Major General LATTA, _Union Depot_:
Send for Huidekoper's, Gallagher's, Beaver's, and White's,
divisions. The location of the ground is such that it is almost
impossible to handle troops. The troops have just fired into the
crowd, and I am informed a number are killed. I am satisfied no
trains can be sent out to-night. The appearance of affairs is
desperate.
A. L. PEARSON,
_Major General_
The object of the movement, was, of course, to open the road, and Mr.
Pitcairn told me shortly before the movement commenced, in reply to an
interrogatory, that he had fifteen crews ready to carry out trains.
Q. Ready to take out trains?
A. Yes, sir. I never knew the reason why the trains did not run until I
read General Brinton's report, which was some ten months afterward. I
inquired from a gentleman connected with the railroad company why the
trains did not move that day when the tracks were open, ready for them
to move, about an hour after the fire occurred, and he told me the
reason was that General Pearson said it would not do; but upon
referring to General Brinton's report, I found that an offer had been
made by the troops to guard the trains, and the railroad people said,
we have not got the men to move the trains, and the trains,
consequently, could not move. The road was open. The soldiers had
discharged their duty, and opened the road.
Q. How long was it kept open?
A. I do not know, but I presume some couple of hours, from all I learn
from the official reports, before they withdrew from this position to
the round-house.
Q. What time was it that Mr. Pitcairn stated to you that he had fifteen
crews to move trains?
A. I should think it was about--just a little while before Brinton came
in, with his troops, and he got there at two o'clock. I saw him in the
hallway of the hotel, standing about ten or fifteen feet from the desk
of the Union Depot hotel clerk's office. I think Pearson stood beside
me. I am not so sure of that, though.
Q. Did you have any consultation with General Pearson or railroad men
about the propriety of undertaking to start trains that evening--that
afternoon?
A. I have no distinct recollection of any consultation with him.
Q. Do you remember of any citizens calling at the office of the Union
Depot hotel, and advising against moving the trains that afternoon?
A. No citizens called on me with such advice.
Q. Did any of the civil authorities?
A. I never saw any civil authorities of the city of Pittsburgh, except
the mayor, for about ten or twelve minutes, and then I sent for him to
come, during all the time I was there.
Q. When did you send for him?
A. About midnight, on Saturday. He met Colonel Quay, and I think the
first word he said--I think he said: "If Hartranft had been here the
troops would not have been ordered out. Why didn't you do like you did
before--telegraph him, and then there would not have been any trouble."
I said to him: "I think that if you get out there you can stop this
thing now." He said it was beyond his power, and he made some remark I
did not like very well, and I turned on my heel, and left him in
consultation with Colonel Quay.
Q. Can you remember that remark?
A. No, sir.
Q. The substance of it?
A. No; not well enough to testify to under oath. Colonel Quay and he
kept up some considerable conversation.
Q. Was Colonel Quay present when that remark was made?
A. He was; yes, sir.
Q. Where was he?
A. Our room was at the head of the stairs, on the second floor--the
first floor--I suppose the hotel would call it the first floor of the
Union Depot hotel. This room faces right opposite the stairs. Quay and
McCarthy were sitting on a kind of a bench there, and I was standing
up. Matters went on. I don't recollect when I first learned that the
troops were in the round-house. Oh, yes! here is the dispatch, on page
5, addressed from Pearson to me:
OUTER DEPOT, _July 21, 1877_.
Major General JAMES W. LATTA, _Union Depot_:
Brinton reports about fifteen killed and wounded, and child of ten
years. The rioters numbered not less than ten thousand, and
completely surrounded the troops, and fired the first shots. It is
reported that the United States arsenal will be attacked, and arms
and ammunition captured. Have notified the commandant of the fact.
The rioters contemplate burning the railroad buildings, and I have
ordered all my troops inside the walls of the buildings, and will
protect at all hazards.
A. L. PEARSON,
_Major General_.
