FRONTENAC DEFENDER OF CANADA
In planning his attacks on the English colonies it does not appear that
Frontenac took specially into account the political disorganization
existing amongst them at the time, or built his hopes of success to any
extent on that circumstance. It is nevertheless true that, if his object
had been to strike at a moment of unpreparedness and weakness, he could
not have timed his operations better. The rule of James II and his
agents had been borne with no little reluctance by his subjects in North
America, and particularly by those of New England, and when news came of
his expulsion from the throne, his flight from England, and the arrival
and coronation of the Prince of Orange and his wife (daughter of James
II) as king and queen, there was at once a popular movement both at
Boston and at New York to seize the government, and hold it subject to
the orders of the new sovereigns. Sir Edmund Andros was governor of New
England at the time, with authority over the province of New York,
Boston being the chief seat of government, and the governor being
represented at New York by a lieutenant-governor, one Francis Nicholson.
Andros had been appointed governor of New York, by James, then Duke of
York, to whom the province had been patented in 1674, and had held the
office till 1681, when he was replaced by Colonel Dongan of epistolary
fame. His recall was consequent upon complaints that had been made by
the colonists of various arbitrary acts on his part; but on his arrival
in England he managed to defend himself successfully, and in 1686, James
being now on the throne, he was sent out again with the larger
jurisdiction we have mentioned.
Religious passions in those days ran high; and Andros, who was a strong
churchman, soon found himself on worse terms with the puritanical
population of Boston than he had been with the more heterogeneous and
less rigid inhabitants of New York. The circumstances of the time, it
must be confessed, were such as to excuse a somewhat sensitive condition
of public feeling. Two years before the arrival of Andros, the Court of
Chancery of England had declared null and void the charter granted to
the colony of Massachusetts in the year 1629, which, from that date
onwards, had been the basis, not only of all government, but of all land
grants, transfers of property, and popular liberties generally. A
provisional government, under one Joseph Dudley had succeeded. Then had
come Andros, commissioned by a king who was far from commanding the
unlimited confidence of his subjects at home, and who was looked upon
with at least equal distrust by the ultra-Protestants of his American
dominions. How long they were going to be deprived of legally guaranteed
liberties there was no knowing, nor what the intentions of James II
might be in regard to their beloved commonwealth. They did not think it
impossible he might wish to hand them over to his close ally the King of
France; and in Andros they feared they saw only too meet an instrument
for stratagems and spoils. The instructions given to him as governor
contained a special injunction to favour by all means in his power the
rites and doctrines of the Church of England; and the colonists, with
the exception of a small minority, were maddened to see public taxes
applied to this hateful object. As the Indians were giving trouble, the
governor made a campaign against them in the summer of 1688, which was
not very successful; hence more odium gathered on his head. Having
failed in his measures of offence he thought he would at least provide
for defence, and garrisoned the forts on the frontier with six hundred
men, chiefly militia. More discontent: the garrisons served unwillingly,
and the people at home professed to believe that such measures were
unnecessary. A small detachment of soldiers had come out with Andros.
Their conduct, according to contemporary accounts, was most unedifying
and in shocking contrast to the unrelenting rigour and formality of
colonial piety. It is not surprising therefore that, when, in April
1689, news was brought that James II, whose commission Andros bore, was
no longer king, but that the leader of European Protestantism reigned in
his stead, there should have been an instant uprising of the populace
against his representative. Andros was seized and imprisoned with fifty
of his followers. "For seven weeks," says a contemporary writer, "there
was not so much as the face of any government." A vessel having arrived
towards the end of May with instructions to proclaim William and Mary,
certain of the members of the former General Council assumed to act, and
one of their number, the aged Simon Bradstreet, was named as governor.
It did not take long for the news to travel from Boston to New York. The
condition of things there was different; public opinion was not in the
same state of exasperation as at Boston; still Andros was of old
unpopular, and after a little hesitation, a movement was organized,
headed by one Jacob Leisler, to take the government out of the hands of
the lieutenant-governor, Nicholson. Like his superior officer at Boston,
the latter was obliged to submit; and Leisler, most unhappily for
himself and his family, assumed, with the support of a committee of
citizens, the control of affairs. Thus, both in New England and in New
York, there supervened a period of divided councils and enfeebled
administration, and this at the precise moment when the colonies were
about to encounter new perils. The provisional government of New
England, in blind opposition to the policy of Sir Edmund Andros,
withdrew or greatly reduced the garrisons he had wisely established
along the frontier. If Leisler could have got his authority recognized
at Albany he would have sent forces for the defence of the northern part
of the province. There was a party there in his favour; but the
magistrates, though quite ready to pay allegiance to William and Mary,
thought Leisler's credentials of too dubious a character to justify
their negotiating with him. Between divided responsibility and
irresponsibility, the difference is not great. News had been received
that the French were meditating mischief, but no proper precautionary
measures were taken. To this condition of unpreparedness the horrible
disaster of Schenectady may be distinctly attributed, and probably those
at Salmon Falls and Casco Bay as well.
Even after the mischief was done, it was extremely difficult to secure
any harmonious or well-directed action. A strong appeal was sent by the
magistrates of Albany to the governor and council of Massachusetts,
representing their own deplorable condition of weakness, and asking that
New England should undertake the serious enterprise of invading Canada
by water. That was a matter for grave consideration, and one, the
authorities of Massachusetts thought, in which, if they attempted it at
all, they should have the assistance of the Mother Country. They
despatched a vessel in April to England with a request for help; but
meantime, spurred by their own wrongs and sufferings, they determined to
take an easier revenge on the French by invading Acadia. Early in the
month of May 1690 the different New England colonies sent delegates to a
congress held at New York for the purpose of deciding on a military
policy. The conclusion come to was that there should be both a land and
a sea expedition, the first directed against Montreal, the second
against Quebec. To the former New York was to contribute four hundred
men and the New England colonies jointly three hundred and fifty-five.
The Iroquois, it was expected, would add a powerful contingent. The
naval expedition, it was proposed, should be provided entirely by the
New England colonies. The Massachusetts delegates hesitated to commit
themselves to so extensive and costly a scheme, but finally agreed to
undertake it, relying on assistance from the Mother Country, which, in
existing circumstances, they hardly thought could be refused. Meantime
the expedition against Acadia could be pushed forward.
