AFTERNOON SESSION.

READING, _April 19, 1878_.

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment. All members present, except

Messrs. Reyburn, Larrabee, and Yutzy.

* * * * *

Peter Cullen, _sworn_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State where you reside?

A. I reside 1022, Centre avenue.

Q. Were you connected with the police officers of the city of Reading

in July last?

A. I was.

Q. In what capacity?

A. Chief of police.

Q. State what day the first disturbance or assemblage of strikers in

any considerable number occurred?

A. That was on Sunday night, July 22.

Q. Had there been any difficulty threatened before that, to your

knowledge?

A. There didn't appear to, in a general way, going round the

streets--the principal streets. There had been a great deal of talk.

Parties gathering, would talk quietly. Some were excited; that is, on

the news received from Pittsburgh. That seemed to start them up some,

but there was not anything particular done until Sunday night, on 22d,

when the mob went out to the outer depot, or the new depot of the

Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and the first intimation I

had that a mob had gone out there; in fact, I did not expect anything

serious. The first intimation I had, was standing at the corner of

Fifth and Penn, and I was informed that the crowd, or mob, had gone out

to the depot, and were at the depot. That they were there, hooting and

yelling, and throwing stones before the engines, and pulling down

engineers, and so forth. I immediately started out this street, to go

to the depot, and I got as far as Fifth and Elm, and found that box 35

fire-alarm sounded, and I also saw the flame of the Philadelphia and

Reading Railroad Company's property. Saw flames near Fifth street

bridge, between the depot and the bridge, just about a square off--not

more from the depot; and I took Fifth street route, and then saw the

crowd had gone over into the cut, and on to the track of the Lebanon

Valley road, and I saw the cars were on fire. As I got to Fifth and

Elm, I found Chief Engineer Boyer going out in his usual style, and I

proceeded to the fire, and when I got there, I found there were a good

many people there. The cabooses were on fire and burning on the tracks

at that time. There didn't appear to be any disturbance of any kind,

but the crowd was very large. That was Sunday evening, July 22, and the

crowd was large, and somewhat excited; but there was no fighting. There

was nothing in the way of any disturbance going on at that time, as the

work had been done, which it appears the rioters had accomplished--which

was intended. That was to burn the cars. I saw Chief Engineer Boyer

then, and asked him about the fire department going into service, and he

said he had been stopped, companies had been stoned, and were not

allowed to go into service. We consulted together, and told him we would

do all in our power to get the fire department into service. He was

willing to do anything; and then G. A. Nichols, the vice president of

the Philadelphia and Reading road, he came there, and myself and Chief

Engineer Boyer and Mr. Nichols talked about this matter together, and

Nichols asked me how many officers I had there. I looked around, and

found I had about six or seven officers, and Mr. Nichols asked me if we

had all revolvers and pistols. I told him, I was not so sure about that.

I thought the most of the men had. I had, and I thought most of the men

had. I came to the conclusion that this matter was a very serious

disturbance, and we agreed that I would get the entire police force

together, and to go immediately to the scene of the riot, and to get the

fire department in the service, and instructed the men on the ground to

do all in their power to assist Chief Engineer Boyer, of the fire

department, and keep the peace, so far as was in their power to do so,

until I could get back with the balance of the force. I got as many of

the men together as I possibly could, and instructed them to proceed at

once to Chief Engineer Boyer, to render him such aid as was in their

power to do so; and we found by the time I had got around, or not quite

around--and found a box on Jefferson street had sounded an alarm, and

the cry was raised that the Lebanon Valley bridge was on fire, and I saw

the illumination, which showed that the bridge was on fire. I proceeded

to the telegraph office, and telegraphed to Mayor Evans to come home at

once, that the cabooses were burning, and that there was serious trouble

apprehended, and the state of affairs at that time was very bad in the

city. The whole population was very much excited, and there were a great

many of the people in the city, in the confusion, running round in the

streets, in all directions. Everything seemed to be confused. When I

found the bridge had been on fire, instructed the officers to go to the

bridge, and they did so; but when they got out, that work of destruction

had been completed, so far as the bridge was concerned. The city that

night was in a continual state of excitement, and the property of the

Reading Railroad Company seemed to be in danger, if not the city of

Reading, and matters went on in that way, and also on the following day,

(Monday.) The mob kept together. They stopped engines, and were drinking

around and disorderly, and they seemed to have a great many sympathizers

in the city at the time. I sent out for two hundred men. There were two

prominent gentlemen in Reading, Captain E. P. Boas and Henry S. Eckart,

that called upon me at the office, and asked what could be done. I told

them I was willing to do anything, but we wanted more help, and this

thing done right, and they agreed at once that they would be responsible

for two hundred men. They would see that they were paid, and they would

equip them and give them all seven-shooters and cartridges, and so

forth. I then detailed a number of men--cannot tell the exact number--to

go out in the different parts of the city, and to prevail upon parties

to come to the city hall, and to go on duty to help squelch the riot. I

waited and waited, and all in vain, and the reports that came in by the

different officers was that they could not get anybody to assist. They

would only laugh, and make different kinds of remarks; they didn't want

their heads shot off, and they were going against their friends, and it

was a workingman's fight, and all that sort of thing.

Q. What time was that?

A. This was immediately after dinner, on Monday, the 23d, and I only

found there was one man I could get in the whole city to respond to the

call of two hundred men. I inquired about the sheriff that night.

Q. State what inquiries you made of the sheriff?

A. I first went to the residence of the sheriff, where he lived, on

South Sixth street--that was about twelve o'clock, or half-past twelve,

Sunday night--and they informed me that he was not in the city. He had

been down home, somewheres near or in the neighborhood of Pottstown--a

little this side. I didn't know what to do at the moment, so I called

on Judge Hagenman and told him the state of affairs, and how the city

was, and how the town was in danger of being destroyed, that the torch

of incendiaries had been applied to the property, and all that, and I

asked what might be best to do under the circumstances. I told him

Sheriff Yorgy was not home, and he advised me at once to try to get

Yorgy to come to the city as quick as possible. I immediately, then,

went to the office of Mr. Paxton, the master machinist of the P. and R.

Railroad Company, and I met him at his office. That was on Monday

morning, about one or half-past one o'clock. It might have been in the

neighborhood of two. I asked him whether he would accommodate

me--whether he could send a telegram for Sheriff Yorgy to come on at

once to the city, that there was a riot here, and a large mob had

gathered here and were destroying the property of the P. and R., and

the city of Reading was in danger. Mr. Paxton was willing to do

anything, and had the telegram sent. I also asked Mr. Paxton if he

would furnish a special engine to bring the sheriff on to Reading, as

it was very important. Mr. Paxton did so, and had an engine furnished

to the sheriff, and he had also a conveyance from the sheriff's house

to the engine. The sheriff arrived, to the best of my knowledge, early

in the morning, about daylight, or thereabouts. I went to the sheriff's

office on that Monday morning, and found him in his office in the

court-house. I went to consult him as regards the situation, and making

arrangements to see what could be done. Told him it was necessary to

act at once, and act promptly, and to get at least five hundred men if

he possibly could. He seemed, at that time, willing, and said he had

sent for William B. Albright. He wanted to consult with him as regards

the matter, and he showed all signs of willingness to act and perform

his duty on that occasion. I told him I was willing to do anything to

aid, help, or assist in the matter, and to have this thing wiped out;

and I came back to the office, then, on that morning, and waited there

with the intention of reporting to the sheriff, and about nine or ten

o'clock on that morning Mr. J. E. Wootten, the superintendent, at that

time, I believe, of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and

he informed me at the city hall that the sheriff had backed out, and

was not going to act; that he would not do anything. I was very much

surprised to hear that answer, as he had seemed to be willing in the

morning, and matters were getting worse all the time. On that Monday

evening, at six o'clock, I took the entire police force.

Q. Now, starting with the Monday evening, you give a full history here

in this evidence? [Indicating testimony taken before coroner's

inquest.]

A. From there on, as to what occurred?

Q. A full history you give here?

A. Yes; it is about correct there as to the trouble.

Q. State whether this is evidence given by you before the coroner's

inquest?

A. Yes; that is all correct.

Q. This is your evidence, given under oath?

A. That is evidence given under oath before Coroner Goodhart at the

city hall, immediately after the trouble.

Testimony offered in evidence is as follows:

On Monday evening, at six o'clock, I started out with the force for

Seventh and Penn streets, where a large crowd had collected. I informed

the officers that we would have to go there, and do our duty. I found

that nearly all the officers had pistols. Marched them to Seventh and

Penn. Saw thousands of people there. Many strangers whom I had never

seen before. There were people in all directions. The pavements and

walls, as far as I could see along Seventh street, were lined with

people, and the crowd extended up and down Penn street; and I got into

the crowd at Seventh and Penn streets. I called upon the crowd to

disperse, but the people paid but little attention to me. I then

ordered the force up, for the purpose of pressing the force back, which

they did, and I succeeded in clearing the pavements. Cleared the whole

corner and crossings, and I kept the passage open on one side for a

certain length of time to allow parties to pass, as also the street

cars. A large number were forced up the cut in driving them away, most

of whom were strangers, which made the crowd there much larger. I then

drew the force up in line from Bechtol's corner over toward the Ubil

house. I was expecting an attack at that time from the party in the

cut. I noticed then, that they disconnected the engine, and commenced

running it up towards us, as also the freight car, and I expected that

they intended to attack our police force. They came forward to within

sixty or seventy-five yards of us. They saw our lines were firm and

solid, and they then stopped. I remained in that position for some time

with the force. I found then that the party I had at first dispersed,

had come in around me in all directions. Things then became quiet in

the cut, and the people remained there. I then formed the force north

and south, with the right resting on Breneiser's corner. I had all the

police force that was at my command. I had them along the one track. I

then detailed men to open the crossings, which they succeeded in doing.

That position enabled us to keep the crossings clear, and to allow

street cars to pass. The crowd was very large during all this time.

There were thousands there. The first disturbance that I heard, was on

Sunday evening about nine o'clock. I heard they had stopped a train,

and that they had things their own way. There had been gatherings on

Saturday evening, but there was nothing of a serious nature. There were

no arrests made until Tuesday. I had twenty-six or twenty-eight men on

the force at my command. I consulted on Monday with some of the

officials of the road, also on Sunday. They made no report to me of

threatened destruction of their property. I was at the firing of the

caboose on Sunday evening, and had seven or eight men there. I received

information of a disturbance at the depot, and went there--the alarm

struck before I got there. I saw the light from Fifth and Elm streets.

