Q. When you first arrived at the Union depot, that was on----

A. Friday, at noon.

Q. Would it have required a large force to disperse the mob then?

A. It would not--not at Twenty-eighth street. I did not get off the

cars at Twenty-eighth street; and I did not go up to Twenty-eighth

street; and I did not know what the disposition of the crowd was; and I

do not know what was back there--what could be seen--but those that

could be seen certainly did not appear over two hundred or two hundred

and fifty men.

Q. If there had been active measures taken on Friday or Saturday, could

not that mob have been dispersed and the rioting suppressed?

A. I believe it could on Friday. I do not believe it could on Saturday.

On Friday it could, because the strikers were determined themselves not

to go to work, and some of them were rioters. There is no doubt about

it; because some of them had interfered with the civil authorities, and

a great portion of them were simply determined that they would not

work, and they would not furnish any assistance to the Pennsylvania

railroad in running their trains. For that reason, I believe the trains

ought to have been started at once. I believe if a train had been

started, the backbone of the thing would have been broken. I believe so

to-day; but it was impossible to move trains, because you could not get

men to man them. They were afraid of the strikers. It was not necessary

for a striker to go up and stick a pistol at a man's head, or say, "I

will shoot you." Some of them would give a wink and lift a finger,

which would be just as effectual as if they had shot at you. I saw one

striker go on the back part of an engine tender of a locomotive and

take hold of a brake that was there. The engineer attempted to start

the train. He just lifted his finger and the engineer never moved that

train.

Q. If these trainmen that were willing to run had received the

protection either of the military or civil authorities, could they not

have run out these trains, and do you not think they would have been

run out?

A. I think everybody got all the protection it was possible to give

them. The Pennsylvania railroad were not prepared to run these trains,

and they knew what the riot was, and what it would amount to more than

we did. I knew no reason why troops should be called out on the morning

I was called out. Never heard of a disturbance of any kind. After the

military had been called out, then affairs had progressed so far that

to have started a train from Twenty-eighth street would have required

to place upon that train a large force of military to protect it. You

could have moved it, probably to the stock-yards, and through the

stock-yards, because there was a military force to protect it there,

but as soon as they got a little west, why something might be thrown

upon the track--a demonstration made of some kind that would block the

cars up. There was no certainty it could go very far after it had

started. But for the reason that there had been no demonstration made

at any point, I believe if the train had been started, it could have

gone through; not that it was in the power of the small force, civil or

military, to put down the strikers, had they determined to resist,

because there were too many of those strikers and fellow helpers in the

mob.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You think there was a necessity for calling on the military?

A. Oh, undoubtedly. There is no question about it in my mind. The only

thing I find to regret was that the military did not have proper

information as to what it meant. I am but an humble citizen of the city

of Pittsburgh, and I know nothing about the strike on the Pennsylvania

railroad, and what led to it, and what it meant. I went down to Union

depot, and until I met General Pearson, or the sheriff, I knew no

reason why the military should be called out. When I got back I could

see why. There was a demonstration against law and order.

Q. There was a necessity?

A. There was a necessity, for the evidence proved that.

* * * * *

Colonel Joseph H. Gray, _sworn_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside, Colonel?

A. I reside in Pittsburgh, East End.

Q. What is your official position in the National Guard?

A. I am colonel of the Fourteenth regiment.

Q. Were you in the war of the late rebellion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What rank did you hold?

A. I was orderly sergeant of a company in the One Hundred and Fifth

Pennsylvania regiment.

Q. How long were you in the army?

A. I went in in 1861, and remained in the service until the battle of

Fair Oaks, where I was laid up from service.

Q. State when you received the orders calling you into service in July

last--what day it was and what time?

A. I was not present. I had left Thursday morning and gone to the

country, fourteen miles, and on Friday the order reached head-quarters

for Colonel Glenn to assemble the regiment, about noon or after dinner

some time.

Q. Was he lieutenant colonel?

A. Yes; lieutenant colonel. About Friday evening I heard that there was

trouble in the city, and that the military was called out, and I also

heard that the men could not be depended on--that they were not going

to respond. Citizens from East Liberty came up. I jumped in my buggy

and started to the city, and I met one company at East Liberty. I

stopped there and, to my astonishment, found that the company had been

assembled, and that a large majority of the company had responded to

the call, and were ready for service, in their armory. I spoke a few

words to the captain and told him to remain there until I came from the

city, and he requested me to telegraph him immediately, and send him

some orders. I stopped at my home, and put on my fatigue uniform, and

came to the city, and went to the central armory and found there my

adjutant, and that Lieutenant Colonel Glenn had taken what men had

assembled there--there are three companies who have their armories

there--and he had taken them to the Union Depot hotel. I immediately

went there and reported for duty to General Brown. I inquired of my

officers as to the number of men that had reported for duty, and then I

had six companies in the city and four in the country. I inquired

whether Captain Shof had been ordered out at East Liberty--he told me

not. I went to the dispatcher's office, at the end of the hotel, and

telegraphed to those companies to report to me immediately, at the

Union Depot hotel. However, at that time they could not very well get

in, and I changed the order to report to me on the first morning train

coming into the city. About 7 o'clock Captain Nesbitt came up and

Captain Glenn, of Mansfield, reported with their companies. That was

Friday evening. It was six o'clock when I came to the Union depot, and

they arrived at seven. I went out to the dispatcher's office the second

time, to order Captain Perchman in. I then met, for the first time,

General Pearson and told him what I proposed doing, and he said that he

preferred that Captain Perchman should remain in his armory there for

the present, and Colonel Moore, as chief of staff, told me he had

communicated with Captain Perchman to this effect, that he should go

and get his men rations and remain there, so that I then turned my

attention to having my men fed. I asked the gentleman in charge of the

depot if he had any cars in the ... he should run them down, so that I

could put my men into them for the night, until further orders. He

immediately had cars run down. I did that because I wanted to get my

men--there was a great deal of talking on the platform around the depot

about the future operations. General Latta had just come in, and there

was a good deal of excitement, and I did not want my men to know

anything about it. I put them in the cars and kept them there until

three o'clock, in the morning. Then I received an order, about twelve

or one o'clock, to take my command, at three o'clock, sharp, to

Twenty-eighth street, by way of Webster avenue. I marched out of the

Union depot precisely at three o'clock, and General Brown and Colonel

Smith and another gentleman. We went to Twenty-eighth street by a

circuitous route, and took a position on the hill side center, opposite

Twenty-eighth street, in line. There we remained during the day. I

should say about nine o'clock, perhaps between eight and nine o'clock,

General Brown sent his adjutant to me, asking the detail of one or two

companies--I think he said fifty men.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. That was on Saturday?

A. That was on Saturday morning. I sent two companies to the foot of

the hill, and they were on duty there for an hour, perhaps an hour and

a half, and they were relieved by two other companies.

Q. From your regiment?

A. Yes, sir; during the forenoon I sent a request to General Brown that

my two companies should be relieved. They had all been down, and I

asked that they be relieved by the Nineteenth regiment. I thought we

were doing more than our share of duty, and for other reasons I asked

to be relieved.

Q. You speak here of Colonel Glenn?

A. Lieutenant Colonel Glenn. He assembled my regiment in the city, and

reported to the Union depot.

Q. You say you were accompanied by Colonel Smith?

A. Colonel Smith.

Q. What regiment?

A. He is connected with another regiment.

Q. During the day, what companies were on duty at the foot of the hill?

A. They were not under my command. I never knew what orders they had

that were detailed. I do not know to-day what their orders were. I know

what duty they were performing. I was never down on the railroad myself

until I was ordered off the hill. We were there when the Philadelphia

troops came there, and we were witnesses of the conflict. About two

o'clock in the afternoon I received an order--I think it was about that

time--the only order I received from the time I had got an order to go

to Twenty-eighth street--I received an order to have my command in

readiness to move, at a moment's notice, on board a train. I

immediately sent my commissary, Captain Wallace, to provide rations.

While there was no explanation of that order, I understood his meaning

that we should take charge of a freight train. I had the provisions

there. The captain got the provisions at Twenty-eighth street, three

days' rations, and we remained, momentarily expecting an order to move

down the hill and get on board a train. At the time that the

Philadelphia troops came out----

Q. Before you come to that--did I understand you to say that you had no

knowledge of what orders those companies had that were detailed, and

sent down to the crossing of the railroad?