French Acadia had at all times been much exposed to attacks from the
English colonies. The settlers were few in number--at this time not much
over a thousand all told--and their defences were but feeble. In 1654,
in accordance with secret orders sent by Cromwell, the territory had
been seized by an English force from Boston under the command of Major
Robert Sedgwick and Captain John Leverett. Two years later it was made a
province, Sir Thomas Temple being appointed governor. After remaining in
the possession of the English for a period of thirteen years, it was
ceded back to France by the Treaty of Breda in 1667. Five years later
Frontenac arrived in Canada for the first time, and in the following
year, 1673, M. de Chambly, a very capable soldier, whose services had
been highly appreciated by the previous governor, M. de Courcelles, was
sent to command in Acadia, and established himself at Pentagouet, a
fortified post at the mouth of the river Penobscot. This was the extreme
western limit of his jurisdiction even according to the French view of
the matter. The New Englanders held that the true limit was the river
St. Croix, the present boundary between the province of New Brunswick
and the state of Maine. To the east Acadia embraced, by common consent,
the southern part of what is now New Brunswick and all Nova Scotia west
of the Straits of Canso.
M. de Chambly had not been more than a year in his new government when
an attack was made on Pentagouet by a Flemish corsair conducted by a
Boston pilot or ship captain. After a brief defence he was obliged to
surrender, his force being very inferior, and he himself having been
wounded. The attacking party then proceeded to the only other Acadian
fort, Jemseg, on the river St. John, and captured it. M. de Chambly was
taken as a prisoner to Boston, but was soon set at liberty and permitted
to return to France. The attack gave rise to a strong protest on the
part of Frontenac, and was wholly disavowed by the Massachusetts
authorities. In the year 1676, M. de Chambly was sent out again from
France with a royal commission as lieutenant-governor. He did not
attempt to establish himself at Pentagouet, but for a time made his
headquarters at Jemseg, and not long afterwards removed to Port Royal,
now Annapolis, on the northern coast of Nova Scotia, which thus became
the capital of Acadia. Here he remained till about the year 1679 or
1680, when he was transferred to the governorship of Grenada in the West
Indies.
It was not till the autumn of 1684 that a duly appointed successor was
provided in the person of M. Francois Perrot, who had finally been
dismissed from the governorship of Montreal. In the interval there had
been one or two descents on the Acadian coast, calling forth further
protests on Frontenac's part, and further disclaimers of responsibility
on that of the constituted authorities of New England. To fish in French
waters or to trade with the inhabitants was considered an infraction of
international law; and yet there is clear evidence that the French
settlers rather longed than otherwise for the flesh-pots of Boston in
the shape of English goods and English money, very much after the manner
of the Iroquois and the Indian tribes of the West. When Perrot came to
Port Royal he was pleased to find that the conditions there were nearly
as favourable as at Montreal for the trading in which his soul
delighted. The chief difference was the substitution of Boston for New
York as his commercial centre. In the fall of the year 1685, a few weeks
after the arrival of the Marquis of Denonville, Meulles, the intendant,
accompanied by a member of the Sovereign Council, Peyras, paid a visit
of inspection to the country, remaining till the following summer. A
carefully-made census showed that the total population amounted at that
time to 885 souls, mustering 222 guns. Of cultivated land there were 896
acres. Horned cattle numbered 986, sheep 759, and pigs 608. Just as
Meulles was leaving the country, the bishop designate, Saint Vallier,
arrived on a pastoral visit. The account he gives of the people in his
_Etat present de l'Eglise_ is most laudatory, and strangely at variance
with a report made by Duchesneau, the intendant, a few years earlier. In
1681 that officer had written that the poverty of the people was not the
most serious evil; "their discords are a much greater one. Among them
there is neither order nor police; and those who are sent hence to
command them pillage them." The future bishop, in 1689, saw things very
differently. Although, he said, they had been deprived of spiritual
instruction for many years, they did not seem to have suffered in the
least thereby. Their morals were excellent; they were kindly and
well-disposed, and were greatly rejoiced to learn that their spiritual
interests were going to be better looked after in future. Of course they
may have improved in the eight years that had elapsed since M.
Duchesneau made his report; or that not very genial individual may have
needlessly darkened the picture; or, again, the worthy prelate may have
thrown a little too much sunshine into it. It is satisfactory to learn
that the result of Meulles's visit was the dismissal of Perrot, who,
doubtless, was plundering the people. This time no other office was
provided for him. He remained in the country, however, to do a little
more trading, and was finally killed, it was reported, in a fight with
some pirates. His successor was M. de Menneval, a good soldier and a man
of character.
Such was the country on which Massachusetts had determined to make a
descent. Seven vessels, carrying two hundred and eighty-five sailors,
and four or five hundred militiamen, were commissioned for the
expedition, which was put under the command of Sir William Phipps, "a
rugged son of New England," as Parkman calls him. Phipps was, in truth,
an early American example of a self-made man. His knighthood, as well as
a comfortable fortune, had been won by adventurous and successful
service at sea. One of his biographers tells us that he was born "at a
despicable plantation on the river Kennebec." His early years were
passed in sheep-tending. The attacks of the Indians drove him, in the
year 1676, to Boston, where he applied himself to learning the trade of
ship-building, and where he also married Mary Hull, widow of one John
Hull, a woman several years his senior and of much better education and
social position than he. A year later we find him in command of a
sailing vessel. A Spanish treasure vessel had been wrecked somewhere off
the Bahamas some forty years before, and Phipps felt confident that if
he were furnished with a suitable ship he could find the wreck and
recover the treasure. He made an application to the English government,
and was granted the use of a vessel called the _Algier Rose_. His first
expedition was not successful; but on a second attempt he located the
wreck, and by the aid of a diving-bell--a comparatively recent invention
at the time--recovered treasure to the value of L300,000. He had next to
face a mutiny on his vessel, which he only quelled by dint of personal
courage and address. On reaching England he received as his own share of
the booty L16,000; but James II further recognized his services by
creating him a knight. This was in the summer of 1687. Phipps then
returned to Boston, and was henceforth a man of substance and influence
in the community.