I was not at the Lebanon Valley railroad bridge. I met Howard Boyer at

the first fire. He told me his carriage had been stoned, that the mob

would not let him put any water on the fire. I consulted with Howard

Boyer, and we concluded that it would be best not to interfere. We had

no idea who the parties were who were implicated in this matter--they

were not all strangers--some of them have since been arrested. I

applied for special power. I was authorized by two citizens to raise a

special force of two hundred men. I sent the members of my force out to

endeavor to enlist men to do special duty up to six o'clock in the

evening, but failed to obtain any. There was no person here who had

appointing power. Persons laughed at our policemen when they asked for

help. Five officers of the force were seriously wounded on Monday

evening. I received information on Monday evening, at Seventh and Penn,

that troops were coming. Half an hour afterwards heard that troops had

arrived at the outer depot. I was not present at their arrival, was not

requested to be there, had no communication with them. Did not know who

ordered them here, or for what purpose they had come. The first I

heard, was two pistol shots from above Court street. I didn't see any

bricks thrown, as I had enough to do at Seventh and Penn. I couldn't

see anything but the people, as everything was a solid mass. I saw some

of the killed and wounded, and helped to carry some of them off. I knew

Mr. Weaver, who was killed. The first I saw of the soldiers, was when

they passed down Penn. I saw no wounded soldiers then, but have seen

several since. During Sunday night and Monday I felt that my force was

entirely inefficient, from the large crowds which were gathering and

the excitement. I had a consultation with Sheriff Yorgey in his office

in the court-house, soon after his arrival. I had telegraphed for him

to come at quarter past two o'clock on Monday morning. I telegraphed

from the depot, after trying at several other places. I had arranged

with Mr. Paxton to furnish a special train to bring him up. He arrived

about five o'clock. I informed the sheriff of the condition of affairs

at seven o'clock in the morning. Told him it would be necessary for him

to summon a thousand men, or thereabouts. He told me he had intended to

do it, but it would take some time. I was certain he intended to do it,

but he told me had sent for William B. Albright, and was waiting for

him. I telegraphed him that I wanted help. Two hours after my

interview, Mr. Wootten, of the Reading railroad, called upon me and

said that Sheriff Yorgey refused to act, which very much surprised me.

There was no force called out until to-day. I placed myself in

communication with the mayor, telegraphed to him at a quarter past

twelve, A.M., on Monday, July 23. I informed him of the condition of

affairs. Asked him to come home at once, that tracks were being torn

up, freight cars had been burned, &c. I was told that the telegraph

office at Ocean Grove had closed. The mayor arrived in Reading on

Monday night. The men on the police force obeyed my commands whenever I

asked them to do so.

I heard two pistol shots in the cut, and immediately afterwards I heard

a volley. Those balls did not come down our way, of any account. The

next volley came into us, as well as the third volley. I realized the

situation at once. The people commenced running in all directions. I

requested all of them to get out of the way. I was struck by a ball on

my left breast, while on duty at Seventh and Penn. I was expecting that

the military, upon their arrival, would report to some of the civil

authorities. All the information that I received was, that the troops

had arrived at the outer depot.

There were shots fired on Penn street. Know that shots were fired down,

as I was in the party. At about half past seven in the evening, was

informed of the arrival of troops at the outer depot. Things looked

very serious that night after the militia arrived. They reported to me

at Fifth and Penn. I found the people were greatly excited in regard to

the shooting, and I kept them away from the soldiers as well as I

could. There were no riotous disturbances in this city after that,

except the tearing up of the tracks. I do not know who ordered the

soldiers to come here. Was satisfied they were coming, but did not

expect that they were coming in the way in which they did.

On being re-called, Chief Cullen said (while the cars were burning) I

consulted Mr. Boyer in regard to the situation, and asked him whether

it wouldn't be better to attack the party and try to get the fire

department into service. I had only seven or eight men with me that

evening, and the crowd was very large. When I was there every person

was quiet, and the cars were burning on the track. There was no breach

of the peace there, so far as I saw. When I asked Mr. Boyer whether it

wouldn't be better to make an attack, I believe he answered, "Yes." He

told me he was not armed, and I said that under the circumstances I

would go into town and get as many men together as I possibly could for

the purpose of doing my entire duty; but before I was half way through

I noticed that box No. 7 struck an alarm, and immediately afterwards I

saw a light looming up along the Lebanon Valley railroad, and I knew

there would be trouble, and I told my men to go out and do everything

in their power to assist Mr. Boyer to get the department into service.

At that time a number of the police were taking lunch, and I had

difficulty to get them together. By that time box No. 7 struck again,

and I saw the fire looming up at the Lebanon Valley bridge. After I got

as many of the force together as I could to go out there, I went to the

telegraph office and telegraphed to Mayor Evans to come home at once,

telling him of the situation. Then I went to the City hotel to see the

sheriff and I was told that he had gone to his home in the country. I

then went to see Judge Hagenman at his residence, as affairs were very

serious. I told him that neither the mayor nor the sheriff was in town.

Judge Hagenman advised me that the best thing to be done would be to

telegraph for the sheriff at once. I immediately started out and found

the telegraph office closed. I went down to Seventh and Chestnut and

saw Mr. Blackman, and asked him where the telegraph operator was, and

he told me that he had just gone home. He sent for him then and the

operator came to the office, and I telegraphed to the sheriff at once

that there was a mob here of about two thousand persons and there was

great excitement, that they were tearing up the tracks and burning

cars, and so on, and that he shouldn't fail to come. I then saw Mr.

Paxton, master machinist, and I asked him whether he would furnish an

engine to bring the sheriff up to Reading at once, and he said he

would, and he also engaged a conveyance to bring him to the depot, and

the sheriff arrived in Reading, as far as I know, at about five o'clock

in the morning. I addressed the crowd at Seventh and Penn streets on

Monday evening. The feeling seemed to be all one way among the persons

who had gathered there. I approached Seventh and Penn with the police,

in front of Breneiser's store, and I announced to the crowd to

disperse. I appealed particularly to all good citizens to go to their

homes so that we would know with whom we had to contend. My voice was

loud, so that the people could hear me a considerable distance on Penn

and Seventh.

I had no power to appoint persons on the police force or call out a

posse. Made an effort to get two hundred and fifty men, but failed to

get even two men. Found it difficult to get anybody. Persons who were

asked, laughed and said they didn't want their heads shot off. The

mayor left on Friday morning previous to the disturbance, when

everything appeared to be quiet. The city charter, I believe, empowers

the mayor to raise a posse the same as the sheriff. This power, I

believe, can not be conferred upon the chief of police. Two hundred

men, armed, would have done a great deal towards quelling the

disturbance.

Q. Did you have any conversation with the men engaged in the riot, at

any time?

A. I had, on Sunday--Sunday afternoon, the 22d of July.

Q. What complaints did they make?

A. They were talking about the Pittsburgh troubles, and that seemed to

be all the go on Sunday, seemed to excite them, and they talked about

it, and that was all that was done, so far as talking and exciting and

gathering in crowds. I did go into one party, and they were talking

over these troubles. In Pittsburgh, the riot was going on at the time,

and I had said to them that they would be a great deal more thought of

and respected by keeping out of difficulties of the kind, and attending

to their business, than in gathering, and going into riots, and one

party made the remark, "That was not bread and butter," and that seemed

to be the feeling generally among the elements that were going around

the streets, and gathering in crowds. The sympathy seemed to be

considerably in favor of riot, on the Sunday and Monday, and it only

commenced to turn about on Tuesday.

Q. What did they appear to complain of--set out as their grievance? Did

they seem to have any particular thing?

A. No; they did not seem to say much on the matter, so far as that was

concerned, as I know of, but the whole feeling seemed to originate from

the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and the feeling in the city of

Reading was very strong in favor of the Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers; at least two thirds of the city, as near as I could

calculate, they seemed to sympathize with the men's dispute between the

company and themselves, and that feeling seemed to follow in reference

to the troubles commencing here.

Q. Do you know what that dispute was?

A. As near as I understand, and so far as I was informed, the

Philadelphia and Reading requested the Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers that they would have to quit the organization called the

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, and to apply to something similar

of their own, which would be beneficial, and as much derived from it as

what they would have received from their own, and that the company

would not have them in their employ unless they complied with those

terms. I heard that spoken of. I cannot say to that officially, because

I don't know it. That seemed to be the general talk.

Q. Had there been a large number of them discharged by the company

prior to this disturbance?

A. Well, they were all either discharged or else quit. I believe the

men quit. I don't think there were any discharged. I believe the men

all quit, that is, the engineers and firemen, and a great many brakemen

quit, and I believe some conductors quit.

Q. Was it the engineers that had been discharged--the idle employés of

the railroad here that first started this disturbance?

A. It appears so, that is, some parts of them--not all. There were some

men of their brotherhood implicated in these troubles from the first

start-out, others did not appear to have much to say or do as far as we

know.

Q. What class of men, so far as you could judge, were engaged in the

actual destruction of property, and burning of the bridge?

A. I have knowledge of two of the party that I had caused the arrest

of. One of them was a railroad man employed by the company, and the

other man had nothing at all to do with the railroad company, so far as

I knew; who used to boat on the canal, and perhaps he would be brought

into their employ in that way. I believe he was a boatman.

Q. Was this one employed by the railroad company at the time?

A. He was one of the men that quit the employ of the company.

Q. What in your judgment was the actual cause of the riot here?

A. I do not believe we would have had a riot in Reading, if the

troubles had not started in Pittsburgh. That is my opinion of it, and I

would judge to the best of my knowledge, and from what I know, that the

troubles originated in this city from the dispute between the P. and R.

engineers and the company. That seemed to be at the bottom of it,

because some of their men participated in private meetings, held in

this city previous to the outbreak which we knew of.

Q. And the news from the city of Pittsburgh from the outbreak there

stimulated the movement?

A. That stimulated the movement, or give it a start. That seemed to

start them up, and made them quite lively on having some disturbance.

Q. Do you know what the damage done to the railroad property was. What

it was estimated at, including the bridge and the burning cars?

A. I can't say exactly; but it may have been--it was in the

neighborhood of anywheres between $150,000, it may have been more, or a

little less, may have gone probably about that. The loss of the bridge

was somewheres in the neighborhood of $100,000. I believe there was

some ten or twelve freight cars burned, and some cabooses burned. There

were telegraph poles cut down, tracks burned up, engines damaged to

some extent, and soon. The actual amount, of course, I am unable to

say; but I suppose somewheres in the neighborhood of $150,000, may be

less and may be more.

