REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE
Railroad Riots IN JULY, 1877.
_Read in the Senate and House of Representatives May 23, 1878._
HARRISBURG:
LANE S. HART, STATE PRINTER.
1878.
Transcriber's Note: Minor spelling and typographical errors have
been corrected without note. Missing words, dialect spellings, and
inconsistencies have been retained as printed.
LEG. DOC.] No. 29.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE
RAILROAD RIOTS IN JULY, 1877.
_Read in the Senate and House of Representatives May 23, 1878._
Mr. Reyburn, from the committee appointed to investigate the causes of
the riots in July last, made a report; which was read as follows, viz:
_To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania_:
The committee appointed on the 3d day of February last, by virtue of a
concurrent resolution of your honorable bodies, which resolution reads
as follows, viz:
"_Resolved_, That a committee consisting of five members of the House
of Representatives and three Senators, none of whom shall be from any
of the counties in which said riots occurred, be appointed, whose duty
it shall be to examine into all the circumstances attending the late
disturbance of the peace in certain parts of the Commonwealth, known as
the railroad riots, and endeavor, if possible, to ascertain the causes,
and by what authority the troops of the State were called out, for what
purpose, and the service and conduct of the same; and said committee
shall have power, in pursuing their investigations, to send for persons
and papers, examine witnesses under oath or affirmation, administer
oaths, and employ a competent phonographer to take all the proceedings
of the committee, and the testimony; the committee shall report in
full, in writing, to the Senate and House of Representatives within
twenty days, &c.,"
Beg leave to submit the following report, viz:
On the 4th day of February, 1878, the committee met at Harrisburg,
and organized by the election of William M. Lindsey as chairman,
Samuel B. Collins as clerk and stenographer, and J. J. Cromer as
sergeant-at-arms. At said meeting it was also decided to commence
taking testimony, first at Pittsburgh, that being the point where the
first, and by far the most serious, riots occurred.
Your committee arrived at Pittsburgh at half-past eleven, P.M.,
February 5th, and on the 6th instant met at the orphans' court-room in
said city, the authorities having kindly tendered the use of the same
to the committee for the purposes of the investigation, and discussed
the manner in which the testimony should be taken, and what class of
witnesses should be subpoenaed, whereupon it was decided that the
chairman should conduct the examination of the witnesses generally on
behalf of the committee, and that all citizens who knew any facts of
importance should be subpoenaed to testify and to furnish to the
committee the names of those known to possess valuable information. The
taking of testimony was commenced on February 7th, and proceeded with
as promptly as possible. After a =week's continuous work it became
evident to the committee that they could not accomplish the work
required of them and report within the time named in the above
resolution. They therefore returned to the capital and presented to
your honorable body a preliminary report setting forth what they had
done, and what was still necessary to be done to complete the work
required of them, when the following resolution was adopted by the
Senate and House of Representatives:
_Resolved, (if the Senate concur)_, That the joint committee of the
Senate and House of Representatives, appointed to investigate the late
railroad riots, etc., be and are hereby authorized to pursue their
investigations according to the plan indicated in their preliminary
report, and that to this end an extension of time over and above the
limitation of twenty days of the resolution under which they are acting
be given and granted under this direction, that the committee make a
full and thorough inquiry, and report as soon as practicable. The
committee afterwards took testimony at Harrisburg, at Philadelphia, at
Scranton, and at Reading, and have made as thorough an investigation of
the matter submitted to them as they reasonably could. As the result of
the testimony taken, your committee is of the opinion that the
following state of facts has been proved, viz:
The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, some time after the panic in 1873,
reduced the wages of its employés ten per cent., and on account of the
general decline in business made another reduction of ten per cent.,
which took effect on the 1st day of June, A.D. 1877; these reductions
to apply to all employés, from the president of the company down to
those whose wages by the month or otherwise amounted to one dollar per
day or less.
These reductions applied not only to the Pennsylvania railroad proper,
but also to the roads which were run by the Pennsylvania Company, a
corporation controlling several railroads, including the Pittsburgh,
Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad and the Pan Handle railroad, each
having one of its _termini_ at Pittsburgh, and running these railroads
in connection with the Pennsylvania railroad, and all being practically
under one management.
These were not the only railroads in the country to reduce the wages of
employés, a reduction of ten per cent. having gone into effect on the
New York Central railway on the 1st day of July, A.D. 1877, and a
similar reduction on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad on the 16th day of
July, A.D. 1877; your committee having no information as to whether or
not any prior reduction had been made by the last named roads. In
consequence of these reductions of wages a great deal of
dissatisfaction was produced among the employés of the roads,
especially those known as trainmen, consisting of freight engineers,
firemen, conductors, brakemen, and flagmen.
These employés had consulted together in relation to the question of
wages, and as the result of these consultations, a committee had been
appointed some time the latter part of May, composed principally of
engineers, who waited on Thomas A. Scott, President of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, and stated the position of the men and their alleged
grievances. Colonel Scott talked frankly with the committee, and stated
the position of the railroad company, which was, in substance, that in
consequence of the depression in all branches of trade, commerce, and
manufactures throughout the country, the business of the company had so
fallen off that it became a matter of necessity to reduce the wages of
the employés, and, that as soon as the business of the company would
warrant it the wages would be increased. The committee expressed their
satisfaction at the statement made by Colonel Scott, and said they
would go back to Pittsburgh and report the same to the employés, and
that everything would be satisfactory and all right thereafter. The
committee retired, and soon returned with their views set forth in
writing, and signed by them, stating that their conference with Colonel
Scott had proved satisfactory, and that his propositions were
acceptable to the committee. No complaint as to wages was made
thereafter by any of the employés of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
or of the Pennsylvania Company to any of the proper officers until
after the strike of July 19th.
Immediately after the order for the ten per cent. reduction, to go into
effect on June 1st, 1877, was issued, the employés of the different
railroads having their termini at Pittsburgh, commenced agitating the
question of a strike on account of said reduction, which agitation
resulted in the organization of "The Train Men's Union," a secret,
oath-bound society, the declared object of which was the protection of
its members, in all lawful ways, by combination, but more particularly
to bring the railroad companies to terms by all striking on a given
day, and leaving the railroads with no men of experience to run the
trains. The first meeting to organize a lodge of the society was held
in Allegheny City, on the 2d day of June, A.D. 1877, and the first
person to take the oath of membership was R. A. Ammon, better known as
"Boss Ammon," then a brakeman on the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago
railroad, who had been in the employ of the company about nine months.
Boss Ammon seems to have been the leading spirit of the society, and he
was immediately appointed as general organizer, to go out and organize
branches of the Union on all the leading trunk lines of the country,
especially on those centering at Pittsburgh. In a short time the Union
was in full working order on the Pennsylvania railroad, the Pittsburgh,
Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, the
New York Central railroad, the Erie railway, and the Atlantic and Great
Western railway, and some others, and a general strike by the members
of the Union was arranged to take place on the 27th of June, A.D. 1877,
at twelve o'clock, noon. The report of the committee of engineers of
the result of their conference with Colonel Scott was not satisfactory
to the members of the Union, they believing, or at least saying, that
the engineers were only looking after their own interests and taking
care of themselves, and therefore the action of the committee did not
arrest the preparations going on within the Union for the proposed
strike. Allegheny City was the headquarters of the organization, and it
was here that the general arrangements for the operations of the Union
were perfected, the members claiming that at least three fourths of all
the train men, whose headquarters were at the two cities of Pittsburgh
and Allegheny City, belonged to the organization. The proposed strike
on the 27th of June was to take place on the Pennsylvania railroad, the
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, the Allegheny Valley
railroad, Pan Handle railroad, and the branches of the roads named, the
Union having been more thoroughly and better organized on these roads
than on any others, and the movements were to be directed from
Allegheny City. Other roads were to be brought into the strike as fast
as possible, so as to make it general and comprehensive.
In accordance with this plan of operations, on Sunday, June 24th, some
forty members of the Union were sent out on the different lines
centering at Pittsburgh, to notify the members on these roads of the
time for the strike to take place, and to make the necessary
arrangements to make it a success. On Monday night, June 25th, a
meeting of the members of the Union on the Pan Handle division was
held, and it was there developed that a portion of them were
dissatisfied with the proposed strike, and trouble ensued on this
account. It was also ascertained that some member or members had
divulged the plans of the Union to the railroad officials, and that the
latter were taking measures to counteract and defeat the strike. The
moving spirits saw at once that with divided counsels, and their plans
known to the railroad officials, the strike, if commenced, would prove
a failure, and measures were at once adopted to prevent it from taking
place by writing and sending word to all points possible in the short
time left. The strike did not take place on the 27th, and the members
of the Union felt as if they had met with a defeat, which left a sore
spot in their bosoms, and which rankled for a long time. It may be well
to state here that the subsequent strike on the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad, at Martinsburg, West Virginia, on the 16th of July, and the
strike at Pittsburgh, on July 19th, was not a strike of the Trainmen's
Union, nor did the Union, as an organization, have anything to do with
either, there having been no meeting of the society either at
Pittsburgh or Allegheny City, after the 27th of June, 1877, up to that
time. The main and almost the only grounds for the proposed strike was
the ten per cent. reduction of wages, although some complaint was made
of the abuse of power and overbearing actions of the minor railroad
officials. Some time in July, 1877, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
issued an order that all freight trains from Pittsburgh east to Derry
should be run as "double-headers," the order to take effect on the 19th
of that month.
A so called "double-header" consists of thirty four cars, and is hauled
by two engines, a single train consisting of seventeen cars, hauled by
one engine. This was one of the measures of economy adopted by the
company in consequence of the great reduction in business, caused by
the financial situation of the country, and the reduced rates at which
the business was done, caused by the great competition of the different
railroads to secure business, and would enable the company to dispense
with the services of one half of their freight conductors, brakemen,
and flagmen on the Pittsburgh division of the road between that place
and Derry, as only one set of men, aside from the engineers and
firemen, were used on a "double-header." One engine could haul the same
train from Derry to Philadelphia that it took two engines to haul from
Pittsburgh to Derry. "Double-headers" had been previously run between
these two points, especially coal trains, but no general order for all
freight trains to run as "double-headers" had ever before been issued.
In selecting men to discharge under the order to run "double-headers,"
single men, and men who had been the shortest time in the employ of the
company, were chosen, and the men with families, and old men, were kept
so far as they could be. Quite a number of men had been discharged by
the company prior to this time, some for cause, and more on account of
the decrease in business since the panic of 1873; and the company had
still in its employ many more men than could be employed at full time,
keeping them along and allowing them each to work a portion of the
time, probably believing in the old adage that "half a loaf is better
than no bread."
Robert Pitcairn, the general agent and superintendent of the Pittsburgh
division of the Pennsylvania railroad, had leave of absence for a short
time, to commence on the 19th of July, and that morning he left for the
east with his family, over the Pennsylvania railroad, no complaint, as
he says, having been made to the officers of the company by the men, on
account of the order to run "double-headers," and he having no
knowledge or suspicion that any trouble was brewing or expected. The
early morning freight trains left Pittsburgh as "double-headers," but
when the time (8.40 A.M.) came for the next train to leave, the men
(two brakemen and one flagman) refused to go out on a "double-header,"
and the train did not go. The conductor notified the dispatcher that
the men had struck, and the dispatcher undertook to find men who would
go, but all the train men refused. He then made up two crews from the
yard men, and gave orders for the engine to back down and couple on the
train, when the striking men, led by one Andrew Hice, threw coupling
pins and other missiles at the brakeman who was attempting to couple on
the engine, one of which hit him, and, in the words of one witness, he
had to run for his life. There was some twenty or twenty-five men in
the crowd at this time; all men in the employ of the railroad company.
The strikers took possession of the switches over which the trains
would have to move, and refused to let any train pass out, and their
number was from this time gradually increased by the addition of the
men who came in on freight trains, who were induced to join the
strikers as fast as they came in. Between ten and eleven o'clock, A.M.,
David M. Watt, chief clerk of the Pittsburgh division, who was acting
in place of Mr. Pitcairn in his absence, went to the mayor's office and
asked for ten policemen to be sent up to the yard of the company, to
protect the men who were willing to go out on the trains, and arrest
any one who should commit a breach of the peace, telling the mayor
that, in his opinion, ten good men, with his (the mayor's) presence,
would be sufficient for the purpose.
The mayor answered that he did not have the men; that the day force,
with the exception of nine men, had some time previously been
discharged by the action of the city council, and he could not send the
night force, and also refused to go himself, saying he had other
business, and it was not necessary for him to be there. He said,
however, that they might get some of the discharged men to go, if Mr.
Watt would become responsible for their pay, to which Mr. Watt
assented, and the ten men were found, sent out under charge of Officer
Charles McGovern. This force went along with Mr. Watt to the
Twenty-eighth street crossing, the scene of the difficulty, and five of
the police were placed at one switch just above Twenty-eighth street,
and Officer McGovern with the balance took possession of a switch just
below Twenty-eighth street. An engine was there ready to back down and
couple on to the train, and Mr. Watt gave orders to one of his men to
open the switch, so the engine could run down on the proper track, but
the man refused, saying he was afraid he would be injured by the
strikers if he did so. Mr. Watt then stepped up and said "I will open
the switch," when a brakeman by the name of Davis stepped in front of
him, and said "boys we might as well die right here," and made some
demonstrations. At this moment a man named McCall, standing behind
Davis, struck Mr. Watt in the eye; that ended the attempt to open the
switch at that time. After some difficulty and considerable chasing,
McCall was arrested by the police, and taken to the lock-up. At this
time, between twelve and one o'clock, P.M., there was about one hundred
persons in the crowd, about one half of which were mere spectators.
Twenty-five or thirty of the strikers attempted to prevent McCall's
arrest by dodging around in the way, and by coaxing the police to let
him alone. A few stones were thrown, but no very serious efforts were
made beyond this by the strikers at this time. Soon after this, Mr.
Watt sent one of his men to the mayor's office for fifty more
policemen, and in answer to this call some five or six men came out
about one, P.M., in charge of Officer White. With these men, Mr. Watt
went out to the stock-yards, at Torrens station, a distance of five and
one tenth miles from the Union depot, to see if the stock trains at
that place, which had been some time loaded, could be got off.
At this place there was a large crowd of persons, a large portion of
whom were either present employés of the railroad company or were
discharged men, and others were unknown to the railroad officials. One
train of stock was coupled on by the yard engine, and run out by
stratagem before the crowd were aware that it was an attempt to send
the train east, and this was the last freight train that was forwarded,
until after the troubles were over. About four, P.M., another attempt
to move a stock train from Torrens was made, but the engineers all
refused to undertake to couple on to the train, as they had all been
threatened by the strikers, and were afraid of their lives, and at any
move made by the engineer the crowd would interfere, so that the crew
gave up their trains. Mr. Watt returned to Pittsburgh, and the stock
was unloaded. Mr. Watt, on his return to Pittsburgh, went again to the
mayor's office, about five, P.M., and asked for one hundred or one
hundred and fifty police. The mayor was not in, having gone, as he
testified, to Castle Shannon, to see his wife, who was sick. The
mayor's clerk was at the office, and informed Mr. Watt that the men
could not be furnished, that the day force of nine men in all were all
busy, that the night force, which consisted of one hundred and
twenty-two men, were not yet on duty, and could not be spared to be
sent out to the scene of the disturbances, as they must be kept in the
thicker portions of the city, and advised Mr. Watt to call on the
sheriff of the county for assistance. On Friday morning, July 20, A. J.
Cassatt sent David Stewart, of Pittsburgh, to invite the mayor to come
to the Union depot, as he wished to consult him in regard to the
situation, and had sent a carriage to convey him to the depot. The
mayor replied that he would have nothing to do with it; the whole
matter was taken out of his hands; they had no business to bring troops
there. Mr. Stewart asked him if he would see Mr. Cassatt, if he would
bring him down to the mayor's office. His answer was: "No, I will have
nothing to do with it," and he turned and left. It will be noticed that
this was some time before any troops were brought there, and a day and
a half before the Philadelphia troops arrived. This ended the call, by
the railroad officials, on the mayor for assistance to disperse the
crowd interfering with their property, although, on that day, warrants
were placed in the hands of the police for the arrest of some fifteen
or twenty of the ringleaders of the strike, and after this time there
does not appear to have been any very serious attempt made by the mayor
or police to assist in quelling the riots. The whole extra force raised
by the mayor, as testified to by J. J. Davis, clerk of the chief of
police, for whom bills were sent in for pay, was twenty-nine men.
During the afternoon of the 19th of July, one or two attempts were made
to start freight trains from Twenty-eighth street, but when the engine
was started some of the crowd would step in front of it, swing their
hands, and the engineer would leave his engine, and soon all efforts to
start trains from this place were abandoned for that day.
Although the engineers and firemen and some of the conductors and
brakemen professed to be willing to run at any time, yet, on the
slightest demonstration being made by any of the strikers, they would
abandon their engines and trains without making one decent effort to do
their duty. The railroad officials claimed that they had plenty of men
willing to run out the trains if they only had the opportunity, but
when the opportunity was made for them the men did not care to take
advantage of it. In the meantime the crowd was increasing at
Twenty-eighth street, and Mr. Watt, after he left the mayor's office,
went to the sheriff's office, and not finding him there drove to his
residence, but he was not there. It was ascertained that he would be
back in the course of the evening, and Mr. Watt returned to his own
office.