A. They were detailed away from my command, and I had no knowledge of

what was to be done.

Q. Who did they report to?

A. They reported to General Brown. I know what duty they were

performing there--could see it all. I might just say here that I had

great apprehensions of the whole matter. They were not the impressions

I had since. Those were what I had then. I want to say this: that I

gave orders distinctly and positively that my men should not be allowed

to talk with, or in any way have any conversation with, the strikers,

and I say, also, that that order was positive. Of course, men sometimes

were away; it was a pretty hot day, and they had to go for water, and

occasionally, perhaps, they talked; but I do not think my orders were

violated at all in any respect. I stayed with my men all day long

watching their behavior, and at this time I received an order to get

my men ready to go on a train. I felt pleased at this, for I thought

those who were at the head of affairs understood the situation. I had

my doubts before that whether they did. Though we did not go on the

train, we were there, ready to go on after the firing was over.

Q. Give us the circumstances of the affair; how it occurred--you were

present there at the time, were you not?--as briefly as you can?

A. I would say, first, that the Philadelphia troops came out in as

grand style as ever men went to any duty, and their position was good.

There can be no exceptions taken to the position. They moved up the

tracks. My recollection of the matter is that there was one company in

advance of the First regiment. I did not know it was the First regiment

at that time. I know that from the report. They moved, and they were

formed in line and marched to the left to the round-house, cleared the

tracks, and then the rear rank was about faced, and cleared the track,

leaving an open space. Two other companies were brought up, and a

Gatling gun brought up to that space, and the company in advance

marched right into the crowd. They were as determined men as ever stood

before anybody. I looked very earnestly, and with a good deal of

solicitation, when the stones were thrown and pistol shots fired. I

could not see whether there was many or not. There was a great deal of

confusion, and the firing began and was kept up--a continuous firing.

Q. You say that pistol shots were fired from the mob?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And stones thrown from the mob and other missiles?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was there any firing from the troops before that?

A. There was not a shot fired until after they were attacked. The first

thing I saw--I knew it was coming. I was not disappointed a particle in

regard to the whole matter--the company charge bayonets on the crowd,

and the first thing I saw was a man in the mob take hold of a gun, and

one man wrenched the gun away from him, and struck him with the bayonet

with a good deal of force.

Q. That is, one of the soldiers?

A. Yes; and then the pistol shots were fired. It was all done in a

moment, and then the fire began by the soldiers.

Q. Was there any command given to fire?

A. It was too far away for hearing the command; but I may say it was

effectually done, and if that was so, it was only a pity the command

had not been given.

Q. Was it a volley or was it a scattering fire?

A. It was a scattering fire, but it extended all along the line. We

were immediately in front of the rear rank that faced to the rear, and

received a good share of the fire.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Was there a rush made by the mob towards the troops before the

firing began?

A. The thing had been gathering momentum from ten o'clock. It was not a

mob--the mob in front--that I was afraid of at all. It was the feeling

that existed there, apparently strong outside, and when the mills

closed that afternoon, it seemed to me they just came up there in

hundreds.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. Rolling mills, iron mills, and so forth?

A. Yes, sir; the crowd accumulated rapidly. They were going and coming

all the time, and they were there in force.

Q. The mill hands are generally at leisure on Saturday afternoon?

A. I think they came right out of the mills, when they closed down. A

great many, perhaps, came there out of curiosity, but there was a great

many added to the mob down on Twenty-eighth street. The crowd increased

rapidly at that time.

Q. From what you saw, would you consider an order to fire justifiable?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What took place after that?

A. The crowd ran away. Those that were on the hill side came up and

devoted themselves to the carrying away of the wounded for a time. The

Philadelphia troops moved up and took their position by the crossing,

at Twenty-eighth street, and placed their Gatling gun in position

there, and I ordered my companies, Captain Glenn and Captain Nesbitt,

up in line of battalion. The crowd down the road, that had been there,

collected again. However, they did not make any attempt to force

themselves on to the railroad. The Philadelphia troops would strike

terror into the crowd and they would run away for a time, and then

would find there was no danger, and then they would come back.

Q. When did you go after that?

A. Five or six o'clock, after quiet had been restored, and the wounded

had all been carried away, I received an order from General Pearson, to

assist Colonel Howard, in moving Breck's guns to the round-house, and

then go to the transfer office, and hold it against any attack. I sent

that order--it was a written order--with my adjutant, to General Brown,

who was with Colonel Howard, on my right and front, and reported to him

that I was ready to move, in obedience to the order. However, I want to

say, that was very reluctantly done.

Q. What was reluctantly done?

A. That movement by me. That was done, because their officers and their

commands were there. Captain Breck came to me at that time, and said he

had such an order, and asked me if I would not see General Pearson, and

protest against the matter. I said to him that there were my men

immediately in my line, and he commenced to explain the situation that

he could be in, and I said to him, "Captain, I won't allow any

discussion of that kind here." I told him to step to one side, and this

order reached me, just at that time, and after I read the order, I

found Captain Breck was waiting and I went to him. He asked me if I had

concluded to do anything in the matter, and I said to him, we will obey

the order. I felt then it was a great mistake.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. For what reason?

A. I did not think we had any business down on Twenty-eighth street.

Q. You went down to obey the order?

A. We obeyed the order. However, just immediately at that time the

Philadelphia troops began moving into the round-house, commencing on

the left, and moving in all the way up, and Captain Breck took this

battery, and then went away, and left me on the hill. When I moved up

they were all in the round-house, and the mob was pressing down this

track. I moved down the hill. Had to go down by a flank movement. I

anticipated trouble then, because I knew by their actions--they hooted

and jeered and taunted the soldiers--the Philadelphians--as they went

away. I anticipated trouble. However, we marched down by the gate-way,

and marched through the crowd, and to the transfer station. Upon my

arrival at the transfer station, I took a view of the station myself.

Colonel Howard came and asked me in regard to the matter. Colonel

Howard asked me if I would take command of the station. I told him

General Brown was here, and he was in authority. I told him that I

would throw out pickets on my front. The transfer station was separated

by tracks in between. Colonel Howard was on the side next to the hill,

and I was on Liberty street, and I told him I would take care of my

side; that he could dispose of his own troops. We remained there, and

the most of them went and laid down to sleep. It was dark, and most of

my men, except those on duty, went to sleep. During the night General

Brown came to me, and said that the place was untenable, and he advised

me to get out of it. We commenced to consult about the matter, and I

told him there was no trouble there, that it was a good place to rest,

and that if we got into any trouble we could get out of it. A short

time afterwards he and Colonel Howard came back, and I had the

situation in my own mind, and had sent my officers out on the hill

side, and at that very time I had sent Doctor McCandless, surgeon on my

staff. He was well acquainted with the hill side in that part of town.

I sent him up there to look at the situation--it is a very ragged

hill--to see in case there was a necessity to pick out the best way, of

a return by the way of the hill side to my old position on the hill

side. When General Brown and Colonel Howard came to me, I told them

what I had done, that I expected that our position was such we could

not do any fighting, but we could from the hill side, and I had sent

officers out to select a way by which we could get out, if necessary.

There was no immediate danger. About ten o'clock General Brown came to

me again, and said we must get out. He had information that we must

leave that place. Says I, "General Brown, you cannot persuade me to

leave this, I will obey your orders, but I do not see any necessity for

leaving this position at this time." He immediately ordered me to take

my command, and go to the Union depot. I formed my command, and we

started, but the road was full of cars, and we had to go out the best

way we could. We got out into the open track below, and when I got out

there, I halted the advance of the regiment, re-formed and marched into

the Union depot in good order.

Q. Will you please tell me about how far it is from the transfer

station to the round-house, where the Philadelphia troops were?

A. From the transfer station?

Q. From where you were stationed?

A. I have very little knowledge as to the location of that transfer

depot. I never passed through there, except going east on the train at

night, but I do not think it is very far, probably two hundred yards.

Q. That is where you were stationed, about two hundred yards from the

round-house?

A. I should think so. That is my idea of the distance there. When I

arrived at the Union depot, I was pretty disgusted with the thing--had

been all day, for that matter. After I re-formed my men, I had expected

to get some rations. I knew my commissary was there getting some, and I

sent an officer to inquire and find out. General Brown, I went to him,

and asked him for orders, and to my utter astonishment he told me I

could dismiss my command.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you obey him?