Q. What time did you receive that dispatch?
A. That dispatch must have been received about dark, or shortly
afterward. I see it is without hour. Then I placed myself in
communication with him. There are two dispatches here. I started a
messenger boy off to the arsenal. It appears that Pearson had been in
communication with them to advise the officers of the fact of what
trouble there was. I was getting replies and sending messages back from
these troops. They were on their way ... of them without ammunition,
and some of them had been unable to get out of there, and wanted to
know whether they should use force, and they finally did get out and go
to the lower end of Pittsburgh by the next morning.
Q. What time did Pearson reach you at the Union depot that evening?
A. I have reported it at ten o'clock, and I think that hour is about
right.
Q. What was that report, then, as near as you state it?
A. He came in with four of his staff, and I was rather astonished at
seeing him. The mob had got pretty thick, and I had learned through the
entire afternoon that no soldier could appear upon the highway with any
safety, unless he had troops with him. A rope, I learned, was put
around the neck of General Brinton's staff officers, and he was
threatened with assassination and all sorts of things; but there is no
question about the fact, unless a soldier was willing to give up his
gun, he had no business out among them. Pearson managed to get down
unobserved. The cars were four lines deep--were all down to the
round-house--and I suppose he got through them. He said he managed to
get down there in that way. I told him I was very much surprised to see
him there, and he said the object of his visit was ammunition and
rations for the troops--they were almost entirely out, and I told him
the situation--whether he understood it fully I do not know--it was
impossible for him to get back. I thought his usefulness was about
ended. He got there, and he could not return again. I told him to go
somewhere else, and report to me at daylight. He went to the house of
one of the staff officers, somewhere on the outskirts of the
town--Richard Evans. Daylight came, and he could not go through, I
suppose, if he had tried. I heard nothing further from him until about
one o'clock. One of his staff officers brought a note from him at the
Monongahela house. He offered to do any duty he could. He said if he
came on the street he was satisfied his life would not be his own for a
moment; and I did not see anything for anybody to do just then, and I
told him I could see nothing to be answered by his coming out at that
time, and he might as well remain where he was.
Q. General Pearson was in command of the troops, then, until ten
o'clock?
A. O, yes. I must say something else. He was in command up to ten
o'clock. Before I told Pearson to go away, I asked him four or five
times very distinctly, and put the interrogatory as strong as I could,
to know whether he had left General Brinton in absolute command, and he
said that he had--that Brinton was the commanding officer, and I have
since letters from General Brinton, in which he has assumed that he was
in command of those troops.
Q. After General Pearson left, then General Brinton was the commanding
officer?
A. He was the commanding officer.
Q. Had entire charge. Did you have any communication with General
Brinton?
A. When Pearson left, no fire had broken out. Pearson rather charges
disaster on me in his report. The burning did not occur until after he
went home. After Pearson left, Mr. Farr and Colonel Norris, Mr. Linn,
and Cassatt and Phillips were active and energetic in getting
provisions out--trying at least. Having got an engine fired up, they
backed it into the Union depot, and I think they got coffee and
sandwiches--a tremendous amount of provisions carried out to where the
engine was. An engineer had agreed to push it out, and everything was
ready for the movement, when the engineer reported that the fire had
gotten between the round-house and the Union depot, and he could not
go. The cars were burned, and he could not run his engine past them,
and the consequence was that the scheme was abandoned. About that time,
a man disguised as a working man, at great personal risk and the
exercise of a vast deal of tact, presented himself to my room at the
hotel. He told me where he had come from, and brought a dispatch from
General Brinton. At that time, I suppose, the fire had got pretty well
ahead, and it was rather of a demoralizing character. I had had it in
mind, if it was possible, to get a communication to Brinton, and
propose some plan to get out of the round-house, and clean that mob
out; but I desisted from that when I read that dispatch. I
unfortunately have lost it, but I recollect I stood up and read it out
in the room, and I recollect I said--that subject of ordering the
troops out had been discussed--I said I will assume no responsibility
of ordering the troops to fight, when a report like that comes from
them, and it left me under the impression that the whole thing was gone
up. I recollect, I walked up and down the room that night, and I
thought every friend I had would be burned to death by morning. I had
no idea they would ever get out, and I devoted my entire energies to
their relief. I had been the associate of the First regiment since my
early boyhood days, and that dispatch left me and everybody else with
that idea. I sat down and answered, in the nature of one which appears
upon page 7, of that report, and sent it back by this same man. At that
time the mob had got to be so serious, that I did not deem it wisdom to
order any troops into the city of Pittsburgh without ammunition. The
troops of Colonel Rodgers, which was part of the First division, and
which should have been supplied with ammunition, were then about
somewhere at Walls station. At the time Pearson came in to me,
communications stopped with the round-house--wires were cut. We had one
Western Union wire running to different points, and that was the only
one we could get hold of. None, however, to the round-house. I sent
word to this detachment at Walls, and to the detachments on their way,
not to come within ten miles of the city, until they got ammunition.