Q. I understood you to say that this bridge was on fire before you

reached the place with your police?

A. Yes, sir; the party, when they made this start to go to the Lebanon

Valley road from the depot, after they had the engine stop there, &c,

and committed their depredations, they started out on the tracks going

right from us, and they commenced setting the cars on fire right

straight along. There were a number of freight cars standing between

the Fifth street bridge, where the first cars had burned, and the

Lebanon Valley bridge, and they had them set on fire, and they appeared

to keep on right straight ahead, until the whole thing was in flames.

There did not appear to be any disturbance we know of, in all that

movement. It seemed to be a concocted and well understood plan.

Q. Was there any sympathy with the strikers manifested by any of your

police force?

A. Well, I can't say about that. To the best of my knowledge there was

not. They did not express this in my presence. If there was, I have no

knowledge of them expressing themselves as being in sympathy with the

rioters, that I heard of.

Q. Did you have any trouble in getting them to obey orders, or do

anything you required of them to do to preserve the peace?

A. No, sir; they did just as I told them, I had no trouble whatever.

They were willing to just obey any order that was given in the

performance of their duty.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Do you know of any communication between the railroad employés of

the city of Reading, and any of the railroad employés of the city of

Pittsburgh during this strike?

A. No, sir; I do not. I have no knowledge at all on that subject.

Q. You said in your testimony, that had it not been for the troubles at

Pittsburgh, you would not have had any trouble at Reading. Now I want

to know how you know that?

A. The reason I know that, is owing to telegrams being brought here to

the city of Reading, and posted on bulletin boards.

Q. To whom were those telegrams sent?

A. The telegrams I have referred to, were sent to the _Eagle_ office,

they were on the bulletin boards of the _Eagle_ office.

Q. To the editor of the _Eagle_?

A. I can't tell who they were sent to, but I saw them on the bulletin

boards.

Q. What was the import of those telegrams?

A. Well, they were about the trouble there, and about firing--the

trouble in Pittsburgh, in a general way, showing a great deal of

trouble, and fighting, and riot going on there.

Q. In short, those telegrams were to the effect that the rioters had

possession of the railroad property at the city of Pittsburgh?

A. I believe that was about the way it worded, or something like that.

I cannot say positively the exact wording of the telegram.

Q. I just want this for information?

A. Certainly, I understand, I will answer all questions.

Q. I just want to know this, that if there was an understanding--did

you as an officer, in the absence of the mayor of the city of Reading,

believe that there was an understanding between these rioters, in the

city of Reading, and the city of Pittsburgh?

A. There may have been, but I do not know it. I have no knowledge of

that at all. As regards any understanding between the parties here, and

the parties in Pittsburgh, I do not know. The only reference I had in

regard to the trouble in Pittsburgh, is, as I stated, that I believed

that had it not been for the trouble there, the probability is, we

might not have had any here, because the news coming here, seemed to

stimulate the matter.

* * * * *

George S. Goodhart, recalled:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State whether this is the testimony taken before you at the

coroner's inquest held here in July last? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is; yes, sir; I took it down.

Q. You reduced it to writing yourself?

A. I did, myself.

Q. The witnesses here were all sworn?

A. Sworn.

Q. This is the testimony of John E. Wootten, as it was taken down by

you? [Indicating.]

A. Yes, sir; _verbatim_.

The testimony of John E. Wootten, taken at the coroner's inquest,

offered in evidence, and is as follows:

* * * * *

John E. Wootten, General Manager Philadelphia and Reading Railroad

Company, _sworn_:

I called at Sheriff Yorgey's office at about nine and a half o'clock on

Monday morning, 23d July, and said to the sheriff that I had come to

see him for the purpose of asking him to take some means for the

protection of the property of the railroad company, and for the

suppression of the mob then threatening to destroy not only the

railroad company's property but that of the citizens of Reading. The

sheriff said, "Well, what can I do?" I asked him if he had learned of

the destruction of the Lebanon Valley bridge and of the burning of the

company's cars. He said that he had. I replied that he should issue his

proclamation, and call out a force for the suppression of violence and

incendiarism. "Yes, I know that, but the men when called upon would not

come." I then told him that in such an event I would engage to furnish

him with a sufficient force to suppress the mob, and if he wished it,

the force would be well armed. He replied "Yes, but the rioters also

have arms?" I then said, "Do I understand you to say that nothing can

be done by you to check the riotous and incendiary spirit that now

threatens to destroy so much property, and for which damage the county

is liable?" He replied by saying that he did not see that he could do

anything. I said, "Suppose you advise with counsel in relation to the

matter." He replied that he had had a talk with Judge Sassaman about

it. I asked what he said. The sheriff replied that he did not know what

course would be taken.

I then left the office, and in the corridor I met Reverend B. R.

Miller, who said that the existing condition of affairs at Reading

required immediate action, and that he, for one, was ready for any call

that might be made upon him to assist in the suppression of the mob. I

replied that I was very glad to hear him say so, and told him that I

had just called upon the sheriff, who was disinclined to act, and that

I would make another appeal to the sheriff if he would accompany me to

his office, which he did. I then told the sheriff that Mr. Miller had

made a tender of his services for the suppression of disorder, and that

I thought there would be no difficulty in getting as many more of our

citizens as he might want. To which he replied that he didn't know yet

what he would do in the matter, and after somewhat of a repetition of

my previous conversation with him, in the presence of Mr. Miller, I

left the sheriff's office and proceeded to the office of Chief of

Police Cullen. Immediately after the interview with the sheriff I went

to Philadelphia and conferred with President Gowen. At the time of my

interview with the sheriff, so far as I knew, no one had any intimation

that any troops were coming. The troops were sent at the order of

General W. J. Bolton. After my arrival in Philadelphia, I telegraphed

General Bolton that Reading was entirely without protection.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller, as

taken down by you, at the time? [Indicating paper.]

A. It is so.

Testimony of Reverend B. R. Miller offered in evidence, and is as

follows:

* * * * *

Reverend B. R. Miller, _posse comitatus_, said:

My story is a short one. Coming from my home, on Monday morning, July

23, I saw an unsettled state of affairs at Seventh and Penn. Of course,

I knew what had been going on the night before, and I stopped, and then

passed on about my business. I saw Mr. Wootten enter the sheriff's

office, and followed him, and I said, when he came out, "This is a

great scare, and if the sheriff will give me arms and ammunition, I

will raise fifty men, and quell the riot before night," and he said,

"Come in, and we will see him." Mr. Wootten said to the sheriff, "Here

is a volunteer, will raise men for you." The sheriff said, "I would

rather not do anything about that," and wouldn't entertain the

proposition at all, and Mr. Wootten turned around on his heels,

perfectly disgusted, and left the office. This was between nine and ten

o'clock in the morning. I didn't know the soldiers were coming until I

met them on the platform. Don't know who ordered them through the cut.

When I offered to raise men, I thought that was the time to work, but

the sheriff wouldn't do anything.

Q. State whether this is the testimony of Sheriff George R. Yorgey, as

taken down by you?

A. It is.

Testimony of George R. Yorgey offered in evidence, and is as follows:

* * * * *

George R. Yorgey, _sworn_:

I am the high sheriff of Berks county. Noticed no collision between the

militia and citizens or disorderly persons on Monday night. Was in my

office at the time, and remained in the office until eleven o'clock

that night--Monday night. No officer of the militia, nor any person

called upon me between those hours at my office to quell this riot. I

had no notice, whatever, that any troops would arrive on that night.

Was not aware that any troops were here until I heard the firing, and

after they told me. I was never consulted in reference to the military

at all. I never ordered them nor knew nothing about them being ordered.

They never formed any part of my posse. Daniel Francis and the watchman

of the court-house were with me in my office. I was waiting for orders

which detained me until eleven o'clock. After the firing, I inquired to

know the result and what had been done. Was told that the crowd had

dispersed. I did not visit the scene of disaster. I was there once on

Monday, saw the crowded condition of the streets, and witnessed the

riotous proceedings. Saw this when I posted up my proclamations on the

four corners. I should have been informed of the coming of the troops,

but was not informed. I do not know whose business it was to tell me. I

informed the railroad officials where they might find me if they wanted

me to call out the _posse comitatus_. I telegraphed this to Mr. Gowen,

Monday afternoon about four o'clock, shortly before I issued my

proclamation, and I received no answer from Mr. Gowen. The militia came

here without my knowledge, and I had nothing to do with them after they

were here. In the forenoon things were middling quiet, and in the

afternoon I had my proclamations struck off. I was not in the city on

Sunday night, and came up from my Douglass township farm Monday morning

at five o'clock. I heard the news Monday morning, and in the evening at

five issued my proclamation. I did not think I should have issued my

proclamation early on Monday morning instead of waiting until nearly

night. In the forenoon of Monday, Mr. Wootten called on me and offered

to furnish me with men. I did not issue my proclamation sooner because

I could not get ready any sooner.

* * * * *

Peter Cullen, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State what the conduct of the militia under the command of General

Reeder was during their stay in Reading, so far as you are able to

judge.

A. Well, the conduct of General Reeder and his troops was good, so far

as I know. They behaved well, and obeyed the commands of the officers,

I know. Immediately after the firing, he marched his command right in

front of the Mansion house; and he asked me what was best to be done,

or something to that effect, in a general way to inquire about things,

and I told him that the Philadelphia and Reading Company seemed to be

the property in danger, and I suggested to him that it would be a good

idea to go to the new depot, and I furnished a guide to escort his

command to the depot. It was then dark, probably half past eight

o'clock in the evening, and a great many of the mob followed down. The

streets were filled with people at that time, and, undoubtedly, there

were a great many of the rioters there--I know there were--and he had

his command formed here in front of the Mansion house, Fifth and Penn,

and there were some of the men going to attack the soldiers with their

sleeves rolled up, and some had brickbats in their hands. One man I had

requested one officer to arrest, and he was locked up, and he was going

to attack the soldiers of Reeder's command, but Reeder's command was

all soldierly, and had a good line of battle when they formed in front

of the Mansion house, after their fight in the cut; they seemed to have

perfect discipline all throughout.

Q. Were there any other troops here whose conduct was not as good as

General Reeder's?