A. Not then. I called around my officers--those that were nearest to

me--surrounded the general, and protested in the strongest terms that I

was allowed to, in regard to the matter, that it was a disgrace to the

officers and men that I had there willing to do their duty; that it was

a disgrace also to desert the Philadelphia troops. The general was a

little startled at my talk, and he says, "You remain here a few

minutes, and I will see you again." He left me, and I did not see him

again.

By Mr. Means:

Q. I would like to know where and when your regiment was disbanded?

A. When and where it was disbanded. It was disbanded a few minutes

before eleven o'clock at the Union Depot hotel, by myself, in obedience

to General Brown's order. And I want to say this in regard to that

matter: After I remained there awhile, I went up to the office of the

Union Depot hotel, and inquired for General Pearson, and they told me

that the general was not there. I inquired for General Latta, and they

told me he was not there. I wondered where he could have gone to, and I

saw Mr. Murdock, who is one of the officers, and he made the same

reply; and I had great confidence in him.

Q. Your head-quarters is here at the market-house, isn't it?

A. I had my head-quarters at my office. That is, our armory.

Q. Your regiment was not brought there, then, as a regiment, and

disbanded?

A. Not that night. No, sir; because I had four companies who had to go

home by railroad.

Q. Were any of the companies brought down here and disbanded?

A. That night?

Q. Yes, sir?

A. No, sir. I directed my staff officers to notify the commanding

officers of companies that their services were not needed, and to take

their men to the armories and dismiss them.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. What the captain wishes to get at is, did your men break ranks there

at the Union depot?

A. I had a company in the next day at ten o'clock.

Q. They marched out by companies?

A. Yes, sir.

By Mr. Means:

Q. What I want to get at is this: If your regiment was disbanded at the

Union depot; and after that, did you not have command of them as a

regiment?

A. Well, sir, I dismissed my regiment at the Union depot. I also sent

word to the companies who had to leave the city--I had four

companies--that they were perfectly safe, and they better not go away

till morning.

Q. What did they do with their arms, when you dismissed them?

A. They took them home, except one company; they could not get away

that night, and stayed there. At ten the next day, I had three

companies that went out on the eleven o'clock train.

By Mr. Means:

Q. The companies that left lived in the rural districts; they took

their arms with them to their homes?

A. I think they all did, so far as I know, except one company.

Q. And they remained in the city?

A. That company was a home company, and remained at the Union depot

until ten o'clock next day, before it left.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. How many rounds of ammunition had you?

A. I think we had about eight or ten rounds to a man. It was not very

equally divided, but we averaged that during the morning. We had

received our ammunition, our share of the ammunition, by requisition, a

few weeks before that time, and had sent out to the arsenal, and they

had not received it, and it was left at Captain Fox's armory, in

Lawrenceville, and on that morning, I think that we hadn't enough, and

I sent out a wagon and had a box of a thousand rounds brought in, and

it was carried up from the crossing to my regiment, and a great many of

the strikers came up to see what kind it was, and that was the only

time that any of them was up there in any considerable number. That is,

if there were any up there, they were strikers away from the fold. They

came up, and I allowed them to remain there until the ammunition was

distributed and issued, so that they could see what it was. Then I

ordered them down the hill and they went. A few minutes after that one

of their number, I presume him to be one of their number, came up and

commenced to me about our being there, and I asked him who he was, and

he said he was a striker, and that they were armed and that they were

going to fight for their rights.

Q. This was on Saturday?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before the Philadelphia troops came out there?

A. Yes, sir; he said they were armed and they were going to fight for

their rights. I heard him, and told him if that was all the business

they had up there he had better get down the hill, or I would arrest

him. He left. That is the only man I talked to that day outside of my

own regiment.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Did you know who that man was?

A. No; I did not know him.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. At the time your dismissed your troops at the Union Depot hotel,

about eleven o'clock, was the whole number with you that you took out

in the morning?

A. No, sir; there was not.

Q. What had become of those that were not there?

A. I dismissed some men early in the day of Saturday morning, men whom

I think were not in a condition to do service there under the

circumstances.

Q. For what reason?

A. There was two of them got something to drink and got drunk. I think

they were drunk, and I relieved them from duty and sent them away. That

was one thing I had great care about. I believe that a commander is

responsible for the morality of his men, and I was looking after that

particularly on that occasion.

Q. How many less men did you have at night?

A. I had between thirty and forty.

Q. That were missing--some of those went off on their own account?

A. No, sir. I dismissed one company entire. I had one company after the

firing of the troops--a great many of the killed and wounded were

killed immediately in front of my line, and I saw the men raising their

guns to fire, and I ordered my men to lie down, and I think I saved the

lives of some of them by so doing. Immediately after that there was a

great deal of excitement, and the crowd down on the hill side came

rushing back and got in the rear of my line. I ordered the captains to

examine the men to see that they had not loaded their arms. I did not

anticipate that that was the end of it, but I wanted to know whether

any of my men had loaded their arms under the excitement, and I found

it was reported that some of them had. I saw some myself, and this

company--the lieutenant had an altercation and tussle, and took a

gun--the man refused to obey, and the lieutenant took hold of the gun

and took it from him. It created a panic in the company, and they ran

back of the line for a few yards, and I sent Colonel Glenn to see what

the trouble was, and the men were a good deal excited. Afterwards the

captain came to me and I sent an order to have them remain there in

that position, and the captain came to me afterwards and asked me to

order them back into the line, which I refused to do. I determined to

send them home. I dismissed twenty-eight men in one company. I want to

say that I believe I did these men a great injustice. Some of these men

tried to get back here at night. I did not know the circumstances, and

I supposed that under the excitement of the firing that they had run

back. And when the matter was explained to me afterwards, I believe I

did them a great injustice. I know I did, because they did service

after worthy of all praise.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. Did any of your men straggle off and desert?

A. Some men went away--not many.

Q. How many men had you at night, or about how many, when you dismissed

the regiment?

A. I had about one hundred and forty-six men and twenty-seven officers.

I had my men counted before I dismissed them. I was not deceived in

regard to them from first to last.

Q. What was the captain's name of that company you sent off?

A. Captain Graham.

Q. Were they veterans as a general thing--had seen service?

A. Which?

Q. These men in the company.

A. I could not answer that; some of them were, I know that. All my

officers are old veterans, except one.

Q. You have seen service in the war?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what capacity did you serve in the army?

A. Orderly sergeant.

Q. For how long were you in the service?

A. From September, 1861, until the last day of May, 1861.

Q. When you were wounded?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What explanation did you have from General Brown for disbanding the

regiment or dismissing the regiment at that time?

A. There was no explanation of it at that time.

Q. Did you think that that order of General Brown's to dismiss the

regiment could be justified on any grounds?

A. No, sir.

Q. You dismissed your regiment upon that order, simply because you

consider it your duty to do so. You obeyed orders?

A. Yes; I obeyed orders.

Q. Where was the Nineteenth regiment at that time?

A. I only saw one of the officers of the Nineteenth regiment at the

Union depot, and that was Captain Bingham.

* * * * *

General A. L. Pearson, _sworn_:

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Where do you reside?

A. I live in the city, sir.

Q. What is your profession?

A. I am a member of the bar of this city.

Q. Member of the National Guard?

A. Yes; I command the Sixth division National Guard.

Q. With what rank?

A. The rank of major general.

Q. Were you in the late war of the rebellion?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long?

A. I entered the service in the beginning of 1862, as captain, and went

through the intermediate ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, colonel,

and was afterwards brevetted brigadier and major general--commanded a

brigade at the end of the war.

Q. Were you in the city on the 19th of July last?

A. Yes, sir; I was.

Q. State when you first heard of the disturbance among the railroad

employés, and your connection with it thereafter?

A. On the evening of the 19th July--Thursday, I believe--I was going

home-I live just at the Allegheny arsenal--I live on Thirty-ninth, just

directly opposite the Allegheny arsenal--going out in the street car,

and I observed numbers of men standing up along the railroad. At that

time I knew there was no difficulty. Had not heard of any strike or any

disturbance of any kind or character. I suppose I retired about

half-past nine o'clock. In the neighborhood of ten, or probably

half-past, a carriage drove up to my door, and the bell rang, and I

went to the door and found a telegraph dispatch from General Latta,

asking if I knew anything relative to the disturbance on the

Pennsylvania railroad. The messenger who was in the carriage requested

me to go with him. Who the gentleman was I do not know. I went with

him.