Then I sent this dispatch back to General Brinton:
Major General R. M. BRINTON, _round-house_:
I know your situation fully. Regret that you are so placed, but
knowing your high soldierly qualities, know that you will hold out
to the last. It would be sad to sacrifice life, as you would have
to, in case of a persistent attack, but if it comes, it
consequently must follow. Every one has been untiring in efforts to
get rations and ammunition to you, and, in every instance, it has
failed. Cassatt and Philips, of the railroad, Baugh, of your staff,
Norris, Farr, and Linn, volunteers, are now making every effort to
again shortly reach you. No chance for friction primers.
Have again made every effort to reach you, but failed on account of
the fire. The rest of Philadelphia troops are at Walls station,
twelve miles east, and there remain awaiting ammunition. I am
starting private conveyance to Torrens, with ammunition to Guthrie,
in large enough quantities to supply himself and the troops now at
Walls. When I hear of its safe arrival, I will order them forward
to Guthrie, to report to him, directing him to move to your relief,
with the whole command. His march will be about five miles, and, if
all things prove successful, he ought to reach you by five or six
o'clock. If compelled to escape at last, do so to the eastward;
take Penn avenue, if possible, and make for Guthrie, at Torrens.
JAMES W. LATTA,
_Adjutant General_.
These instructions were not followed; but a different and another route
was taken. I had inquired from the people of Harrisburg where the best
place was to feed troops at that time in that large body. I was told by
those who seemed to know that one of those large hotels at East Liberty
could accommodate five or six hundred men, and I had made this
direction to go to East Liberty to get the men fed. Men dragged out
from their homes, and kept up two nights, cannot exist like the old and
heavier campaigner can, who have become inured to privations.
Q. In giving these orders in your communication to General Brinton, and
in the orders you gave to Colonel Guthrie and Colonel Rodgers, were you
assuming command of the troops, or in what capacity?
A. I was assuming command, so far as that was concerned. I could not
assume, as Adjutant General, the command of any troops, unless I
relieve the officer commanding, and that would be a very delicate thing
to do in the situation we were in. For the purpose of concentration,
and for the purpose of a movement, I was acting as commander-in-chief,
and for the purpose of giving general directions.
Q. You had plenty of ammunition at the Union depot?
A. Plenty of ammunition.
Q. Could you not, have ordered Colonel Guthrie to have marched down
Fifth street by a circuitous route, and brought him to the Union depot
at night?
A. He said he hadn't forces enough.
Q. There was no force on Fifth street, was there--running out Fifth
avenue?
A. I suppose I could have done all these things, but I didn't conceive,
in view of the reports I had, that it was wise to undertake, and my
views were fully confirmed by the dispatches that came from Guthrie
himself, after I had ordered the movement, because he wired me as
follows--after I got him an order for the concentration he wants to
know--a Pittsburgher inquired of me what route he shall take.
Q. Did Colonel Guthrie have any ammunition?
A. O, yes; he had some seven to ten rounds, I believe--I know he had
some ammunition.
Q. How many rounds did General Brinton have with him in the round-house?
A. I reported twenty--that is my belief.
Q. At the time you sent this communication, on page 7, with the message
to General Brinton, could you not have ordered him out of the
round-house, and could he not have marched, at that time, down to the
Union depot?