The fleet under his command sailed from Nantasket about the 1st May, and
on the 11th reached Port Royal. Menneval, the governor, had under his
command a garrison consisting of not far short of one hundred men. The
fort had also been provided with twenty cannon; but these, it appears,
had not been mounted. Menneval must have judged that the place was
incapable of defence, because, when summoned by Phipps to surrender, he
complied without making any attempt at resistance. He stipulated that
private property as well as the church should be respected, and that the
garrison should be returned to France. Phipps might have insisted on
surrender at discretion, as he clearly saw when he entered into
possession of the fort; but as he had not done so, honour required that
he should observe the terms he had made. This, unfortunately for his
reputation, he did not do. Availing himself of the pretext afforded by
the fact that some goods belonging to the king had been carried away
from the fort and secreted in the woods, he proceeded to plunder the
traders of the place and desecrate the church. It is one of his own men
who writes: "We cut down the cross, pulled down their high altar, and
broke their images." The inhabitants in general were promised security
for life, liberty, and property, on condition of swearing allegiance to
the English Crown, which they did with great alacrity. The fact was they
had dealt so much with the New Englanders in the way of business that
they had little prejudice against them, while they had been so much
neglected by the French government, both politically and
ecclesiastically, not to speak of being robbed by its agents, that their
national feelings had been but little cultivated. Phipps had with him
such a force as they had never seen before--seven hundred men; and the
probability is that they hoped for greater quiet and surer protection
under English rule than, so far as they could see, they were likely to
enjoy under that of France. Phipps seemed to have assumed that they
would remain true to their new allegiance, for he did not leave any
garrison in the country, but invited the people to govern themselves by
means of a council consisting of six ordinary members and a president,
whom he chose from amongst themselves. Acadia was now to rank as a
colony of Massachusetts, which was thus affording the earliest example
of American "imperialism," though in a liberal fashion.
While Phipps was taking possession of Port Royal, one of his officers,
Captain Alden, had captured Saint-Castin's post at Pentagouet
(Penobscot), after which, by orders of his chief, he sailed to the
southern coast of what is now Nova Scotia, and seized the settlements of
La Heve, Chedabucto, and one or two others. No resistance was made
anywhere, and consequently no lives were lost. The conquest, such as it
was, was a bloodless one. Bitter complaint, nevertheless, was made of
the bad faith shown by the New England leader after the capture of Port
Royal, and with good cause. A soldier's word in such a case should be
absolutely inviolable. At the same time it is a memorable fact that men
who might have sought to avenge the blood of kindred slain without
warning in night attacks, such as those at Schenectady and Salmon Falls,
or in violation of terms of surrender, as at Casco Bay, should have
absolutely refrained from bloodshed. The French account of the affair
at Port Royal distinctly mentions that the New Englanders were bitterly
resentful of the Salmon Falls massacre in particular; nevertheless it
did not enter into their mind to follow the example of Hertel and his
braves.
On the 30th May Phipps arrived at Boston, bringing with him as prisoners
Menneval, fifty-nine French soldiers, and two priests. The "rugged son
of New England" showed that he had the over-thrifty qualities which were
formerly, more than to-day, associated with the "down-east" character.
Menneval had entrusted him with his money, and Phipps refused to return
it. He also appropriated a quantity of the French governor's clothing
and other effects, which he showed the greatest reluctance to give up,
though distinctly ordered to do so by the General Council of
Massachusetts. Upon a repetition of the order in more emphatic terms, he
restored a portion of the property, but could not be induced to make
complete restitution. Successful generals are not always easy to confine
within the bounds of strict legality. Phipps himself was a member of the
General Council, having been elected thereto while absent in Acadia;
and, as just before starting on the expedition, he had joined the church
of the celebrated Cotton Mather, he possessed a combination "pull," as
it would be denominated in these days--civil, religious, military, and
doubtless social--which it must have been very difficult to overcome,
particularly in the unsettled condition of things then prevailing.
Menneval, after being kept for a considerable time in confinement, was
allowed to sail for France.
Massachusetts had not waited for the return of Phipps before taking in
hand the more serious matter of the expedition against Quebec. It was
hoped, as has already been mentioned, that some assistance would come
from the Mother Country in time for a union of forces; but, should that
hope be disappointed, New England had determined to proceed with the
enterprise alone. The ease with which Acadia had been reduced to
submission seemed to be a presage of success in the larger undertaking;
and if Phipps could return with a respectable show of booty from so
small an establishment as that of Port Royal, what might not be expected
if so acquisitive a commander could get a chance at Quebec. Then there
was the religious aspect of the case. The Puritan commonwealth would not
dishonour God by doubting that they were the people, or that the
Catholics of Canada were idolaters. With all the sound doctrine and
scriptural worship on one side, and all the deadly error and
superstitious practice on the other, how could Providence hesitate which
cause to support? At the same time prayer was not considered
superfluous, nor was it allowed to flag. "The wheel," as Cotton Mather
expressed it, "was kept in continual motion"; and as they prayed they
worked, these sturdy Roundheads of the New World. Till well past
midsummer Boston harbour was alive with preparation. The chief
difficulty was to finance the enterprise. Previous Indian wars had
exhausted the colony, and the treasury was well-nigh empty. The only
thing to do was to pledge the public credit and raise a loan, which it
was hoped might be liquidated, in great part, if not in whole, by the
plunder of the enemy. Thirty vessels altogether were requisitioned for
the expedition. Most were of small capacity; the largest was a West
India trader named the _Six Friends_, carrying forty-four guns, and the
second largest the _John and Thomas_, carrying twenty-six guns. The rest
had little or no armament. Three vessels appear to have been contributed
by the province of New York, one of which was a frigate of twenty-four
guns, and the two others vessels of smaller size carrying eight and four
guns respectively. The supply of ammunition was decidedly short; but it
was hoped, almost up to the last moment, that some contribution in the
way of warlike stores, if not in ships and men, would arrive from
England. That hope was destined to be frustrated. It was the year when
William III was carrying on his campaign in Ireland, while Queen Mary
and her Privy Council were trying to control domestic disaffection. It
was the terrible year of Beachy Head, when the combined English and
Dutch fleets, under Torrington and Evertsen, were defeated by the French
under Tourville, and when the buoys at the mouth of the Thames were
taken up to prevent the ships of the enemy from appearing before London.