The crowd had so increased at the Twenty-eighth street crossing that
they had full possession of the railroad tracks there, and the yard
engines could not be moved to transfer the cars in the yard from place
to place, and orders were given to the engineers to put up their
engines. Between eleven and twelve o'clock, P.M., Mr. Watt started for
the sheriff's residence, and on his way called at the office of
Honorable John Scott, solicitor for the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,
to have that gentleman go with him. The sheriff was at home, and they
called on him for protection for the property of the company, and
advised him of all that had taken place up to that time. The sheriff
went with them to the outer depot, near Twenty-sixth street, where they
found General Pearson, who had come to Mr. Pitcairn's office to
ascertain the condition of affairs, so as to report the same to
Adjutant General Latta, who had telegraphed him from Philadelphia,
making inquiry if he knew anything of the disturbances on the
Pennsylvania railroad. Governor Hartranft was at that time out of the
State, and somewhere in the West, on his way to California, and before
going had given instructions to Adjutant General Latta, that in case of
trouble requiring the presence of the military, he must, on the
requisition of the proper civil authorities, assume the responsibility,
and act as occasion demanded.
A little after midnight the sheriff, together with General Pearson, Mr.
Watt, and some fifteen or twenty railroad employés, walked out to
Twenty-eighth street, and there getting up on a gondola or flat car so
as to be above the crowd, addressed them, advising them to disperse and
go to their homes, stating to them his duty in case they refused. The
crowd refused to disperse, and hooted and yelled at the sheriff, and
fired pistol shots in the air while he was addressing them. They told
the sheriff to go home, that they were not going to allow any freight
trains to leave until the difficulty between them and the railroad
company was settled, that the mayor and policemen were on their side,
and that prominent citizens had offered to assist them in provisions
and money to carry on the strike. It should be here stated that there
is no proof that any such offers of assistance were actually made,
except that tradesmen with whom the strikers were dealing offered to
trust them until they got work again, and one prominent citizen, whose
name was used by the mob, came forward testified that he had never made
any such offer. Some of the mob also read messages purporting to come
from other places, urging them to hold their ground, and assistance in
men and means would be sent them. There is no means of ascertaining
whether these messages were really sent as they purported to be, or
were only bogus ones, used for the purpose of firing up the mob, and
inducing them to hold out in their purpose. They were probably bogus,
and they, without doubt, produced the effect intended by their authors.
At this time the crowd numbered some two hundred men and boys, and was
composed of some railroad men, some discharged men, quite a number of
mill men, (that is men from the iron mills, glass factories, &c.,) and
some strangers as they were called by the witnesses, repulsive, hard
looking men, probably tramps and criminals, who always flock to a scene
of disturbance like vultures to the carrion. The sheriff, as he
testifies, becoming satisfied that he could not raise force sufficient
to control the crowd, made a call on the Governor, by telegraph, for
military to suppress the riot. The sheriff at this time had made no
effort whatever to raise a posse to disperse the mob, and in view of
subsequent developments it is probable that such an effort would have
been futile. The copy of the telegram of the sheriff to the Governor is
given in the report of the Adjutant General for 1877, as are also
copies of all other telegrams sent and received by him during the
troubles, and most of them in the evidence taken by your committee, and
therefore they need not be copied here.
In view of the absence of the Governor, the telegram was also sent to
the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the Adjutant General, the one to
the latter reaching him at Lancaster on his way to Harrisburg. General
Latta immediately telegraphed General Pearson, who held the rank of
major general, and commanded the Sixth division, National Guard, with
headquarters at Pittsburgh, to assume charge of the military situation,
place one regiment on duty, and if he found one regiment not
sufficiently strong, to order out the balance of the division and to
report generally. General Pearson immediately ordered out the
Eighteenth regiment, Colonel P. N. Guthrie, and this order was soon
followed by one ordering out the Fourteenth regiment, Colonel Gray, the
Nineteenth regiment, Colonel Howard, and Hutchinson's battery in
command of Captain Breck. These orders were responded to very slowly,
as it was in the night time, and the men were scattered about the city,
and some companies were made up of men at some little towns outside of
the city. Colonel Guthrie resides at East Liberty, and received his
orders about half past four, A.M., on the 20th. He at once notified his
officers, and they notified the men, but as it was too early to be able
to get messengers the colonel had to go personally to the officers and
it was about twelve o'clock, noon, when the regiment reported at the
Union depot hotel two hundred and fifty strong. This regiment was
ordered out to Torrens Station to protect property and clear the track
at the stock yards, and on its arrival there, at half past one, found a
crowd of from twelve hundred to fifteen hundred persons assembled. The
regiment had no difficulty in getting into proper position, and Colonel
Guthrie then lay in position waiting further orders. It was understood
between General Pearson and Colonel Guthrie that the Fourteenth and
Nineteenth regiments and the battery should clear the track at
Twenty-eighth street, and protect the men on the trains in getting them
started, and that Colonel Guthrie should clear the track at Torrens and
protect the trains in passing that place. The Fourteenth and Nineteenth
regiments assembled very slowly, and it was not until about five P.M.,
that General Brown, commanding the brigade, got together three or four
companies, and these not half full, and marched out to Twenty-eighth
street. Before taking a position there, he received orders from General
Pearson to return to the Union depot, as he had not force sufficient to
accomplish anything, and accordingly he returned with his command.
In the meantime, General Pearson, fearing that the majority of the men
in these regiments sympathized with the strikers, telegraphed Adjutant
General Latta to that effect, and suggested that troops from
Philadelphia should be sent on, and gave it as his opinion that two
thousand troops would be needed to disperse the mob, as it was now (six
thirty-five, P.M.,) very large (four thousand to five thousand men) and
increasing hourly. General Latta at once telegraphed Major General
Brinton, commanding the First division of the National Guard, at
Philadelphia, to get his command ready to move to Pittsburgh. General
Brinton received this order in the evening, and at two o'clock on the
morning of the 21st he had six hundred men at the railroad depot ready
to start. At Harrisburg, General Brinton received some ammunition and
two Gatling guns, and reached Pittsburgh at one, P.M., and reported to
General Latta at the Union depot hotel, and there distributed twenty
rounds of ammunition to his men. In order to understand the situation
of things and the future movements of the troops, a description of the
depots, buildings, tracks, and surroundings of the Pennsylvania
railroad property at Pittsburgh is here necessary. The Union depot was
situated between Seventh and Eighth streets, and from this place the
line of the railroad ran eastwardly, at the foot of a steep bluff, from
one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet high on the right, and with
Liberty street on the left. There were a great number of tracks running
side by side out to and some distance beyond Twenty-eighth street, with
numerous switches in order that the tracks might be used conveniently,
and many of these tracks were filled with cars, passenger and baggage
cars near the depot, and freight cars further out. The outer depot,
lower round house, machine shops, &c., were situated at and near
Twenty-sixth street, about a mile from the Union depot, some other
shops were scattered along there to Twenty-eighth street, near which
street was what was called the upper round-house. From Twenty-eighth
street down to the Union depot the tracks were several feet higher than
Liberty street, and a strong wall was built up at the side of Liberty
street to support the embankment and keep it from caving into the
street. At Twenty-eighth street there was a crossing much used, the
bluff not being as steep or as high here as it is further down, and the
hill is ascended by a diagonal road or path from the crossing.
About two o'clock, A.M., of the 21st, the Nineteenth regiment and
Breck's battery were sent out to Twenty-eighth street, the battery to
take a position at the foot of the bluff, near the crossing, and the
regiment a position on the side hill, a little above and commanding the
crossing. About four, A.M., of the same day, the Fourteenth regiment
was sent out, and ordered to take a position higher up the hill, and
above the Nineteenth regiment, and the orders given by General Pearson
were to hold this position, and keep the Twenty-eighth street crossing
and the tracks in the vicinity clear of the crowd. This Twenty-eighth
street crossing was the gathering point of the mob, and but very little
effort seems to have been made during the day (the 21st) to carry out
General Pearson's order. A few times in the forenoon one or two
companies were ordered down, across the tracks at the crossing, and
back again, and for the time would clear away the crowd in their
immediate path, but as no effort was made to hold the crossing, nor to
clear the tracks on each side of it, the effort amounted to nothing,
and when the soldiers went back to their position on the hill the crowd
would again resume possession of the ground cleared. The soldiers also
fraternized with the mob. Most of the time their arms were stacked, and
they were mingled indiscriminately with the crowd, lying about on the
ground talking with them, and when, about four, P.M., the Philadelphia
troops were marched out to Twenty-eighth street, a dense crowd filled
the Twenty-eighth street crossing and vicinity, and was so mixed up
with soldiers that no lines of regiments or companies could be
observed, and it was with difficulty that soldiers could be discovered
at all. On the morning of the 20th warrants had been issued for the
arrest of some fifteen or twenty of the ringleaders of the strikers,
and were placed in the hands of police officer McGovern and his men to
be executed. His orders were not to attempt to execute the warrants in
the crowd, as they were excited, and a collision might be provoked, and
if arrests were made at all they must be made quietly. If the
opportunity for quiet arrests occurred, it was not taken advantage of,
for no arrests were made, and no attempts seem to have been made to
spot the men, or ascertain their whereabouts, or to do anything towards
executing the warrants while they were in the hands of the officers. On
the morning of the 21st, bench warrants for the arrest of the same
persons were issued by Judge Ewing, and these were placed in the hands
of Constable Richardson, who called on the sheriff for a posse to
assist in making the arrests. The sheriff sent out ten of his deputies
to raise a posse for the purpose, and the deputies claim they were
vigilant and thorough in their efforts to find men willing to serve,
but were unable to raise any considerable number of persons. All sorts
of excuses were made, and not over ten persons in all responded. No
peremptory summons or call, such as it was his right and duty to make,
was ever issued by the sheriff, and, as testified by him, when he
reached the Union depot with his deputies and posse, a short time
before the Philadelphia troops arrived, all but six of his posse had
left.
On Saturday it is the custom for the different mills and shops at
Pittsburgh and vicinity to shut down about noon, or soon after; and on
that eventful Saturday, July 21st, those in the neighborhood of the
Twenty-eighth street crossing saw the crowd at that point suddenly and
largely increased soon after the hour for shutting down the mills. A
prominent manufacturer of Pittsburgh was at the Union depot on
Saturday, about the time of the arrival of the Philadelphia troops, and
had a talk with Mr. A. J. Cassatt, third vice president of the
Pennsylvania railroad, and, in this conversation, told him that
Saturday was an idle day with their workmen in Pittsburgh, and that it
would be great wisdom in him to wait until Monday, when the laboring
men would be at their work, before attempting to open their road; that
it was natural that their home troops should sympathize with the
strikers, and they could not be fully depended on in case of a riot.
Mr. Cassatt refused to give any directions to delay the movements of
the military, saying they had already lost a great deal of time, and it
was the duty of the government to put them in possession of their
property at once. General Brinton, with his command, arrived at
Pittsburgh at three, P.M., and, after being furnished with coffee and
sandwiches at the Union depot, were formed and marched out along the
tracks to the Twenty-eighth street crossing. Before starting from the
depot, General Brinton gave orders that the mob must not be fired upon,
even if they spat in the soldiers' faces, but if they were attacked,
however, they must defend themselves.
The plan adopted for the afternoon's operations was for a portion of
the Philadelphia troops to take possession of the premises of the
railroad company at and in the vicinity of Twenty-fifth and
Twenty-sixth streets, where the freight trains that had been prepared
to send out stood, and clear this portion of the tracks from the crowd,
so that when the tracks and switches at Twenty-eighth street were
cleared and put in possession of the company, the trains could at once
be moved, as the engineers and men were said to be ready to start with
the trains. The balance of the Philadelphia troops were to move up to
Twenty-eighth street and coöperate with the Pittsburg troops in
clearing the tracks at that point, and when this was done the trains
were to be started, and after a few trains had been run out it was
believed that the strike would be broken up; that the strikers would
see the futility of trying to resist the law when backed up by the
military, and would give up the contest.
The sheriff and his deputies (he had no posse to speak of) started from
the Union depot towards Twenty-eighth street, to execute the warrants
in the hands of Constable Richardson, a little in advance of the
Philadelphia troops, but were delayed on the way out, somewhat, by
looking after men, and before arriving at Twenty-eighth street, were
overtaken by the troops, but no arrests were made by them. The second
division, in command of Brigadier General E. De. C. Loud, was left on
Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth streets, with orders to disperse the
crowd at that point and protect the employés in starting the trains.
The order was promptly executed by throwing out skirmish lines and
clearing the tracks in the vicinity of the trains. The first division
brigade, under the command of General E. W. Mathews, and the battery of
Gatling guns, all under command of General Brinton, marched out to near
the Twenty-eighth street crossing. The command marched out by column
far into the crowd as far as possible, and then General Brinton gave
the command to wheel into line by the right flank, which brought one
line lengthwise of the tracks, below the Twenty-eighth street crossing,
facing Liberty street, and another line was formed parallel with the
first, on the opposite side of the tracks facing the hill. The crowd
was ordered to disperse by the sheriff, and he was answered by hoots,
jeers, and rough language. The move made by the troops had cleared the
tracks between the two lines, and the crowd now began forcing itself
down from Twenty-eighth street, between the lines formed each side of
the tracks. General Brinton ordered two companies to form across the
tracks at right angles with the two lines already formed, and between
them, facing Twenty-eighth street, and to march up and press the crowd
back and clear the crossing. The sheriff and his deputies had been in
front up to this time, but they now took a position in rear of the two
companies. General Pearson had been with the command until this time,
when, seeing the size of the crowd, and its determination, he went back
to Mr. Pitcairn's office to telegraph General Latta, for the purpose of
having more troops ordered to the place. The two companies, in carrying
out their orders, marched up against the crowd, with their pieces "arms
port," and endeavored to press them back in this way, but no impression
could be made on them. General Mathews, at this juncture, seeing, as he
said, that the mob was firm and determined, and would not bear
temporizing with, gave his men orders to load.
The two companies were then ordered to charge bayonets; many of their
guns were seized and some of the bayonets nearly twisted off, but no
impression was made on the crowd. While these movements were being
made, the mob was becoming more and more noisy, defiant, and
boisterous, and were throwing stones and other missiles at the troops,
several of the latter having been hit, and one or two seriously
injured. Several pistol shots were also fired by the crowd, and
immediately after the pistol shots the troops commenced firing on the
mob. The firing was scattering, commencing at a point near where the
pistol firing took place, and running along the line in a desultory
manner, until it became almost a volley for a moment. The officers
ordered the firing to cease, and stopped it very soon. There is a
conflict in the evidence as to whether or not an order was given the
troops to fire, but the great weight of the testimony is that no such
order was given. The most of those who testify that such an order was
given, say it was given by General Pearson, but General Pearson was not
present when the firing took place, but was at the superintendent's
office. Every person, however, from General Pearson down, who have
given an opinion on the subject, say that an order to fire was
justified and should have been given, and the officers in command say
that the order would have been given very soon. The firing had the
effect to disperse the crowd at once, they scattering in all
directions, and leaving the troops in full possession of the
Twenty-eighth street crossing and the tracks in the vicinity. Several
persons were killed and wounded, and as is usually the case, a number
of innocent people suffered. The coroner held inquests on the bodies of
twenty-two persons in all, the most of whom were killed by the soldiers
at this time at Twenty-eighth street, but a few were killed the
following night and Sunday morning at or near Twenty-sixth street. The
number cannot be ascertained with any certainty, but several were
seriously injured. It is believed, by those best situated to know the
facts, that a number of the mob were secretly disposed of or taken care
of by their friends, and whose names have never been given. If men had
been ready and willing to man the trains, they could have been sent out
after the dispersal of the crowd, but the occurrence at Twenty-eighth
street seems to have thrown everybody into confusion, and, as usual,
the engineers and train men were glad to find some excuse for not
going. No attempt seems to have been made to move the trains, which
were supposed to be ready at Twenty-sixth street, and the cars remained
there until they and their contents were burned. The troops remained on
the ground from the time of the firing about five, P M., until about
dusk, when they were ordered, by General Pearson, to move into the
lower round-house and machine-shop, near Twenty-sixth street, and
remain for the night, as all attempts to move trains had been
abandoned, and the troops needed rest and food.
