PITTSBURGH, _Thursday, February 21, 1878_.
The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at three o'clock, P.M. Mr.
Lindsey in the chair, and continued the taking of testimony. All
members present except Senator Reyburn.
* * * * *
Colonel P. N. Guthrie, resumed:
Q. When we adjourned you had got at Torrens station. I wish you would
state to us how large a crowd you found there, what the appearance of
the crowd was, and so on, and give your movements from that time?
A. When I got to Torrens station I found at least twelve hundred men
there, composed of strikers, and the crowd and mob--not a mob--lookers
on. I had no trouble in getting into position, no trouble of any kind.
Was not greeted with hisses, noise, or demonstration of any kind
whatever. As soon as I got my command in the position I wanted them in,
I brought them to a rest. Then I went around on the tracks to see what
the condition of affairs was. I found, as I stated before, that the mob
contained two elements there--strikers and lookers on. I sent for the
man who was represented to me to be a leader among the strikers, had
him brought down to my position, and had a long conversation with him.
I informed him that I had been sent out there with orders from General
Pearson to see that all trains passed through the stock-yards. It was
my duty to keep the tracks clear, and keep the crowd from interfering
with the passage of trains, &c. I didn't want to have any trouble or
any disturbance of any kind; but the moment a train approached there it
was going to go through. He told me that the strikers had no intention,
no disposition to interfere with the passage of the trains, that the
Pennsylvania railroad might send all the trains through they had got.
He said they could not send any through because they could not get the
men to man them; but if they could, they could send them through; they
didn't intend to interfere. I told him I was glad to hear that, that it
would probably make things a great deal easier, because if the crowd
interfered outside of the strikers a man would have less hesitation in
dealing with them. This conversation with this leader of the strikers
occurred immediately after I got there, as soon as I got my command
into a position and gave the command rest. Almost immediately after,
and during my conversation with this man, a train came up to the
stock-yards from Pittsburgh. That was a freight train or a passenger
train--I have forgotten. I did not probably look at that time; but I
think it was a freight train; but that train was loaded down with
roughs on the cars, and platforms of the cars, the engine, cow-catcher,
and every available space. I think the train was crowded with the most
infernal lot of scoundrels that a man ever saw. I do not think that
they were strikers entirely, though. There were a great many men from
Pittsburgh that I recognized; but there was a large element on that
train I could not account for at all. They became very noisy and
offensive. All of them got off that train and crowded on to any trains
that were stationary there--cars standing on the track, which brought
them within a very few feet of my regiment. Their remarks became so
offensive to me that I was afraid that if it was allowed to continue it
might bring about trouble. I had the bayonets fixed on my guns, and I
charged bayonets on this crowd. They broke and fled away, and got some
distance off. In the interval I formed my men in another position more
satisfactory to me--got them on the street, and in what we call column
of companies. Before, I was in line of battle. I remained in that
position for some time. I would say here that the understanding between
General Pearson and myself, when I went to the stock-yards, was that
the trains would be sent out immediately. I urged it upon General
Pearson. I believed it was the best thing then, and I believe so now,
that a train should have been started, that if one train could have got
through, all the rest would have followed, and even one train would
have broken the force of the strike; but I waited and waited and waited
in position there until the men could stand it no longer. The crowd
three times during my stay at the stock-yards annoyed me, and crowded
close on my lines, and became somewhat demonstrative, so much so that I
was afraid to allow the thing to continue, and I charged bayonets.
Every time I charged bayonets the crowd dispersed, and twice I loaded
the guns in the presence of the mob, and the moment the guns were
loaded the crowd fled and dispersed; but would return almost
immediately after. As soon as the crowd would go away from my front I
would take the cartridges out of the guns to prevent the men from
recklessly firing and bringing about any conflict between the troops
and the crowd. That continued time after time during my whole stay at
the stock-yards. These men were easily driven away by me. At any
appearance I would make of a disposition to fire upon them or use force
against them, the mob would disperse--the crowd would disperse, because
it was hardly a mob. I could not see that they were armed at all. If
they were armed they had pistols--they had no guns of any kind.
Q. Had they thrown any missiles?
A. The second time I charged on them, they began throwing, but it
didn't amount to anything--no more than five or six men were engaged.