It is perhaps not much to be wondered at that, in a time of so much
stress and perplexity, an appeal from a trans-Atlantic colony for
assistance that could ill be spared should have received scant
attention. No help was sent: the New Englanders were left to fight their
own battles as William was fighting his.
Considering the resources of the colonies, it was no mean effort they
were putting forth. Some hundreds of men volunteered for the expedition;
but, the number being insufficient, a press was resorted to in order to
make up the total required, namely, twenty-two hundred. Of these about
three hundred were sailors, and the rest soldiers. Provisions for four
months were taken on board, and the expedition, under the command of
Phipps, sailed from Nantasket on the 9th August 1690.
What progress was being made in the meantime with the land expedition
against Montreal in which New York was to take the lead? The answer must
be, very poor progress indeed. At Boston there was a considerable
measure of unity of action; in New York there was almost none. It had
been agreed that Connecticut should furnish a contingent of troops, and
that the whole expedition should be placed under the command of one of
its officers, Fitz-John Winthrop, afterwards governor. Winthrop
organized a force of two or three hundred men, and started from
Hartford for Albany on the 14th July. A week later he arrived at the
latter town only to find everything in complete disorder. "I found," he
says, "the design against Canada poorly contrived and little forwarded,
all things confused and in no readiness or position for marching towards
Canada; yet every one disorderly projecting something about it."[44] The
Dutch displayed the greatest indifference in the matter, and the
English, for want of any commanding influence or unquestioned authority,
were irresolute and vacillating. There was no definite understanding
with the Indians; and what help they were going to give was quite
uncertain. Organizing his forces as best he could in these most
disadvantageous circumstances, Winthrop set out from Albany on his march
northwards. He had not gone far when he was overtaken by a despatch from
the governor of Massachusetts and Connecticut, telling him that the
fleet was in readiness to sail. Eager to do his part in the combined
operations, Winthrop pressed on and encamped at Wood Creek at the
southern extremity of Lake Champlain. Here smallpox broke out among the
troops; disagreements arose with the Indians; and, to make matters still
worse, the provisions which should have been pushed on from Albany
failed to arrive. After waiting several days in inactivity, Winthrop
became persuaded that an advance to Montreal with the body of his
troops was out of the question. He allowed the mayor of Albany, Captain
John Schuyler, to go on with a small detachment, while he with the rest
of his force, largely consisting of sick men, returned to Albany. All
that Schuyler succeeded in doing was to perpetrate a rather ignoble raid
upon the hamlet of Laprairie near Montreal, where he killed ten or
twelve of the inhabitants, destroyed the farms and the cattle, and made
a number of prisoners, including some women. As an act of retaliation
for Schenectady it was a feeble performance; as an act of war it was not
a heroic exploit. Winthrop, before the month of September closed,
marched back to Hartford, and thus ended the New York expedition.
Clearly, if anything effective is to be done against Canada, the Boston
men must do it.
The fleet sailed, as already mentioned, on the 9th August. The admiral's
pennon floated from the _Six Friends_, the vice-admiral's from the _John
and Thomas_. The vice-admiral for the occasion was Major John Walley;
the third in command, apparently, was a Major Thomas Savage. Had the
winds been favourable, the expedition might easily have reached Quebec
within a month. They were most unfavourable, however; and it was not
till the 3rd October that it arrived off Tadousac. Here the ships were
brought to anchor, and a council of war was held. Four days later the
fleet had only advanced fifty miles, and it took eight days more to
reach a point off the Island of Orleans near the present village of St.
Jean, where it anchored for a few hours. Here Walley proposed that the
men, who had been for weeks confined on shipboard, should be allowed to
land and "refresh themselves," and that opportunity should be taken to
form the several companies, and get everything into perfect order before
proceeding to an attack. He was overruled however; and, taking advantage
of a rising tide, the fleet slipped up the river, and at daybreak on
Monday the 16th October made its appearance in the harbour of Quebec.
We have seen that, during the month of August and part of the month of
September Frontenac was engaged at Montreal with his western Indians. It
was during this time that Schuyler made his attack on Laprairie. After
the departure of the Indians, Frontenac remained in Montreal to complete
his measures for the defence of the country, and hoping also to get news
of his embassy to the Iroquois. His return to Quebec was fixed for the
10th October, and on the afternoon of that very day a messenger who had
been sent post haste by Prevost, the major in command of the troops at
Quebec, placed in his hands two letters. The first, dated the 5th
October, told him that an Abenaquis Indian had arrived at Quebec from
the neighbourhood of Pentagouet deputed by his tribe to bring important
news obtained from a captive New England woman, namely that, about six
weeks before, a considerable fleet had sailed from Boston for the
capture of Quebec. The second letter, written later on the same day,
said that one Sieur de Cannanville had arrived from Tadousac, where he
had seen twenty-four ships, eight of which appeared of considerable
size.
It does not say much for Frontenac's intelligence department, if such an
institution existed in that day, that he should have known nothing of
the preparations which had been going on in Boston during the previous
spring and summer. His first impulse was to disbelieve the news now
brought, but none the less he lost no time in starting for Quebec with
the intendant, Champigny. The first boat he embarked in proved leaky,
and came near foundering. He transhipped into a canoe, and went as far
as was possible before dark. On the afternoon of the next day a further
message was received from Prevost confirming his first, and saying that
the enemy had captured, about thirty leagues below Quebec, a vessel in
which were two ladies. This looked serious, and the count sent back
Captain de Ramesay to Montreal with orders to Callieres, the governor,
to march to Quebec at once with all the troops he could gather at
Montreal or pick up on the way. He himself made all possible haste, and
arrived at Quebec at ten o'clock in the morning of Saturday, the 14th
October.