A. I cannot answer whether he could have marched down. I could have
ordered him to do so.
Q. What is your opinion about his having been able to march down to
Union depot, and cut his way to Union depot at that time?
A. I do not think at that time it would have been a wise movement in
the night.
Q. A fire had already broken out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know that Brinton had received that communication?
A. 0, yes; Brinton got that.
Q. Was that discussed, or did that occur to you at the time to order
him down to the Union depot?
A. Yes; I have just stated I intended to order him out. I do not mean
to say at that particular time, but I intended to suggest, when I got
this dispatch, and then I would not assume the responsibility of
ordering troops out that were described to be in that condition.
Q. Have you that dispatch?
A. That is lost.
Q. Can you state the nature of it--the contents of it?
A. I do not want to say one thing that is in it. The contents of it
were, as I have stated, general demoralization.
Q. Of his troops?
A. I do not mean to say his troops. The impression made by the dispatch
was one that created upon the mind of anybody who read it--and there
was no use attempt to fight just then with the troops. That was an
impression left upon my mind, and upon the minds of those who heard me
read it.
Q. Is that dispatch lost?
A. That dispatch is lost.
Q. Who was present and heard that dispatch read?
A. Colonel Farr, Colonel Quay, Colonel Hassinger, and Mr. Russell.
Q. What time was that received?
A. About midnight.
Q. Did General Pearson consult you after the track had been cleared,
and after the collision, at about five o'clock--did he consult you as
to the disposition of the troops?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know they were going to be placed in the round-house?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you know where the Fourteenth and the Nineteenth regiments were,
commanded by Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard?
A. I knew where they had been sent to in the morning.
Q. Do you know where they were in the evening?
A. I made up my mind they had all disappeared. I must not use that
phrase any more, because one of the military newspapers says it is a
peculiar one to use--that troops disappear.
Q. Did you know they were ordered in the transfer depot?
A. No, sir; but somebody came in, and told me they were all gone.
Q. Do you know when they were disbanded by order of General Brown?
A. The first I knew of that was, I saw Brown two or three times during
the night in citizens' clothes, and toward the early morning, but I had
heard all along his troops had gone. The old gentleman was pretty well
excited. He was going out and making promises, and coming back, and
having interviews, and getting in among the fellows. The next day, Cap.
Bigham, he was a pretty strong man, was in the room at the hotel,
between nine and ten o'clock, and I said something pretty rough to
Bigham, about the troops running away, and Bigham, like a good soldier,
would ... that he had done what he was told; he said these troops left
there by order of General Brown.
Q. That was the first you knew of General Brown's order?
A. That is the first I ever heard.
Q. After General Pearson left, then General Brinton was the commanding
officer, as I understand, and you learned that fact by and through
General Pearson?
A. By and through General Pearson.
Q. That he had left him in command?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did General Brinton know that the ammunition was at the Union depot?
A. O, yes.
Q. He knew it had been left there?
A. You know he kept sending for us to send it out to him. He left the
ammunition under the guard of a detachment of cavalry. They had sabers
way up at the lower end of the depot. My recollection is, when things
got pretty hot, these men were no earthly account round with their
sabers, and I believe a captain and some men of the Fourteenth were
standing around there, too. They never reported to me for any special
purpose. I sent those gentlemen out. I know I sent some of them out,
for they succeeded in getting out, some from this exposed place, down
to the cellar of the hotel.
Q. Was Cassatt and Pitcairn out at Twentieth street, at the time of the
collision?
A. I am told they were.
Q. Did you have conversation with them after they returned?
A. I had a conversation with one of them.
Q. Did you ask them whether trains had been moved?
A. Yes; and they made answer just as I have stated. Said General
Pearson told them not to move--they said General Pearson told them not
to move.
Q. And did you have any conversation with General Pearson on the
subject, when he came in?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you have any consultation before the troops started with the
civil authorities?
A. I never saw them.
Q. You don't know what arrangements--as I understand it, the sheriff
marched with a posse in front of the troops?