One man who stood on the top of the cars--a man known as Monkey John, a
man who has since been tried by the courts here--was the most offensive
in the whole crowd. He expressed a great desire on his part to split my
head open, but he didn't try it. He was within a few feet of me, and I
was strongly tempted to split his head open, but I thought I had better
not. During the time I remained at the stock-yards, I was frequently
visited by General Pearson, and to all of my inquiries, why trains had
not started out, his answer was, the troops were not ready in the town,
and hadn't been able to get possession of Twenty-eighth street, which
brings me back to my original assertion, that, if the first troops had
gone to Twenty-eighth street, we might have had the trains moving.
General Pearson, every time he came out, was accompanied by some of the
railroad officials, and all of them seemed to be very anxious with
regard to my ability to hold that place; but I told them there was no
mob in front of me, only a crowd, that might become a mob if they got
the upper hand, and so long as they didn't have the upper hand they
were a crowd. That was the state of affairs until the arrival of the
troops from Philadelphia. At the time they arrived, General Pearson
informed me that as soon as they got into the Union Depot hotel they
would be disembarked, and brought out to Twenty-eighth street, and
placed in position at Twenty-eighth street, and the Fourteenth, and
Nineteenth, and Breck's battery would be sent out to me, and the trains
moved. I waited until nearly two o'clock that night, (Saturday,)
waiting for trains, and waiting for information. Not a train appeared,
and not a word of official information reached me until Sunday morning.
On Sunday morning, about half past two o'clock, I received a
communication from James W. Latta, Adjutant General, which was the
first information I had that General Pearson was not in command, and
that General Latta was directing affairs--informing me that ammunition
would be sent out to me by wagon, under the charge of an officer of the
staff. Upon the arrival of that ammunition, I would be joined by troops
from Walls station, and, when that junction was formed, I was to march
into town to the relief of General Brinton, besieged in the
round-house. I prepared my men for marching, and waited the arrival of
the ammunition. Sometime after that the ammunition arrived, and I am
not able to state the time exactly, because my watch had run down, and
everybody else's around. When the ammunition reached me, an order also
came with it, stating that the troops at Walls station were without
ammunition, that the engineer was unable to bring the train in, and
they could not make a movement until they had ammunition. That all the
approaches to the city from Walls station were crowded by rioters. That
all points along the railroad, suitable for their purpose, was in
possession of the rioters--a fact which I demonstrated afterwards by
sending men out of my own command to determine whether that was the
case or not. I received orders also to send ammunition by wagon out to
these men. As soon as that ammunition was received, they were directed
to continue to march in to me, and, when they joined me, I was directed
to complete the movement as ordered in my first dispatch. I hired a
wagon, and sent a squad of men out with it. They had to take a
roundabout way to get there. I sent, I think, five thousand rounds of
ammunition out to these men. Time was passing away very rapidly, and it
was nearly ten o'clock before these men got to Walls station with that
ammunition.
Q. Ten o'clock on what day?
A. On Sunday morning. In the meantime I had made up my mind that the
Walls station troops could not get in. About five o'clock I had made up
my mind that the troops from Walls station could not get in to me in
time to make the junction and march in to the relief of General
Brinton, and I sent Captain Aull, of my regiment, in to General Latta,
with instructions to tell him that, in my opinion, these forces
couldn't join me, and to countermand the order so far as Walls station
troops were concerned, and order me into the city. On the way in to
General Latta, Captain Aull witnessed the leaving of the round-house by
General Brinton's command. He conveyed that information to General
Latta. General Latta then sat down and wrote an order to General
Brinton, ordering him to unite with me at the stock-yards, and sent a
copy of that order out to me. Of course that prevented me acting on my
own responsibility, and I was compelled to remain at the stock-yards.
The order reached General Brinton, and General Brinton refused to join
me--at all events he didn't join me. I waited there until about twelve
o'clock, and I was satisfied then that it was not General Brinton's
intention to come to me--that he had left the city, and he didn't
intend to return. I then made up my mind I would go into town and see
myself what was going on. In all this time I hadn't one word of
official information concerning what was going on in town. Colonel
Smith came to my camp on Sunday morning, and gave me the first
information of the state of affairs in Pittsburgh. Of course I could
see a dim light in town, but the extent of what had occurred I didn't
understand--I could hardly believe--and I could hardly believe that the
large force of well drilled men under General Brinton could not control
any mob that might be brought against them. At twelve o'clock and about
ten minutes, these troops from Walls station came down to Torrens
station.