Work on the fortifications of Quebec had been more or less in progress
all summer; but from the moment that the first news of the intended
attack had been received, Prevost had been particularly active in
planting batteries, digging trenches, and doing other work of immediate
necessity. He had also despatched a long-boat and a canoe, both well
armed, under the charge of his brother-in-law, Grandville, to make a
reconnaissance in the direction of Tadousac, and had sent orders to the
militia captains of the neighbouring parishes of Beauport and Beaupre,
and also to those on the Island of Orleans, to hold their men in
readiness to march into the city, and meantime to watch the enemy, that
they might offer all possible opposition to his landing. Frontenac
employed his time on the 14th and 15th in examining and perfecting the
general system of defence; and he was much pleased as well as surprised
to find how much Prevost had accomplished in a few days. Two principal
batteries had been established in the Upper Town, one, consisting of
eight guns, to the right of the chateau, and one of three guns on the
rock overlooking Mountain Hill known as Sault au Matelot. Two batteries
of three guns each were placed on the river bank, one near the present
market-place, and the other near where the Custom House now stands. Most
of the pieces were eighteen pounders. The non-combatant inhabitants of
the surrounding country had come into the city in considerable numbers,
bringing with them what they could in the way of provisions. On Sunday
two canoes were sent down the river to warn the vessels that were
expected to arrive from France to keep out of harm's way. On their safe
arrival the life almost of the colony might be said to depend. At seven
o'clock on Sunday evening news came that the hostile fleet had passed
the eastern end of the Island of Orleans. There was not much sleeping
that night. At three o'clock on Monday morning their distant lights
could be seen down the river. At daybreak there could be counted in the
harbour, some authorities say thirty-two, and some thirty-four, English
sails.
A few hours of tense expectation elapsed, and then a boat carrying a
flag of truce was seen putting out from the admiral's ship. It bore an
envoy from Phipps, who was to demand of the governor the surrender of
the place. A boat put out from the shore to meet it, and the envoy,
having been taken on board, was blindfolded, and brought ashore. Here,
according to one account, he was crowded and hustled, and made to
clamber over unnecessary obstacles, the object being to persuade him
that the place was more numerously defended and more difficult of
entrance than it really was. In reading the contemporary narratives it
is often difficult to know what to believe. Nearly all are vitiated by
extreme generality of statement and inaccuracy in detail. That of La
Hontan betrays the enormous mendacity of the writer, who, so long as he
could be amusing and sensational, was absolutely indifferent as to
facts. Checking one by another, however, it is not impossible to arrive
at a fairly coherent and credible narrative. It was about ten in the
forenoon when the messenger was introduced into the reception-room of
the Chateau St. Louis. The _mise en scene_ had been carefully arranged
for the moment when the bandage should be removed from his eyes.
Frontenac was there in a gorgeous uniform and looking the soldier and
seigneur from head to foot. Around him, also in uniform, stood the
members of his staff and the principal military and civil officers of
the colony. It was such an array of military and official pomp as simple
New England eyes had probably never gazed on. History does not seem to
have preserved the name or rank of the messenger, and we have no certain
information as to the effect produced upon him by the gallant and
brilliant company that met his gaze. All we know is that he handed a
letter from Phipps to the haughty governor, and awaited his answer. The
letter read as follows:--
"Sir William Phipps, Knight, General and Commander-in-Chief, in
and over their Majesties' forces of New England, by sea and
land, to Count Frontenac, Lieutenant-General and Governour for
the French King at Canada; or in his absence to his deputy, or
him or them in chief command at Quebeck.
"The war between the Crowns of England and France doth not only
sufficiently warrant, but the destruction made by the French and
Indians, under your command and encouragement, upon the persons
and estates of their Majesties' subjects of New England, without
provocation on their part, hath put them under the necessity of
this expedition for their own security and satisfaction. And
although the cruelties and barbarities used against them by the
French and Indians might, upon the present opportunity, prompt
unto a severe revenge, yet, being desirous of avoiding all
inhuman and unchristian-like actions, and to prevent shedding of
blood as much as may be.
"I, the aforesaid William Phipps, Knight, do hereby in the name
and on behalf of their most excellent Majesties, William and
Mary, King and Queen of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland,
Defenders of the Faith, and by order of their said Majesties'
government of Massachusetts colony in New England, demand a
present surrender of your forts and castles, undemolished, and
the king's and other stores, unembezzled, with a reasonable
delivery of all captives; together with a surrender of all your
persons and estates to my dispose: upon the doing whereof you
may expect mercy from me, as a Christian, according to what
shall be found to be for their Majesties' service and the
subjects' security. Which, if you refuse forthwith to do, I am
come provided, and am resolved, by the help of God, in whom I
trust, by force of arms to revenge all wrongs and injuries
offered, and bring you under subjection to the Crown of England,
and, when too late, make you wish you had accepted of the favour
tendered.
"Your answer positive in an hour returned by your own trumpet,
with the return of mine, is required upon the peril that will
ensue."[45]
Frontenac was not versed in the English language, so the letter was
given to an interpreter to translate. When the latter had finished the
reading, the envoy presented his watch to the governor, observing that
it was then ten o'clock, and that he would have to have an answer by
eleven. The dignity of the assembled officers was much hurt by the
brusque terms of Phipps's summons; and, before Frontenac had had time to
frame his reply, one of them cried out that Phipps was nothing but a
pirate, and that the man before them should be hanged. Frontenac was not
disposed to go so far. "Tell your general," he said, "that I do not
recognize King William, and that the Prince of Orange is a usurper, who
has violated the most sacred ties of blood in attempting to dethrone his
father-in-law. I recognize no other sovereign in England than King
James. Your general ought not to be surprised at the hostilities he says
are carried on by the French against the Massachusetts colony; since he
might expect that the king, my master, having received the King of
England under his protection, and being ready to replace him on the
throne by force of arms, as I am informed, would order me to wage war
in this country on a people in rebellion against their lawful sovereign.
Does your general imagine," he continued, pointing to the officers who
filled the room, "that, even if he offered me better conditions, and I
were of a temper to accept them--does he think that so many gallant
gentlemen would consent to it, or advise me to place any confidence in
the word of a man who violated the capitulation he made with the
governor of Port Royal, one who has been wanting in loyalty to his
rightful sovereign, and who, unmindful of the personal benefits received
by him from that sovereign, adheres to the fortunes of a prince who,
while trying to persuade the world to accept him as the liberator of
England and defender of the faith, tramples on the laws and privileges
of the kingdom, and overturns the English Church? This is what the
divine justice invoked by your general in his letter will not fail some
day to punish severely."
