven back by the English

rear-guard, while Moore stopped only long enough to destroy the

magazines at Benevento, and then hurried on to Astorga.

For two days longer the retreat continued. Moore, after many

successful skirmishes, reached Corunna, where he hoped to embark.

Soult crossed the Esla at last, and on New Year's day, 1809, the

Emperor found himself at Astorga. He believed there was an English

fleet at Ferrol; the weather was bitter, and his health was

jeopardized by the severity of the cold; moreover, disquieting letters

arrived, and he determined that this game was not worth the candle.

Soult was intrusted with the pursuit, Ney was stationed at Astorga as

a reserve, and Napoleon, putting himself at the head of his guards,

set out for Valladolid, which he reached on the sixth. After a rest

of ten days, new and more disquieting despatches made clear the urgent

need for his presence in Paris, though his task in Spain was far from

ended. On January twenty-third he reached the Tuileries.

The tale of Moore's splendid retreat, of his courage and calmness in

loss and disaster, of his superb control of his men in their

disappointment when Corunna was reached and no fleet was found there,

of his brave fight with Soult on January sixteenth, of the mortal

wound which struck him down in the hour of victory, and of the

self-forgetfulness which enabled him in the agonies of death to make

all necessary arrangements for his men to embark on the belated

ships--all this is a brilliant page of English history, perhaps the

finest record in its entire course of glory won in retreat, of

patience, moderation, and success in the very hour of bitterest

disappointment. It was the spirit and example of Moore which made

possible the victories of Wellington.

The French interests in Spain were left in a most deplorable

condition. The populace of Madrid had received the hero of the age

with coldness, and shut themselves up in their houses to avoid forming

a crowd or creating any enthusiasm in the streets. They would not even

come out to see the gorgeous military parade which was arranged for

their benefit. The gentry and nobility had been alike distant and

cold. It was clear that Spain could neither be wheedled, cajoled, nor

threatened into even passive acquiescence in the new conquest. It was

essential, therefore, that another course should be tried. On December

fourth, Napoleon, in the role of reformer-statesman, pronounced and

issued from Chamartin a series of the most thoroughgoing edicts. All

feudal privileges, all interprovincial customs dues, were swept away;

the Inquisition was abolished, and the number of convents was reduced

to a third. These measures were in themselves most salutary, and

struck at the very root of the upas-tree under the baneful shade of

which Spain had been slowly perishing. But to do good they must be

enforced; there must be a complete military conquest of the country,

and a capable administration.

There was neither. The Spanish army had been defeated, but, severe as

had been its punishment, its power of resistance was not destroyed;

the occupation of the country was also sadly incomplete, and it made

no difference whither French soldiers marched, or what strategic

points they held, some kind of Spanish fighting force, no matter how

irregular, sprang up behind them and on their sides. The complete

military centralization of Prussia had made Jena decisive for the

whole loose-jointed territory of that kingdom; the compact territory

of Spain and the local independence of her peoples made regular

victories utterly fruitless so far as the open country was concerned.

Moreover, Joseph, although he had been driven from his capital, and

had enjoyed neither power nor consequence except as the general of

Napoleon's armies, now asserted that he, and not his brother, was the

king of Spain. He was angry and hurt by the Emperor's assumption of

superior sovereignty. He was the one, he felt, who could best deal

with the Spaniards, win their affection, and consolidate his power. To

be shouldered off his throne, and compelled to stand by while such

radical measures were taken, embittered him. Shame, he said, covered

his face before his pretended subjects; he renounced all rights to the

throne, preferring honor and honesty to power so dearly bought. This

angered Napoleon, and he threatened to divide the land into military

provinces; but, like his gentler brother, he himself recoiled before

the utter annihilation of a nationality so ancient and dignified as

that of Spain.

As the price for the evacuation of Madrid, the people of the capital

swore to accept Joseph once more as their king. Similar oaths of

allegiance came from all the provinces occupied by the French.

Although these oaths were not considered binding by those who took

them, inasmuch as they held themselves to be acting under compulsion,

yet at least the shadow of Joseph's monarchy reappeared under the

imperial protection, and a so-called liberal constitution, modeled on

that of France, was given to the people as a boon. "It depends on

yourselves," was the Emperor's language, "to make this charter yours.

If all my endeavors prove vain, and you do not justify my confidence,

then I have nothing left but to treat you as a conquered province, and

create another throne for my brother. In that case I shall put the

crown of Spain on my own head, and teach the ill-disposed to respect

it; for God has given me the power and the will to overcome all

obstacles."

The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 3 (of 4) · 第 13 / 34 章