Q. Twelve o'clock Sunday night?
A. Twelve o'clock noon on Sunday. At that time I knew, from the
officers I had sent out after Brinton, that Brinton was not going to
come back to Pittsburgh. I had official information from the staff of
the Sixth division that the Fourteenth regiment and the Nineteenth had
been disbanded by General Brown, and there was no military force in the
city of Pittsburgh. I didn't deem that the troops from Walls station
were of any assistance to me whatever, at that time. I thought they
were a great hinderance to my efforts. I ordered them back to Walls
station, and to go from there to Blairsville, which would be, I thought,
almost necessary that Brinton should make a junction. 1 didn't see how
he was to get home unless he did go to Blairsville in some way or
another. I then came into town to see how affairs stood. I went to the
Union Depot hotel; reached the Union Depot hotel just about the time it
had been fired--it was then in a blaze, commencing to burn, though the
fire was not thoroughly under way. I went to the end of the building,
and I saw some fifty or sixty men on the tracks engaged in burning and
pillaging. I think at that time that twenty-five good men could have
checked that whole business. There was a large crowd in the open space
in front of the Union Depot hotel, and a large crowd on Liberty street.
I went through the crowd in front of the hotel, and went through the
crowd on Liberty street, and I am satisfied there were not men enough
in the Sixth division to stop that burning. The crowd on Liberty street
and in the space in front of the Union Depot hotel was merely
lookers-on, but it only needed a demonstration of some kind against
them to have made every one of those men, or nearly every one of those
men, part and parcel of that mob engaged in pillaging and burning. They
would have gone to the defense of those men without any question. I
satisfied myself of this matter pretty thoroughly. I was not hasty
about it--calmly went through that crowd and heard them talk, and knew
exactly what they meant. They were men that were not disposed to take
upon themselves to burn or pillage, because there was no necessity,
since they had other men to do it for them.
Q. Were you in military uniform?
A. No, sir; I was not. I could never have got into town with a military
uniform on. I came into town not only disguised, but in a great measure
hidden. I did that for the reason that men that joined my command,
within a few moments of leaving, had told me of being stopped on the
way themselves. They had to take a roundabout way to go out to the
camp. I saw on my way in there were crowds of men everywhere who would
have put a stop to any person coming into town in uniform. I went to
the Union Depot hotel for the purpose of finding General Latta, and
discover what was being done and what had been done. The moment I got
there I saw for myself what had been done by the rioters, but what the
military authorities were doing, of course, I couldn't ascertain until
I had found General Latta. 1 hunted around through the town and found
General Latta at the Monongahela House. He was regretting very much, at
that time, that General Brinton had gone out of the city instead of
going out to me or coming into the city. He was powerless to do
anything, he had no troops under his command except my own regiment. I
went to my armory, and I sent out to Colonel Smith and the adjutant
general of the Fourth brigade instructions to my regiment to march into
town. Through some delay on the part of Captain Aull, the regiment was
delayed about two hours. They reached here about dark.
Q. By what route?
A. They came in on Fifth avenue, the only route they could have gotten
into town. The crowd was very large on Penn avenue. Notwithstanding,
they came into town, I believe, without any demonstrations of any kind
against them whatever; marched down to the armory. We remained there on
duty continually. Colonel Howard came in and he brought his regiment
together. Colonel Gray, of the Fourteenth, got his regiment together.