The crowd had come together again gradually, in the vicinity of the
Twenty-eighth street crossing, but whenever the troops made any move
towards them, they would scatter, and when the troops marched into the
lower round house and machine shop, the mob took possession of, and had
full sway again at the crossing. General Pearson had ordered the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments to go down and take possession of
the transfer depot as it was called, about two hundred yards below the
lower round house, and these regiments marched down there about the
time that General Brinton's command went into the round house and
machine shop. Colonel Gray, at request of Colonel Howard, assumed
command at the transfer depot, and held possession until about ten
P.M., when General Brown came and told Colonel Gray that the place was
untenable, and could not be held; that he had information which made it
necessary for them to get out, and ordered the command to go to the
Union depot. Colonel Gray had been disgusted at the order to leave the
side hill above the Twenty-eighth street crossing, thinking it a great
mistake, and was also disgusted at the order to move down to the Union
depot. Colonel Gray, received orders from General Brown to disband his
command, and at once called around him his officers, and protested
against it. Said it was a disgrace to do so, with the mob in force in
the vicinity, and a disgrace to desert the Philadelphia troops, but the
order was obeyed, and the men dispersed to their homes, carrying their
guns with them; about eleven P.M., General Brown testified, that
leading citizens and military men advised him that it was best to
disband these troops, that their being kept under arms aggravated and
exasperated the mob, and that this advice coincided with his opinion,
and therefore the order was given. About two hundred men were present
at the time they were disbanded, nearly as many more having left from
time to time, during the day and evening, and it is General Brown's
opinion, that they were absent on account of their sympathy with the
strikers, and not on account of fear. When these troops marched down to
the transfer depot, the mob did not jeer or rail at them, as they did
at all times at the Philadelphia troops, and it does not seem from the
evidence, that anything had been done by them to aggravate or
exasperate the mob in the least. General Pearson entered the round
house with General Brinton's command, and left them about half past
eight, to see about getting provisions for the men, who had received no
regular meal since leaving Philadelphia. They had been furnished with
coffee and sandwiches at Altoona, and the same at Pittsburgh.
On leaving, General Pearson gave General Brinton orders to hold the
position until he returned, which he thought would be within an hour.
On reaching Union depot General Pearson was informed that the mob was
very much exasperated against him, as they held him responsible for the
firing on them by the troops, and was advised by General Latta and
others that his presence would still further aggravate the crowd, and
that he had better retire to some place of safety until the excitement
was over, which advice was followed, and he therefore did not return to
General Brinton. The effort to provision General Brinton's troops was a
failure, as the mob seized, used, and destroyed the food which was sent
out for the purpose. The round house and machine shop overlooked
Liberty street on one side, on the other side were the tracks, many of
them filled with cars, and near the machine shop were piles of lumber
and materials used in repairs. Pickets were put out on this side of the
machine shop so as to prevent the mob from taking shelter behind the
piles of lumber, and firing on the troops from these places. The mob
had broken into two or three gun stores in the city between eight and
nine o'clock that evening, and had, by this means, secured guns and
ammunition, and soon after dark commenced firing on the round house and
machine shops, firing in at the windows and at any soldiers they could
get sight of, one of the mob firing an explosive bullet, which the
troops could see explode every time it struck anything in their
vicinity.
Two of the soldiers were wounded, one in the arm and one in the leg,
during the night, which is all the casualties that occurred among them
until after they left the round house and shop in the morning. About
ten o'clock P.M., the mob began setting fire to the cars, and running
them down the track nearest the round house, in order, if possible, to
set it on fire, and thus drive out the troops. From some distance above
Twenty-eighth street to below Twenty-sixth street it is down grade, and
the cars will run of their own gravitation, on being started, down to
and below the buildings in which the troops were located. The first car
fired was a car of coal, and, after being set on fire, it was started
on the down grade with one of the mob on it, and he, on arriving at the
round house, broke up the car and stopped it. Other cars were fired and
run down against the first one, and there was soon a string of fire the
whole length of the shops on the side next the tracks. The round house
was well supplied with water, and the troops were enabled to keep the
fire from communicating with the buildings during the night.
About one o'clock, on the morning of the 22d, (Sunday,) it was
discovered that the mob had a field piece on Liberty street, ready to
fire on the round house. By General Brinton's orders his men were
stationed at the windows ready to fire, and the mob were notified to
abandon the gun and not attempt to fire it, or they would be fired on.
They paid no attention to the warning, and when one of them was seen
with the lanyard in his hand ready to discharge the piece, orders were
given the troops to fire, and several of the mob fell, and the rest ran
away. Several attempts were made by the mob during the night to creep
up and discharge the gun, but the soldiers kept close watch on it and
allowed them no opportunity to do so. General Brinton succeeded in
communicating with General Latta during the night by sending out one of
his men, Sergeant Joseph F. Wilson, who, by disguising himself,
succeeded in getting out and back twice, but would not undertake it
again. He brought orders from General Latta to hold on as long as
possible, that Guthrie had been ordered to report to him, and ought to
reach him at five or six o'clock, but if compelled to escape at last,
to do so to the eastward, to take Penn avenue if possible, and make for
Colonel Guthrie, at Torrens. The scout, Wilson, brought in the last
dispatch about two o'clock, A.M., the 22d, and this was the last
communication that reached General Brinton while in the round house.
The ordeal through which these men passed that night was fearful.
Tired, hungry, worn out, surrounded by a mob of infuriated men, yelling
like demons, fire on nearly all sides of them, suffocated and blinded
by smoke, with no chance to rest, and but little knowledge of what
efforts were being made for their relief, with orders not to fire on
the mob unless in necessary self defense, the wonder is that they were
not totally demoralized; but the evidence of all the officers is that
the men behaved like veterans, obeyed all orders cheerfully and with
promptness, and during the whole night but one company manifested any
spirit of insubordination, and these proposed to lay down their arms
and quit, as they were not allowed to use them on the mob, while the
latter were taking every opportunity of shooting down the soldiers.
This insubordination was quickly brought to an end as soon as the
attention of the proper officer was called to it, and when the troops
marched out in the morning, no one could tell by their actions which of
the men had wavered during the night. About half-past seven, Sunday
morning, the 22d instant, the machine shop caught fire in many places,
the roof of the round house also was on fire, and it became necessary
to evacuate the buildings. The two Napoleon guns could not be removed,
and were spiked, and about eight, A.M., the command marched out into
the street in good, order, taking their Gatling guns with them. The mob
scattered in every direction at sight of the troops coming out, and no
attempt was made to molest the soldiers until they began their march
eastward by Penn avenue, in pursuance of the orders received from
General Latta.
After marching two or three squares, the troops were harassed by a fire
in their rear. They were fired at from second story windows, from the
corners of the streets, and from every place where one of the mob could
fire from under cover so as to be safe himself from a return fire. They
were also fired at from a police station, where eight or ten policemen
stood in uniform, as they passed, and when they were a convenient
distance from the station, shots were fired at them from the crowd
there assembled. It is hard to believe charges of this kind, but the
evidence is too positive and circumstantial to leave room for doubt. At
one point, just before reaching the United States arsenal, there was
some confusion among the men in the rear of the column, caused by an
attack by the mob that was following up, and a halt was made, and the
Gatling guns used on the attacking party, which dispersed them, and
this ended all attacks on the troops. In this retreat, three of the
soldiers were killed and several wounded, one of whom, Lieutenant Ashe,
died a few days afterwards, at the United States arsenal. On arriving
at the arsenal several of the soldiers climbed over the fence, into the
grounds, and General Brinton called on the commandant, Major
Buffington, for leave to feed and shelter his troops there. General
Brinton and Major Buffington disagreed as to what occurred between them
at that time, which question of veracity the purposes of this report
does not require us to decide, but General Brinton is corroborated by
the testimony of one of his officers, and Major Buffington has no
corroborating witness. The result of the conference was, that General
Brinton and his well men went on, and his wounded were left, and well
cared for, at the arsenal. General Brinton, hearing nothing from
Colonel Guthrie, continued his march out to and through Sharpsburg, and
finally brought up in the vicinity of the work-house, and encamped on
the grounds near that institution, where he was furnished with rations
for his men, and gave them a chance to get the rest they so much
needed. These rations reached General Brinton's command during Sunday
afternoon, through the personal exertions of A. J. Cassatt, who, from
the time of the occupation of the round-house by the troops, had been
unwearied in his endeavors to get provisions to them. The command was
also furnished with blankets and other necessary camp equipments, by
Colonel Thomas A. Scott, who had also been vigilant in looking after
the welfare of the men, and all necessary transportation needed on
their behalf, after their departure from Philadelphia, unprepared for a
campaign, on account of the brief notice given them. To these two
gentlemen, the friends of the National Guard owe a debt of gratitude
for the personal interest taken by them, at all times, during the
campaign, to render any service that lay in their power to make the men
comfortable.
The destruction of the railroad property by the mob had been continued
all night, the cars and goods contained in them that could not be
carried off being burned as fast as they could be broken open, the
goods thrown out and the cars set on fire. Crowds of men, women, and
children were engaged in the work of pillage, and everything portable,
of any value, was seized as fast as thrown from the cars, and carried
away and secreted. One feature of the mob at Pittsburgh is new in this
country. A large number of women were in the crowd at Twenty-eighth
street, on Saturday, the 21st instant, and according to testimony, they
talked to the sheriff, and others who tried to get the crowd to
disperse, worse than the men, used viler epithets, and more indecent
language, and did everything in their power to influence and excite the
mob to resistance. They also, during Saturday night and Sunday, brought
out tea and coffee for the men engaged in the destruction of property,
and were the most active in carrying away the goods taken from the
cars. This work of pillage and destruction continued all day Sunday,
and the actual destruction was participated in by only thirty to fifty
men, the citizens in the meantime standing looking helplessly on, and
no effort made to stay the damage by the bystanders. There was a very
large crowd in the vicinity of the burning, who were supposed to be in
sympathy with the destruction, and this probably deterred anyone from
interfering to put a stop to it. The police, on Sunday, arrested some
seventy-five persons who were carrying off goods, the arrests being
made some distance from the place where the articles were taken. Those
arrested were taken before Deputy Mayor Butler, and most of them were
by him discharged. This seems to be all that the police did to restrain
the rioting that day, and it is in evidence that one policeman in
uniform got into one of the cars and threw goods out to the mob.
On Saturday morning, General Latta had sent written orders by Captain
Aull to General Brinton, for the latter to make a junction with Colonel
Guthrie, at Torrens, and with the whole force to march to Pittsburgh,
and fearing that Captain Aull might fail to reach General Brinton, the
order was read to Colonel Norris, who volunteered to go in search of
General Brinton.
Colonel Norris, in company with J. M. Stewart, overtook General
Brinton's command a little beyond Sharpsburg, and they both testify
that Colonel Norris told General Brinton that Captain Aull had been
sent by General Latta in search of him with orders, and communicated to
him, (General Brinton,) the substance of the orders, and that General
Brinton refused to go back, saying that his men had been fired at from
houses, street crossings, and police stations, and were almost famished
for want of food, and he was going into the open country where he could
intrench and defend himself, and procure food for his men, but that if
he received positive orders he might return.
General Brinton and several of his officers testify that although
Colonel Norris visited him at the time and place stated, yet that he
delivered no orders whatever, and stated that his errand was to find
out where the command was. In regard to these counter-statements your
committee will have something to say under the head of "conduct of the
militia." It is proper to state here, however, that the written order
given to Captain Aull to take to General Brinton was not delivered to
him till the 1st day of August, a week from its date.
Soon after the first car was set on fire, Saturday night, the alarm of
fire was given, and the firemen with their engines at once turned out
and arrived in the vicinity of the fire about eleven o'clock, but were
not allowed to attempt to stop the destruction of the railroad company
property. They tried several times to lay their hose, so as to play on
the fire, but the mob cut their hose and threatened them with death if
they persisted. Some of the police testify that they cleared away the
mob at one place and notified the firemen that they were ready to
protect them if they would go to work and put out the fire; but the
firemen deny this, and testify that no such offer was made, and that at
no time did they see half a dozen police together.
In view of the general failure of the police to do what must be
considered their duty in regard to the rioters, during the whole time
of the trouble, they need not think it strange if the majority of
people are inclined to believe the statements of the firemen. The
officers of the fire department testify that the firemen were well
organized at the place of danger, ready to do their duty at all times,
and that this department was the only one in the city that was
organized trying to do its duty during the time of the riot. The
firemen, after some remonstrance on the part of a portion of the
rioters, were allowed to save private property, and to this fact may be
ascribed the safety of a good portion of the city; for the fire from
the railroad property communicated to the adjoining property of
individuals, and but for the labors of the firemen there must have been
a very extensive conflagration throughout Pittsburgh. The destruction
of property did not cease until about five o'clock, P.M., on Sunday,
the 22d, and then only when the limit of the corporation property had
been reached at Seventh street by the destruction of the Union depot,
Union depot hotel, and the grain elevator. The latter did not belong to
the railroad company, but it was believed by the mob to be owned by a
corporation, and therefore it was doomed to destruction with the rest.
Several times during the day--Sunday--the cry of "police" was made by
some one in the crowd, and whenever this was done the mob would scatter
in all directions, but as soon as it was ascertained to be a false
alarm they would again return to the work of destruction. It was
demonstrated also that whenever any citizen gave a determined and
positive order to any of the mob it was usually obeyed.
A notice had been published in the Sunday morning papers, and had also
been given out in the various churches, that a meeting of the citizens
would be held at the old city hall, at noon, for the purpose of
organizing to protect the city. Some citizens met at the old city hall,
according to notice, but there seemed to be no head to the movement,
and it adjourned to meet at the new city hall immediately. At this
place a committee of safety was appointed, and a sort of an
organization for defense commenced, but in the language of a prominent
witness engaged in the movement: "They were all day doing very little;
there was no head anywhere; the mayor did nothing, and seemed to be
powerless, and the sheriff had run away. The mayor seemed to be
confused; he ran around some, but really did nothing." A nucleus for an
organization of the responsible citizens of the city was formed,
however, which on the following day developed into vigorous action, and
the best men of the city came forward and subscribed liberally to a
fund to pay an extra police force, and pledged themselves to subscribe
any amount necessary to put the city in a complete state of defense
against the mob element. Some sixty thousand dollars was actually
subscribed, of which about fifteen thousand dollars was used to pay the
extra police force called into existence by the action of the citizens
during the emergency.
About four to five o'clock, P.M., a body of fifty or sixty men,
composed of professional and business men, were organized under the
lead of Doctor Donnelly, and armed at first with ax-helves, and
afterwards with some old muskets and no ammunition, and with white
handkerchiefs on their left arms, appeared at the scene of the trouble,
near the Union depot and elevator, but it was too late to save these
buildings, as they were already burned. The crowd gave way to this
force, but as the destruction was completed here but little could be
accomplished. The doctor ordered the mob to take hold and tear down a
fence so as to stop the spread of the fire, and they obeyed orders.
There was such an apathy among the citizens, that it took all the day
to raise this force led by Doctor Donnelly, and after being on the
ground a short time, and finding nothing for them to do, they
disbanded.
During the day (Sunday) a car load of whisky or high wines was broken
open by the mob, and they drank very freely of it, and towards night,
at the time the Union depot and elevator were burned, most of the
active rioters were so drunk as to be unable to continue the work of
destruction, if they had been so disposed. Whisky had done good service
in this case, if never before. The fatigue consequent upon the labors
of Saturday night and Sunday was also producing its effect upon the
rioters, and taken in connection with the fact, that most of them must
have been filled to satiety with rioting and destruction of property,
shows a good cause for the waning of the riot on Sunday afternoon. A
few of the rioters, between five and six o'clock, P.M., went to the
Duquesne depot, (the property of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company,) at
the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers, with the
intention of burning it and the cars in the vicinity. One car was set
on fire and an attempt made to set the depot on fire, but some six or
eight of the citizens' safety committee arrived there about the time
the rioters did, and they interfered at once to put a stop to
destruction, and had no difficulty in doing so, as the rioters desisted
and left as soon as they saw any authority exerted in opposition to
their schemes.
The Eighteenth regiment (Colonel Guthrie) had remained at Torrens
station, keeping the track clear at that point, and waiting for the
expected trains. The crowd at that place numbered about fifteen hundred
men, composed of mill men, some railroad men, boys, roughs, and tramps.
The passenger trains were allowed to run by the mob, but between
Pittsburgh and Torrens they were filled to overflowing by the roughest
of the crowd, who traveled backwards and forwards between those places
on the trains at their pleasure, and no one dared to interfere with
them. They even climbed on the engine and tender, and roofs of the
cars, and controlled the movements of the trains whenever they chose so
to do between those two points. At Torrens, the crowd would
occasionally become demonstrative and defiant, and Colonel Guthrie was
obliged to charge bayonets on them several times, and each time had no
difficulty in dispersing them. Twice he ordered his men to load in
presence of the crowd, and this of itself dispersed them. Colonel
Guthrie's troops were not allowed to fraternize with the mob, but were
kept entirely aloof from them, and this regiment does not seem to have
become demoralized, as the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments were.
About four o'clock, P.M., Sunday, Colonel Guthrie, hearing that the
Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments had been disbanded, and being
unable to ascertain the exact condition of affairs at Pittsburgh, went
there and consulted with General Latta, and his regiment was ordered to
march to that place, where they arrived about dark, and, of course, too
late to be of any service in stopping the destruction of property,
which had all taken place before their arrival. They marched to the
armory and stayed all night, and on Monday forenoon, the Twenty-third,
together with the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments, which had been
ordered to reassemble that morning, marched through the principal
streets of the city for the purpose of overawing any riotous
disposition that might still remain in those who had been engaged in
the work of destruction the day before. Colonel Guthrie assumed command
of the division, his commission being older than Colonel Gray's or
Colonel Howard's, and when General Brown wished to assume command
Colonel Guthrie refused to recognize his authority, on account of the
manner in which he had managed matters on Saturday, the 21st. On
Saturday night, a few of the leading citizens had suggested to the
mayor that it would be well to call out all of the old police force
that had been discharged, and in accordance with this suggestion the
chief of police caused a notice to be published, calling on them to
report at his office and they would be assigned to duty. During the day
several reported and were employed, and afterwards most of the old
force were taken back and assigned to duty for a time. This extra
force, together with the force of citizens organized for the purpose,
patrolled the city that Sunday night, and succeeding nights, until the
danger had passed.