It is possible that the terms of the governor's answer may have been
somewhat conventionalized by his secretary, to whose pen we are indebted
for a report of it.[46] Phipps speaks of it as "a reviling answer," the
drift of which was that he and those with him were traitors for "having
taken up with a usurper, and seized upon that good Christian Sir Edmund
Andros." The messenger, who doubtless felt his position somewhat
uncomfortable, asked the count whether he would not give him an answer
in writing. "No!" was the reply; "the only answer I will give will be
from the mouth of my cannon and musketry, that he may learn that it is
not in such a style that a person of my rank is summoned." Whatever he
might forget, Frontenac could not forget his personal rank. There was
now no more to be said; the messenger's eyes were again bandaged, and he
was conducted back to his boat.
So now, Sir William, your work is cut out for you! There is the
fortress; take it. This is not Port Royal, nor is that hard-featured
warrior Menneval. This is a city set on a hill. Its guns are shotted and
skilfully disposed. It has defenders by the hundred; and before night
closes their numbers will be doubled; for Callieres is on the march with
all the troops that can be spared from Montreal, Three Rivers and other
posts--eight hundred fighting men in all. Behind those ramparts, or
awaiting you in the rear of the town, are men accustomed to warfare
whether in the open field or in forest ambush. The adventure is one of
great pith and moment, if you can but succeed in it!
The probability is that by this time Phipps had begun to take a more
serious view of his task. He was one of those men who require to be
favoured by luck. He was better at making a dash than at organizing
victory. He had courage and a good deal of practical skill in
navigation, but there is no evidence that he possessed the talents of a
military commander. The readiness with which the inhabitants of Acadia
had renounced their French allegiance had led him to believe that in
Canada he might actually be welcomed as a liberator.[47] Of any such
disposition on the part of the Canadians there had certainly been no
sign as yet. It was reported at Quebec that he had attempted to land
some men at Riviere Ouelle, and had been repulsed by the inhabitants
under the leadership of their _cure_. The story, however, as given by
Mere Juchereau, had plainly passed through the hands of the mythmakers
before she got hold of it, for she tells us that "the moment the first
boat was within musket shot, the _cure_ ordered a volley, which killed
the whole crew with the exception of two men who made off in great
haste." Walley's journal makes no mention of any attempt to land, and
the story may be assumed to be an imaginative invention. What at least
may be regarded as certain is that, up to the date of his arrival before
Quebec, Phipps had not received any encouraging overtures from the
inhabitants. Other causes of anxiety were not wanting. Smallpox had
broken out in his fleet, and the weather was most bitterly cold for the
season. On the day of the summons and the following day he and his force
remained inactive. On the afternoon of the first day Iberville and his
brother Maricourt, returning with a few of their men from Hudson's Bay,
landed safely at Beauport in sight of the ships, having slipped up the
North Channel in a couple of canoes. In the evening about seven o'clock
Callieres, governor of Montreal, marched into the city at the head of
eight hundred men. Shouts of welcome, mingled with martial music,
reached the ears of the English, and were rightly interpreted as meaning
that the city had received reinforcements.
The plan of the attack was that a body of men should be landed on the
Beauport flats to the north of the city, and endeavour to obtain access
by crossing the river St. Charles; that the principal war vessels should
take up their position in front of the city; that others should move
further up so as to create the impression that troops were to be landed
above Cape Diamond, in order to take the city in the rear; and that the
bombardment should only begin when a signal had been received that the
troops at the other side had made their entrance. The scheme was a good
one, but it was not well carried out. On Wednesday forenoon about
thirteen hundred men under Major Walley were landed, apparently without
opposition, though there were troops in abundance--levies from Beauport
and Beaupre, Indians from Lorette, as well as the forces within the
city--who could have made the landing exceedingly difficult and costly
in lives, had they been led to the spot; particularly as the enemy had
to wade knee-deep, and even waist-deep, in icy water in order to get to
land. The landing having been effected, Walley drew up his force in
companies, selecting four to act as an advance guard, or, as he calls
them, "forlorns," and then ordered a march for the higher ground. They
had not gone a hundred yards before there was firing from cover on both
flanks, particularly from the right; there, Walley says, "there was a
party galled us considerably." A charge having been ordered the
defenders gave way, but continued to fire from swamp and bush as they
retreated.[48] In the pursuit Walley gained a position not far from the
St. Charles River. He was expecting some vessels to come into the river
with supplies, and for that reason, as well as for others, wished to be
near it. One or two houses and barns gave a little shelter, but many of
the men had to lie out all night. If we may trust his statement his loss
in killed on that day was four, and in wounded sixty. Considering the
nature of the landing, "it was a great mercy," he says, "we had no more
damage done us." He judged that he had killed some twenty of the
Canadians, but that was a vast over-estimate. The Chevalier de Clermont,
an experienced and valuable officer, had been killed, and Juchereau de
St. Denis, who commanded the Beauport militia, had been wounded; but the
total of killed and wounded on the Canadian side did not probably exceed
the figure mentioned.
In the course of the day a Frenchman, who was a fugitive from his own
side, surrendered to Walley's men, and from him the New England
commander learned the somewhat discouraging news that the defensive
forces in the city far outnumbered the whole of Phipps's expedition.
Troops had been pouring in from different quarters both before and after
the governor's arrival, and the last body of men brought by Callieres
had raised the total to about three thousand. Walley threatened the man
very seriously as to what would happen if he did not tell the truth, and
he seems to have heeded the warning. The number he mentioned agrees with
the figures given by the contemporary historian Belmont, and also by
Captain Sylvanus Davis, who was a prisoner in Quebec during the siege.
According to the arrangement made between Phipps and Walley, the former
was only to begin the bombardment after the latter had forced an
entrance into the town. Moreover, small armed vessels were to sail into
the St. Charles, to assist his passage of that river and to furnish his
force with necessary supplies of food and ammunition. Why this
arrangement was departed from is not very clear; but about four o'clock
on Wednesday afternoon Phipps moved his four principal vessels up
before the town, and no sooner had he come within cannon shot than the
shore batteries opened fire. Then ensued a duel in which the defence had
all the best of it. Their guns were much better served than those of the
assailants, and they had excellent marks to shoot at. The fight was
maintained till after dark, by which time Phipps had fired away nearly
all his ammunition and accomplished virtually nothing. One boy in the
town had been killed by a splinter of rock; the buildings in the town
had scarcely been injured at all. Phipps says he dismounted some of the
enemy's best guns, but his story is unconfirmed. Certain it is that his
vessels suffered serious damage in hulls, masts, and rigging, and that,
after a brief renewal of the encounter the next morning, he drew them
all off.