On Monday morning the three regiments were here in the city of
Pittsburgh ready for duty, and on Monday morning, the three regiments,
I believe, paraded through the streets. Colonel Howard's and my own
regiment paraded together. I think I remember, after going back to the
armory, seeing Colonel Gray's regiment return to the armory after their
parade. I am not certain about that, but I think I did. Those two
regiments returned to their armory, were ready, and could have been
assembled had anybody taken the trouble to order them--could have been
assembled in a very short time. On Monday morning, I believed that I
was in command of the troops of the Sixth division. I certainly was in
command of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth regiments, because Colonel
Howard was then in my armory with his regiment and had agreed to obey
orders under me. General Brown came in and assumed command on Monday
morning, and I refused to recognize or obey any orders from him. He
remonstrated, but I insisted that I wouldn't obey his orders. I was in
command of the troops, and I intended to handle them, and he went out
and various men came in and thought it was a very serious thing to have
dissensions in the military at that time--the city was apparently in
the hands of the mob, and it would be better for the military to
proceed as a military body, without any dissensions in rank. After
listening to them, I agreed to serve under General Brown, and I so
notified him. From that time until the troops were ordered to Luzerne,
and until we returned, I served immediately under the command of
Brigadier General Brown. That is the outline of my service.
Q. Did you receive any orders from General Brown to disband your
regiment at any time?
A. On the 31st of July, about one o'clock in the afternoon, General
Brown sent an officer of his staff to my head-quarters, requesting my
presence at his head-quarters. I think it was the 31st of July. I went
up to General Brown's head-quarters, and he gave me a verbal order to
dismiss my regiment. I asked him by what authority the regiment was
disbanded. He said he had just come from the Governor's head-quarters,
or he had received an official communication from the Governor's
head-quarters, I have forgotten which. At all events, the orders were
from his superior officers that my regiment, and also Colonel Gray's
and Colonel Howard's were to be disbanded. I think he had sent to
Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray also. I determined that I wouldn't
disband my regiment, and I couldn't see why the Sixth division should
be dismissed when the Governor was rapidly assembling all the troops of
the State in this city. Could not understand it, and felt there was a
mistake of some kind about it. I went back to the armory. That
afternoon I paraded my regiment, and before I got through the parade I
had official knowledge that the Sixth division was to go to the coal
regions, which demonstrates fully to my mind that there had been a
mistake made somewhere, or there never was a communication of the
Governor's that the Sixth division should be dismissed at all. So far
as official knowledge of what took place in the city of Pittsburgh on
Friday after half-past one o'clock, and on Saturday until six o'clock,
I know nothing at all. I was not present with my regiment and knew
nothing at all about it, except on Sunday afternoon, when I came in
myself. With the burning of the elevator on Sunday afternoon, I think
all danger of a mob had passed. The men had got all the whisky they
could get hold of, and the whisky had worked its effect on these men.
The burning and pillaging of this city was stopped by the giving out of
whisky, and with the natural working of the whisky on the human body.
The men were dead drunk. On Monday morning there was no mob in the city
of Pittsburgh that I could see, though the railroad property and trains
were in the possession of the strikers, and remained so until the
arrival of Governor Hartranft with the national guard.
Q. What day was that?
A. I do not remember what day that was; that was probably the 25th or
26th of July--it was later than that. I cannot state the date of his
arrival. They were here on the 31st of July. I remember that, because I
went to out to see General Brinton on that day.
Q. Did you have any trouble in assembling your regiment--in getting
them together?
A. When they were first ordered out?
Q. Yes.
A. Oh, I had a great deal.
Q. What I mean is, were the men willing to serve?
A. Oh, yes; no trouble of that kind in my regiment whatever. The only
trouble was in getting hold of the men.
Q. Was there any disposition among your men to aid or sympathize with
the strikers?
A. Not a bit, sir.
Q. Could you have depended on them, do you think, for any emergency?
A. Depended on them for any emergency whatever. I had no trouble of
that kind. I never gave a thought of trouble of that kind. I had no
personal worry or annoyance with the men in my regiment. I do not
believe there was much of that thing in any of the other regiments.
Q. How much, or under what circumstances, would you deem it proper for
an officer under command, in the face of a mob, to give the order to
fire. That is, how much resistance on the part of the mob, or
demonstration on their part, before an officer would be justifiable in
firing, or giving the word of command to his men to fire?