A. The Sixteenth regiment was here. I saw some of the members of the

Sixteenth regiment on the streets, walking about loosely, and one of

the members I asked him where he was going to, and got into a

conversation with him, and I saw he was away from his command, and I

asked him why he did not stay with his command, and he told me, he was

not going to fire on his fellow workmen--that he didn't come here to do

that. He showed me his hand, and says he, "Do you see that I am a

workingman myself? I am not going to fire on any workingman."

Q. Who commanded the Sixteenth regiment?

A. I can't say positively about that. I believe Colonel Good is

commander, or was the commander.

Q. Did you meet him, or have any conversation with him?

A. I did not come in contact with any of the officers of the Sixteenth

regiment then.

Q. Knew nothing of his conduct but what was soldierly?

A. Never heard anything but what was right on the part of the officers

of the regiment; and, undoubtedly, a large portion of the Sixteenth

regiment was right. And I had received positive information that

members of the Sixteenth regiment had been dealing out ammunition

amongst the rioters in the crowds on the street during the day time.

Q. Of what day?

A. That was on Tuesday, the 24th of July.

Q. Did you have any conversation with more than one of the regiments?

A. Yes; I spoke to several, as they were walking about, and they did

not seem to care about being connected with the military at all. They

were walking round independent--didn't seem to care whether they had

any duty to perform as soldiers. I did not see very many of them. I

saw, probably, five or six in that way; but I heard a number of reports

in regard to their giving out ammunition. I have that from worthy

sources.

Q. Did you call the attention of the commanding officer to that fact?

A. I had word sent to that effect to the officer at the depot, but

whether it was communicated to him, I am unable to say. But I did send

word out to the depot that some of the men had been in amongst the

crowd of rioters dealing out ammunition. That made the worst feeling of

all that occurred--the soldiers giving their ammunition away, and

mingling around with the rioters, and being away from their command. I

cannot tell whether they were away from their command with leave. I

suppose, certainly, they ought not to have leave given in a crisis of

this kind, and I judge they must have been absent without leave.

Q. How long was the regiment here?

A. The Sixteenth were here, I believe, about a day and a half, to the

best of my knowledge.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know from whom you received the fire--or if you did

receive any--at the cut at Penn street, I believe you call it?

A. Seventh and Penn.

Q. You received a volley of musketry, or pistol shots, or something

there. Whom did you receive it from?

A. From the military. I had a police force right on our tracks.

Q. It was at Seventh and Penn, if I am rightly informed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is a part I had already forgotten, but it came into my mind a

while ago, that while you had that police force there, you received a

volley fired by somebody there at that point. I would like to know who

it was from?

A. To the best of my knowledge, it was from the soldiers.

Q. Of what command?

A. General Reeder's command. The soldiers came down through the cut,

and the first firing we heard, there were some parties said they are

firing blank cartridges. The first firing I heard was pistol shots,

that was the starting of the fire, but the crowd was very large on both

sides of the cut, and the cut was pretty well filled with the

rioters--with the mob, and the first I heard was pistol shots, and then

I heard louder shots that seemed more like gun shots, and rifle shots.

There were several of them, and immediately afterwards, there was a

regular volley fired right down in the crowd.

Q. Have you ever been in active service in the army?

A. Yes; I have been three years and nine months.

Q. And from what you know of being there, did you consider that this

shooting was musketry, or was it pistol shots?

A. It was musketry, it was rifle firing--there was pistol firing and

rifle firing. The shots were sharp enough, that I knew they were minie

balls.

Q. Could you tell whether there was a volley or skirmishing?

A. First, there were a few shots fired that went over our heads. Then a

second volley was fired--a heavy volley, and just took a low range.

Q. You were there at that time, if I am rightly informed, endeavoring

to clear that track, and keep that cut open?

A. Keep the crowd open, trying to disperse the crowd at that time.

Q. That is the time you received the volley?

A. That is the time we received the volley. The military did not see

the police force, nor did the police force see the military. It was

just dusk, and about that time the crowd was very large, and they came

marching into the cut, and were at the corner of Seventh and Penn,

right on the railroad tracks, and they got very close upon us before we

knew it, owing to the large crowd.

Q. If I understand you, the military fired on the party, not knowing

who they were firing on?

A. They were brick-batted and stoned, and pistol shots fired on the

soldiers in the cut before they fired, and from the best information I

have, and in that way I judge they did it in self-defense.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You don't think that they knew, or had any intention of firing on

the police?

A. No; I don't believe that. About the place where the military

commenced firing was in the cut, between Court street and Washington

street bridge, or about there, and the crowd or mob was all up along

that place, from Walnut street, for two squares above in the street,

and on the sidewalk, and all along the walls of the cut, and it appears

the military came in through the cut, and when they got in they were

attacked, and the pistol shots fired, and to the best of my knowledge

the shots came from the wall of the cut, right above, over the

soldiers' heads.

Q. That is what I wanted to know--if you believed that the firing was

done in self-defense?

A. That is the way I looked at it. I looked at it in that light. They

did it in self-defense, and the pistol shots seemed to come from the

wall. That was pretty close--only half a square from the place where

the firing took place.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the

chairman.

* * * * *

HARRISBURG, _May 2, 1878_.

The committee met at half past seven o'clock, P.M. Mr. Lindsey in the

chair. All members present.

Colonel A. Wilson Norris, re-called:

Q. Colonel, you may state briefly the facts and details in reference to

your visit to General Brinton, on Saturday morning, of July 22?

A. Well, I can only state the substance, probably, of what I stated

before. When I discovered in the morning that General Brinton had

escaped from the round-house, I believe the information was first

brought by Captain Aull, of the Grays, and afterwards we ascertained

through Captain Breck. There were no officers, I think, at the time,

but Colonel Stewart and myself, and I volunteered to go to find--in

fact, I was not an officer. I would like that stated. I volunteered to

go and find General Brinton. I was moved to this action out of my

regard for General Brinton, personally, and for his command, a great

many of whom were my friends, and for public reasons, which I thought

paramount to all. I thought it was very necessary to effect the

junction with Colonel Guthrie and the other troops that were to join

him, and I said to General Latta, that if he would procure me a

carriage, I would endeavor to find him. At this time, or a little

before, the order that is contained in the Adjutant General's report,

and which closes, I believe, with an allusion to me, and with a

suggestion to General Brinton to consult with me, was written and

handed to Captain Aull, and at the same time was read to me, so that I

could understand the purport of it. Captain Aull then left with the

same purpose of reaching Brinton. When I volunteered to go, Colonel

Stewart said he would accompany me, and rose off the bed where he was

lying, and when the carriage came, we started and rode through the mob,

which was chiefly on Liberty street--I believe it is called. We passed

right up Liberty street, over the hose, and through the mob. There was

no other way for us below them at that time, and after going a few

squares we passed down to the street below. I do not know what the name

of it is--I think Penn street; and we went in pursuit of General

Stewart to the arsenal. By that time we had reached the skirts of the

mob, and had gotten beyond it, we found numbers of men along the way,

but no indications of any great crowd having been there. We then

discovered Captain Aull, and he told us that General Brinton and his

command had gone on before towards Sharpsburg, I believe, or in that

direction. I do not remember distinctly where he said. We continued our

pursuit of him; inquired here and there from little groups of men that

were discovered along the way.

Q. What was Captain Aull doing at the arsenal?

A. Well, I don't know. He had his buggy there, and had evidently been

making some inquiry, I suppose. I didn't know at the time what he was

doing.

Q. Did you leave him at the arsenal?

A. Yes; left him near there. We drove on.

Q. Was he driving when you left him?

A. No, sir; I think when we saw him he was out of his buggy. His buggy

was a short distance away from him--at least I thought it was his

buggy. I don't know whether it was or not; I didn't ask him.

Q. Proceed?

A. We then followed General Brinton across the bridge, and inquired at

the end of the bridge if anybody had followed him across the bridge. We

thought perhaps the mob had pursued him. He stated that nobody crossed

the bridge after him--the toll man. We followed through the town, where

everything was peaceful, and there was no indications of any mob, and

found General Brinton's command perhaps a half a mile beyond

Sharpsburg. The carriage drove up, and I hallooed to some officer, I

don't remember who he was, and he directed the command to be opened,

and we drove through and I joined General Brinton. We got out of the

carriage before he stopped his command, as my recollection is, and then

I joined him and continued to walk with him. There were some of his

officers around, of course. I couldn't swear positively as to whom were

all there, and my first salutation to General Brinton was

congratulating him upon his escape, and then made some remarks about

where in the name of Heaven he was going, or something of the kind. He

was going in the wrong direction, and then the conversation ensued

about the order, in which I said that an order had been prepared,

signed by Captain Aull. I may have said an officer. I may not have

mentioned Captain Aull; but I think I did--pretty sure I did--because

very likely when I knew he had gone with the order, and that he had it

that, I did say so. General Brinton said that he couldn't take his

command back in the condition they were in, and he wouldn't take his

command back. He said perhaps if he had a positive order he might go,

which implies at once--I don't think he will deny that--that he was

pursuing the wrong direction. He then commenced to talk to me about his

ammunition and provisions, and I suggested to him to levy mail on the

country, to assess the provisions if his troops were in that condition.

He said he wouldn't do that, he would have two hundred and fifty

thousand people in the country down upon him. That I am positive he

said. I then suggested that he should go back to Sharpsburg, saying

that he could hold his position there. I didn't say this as an order,

perhaps, but it was in our conversation. Of course, I had no right to

give it as an order, and I did not. And he said he was not satisfied

with the disposition of the people at Sharpsburg. That they were even

worse there than they were at Pittsburgh. I thought that rather

strange, because I had seen a train standing there, and people sitting

in their yards, as we drove through. I am sure he said that. He said,

further, that he had been fired on from that train--at least, I so

understood it. It may have been from the cars in the city--I may have

gotten the two mixed, so far as that is concerned. He said, too, that I

told him where he first turned off to unite with Colonel Guthrie. And

he said he had been followed by at least a thousand armed men to that

point, and they had men over in the direction of Colonel Guthrie. I

asked him whether I should go with his command, or go back. He said he

would prefer that I would go back, and endeavor to get provisions and

ammunition for him. Of course, there had been a running conversation

about provisions and ammunition, and his men looked as though they

needed it. The most of this conversation passed between us while we

were walking along, and I am certain it couldn't have been heard by all

of his officers, because Brinton and I went side by side--it could have

been heard, a good deal of it. I have no doubt these gentlemen are

perfectly honest in saying they didn't hear me say it. I am sure some

of them know that what I have stated to-night they did hear. We then

had a talk about whether I should stop there, or whether I should go

back. And he said he would go on a short distance, and remain there--I

think he said about a mile, on a hill. I forgot to say that when I

first met him, in speaking about his designs in leaving the city, he

said he wanted to get the river between him and the mob, and to reach

the hills and entrench; and that was his object in going across the

river, so that he could feed his troops and revive them. When I closed

the conversation with him, he said then he would go a short distance

beyond--and I think he said half a mile--and remain there. That he

didn't remain, I only know, of course, from hearsay--that he was not

there.