Q. What time was the message received at the office?

A. That is what I cannot tell you.

Q. Did not notice that?

A. I did not notice it. I supposed it had just been received, and

brought directly from the office to my residence. I received it

probably a few minutes after ten--between ten and eleven. I got in the

carriage and accompanied the gentleman down to Mr. Pitcairn's office,

which is at the corner of Twenty-sixth and Liberty avenue. When I got

there I think Mr. Scott was present, who was the solicitor of the road,

and several other gentlemen. They told me about the difficulties, and

stated that they had sent to Sheriff Fife. At that time I knew of no

difficulties. Did not know there were any troubles at all, and I waited

a long time, and I presume it was in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock

when Sheriff Fife arrived, and they talked over the situation of

affairs, and at the request of the sheriff I accompanied him to

Twenty-eighth street, walking up the track.

Q. Twelve o'clock at night?

A. I suppose in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock in the night. When

we arrived in the neighborhood of Twenty-eighth street, several shots

were fired--not at us, however. They were fired, I presume, in the air,

at least, nobody was hurt, and we went in among the crowd, and the

sheriff mounted a little pile of lumber or so, and told this crowd who

he was, and was answered with most outrageous language. He told them he

was there as a law officer of the county, and insisted upon them

dispersing. Told them the consequences of their illegal acts. After he

had spoken sometime, some one, who evidently was leader of the party,

cried out, "Why, you can go and bring your posse, we don't care a damn

for you or your posse. Mayor McCarthy and his police are with us." Then

they mentioned the name of some merchant who had promised them a

thousand barrels of flour, and another gentleman who promised them one

thousand dollars if they would continue. After they had made these

remarks, two or three of the fellows took me one side, and told me

about a man named McCall, who had been arrested for striking Mr. Watt,

and wanted to know if I would defend him next morning at the mayor's

office at ten o'clock. I told them if it was necessary; that I was an

attorney, and I would go with them, and advised them to leave the

railroad property at that time. Talked to them quietly, and promised to

meet them the next morning to defend this fellow who had struck Mr.

Watt. Sheriff Fife still talked with the crowd. The crowd was very

large, and, while he was talking, one or two, maybe three,

dispatches--whether they were telegraphic dispatches or not, I do not

know--but they received one or two, and probably three dispatches.

Q. The mob?

A. The mob; and as some person would announce the fact that they

received these dispatches they would run hurriedly with a lantern, and

he would read it out. They said we don't care a damn for you, or your

posse, to-morrow at eleven o'clock we will stop every road in the

Commonwealth. There will not be a railroad train run to-morrow after

eleven o'clock. Their language was simply outrageous. One or two women

in the party were, if anything, worse than the men, and extended

invitations to the sheriff which he did not accept at that time.

Whether he has or not, I don't know. No such invitations were extended

to me, however. At that time I was treated very civil, indeed. They

treated me very nicely with the exception of the boisterous language

which had been used more directly to the sheriff. Finding nothing could

be done they insisted upon remaining where they were, and stopping the

trains. We walked down to the telegraph office where we had left, and

there in consultation with Mr. Scott and others who were present, the

sheriff sent communications to the Governor, to the Lieutenant

Governor, to the Adjutant General, and Mr. Quay, and whether he sent to

any other State officers or not I can't say. He hesitated at first in

regard to writing these communications, and said he would prefer to

have his attorney. Says he: "I can't reach Mr. Carnochan, but I will

submit and ask your advice in regard to this matter."

Q. That is, addressing himself to you?

A. Addressing himself to me. I told him I was very free to confess that

after having heard what had been said by the mob at Twenty-eighth

street, and the fact that there was not a single police officer to be

seen in that neighborhood, although large crowds had congregated there,

that it was more than likely that what they said in regard to the mayor

was true, that everything looked very serious, that he had but one duty

to perform, and that was to call out his _posse comitatus_, and in

view of the fact that everything looked so badly just then, that I

would not hesitate, were I the sheriff of the county, under the

circumstances, to notify the Adjutant General of the true state of

affairs. He then sent the telegraphic dispatches as I have stated.

Q. By whom were they written?

A. That is what I cannot tell you, sir. They were sent, I know, by the

sheriff. They were not written by myself, and I do not think they were

written by Sheriff Fife.

Q. Were they written by Mr. Scott, the solicitor?

A. I think it is more than probable that Mr. Scott wrote the

dispatches. When I knew he was going to send the dispatches I had other

things to think about. I knew my command was scattered, and I would

have a good deal of work to get them out if I was so ordered.

Q. Who first suggested the calling out of the militia in that

conversation?

A. That would be hard to tell. The conversation was a general one.

Probably there were half a dozen gentlemen present at that meeting.

Q. Between yourself and the sheriff?

A. There was Mr. Scott was there, and I think Mr. Watt and the sheriff,

and two or three other railroad officials, and myself. The dispatches

were sent. I telegraphed General Latta that I was then at the telegraph

office, and subject to any orders that he might send. At about three

o'clock, probably half past three o'clock in the morning, I received a

telegraphic communication--order from General Latta--ordering me to

place one regiment--ordering out one regiment for duty. Upon that order

I telegraphed Colonel Guthrie, who resided at the East End, telling him

I had ordered out his regiment--the Eighteenth regiment. I came down to

the city and stopped one or two of the newspaper presses, and got my

order--I think it was in the _Gazette_ and the _Dispatch_--calling upon

the Eighteenth regiment to assemble at their armory at six o'clock in

the morning, and report at the Union depot at seven. My adjutant was

out of town, and I had no means of reaching any members of my staff;

but having telegraphed Colonel Guthrie, I fortunately met him early on

the following morning, and he had been at work from the time he had

received my dispatch in getting his men together. From the fact that

his regiment was scattered all over town, it was almost impossible for

him to have access to the members of his command, and they did not

report at the hour named, to wit: seven o'clock in the morning, but at

about twelve o'clock. Colonel Guthrie reported at the Union Depot

hotel. I deemed it then--at that time, at Torrens station, where the

stock-yards were--there was a large number of sheds, and a great many

cattle congregated there, and a large crowd had been there, and I

considered it was the principal point of attack--that there was more

danger to be apprehended there than any place else. I consequently sent

Guthrie and his command to Torrens station by rail. I had telegraphed

General Latta of the situation of affairs, and suggested the propriety

of calling out the remainder of my division, and received an answer

thereto, with orders to that effect. General Brown lived at McKee's,

some distance below the city, and I had no means of communicating. I

consequently issued my orders directly to the regimental commanders,

Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard; also, instructing Captain Breck to