A. I have been told so. I never saw the sheriff but once in my life,
and that was two or three weeks afterwards.
Q. Were your instructions to the commanders to keep themselves
subordinate to the civil authorities?
A. I have just read my original dispatches--aiding the civil
authorities.
Q. When General Pearson left, at ten o'clock, you did practically
relieve him from command?
A. Yes. Of course, it was a virtual relief, as explained in that way.
Q. He first asked you whether he had left General Brinton in command?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, did you consider you had power to order the movements of
General Brinton, after General Pearson had left?
A. I did; for purposes such as that.
Q. And also of Colonel Guthrie?
A. I did; yes, sir.
Q. And Colonel Rodgers and the troops in that vicinity?
A. Yes, sir. You will observe I did not give Brinton any particular
order.
Q. That power you had by virtue of the instructions that the
commander-in-chief had given you before he left?
A. I took it I had that power generally in the comprehensive duties of
Adjutant General. The conclusion of this dispatch to Brinton is not in
the shape of an order. It tells him what to do. Brinton thought he
could have done better, he could have gone somewhere else, and when a
man don't follow such instructions as that he takes a great deal of
risk, just as a man who refuses to obey the order of an adjutant, if
the Adjutant General is sustained by his chief, he is going to get a
pretty good dressing; if not, he is all right.
Q. General Brinton could have obeyed your instructions or disobeyed
them?
A. I am simply applying that remark to the conclusion of this letter,
which reads: "If compelled to escape, at least do so to the eastward.
Take Penn avenue, if possible, and make for Guthrie, at Torrens."
Brinton could have taken that direction, or taken some other one if he
thought he could do better by taking some other. When he didn't take
the direction I gave him, he assumed a responsibility.
Q. Afterwards, you ordered him to join Guthrie, at Torrens?
A. I did; yes. He had got too far then. After this order went out, they
succeeded in getting ammunition to Guthrie. I had ordered a train from
Walls by telegraph. The reply I got from Walls was, that the "engineers
won't run the trains. I can't move them." Then I ordered the wagon.
Q. Did you see the sheriff after you arrived at Pittsburgh, or the
Union depot, before the troops were sent to Twenty-eighth street?
A. I never saw the sheriff nor the mayor until I sent for him.
Q. Did you ask General Pearson whether he had a consultation with the
sheriff or the mayor?
A. I did not ask him anything about the mayor, but I had dispatches
from Pearson in which he said he had been with the sheriff.
Q. You saw no citizens on Saturday night, I understand you to say?
A. Saturday night--I don't recollect. I think Mr. Rook came in the room
for a few moments on Saturday afternoon. Mr. Hampden was in the room.
Q. Who is the solicitor?
A. There was a good many railroad men around there, but outside of the
railroad men I have no distinct recollection of any one but Rook.
Q. Did you see James Park, junior, Saturday evening?
A. I don't know such a name. I might know him if I would see him.
Q. He had no conversation with Mr. Cassatt in your presence, that you
recollect of?
A. No, sir; nor nobody had any conversation with Mr. Cassatt in my
presence during the evening. I didn't see Mr. Cassatt more than a few
moments.
Q. On Saturday afternoon, did you see these gentlemen?
A. I don't know--I don't think I did. I might have seen him. If I saw
this gentleman I could tell better. I don't know the name.
Q. Did any citizens speak to you or to Cassatt, in your presence, in
regard to any meeting any time to move trains on Saturday?
A. No, sir; nobody. I heard it talked of, but nobody ever came to me.
It was talked of in our room between us.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. It was talked of in the room?
A. Between ourselves.
Q. Was this before the effort was made to clear the tracks with troops?
A. I do not recollect.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Did it occur to you that Saturday would be a bad day to undertake
the movement of trains?
A. It has occurred to me. Whether it occurred to me then or not I am
not able to answer.
Q. Were you aware that the rolling mills and manufacturing
establishments in Pittsburgh closed at noon on Saturday?