Q. Did you see Captain Aull when he started with the order?

A. Did I see him when he started?

Q. Yes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did he go prior to your starting?

A. Possibly half an hour, probably more--may have been more. I couldn't

swear to that positively. He started before I did. When Captain Aull

started, I suppose he went out with his buggy, and we, in the meantime,

had to get a carriage. It simply was an effort to duplicate the attempt

to reach Brinton, and I volunteered to go, as I said, simply for that

reason. I had no other object in the world.

Q. You saw the order handed to him by General Latta, did you?

A. Yes; I did.

Q. Did you read the order?

A. The order was read to me, sir. The order, as you observe, contained

a suggestion to General Brinton to consult with him in regard to the

situation in Pittsburgh. Of course, we had a running general

conversation about what had happened in Pittsburgh. The general asked

him about the hotel--whether it had been burned, and, when I left, he

handed me, and several of the officers handed me, their checks, which

were afterwards delivered, I believe, by one of the officers of the

staff or one of the gentlemen, over to Major Baugh.

Q. When you overtook Captain Aull, at the arsenal, did you have any

conversation with him, as to where he was going then?

A. No; I didn't.

Q. Had you then learned where Brinton's troops were?

A. Nothing positive, sir. I don't know whether Captain Aull knew

positively. He just, I supposed, had ascertained in some way from

inquiries made along the road.

Q. When you reached General Brinton, you say you indicated to him the

fact that Captain Aull had delivered an order, or an officer had

delivered an order?

A. An officer had an order to effect this junction.

Q. You are not certain whether you named Captain Aull or you named an

officer?

A. I am not positive about it, but I feel very sure that I did, because

of the fact that Captain Aull had the order that had been read to me,

and that he had started in advance of me, and all that, and it strikes

me that I would say so. I cannot see why I should not. Of course I may

not have done it.

Q. Did you communicate to him the fact of having seen Captain Aull at

the arsenal?

A. I don't know that I did, sir.

Q. Or that you left an officer at the arsenal?

A. I don't know that I did that. I may have done so, without having any

recollection of it.

Q. Was any other person with you in the carriage, except Mr. Stewart?

A. No, sir; nobody accompanied us except the driver. It was an ordinary

cab, and the driver was on the outside.

Q. When you reached General Brinton's force, did the driver drive you

to General Brinton?

A. I think not all the way. I think I got out before we reached him. I

may not have done so. I wouldn't be sure about that, but am pretty sure

we got out before we reached General Brinton and joined him, walking up

to him.

Q. When you left the carriage, did Stewart leave the carriage with you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he accompany you to General Brinton?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did General Brinton stop himself?

A. He didn't stop. My recollection is that the general didn't stop his

command until his surgeon came up and asked him to stop, to take a ball

from the shoulder of one of the men. Then they stopped, and the place

where we stopped was along a small ravine, where several of the

officers and ourselves sat down.

Q. Then you walked beside him for some little distance before he

stopped?

A. Yes; I think I must have walked three fourths of a mile or a mile. I

say that, from the fact that we had to go back to find our carriage,

and our carriage stopped about the place we left it, and I think it was

fully three quarters of a mile or a mile before we joined it. I know we

became a good deal alarmed about it, and were afraid that we had lost

him, and it was during our walk back we met I think Dr. Mears.

Q. Did you and General Brinton walk side by side?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was Stewart during that time?

A. Stewart was walking by my side, and perhaps on the other side of

General Brinton a portion of the time. I am pretty positive he was

present during nearly everything that was said.

Q. Were there any officers walking with General Brinton when you

overtook him?

A. Yes; I think there were.

Q. Did they continue to walk along?

A. Well, I think probably they did--some of them.

Q. Did you know the officers?

A. I remember General Loud being there. I remember Colonel Wilson being

there; but whether they were around when everything was said I didn't

know. I remember seeing Mr. Pettit. I remember seeing Dale Benson, but

not with them. I think I met him on my way back. I know I shook hands

with him.

Q. Do you remember of seeing Surgeon Mears?

A. I recollect about Surgeon Mears directly. I recollect him bringing

up some bread, after we had left the command on our way back--that is,

the person I took for Surgeon Mears. I have met him since, but I don't

think I knew him then.

Q. After you had walked some distance, General Brinton halted, I

understand you to say?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did you remain standing there in conversation?

A. Well, I don't suppose we had a ten minutes' conversation there.

Q. Did you remain standing all the time?

A. No, sir; I think we sat down, or sort of lolled on a bank or

something of the kind. I don't think we stood, because we were all

pretty tired. I know I was dreadful tired. That was the chief cause of

my alarm when we went back to find the carriage, because I was

satisfied I could never reach Pittsburgh. I had been up for two nights,

and was worn out. The ride was a dreadful one.

Q. In communicating to him that an officer had been sent out with an

order, you communicated to him the substance of the order you saw?

A. Yes; it was as I explained to him. I didn't say it in those words,

probably, simply the substance of those orders, and they were to effect

a junction with Guthrie. The whole object was to have the troops

concentrated, and it was with that purpose that I went out. There was

no earthly purpose for me to go and find General Brinton, other than

that.

Q. In communicating that to him, did you tell him that General Latta

had requested you to communicate the order to him?

A. Yes; I think I did.

Q. Did you tell him you had been sent for that purpose?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did he make any reply?

A. Yes; he said what I have said, that if he got a positive order, he

would take his command back. I can say, too, without any reservation,

that there was no reason under heaven why General Brinton should not

have stopped with his command at Sharpsburg. There was not a symptom of

the riot within two miles, after we left the skirts of it, at the

arsenal. We rode on, and, of course, we met groups of men, but there

were none of them that numbered thirty, and he was followed up by

nobody from Sharpsburg but a small collection of boys, that were in the

rear of his column, more out of curiosity than anything else, and that

was the reason I suggested his taking up the position there, because I

knew, and I said to him, we could have access to him there very easily,

because the trains were then running, and I had seen a train standing

there, and it moved off as we passed toward Allegheny, and my idea was,

that if he wanted provisions and ammunition we could more easily get it

there for him than at any other point, and I said that he could protect

that bridge against any force. Any one who knows the bridge would be

aware of that. It is an open bridge, and those two guns would have

protected it against any force coming in that direction.

Q. Did you meet any officer of General Brinton's command on your return

to Pittsburgh?

A. That had been with him?

Q. Any one that had remained in the city during the night?

A. Major Baugh.

Q. Where did you meet Major Baugh?

A. I saw Major Baugh at the Monongahela house.

Q. What time?

A. That night, sir.

Q. Did you meet him when you were returning to Pittsburgh anywheres

about the arsenal, or on the way going to General Brinton's command?

A. I don't think I did. I met one officer, and I thought he was Doctor

Mears--he had the bread in a bucket--and I don't think we met anybody

else, because I cannot remember this circumstance, and if we had met

them, I would have recollected it. We were followed, just after the

doctor accosted us, by a man on horseback, who endeavored to have us

intercepted three or four times--came up to the carriage--and when we

got into Pittsburgh, evidently tried to have us intercepted by the mob,

and we drove through the alleys to escape him, and we were more

concerned about that than anything else at that time, and I think if we

would have met anybody, it would have impressed itself upon my mind,

and I don't recollect meeting anybody after we crossed the bridge. That

I am quite sure. We didn't discover this man until we got across the

bridge, and we discovered it by his coming up, and making inquiries,

and making some remarks.

Q. After you crossed the bridge, you don't remember of meeting Major

Baugh?

A. I don't, sir.

Q. Who made the inquiries of you?

A. Major Baugh?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. I don't have the slightest recollection of that. I think the one

officer we took for Surgeon Mears. I think he was pretty nearly where

this man accosted us.

Q. When Major Baugh came to the hotel in the evening, did you learn the

object of his mission?

A. What--to General Latta?

Q. Yes?

A. No, sir; I couldn't say that I did.

Q. Did you hear any conversation between him and General Latta?

A. I may have heard it without having any recollection of it.

Q. Do you know whether General Latta gave him any orders or not?

A. I really don't know that, sir.

Q. That is all, unless you desire to state something further.

A. I have nothing to say, sir, I believe, except what I have said. I

simply would ask these gentlemen to be called who heard me, because

when I went back I made a statement which, in substance, is what I said

here, and I may have said it a little different, but substantially the

same, to Colonel Guthrie; and Captain Aull is here himself, and he

knows that I was present when the order was given, and Colonel Stewart

was present with me all the time, and I simply would like to have them

called for that reason, to show that my two statements are consistent.

* * * * *

Colonel P. N. Guthrie, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may state what Colonel Norris stated to you on his return from

General Brinton's command, in relation to his conversation with General

Brinton?

A. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would like to start out a little further back

than that, because Major Norris stated nothing to me of his own will,

only at my request. I would like to state here that when Captain Aull

left my regiment to enter the town, he was sent by me with instructions

to General Latta, to this effect: that I didn't believe, at that hour,

it was possible for the troops from Walls station to reach me; and that

it was useless for me to remain at the stock-yards; and to report fully

to General Latta the condition in which my regiment was placed; that we

were doing nothing, and of no particular service to the railroad or to

the public peace, and neither the railroad, at that hour, was

threatened, nor the public peace. Captain Aull having gone in and

witnessed the departure of General Brinton from the round-house, and

conveyed that information to General Latta, receiving an order from

General Latta, to be conveyed to General Brinton, one copy of which was

to be conveyed to me, and reaching me at an hour of the day--I do not

remember what--with the information that he had not reached General

Brinton, I deemed it of the greatest importance that I should know, of

my own knowledge, what was the intention of the Adjutant General, and

what was the condition of the forces. I waited at the stock-yards until

I was satisfied by the actual appearance of the troops from Walls

station, and from knowledge that I had received by sending one of the

men from my regiment out in search of General Brinton, that there was

no possibility of that junction. I then came into town fully impressed

with the necessity that there should be some understanding between

General Brinton's troops and mine, which was the only regiment left in

Allegheny county, or in the vicinity of Pittsburgh and Allegheny, after

General Brinton had crossed the river at Sharpsburg. I came in there to

ascertain information from General Latta. I met Colonel Norris, and I

asked him the question. At first he gave me no particular information.