report with two pieces of artillery. Late in the afternoon of Friday,

probably in the neighborhood of half past three o'clock, Captain Breck

reported with his two pieces of artillery, and Colonel Howard reported

with but a very few men--I suppose, all told, not fifty from his

regiment. I then ordered Colonel Howard and Captain Breck, with his two

pieces of artillery, to take their position on Liberty avenue, with the

expectation of moving out to Twenty-eighth street. Mr. Thaw, Mr. Scott,

and Mr. Cassatt, and one or two other gentlemen, met at the office of

Mr. Butler, who was the depot master, and wanted to know whether I

could clear Twenty-eighth street with the number of men I then

had--that was about seventy-five. I told them there was no doubt about

my----

Q. What time was that?

A. That was at four o'clock. I told them there was no doubt about my

ability to clear the tracks, at that time, with the number of men. That

I had already ordered them to start, to go out Liberty avenue to

Twenty-eighth street, and up Twenty-eighth, and take possession of the

tracks at that point. I had no doubt of my ability to clear the tracks,

at that time, but I was compelled to say that it would be at a fearful

loss of life, a thing that I preferred to avert, if possible. Mr. Thaw

and Mr. Scott both expostulated, and asked if I would send an aid, and

stop the troops from going at that time, which I did. They halted at

the Catholic church, and we then talked the matter over. Mr. Cassatt

thought it much better to go out and take possession of the property

then, even if there should be a trouble. I told them, then, that I

could go and take possession of the track, that I thought, from the

feeling that was existing then, it would be impossible for me, with

seventy-five men, to hold the position. I would clear the tracks, but I

would not promise to hold the position at that locality. After

considerable conversation, believing it better to avert bloodshed and

loss of life, and, acting upon the suggestion of Mr. William Thaw and

Mr. Scott, I re-called the troops, and brought them into the Union

depot, but, in the meantime, I had visited Torrens station, in company

with the sheriff, and he there had spoken to the crowd, and commanded

and demanded that they should disperse. They treated him with a very

great deal of disrespect, hurling all sorts of outrageous epithets at

him, and, seeing quite a number in the crowd whom I knew, not by name,

but whom I knew, I thought if I would talk to them I might have some

influence, and I got up on a tender, and spoke to them. It just had the

opposite effect. They said, we don't care a damn for you or your

troops. One man in particular said, "I have been in the army for four

years, and many of us have been, and we are going to have bread or

blood, and we will wade up to our waists in blood before this thing is

over." I told them that was the language generally used by fellows who

ran away. There was a good many women and children, and I begged that

they would go away. We then returned to Twenty-eighth street, and I

again spoke to the crowd there, with a like result. After the troops

had been re-called into the Union Depot hotel, it was suggested that,

inasmuch as very many of the men of my division were workingmen, who,

probably, had fathers or brothers who were directly interested in the

railroads, being employés of the road, that their sympathies would be

with those that were opposing law and order, that some other troops

should be called, and Mr. Cassatt suggested that a Philadelphia

regiment be sent for. I telegraphed to General Latta what had been

suggested, and, in answer thereto, he asked what I thought of affairs.

I told him, from the situation of affairs, that I thought it would be

much better to bring additional troops here, and that we ought not to

have less than two thousand. That there was but one way to avoid the

shedding of blood and loss of life, and that was to overawe the

strikers and rioters by an appearance of strength. Acting upon that

suggestion, I think General Brinton's command was ordered here. In the

evening, I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Latta, stating

that he had ordered General Brinton's division to report to me. I

received a dispatch from General Brinton, stating that he would leave

at one o'clock with eighteen hundred men, fully armed and equipped. At

that time, Colonel Gray had reported with the Fourteenth regiment at

the Union depot, and a considerable number of the Nineteenth

regiment--Colonel Howard's regiment--had also reported, swelling the

entire strength of the division to the neighborhood, probably, of six

hundred men. Of that number Colonel Guthrie, probably, had two hundred,

and over, men at Torrens station. Anticipating the arrival of General

Brinton early on Saturday morning before daylight, I ordered Colonel

Gray, and Colonel Howard, and Captain Breck to have their men under

arms, and ready for any movement I might suggest.

Q. On Saturday morning?

A. Yes, sir; and I think about two-thirty o'clock that morning, I sent

Colonel Gray out, taking a circuitous route--taking Bedford avenue, so

as to strike the top of the hill directly opposite Twenty-eighth

street, with orders to deploy on the summit of the hill, and move down,

and giving him time to get to that locality. I had taken out Breck's

two guns upon gondola cars and what troops of the Nineteenth had

reported under Colonel Howard, and just as we reached Twenty-eighth

street, Colonel Gray's regiment could be seen coming down from the

summit of the hill, and moving down towards the pieces. At that time

there were not many men there--not many of the mob. We disembarked

Captain Breck's guns, and placed them in position, facing Twenty-eighth

street, and commanding that position. Colonel Gray moved his command

down, probably half way down the hill and halted. Colonel Howard took

possession of the railroad tracks, and I walked up to meet Colonel

Gray's command, and found half a dozen men who had evidently been

posted there, and we drove them off the hill. We pushed the crowd back

clear to the westerly track, and I told them then and there, that the

Philadelphia troops had been ordered here, and that we had no blank

ammunition, that these men were all sworn into the service, that they

had but one duty to perform, and that was to obey orders, and that they

were there in opposition to the law, and that they must leave.

Q. The mob was there in opposition?

A. The mob was there in opposition to the law, and they must leave the

tracks, that they had no right there, and that the orders that I would

give to my troops would be to keep the hill side clear, and the tracks

open for the passage of any trains the railroad officials might see fit

to send. There was considerable howling at that time, and some of them

spoke about wanting bread, and says I, "If you want bread, if you will

go away from there, I will send you a car load of bread. I will furnish

you with all the bread you want, if you go away and let these tracks

alone." The tracks then were comparatively clear. There was no person

on the hill side with the exception of the troops. I then gave

directions to General Brown, who had command of the infantry portion of

the division, to keep the hill side clear, and allow no person upon the

track, and to hold it in the position until he received further orders

from me. He spoke of the fact that Twenty-eighth street was a public

street, and that the public had a right to use it. I told him that was

a matter he had no concern about whatever. I had the responsibility of

closing up that street, and I gave him an order to keep the hill side

clear, and the people off the track, and anything he might do to carry

out that order I would be responsible for, and he would be doing what

would place him in no false position. I then jumped on the locomotive,

and returned to the Union Depot hotel. During this time numbers of

people had come to me to expostulate with me for calling out the

troops. I told them that was a matter in which I had no concern

whatever; I was merely obeying orders. I was a sworn officer of the

Commonwealth, and that every officer and every man in my command had

filed their oaths to obey orders. I was there to obey orders, and

anything that might happen would not be upon my shoulders, but upon

those who were breaking the laws. I received telegrams from General

Brinton from various points on his route to Pittsburgh from

Philadelphia. When he reached Pittsburgh, it was then in the

neighborhood of two o'clock. He had about five hundred and fifty men

and two Gatling guns, and I think twenty thousand rounds of extra

ammunition. Upon his arrival, we furnished his command--they came in

two sections--when the first section arrived, we furnished the troops

of that section with such rations as we could procure, which was

nothing more or less than a sandwich and cup of coffee, and probably

thirty minutes after the second section arrived, and we furnished the

troops in that section with sandwiches and coffee. We took the

ammunition and placed it in the small building near the track, and I

then took General Brinton out and had a consultation with General

Latta, who was then in the Union Depot hotel. He wanted to know what my

plans were, and I told him, and he asked me the question, "Do you still

think that it is better to overawe the mob with the large number of

troops?" And I told him, certainly I did, and General Latta agreed with

me. Says he, "I think you are pursuing a wise policy. We will try to

avert the shedding of blood and loss of life if possible." He then

wanted me to show General Brinton the situation of affairs, and I drew

a small plot of Twenty-eighth street and the hill, and the track, the

round-house, &c. And General Latta asked me, "Who will you send out

with General Brinton to show him the situation?" I told him I had

better go out myself. We started out the tracks, taking the two Gatling

guns by hand. At that time a large crowd was congregated in the

neighborhood of the Union Depot hotel, many of them looking over the

fences, and others had got inside, and were mingling with the troops,

but we pushed out the tracks, and in the neighborhood of Twenty-fourth

street there was quite a crowd lining the tracks, standing on the cars,

occupying the side of the hill. Probably at that time there was in the

neighborhood of one thousand five hundred or two thousand cars laden

with all kinds of goods there, and I suggested to General Brinton the

propriety of leaving a portion of his troops to guard his flank and

rear, as well as to protect the cars, which he did. I think that was

probably General Loud's brigade, consisting probably of three hundred

men. They were deployed over that locality clear up to the lower

round-house. We pushed on with the balance of the troops, headed by the

sheriff and his posse. When we got to Twenty-eighth street, instead of

finding the tracks clear, and the hill side clear of people, there was

one dense mass of humanity, men, women, and children--the hill side was

crowded with people. I could not see Colonel Gray's regiment, the

Fourteenth. I found a small portion of the Nineteenth occupying the

right hand track of the railroad, and the entire tracks in possession

of the mob. As we went up the track the sheriff was received with all

manner of derisive shouts, calling him all sorts of names. I was

received in a like manner, but the crowd seemed to know me very well by

name. They pointed me out, and everything that a dirty, low man could

say was said. At that time one of the mob pushed through the line of

soldiers and struck at one of the officers--whether it was General

Brinton, or General Mathews, who commanded one of his brigades, I don't

know.