From the first commencement of the strike, the strikers had the active
sympathy of a large portion of the people of Pittsburgh. The citizens
had a bitter feeling against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company on
account of, as they believed, an unjust discrimination by the railroad
company against them in freight rates, which made it very difficult for
their manufacturers to compete successfully with manufacturers further
west, and this feeling had existed and been intensified for years, and
pervaded all classes. A large portion of the people also believed that
the railroad company was not dealing fairly by its men in making the
last reduction in wages, and the tradesmen with whom the trainmen dealt
also had a direct sympathy with the men in this reduction, for its
results would affect their pockets.
The large class of laborers in the different mills, manufactories,
mines, and other industries in Pittsburgh and vicinity, were also
strongly in sympathy with the railroad strikers, considering the cause
of the railroad men their cause, as their wages had also been reduced
for the same causes as were those of the railroad men, and they were
not only willing but anxious to make a common fight against the
corporations. This feeling of aversion to the railroad company and
sympathy with the strikers was indulged in by the Pittsburgh troops to
the same extent that it was by the other classes, and as many of them
had friends and relatives in the mob, it is not much to be wondered at
that they did not show much anxiety to assist in dispersing the crowd
and enforcing the law.
With the repulse of the attempt to set fire to the Duquesne depot ended
all active efforts by the mob to destroy property, and after that
Sunday night no mob of any size was again assembled, although it was
several days before complete order was fully restored, as the people
had lost confidence in all the laboring men, and no one knew who to
trust or what to expect from others on account of the extent to which
the demoralization had gone.
About sixteen hundred cars, (mostly freight,) including passenger and
baggage cars, with such of their contents as were not carried away by
the thieves; one hundred and twenty-six locomotives, and all the shops'
materials and buildings, except one or two small ones, of the railroad
company, from above Twenty-eighth street to the Union depot, were
burned on that Saturday night and Sunday.
It has been estimated, by a competent person, that the damage,
including loss of property and loss of business, consequent upon the
interruption of business, which was inflicted by the mob, at Pittsburgh
alone, was $5,000,000. This may be a large estimate, but if the
consequential damages could be correctly arrived at, the total damage
would fall but little short of the figures given. The actual loss of
property by the railroad company alone, not including the freight they
were transporting, is estimated at two million dollars, by the officers
of the company, from actual figures made. The authorities of Allegheny
county adopted thorough measures to ascertain the extent of the loss of
property, and to that end appointed a committee to investigate claims
of those claiming damage. One hundred and sixty-nine claims were
settled by the committee, that is, the amount of each claim of this
number was adjusted and agreed upon by the committee and the parties,
and the total amount thus adjusted is about one hundred and sixty
thousand dollars, and all this is strictly private property. Some
persons refused to adjust the amount of their claims with the
committee, among which is the claim of the elevator company, amounting
to the sum of two hundred thousand dollars. Property that was stolen
was also recovered and returned to the railroad company, amounting in
value to at least sixty thousand dollars.
The tracks from Union depot out to and beyond Twenty-eighth street were
nearly all ruined by the fire, the rails being warped and twisted and
the ties burned; they were also covered with the debris of the burned
cars, and it was about a week after the destruction, or until July
30th, before the railroad company were enabled to get their trains all
running regularly again over this portion of the track.
During the troubles of the 20th and 21st, efforts were made by the
strikers to come to an understanding or compromise with the railroad
officials, and a committee to confer with the officials was appointed.
Some time on Friday, the 20th, the committee met Mr. Pitcairn, the
superintendent of the Pittsburgh division, and presented him with a
written statement of the demand made by the strikers, of which the
following is a copy, viz:
"BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS,
PITTSBURGH DIVISION, NO. 50,
PITTSBURGH, PA., _July 20, 1877_.
_To the Superintendent Western Division, Pennsylvania Railroad_:
_First._ We, the undersigned committee appointed by the employés of
the western division of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, do
hereby demand from the said company, through the proper officers of
said company, the wages as per department of engineers, firemen,
conductors, brakemen, and flagmen as received prior to June 1,
1877.
_Second._ That each and every employé that has been dismissed for
taking part or parts in said strikes to be restored to their
respective positions.
_Third._ That the classification of each of said department be
abolished now and forever hereafter.
_Fourth._ That engineers and conductors receive the wages as
received by said engineers and conductors of the highest class
prior to June 1, 1877.
_Fifth._ That the running of double trains be abolished, excepting
coal trains.
_Sixth._ That each and every engine, whether road or shifting,
shall have its own fireman.
Respectfully submitted to you for immediate consideration.
J. S. MCCAULEY,
D. H. NEWHARD,
JOHN SHANA,
G. HARRIS,
J. P. KESSLER,
_Committee_."
Mr. Pitcairn informed the committee, that these terms could not be
accepted by the railroad company, and that he could not send such a
proposition to Colonel Scott, the president of the company, and the
negotiations were broken off. An attempt was made on Sunday, by some of
the citizens, to induce the railroad officials to submit some
proposition for a compromise to the strikers, but the officials
refused, saying that the men had taken the law into their own hands,
and that no proposition could be made to them until their property was
restored, and all opposition had ceased, and that it was now a matter
of law, and the State authorities must settle the question with the men
first.
The propositions embraced in the papers submitted by the committee of
engineers, proposed that the railroad company should make concessions
that had never been asked before. The first and second explain
themselves fully, and had been grounds of complaint before. The third,
requiring the abolishment of the classification of conductors and
engineers, had never been a ground of complaint by the men. The
conductors were divided into three classes: The first of which received
a certain rate of pay per month the first year of service; an addition
of ten per cent. for the second year, and another addition of the ten
per cent. for the third year. The engineers were divided into four
classes, and received an advance of ten per cent. for each year of
service after the first until the fourth class was reached. This
classification was adopted at the request of the men themselves, some
years previous, and no complaint in regard to it had ever reached the
officers of the company.
This principle of classification had been practiced by other railroads,
and has worked well, and is a good rule for both the men and the
railroads, as its tendency is to secure and retain better men to run
the trains.
The fourth proposition, if accepted, would have placed the new,
inexperienced men on the same footing as the men of experience, and to
give them at once the highest wages paid the older and more experienced
men.
The fifth proposition was for the railroad company to back down and
rescind the order made to run double-headers and the sixth that the
company should employ a fireman on all shifting engines, a place where
they are not usually needed, as the engine is not engaged in steady
work, and the engineer can do his own firing without trouble or
over-work. No proposition of compromise was submitted to the strikers
on the part of the railroad company, and what would have been the
result if one had been made, it is useless to speculate about.
As tending to show the feeling of the people of Pittsburgh on the
subject of the difficulties between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company
and its employés and in regard to the strike, some copies of editorials
from several of the newspapers of the city, written and published at
the time of the strike, have been inserted in the evidence accompanying
their report.
More space has been given to the history of the riots at Pittsburgh
than to any other place, as it was here the troubles first commenced in
this State; here was the greatest loss of life, and it was here that,
by far, the greatest destruction of property took place. We turn now to
Allegheny City, just across the river from Pittsburgh, and the termini
of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, the Allegheny
Valley railroad, the Pan Handle railroad, and the Connellsville
division of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. On Friday morning, July
20th, the freight conductors and brakemen on the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne
and Chicago railroad refused to go out with their trains, and the
railroad officers, fearing trouble, sent up to the mayor's office for
some policemen to preserve the peace, and ten were sent them. The mayor
was not at his office at the time, but, on his return, he immediately
went up to the depot to look after the troubles himself. At the time
the mayor arrived on the ground there was a crowd of two hundred and
fifty to three hundred and fifty men assembled and no man could be
found to man the trains. One engineer came out with his engine, which
was surrounded by the crowd, but no violence was used and there is no
evidence of any threats being made at the time, but he returned with
his engine to the round house. After this time no attempt to run a
freight train was made on this road until the troubles were all over
and the men had given up the strike.
The strikers here were under the leadership of one R. A. Ammon, better
known as Boss Ammon, and declared their intention to use no violence to
prevent trains from running; that if the railroad company could get
"scabs" (as the strikers called any man who was willing to work during
a strike) to run their trains, they were willing the trains should run,
but as the company was unable to find men willing to go out on the
trains, the good intentions of the strikers were not tested. As this
road was run directly in connection with the Pennsylvania railroad on
the general western through traffic, it was but little object to force
the freight trains out as long as the Pennsylvania railroad was
blockaded, and, hence, no effort was made, after the first day, to run
freight trains. The main efforts were in the direction of keeping the
peace and preventing the destruction of property. The strikers declared
their intentions to keep the peace, and prevent the destruction of
property, and not interfere with the running of passenger trains, and
they were told that so long as they did this in good faith, they would
not be interfered with. Mayor Phillips immediately ordered out all his
police to patrol the city, organized an extra force of citizens, and
swore them in, made a requisition on the Secretary of War for five
hundred guns, and got them, and placed them in the hands of the
citizens, and generally had everything so well organized and arranged
that any attempt at a riot could have been met and quelled at once. It
was rumored that the mob had broken, or was going to break, into the
armory and get the guns (about forty) stored there, and the mayor at
once sent and had the guns all removed to a place of safety. It was
also rumored that the mob from Pittsburgh intended to come over into
Allegheny City, and destroy the railroad property there, and the mayor
had the bridges all guarded by armed men, with two field pieces at the
principal ones, which he was enabled to get, and there being no balls
with them, he caused them to be loaded with square iron burs, an inch
or so in size.
The city had fifty-five policemen, and these were kept on duty as much
of the time as it was possible for men to be out, and no opportunity
was given any of the Pittsburgh mob to cross over to Allegheny.
At the time it was alleged that the Pittsburgh mob was coming to
Allegheny City, to destroy the property of the railroad company there,
an arrangement was made with Ammon and his men to take the freight cars
out of the city, which was accordingly done, and ten miles of cars were
hauled out from the city some miles, and stowed away on the side
tracks, until the troubles were over, when the same men brought them
back and turned them over, in good order, to the railroad authorities.
It was also arranged with Ammon and his men, that as long as the men
behaved themselves and protected the property of the company, no
soldier should be brought there to interfere with them, and if, at any
time, they found themselves unable to preserve the peace and take care
of the property, they were to notify the mayor, who would then furnish
a force to preserve order. The mayor also, at the commencement of the
troubles, sent his policemen around to notify the saloon-keepers, and
others, to close their bars, and sell no strong drink to any one, and
afterwards sent the force around to see that the order was obeyed.
Although not legally binding, the order was very generally observed,
and no trouble was experienced on account of the crowd using strong
drink. The mayor had notices posted throughout the city that, if
necessity required it, ten taps of the bell was to be the signal for
the general assembling of the citizens at a given place for defense,
which signal, fortunately, was not required to be given.
Mayor Phillips considered himself as the chief peace officer of the
city, and if the sheriff or military had been called on for assistance,
he did not consider either or both superseded him, but that it would
have been his duty to have cooperated with them to the full extent of
his power.
"Boss" Ammon and his party, which consisted of about one hundred
railroad men and a crowd of two or three hundred outsiders, roughs, and
laborers, continued to run the Pittsburgh division of the Pittsburgh,
Fort Wayne and Chicago road until Tuesday evening, the 24th instant, at
which time Governor Hartranft arrived from the West. When Ammon heard
that the Governor was on the train, coming to Pittsburgh, he
telegraphed him, welcoming him to the State, and assuring him a safe
passage. On the Governor's arrival he was met by Ammon and introduced
to the crowd, and gave them a short talk, counseling obedience to the
laws, which was well received. It was now felt by all that the strike
must come to an end immediately; that there was a man at the head of
affairs who knew his duty and would not be trifled with, and that all
parties would be fairly and justly treated. Boss Ammon immediately made
arrangements to turn over the railroad to the proper authorities, he
seeing very clearly that the proper time to do so had now come, and
that further delay was dangerous. Some of his men could not agree with
him that it was best to make terms while they could, and, at a meeting
of the men, he was hissed, and they refused to hear him speak.
Thus fell from his position of boss the man who, with only eleven
months' experience as a brakeman, for four or five days successfully
ran one division of a great railroad.
It has by some been considered an extraordinary performance for a young
man of twenty-five, with the small experience he had, to control the
men he did, and keep the passenger trains running regularly without
accident on such a railroad; but when the circumstances are considered
it is nothing wonderful. In the first place, a mob or crowd are always
willing to follow any person who has nerve, and is willing to assume
the responsibility and take the lead. Ammon had the nerve; was
naturally shrewd and sharp, and knew how to control men, and they had
been used to look up to him as the organizer of the Trainmen's Union.
The mob always wants a dictator, and in Ammon they had one. In the next
place, the great railroads of the country are so organized, and their
trains are run by such a regular system in connection with the
telegraph, that the trains can be run for days without a break if the
superintendent should abandon the road entirely. Ammon was a king so
long as he led in the direction the crowd wished to go; when he
undertook to put on the brakes and get them to reason about their
situation, and ran counter to their opinions, he was dethroned with as
little ceremony or compunction as one school boy shows in knocking off
the hat of another.
Human nature is the same everywhere; in politics, society, or with the
mob, the leader must go in the direction his followers would have him
go, or he is replaced for one more subservient. From Wednesday, the
25th of July, the officers of the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago
railroad began to be able to get control of their road, and in a few
days all the trains were running regularly. The other railroads running
into Allegheny City had nearly the same difficulty with their men as
did the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and Chicago railroad, and their trains
for a few days were not regularly run, but they got along without any
rioting or destruction of property, and were soon able to start all
their trains again.
On Friday, July 20th, the freight conductors and brakemen on the
Pennsylvania railroad, at Philadelphia, began to be uneasy, and on
Saturday, the 21st, a strike was in full operation among them. They
gathered in crowds at the yards of the company where the freight trains
were made up to start out, and they, as in other places, were joined by
a large crowd of idle men, tramps, and vagabonds, such as are found
around a large city, and who scent out a chance for trouble or a riot,
as a crow scents carrion. The officials called on Mayor Stokley for
policemen to keep the peace, and protect the property of the company.
The mayor at once acted vigorously; sent out his police with orders to
disperse any crowd that might gather on the grounds of the railroad
company, and, on advising with the citizens, he was authorized to call
out an extra force, which he did at once. His action was so thorough
and efficient, that no serious interruption of traffic was experienced
at that place, although crowds of rough men had gathered to the number
of two or three thousand, and at one time, as estimated, to the number
of four thousand to five thousand. They were dispersed by the prompt
and vigorous action of the police, who would charge into the crowd,
using their clubs freely and scattered them at once. It was the policy
of the mayor not to allow a mob to collect, and this prevented a
serious rioting.
To Mayor Stokley and his police force, the State, as well as the city
of Philadelphia, is greatly indebted, and to their efforts may be
ascribed the salvation of that city from the disgraceful scenes enacted
at Pittsburg.
On Saturday, July 21st, an uneasiness among the trainmen at Harrisburg
and Scranton was observed, which, within the following two or three
days, ripened into a strike. The first crowd which gathered in
Harrisburg was on Saturday evening, the 21st of July, at the
Pennsylvania railroad depot, to prevent the shipping of ammunition to
Pittsburgh. The mayor was notified about ten o'clock, P.M., of what was
going on, and he immediately sent for the chief of police, to make
arrangements to meet the threatened danger. A lieutenant of police and
another policeman being the only members of the force then available
for prompt service, were sent to the scene of the trouble, and, by
arrangement, arrested a man and started for the mayor's office with
him, to draw the crowd from the depot. This ruse proved successful, and
the ammunition was shipped before the crowd returned. Some three
hundred or four hundred persons followed the policemen with their
prisoner to the mayor's office, and, on their arrival there, the mayor
went out and asked them to disperse, when about one half of the crowd
left. The person arrested then appeared at the door, and informed the
crowd that he had been arrested for drunkenness and disorderly conduct,
and the balance of them dispersed.
On Sunday, the 22d, the trainmen, whose head-quarters were at
Harrisburg, struck, and in consequence thereof a large crowd gathered
on the common, and listened to harangues from some of their number,
among whom was an insane man from the lunatic asylum. From the common,
the mob went to the Pennsylvania railroad depot, and prevented a train
from going out, and the mayor, having notice of their movements,
appeared upon the scene and found some boys uncoupling an engine from
the train, which the mayor put a stop to, and requested the engineer to
move on, which he refused to do, giving as an excuse that he was told
there were obstructions on the track a short distance out of town. The
crowd at this time was composed of all kinds of citizens, good, bad,
and indifferent, and they soon dispersed, and no violence took place.
On Monday, the 23d, the mob gathered in large force about the railroad
premises, and there being a larger number of roughs and tramps, became
more turbulent and interfered with the running of the trains. The mayor
consulted the leading men about raising a posse to assist the police,
there being only seventeen in the service of the city, and it was
determined to raise a force of citizens, to be called the "law and
order posse," who were to assemble at the mayor's office, on a given
signal from the court-house bell.
The sheriff of the county was at Atlantic City at the commencement of
the trouble, and was telegraphed to when matters began to assume a
serious aspect, and he arrived at Harrisburg on the evening of the 23d.