Afterwards, when I asked him again, he told me that he and Major

Stewart had gone out in search of General Brinton, and had reached him

at a point, I understood, across the Sharpsburg bridge. That he had

represented to General Brinton that an order had been issued by General

Latta, which was an order to him, General Brinton, through Captain

Aull, instructing General Brinton to form a junction with me. When that

junction was formed, General Brinton was to judge himself of the

circumstances, and govern himself accordingly. It was my belief, that

if that junction had been formed, the troops could have come into

Pittsburgh, and reached the vicinity of that disturbance in time to

have saved property. I asked Major Norris, particularly, if he had seen

General Brinton and had conversed with him. He said he had. I asked him

what the reply was, and he said that General Brinton was not able to

come in. I asked him again what General Brinton's reply was. He

shrugged up his shoulders, and still did not give me the verbal reply

of General Brinton. Sometime afterward, in conversation with Colonel

Norris, he told me that General Brinton had refused to form that

junction with him, that is, to return from the position that he was

then in. There is no "ifs" and "ands" in the matter, in my mind. My

impression is distinct and clear that Colonel Norris told me he had met

General Brinton and he had had that conversation with General Brinton.

He had urged upon General Brinton that he would comply with what were

the instructions of this order, though General Brinton had not received

it. That General Brinton had refused to comply with that order. I would

further state to the committee here, that a copy of that order that was

intended for General Brinton reached him on Sunday. I brought it back

into the city on Sunday afternoon to General Latta, and I delivered it

myself, personally, to General Brinton, at his head-quarters at the

hospital, in Pittsburgh, after the return to Pittsburgh.

Q. What day?

A. Well, nearly a week--just a week. I gave it personally to General

Brinton.

Q. The 31st of July, was it not?

A. I guess so. It was after General Brinton had gone back to the

junction and then returned to Pittsburgh with the Governor. General

Brinton told me at that time, that that was the first information he

had of that order.

Q. The copy was delivered to you by Captain Aull, was it, colonel?

A. Captain Aull failed to reach General Brinton, for reasons which I

will let Captain Aull state to you himself.

Q. I do not quite understand your statement, whether it was the

original or a copy that was delivered?

A. The original order. There was one copy of that order, the original

order is probably on file in the head-quarters. Copies of the order

were given to Captain Aull, one for General Brinton and one for myself.

Q. You brought it into the city and kept it in your possession all the

time, until you delivered it to General Brinton?

A. I kept it in my possession until I delivered it, personally, to

General Brinton, at the hospital grounds, after the return to the city.

Q. Do you know whether General Latta was notified that General Brinton

had not received the order?

A. I cannot say. I do not remember whether I stated that fact to

General Latta or not. I do not believe I did. I went into town fully

impressed that General Brinton would not join me, and that some other

arrangement of troops must be made, and I do not know whether I stated

to General Latta that General Brinton would not join me, and that he

must make some other arrangement, or whether I stated to him that

Captain Aull had been unable to reach General Brinton. At all events,

the original order General Brinton never received until the 31st, I

believe it was.

* * * * *

Captain W. F. Aull, re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Just state, if you please, what your conversation was with Colonel

Norris, and why you did not reach General Brinton with the order given

to you by General Latta Sunday morning, the 22d July?

A. Colonel Guthrie has stated that he sent me in for a personal

conversation with General Latta, and I just state here that in passing

Twenty-sixth street, I think it was, that as I approached Twenty-sixth

street, I saw the people massed around the corners of the building,

looking round up the street, as if something was going on, and I asked

two or three parties what it was, and they said the troops were out. I

drove across. They undertook to stop me, saying I had better look out,

or I would get shot, that they had the Gatling guns up there, and they

would shoot down street. I drove across the street and saw no

indications of anybody shooting. I drove on and went around the square

from there, where I could see the troops more closely, and they passed

on out Penn street. I waited until I saw they had the Gatling guns

along with them, and I drove then, as rapidly as possible, to the Union

depot. I was not aware that General Latta had not yet received the

information of their leaving the round-house, until I went in, and, I

think General Latta will remember, I was a little slow to tell him,

from the fact that I supposed he knew about it, and when I told him

they had got out of the round-house, and after getting out upon the

street with their Gatling guns, he jumped up and appeared very much

pleased, said, "Thank God they are out." I knew then that that was the

first information he had received. He then turned to some officers

present, and they commenced to congratulate each other that they had

got out, and he told me to take a seat and remain. I sat down. A few

moments afterwards, a party that I didn't know at the time, but who

afterwards turned out to be a man by the name Surgeon Wilson, who had

been acting the part of a spy for General Latta, reported that they

were out of the round-house, and, I think, reported that they were

going to the arsenal. A few moments afterwards another party came in,

and reported that they had gone to the arsenal, and were now quartered

in the arsenal. That I am positive of. I heard that--that they were

quartered in the arsenal. That appeared to afford a great deal of

relief to the officers present, and General Latta immediately began to

dictate an order to his clerk, Mr. Russell, I believe. I waited until

he had written the order, and he either wrote out a duplicate or wrote

out two orders, I don't remember which. I am not clear as to whether

they were two different orders or duplicate orders. At any rate he gave

me an order; but before he gave it to me he had a long talk with

Colonel Norris, took him into a private room, or talked with him first.

He then read the order in my presence, that he afterwards handed to me,

giving Colonel Norris instructions to reach General Brinton. My

instructions were to return to my regiment, and that General Brinton

being quartered in the arsenal, I should take the order, which I

received, to deliver it to him there, then deliver the other order to

Colonel Guthrie. When I reached the arsenal, I found the troops were

not quartered there, and I went to two or three different parties at

the arsenal for fear that they were trying to deceive me, that probably

they were in the arsenal. I walked round the fence, and looked in

wherever I could see, wherever I had the opportunity to see in, to

convince myself positively that they were not there, before I would go

any further; but finally, I being convinced that they had gone out

Butler street, as the sentinel informed me, I started back to my buggy,

and just as I was approaching the street that crosses Butler street at

right angles, Colonel Stewart and Major Norris came driving across the

street, and I hailed them, and told Colonel Norris that they had gone

on out Butler street, that I had information enough to convince me of

that, and immediately turned round and started on, without asking for

any further information. He drove on out Butler street. I got into my

buggy and started after them. I drove on as far as Sharpsburg bridge,

and made numerous inquiries of parties along the street how far they

were ahead of me, and what the prospects would be of overtaking them.

When I reached Sharpsburg bridge I was told they must be at least two

miles ahead of me, and they had struck out into the country, towards

Butler county. I supposed I stood or sat in the buggy for fully two or

three minutes, meditating whether I would follow or take the other

order to Colonel Guthrie first. I concluded, at last, that I would

first take the order to Colonel Guthrie. I had two orders to deliver,

and I concluded I would take the order to Colonel Guthrie, and if he

advised me to, to strike across the country, and reach General Brinton

with the other order. I drove straight to East Liberty, and reported to

Colonel Guthrie what I had seen, and handed him the order that I had

been authorized to deliver to him. I also stated to him that I had an

order for General Brinton, and stated the circumstances under which I

had not delivered it. I asked him the question if I should strike

across the country from there, right directly across the river, the

direction I knew they were in, or whether I would remain where I was.

He replied, "Give me that order and I will go to the city and see

General Latta myself," and I handed him the order and I never saw it

afterwards. Colonel Guthrie then left the regiment and went to the

city, as he has stated.

Q. When did you see Colonel Norris next after leaving him at the

arsenal?

A. I am not exactly clear on that. I think I saw him Friday. I saw him

at the Duquesne club-rooms.

Q. Well, did you see him within a week?

A. No, sir; it was some time afterwards before I saw him again.

* * * * *

Norman M. Smith re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You may state the facts in relation to the conversation that

occurred between General Brinton and Colonel Norris, or what you know

in relation to it?

A. Mr. Chairman, the only evidence I can give is corroborative. I met

Colonel Norris immediately after his return from his trip to General

Brinton's command. Met him in front of the Union Depot Hotel,

immediately after he got out of his carriage, I think. He stated to me

that he had carried the orders to General Brinton. That Colonel Norris

has already said to you, that he carried, and also said that General

Brinton had refused to obey them, and return to Pittsburgh.

Q. What time was it you met him?

A. Well, it is pretty hard for me to give the hour exactly. I had been

up for three or four days and nights. I think, though, it was between

nine and ten o'clock. I will not be positive about that. It might have

been earlier, and it might have been later. I think, though, between

nine and ten o'clock in the morning.

Q. Did he state exactly where he found him?

A. He said he had followed him beyond Sharpsburg, and dismounted from

his carriage, and had marched on foot with him for some distance. Had

communicated the order that he has stated. Had conversed with him for

some time, and that General Brinton had refused to return to

Pittsburgh.

Q. Did he say anything about his refusal to join Colonel Guthrie?

A. While I said return to Pittsburgh I meant to join Colonel

Guthrie--that was implied. That after they joined, that is, it was in

our minds, after they had united their commands, that they were to

return to Pittsburgh; but when I said refused to return to Pittsburgh,

I meant refused to join Colonel Guthrie, or rather to execute the order

that Colonel Norris had to carry.

Q. Did he say anything about the condition of General Brinton's troops?

A. Perhaps he may have mentioned it in a general way, but 1 do not

recollect that he specified it particularly.

Q. That was not spoken of?

A. I think not. At least that did not impress itself on my mind, if it

was mentioned.

Q. Anything said about getting provisions to them?

A. Well, there probably was, but I am not prepared to say what it

was--that was a matter that was paramount in all our minds, the matter

of provisions for the troops had been concerning me, particularly, from

the evening before, and continued to concern me until the next evening,

until I secured some provisions and got them to the troops.

Q. Is that all that you know in relation to what occurred between

Colonel Norris and General Brinton?

A. That is all, I believe, sir.

Colonel Norris: I would like to say, when I got back to the hotel, Mr.

Cassatt was there, and I believe Mr. Bennett, of Allegheny, and we had

a conversation then about supplying General Brinton's command with

provisions and ammunition, and an arrangement was there made, I myself

giving the directions where he was to convey the provisions to him, and

that provisions did ultimately reach him. That conversation was heard,

I believe, by Colonel Hassinger.