Q. What did he strike with?

A. Struck him with his fist. I got the fellow by the shoulder and

quickly pushed him towards the sheriff. Says I, "Here is a fellow that

will make trouble; take charge of this man." The sheriff pushed him

into the midst of his posse. At that time there was a fellow standing

upon my right, just off the railroad tracks, and he was doing a good

deal of loud talking and making all sorts of threats. I pointed him out

to the sheriff, and says I, "Here is another fellow you had better

arrest; he will make trouble." I pushed through the mob and started up

the hillside to find where General Brown was--to find where the

Fourteenth regiment was, and the remainder of the Nineteenth was. I

found Colonel Howard, who commanded the Nineteenth regiment, occupying

a position on a private road leading to the West Pennsylvania hospital,

and asked him the question what he was doing there. He said he had been

ordered to report there, and, says he, "I am sorry to say you can place

but little dependence upon the troops of your division, and some of the

men have thrown down their arms and others have left, and I fear the

situation very much;" and spoke in like terms--says he, "I think the

Fourteenth regiment is in the same position." I then gave orders to

Colonel Howard to move his command in such a position that they would

be of some use in case of attack, which he immediately proceeded to do.

I then came down, pushed through the mob, and having heard this

information from Colonel Howard of the situation of affairs, and

finding General Brown was not to be found, I did not see him, and did

not know where he was--had not seen him that day at all--and finding

the hill side occupied with people, the tracks in complete possession

of the mob, the troops outnumbered in a very large degree, I concluded

it was my duty then to notify General Latta of the state of affairs,

and to ask that additional troops be sent for. I knew that four

divisions had been ordered under arms prior to that--General White's,

General Huidekoper's, General Gallagher's, and probably General

Bolton's, had been ordered under arms prior to that. As I pushed

through the mob I found that General Brinton had deployed, by what

command I cannot state. But one single line of his troops occupied a

portion of the westerly track. There was a single rank facing the hill

side, and as I passed down the company was moving up from his rear and

moving directly up the tracks towards Twenty-eighth street. I left my

station there with Major Evans, walked down the tracks, entered the

telegraph office at the corner of Twenty-sixth and Liberty avenue, and

telegraphed General Latta of the situation of affairs, asking if he

would immediately telegraph to the Fourth division commanders and order

them at once. Probably that had hardly taken place, and in looking out

of the window I found a man carrying a boy across his arms with his

legs dangling down. I remarked to Major Evans that I feared there had

been a conflict. He went out and came back with the report that a boy

had been sun-struck. Just then I heard a cry on Liberty avenue, and

looking out of the window I found the dead and wounded being carried

past, and the crowd rushing down to the workshops of the railroad. At

that instant Mr. Cassatt came in. He had been up in the cupola of one

of the workshops, and had seen the firing and was the first to

communicate the fact to me that the firing had taken place. I had not

even heard the reports of the muskets. I presume the noise of the

ticking of the telegraphic instruments and the steam which was up in

half a dozen locomotives in the adjoining round-house was such that I

did not hear the explosion of the pieces. Mr. Cassatt stated that as

the mob was rushing round Twenty-eighth street and down Liberty,

towards the round-houses, he feared destruction of property. The

round-houses were filled with locomotives, the workshops filled full of

valuable machinery, and the tracks lined with cars laden with all sorts

of valuables of every kind and character, and stated that he feared

that property would be destroyed. I had sent word to General Brinton

asking him, if necessary, to send a staff officer to me or communicate

in person. He came in in a moment or two, stating that he had cleared

the tracks; that the mob had fired upon his troops; that many of the

men had been knocked down by stones and pieces of iron, and without

orders his troops had fired into the crowd; that the tracks were

cleared, and that he was ready, and if they had any trains to send them

out. It was then stated by some of the railroad officials that they had

no crews to send out trains, and Brinton suggested that in as much as

nothing could be done that night, and his men were almost in a famished

condition, that they be brought into the round-houses or workshops. I

then stated that it was the only thing to be done to save the property

of the road. I issued orders to General Brinton to bring his troops in

and to occupy the round-house, and I sent direct communications to

Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray ordering them to bring their regiments

in and take possession of the transfer offices, which were long wooden

sheds, extending from Twenty-third, I think, to Twenty-fourth street.

My orders were obeyed. Captain Breck brought two pieces of his battery

in and placed them in position, facing Twenty-sixth street. Brinton's

two Gatling guns were brought in and placed in a like position. The

gates fronting Twenty-eighth street were closed, and everything at that

time in as good a condition as could possibly be. Mr. Pitcairn,

superintendent of the western division of the Pennsylvania Railroad

Company, who had been an observer of all the Twenty-eighth street

troubles, came in, and I suggested the propriety that they should go

down and send out rations from the depot hotel. They said they would,

and they started off for that purpose. Towards evening an express wagon

came up. General Brinton and his staff was occupying the second story,

then, of the telegraph office, and I had my station there. We were

congratulating ourselves upon the fact that we were going to have at

least one decent meal. We could see the express wagon coming up with

the supper, and just at that time the crowd made a rush upon the wagon

and took entire possession, and instead of supper we got broken dishes

through the windows, which did not add much to the good feeling

existing in the building at that time. And after that an Irishman--I

know he was an Irishman by the cut of his jib and his language--drove

up on a bob-tailed, lantern-jawed horse and made a very inflammatory

speech to the mob right in front of the gate. It was a very ludicrous

speech, and the mob seemed to take it as such, because one of them

pulled off a piece of board off a fence and struck the horse over the

back, and the last we could see of this Irish orator he was going down

Liberty avenue. Then a few shots were fired through the windows, and

stones thrown, and General Brinton insisted upon firing into the crowd

with his Gatling guns. I expostulated with him, telling him the

situation was not serious enough to use his guns at that time, because

then on Liberty avenue, directly in connection with where we were,

there were very few of the rioters. Down Twenty-sixth and up there

probably there were a thousand men, women, and children congregated,

and particularly women and children, and as his officers would go up to

his Gatling guns the active rioters who were on Liberty avenue would

get behind the stone wall, leaving Twenty-sixth street exposed. I ran

out and called attention to the fact. Says I, "If you fire now instead

of killing these people that should be killed, you will kill a large

number of women and children who are merely idle spectators," and gave

direct orders to one of the officers not to fire that gun. They

apparently cooled down and returned into the building, and the thing

was repeated. I then gave orders again that until the affairs became

more desperate that there was no occasion to use the Gatling gun,

because the active rioters would not be injured--that merely women and

children would be knocked down in the streets. At eight o'clock--in the

neighborhood of eight and nine o'clock--General Brinton had been

complaining during this time of the half-famished condition of his

troops, and I knew the fact that they were in a half-famished

condition, and I knew my own troops were no better off. My

commissary--the officer who attended to the commissary of my

division--was at Torrens station. General Brinton was at the Union

depot, and he asked me the question, "Can you not go down and try to

get some provisions of some kind to carry to my troops?" Says I, "I

think I can." At that time everything was apparently quiet, and,

accompanied by the members of my staff, we started down the railroad

track, leaving General Brinton in command at that place, leaving him

with orders to hold the position.

Q. Where was Cassatt?

A. Mr. Cassatt had, long before this, gone to the Union Depot hotel. I

do not think any of the railroad employés were there at all.

Q. What time was it you started?

A. I think it was between eight and nine o'clock that night. We started

down the tracks, and when we reached the depot----

Q. Were you dressed in uniform?

A. Yes; my entire staff was in uniform. All had our swords and

everything. When we reached the depot, everything was silent as a

graveyard in and about the depot, and we passed down and entered the

Union Depot hotel. We went up to General Latta's room, and there found

General Latta, Colonel Quay, and Mr. Farr, the Governor's private

secretary, Colonel Norris, of the Governor's staff, and several other

gentlemen. There seemed to be a very great deal of surprise manifested

at the fact that we had got through the crowd and reached the Union

depot. I had established my head-quarters there at the beginning of the

entire affair, and it was then suggested that, inasmuch as the rioters

had blamed me for ordering the firing and killing the citizens, that my

remaining in further command of the troops would only aggravate

affairs, and that was doing a very material injury to the troops, and

it was stated by some one in the room that the rioters had gone through

the hotel looking for me. That they had gone from the cellar to the

roof, and if found, I and any with me, would be hanged. I thought the

threat was an idle one, and wanted to know what they wanted me to do.

At that time we could hear bodies of men marching up with drums and

fifes, and hear them shouting.