At this time the mob had increased largely, and was becoming
demonstrative. The sheriff was informed as to what measures had been
taken so far, and the mayor requested him to take charge of the
situation and control the movements generally, which the sheriff
assented to, and at once prepared a proclamation, ordering all good
citizens to turn out and assist in enforcing law and order, which
proclamation was published in the papers the next morning. In the
evening of the 23d a portion of the mob had gone to Aultmeyer's gun
store, on Second street, and demanded admittance, and the proprietor
had opened the doors to them. Word was sent to the mayor of the
occurrence, and he took his police and repaired to the place
immediately. He found the store full of men and boys, who had helped
themselves to guns and knives. The mayor formed his police in front of
the store and went in and talked with them, and after a little
parleying they delivered up the weapons they had seized and left. About
eleven o'clock, P.M., the mob gathered in large numbers on Market
street, where it crosses the railroad, and working up Market street
they broke into two or three stores. The signal for the assembling of
the citizens was given, and they assembled immediately at the corner of
Third and Market streets to the number of three hundred to four
hundred, together with the sheriff, the mayor, and the police. The
sheriff being a man of considerable military experience, had caused the
citizens to adopt company and regimental organizations, by reason of
which they were more quickly assembled and more easily handled and
moved. The sheriff and mayor went down to the mob and ordered them to
disperse, which they refused to do, and then the police and citizens,
armed with pistols and clubs, were marched toward the mob, the police
and mayor at the head of the column. The mob numbered from seven
hundred to one thousand, and two thirds of them dispersed on seeing the
force marching against them, but some two hundred stood their ground.
The force in command of the mayor and sheriff marched into this body,
using their clubs freely, and completely dispersed them without firing
a shot. Several of the rioters were arrested at the time, and quite a
number during the week; in all some forty-five or fifty of the leaders
were arrested, many of them being taken in their beds that night.
This determination on the part of the civil authorities, backed by the
citizens, broke the spirit of the mob, and they did not again assemble
in any great number, or commit any further breaches of the peace,
although the citizens' organization was kept up for several days, and a
special force of some fifty men was employed to be on the watch for
some time, and until matters became quiet throughout the State. The
whole number of citizens enrolled was about fifteen hundred, and more
than one thousand were out on a parade at one time. On receiving news
of the uneasiness manifested at Harrisburg, General Latta, then at
Pittsburgh, telegraphed Major General J. K. Sigfried, commanding Fourth
division National Guard, with head-quarters at Pottsville, to put the
City Grays, of Harrisburg, on duty at the arsenal at once, and order
his whole division under arms, and move to Harrisburg. He also received
a similar telegram from Governor Hartranft, from Medicine Bow, Wyoming
Territory. The telegrams were dated July 22d. General Sigfried had, on
the previous day, as a precautionary measure, ordered Captain Maloney,
of the Harrisburg City Grays, to ship his arms and ammunition to the
State arsenal, located just outside of the city, and to stay there and
guard the same, to prevent it from falling into the hands of any mob
that might undertake to capture it. General Sigfried arrived at
Harrisburg with nine companies of the Seventh and Eighth regiments on
the 23d, and was there joined by eight other companies, making a force
under his command of some eight hundred men. These troops were
stationed at the arsenal at the time the mob was dispersed by the
police and sheriff's posse, on the night of the 23d, but were not
called on by the civil authorities, they evidently understanding their
duty, which was to attempt to enforce the law by the means within their
power, before calling on the military for assistance. Had this been
done as promptly in some other places, much expense to the State might
have been saved, and the riot nipped in the bud, instead of being
allowed to become strong and organized, while waiting for troops to
arrive. The mayor testified that when the disturbance first commenced
the citizens were lukewarm, and seemed to have considerable sympathy
with the strikers, but as soon as affairs began to assume a serious
aspect, they came forward and enrolled themselves freely in the law and
order posse, and urged prompt and vigorous action, and by so doing they
no doubt prevented the enacting at this place of the terrible
destruction of life and property which took place in other localities.
At Reading, on Saturday, July 21st, the idle men began to gather in
small bodies and talk of strikes, and showed a disposition to interfere
with railroad property, but no overt act was committed until Sunday the
22d. The mob at this place was composed primarily of discharged
employés of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, who had been
discharged in the month of April preceding. The officers of that road
learning that the society called the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers intended to make the company trouble, commenced preparing for
it, and when in April the engineers demanded an advance in wages of
twenty per centum, they were notified that any person who belonged to
the brotherhood could not remain in the employ of the company unless he
severed his connection with that society, and that, as the society was
a beneficial one, and had a fund for its members to draw on in ease of
sickness, the company would establish such a fund for its engineers. In
consequence of this demand, and the circular of the company, some four
hundred engineers, firemen, and brakemen left the service of the
company, whose places were filled by promoting firemen and hiring new
men, and those coming from other roads who held certificates of
competency and good behavior. Many of these men who left the employ of
the company had remained in and about Reading, and on hearing of the
riots at Pittsburgh, thought it would be a good time to take their
revenge on the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, and these,
with other idle men, composed the nucleus of the mob, and were, as in
other places, soon joined by all the tramps and criminals in the
vicinity. None of the regular employés of the railroad company struck
at that time, nor were they engaged in the riots. On Sunday trains were
interfered with near the depot, and one or two cars burned, and on
Sunday night, the 22d, the Lebanon Valley railroad bridge, which is a
very high one, crossing the Schuylkill at Reading, and costing a large
sum of money, was burned. On the evening of July 22d, Adjutant General
Latta telegraphed to Major General William J. Bolton, commanding the
Second division National Guard, with head-quarters at Norristown, to
concentrate the Sixteenth regiment, under arms, at once at Norristown,
and the Fourth regiment, at Allentown, which was done as soon as
possible, and the Fourth regiment, General Reeder, reported on the
morning of the 23d, that all the companies were in hand except company
A, which was in the hands of the mob at Reading.
At 3.50, P.M., of that day, J. E. Wootten, general manager of the
Reading Railroad Company, telegraphed General Bolton, that they were in
need of protection at Reading, and asked that General Reeder be sent to
that place with his command, which request was complied with, and
General Reeder ordered to proceed to Reading at once. General Reeder,
with the Fourth regiment, Colonel Good, arrived at Reading about seven
o'clock, P.M., of the 23d, and instead of finding the mob in possession
of the depot of the Philadelphia and Reading railroad, as he expected,
found it in possession of a squad of the coal and iron police. The mob
had had pretty much its own way all day, and had stopped the running of
all freight trains, and interfered with the passenger trains. The
sheriff of the county, George R. Yorgey, who was out of the city, had
been telegraphed to by the chief of police, in regard to the trouble,
and having been furnished an extra train, arrived in the city about
five, A.M., of the 23d.
On his arrival, he refused to take any steps to raise a posse, although
men were offered him by the railroad officials, and the only step taken
by him to disperse the rioters, and preserve order during the troubles,
was to issue a proclamation at night, on the 23d, requesting all good
citizens to remain at their homes. When the chief executive officer of
the county, so fails in his duty, it is no wonder that mobs become
defiant and destroy life and property.
The mayor was absent from the city, and the chief of police, Peter
Cullen, was the only civil officer who did any thing to preserve order.
He, with the police force of twenty-seven men, did all that men could
do under the circumstances. On Sunday night, with a few police, he
tried to prevent the burning of the cars, and stopped it after a short
time. On Monday, with his force he cleared the crossing at Seventh and
Penn streets, so that the street cars and people could pass, although
the crowd numbered several thousands. He also sent out his men to raise
a posse of two hundred men among the citizens, but they all refused,
and laughed at the police, and he did not consider that he had the
authority to summon them or order them out.
The police force was still at the Penn street crossing when General
Reeder arrived at the depot. The railroad officials requested General
Reeder to move into the railroad cut to release a train that was in the
hands of the mob, and as that was on the direct route to Penn street
crossing, the point to which he wished to go with his force, he
commenced his march through the cut. The cut is some three squares
long; the banks about thirty feet high at the highest place, and at the
ends tapering down to nothing, with streets crossing it by bridges in
two places, and walks at each side near the top of the bank, with a
stone wall down the face of the bank, and a parapet three or four feet
high to protect the walks.
On nearing the cut, General Reeder's force was met by a large crowd
hooting and jeering at the soldiers, and throwing stones, and the
General, seeing the temper of the mob, ordered his musicians to the
rear and his men to lead. The mob gave away, but as the troops entered
the cut the mob, which lined both sides of the cut, began to throw
brickbats, paving stones, and other missiles down on them, which the
soldiers bore until they were two thirds of the way through the cut,
when one or two pistol shots were fired at them, and one soldier fired
his piece in the air, which was followed by scattering shots, and then
by a regular volley, and firing was kept up until they reached the Penn
street crossing, where the police were stationed. Of the two hundred
and fifty-three soldiers only about fifty escaped being hurt, but none
were seriously injured. Of the crowd eleven were killed, and over fifty
wounded, two of the killed and some of the wounded being mere lookers
on, and not engaged in the riots.
It being so dark that no one could be readily distinguished, seven of
the policemen who were in line across the railroad at the Penn street
crossing were wounded by the fire of the troops, some of them quite
seriously, but they all recovered. This collision broke the spirit of
the mob, and no destruction took place after that at this place. But
the mob was threatening for several days, so much so that five
companies of the Sixteenth regiment were immediately sent to General
Reeder, from Norristown. This did not improve the condition of affairs,
as the men of the Sixteenth regiment openly fraternized with the
rioters, and declared their intention, in case of further trouble, of
siding with them, and furnished them with ammunition. This soon
destroyed the morale of the Fourth regiment, and General Reeder asked
leave to move them to Allentown, which was granted, and General Bolton
started for Reading on a special train, after giving orders for the
movement and disposition of the balance of the men of his division. On
arriving at Reading he found matters rather quiet at the depot, with
the Sixteenth regiment in possession. The authorities fearing trouble
that night, and the police having been out that day again trying to
raise extra men for the force, and failing, General Bolton telegraphed
to General Reeder, who was at Temple station, six miles distant, to
return at once with the Fourth regiment; to which General Reeder
answered that "the men positively refused to return to Reading
to-night; the regiment and company officers are perfectly helpless;"
and from Colonel Good: "The men of the Fourth positively refuse to
return to-night; I can't get twenty-five men," and General Bolton
finally ordered General Reeder to rendezvous at Allentown and await
further orders. It is enough to say that three hundred United States
troops arrived that day at Reading, and no further serious trouble was
apprehended or occurred; that General Bolton ordered the Sixteenth
regiment to return to Norristown; but company I mutinied and refused to
return, and was disbanded in dishonor by the general. He afterwards
issued an order to disband companies C, D, E, and H, of the Sixteenth
regiment, subject to the approval of the Governor, for general
insubordination and mutinous conduct while under orders.
At Scranton, the railroad men began to feel the effects of the strikes
in other places, and on Monday, the 23d of July, rumors were circulated
that a strike was to be inaugurated on the roads running through that
place. Mayor R. H. McKune was at Ocean Grove, and seeing the accounts
of the troubles at Pittsburgh in the newspapers, hurried home, where he
arrived on the evening of the 23d. On the 24th, he tried to get the
city council together to prepare for the emergency, as the strike,
according to rumor, was to take place the next day, the 25th; but the
council were opposed to doing anything in that direction, and refused
to take any action. On Wednesday, the 25th, a committee of trainmen
waited on the superintendent of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western
railroad, and informed him that no trains would be allowed to leave,
except the engine with a mail car. The superintendent asked the mayor
for a force to protect the trains, but the regular police force of the
city had been reduced to ten men, which was entirely insufficient, and
the superintendent was advised to run the mail cars for the present,
and not undertake to move regular trains until more assistance could be
got, which advice was finally followed.
On the 26th of July, the miners of the Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company
held a meeting at the Round woods, at which from six thousand to eight
thousand persons were present, and a committee was appointed to confer
with the general manager in regard to wages, and the crowds began to
gather in the streets. The mayor called an advisory committee of seven
of the leading citizens, on Thursday morning, the 26th, and it was
agreed to raise and swear in a special police force of the citizens, to
act during the emergency, which arrangement was carried out, and quite
a number of them raised that day, and placed under the command of
officers who had seen service in the army. A room was procured at the
company store, as it was called, for this special force to meet and
organize in, and meetings were held and necessary arrangements made to
meet any emergency.
The miners had resolved to quit work and not allow the mines to be
pumped, and there was great danger that they would be flooded and
immense damage inflicted. On Sunday, the 29th, the authorities met a
committee of the miners and represented to them that the damage of
flooding the mines would--a great portion of it--fall on them, as the
mines could not then be worked for a long time if once flooded, and it
was finally concluded that the pumps might be worked, so that on Monday
the pumps were generally going again. On Monday the city council met,
and resolved that no necessity existed for special police, and that
none would be paid by the city. The mayor on that day sent for the
executive committee of the trainmen, and informed them that on Tuesday,
the 31st, it was proposed to start the regular trains at nine,
A.M., and if resisted the mayor would use all the force at his command
to put the trains through. In the afternoon the trainmen had a meeting
and resolved, by a large majority, to resume work, and by evening of
that day all fears of any further trouble had passed. The special force
of citizens which had been sworn in were armed partly with Remington
rifles and partly with muskets, and it was arranged that they should
assemble at headquarters on a given signal through the church bells.
Wednesday morning, August 1st, a meeting of the laboring men of the
vicinity was held at the silk-works, a mile or so below the city, at
which some seven thousand or eight thousand men were present. Accounts
conflict as to the purpose of this meeting, some contending that it was
called to hear a report of some committee, and some that no object was
specified in the call, which was by word of mouth from man to man. No
committee made any report, but a letter was read by some demagogue,
purporting to be written by W. W. Scranton, general manager of the
Lackawanna Iron and Coal Company, saying that he meant to have the men
at work for fifty cents a day, and when they died bury them in a culm
pile. Mr. Scranton denies having written any such letter, but it
answered the purpose of its author by inflaming the minds of those at
the meeting, and they broke up with the cry, "let us clean out the
company's shops." About half-past ten, A.M., the mayor was informed
that a crowd of men was coming up from the silk-works. The mayor, with
a friend, started out to see what was the trouble, and on his way
notified some of the special police to meet at head-quarters.
On arriving at the corner of Lackawanna and Washington avenues, they
saw a crowd of from three to four thousand coming up the latter street,
and swarming about the machine and other shops, and about the railroad.
The mayor went down into the crowd, which opened for him, and he went
as far as the machine shop, and turned and came back to the roadway of
the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western shops. He had said to them: "Boys,
you are doing wrong; you must disperse and go home." On arriving at the
roadway, a company of one hundred and fifty or two hundred, who had
been driving the men from the shops, and beating and maltreating them,
came along, and the leader asked who that was. On being told it was the
mayor, he said, "kill the son of a bitch; he has no business here," and
immediately two shots were fired, and the mayor was struck between the
shoulders by a club, or some heavy weapon, so hard as to cause
hemorrhage of the lungs; a stone struck him in the small of the back,
and several persons struck him with sticks. Several friends gathered
about the mayor, and Father Dunn, a Catholic priest, came along to
assist him. He was slipped out under the railroad bridge and toward
Lackawanna avenue, followed by the crowd. The mayor had, before
entering the crowd, given orders to have the signal given for the
assembling of the extra police force, which order had not been
executed, but word had been passed to a number of men, and when he got
back to the avenue, he saw a body of them coming down towards him. At
this point the mayor was hit by some heavy instrument, which broke his
jaw and knocked him senseless for a time, but he went a short distance
down the street and back again to where the mob and extra force of
citizens were just about to meet. The mob, on leaving the machine
shops, had cried out, "now let's clean out Lackawanna avenue," (the
principal street of the city.) "Let's clean out the town." The force of
citizens--about fifty in number--were passing Washington avenue just as
the mob came up it and struck Lackawanna avenue, and they closed in
behind the citizens and on both sides of the street around them; then a
large number of stones and other missiles were thrown at the special
police, with cries of "kill them; take their guns from them," and
similar threats, and shortly two or three pistol shots were fired by
the mob, and then the order was given the citizens to fire, which was
immediately done, and three of the ringleaders killed the first fire.
This dispersed the mob, which fled in every direction. The citizens
gathered again at the company store to the number of two hundred, and a
policeman soon reported the crowd gathering again.
The mayor, at the head of twenty-five of his men, immediately went to
the crowd and ordered them to disperse, which order they obeyed. This
force of citizens kept up their vigilance, not allowing any crowd to
gather until the troops arrived on August 2d, and took charge of the
military affairs at that place. A great deal of ill feeling and
dissatisfaction still existed among the miners and mill men, but no
open outbreak occurred, and before the troops left that section quiet
and order was fully restored. Too much praise cannot be awarded the
mayor and citizens' special police force of Scranton for the admirable
organization they created, and for the prompt and vigorous measures
taken when the emergency arrived. Had the action of the city council
been approved and its advice taken, no special police force would have
been raised, or had there been timidity among them when called out,
Scranton would, no doubt, have suffered as badly as did Pittsburgh; for
nowhere in the State was there a harder set of men than at Scranton and
vicinity, many of the Molly Maguires, driven out of Schuylkill county,
having gathered in and about that city, besides the scores of other
hard cases who had been there for years. Riotous demonstrations were
made at several other points in the State, but none of them assumed any
great magnitude, except at Altoona and a few places in the anthracite
coal region, and the occurrences at these places being described in the
movements of the military as reported in the report of the Adjutant
General for the year 1877, and being so similar to those that took
place at the points particularly described herein, except as to
magnitude, it is not deemed necessary to further notice them in this
report.