A. I would hesitate some before I would give an order to fire, unless
there was a shot fired. The firing of a gun or pistol into the ranks of
my men would, I believe, justify me in giving an order to fire, and I
would at once do it. A man in command of troops has to judge a good
deal of the disposition of the crowd, as he can see it. I can hardly
tell you exactly what I mean. Sometimes you find a crowd in front of
you good-natured, meaning no harm, and you generally find among the
crowd a lot of men who are working the mischief--see an element of that
kind in a crowd. I do not think an officer is justified in hesitating
at all, because these men can soon influence a crowd to do as they want
to. If a crowd attempted to seize hold of the guns of my command, I
should certainly give an order to fire. I would not give the order
recklessly to fire. I would give the crowd time to get out of the way,
by simply announcing to them that I would fire if the crowd did not
disperse. If they had been firing into me, and committing acts
imperiling the lives of my men, I do not know that I would give them
that warning. These are little things a man would have to judge of as
they occurred. I believe an overt act committed by a mob justifies the
officer who commands the troops to fire.
Q. Would the hurling of missiles into your men by the mob be a
provocation sufficient to justify the commander giving an order to
fire?
A. I believe it would, but the commander would consider the previous
acts of the mob and all the conditions of it, the character of it, and
the character of the people in it, &c. I believe whenever a mob in the
presence of the military does damage to the military that the military
are justified in doing damage to the mob, and doing it right quick.
Q. And use the necessary efforts to disperse the mob?
A. Yes; fire at them, and do it quickly, and do enough of it to prevent
them ever coming back. I do not believe a man in command of troops has
any right to act rashly, and would hesitate some before he would do a
thing of that kind. My idea of the military has always been that they
are subordinate until the sheriff is satisfied he can do nothing--that
then they step in and act quickly. Probably there would be no
demonstration against the military if the military officer would inform
the mob that if they did not disperse within a certain time, he would
fire upon them, and if necessary, load in the presence of the mob, and
ninety-nine times out of one hundred, I believe, there would be no mob
by the time they got loaded.
Q. Did the mob flee or disperse before your men every time you gave the
order to load?
A. They scattered every time. I had no trouble at all with the mob--I
did not consider that I had a mob in front of me. I simply had a large
crowd, which I believe would have been a mob if they could have got the
upper hand in any way.
Q. You ordered to charge bayonets once or twice?
A. Three times.
Q. In the charge bayonets, did the crowd stand until your men came
close to them?
A. No, sir; they fled in a good natured way. Laughed--no trouble at all
to get rid of them. My object only was to prevent them coming too
close. If the men get close enough some men in the crowd might feel
like taking a musket away, and that would bring about a disturbance. It
is better to prevent anything of that kind than to allow it to come and
then act afterwards.
Q. Your object was to preserve the military character of your regiment?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. Keep the troops and the mob separate?
A. Yes. I never let the mob in with my troops at all, sir.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. You were in active service during the last war, were you not?
A. I was.
Q. In what capacity?
A. I went out in the service as second lieutenant, and came back a
major--filled all the intermediate ranks.
Q. How long were you in the service?
A. Three years and seven months.
Q. You were speaking about taking command of the three regiments--the
regiments commanded by Colonel Howard and Colonel Gray--did you take
command by virtue of your seniority over them?
A. I would, but I do not think I spoke of taking command of the three
regiments, as I had not seen Colonel Gray. I do not know what he would
do if he had been dismissed by General Brown. I suppose he would think
General Brown had his reasons for that. Colonel Howard had voluntarily
offered to join with me, and I did assume command. I had no
conversation with Colonel Gray at that time, nor for weeks afterwards.
I did say that on Monday, when Colonel Gray and myself were parading
the streets, that, to the best of my knowledge, as we were returning, I
saw Colonel Gray out with his regiment doing the same thing. That
continued during the time we remained in our armory afterwards. In
other words, I am satisfied that the Fourteenth regiment was organized
and ready for duty on Monday.
Q. After they had been dismissed by General Brown?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you refused to receive orders from General Brown on Monday?
A. I did.
Q. Give us the reason for that?
A. My reason for that was, that General Brown had dismissed his
command, and when he dismissed his command, his authority ceased over
them until he re-organized. The act of re-organizing or bringing
together the Nineteenth regiment, was a personal matter on the part of
Colonel Howard; General Brown had nothing to do with that; it was
between Colonel Howard and myself, until General Brown got a brigade
together. He could not command me. One regiment does not need a
brigadier general and a colonel to command it; there would be a
conflict of authority at once; those were my reasons.