An incident which has given rise to a good deal of discussion may here
be referred to. The flag of the admiral's vessel was shot away and fell
into the river. It was captured by some men from the shore, but whether
under the very heroic circumstances described by an eminent Canadian
poet on the authority of Pere Charlevoix, is, to say the least, open to
doubt. Charlevoix has it that, no sooner had the flag fallen into the
water and begun to drift away, than some Canadians swam out and seized
it, notwithstanding the fire directed on them from the ships.
Contemporary writers know nothing of any such feat. The one who comes
nearest to the father's account of the matter is Mere Juchereau, who
says that "our Canadians went out rashly in a bark canoe and brought it
to land under the noses of the English." She does not even say they were
fired on. How near they got to the English we can hardly judge from the
expression "_a la barbe des Anglais_," which is not a measure of length.
On the other hand we have from a contemporary writer, the Recollet, Pere
Leclercq, whose book was published in 1691, the year following the
attack on Quebec, a plain, consistent statement as to how the thing
happened, and one the terms of which are in distinct conflict with the
popular version. After describing how the vice-admiral's ship had been
the first to withdraw beyond the reach of the shore batteries, he
continues: "The admiral [Phipps] followed him pretty closely and with
precipitation, paying out the whole length of his anchor-cable, and then
letting it go. His flag, which drifted away in the river, was _left to
our discretion_, and our people went and fished it out."[49] The words
used plainly imply that there was neither difficulty nor danger in
recovering the flag; and this be it remembered was the story Leclercq
heard at the time, and published almost immediately. Frontenac, who
would certainly have been pleased to approve the bravery of his people,
simply says that Phipps lost his flag, "which remained in our
possession"; while Monseignat's statement in what may be regarded as the
official narrative, is that the admiral's flag and another were borne in
triumph to the church. Charlevoix's lack of accuracy in details is
evident in the very paragraph in which he deals with this incident; for
he says that no sooner had Phipps's messenger returned to his ship,
than, to the great surprise of the English, shots were fired from one of
the Lower Town batteries, and that the first one carried away the flag.
This is pure romance. Phipps's vessel was not within range at the time,
and no shots were exchanged till late in the afternoon of Wednesday, two
days later. The loquacious La Hontan, who at least knows how to adorn a
tale, if not point a moral, knows nothing of this particular occurrence,
otherwise he would certainly have included it in a narrative which, it
is evident, he aimed at making as lively and piquant as possible. It is
no disparagement of the valour of the defenders of Quebec to doubt
whether the incident took place as described either by Charlevoix, who
did not visit the country till thirty years after the event, and did not
publish his book till twenty-four years later, or by Mere Juchereau.
Many a brave deed has passed unnoticed of history; and, en revanche,
many an insignificant act has been wrapped round by legend with clouds
of glory. If there is reason to doubt whether this particular deed was
done in a specially heroic, or even in a very dramatic manner, there are
incidents in abundance left to attest the heroism of the French-Canadian
race. The legends of a people bear witness to its ideals, and help to
repair the wrongs that history does by leaving so much that is truly
memorable and admirable unrecorded.
While Phipps on Thursday was drawing off his shattered vessels, Walley
and his men were having a very miserable time ashore. The succour he was
expecting did not arrive. Instead he received what he did not want at
all--six field-pieces, twelve-pounders, weighing about eight hundred
pounds each, which the nature of the ground made it impossible to use,
and which thus proved a simple embarrassment. However, thinking the
vessels would arrive later in the day, Walley moved his men somewhat
nearer to the town, and took up a position rather better both for
shelter and for defence. This movement does not seem to have been
opposed by the Canadian forces, as there is no mention in the narratives
of any fighting on this day. The vessels did not come with the evening
tide as hoped; and Walley, in his simple narrative, says: "We stood upon
our guard that night, but found it exceeding cold, it freezing that
night so that the next morning the ice would bear a man." The position
was both distressing and precarious, and a council of war was called
during the night to consider what should be done. By this time the
assailing force had some idea of the nature of the task they had
undertaken: to advance in the face of skirmishers having every advantage
of position; to ford a river behind which a thousand men and several
pieces of artillery were posted; and, should they by any miracle succeed
in that, to encounter a couple of thousand more within the walls of the
town. Many of their men were sick, some were literally freezing, others
worn and exhausted. Their provisions were short, their ammunition very
low. The decision of the council was that Walley should go on board the
admiral's vessel next day and ask for instructions.
During Walley's absence on Friday forenoon, skirmishing was renewed with
losses on both sides, but chiefly on that of the New Englanders. On the
French side M. de Ste. Helene received a wound in the thigh, from which
he died in hospital some weeks later. Phipps consented to a retreat; and
Walley, on returning to land in the afternoon, began to prepare for it.
The following morning before daylight boats arrived to take the men off;
but Walley, discovering too great haste on the part of his men to
embark, ordered the boats back. There was further skirmishing during the
day consequent upon Walley's desire to keep the enemy at a respectful
distance, so that the embarkation he hoped to make that night might not
be interfered with. Towards evening he used some boats that he had to
send off his sick and wounded, but was careful not to afford any
indication of a general retreat. This was finally accomplished, not
without haste, noise, and confusion bordering on insubordination,
between dark and one or two o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the 22nd.
Through some gross mismanagement five of the eight cannon that had been
landed were left behind for the greater glory of the enemy.
A council of war was held on board the admiral's ship on that lamentable
Sunday. Further offensive schemes were discussed; but, even as they
talked, the leaders knew that nothing of any moment could be
accomplished. They had all but exhausted their ammunition, and their
provisions were running low. There was a great deal of sickness among
the men, and the casualties ashore and in the bombardment had not been
inconsiderable. In the end, they appointed a prayer-meeting for next day
"to seek God's direction" as Walley expresses it, but the weather was
unfavourable for a meeting. Some of the ships, in fact, dragged their
anchors, and were in danger of being driven on the town. The following
day the whole fleet slipped down to the Island of Orleans on the
homeward track.
Walley in his _Journal_, apparently an honest piece of work, sums up
comprehensively the causes of the failure: "The land army's failing, the
enemy's too timely intelligence, lying three weeks within three days'
sail of the place, by reason whereof they had time to bring in the whole
strength of their country, the shortness of our ammunition, our late
setting out, our long passage, and many sick in the army--these," he
says, "may be reckoned as some of the causes of our disappointment."