Your committee has not thought it necessary to give a detailed account
of the general movements of troops, except so far as they relate to the
troubles at some particular point, where the same was necessary to a
correct idea of all the circumstances occurring at such point, these
general movements being all detailed fully in the Adjutant General's
report above referred to.
As it is made the duty of your committee to report "by what authority
the troops of the State were called out, for what purpose, and the
service and conduct of the same," we approach this part of our labors
with considerable diffidence, on account of the peculiar situation of
affairs at many of the points to which troops were sent; the fact that
this kind of service was new to most of them, and that, unaccustomed as
our people are to the use of the military to enforce the laws, the
opportunities for forming a correct judgment are few, and the chances
for being mistaken are many. It is perhaps easy, after a thing has
happened, to criticise the actions of those engaged in the transaction,
to point out where they failed, and to say where they ought to have
done different, but if the theories of the critic had been tested by
actual experience, he too might have produced no better results than
did those he criticises. Bearing this in mind, and endeavoring to treat
the whole subject fairly and conscientiously, we proceed to give our
views upon this part of the matter under consideration. And first, the
troops of the State were called out, in the first instance, by orders
from James W. Latta, Adjutant General of the State, on a call from the
sheriff of Allegheny county, the orders being signed by him, the
Adjutant General, the Governor's name not being attached thereto, the
Governor, as before stated, being absent from the State. He, with his
family, started for California on the 16th of July, and before leaving
had a conference with the Attorney General, Adjutant General, and
Secretary of the Commonwealth, as to whether there was any reason why
he should not go. It was agreed by all, that everything in the State
was quiet at the time, and no prospects of any disturbance, and that
there was no reason whatever, why he should not take the contemplated
trip. Before leaving, however, he instructed Adjutant General Latta
that if there was any trouble in his absence he should exercise the
authority vested in the Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the same
rule and principles previously established, which were that on a call
from the sheriff of a county for troops to assist in enforcing the law,
the military should only be sent after he became satisfied that the
sheriff had exhausted his powers and authority to suppress the
disorder, and that the lawless element was too strong to be controlled
by the civil authorities.
General Latta, after directing General Pearson, at Pittsburgh, to order
out one regiment, and to take command of the military situation,
reported what had occurred, and his order to General Pearson, to the
Governor, which dispatch reached the latter at Antelope, on the Union
Pacific railroad, July 20, before noon, which was answered by the
Governor from Cheyenne, at half past one, P.M., the same day, directing
General Latta to "order promptly all troops necessary to support the
sheriff in protecting moving trains on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad,
and go to Pittsburgh and keep supervision of all troops ordered out."
From this time communication by telegraph was kept up by the Governor
until his return, and all troops were ordered out in pursuance to
general orders given by him. The Governor received a telegram from C.
N. Farr, his private secretary, and General Latta, at 2.20, P.M., the
20th instant, that everything was going on well, and the riot would be
suppressed, and for him to go on. He accordingly pursued his journey to
Salt Lake City, where he received a telegram Saturday evening, the
21st, at nine o'clock, giving an account of the collision between the
troops and the mob at Pittsburgh, when he immediately procured a
special train, and started on his return. These facts show that the
troops were called out by the proper authority of the State, on a
requisition of the civil authorities of the locality where the troops
were to be sent.
We believe that neither the mayor of Pittsburgh, nor the sheriff of
Allegheny county, had exhausted their powers under the law to disperse
the mob before calling for troops, and that under the rules adopted by
the commander-in-chief the steps prerequisite to ordering out the
troops had not been properly taken by the civil authorities. The
purpose for which the troops were called out was to assist the civil
authorities in enforcing the law, and preserving the public peace, and
it was at no time supposed by any one of the military officers that
they superseded the civil power, although at some places they were
obliged to act in the absence of the civil officers, the latter having
run away, or refused to do anything to suppress the riotous
disturbances.
The service and conduct of the troops was generally good, considering
the circumstances under which they went into service, except in a few
instances, which will be more particularly specified hereafter. It
should be remembered that never before were the militia of the State
placed in so trying a position as that in which they were placed in
July last. Rarely, if ever, were regular soldiers placed in more trying
circumstances. Called upon without a moment's warning, they left their
homes, with but little or no preparation, and hastened to the scene of
the troubles. Nothing had occurred to give the people of the State or
the railroad officials any indications of an outbreak at that time, but
all at once the storm burst upon the city of Pittsburgh, and threatened
its destruction. In this emergency the National Guard was called out,
and most of the commands arrived at the scene of the troubles with
great promptness, and there met a foe more formidable than they had any
expectation of meeting. The active National Guard of the Commonwealth,
being made up of volunteers from the people of the locality in which
the military organization exists, is usually composed of all classes of
the citizens of the locality, and the members of the military will,
therefore, naturally be impressed with all the feelings of the
community in which they reside, and be infected with any spirit of
resistance to constituted authority that may exist among any great
class of their neighbors.
Hence it is that this guard cannot be always relied upon to do its full
duty in case of troubles at home, requiring the intervention of the
military.
Not being brought up to the profession of soldiers, and the officers
being their friends and neighbors, and when at home being no better and
having no more authority than themselves, they are sometimes loth to
obey orders when these orders run contrary to their wishes and
inclinations. The military discipline, which comes from actual service,
is wanting, and being accustomed to do their own thinking, having an
opinion on all matters that come before them, and freely expressing it,
it is very hard to come down to the condition of executing orders
without a why or wherefore, even in ordinary cases; but when it comes
to using their weapons against their friends, neighbors, and perhaps
relatives, it is not to be wondered at if they sometimes waver in their
duty. Every member of the active National Guard ought, however, to be
taught that as a soldier it is his duty to obey the orders of his
superior officers without question; that in case of a mob or riot in
his neighborhood, strong enough to defy the civil authority, the
organization of which he is a member is the first to be called upon,
and that this aid to the civil powers is one of the principal duties
which devolve upon him, and one of the principal reasons for
maintaining such an organization. Taking into account the difficulty of
overcoming these natural feelings of men, a large majority of the
troops called out in July last may be said to have behaved nobly.
General Pearson has been severely censured for having (as was alleged)
given the command to the troops at Twenty-eighth street to fire on the
mob, and the troops have also been denounced for the firing which
occurred at that point.
Your committee have found, from the evidence, that General Pearson did
not give the orders to fire, but we are of the opinion that he would
have been justified in so doing, and that if he had been present at the
time, he would not have been justified in withholding such an order for
a moment later than the firing actually occurred. Neither can any blame
be attached to the troops themselves. They had been pelted with clubs,
stones, and other missiles by the mob, and this was continually growing
more severe, when some persons in the mob fired pistols into the ranks
of the men, and others were trying to wrench their guns from their
hands, and it had become a question of submission to the mob on their
part, or to fire in self-defense before a gun was discharged by them.
As it is usually the case in such occurrences, some innocent persons
were killed and others injured, but for this the soldiers were not to
blame. Being where they ought not to be, their presence whether so
intended or not encouraged the mob, and the soldiers could not in such
a crowd distinguish friend from foe. Spectators ought to keep away from
such mobs at all times and not let their curiosity get the better of
their judgment and discretion. It has been questioned whether it was a
wise movement to order General Brinton's command into the round-house
and shops on the evening of the 21st. The move itself we do not care to
criticise, but having been made, we think a stronger picket guard
should have been thrown out, all approaches more thoroughly guarded,
communication kept up with the Union depot, where the supplies of
ammunition and food were stored, and whenever the mob began to assemble
in the neighborhood a sufficient force should have been ordered out to
disperse them, which could have been done with the means at General
Brinton's command.
The great mistake was made by General Pearson in ordering General
Brinton not to allow his men to fire on the mob when they began to
re-assemble, and showed their murderous disposition by firing on the
troops, and the other measures taken by them in the early evening.
General Brinton asked for leave to fire on the mob when they began to
assemble around the round house and fire on his men, but General
Pearson would not allow it. It was of no use to march out for the
purpose of dispersing such a mob unless the men were allowed to fire,
if necessary, as blood had been shed, the mob had become enraged by
this and emboldened by the position and apparent inactivity of the
troops, and nothing but the most severe measures would now be
sufficient to overawe and disperse them. General Pearson was evidently
intimidated by the denunciation which he received, at the hands of the
press and people of Pittsburgh, as the supposed author of the order to
fire on the mob at Twenty-eighth street. In his evidence he states that
if he had given the command to fire at Twenty-eighth street, and it had
not been followed by the frightful destruction of property which
ensued, he would have been tried, convicted, and hung for murder, such
was the sentiment of the people of Pittsburgh at that time. We think he
should have taken vigorous measures against the mob after the
occurrences at Twenty-eighth street, and not have allowed it to
assemble again in that vicinity, and that he ought not to have left the
round house at the time he did. For what occurred after that time he is
blameless, for on reaching the Union Depot Hotel he was practically
relieved from his command by General Latta. We think this was a mistake
also; that it was giving way to the sentiment still prevailing in
Pittsburgh that the attempt to disperse the mob at Twenty-eighth street
was wrong, and the killing of the persons at that place nothing less
than murder. The military had commenced a move to accomplish a certain
purpose under the lead of the sheriff, and as his posse; a collision
had occurred, the sheriff had left, the mayor refused to cooperate with
the sheriff or military, and it was the duty of the military officers
to carry out the movement, (to wit: dispersing the mob,) in a vigorous
manner, and not in any way be swayed from their duty by the sentiment
above spoken of.
We think the order given by General Latta, sent by Sergeant Wilson to
General Brinton in the round house, which closed as follows, viz: "If
compelled to escape at last, do so to the eastward; take Penn avenue if
possible, and make for Guthrie, at Torrens," was a mistake. Some
question has arisen as to the right of General Latta to give orders to
General Brinton at all. We think that it is enough to say that General
Latta was directed by the commander-in-chief to "go to Pittsburgh and
keep supervision of all troops ordered out;" that he went there in
pursuance of these directions, issued orders as if he understood
himself to be at the head of military affairs after General Pearson
left, was so recognized by all, and his orders obeyed as if coming from
the commander-in-chief, and that, therefore, he cannot escape the
responsibility of any orders issued by him, or the failure to take such
steps as a military commander should have taken under the
circumstances. If General Brinton was to leave the round house he
should have been ordered to the Union depot, where he could have fed
his men, and received a supply of ammunition, and from there he could
have taken the most available position to disperse the mob and protect
property. Of General Brinton's ability to have made this movement, if
so ordered at any time, there can be no doubt.
Life would probably have been sacrificed in making such a move, but law
and order must be upheld, even at the sacrifice of the lives of such
persons as composed that lawless mob, or those who innocently mingled
with it. The loss of life on the part of the troops could not have been
greater than it was by pursuing the course afterwards taken, and it
probably would have been much less, as mobs are always cowardly, and
every demonstration made against this mob after the collision at
Twenty-eighth street by any persons having authority, either civil or
military, scattered it. Colonel Guthrie, with the Eighteenth regiment,
should have been ordered from Torrens to Pittsburgh Saturday night, and
the only excuse we can conceive for not doing this promptly, without
waiting for the troops from Walls Station, is the fear that being
Pittsburgh men they would refuse to obey any orders which would bring
them in collision with the mob. This is not sufficient excuse. The
proper order should have been given, as this regiment had not shown any
insubordination, was not allowed to mix or talk with the mob, and would
no doubt have obeyed all orders.
The conduct of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth regiments has been
severely criticised by some, but many considerations are to be taken
into account in coming to a just conclusion in regard to these men. The
mob was made up in part of their neighbors and their fellow-laborers,
and it was hard for them to take up arms to assist the sheriff in
enforcing the law as against men having so much of their sympathy. This
accounts for their dilatory movements in assembling when first called
out, and the failure to report of many of their men. Their officers
were to blame for allowing them to mingle with the mob, or rather for
allowing the mob to mingle with them, and for the lack of strict
discipline on Saturday, the 21st of July. Neither the officers nor men
were to blame for their mismanagement on the night of the 21st, General
Brown being alone responsible for that order.
This conduct of General Brown was unaccountable, until it was
ascertained that he had been for some time previous suffering from
severe physical ailments which had seriously affected his mind, and
that he was not responsible for a failure in judgment at the time. It
is no wonder the order called forth the indignant protest of Colonel
Gray, but coming as it did from a superior officer, it was reluctantly
obeyed. These regiments were afterwards sent to the coal fields, and
there acquitted themselves like true soldiers.
As to the dispute between Colonel Norris and General Brinton, it is
important only in treating of the conduct of General Brinton. The
Adjutant General, in his evidence before your committee, stated that
his duty was to assemble the troops, and that the command devolved upon
the senior major general, (in the absence of the commander-in-chief,)
who was General A. L. Pearson. He further stated that when General
Pearson came to the Union depot hotel, before relieving him of his
command, he was particular to ask him if he had left General Brinton in
command, and that General Pearson replied that he had left him in full
command. If General Brinton was in command, he had a right to act on
his own judgment. But while General Latta's statement is correct when
applied to him as Adjutant General, yet it must be remembered that he
had assumed to act for the commander-in-chief, and gave orders to
General Brinton during the night, and assumed the direction of the
troops. It is evident that General Brinton considered himself bound to
obey the orders of the Adjutant General, and we take it for granted
that he was. The important question then is, did General Brinton
disobey the orders of General Latta? It is clearly proven and conceded
by all parties that General Brinton did not receive the written order
given to Captain Aull to convey to him until the 1st day of August, a
week or more after it was dated. Colonel Norris says in his testimony
that he did not deliver it as an order to General Brinton; that he did
not consider he had a right to do so, but that he told him that Captain
Aull was on the way to him with an order from General Latta, and
communicated to him the substance of the order. He further said General
Brinton said he might return if he got positive orders to do so. This
remark shows that General Brinton did not receive it as an order.
And further, Captain Aull not reaching General Brinton during the day,
in the evening he sent Major Baugh, a member of his staff, to the
Adjutant General's head-quarters, at the Monongahela House, for orders.
The Adjutant General gave Major Baugh a written order, which he
delivered to General Brinton, who obeyed it promptly. If Colonel Norris
had reported it to General Brinton as an order coming from General
Latta, and General Brinton had received it as such, he would not have
sent to head-quarters for orders, as he did. As your committee
understand the evidence, all that Colonel Norris claims is, that he
told General Brinton that Captain Aull had an order for him, and
communicated the substance of it to him, and that General Brinton
understood it. True, that in this he is disputed by General Brinton,
but it is not necessary for your committee to settle this question of
veracity between them. The only question for us to settle is, did
General Brinton disobey the order? We do not think that he did. Colonel
Norris does not say he gave him the order. He simply told him Captain
Aull had an order, giving him the substance of it. General Brinton, it
seems, did not consider it his duty to act until the order reached him.
Captain Aull not reaching him, he did what was very proper, sent to
head-quarters for orders.
General Brinton has been censured for going so far out from the city,
and not staying in its immediate vicinity. No one in his position could
be expected to do differently. Ordered into the round house, not
allowed to fire on the mob which was gathering around with the avowed
purpose of killing his men, hooted at by the same mob which cheered the
Pittsburgh troops, the Pittsburgh troops disbanded at a time when the
mob had surrounded and besieged the shops in which his command was
stationed, fired at from the windows of the houses, street corners, and
even from a police station, not an official (except the sheriff) or
citizen of the place to come near him at any time, or express a word of
sympathy or encouragement in the disagreeable and delicate duty he was
bound to perform, and after all, rebuffed at the United States arsenal,
where he expected aid and sympathy, he had good reason to believe he
was not wanted in the city, and needs no excuse for putting a
reasonable distance between his command and that place.
The Sixteenth regiment seems to have been the most unreliable of all
the regiments called on for service during the time of the troubles.
Company I was disbanded in dishonor, for insubordination, cowardice,
and mutinous conduct in disobeying orders and furnishing ammunition to
rioters at Reading, by Major General Bolton, and he afterwards
disbanded companies C, D, E, and H for mutinous conduct, subject to the
approval of the Governor. The bad conduct of these companies commenced
before they left home, in refusing at first to go aboard the cars, and
continued until they got back again. The Fourth regiment, after having
a serious collision with the mob at Reading, and behaving like men
through that trouble, became badly demoralized by the action of the
above named companies of the Sixteenth regiment, and, for a day or two,
was entirely unreliable, but afterwards recovered its morale and did
good service. A squad of some fifteen or twenty men, of General
Brinton's division, (company and regiment not known,) which failed to
report in time to leave with him for Pittsburgh, afterwards came on and
were stopped near Altoona, and being unable to go further came back to
a short distance above Harrisburg, and then left the cars to pass that
place on foot by a circuitous route, as it was reported that the mob
was in possession of the railroad, and would allow no soldiers to pass
through. This squad stopped at some place across the river from
Harrisburg. Some two hundred to two hundred and fifty men and boys, on
the 23d of July, went across the river and came back escorting this
squad of soldiers, a lot of boys carrying their guns, and they were
taken to some place near the railroad, fed and afterwards put on the
cars for Philadelphia. Such an isolated instance as this ought not to
condemn the command to which it belongs, but it is discreditable to
those engaged in it, and, it is learned, a court-martial has been
ordered to sit on their case.