Q. Did you not regard him as your superior officer, if you were the
only man in his brigade?
A. I would regard him as my superior officer. I believe I could have
done better service than he. I was willing to take the responsibility.
I think that is the trouble with all the National Guard--there are too
many officers.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. And not enough men?
A. And not enough men.
Q. Was there any reason you had for disobeying his orders or receiving
orders from him?
A. There was. I believe that General Brown has been suffering from
sickness more or less. He was physically weak, and I did not believe
was fully equal to the fatigues and annoyance of the command. I had no
disposition to ignore General Brown, but I did think that in the great
excitement of that day I could have handled my regiments better without
being hindered by orders from brigadier generals.
Q. In other words, you regarded him incapacitated for his position in
consequence of his illness and mental distress?
A. I did.
Q. And that would justify you?
A. That would have been my defense if I had got into any trouble.
Q. If it had not been that, as a disciplinarian and a military man, you
would have considered it your duty to obey?
A. I would. I considered General Brown, under ordinary circumstances,
was fully competent for his command; a braver man, I know, never
breathed than General Brown--possesses every quality for bravery. His
military capacity can hardly be doubted, when a man has filled the
various commands that he had in the army.
Q. That is, when he is in good health?
A. When he is in good health, he is a good man.
Q. Did you see anything of General Brinton's command during this
trouble, up to the time the collision occurred at Twenty-eighth street?
A. I saw nothing of any troops, except my own regiment, until Sunday
night or Monday morning, when I came to town. I saw the troops of
General Brinton in the cars, as the passed the stock-yards on their way
to Pittsburgh. That is all I saw of them.
Q. As an officer of experience in the army and active service, did you
think it was prudent for General Brinton to retire to the round-house
when he did?
A. I would not like to have done it. If I had had command enough to
have guarded every approach to the round-house, and to have had a guard
around the round-house, for the purpose of allowing one portion to
sleep while the other was on duty, I might have taken the round-house.
Q. For the reserves?
A. Yes, for the reserves; but under no circumstances would I go into
the round-house, without I was certain that every approach to the
round-house was thoroughly and properly guarded, and, if it was going
to take too many men to guard the approaches to the round-house, I
would not go into it then.
Q. Where would you have stationed your men?
A. The hill side there furnished an excellent position. Men could have
slept there, and with a small portion of them guarding it, and been
free from attack. They could have been free from danger. I like to be
out in the open air myself, where I can swing free and clear.
Q. Could you have intrenched yourself on the hill side, so as to make
the position secure and safe?
A. I do not think it needed any--it is naturally a strong position. If
it was necessary they could have gone to the top of the hill, and
nothing could have come in there. A very small force would have guarded
any approach. It would not be likely that anybody would have crawled up
there.
Q. If there would have been an assault made, would not the troops have
been exposed without entrenchments?
A. Not to any extent. Men could have hidden behind a house here and
there, and might have taken advantage of the inequalities of the
ground, and no large body could have got there.
Q. That hillside is terraced with ravines and wash-outs, which would
have given your men as much protection as the enemy?
A. Just as much, and with the advantage that a man in command of the
troops would have the selection of the ground. I never walked over the
ground particularly--I walk by there twice a day, and I am familiar
with the appearance of the hill. What the number of inequalities of the
ground are, I do not know, but it is a hill, at all events, and the mob
would come from below.
Q. The hill would have been the most eligible position for the force
From your knowledge of the Union depot, would that have served as a
fortification for General Brown's command to repel the mob, in case
they had made an attack on the depot?
A. To go down to the Union depot?
Q. For instance, if they were in the depot?
A. Oh, no; I think not. I do not think that depot was a desirable place
for any defense, because there was too much space between there and the
transfer station, where General Brown was, but the Union depot was
certainly the only place where these troops could get supplies, and it
would have been a good thing to have kept that space open, between the
Union depot and General Brown. I do not think that the force could have
scattered them to the extent that you speak of, defending the Union
Depot hotel and transfer station and the round-house. I do not think
they had enough men for it.
Q. Was there any available position between the transfer station and
the Union depot, where he could have entrenched himself and secured a
position?