A. I don't think I was at that time.
Q. And that a large number of men were idle on Saturday afternoon?
A. I don't think I was at that time, but it is just one of those sort
of things I know now, and I cannot give a full recollection or
impression. I know this much, there was no direct report to me of this
fact with any suggestion that the movement be suspended on account of
that fact, because then I would recollect distinctly.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Your own understanding when you got to Pittsburgh was the civil
authorities had lost all control, and were powerless?
A. When I first got to Pittsburgh?
Q. Yes?
A. Yes; so far as any force they had.
Q. They were powerless to disperse the crowd?
A. Yes, sir; so far as any force which they could control as a civil
posse.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. After the burning commenced Saturday--the burning of cars--did it
occur to you that it was possible for General Brinton, with the men he
had there, to stop that in any way?
A. I don't know. It occurred to me.
Q. Did you take it into consideration?
A. I don't know that I did particularly. I was not thinking
particularly about that.
Q. Did you have any consultation with the railroad officials during the
night there as to any means--or try to devise any means to stop the
burning cars?
A. There was not any of them there.
Q. What became of the railroad officials?
A. I don't know, sir.
Q. When did you miss them?
A. I last saw Mr. Cassatt somewheres towards dark. They were down
stairs. I think Mr. Cassatt was down, but I didn't see him. He came
back again.
Q. Did you see Pitcairn during the night?
A. I don't think I ever saw Pitcairn after I had talked with him about
the cars.
Q. Did you see Mr. Scott?
A. Scott was the first man to tell me about the collision. He came in
the room and announced the collision, said it was very sad, and walked
out. I saw Mr. Phillips, another railroad man, I recollect, when the
fire was getting close to the hotel. He and Russell threw cartridges
into the pitcher full of water, thinking it would destroy them.
Q. What time did you arrive at the Union depot?
A. I estimated it at about noon.
Q. Sunday?
A. Sunday, yes, sir.
Q. What means did you take Sunday to try to stop the burning?
A. I didn't take any. I had nothing to take any means with. There were
six gentlemen in citizens' clothes--most of them civilians--all
civilians I think. The next day when I first heard that, Captain Aull
was the first party who came in. He announced that the troops had got
out of the round-house. There were two parties from East Liberty who
had come into the room to ask me to retain the Eighteenth regiment
there, and I looked at them in astonishment when I had ordered them to
come in to the relief of General Brinton. While I was talking to those
citizens, Captain Aull came in, and he overheard the conversation. He
stepped up and told me he had driven through Brinton's troops, and they
were marching out. I was relieved from a great deal of anxiety, so I
sat down and immediately told Aull--having no other, I think--sat down
and dictated a dispatch, which appears here on page 11, addressed to
Brinton, signed by me, dated July 22, 1877:
PITTSBURGH, _July 22, 1877_.
Major General R. M. BRINTON:
Remain in position at stock-yards, or thereabouts, securing
yourself, and await further orders. Congratulate you on your
manoeuver of this morning. Consult with Colonel Guthrie, and
govern yourself accordingly. From information received here, it
appears Eighteenth regiment is sufficient to protect stock-yards,
and will not excite special prejudices of the mob. There is an old
fort in the vicinity, which is suggested as a good place to hold.
It can be shown to you by parties familiar with the neighborhood.
Keep your channels of subsistence well open, and await further
orders. There may be some developments, which, of course, will
require you to act on your own responsibility. If any troops arrive
at East Liberty, assume command of them. Report their arrival here,
if possible. Norris will be on the ground shortly, and explain the
situation here. Act after consultation with him.
JAMES W. LATTA,
_Adjutant General_.
At the same time, Norris being a staff officer--it is not customary to
give a staff officer written instructions--I started him off to talk
with Brinton. Brinton appears to have given this order sometime about
the 31st of July, seven or eight days afterwards. Norris got hold of
me, and told me the purport of the order, and told me what the
directions were, and he moved about a mile beyond Sharpsburg bridge and
stayed there. I started off to try to make a junction with the troops
at Walls, which I did not know at that time had gone to Blairsville.