The National Guard of the Commonwealth is a necessity, and in a State
like ours, with large numbers of illiterate and unprincipled men
concentrated in certain localities, many of whom are foreigners, and
imbued with the spirit of foreign communism, which is spreading in this
country, the Guard must occasionally be called on as a posse to assist
in enforcing the law; but it never should be called on until all other
means are tried and exhausted. It has become too common to call on the
Governor for troops, in ease of a mob, and the experience of the summer
of 1877, demonstrates that in any community where the civil authorities
and the citizens wish the law enforced, and act together harmoniously
and vigorously, order may be maintained and mobs dispersed without the
intervention of the military. At Philadelphia, large and angry mobs
were dispersed by the police, which, if allowed to have been together
for a day or two, would have become so strong, as to defy the ordinary
authorities, and the result would have been riot and destruction. It
was the same at Harrisburg, and also at Scranton, except at the latter
place the city council refused to cooperate with the mayor and
citizens, but notwithstanding this disadvantage, the wisdom of the
measures of the mayor was vindicated at the first collision with the
mob. It is but just to the people of Pittsburgh to say that the above
places had the example of the latter place before them, and had learned
the danger of temporizing or in any way sympathizing with anything like
a mob, however just they may believe their original demands to be.
In conclusion your committee adopt the following clause of the
Governor's message, which fully coincides with their views, viz:
"I have been thus solicitous to present the conditions of a militia
campaign, because the conduct of our troops during the late crisis has
elicited every variety of criticism, from mild censure to absolute
condemnation, and because there has grown up in Pennsylvania a spirit
of caviling at its militia, in marked contrast with the kindly feeling
and pride manifested by other States towards their citizen soldiery.
Now, that a temperate review of the facts may be made, I believe it
will not be considered a partial judgment to say that during the
conduct of the State troops during the late strike was, upon the whole,
commendable and creditable. In Pittsburgh before a final decision, many
considerations must modify our judgment. The conditions were not purely
military. It was not simply a question of preserving a body of soldiery
intact, of holding a position or defeating an enemy. Expecting to march
into a friendly community, whose moral support would be cheerfully
given them, they entered a practically hostile city, were denounced and
threatened by press and people, and attacked by men who lurked in the
security of a sympathetic crowd, and used women and children as shields
and instruments. If, under such circumstances, their action lacked the
energy and severity that purely military canons would have justified,
it cannot be a matter of surprise, that having so long been accustomed
to peace, they were unable to comprehend at once the sudden conditions
of war. As it was, though not executed with the skilled precision of
regular troops, the movement accomplished its purpose, and the failure
to move the freight trains out of the city, to which more than any fact
the subsequent burning is attributed, was the result of the want of
cooperation of an adequate and competent police, and the desertion, at
the critical moment, of the railroad employés.
"The behavior of the Pittsburgh troops, in a military sense, is without
excuse; but was it any worse than the defection of officers and men in
the regular army, who, in 1861, deserted their comrades in arms to join
the communities in which they were born and bred? Such things are not
military, they are political or social; and it cannot be expected that
they should be judged by the severest military code. It was, in fact,
the temporary excitement of unthinking men, carried away by the
universal clamor around them. For that reason, when the burst of
passion was over, I re-instated them; otherwise, new troops would have
had to be enlisted, while these might be trusted to have a keener sense
of duty, from a desire to retrieve their fame. In the case of the
Philadelphia troops, although disheartened by being placed on the
defensive, and a part of the command demoralized by a too precipitate
retreat, the general steadiness and obedience to orders, under
comparative hardships, and in real danger, show them to have been
composed of the best of soldiery material. The failure to subdue a city
in insurrection against the laws is not to be attributed to the want of
courage, capacity, or fidelity in the officers and men, but to a
natural disinclination to take life indiscriminately, and the
uncertainty as to how far, under the laws, they could exercise a purely
military discretion. For myself, I have every confidence in the Guard,
and shall not hesitate, if another occasion should unhappily arise, to
rely upon its fidelity and courage. The after service of the Guard,
when assembled together, prepared for active campaigning, was all that
could be desired. The fact that as many answered the call for a service
likely to be long and dangerous, as assembled in the pleasant
encampment at the centennial, is conclusive proof of the general zeal
and fidelity of the troops."
The causes which led to the riots are, in the opinion of your
committee, as follows, to wit: The riots grew out of the strike of the
railroad men, and the strikers themselves were the protest of the
laborer against the system by which his wages were arbitrarily fixed
and lowered by his employer without consultation with him, and without
his consent. There are many other causes that combined to bring about
the strikes, but the cause mentioned underlies the whole question, and
it is the foundation of all the trouble.
Instead of capital and labor working together in harmony, as their
community of interests would dictate, a conflict has been growing up
between them, which, if not averted or discontinued, will lead to more
serious troubles than any that have yet occurred, and which must
result, as all such conflicts do, in the defeat of the labor interests
and in consequence thereof placing labor at a still greater
disadvantage than it now occupies. This conflict has been engendered
and kept up by demagogues who, for their own advantage, seek to control
the votes of the laboring men for base and partisan motives and who, in
order to more surely secure their ends, profess to be the only and true
friends of the laborer, and persistently misrepresent the capitalist.
It is much easier to move a body of men (which, like a large portion of
the laboring class, has but little time to investigate the problem of
the true position of labor and capital towards each other) by appealing
to passion and prejudice, and in this respect your demagogue knows the
material he has to work upon and allows no scruples of either honesty
or modesty to restrain him. He is the leading spirit in organizing and
keeping up so-called labor organizations of one kind or another, and
which organizations, as heretofore managed in this country, have never
resulted in any advantage to the men in whose ostensible interests they
are gotten up, but, on the contrary, have inflicted untold damage on
them. The demagogue likes to be appointed to some position in the labor
organizations, and is not slow in suggesting a traveling agent or
lecturer, with some supposed duty, where he can travel about the
country, living at his ease on the fruits of the hard labor of his
comrades, and spending freely the money that is as freely furnished
him.
Why cannot the laboring men of the country see through the flimsy
disguise of these men, and look at them as they are, the leeches and
vampires who prey upon the life-blood of the interest they profess to
befriend. There are men in all parties who have, or claim to have, some
reputation as statesmen, who are not above the arts of the common
demagogue, and who seem at times to be running a race with him to see
which can stoop to the lowest tricks to secure the votes of the dear
laborer. By the efforts of these men, and the tricks they practice,
this conflict has been brought on. But the capitalist himself has not
been blameless; instead of, in the common phrase, meeting his workmen
half-way, and trying to come to a fair understanding with them, he has
put himself on his dignity, and has placed all the blame of the results
brought about by the demagogue upon the laborer himself. He must
remember that the laborer is human, with hopes and aspirations as well
as passions and prejudices, and that it is much better to cultivate the
former by fair, frank, and courteous treatment, than to inflame the
latter by the opposite course. The laborer believes, as he has a right
to believe, that his wishes should be sometimes consulted, and that he
should be recognized as one of the parties to the contract, and as
such, fully consulted whenever the same is to be changed or abrogated.
We believe it is in the power of the capitalist who is an employer of
men, by fair, frank, and just treatment of his employés, not only in
the immediate question of wages, but also in looking after their social
and educational interests, to completely undermine and destroy the
occupation and influence of the demagogue spoken of, and create that
mutual trust and friendship which ought to exist between labor and
capital, and thereby put an end to the frequently recurring strikes
which inflict such serious damage on the business of the country, and
do no man or set of men the least particle of good.
Many instances of the favorable results following such action might be
given, but we will only refer to one instance, which occurred in
Yorkshire, England. Titus Salt, whose father was a woolen manufacturer
at Bradford, in Yorkshire, at the age of twenty-one years, started out
in business for himself, by hiring a small mill and one or two men,
who, with himself, did the work of the establishment, and so diligently
and wisely were his affairs managed that in a few years he found
himself doing a successful and rapidly increasing business, and by a
lucky discovery of the value of the wool of the Alpaca sheep, and its
manufacture in dress goods, he soon acquired a fortune. This
necessitated the enlargement of his mill, and to do this the more
conveniently, he moved some two miles from town and erected a large
manufactory, in which he gave employment to some four thousand
operatives. Having been a laboring man himself, he knew the needs and
wants of the laborer, and he accordingly erected neat and convenient
cottages for the use of his employés, which were rented to them at a
moderate rental, with the privilege of buying to those who were able,
thus assisting them to procure a home of their own, and giving them a
substantial interest in the success of the business they were employed
in. He also caused to be erected churches which all could attend, and
also school-houses, wherein every child could receive a good and
thorough education. A public park was laid out and completed,
bath-houses built, and clubs and lyceums established, Mr. Salt taking
the lead and encouraging his people to carry out and sustain these
institutions. In a short time a thriving town was built up which was
named Saltaire, in honor of its founder, and here the laborer has an
opportunity to enjoy himself like other human beings, with no thought
of occasion for strikes, the employer or capitalist and employés all
feeling a common interest in the fortunes of their place, and with none
of the jealousies or prejudices now commonly existing between these two
classes. Mr. Salt has been created a baronet, but this can add no
additional honor to the name of a man who has successfully solved the
problem of the true relations between labor and capital, and who has
taught the capitalist to what noble duties it is possible to devote
himself, and the laborer, that the barrier between the sympathies of
the master who employs and overlooks, and the man who works, may be
broken down in other and better ways than by hostile combination. Such
a town as Saltaire, with its neat cottages, pleasant parks, clean
streets, fine churches and schools, where labor is respected, and
intemperance banished, is a better monument than any made of marble or
stone, and will perpetuate the name of its founder more surely and
completely than if he had made a fortune by grinding down his human
help to the last farthing, and then on his death-bed bequeathing it to
some public institution.
The immediate cause of the first strike which took place in
Pennsylvania, in July, 1877, to wit: that at Pittsburgh, July 19th, was
the order by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company to run "double-headers"
from that place to Derry. This order of itself, had there been no
previous reductions of wages or dismissals of men on account of the
depression in business, would probably have caused no strike, but
following so soon after the second reduction, while the ill feeling
engendered thereby was still having its effect on the men, together
with the spirit of independence and probably recklessness which was
brought about by the organization of the Trainmen's Union, with its
general plan for a strike on the 27th of June, and the feeling of
uneasiness and dissatisfaction existing among the laboring men of the
country generally, caused by the want of labor and the low price
thereof as compared with a few years previous, all together combined to
set in motion this strike, which was followed by results so disastrous
as to be forever memorable in the history of the State, results
unforeseen and unanticipated at the commencement by the actors therein.
The few trainmen who refused to take out the freight trains on the
morning of July 19th, while not intending or wishing to cause any
destruction of property or loss of life by their action, still cannot
escape the primary responsibility of the fearful scenes enacted at
Pittsburgh during the few following days. The order which the railroad
company made was one it had a right to make, and if the men did not
wish to work under the order, they had a right to refuse to do so. So
far there can be no question among reasonable men. The order having
been promulgated several days before it was to go into effect, gave the
men plenty of time to consider its effect, and if they did not wish to
go out on double-headers, fair treatment would have dictated that they
should have given the officers of the company reasonable notice of
their decision prior to the time at which the order was to take effect,
but this did not comport with the intentions of the men. They not only
did not intend to work themselves under that order, but they did not
propose to allow those who might be willing to accept service of the
company on the double-header trains to do so, and when they combined
together and raised their hands to prevent other men from working, they
committed an act for which there can be no excuse.
It was hard for them to see not only their wages cut down, but also to
see an order issued, which, if carried out, would result in the
discharge of one half of their number, at a time when work was not to
be had, but this does not justify, and cannot excuse their interference
with the right of a corporation to take such measures as it may think
most beneficial for its own interest, so long as it does not interfere
with the rights of others, and especially can it be no excuse for one
man, or set of men, who do not wish to work under certain regulations,
to interfere with those who are willing to do so. The property of all
citizens must be protected, and the laws must be enforced, and those
who undertake to interfere with the one, or stand in the way of the
enforcement of the other, must learn, however severe the lesson, that
these things cannot be tolerated in a land of liberty and of law, and
that however much trouble and expense they may succeed in inflicting on
the subjects of their spite, in the end law and order will triumph, and
those who stand in the way are those who suffer the most.
Every violation of law, if suppressed or punished, is done so at the
expense of the community where the violation occurs, and the greater
the violation the greater the expense. This expense must be met by
taxation, and as taxation is so arranged as to reach every member of
the community, the result of this, therefore, is that the person who
creates a disturbance or commits a crime which requires the
intervention of the officers of the law, is forced to pay from his own
pocket a portion of the expense incurred in its vindication.
The practice of a little arithmetic ought to convince any one that
violating the law is a very expensive luxury, besides bringing him into
disgrace and subjecting him to a penalty. This argument is not intended
for the professional criminal, as it is not expected that he can be
reached by any argument, but it is hoped that it may reach those who
usually intend to be law-abiding citizens, and whose fortunes are
affected by the good or evil fortune of the community in which they
reside, and that this class may be induced to pause and consider before
they attempt to use unlawful means to redress any grievances, however
great it may seem to them. The destruction of property, although it may
belong to a corporation, results in a direct loss to the labor of the
country. It is conceded that all property and capital is created or
produced by labor, and, therefore, any absolute loss, by the
destruction of either, must, in the end, fall upon the laborer. The
argument sometimes used, that if property is destroyed its replacement
gives employment to the laborer, and that, therefore, it is a benefit
to him, is fallacious, for the reason that the capital necessary to pay
for the reproduction of the property destroyed must be originally
created by labor. The capitalist who loses his property by fire is much
less able to furnish employment than he was before, and if this
destruction overtakes the property of a whole community, capital to
replace what is lost must be drawn from some other locality by
borrowing, and while times may seem prosperous during the time the
re-building is being done, yet there has been an actual loss to the
community, which, sooner or later, must be felt. The draining of
capital from one place, to any great extent, causes its loss to be felt
there, and there is no way in which the destruction of property, in one
place, can be made good there, without the loss being felt somewhere,
and in the end most fully and completely realized at the locality where
it occurred.
The effects of such destruction of property may be temporarily
prevented by bringing capital from other localities, as before
suggested, and business affairs may, for a time, seem even more
prosperous than ever; but when the capital thus brought is to be
repaid, comes the re-action, and the loss is felt even worse than it
would have been had no such borrowing have taken place. Witness the
city of Chicago, as a notable instance in the recent history of the
country. The buildings destroyed by the great fire at that place were
speedily rebuilt, a good portion being done by borrowed capital, and it
was really surprising to see with what amazing rapidity the losses
seemed to be replaced, and the city rise, as the phrase goes, "Phoenix
like from its ashes." Business went on, seemingly, as brisk as ever,
and it was boastingly proclaimed that Chicago beat any city on the
continent in recuperating power, and that it was a greater city than
before the fire. But pay day must come. The property destroyed had been
replaced, but not by the creation of capital by labor. The seeming
wealth had no substantial foundation, the re-growth having been too
rapid to come from this source, and how stands that city to-day?
The city treasury bankrupt, with a very serious question arising
whether the municipal government can be maintained much longer, and
private bankruptcy on every hand, for the pay day has come to
considerable of the indebtedness, and the shift of borrowing cannot be
resorted to forever. The lesson to be drawn by the striking laborers of
Pittsburgh, from this illustration is obvious, and it should be taken
to heart and pondered on by all labor organizations throughout the
country, lest, by their unwise and hasty action, they may strike a blow
which will re-act on themselves with treble the force with which it is
aimed at some corporation or capitalist. It may be expected that an
opinion will be given as to whether or not the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company were justified in making the reduction in wages of ten per
cent. on June 11, 1877, and, ordinarily, the question might be answered
that this, or any other, corporation or individual has the right to pay
such wages as it or he pleases, and to require such services for the
money paid as it or he may choose. This rule must be received with
considerable modification, in the case of a great corporation,
receiving special privileges from the State, and employing thousands of
men, scattered from one end of the State to another.
If such corporation should execute a written contract with all of its
employés on taking them into its service, specifying fully and
particularly the hours and service required from them, the length of
time for which each was hired, and the causes for which he could be
discharged, no one would claim that they could vary the terms of that
contract, without the assent of the employé. From the manner of the
employment of the railroad employés in this country, and especially of
the trainmen, there is in good faith an implied contract that the
employé shall continue to receive the wages the company is at that time
paying for the particular duty which he discharges, until the price is
changed by mutual consent, and that his term of service shall continue
as long as he behaves himself well and performs the services required
of men in his position. This ought to be, and is in equity the implied
contract between the parties, although not legally enforceable. But the
railroad employé has a right to expect such treatment by the company
into whose employ he enters. He is required to be on hand whenever
called for, to give his entire attention to the business of the
corporation, and he settles down with his family in such place as will
make it most convenient for him to attend to the business of the
company. His whole services are theirs, his arrangements are all made
with reference to their business, and when he is discharged, without
any reasonable cause, without any prior notice, or his wages reduced
while his labor is not reduced, and, as is sometimes the case,
increased without his consent, and the order for that purpose made
without consulting him in any manner, he has a right to find fault. He
is like a soldier, whose whole time has been spent in the service. His
occupation is more dangerous than that followed by others, and the kind
of services he has to perform unfits him for other duties, and railroad
officers should always take these facts into consideration in dealing
with him.