A. The hillside was there. I think there was too much space between
Twenty-eighth street and the Union depot for General Brinton to have
attempted to protect all that line of property. He had not enough for
that.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Could he, with his men stationed at the Union depot, have gone out
and driven off any crowd of men that might attempt to set fire to the
cars and thus keep the space clear by sallying from the Union depot.
A. I think he could; and, if it was necessary for him to go into any
house, I would have preferred taking the whole command down to the
Union depot, than going into the round-house and transfer station.
Q. And then guarded it as far out as you could?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The reason for that would have been that the supplies were all at
the Union depot?
A. All at the Union depot.
Q. And the ammunition?
A. The ammunition was there. However, I do not think that General
Brinton knew anything about the ammunition, where that was, or anything
about it, when he went into the round-house, and neither do I believe
that General Brinton anticipated any trouble when he went into the
round-house. Firing upon the mob and dispersing it, he was left without
any disposition for some time, and then he went into the round-house.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Do you know whether General Brinton received the order from General
Latta, to join you at the stock-yards?
A. No; I can only answer that by hearsay.
Q. Did he report that he received that order?
A. Yes, he does. The adjutant general in his report states that Colonel
Norris and Colonel Stewart went out to deliver an order to General
Brinton. General Brinton in his report states that at a certain time,
Colonel Norris did join; he did not state whether Colonel Norris gave
him, or what answer he gave Colonel Norris; but the two put together,
demonstrate pretty clearly that he did receive an order.
Q. Was there anything to prevent General Brinton from joining you at
the stock-yards?
A. Nothing at all, except, probably he might have not known the way
out, but he could have found that by inquiring. There was not even that
excuse, because he had an officer of the Sixth division with him, I
believe, showing him the way.
Q. In his retreat or march from the city to Blairsville, how far did he
pass from you, from the stock-yards, how near?
A. He was going away from me within fifteen minutes of the time he left
the round-house--about fifteen minutes' march from the round-house he
came to the junction of the Sharpsburg and East Liberty roads. The East
Liberty led to the right and the Sharpsburg road to the left. He took
the road to the left, so he was going away from me all the time after
he got to where these two roads united. General Brinton did not get
this order that General Latta speaks of in his report and that Colonel
Norris carried to him--he did not get that order, and Colonel Norris
did not join him until he got to the Sharpsburg bridge.
Q. Until he got to it--he received it before he crossed the river?
A. I think he did. This is only hearsay on my part. I do know that
General Brinton had not received that order until he got to the
Sharpsburg bridge, because Captain Aull of my regiment had a copy of
the order. He had the written order. Colonel Norris had a verbal copy.
Stewart and Norris reached General Brinton. Captain Aull did not.
Captain Aull was in uniform, and had not the same facilities for
passing through crowds that the other two men had who were in citizens'
clothes.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. In the absence of the commander-in-chief, who is the senior?
A. The next officer of the line, the senior officer?
Q. Who is he--what person would be the next?
A. In these troops out here I believe General Pearson would be in
command.
Q. Of the troops of the State who would be?
A. The Governor is the commander-in-chief. After the Governor, the next
senior major general. I believe the senior major general was General
Dobson or General Osborne. I have forgotten which. After him comes
General Pearson in order of seniority, and after all the major generals
had been exhausted the brigadier generals would come in; then the
colonels.
Q. Is there any other person except the Governor as commander-in-chief
who has authority to call out the militia?
A. I think not. That is a matter of law, and that I am not exactly able
to give an opinion upon. My understanding as a military officer is that
no one but the Governor can call the troops out. I certainly would
hesitate a long time before I would obey an order from anybody else.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. In the absence of the Governor from the State is there any one that
could call out the troops?
A. Unless he left orders with his adjutant general.
Q. Can he delegate that power as commander-in-chief to any person?
A. That is another fine legal point. I will say this: That if the
Governor is absent and an order came signed by order of the
commander-in-chief, James W. Latta, Adjutant General, I should obey it.
It is not my business to know whether the Governor is present or not.
The order the official----
Q. He might exercise his powers as commander-in-chief out of the State,
and without the exercise of the power from him, could any other person
exercise that power of commander-in-chief?
A. No, sir; there is no power can order out the militia but the
Governor.
Q. Is there such a thing as a Governor _pro tem._ in the absence of the
Governor?