Q. Did you have any consultation with the officers on Sunday?
A. I saw no citizens of Pittsburgh on Sunday, except Mr. Bennett.
Whether we called to see him or not, I don't know. I was in the room
just as Norris had returned to the Monongahela house. Bennett and
Cassatt were sitting upon one bed, and Norris and some other gentleman
on the other, and Norris was giving a description of his ride to
Brinton, and I was introduced to Mr. Bennett, and shook hands with him,
and overheard part of their conversation, which was to the effect that
Mr. Bennett was trying to persuade Cassatt to make some compromise with
the men, which Cassatt refused to do.
Q. He was the only one?
A. I think so; the only one I saw. I was going to say, I remained there
until nine o'clock at night, and then I had got dispatches from every
part of the country, that showed everything was in a general uprising,
and I made up my mind I must get to Harrisburg, and Phillips told me
there was no way to get over the Pennsylvania, and we went to Beaver,
believing the Erie route to be the most practicable. At Beaver I
telegraphed to Scott to get a special train. Scott intimated their road
was open, and I hired a carriage and drove back to Allegheny City, and
came back here.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. Do you know what became of the ammunition in the Union depot?
A. Before I left the Union depot I spent about nearly an hour in
arranging a plan to get it saved. I left it in charge of Captain Breck.
The plan we had arranged was to--that was just about the time the
milkmen were going back to their places in the country--to get empty
milk cans and open the boxes and pour the ammunition into the cans and
take the ammunition out. I am told that he got five or six cans loaded,
and was on his way to hunt transportation, when the fire got hold of
the thing, and the ammunition was destroyed.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Did the mayor, in that interview, express any intention or desire to
suppress this--making any attempt to control it?
A. No, sir; simply said the matter was beyond his control, and he could
not do anything, and he was tolerably mad.
Q. Did he say he had in the first place?
A. No, sir; I didn't ask him anything about that.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Who explained the movements of the troops, as they advanced out to
Twenty-eighth street?
A. General Pearson. He showed his plans to me before he started.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Do you know whether the command was given to fire that day, by any
of the officers?
A. I do not know anything about it.
Q. Do you know whether General Pearson was there at the time the firing
took place?
A. I do not know.
Q. Do you know how General Pearson was dressed on that day?
A. Yes, sir; he left me with a blouse on. Major general's
shoulder-straps and fatigue cap, and my impression is he had one of
these old fashioned blouses, with the braid in front, and a sword and
belt. Whether the belt was outside of the blouse or inside, I cannot
recollect. He had a fatigue uniform of the United States army,
excepting that braid, if that was there. It is not now a part of the
uniform.
Q. What time did he leave you with that uniform on?
A. He left me with that uniform on, about three o'clock, and returned
again with it on at night.
Q. Did he have it on at night?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Engelbert:
Q. You saw him before the firing, and after the firing with the same
uniform on?
A. Yes, sir; with the same uniform.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. After you returned to Harrisburg, who directed the troops from that
time until the arrival of the Governor in the State?
A. There was very little direction done. In the meantime he had been
advised of my movements, and he had in the meantime been directing
himself. After the Pittsburgh collision, he commenced to move the
troops, and we got into the same channel. Pretty much all the orders
were alike.
Q. Do you know anything about a collision that occurred at Reading,
with General Reeder's troops?
A. Only as it is officially reported by General Reeder and Bolton. It
was reported here immediately, I saw it the next day.
Q. What time did General Huidekoper get to Pittsburgh?
A. He got to Pittsburgh from Chicago, a little before daylight on
Sunday morning.
Q. Did you have any consultation with him after his arrival?
A. We had a plan of battle arranged there. Huidekoper started on its
accomplishment. We chartered a steamboat, and we managed to smuggle
several boxes of ammunition from the hotel, and he went to Rochester,
believing his troops were coming down. He ought to have been in
Pittsburgh by noon, but the troops were stopped by the riot.
Q. They were stopped by reports at Greenfield?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was the colonel commanding these troops that were on their way?
A. I think they were in charge of a major on the Allegheny Valley road.
They were in charge of Lieutenant Colonel Magee.