Colonel Smith: If I may be permitted--I was speaking of the time I met

Colonel Norris. I was present at that conversation, at the Monongahela

house, and can verify what the colonel said at that time.

* * * * *

Colonel D. L. Hassinger, _sworn_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You understand, I believe, the subject of evidence to-night. Will

you go on and state what knowledge you have on the subject?

A. I was at the Monongahela house when Colonel Norris and Major Stewart

returned, and I heard just about--he reported that he had caught up

with General Brinton on his way out beyond Sharpsburg bridge, that he

got out of the carriage and walked along, and had the conversation, and

spoke about the order which had been sent to him through Captain Aull,

and he said he gave him the substance of the order, and General Brinton

had refused to obey him.

Q. Can you give the language of Colonel Norris--the exact words that

Colonel Norris used?

A. Well, I don't know that I can, exactly. I do not recollect that part

of it.

Q. You don't pretend now, in our statement, to give the language?

A. No. I have not heard any of the evidence at all that was before the

committee, except sitting here for a few minutes.

Q. You are a member of the National Guard?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What regiment?

A. Assistant Adjutant General of the State.

Q. Had you been at Pittsburgh during the riot--the entire progress of

it?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you with General Latta?

A. I was with him most of the time that he was there. On that morning I

had started out when I heard that the troops were out of the

round-house. I went out as far as the arsenal, and when I got there I

found that they had gone in another direction. I was afoot, and, I

think, returned to the hotel.

Q. You were at the hotel when the colonel arrived?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know whether Colonel Norris communicated that fact to General

Latta that you have just related?

A. Yes; he did. General Latta was in the room at the time.

Q. In your presence?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That is all you know in relation to the conversation that occurred

between them, is it?

A. That is about all, sir; yes, sir.

* * * * *

General James W. Latta re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I would like you to state, general, just what Colonel Norris stated

to you on his return from General Brinton's command?

A. I did detail that, sir, about as fully as I recollect it, describing

the room and situation and surroundings. I will go over it again if you

desire.

Q. I want to ask you one other question. Did you learn on Sunday that

Captain Aull had not reached General Brinton with that order?

A. I did not find it out, sir, until nearly a week afterwards.

Q. When Major Baugh came to the hotel on Sunday, was anything said to

him by you about whether Captain Aull had reached the command or not?

A. No, sir.

Q. And he did not communicate anything of the kind to you?

A. No, sir.

Q. When you gave the order to Major Baugh, you had no knowledge

whatever of whether Captain Aull had reached General Brinton with the

first order or not?

A. I had not, sir. I supposed he had. I took that for granted.

Captain Aull: Will General Latta add that he gave me no instructions to

report back?

The witness: I did say that in my report.

* * * * *

Major General R. M. Brinton re-called:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. I wish you to state, general, whether at any time during your stay

in Pittsburgh any attempt was made by any of the officials of the

Pennsylvania Railroad Company to control your movements, or the

movements of your troops in any way?

A. No, sir; there was no attempts made by any officers of the

Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to my knowledge, to dictate or interfere

in the slightest with the movements of the troops. I remember at one

time, just after the firing occurred at Twenty-eight street, that

General Pearson was in Mr. Pitcairn's office, and Mr. Cassatt was

there, one of the vice presidents of the Pennsylvania railroad, and I

asked permission of General Pearson to clear the streets, and to follow

the crowd to the arsenal, and he, more in his manner than anything

else, appealed to Mr. Cassatt, and Mr. Cassatt said I have nothing to

do with the movements of the troops, I know nothing about that

whatever. I can say that at no time did they attempt, to my knowledge,

to interfere in any way with the movements of the troops.

Q. Will you state from whom, or by whom, the provisions were delivered

to your troops, on the hill beyond Sharpsburg?

A. After our arrival in Pittsburgh, or previous to our arrival, I

telegraphed to Pittsburgh for provisions, to General Pearson, and he

procured them from the Union depot, that is, a sandwich and a cup of

coffee. After that, we were in the round-house, and I made repeated

appeals----

Q. I speak of the provisions that were brought after you went beyond

Sharpsburg, on the hill, when you were encamped there--from whom you

received, the provisions, that is, who delivered them to you?

A. I had a note from Mr. Cassatt, about, I should think, ten or eleven

o'clock that night, that is, Sunday night, saying that he had procured

for us a lot of hams and provisions, &c, and had sent them out. I

thought, at the time, that Mr. Cassatt had left Pittsburgh, but I found

that he had not, and he had also sent two parties from Sharpsburg,

merchants there, who said that they had an order from Mr. Cassatt to

give us whatever they had in their stores, and they gave me an

inventory of it, and said it was at my disposal, and that Mr. Cassatt

had given them orders, and that he would be responsible for it, and I

might say the only provisions I did receive from the time we went to

Pittsburgh, until we arrived at Blairsville, came through his energies.

Q. Who delivered the line from Mr. Cassatt to you?

A. My impression was, or is, it was Mr. Smith--Colonel Smith, I

think--who brought it there that night. There is one point I should

like to correct. I won't detail any of the conversation, further than

to allude to my evidence, which I gave before. You have, with Colonel

Norris, stated that I wanted to cross the river and intrench. That I

did not say, and, moreover, it would have been impossible, because I

had not any means of intrenching--no tools, or anything of the kind. He

said he saw no crowd, at all, following to Sharpsburg, and that we

should have remained there, in his idea. I merely refer to a dispatch

which General Latta sent to the Governor at that time, and which he

must have received information either from Captain Aull or Colonel

Norris, as it was sent by telegram. It was directed to Governor

Hartranft, dated July 22, p. 36, in which he says, among other things:

"The first division, after stiff fighting for about fourteen hours,

have retired to a point near Sharpsburg, pursued vigorously by a mob,

to the high bridge at that point, under a hot fire pretty nearly all

the way, but they effectually checked the attack." Colonel Norris

returned, he said that there was no mob following us whatever.

Q. Go on, general?

A. In regard to our not stopping in Sharpsburg, and that ammunition,

&c, could reach us, I want to state that we went on a point of the

railroad below Sharpsburg, where we could procure provisions, and where

we were in direct communication by rail with Pittsburgh, the same

railroad which runs through Sharpsburg, and therefore we lost nothing

by not stopping in Sharpsburg. In regard to receiving the provisions

which Colonel Norris promised us if we would remain there, the

provisions never came, except by the hands of the Pennsylvania Railroad

Company. The evidence which Colonel Norris has given in regard to the

situation we were in, &c., of course is entirely different from what I

have already stated, and from what the officers who were immediately

surrounding us when he joined us said. They being on the spot, it was

not hearsay evidence on their part, but it was what they actually

heard, and they have sworn that they were sufficiently near to hear

every word that was passed at the time, but if it is necessary, I can

produce those officers to corroborate it.

Q. We have had that.

Colonel Norris: I wish to ask Colonel Smith, whether the provisions

were not sent in pursuance of the arrangements made after my

conversation with Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Bennett?

By Mr. Lindsey:

You may state that, Colonel Smith.

Colonel Smith: As has already been stated, Mr. Cassatt and Mr. Bennett,

and others, had a consultation at the Monongahela house, about noon of

Sunday. Mr. Bennett and Mr. Cassatt left the hotel together, Mr.

Cassatt, at least, and I think Mr. Bennett with him, went to Allegheny,

to arrange with bakers, and other people there, to prepare sandwiches

and other provisions to send out. I left the Monongahela house about

three o'clock, and had this understanding with Mr. Cassatt, who was to

take the road on the north side of the river, with the wagons of

provisions. I was to move up on the south side, as stated in my

examination in chief. I proceeded by certain routes across the

Allegheny river, and at Aetna, I met Mr. Campbell Herron, and I stated

the necessities of the troops, and asked him whether he could assist me

in procuring provisions for them. I had in mind the conversation and

action taken place at the Monongahela house, between Mr. Cassatt and

others. Mr. Herron said that the store belonging to their furnace,

their property, had some provisions in it, and he sent for his manager,

Mr. Chalfant, and with him I arranged to load up whatever provisions

they had, as soon as it became dark, and that they should be sent on to

the camp of General Brinton's command. My arrangement with Cassatt, was

to wait at General Brinton's camp until I heard from him--either saw

him or heard from him. After that, I was to proceed to execute the

orders I carried from General Latta, which has already been stated here

to the committee. I waited there until about ten o'clock, when a man by

the name of Bradley, a livery stable keeper--he had charge of hauling

the provisions out there--came into camp, and reported two wagon loads

within a short distance, and in the meantime, Mr. Chalfant had reported

there, that a wagon containing hams, and some other provisions, which

we turned over to the commissary of General Brinton's command. I

believe there is no question about that, but all these arrangements

were made in pursuance of the understanding arrived at between Mr.

Cassatt, and Mr. Bennett and others, at the instigation of Colonel

Norris, after his return from visiting General Brinton's command in the

morning.

At this point the committee adjourned, to meet at the call of the

chairman.

* * * * *

Explanatory Note by the Reporter of the Committee.

Owing to an urgent desire on the part of the committee to have the

testimony--taken in shorthand--transcribed and printed as rapidly

as possible after the order to print was made by the Legislature, a

number of men were put to work on it, each man taking a portion,

irrespective of dates. As fast as transcribed, these portions were

printed. This will explain the mingling of dates. Furthermore and

unfortunately, in the hurry and confusion of such quick work, some

of the copy was mislaid or lost before reaching the printer's

hands, necessitating a re-dictation by myself from the original

notes. This will explain the consequent delay.

SAM'L B. COLLINS,

_Official Reporter of Legislature_.

PHILADELPHIA, September 30, 1878.

* * * * *

F. B. Gowen, _sworn_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. State your residence and official connection with the Reading

Railroad Company?

A. I reside at Mount Airey, in the city of Philadelphia, and am

president of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and have

been so since the spring of 1869.

Q. We wish you to state now whether there was any difficulty on the

Reading railroad during the riots last July; and if so, give us the

circumstances?

A. There was a difficulty at Reading, on the line of the Reading

railroad. We did not originate that, nor was it participated in by any

one then in the employ of the company, so far as we have been able to

ascertain. In other words the riotous attacks on property at Reading,

which culminated in the burning of a large bridge over the Schuylkill

river, in the city of Reading, were not the acts of any one of the then

employés of the company, nor, so far as we have been able to learn, was

there any single man then in the employ of the company absent from his

post at that time, nor was there then any strike of any kind whatever

among any of the then employés of the company.