Q. What room was that?

A. General Latta's room, at the Union Depot hotel. And then General

Latta suggested me--he asked the question--and says he, "Is General

Brinton in command out at the round-house." Says I, "He is." Says he,

"Then I think the best thing we can do for the situation of affairs and

the protection of your troops, and to try and quell this disturbance,

is for you to go away from here. If you do not go, you will be hanged."

I told him there was a sufficient number of us there to make a hanging

very agreeable to all, and I did not think there was much danger; if

any one was hanged, somebody would be hurt. He said it was no time to

use any levity; the situation was very serious, and my life was not

worth a penny, and that my remaining in command of the troops was doing

an injury; that I had been blamed for the whole thing. I asked him what

he wanted me to do.

Q. What time was that in the evening?

A. It was between nine and ten o'clock.

Q. Saturday night?

A. Saturday night. Says I, "What do you want me to do? Do you wish me

to change my head-quarters? If so, will I go to the Monongahela house?"

"No; you will just be as bad off there as here," and then Major Evans,

of my staff, spoke up, and said, "General Latta, if you insist that

this ought to be done, let General Pearson come to my house." General

Latta said, "Yes; that is the very thing to do." I had never been at

Major Evans' house, but knew it was in the neighborhood. The address

was taken by General Latta, and I think by Mr. Farr, of the Governor's

staff. At that time, Mr. Dalzell, one of the attorneys of the road,

came into the room, and I spoke to him, and I spoke to Quay. Says I,

"Mr. Quay, do you think I ought to leave this place?" Says he: "I

certainly do. The situation of affairs is such in the manner in which

you are blamed for this, that you are doing an injury to the troops;"

and others of the Governor's staff spoke up in the same way. Says I,

"Very well, I take this as an order, but before I go I will leave you

three members of the staff." I left my brother, Mr. Murray, and Major

Steen, stating that I would be prepared to perform any duty. That these

officers knew where I could be found, and anything they wished done, I

would do. Major Evans and myself left. There was no possible way of

getting out front, and we crossed a small bridge, and went up over the

hill-side, and reached Major Evans' house. At that time there had not

been a car fired, and there had been no torch communicated to

anything--buildings or cars.

Q. Where was Major Evans' house?

A. Major Evans' house is situated in what is known as Oakland. I do not

know what street he does live on.

Q. What distance from the Union depot?

A. I suppose it is in the neighborhood of a mile and a half. We reached

Mayor Evans' house, and I then sent him over to find out, if he could

ascertain anything about my family. I had heard my house was ransacked,

and I know that my daughter had been driven away. She drove down in an

open buggy after the firing. Came down to Twenty-sixth street and the

round-house, where the troops were, drove through the mob, and tried to

get some communication from me. It had been reported that I was shot.

It was impossible to get any communication with her, and the mob drove

her off. I sent Major Evans over to see if he could find out anything

about my family. While he was gone, Colonel Moore and my brother came

out for me to give him an order for ammunition at the Allegheny

arsenal. The ammunition had been stored there and could not be taken

out, except by my order. I gave the necessary orders. At that time

everything was quiet. They started away with the orders for ammunition.

Subsequently Major Evans came in and reported that so far as he could

learn everything was quiet. At about ten o'clock, Sunday morning, I was

wakened up and told of the fact that the rioters and mob had set fire

to the cars and burned out the round-house, and I immediately sent a

written communication to General Latta, by Major Evans, stating that I

had heard what had taken place, and desired to receive some

instructions from him. That I was ready to perform any service, and to

do any duty, and to go any place, and suggested the propriety of

immediately telegraphing the Governor for his return. Probably about

one or two--it might have been after that--Sunday afternoon I received

a verbal reply by Major Evans stating that General Latta had stated for

me to remain where I was until I got further orders. My appearance then

would only aggravate matters and do more harm than good, and for Major

Evans to report on the Monday following. I sent Major Evans in on the

Monday morning, and at the same time General Latta had left. I believe

he did not see him. I know nothing at all about the situation of

affairs from that time up.

Q. How long did you remain at Major Evans'?

A. I remained several days there, and the family being a strange family

to me--had never seen his family. I knew the major very well--and

having received intelligence that there was a likelihood of the major's

house being mobbed, and not desiring to put them in a situation of that

kind, I left Major Evans' house. Subsequent to that--of course, when I

left the Union Depot hotel, I looked upon that as being virtually a

relief from my command, and found, by reading the daily papers, that

General Brown had assumed command of the division. I think it was the

1st of August--a number of days subsequent, anyhow--I received an

official communication from the Governor, instructing me to hold my

command in readiness to move at an hour not later than eight o'clock,

and to go up to Luzerne coal regions, where difficulties were

apprehended.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. Did you go?

A. At that time I found that the division had been ordered to

disband--verbal orders had been given by General Brown to disband the

troops, and by accident I was at Colonel Guthrie's head-quarters, and I

suggested the propriety of him not disbanding just at that time, and he

concluded that he would not. That he would have a street parade of his

regiment that evening. I returned to my head-quarters, and when I

returned, I got orders from the Governor, ordering me to have my

division in readiness to start off at an hour not later than eight

o'clock. I immediately communicated with various officers of the

division, and at the hour indicated I was ready to move with the entire

command. Transportation could not be procured at that time, and we did

not leave until the neighborhood of twelve o'clock--started off with, I

think, one thousand and thirty-five men, and went to Luzerne county. Do

you desire me to give an account of how we proceeded there, and what

took place?

Q. You might state whether the mob went to your house in search of you?

A. Of my own personal knowledge, of course, I do not know. From what I

have heard, they did go.

Q. You ordered Colonel Gray and Colonel Howard to move their commands

to the transfer station, I believe you said?

A. Yes, sir; I did that, because I considered it my duty to put these

men in positions I considered the most dangerous--they were my own

troops. The transfer sheds were long, low frame buildings, extending

probably in the neighborhood of a square, open and unprotected, and I

thought it was my duty at least to expose my own troops much more than

strangers who were coming here from a long distance. I placed General

Brinton's command in brick buildings.

Q. Was it General Brinton's suggestion, or because you deemed it the

best position, that you placed him in the round-house?

A. I found that no trains were to be run at all, that it would be mere

and utter foolishness to keep General Brinton's troops standing upon

the railroad tracks, and to place them upon the hill side would be

exposing that command to danger, as all the hill side and all the

buildings on it were filled up by railroaders, I believe, and

consequently, to place General Brinton's command on the hill side would

subject them to any troubles that might occur from the railroaders

living above them, and of the mob getting round on top. Then, the

further fact that the mob would have taken possession of the

round-house and used the cars as barricades, and he could do nothing.

He suggested the propriety of bringing them into the round-house, and

giving them some chance to rest, and getting them provisions; and I say

now, that knowing all the facts of the case, if the thing was to be

done over again to-morrow, I would do exactly what was done. To have

placed them in any other position than that in which they were placed,

would have been a piece of folly that I would not be guilty of. A man

that would have taken troops and placed them upon the hill side, under

the situation of affairs, I would characterize as an ass, and not

worthy of commanding troops.

Q. Would it not have been better to have retired the troops to the

Union depot, inasmuch as there were no trains to be moved that night?

A. It would have been a great deal pleasanter to the troops, but it

would have given entire possession of the cars, round-houses,

workshops, locomotives, and the entire moving machinery of the

Pennsylvania railroad--placed it entirely in the hands of the mob.

Q. Could you not have sent out detachments to have driven away any mob

that might have gathered for the purpose of burning buildings?

A. That might have been done in an open field, but the fact that the

railroad tracks ran along Liberty avenue, are probably ten or twelve

feet above the grade on Liberty avenue, and then on the right of the

tracks is a hill side, and Brinton did not bring one thousand eight

hundred men, Brinton brought about six hundred men, and Colonel Guthrie

was at Torrens, and to have scattered the few men out along the

railroad tracks--men who did not know the situation of affairs, and did

not know the general locality of the ground, they would be subject to

all sorts of annoyance, and could be shot down at pleasure by those

people. There is one thing the committee must understand, that this mob

did not only congregate at Twenty-eighth street. They formed in

position on the south side; that they came over in a compact body by

regiments. They formed in different localities in Allegheny City, and

different places, and they were all marched to a given point, and to

have sent a few troops along the line of the track they could have

picked them up, one by one, and carried them off body and breeches.