Q. They were not in charge of Colonel Carpenter?
A. Possibly so. I don't know that. Magee--I had communications with
him.
Q. Do you know why they stopped at Greenfield?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever try to ascertain the causes?
A. No, sir; that matter was altogether in the hands of General
Huidekoper; he was division commander.
Q. Did Huidekoper report to you any reasons for it?
A. No, sir; not unless there is something in this report here. I think
if he had I would have recollected it.
Q. Was it reported to you by anybody that there was no cause for the
stopping of the troops there, excepting that the colonel commanding the
troops was afraid to go on?
A. I never heard. I don't think I ever heard that before. There was
plenty of ammunition; there was five thousand rounds of ammunition at
Greenfield at the time.
Q. Plenty of ammunition in Greenfield?
A. I didn't know it then because it was in Huidekoper's division. I
learned afterwards it was at Greenfield.
Q. They should have arrived, you say, at Rochester, at what time?
A. If the trains had been on time they ought to have been in Pittsburgh
at twelve o'clock.
Q. Sunday?
A. Sunday, yes, sir.
Q. They never got any further than Greenfield?
A. Not within fifty or sixty miles. Huidekoper left Rochester and went
out west to meet the Governor. He gave up all hopes of getting near
about noon.
Q. Were any steps taken by the commander-in-chief to ascertain the
cause of that delay?
A. No, sir; we assumed it was because they could not get the hands to
run them. That was the report from every place, and it seemed to be
generally confirmed. I was just going to say, in looking at this
matter, it ought to be looked at in an exceptional light. It is a
thoroughly new thing. The soldiers ought not to be reflected on as
severely as the people have. There is as much courage in the National
Guard as there is anywhere, and it ought not to be judged of in the
light of a regular warfare nor by such rules.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. You found after you had organized the troops, and had them out a few
times that they were just as good as any soldiers?
A. Just as good as any soldiers you bring from any quarter of the
globe.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. It was reported that some Philadelphia troops were captured across
the Susquehanna here by a squad of rioters from Harrisburg, and tramps,
and brought into the city. I wish you would state what you know about
that, and who the troops were?
A. I only know if as you do. I didn't see it, and know nothing of it.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. But was the thing not officially reported?
A. Nothing official reported to me. I believe the officer in charge of
those troops is now undergoing trial by court martial in Philadelphia.
Q. Do you know who it is?
A. I only know from hearsay.
Q. Do you know of any troops that were ordered to Pittsburgh returning
without orders?
A. I heard so, yes, sir; that there were troops that did return.
Q. Do you know it officially?
A. No.
Q. Of your own knowledge?
A. I don't think any troops did return, as bodies, to Philadelphia.
Scattered, straggling men did, but no body of troops returned to
Philadelphia. I do not think that the straggling in the National Guard
was equal to what it is sometimes.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do you approve of General Brown's course, in disbanding his
regiments at Pittsburgh?
A. If it be a fact that General Brown did give these troops directions
to leave, it was a most outrageous breach of everything a good soldier
ought to have done. I believe those troops there could have held that
place until now.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. I understand you to say that it is your judgment that those troops
might have held that place?
A. I think so.
Q. Do you know anything as to the reasons that induced General Brown to
disband those two regiments?
A. Haven't the most distant idea. I don't even know that it is a fact,
except as I have seen it alleged in the newspapers.
Q. Are you well acquainted with General Brown?
A. I have known him five or six years. He has a very fine record in the
army. He used to be adjutant in our corps.
Q. Stood well, up to this time, in the National Guard?
A. Excellently well.
Q. Do you know that he was at that time laboring under any physical or
mental disability?
A. No, I do not, except that he struck me as being most terribly fussy,
and ... a whole lot of information that it was not worth while
bothering with.
Q. Did he strike you at that time as laboring under any mental
disability?
A. No; I would not at all have considered that.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did he show unusual excitement--nervousness?
A. Brown is a terribly talkative fellow, and he talked in his usual
strain; I should not have set him down as anywise wrong.
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