Q. Did the road continue to run during the troubles?

A. The road was stopped for one day--absolutely for a little over

twenty-four hours--the main line of the road was stopped--all the

branches were running. The main line was stopped at Reading, by the

tearing up of the track, and also the Lebanon Valley railroad was

stopped for a long time, in consequence of the burning of the bridge,

which took place on the night of the day on which the disturbance

occurred elsewhere in Reading.

Q. Was this destruction of property caused by former employés of the

road?

A. Almost entirely. It was caused by a mob that was composed

principally, I believe, of former employés of the company, or led by

them--organized by them--and, of course, participated in, or witnessed

by a great crowd of people, many of whom may not have been at all

active participants, but merely spectators.

Q. State whether you had reason to believe there would be any

difficulty; and if so, what steps you took to prevent it?

A. Early in the spring of the year, as early as March, at least, we had

reason to believe that the society called the Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers was arranging to make some kind of an attack upon the

company, somewhat similar to that one which occurred on the Boston and

Maine railroad and the Central railroad of New Jersey, and we had also

reason to believe that there was then being organized throughout the

country, somewhat under the shadow of, or in some way connected with

the Locomotive Brotherhood, another society, which was to embrace all

the trainmen employed upon the railroads generally, and we thought that

the proper way to prevent such action having a disastrous effect upon

our company and its property would be to state to those who belonged to

this society that they could no longer remain in our employ; and upon a

demand being made upon us by a committee of the Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers for an advance in wages of twenty per cent., which

we believed to be the preliminary step for testing the question of

power, we notified all the engineers and firemen, who belonged to the

Brotherhood of Engineers, that they could not remain in the service of

the company and be members of that organization at the same time; but,

as we understood, that that organization had a beneficial fund from

which the members derived some benefit, we proposed to give them a fund

of the same kind to which the company also would be a contributor, as

well as themselves, so that no man, in leaving that Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, would lose the money value of his membership.

When we issued this circular, between three and four hundred men,

principally engineers and firemen, and a few others who left in

sympathy with them, left the service of the company. That was in the

month of April. That has been spoken of as a strike, but it was no

strike, because these people who joined it knew that they could not

remain in the service of the company, and it was different from a

strike where persons simply stop work for the purpose of enforcing a

demand for higher wages. A great number of those persons who left the

service of the company in April, still, I think, remained under the

impression that they could force the company to take them back, and

they organized themselves more closely at Reading, and had a series of

meetings at which they took in a great many others that didn't belong

to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. They had regular meetings

in some hall there, and maintained a position or attitude of hostility

to the company. Their object being to embarrass the company in the

transaction of its business, so that the company would be forced to

take them back; but as the company didn't take them back, as they

desired, from day to day, and week to week, and month to month, they

became very sore on the subject, and I believe that the riot at

Reading--indeed, although I can only speak from hearsay evidence; but

as I took part as a lawyer in the cases that grew out of it, I derived

a great deal of information as to the reason of it. I believe that when

the news came to Reading of the general outbreak upon the Baltimore and

Ohio railroad at Martinsburg, a number of those former employés of the

company assembled at a hall in one of their meetings, and determined

that they would have to do something of the kind, such as the burning

down of the bridge and the tearing up of the track, and, resulting from

that, this attack was made upon the company, which I believe was

confined entirely to such employés as had left the service of the

company, and among them such followers or sympathizers as could be got

into a crowd on such an occasion; but I believe that none of the

employés of the company had anything to do with it, or took any part in

it.

Q. Prior to the breaking out of the riot, had you filled the places of

all those men who had left your services?

A. Yes; their places were filled within two or three or four days of

the time. Indeed, there was no interruption in the business of the road

resulting from those engineers leaving us in the month of April, except

that we stopped the movement of the coal trade one day so that all the

engineers who remained in our service connected with the coal trade

might be on hand in case we didn't have enough new ones, so that all

the trains we call schedule trains, that is passenger trains and

freight trains, might be moved promptly. The whole thing was over in

two or three days. The places of those who left were immediately

supplied. We promoted a great many firemen competent to take the places

of the engineers. I am sure that within a week or ten days after they

commenced to leave, there was no longer any vacancy in our service not

filled.

Q. Was there any difficulty in finding men?

A. None whatever. It was rather remarkable we had them so quickly, so

rapidly. Of course, anticipating this disturbance, we were quietly on

the lookout for men.

Q. Were the new men you employed experienced engineers?

A. Yes; and it was more remarkable still. Our business is a peculiar

one. It is very much more difficult for an engineer from another road

to take hold of a heavy coal train on a down grade, than to handle a

passenger or a common freight train on an ordinary grade. But there

were very few accidents. There were a few such as might result from the

inexperience of men unaccustomed to that kind of business; but they

were remarkably few. Of course we had to be very vigilant. The company

went to some expense in order to guard against accident.

Q. Were any of those new men you got men who had been discharged from

other roads?

A. I cannot answer that question positively, for the reason that I

don't know it; but I should judge from the habit or custom of the

company in that respect, that no new man was taken into the service of

the company who didn't bring a certificate of good character. I am sure

no one would have been taken that was discharged from any cause that

affected his ability or knowledge as an engineer.

Q. Then I understand you to say that you had no difficulty in securing

plenty of engineers?

A. None whatever. You will understand, of course, that while quite a

number of firemen left our service, a great many other firemen in our

service were competent to take an engine, and a number of those were

promoted.

Q. Have you any knowledge of the number of new men employed?

A. I think the entire number of engineers and firemen could not have

been more than about from three hundred to three hundred and

fifty--probably not so many. I think about three hundred or three

hundred and fifty would cover all of those two classes--engineers and

firemen.

Q. What steps were taken by the company to punish the rioters at

Reading?

A. We left that, to some extent, to the civil authorities of Reading.

In connection with them, prosecutions were commenced against a great

number. Two of them who were known to have actually set fire to the

bridge, or participated in the actual burning, who ran away, were

arrested at a distance, and plead guilty.

Q. Were they men who had been in the employ of the company?

A. One of them had been at one time.

Q. In what capacity?

A. I think as a brakeman, and he had left the service of the company,

at the time the locomotive engineers left, and at this meeting I spoke

of as taking place at the hall in Reading, he had been promised by the

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers to be paid so much a month, if he

left the service of the company. The other one had never been in the

service of the company--not that I am aware of.

Q. Do you know what steps were taken by the civil authorities at

Reading to suppress the riot at that time?

A. There was very little done at the time. I think that all disturbance

at Reading could have been prevented, if the sheriff of the county had

shown the slightest amount of pluck or appreciation of his position. He

had full knowledge--in fact, he was informed that it was to take place,

but he did nothing practically, except when it was too late, to issue a

proclamation that amounted to nothing.

Q. Do you know how long before it took place that this information was

communicated to him?

A. Information was communicated to him of the intended rising. He was

told of the facts in the possession of the party informing him, and an

offer was made to him of men to act as a _posse comitatus_, about eight

or ten o'clock in the morning of the day in which the trouble

culminated. He did nothing until late that afternoon. I am quite

confident that a determined man, armed with the law, in the position of

the sheriff of Berks, at Reading, with twenty men--ten times which

number he could have gotten from the citizens--could have prevented the

whole disturbance.

Q. Do you know whether he made any call for help from the State?

A. I am not aware that he did, nor am I really aware of the means used

to bring the military to Reading, or who first made the call for them.

I know the military were sent there by the orders of some one in the

military department of the State, who had authority upon that subject,

and the disturbance was finally quelled by the action of the military,

which unfortunately led to the killing of several persons.

Q. Had there been any reduction of wages on your road prior to July?

A. I think there had been no reduction of wages on the road for months

before that. There had been two reductions of wages within the last few

years.

Q. Since 1873--the time of the panic?

A. Yes.

Q. How large?

A. Each, I think, was ten per cent. The engineers on the Reading

railroad have been for a great number of years paid according to the

length of service. We have four grades, the first year the men get the

lowest grade, and after they have been in the service of the company

four years, they get the highest grade. That was due entirely, not to

his knowledge as an engineer, but to his length of service as an

employé in the company. It was understood that the men's wages should

increase with the length of time they remained with us. When any man

left us, and came back, again he had to go down and come up, as the

lowest men.

Q. Did that apply to any other employés but the engineers?

A. It applied to the firemen.

Q. Can you give the wages that the brakemen and firemen and engineers

were getting per day.

A. I cannot give it exactly. I think at the time of this disturbance

the highest grade engineers were paid $2 97 per day. I think the

firemen were getting about $1 50 to $1 60 per day. In the coal trade on

the Reading railroad there were opportunities for engineers, during the

busy seasons, to earn more than six days per week. Since the strike, or

shortly after this trouble occurred, in April, as a mark of our

appreciation of the fidelity of those who remained with us and resisted

the temptation to leave when the Brotherhood of Engineers left--a good

many of them, indeed, were members of the Brotherhood that stayed with

us--we made a new grade of engineers, which no new men thereafter could

enter, except after five years of service, and we put all the faithful

men who remained with us in that grade, and gave them $3 23. We have

also that system among the conductors of the passenger trains. They are

paid according to length of service, and there is an amount of their

pay kept back from them, and invested for their benefit which increases

with length of time.

Q. What were the wages of the brakemen?

A. I think from $1 50 to $1 60.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Were you at Reading during the riots?

A. I was not there.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did any of those firemen or engineers who left you at that time,

ever make application to come back?

A. A great many, and it was a very sad thing.

Q. Was there a man by the name of Clarke who made that application to

you personally?

A. I cannot give their names, but a great many have made application

personally.

Q. Didn't you tell him that he had done wrong in being led away by the

Brotherhood?

A. I know of a great many such cases. A great many I knew expressed a

willingness to come back.

Q. And acknowledged to you that they had done wrong, and after their

places had been filled by other parties, wanted to be again in the

employ of the road?

A. A great many--I can hardly give you the number. The point with the

company was this: we had taken on three hundred new men, and the first

duty was to them. And most of those new men are excellent men. Some of

them went to the expense of moving their families hundreds of miles.

Many of the old men have written and asked to come back, saying that

they did wrong, and saying that they were threatened. Many of them have

been very seriously crippled, by reason of not receiving the pay

promised them. I think that they promised sixty dollars a month to

every man who quit the service of the company.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. From what source?

A. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The money didn't come?

A. They got very little. From what I understand from a number of them,

I don't think they got enough to make more than ten dollars a

month--hardly that.

Adjourned, to meet at eight o'clock this evening.