There was but one thing to do, and it was to take possession of the

buildings, and the only mistake that was made was General Brinton's not

calling out his pickets and shooting down the people, as they should

have been shot down, and the property would have been saved, and if it

had been saved, General Brinton and others would have been hanged for

murder, because the feeling in this community at that time was such

that if it had not been for the fact that the railroad property had

been burned down, and private property had been taken and robbed, and

private buildings burned down, there was no officer in command of

troops safe, and his life was not worth a penny. The feeling in the

community was such that I have no hesitancy in saying indictments would

have been found and the officers convicted of manslaughter.

By Mr. Means:

Q. Is there no similarity between this riot, and the military force

meeting the enemy in the field of battle?

A. Certainly not. Meeting an enemy on a field of battle, you go there

to kill. The more you kill, and the quicker you do it, the better; but

in this instance you had a division of six hundred men--my division was

six hundred men. Colonel Guthrie was at Torrens, surrounded by a mob.

The balance of my troops were at Twenty-eighth street, and here you had

men who had fathers and brothers and relatives mingled in the crowd of

rioters, and it was very natural for them to have a feeling that to

fire then and kill these men, was like shooting their own relatives.

The sympathy of the people, the sympathy of the troops, my own

sympathy, was with the strikers proper. We all felt that those men were

not receiving enough wages.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You say you meet an enemy on a field of battle, and you go there to

kill. What was the purpose of the troops in going out to Twenty-eighth

street?

A. The purpose of the troops was to try to preserve order and preserve

peace. There would be no difficulty of us going out there and

commencing to shoot if that had been an enemy. The first thing we would

have done, would be to throw out a skirmish line and commence to shoot.

Q. You were to preserve the peace at all hazards--if necessary to

preserve the peace to call, you are justifiable in doing it?

A. Certainly.

Q. When an attack is made upon your troops with clubs and stones, and

firing into your troops, are you not justified in killing?

A. My opinion may be different from a great many other military men. I

look at it in this way: when troops are officered, it is the duty of

the officers to do the thinking. If every man that carries a musket has

a right to think and shoot just as he thinks, there is no occasion to

have any officers at all, because, when we started out from the Union

Depot hotel these Philadelphia men were insulted long before they

arrived. Colonel Guthrie was insulted at Torrens, and if each man had

carried out his own thoughts and commenced to shoot, it would have

showed a great want of discipline.

Q. Would not the commanding officer be justifiable in giving the

command to fire?

A. Most undoubtedly so. He would not only be justifiable, but it would

be his duty so to do, and I have no hesitancy in saying, from what I

have learned from the manner in which General Brinton's troops were

received and treated, and the shots that were fired at them, the stones

that were hurled at them, and the fact that these men were knocked

down, it was his duty to have given the order to fire, and if I had

been there I would have had no hesitancy in giving the order.

Q. What I understand you to say is, that there was not a public

sentiment that would have justified the commanding officer in giving

that command to kill?

A. The sentiment afterwards showed that the sentiment was directly

against the firing.

Q. Do you mean to say that the civil authorities, the civil arm of the

government, would not have protected the military officer in giving a

command to fire under circumstances of the attack made there at

Twenty-eighth street on the militia?

A. I have got to answer that in a twofold capacity. As a lawyer, I

believe that the courts would most undoubtedly have sustained the

officer. I believe that the mayor and his police were in direct

opposition to the troops--after having heard the crowd state that the

mayor and his police were in sympathy with them, and finding that no

arrests had been made, and knowing the fact that upon every occasion

that mayor's police were only too anxious to protect men up for

disorderly conduct, that there was not a police officer to be found at

Twenty-eighth street, and that no arrests had been made, although there

was any number of chances to arrest for disorderly conduct and other

offenses--finding that none of those officers were there, I had no

other way to think that these men had said truly, that Mayor McCarthy

and his police were in sympathy with the mob. I telegraphed Mayor

McCarthy after the troops had been taken into the round-house--I

telegraphed him, and I told him I thought his presence there might be

the means of saving life. I believe then, and I believe now, that if

Mayor McCarthy had come at that time and talked to the crowd, something

might have been done. There was then a terrible feeling against the

troops, and no feeling against the police. I believed then, and I

believe now, that if he had responded to my telegraph, many valuable

lives might have been saved. There was no sympathy extended to the

troops by anybody outside of the sheriff and his posse. The sheriff and

his posse were the only ones that gave any aid or assistance to the

troops. He did all that he knew how and all that he could.

Q. Did you have any communication with the sheriff, after the firing at

Twenty-eighth street?

A. No, sir; I did not see the sheriff after that.

Q. Do you know where he went?

A. I have no idea.

Q. You were in communication with him up to that time?

A. Certainly; he was at the head of the troops.

Q. And you, as commanding officer, were to protect him in making his

arrests?

A. Yes; he was armed with warrants from Judge Young to arrest certain

parties therein named, and we went out with him.

By Senator Yutzy:

Q. You speak of an order you received from General Latta. Did that

order purport to be signed by order of the Governor, sent by him as

Adjutant General?

A. No, sir; it was not by order of the Governor; it was a telegraphic

communication, ordering me to order out one regiment.

Q. Was it official?

A. I think so. I have not got it, because they were destroyed at the

Union depot. I think the Adjutant General's report shows all those

telegrams. I think that gives all the telegrams that passed.

Q. Did you, at any time, give an order to the troops to fire?

A. I am sorry to say that I did not. I am sorry to say I was not there

when the occasion required such an order. If I had been there, I would

have given the order, and in such a manner that the active rioters

would receive their reward of merit. They deserved it, and they ought

to have had it. I am only sorry to say I was not there.

By Mr. Larrabee:

Q. You said the people expostulated with you about calling out the

troops. What people were they that came to you and expostulated?

A. Oh, very early in the morning. Of course, the Friday morning papers

had the order, and people came to me, at the Union Depot hotel, and

say, "You ought not to do this thing; these men are workingmen; they

have their rights."

Q. Were there many of them--more than two or three?

A. I was stopped on the street by women--respectable women. I was

stopped in the streets by business men of the place.

Q. Business men of the place expostulated with you?

A. Yes; and after the firing, men came to me and insisted upon my

taking the troops out of the round-house. I want to say this in

regard--there may be an impression in regard to the manner in which the

Sixth division responded to my order--that it may not be known to the

committee that we have no direct way of calling out the troops--that

is, by any alarm--not by a fire alarm or anything of that kind. An

officer has to hunt up his officers, and they, in turn, have got to

hunt up their men, who are scattered all over through two cities, and

when I notified Colonel Guthrie, I found him early in the morning and

he was hard at work, and they responded as promptly as any regiment

could possibly respond. There was no way to get his men together any

sooner than they did. They went to Torrens station, as per order, and I

believe remained intact until the 6th or 7th day of September. I do not

know of them having disbanded for a single instant, from the time that

they were first called out, until the end of the trouble in Luzerne

county, and the Fourteenth regiment, as I have subsequently learned,

performed their service as well as a regiment could. They had been

ordered to disband, contrary to the wishes of Colonel Gray and his

officers, and nearly obeyed an order made by a superior officer.

By Mr. Lindsey:

Q. You knew nothing of the command which General Brown gave?

A. No, sir; there are officers who heard the command and know all about

that.

Q. He did it upon his own responsibility?

A. Certainly. Had General Brown carried out the instructions he

received at Twenty-eighty street, and kept the hill side and the tracks

clear, with the plans I had adopted of taking General Brinton out, and

letting him occupy the position, and sending a portion of General

Brown's command to Colonel Guthrie, and used a portion for the taking

out of trains, I think there would have been no subsequent troubles.

Instead of that we found the ground entirely occupied and in possession

of the rioters and sympathizers, and the result was just as you know.

Q. Could the destruction of property have been prevented by any other

distribution of the troops that night, do you think?

A. I presume, had we known the fact that the rioters had converted

themselves from men to devils, and had concluded to roast everybody

alive, and gone into it in the manner in which they did, that something

might have been done. Of course, no one could anticipate the fact that

those men would send burning flames of oil down upon the troops in the

round-house. No man living could ever think of such a thing.

At this point the committee adjourned until ten o'clock, to-morrow

morning.