Reasons enough surely. On both sides the hand of Providence was seen.
"Well may you speak of this country," writes Laval to Denonville, "as
the country of miracles." Had Phipps arrived but one week sooner he
would certainly, in Laval's opinion, have captured the city, and that he
did not arrive sooner was due to unfavourable winds. Similarly, Sister
Anne Bourdon, archivist of the Ursuline Convent, writes that, when the
first news of the approach of the English was received, nothing was
spared in the way of religious practices "to appease divine justice."
The happy result was that "Heaven, granting our prayers, sent winds so
contrary that the enemy in nine days only made the distance they might
otherwise have made in half a day." So Mere Juchereau of the Hotel Dieu:
"God doubtless stopped them, to give the Montrealers time to arrive."
Bishop Saint Vallier improved the occasion to stimulate the piety of his
people. "Let us," he said, "raise our eyes, my dear children, and see
God holding the thunder in His hand, which He is ready to let fall on
us. He is causing it now to rumble in order to awaken you from the
slumber of your sins."
On the English side no less solemn a view was taken of the events of the
time. Governor Bradstreet, of Massachusetts, writing to the agents of
the colony in England, speaks of "the awful frown of God in the
disappointment of that chargeable [costly] and hazardous enterprise."
"Shall our Father," he exclaims, "spit in our face, and we not be
ashamed? God grant that we may be deeply humbled and enquire into the
cause, and reform those sins that have provoked so great anger to smoke
against the prayers of his people, and to answer us by terrible things
in righteousness." Cotton Mather in like manner speaks of "an evident
hand of Heaven, sending one unavoidable disaster after another." He also
reports a saying of Phipps, that, though he had been accustomed to
diving in his time, he "would say that the things which had befallen him
in this expedition were too deep to be dived into." The total loss of
life on the part of the New England forces, taking shipwreck and disease
into account, must have run far into the hundreds. Phipps estimated his
loss in the engagements at Quebec at thirty, and possibly the number of
those actually killed did not much exceed that figure. On the Canadian
side the number of killed has been placed at nine, and of the wounded at
fifty-two.[50]
All that remained now was to make the best of their melancholy way to
Boston. Frontenac had sent a small force under M. Subercase to the
Island of Orleans to watch the departing fleet, which might, had its
commander been so minded, have committed serious depredations on the
parishes along the river. Phipps sent ashore to ask Subercase if there
would be any objection to his buying supplies from the inhabitants. The
reply was that he might buy what he liked, and a lively trade, very
profitable to the farmers, at once sprang up between them and the
squadron. Negotiations for an exchange of prisoners followed. Phipps, as
we have seen, had captured some on his way up; and he had with him two
ecclesiastics whom he had taken in Acadia. The French on their side had
Sylvanus Davis, the former commandant of Fort Loyal, two daughters of
Captain Clarke who had been killed in the attack on that fort, and a
little girl called Sarah Gerrish. All these had received good treatment
during their detention at Quebec, and the little girls had particularly
endeared themselves to the nuns to whose charge they had been confided,
and who were much grieved at having to give them up.
If the weather had been bad on the way to Quebec it was worse on the
return. Without the aid of a pilot, Phipps had succeeded in bringing all
his vessels safely to Quebec, but on the home voyage several were lost.
One, Cotton Mather relates, was never heard of. A second was wrecked,
but most of its crew were saved. A third was cast on the coast, and all
on board, with the exception of one man, perished through drowning,
starvation, or at the hands of the Indians. A fourth was stranded on the
Island of Anticosti. There seemed to be no means of escape from this
dreary shore; and forty-one of the crew had already died of hardship,
when the captain, John Rainsford by name, and four others determined
that they would try to reach Boston in an open boat, in order that, if
they escaped the perils of the sea, they might send help to those still
alive on the island. It was the 25th March when they put forth in their
most precarious craft. "Through a thousand dangers from the sea and ice,
and almost starved with hunger and cold," to use the words of Cotton
Mather's recital, they arrived at Boston on the 11th May. As soon as a
proper vessel could be procured, Rainsford started back to rescue the
survivors. Four had died during his absence. Death was staring the
remainder in the face, when the sail they had hardly dared to hope for
flickered on the horizon. It was too good to be true, and yet it was
true. Their heroic captain had come to their relief; and on the 28th
June he landed them, seventeen in number, once more on New England soil.
[Footnote 44: See "Winthrop's Journal" in _New York Colonial Documents_,
vol. iv. p. 193.]
[Footnote 45: The letter is given in Cotton Mather's _Magnalia_, vol. i.
p. 186.]
[Footnote 46: _New York Colonial Documents_, vol. ix. p. 486.]
[Footnote 47: The same mistake was destined to be made in later days,
more than once, under the English regime.]
[Footnote 48: "La Canardiere (the name given to the flats where the New
Englanders landed) was in those days nothing but a horrible marsh,
covered with impenetrable woods thickly fringed with underbrush. So
dense was the thicket that in full daylight our skirmishers were
invisible to the English, who in their exasperation had nothing to guide
them in firing but the smoke of their enemies' muskets."--Myrand, _Sir
William Phipps devant Quebec_, p. 271.]
[Footnote 49: _Premier Etablissement de la Foi_, vol. ii. p. 434. As
Leclercq is the one authority of importance of whom Mr. Myrand, in his
discussion of this matter, makes no mention, his exact words, which I
have not elsewhere seen reproduced, may be quoted: "L'amiral le suivit
(le contre-amiral) d'assez pres et avec precipitation; il fila tout le
cable de son ancre qu'il abandonna; son pavillon fut emporte dans la
riviere et laisse a notre discretion, que nos gens allerent pecher."]
[Footnote 50: In his work already quoted, _Sir William Phipps devant
Quebec_, Mr. Myrand goes very carefully, and in a spirit of great
impartiality, into the question of the probable losses on the New
England side. Those on the Canadian side he is able to establish by
means of authentic records. Mr. Myrand has laid his readers under great
obligations by reprinting the principal original documents bearing on
the Phipps expedition, as well as by his own intelligent discussion of
the whole episode.]