The wages of the trainmen, after the reduction in June, 1877, were as
follows, to wit; Freight conductors: first class, two dollars and
twelve cents per day; second class, one dollar and ninety-one cents per
day; brakemen, one dollar and forty-five cents per day, and the day's
work averaged from seven hours and twenty-five minutes, the shortest
time, to eight hours and thirty-five minutes, the longest time. These
wages were good wages for the amount of labor performed per day, and if
the men could make full time, would amount to thirty-eight dollars and
seventy cents per month for brakemen, and fifty-five dollars and twelve
cents for first class conductors. This was higher wages than the same
class of men could get in other employments and seemed to be, as stated
by the president of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, some twenty per
cent. higher than the wages paid in other lines of business, the
company intending to keep the wages of its men about so much more than
is paid in other occupations on account of the risk taken by the
trainmen. It is claimed by the railroad officials that the depression
in freight traffic on the railroads, both in amount and in price,
required a consequent reduction in the expenses of the railroads, and
the reduction of June, 1877, they asserted to be justifiable, under all
the circumstances, and it is the opinion of your committee that, if
before it had gone into effect, the men had been made fully acquainted
with the reasons for the step taken, and the necessity of it, in short,
treated as if they were reasonable men and entitled to consideration,
very much of the dissatisfaction would not have existed, and the
country might possibly have been spared the troublous scenes through
which it passed at that time. No doubt the fact that a strike of the
trainmen of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad had taken place at
Martinsburg, West Virginia, on the 16th of July, and was gaining
strength and headway, had its influence in determining the trainmen of
the Pennsylvania railroad, at Pittsburgh, to commence their strike at
that place, and, in consequence thereof, a much less grievance was
needed than would otherwise have sufficed, as an excuse for their
action. The fact, also, that the trainmen on other railroads were
rapidly following suit, and stopping the running of freight trains on
such roads, encouraged the men to persist in their course to stand out
and prevent, by force, trains from being run on the Pennsylvania
railroad.
There seemed at this time to be an epidemic of strikes running through
the country, not only among the railroad men, but among all classes of
laborers, and this helped to precipitate and bring about strikes at all
the places about which this report will treat. The general feeling of
uneasiness existing among the laboring classes of the country before
mentioned, and the sympathy felt by these classes for each other made
them very susceptible to anything which affected their fellow laborers,
and, to use a medical phrase, the labor system was in a good condition
to receive the epidemic which was spreading over the country, and in a
very poor condition to resist and throw off the disease. The strike
once inaugurated at Pittsburgh, was strengthened and encouraged by the
sympathy the strikers received from nearly all classes of the citizens,
and more especially by the sympathy shown by the city officials. Had
the community frowned on the attempt of the strikers to prevent, by
force, the running of freight trains, as it should have been done, and
had the civil authorities shown a firm determination to enforce the law
at the outset, as it was their sworn duty to do, there can be no doubt
but the mob would have been dispersed without bloodshed and riot, as it
was in Philadelphia, Scranton, and other places. Philadelphia and
Scranton are particularly mentioned, for at these places there is a
much larger proportion of the turbulent class than at Pittsburgh, and
consequently a great deal more of the material of which riotous mobs
are composed. When any community winks at a small violation of the law,
by any person, and more especially by a combination of persons, it is
laying the foundation for trouble and difficulty. A crowd of people
assembled for the purpose of accomplishing, however worthy, a purpose
in a questionable manner, is very easily converted into a riot, and
when a crowd proposed to carry out an unlawful object by violence it
soon becomes an uncontrollable mob, if encouraged in its purposes by
the sympathy, either expressed or passive, of the community and the
civil authorities. The small show of force made by the police in the
spasmodic manner, it was on July 19th and 20th, was worse than if no
police force had ever appeared on the ground, for the strikers knew
they had nothing to fear from them, and the lawless characters, who had
begun to gather around, construed this action as a sort of license to
do what they chose as long as they interfered with nothing but
railroad interests.
The refusal of the mayor to go to the scene of the disturbance himself,
when specially requested to do so, and to raise a special police to
meet the emergency, is inexplicable on any theory of a wish on his part
to do his duty and enforce the law, and when contrasted with the
vigorous measures taken by the mayor of the sister city of Allegheny,
and of nearly every other place in which riots occurred, must be most
humiliating to the people who elected such a man as their chief
magistrate. Had he shown a proper appreciation of his duty by going to
the grounds of the railroad company when requested, he would have known
better the extent of the troubles threatened, and if determined to
enforce the law, could have prepared to do so by swearing in special
policemen, as was done in all other places. If he chose to rely on a
subordinate to do what was manifestly his duty, and that subordinate
failed from any cause, either incapacity or sympathy with the mob, to
appreciate the danger, and take measures to prepare for it, the
responsibility must still rest on him. His evidence, that he received
reports from his officers through the night of the 19th and 20th, that
all was quiet, is belied by all the testimony in the case. When a call
was first made by the railroad officials for ten policemen, and for his
personal presence, followed in a short time by a call for fifty
policemen, and that by a call for one hundred and fifty, most men would
have concluded that all was not quiet, even if the police should report
to the contrary. This taken in connection with the fact that the
morning papers of the 20th, contained the call of the sheriff on the
Governor for troops, and the orders for the troops to assemble, and
that this was done only after an appeal, soon after midnight, by the
sheriff in person to the crowd to disperse, and their answer to him by
blasphemy, and hooting, and yelling, and other indignities would leave
the people generally to believe that the mayor had willfully shut his
eyes to what was transpiring on the premises of the railroad company.
Very blind or confiding policemen they must have been that night of the
19th and 20th, and very confiding was the mayor to go to Castle
Shannon, a distance of six miles, and let matters take care of
themselves. The mayor, to excuse himself for doing nothing after the
sheriff made a call for the troops, says that he considered himself
superseded by the sheriff and by the military. It has usually been
considered that the military was subordinate to the civil authority,
and that the clause of the Constitution, which reads: "The military
shall, in all cases, and at all times, be in strict subordination to
the civil power," means something, and was placed in the Constitution
for a purpose. If the construction of the law, given by the mayor, is
to prevail, people have been very much mistaken in their understanding
of what is the law, and that all the military need do, under the
mayor's dispensation, is to get some authority to call them out, and
then, as they supersede the civil authority, they have full control,
and can decide for themselves, when the necessity for their services
has ceased, and can, therefore, take charge of the affairs of the
community as long as any ambitious officer may elect. It is a new
doctrine, this of the mayor's, in this country, and he must excuse this
committee if they fail to take any stock in it. The other excuse given
by the mayor for his inaction, to wit: That the men (meaning the
sheriff and military officers,) who had charge of matters after the
19th, were narrow gauge men, and he could not coöperate with them in
their views, and the measures necessary to be taken in the emergency,
is also untenable. It does not appear that he ever consulted with these
men, or any one of them, in regard to what should be done, while it
does appear that he was sought after, and frequent attempts made to
consult with him by the railroad officials, until they learned that
nothing could be expected of him. If his excuse for neglecting his duty
in the matters within his immediate jurisdiction, (to wit: Keeping the
peace, dispersing a mob, and enforcing the law in the city of which he
was chief executive officer,) is a valid one, the others might, with
the same propriety, claim that his gauge did not suit them, and,
therefore, they could not coöperate with him, to keep the peace in his
bailiwick, and refuse to do anything, and the mob allowed to have its
own way.
If the officers referred to were superior to the mayor, he should have
done what he could to coöperate with them, in dispersing the mob, and
suppressing the riot, and on them would rest the responsibility for the
measures they adopted; if they were not superior to him, then even he
will not claim that he had a right to do nothing. All peace officers
(and the military when called out to suppress a riot, is only a posse
for the peace officers) are expected, and it is their duty, to
coöperate for the purpose of keeping the peace. An officer, willing and
anxious to do his duty, will never object to do what he can to enforce
the law because some other officer or officers are trying to assist in
the same object, even if they do not consult him, while one who is
looking for some excuse for evading his duty is very apt to find one
that will satisfy himself, although it may be satisfy no one else.
Mayor McCarthy, at any time on the 19th day of July, at the head of a
determined posse of fifty men, could have dispersed the strikers, and
allowed trains to go out, and the trains once running, the strikers
would have given up the contest. On the 20th of July, the mayor, with
one hundred men, could have dispersed the crowd, and by the arrest of a
few ringleaders broken the strength of the strike.
These statements are made on the supposition that the mayor had been in
earnest, and acted with the vigor that characterized several of the
mayors who were called upon for the same duty in their respective
cities at nearly the same time.
The mob knows instinctively the feelings of the bystanders and
officers, and a little encouragement makes it very bold, while a
determination to enforce the law by a few brave officers will cause the
same mob to disperse, for it is an old and true saying that mobs are
cowardly. This report has already stated, as a matter of fact, proved
by the evidence before the committee, that all classes of the citizens
of Pittsburgh sympathized with the trainmen in their strike. Some of
the citizens claim this is hardly true, but most of them admit it, but
deny that any of them sympathized with the riotous conduct of the mob
and the destruction of property by it. The best description of the
feeling of that community was given by Sheriff Fife, who testified that
there was a general sympathy with the strikers; the entire laboring
class sympathized with them; the merchants sympathized with them to a
certain extent; that the responsible portion of the people of
Pittsburgh were not in sympathy with the riot, but that it took a
certain amount of riot to bring them to their senses. That this
sympathy with the strikers pervaded the whole community does not admit
of a reasonable doubt. There may have been, and no doubt were persons
who did not sympathize, but they were isolated cases, and so few as to
be of no use in controlling or directing public sentiment. There are a
great many evidences of this aside from the direct testimony of most of
the witnesses who were asked the question. The fact that Sheriff Fife
testifies to that he did not undertake to raise a posse to disperse the
mob before calling on the Governor for troops, as it would have been
folly to have tried it in the city for he knew the feeling of the
people, he might possibly have raised a posse in the country, if he had
had time, is one evidence. On Saturday, the 21st, he sent out twenty
deputies to raise a posse to assist in arresting the ringleaders, and
they did not raise an average of one each, after, as they testify,
making a vigorous effort. The action of the Pittsburgh troops, also
shows that the same feeling of sympathy pervaded them, and the actions
of the mayor and police show conclusively the same thing, so far as
they were concerned. The editorials in the newspapers of the city show
as strongly as any evidence can, where the sympathy of the community
was, these being the best exponents of public sentiment when not
repudiated by the people. The prejudice among the shippers over the
Pennsylvania railroad against that company on account of the alleged
discrimination in freight against them, caused them also to sympathize
with the trainmen, and the general feeling was, after the commencement
of the strike, to let the company take care of itself. No one can doubt
that the existence of this feeling in the community was well known to
the strikers, and that it encouraged them to hold out in their purposes
and make them more bold in their adoption of measures to resist the
company, and prevent by force any freight trains from leaving
Pittsburgh.
This feeling of boldness and confidence in disregarding the law
communicated itself to the new comers in the crowd, many of them being
the worst criminals and tramps, until the mob became so confident that
they could do as they pleased, that they did not believe any serious
attempt would be made to disperse them, until the railroad company had
yielded to the demand of the strikers, and that if such an attempt
should be made they could easily repel it. None of the citizens had the
remotest idea that the strike would culminate in any serious riot or
destruction of property, neither did the strikers themselves expect
this would be the result, but the resistance to law once started, the
original movers soon lost all control of the movement, and the
consequences were such as to astonish the most reckless among them. No
one could have foreseen the result, and the experience of the people of
Pittsburgh, with strikes prior to that time, had not been such as to
lead them to anticipate anything serious in this case. There being many
manufacturing establishments in and around that place, employing a
large number of men, strikes were quite familiar to them, but as they
were usually confined to the men of one establishment, or one branch of
trade, they were arranged without serious disturbance of the public
peace, and no one realized the danger in winking at the course of the
strikers in this case. No strike had ever before taken place under such
favorable circumstances to make trouble. Never before were so many of
the resident laborers out of work, never before was the country so
filled with tramps to flock to such a scene of disturbance, never
before was the laboring class of the whole country so ready to join in
a move of that kind, and never before were the civil authorities of the
city so utterly incompetent to deal with such an outbreak, or if not
incompetent, then criminally negligent, in not making an earnest effort
to enforce the law. The railroad riots of 1877, have by some been
called an insurrection, for the reason that strikes occurred at nearly
the same time on several of the main trunk lines of the country, that
several Governors of States issued proclamations warning the rioters to
disperse, &c., some of them calling on the President of the United
States for troops to assist the civil authorities in dispersing the
mobs and enforcing the law, and the large number of men engaged in
these troubles in the different parts of the county. Insurrection is
defined to be "a rising against civil or political authority; the open
and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of law in
a city or State; a rebellion; a revolt."
The railroad riots in Pennsylvania were not a rising against civil or
political authority; in their origin were not intended by their movers
as an open and active opposition to the execution of the law. Most of
the riots were the result of the strikes by a portion of the railroad
men, the strikes being intended to bring the railroad officers to a
compromise with the strikers, of the differences between them. In some
places the men merely proposed to quit work, and not interfere with the
running of trains by any men the railroad authorities could get; in
other places they would not allow other men to work in their places,
nor railroad officials to send out freight trains, if in their power to
prevent. It was in no case an uprising against the law as such, but a
combination of men to assert an illegal right as between them and the
railroad company. There was no organized movement throughout the
country, no pre-arranged plan of the trainmen to prevent the running of
freight trains by violence or combination, understanding or agreement
between the men on any one railroad and the men on another. Each strike
was independent of those on other roads, each having a local cause
particularly its own. As before stated, there was a sort of an epidemic
of strikes running through the laboring classes of the country, more
particularly those in the employ of large corporations, caused by the
great depression of business, which followed the panic of 1873, by
means whereof many men were thrown out of work, and the wages of those
who could get work were reduced to correspond with the reduction in the
prices of all commodities and the reduced amount of business to be
done. Each strike, except at Reading, although commenced originally by
men then at work for a railroad or some other corporation, to carry out
their own purposes, was soon joined by all the idlers and vagabonds in
the vicinity, and these being by far the largest in number, soon took
the movement out of the hands of the originators and carried it clear
beyond anything they ever anticipated. The vagabonds having no object
but plunder, and having no particular interest in anything else, were
ready to resort to violent measures to accomplish their object.
The immediate cause of the strike at Pittsburgh was not similar to any
other that has come to the knowledge of this committee, it being the
order to run double-headers. No such cause existed anywhere else, and,
therefore, the troubles there could not be considered as a part of any
general understanding between trainmen. At Reading, the railroad men
were not engaged in any strike, nor did they take any part in the riots
there. The troubles there were caused solely by idle men, who had some
time previously been discharged from the employ of the Philadelphia and
Reading Railroad Company, and for the purpose of venting their spite on
the company. At Scranton, although there had been a strike of the
railroad men, this had been adjusted, and the men were at work again,
when the riots occurred, the riots being engaged in by the idle men and
striking miners and mill men. If a riot, growing out of any of these
isolated movements, is to be called an insurrection, or if these
movements, altogether, are to rise to the dignity of an insurrection,
then the word must be given a new definition, for as it now stands,
there must have been some pre-concerted arrangement between the men at
the different points, to resist the laws of the country, or the move at
some point must have been for the purpose of resisting constituted
authority, and not the mere purpose of forcing railroad companies, or
any other corporations, to come to terms with the strikers, by
obstructing the business of the railroad or other corporation. No
pre-concerted arrangement of any kind has been proved before your
committee, although such persons as might be supposed to know the fact,
if it existed at all, were subpoenaed and testified before us, and
all of them positively deny that there was any concert of action
whatever, among the trainmen, for a strike after the 27th of June, and
a local cause for the different strikes in Pennsylvania is given by
them all. It has been asserted by many that no rioting or destruction
of property would have taken place at Pittsburgh, if the troops had not
been called out, and had not fired on the mob. The trifling with the
mob, at this place, by the civil authorities, and the sympathy shown by
the citizens, with the original strikers, had emboldened and encouraged
it to such an extent, that when the Philadelphia troops arrived on the
ground, it had, no doubt, got beyond the control of the civil power, as
then constituted, and there can be no doubt of the necessity for the
presence of those troops. Such mobs as that at the Twenty-eighth street
crossing, on Saturday evening, July 21st, at the time the Philadelphia
troops were marched out there, would never have dispersed without
making serious trouble, troops or no troops.
How long it would take a mob to disperse and melt away of its own
accord, which on Thursday numbered from fifty to two hundred men, on
Friday from five hundred to fifteen hundred, and on Saturday from two
thousand in the morning to seven or eight thousand in the afternoon,
and which was growing all the time more turbulent and excited, we leave
for the advocates of the do nothing policy to determine if they can.
The firing on the mob by the troops, and the subsequent inaction
precipitated and aggravated its action, but did not create the riots.
When a great line of public travel and traffic like the Pennsylvania
railroad is blockaded by a mob, the public interests suffer more than
the railroad interests, and every day that it is allowed to continue,
damages the community to the extent of thousands of dollars, and it was
the duty of the local civil authorities to adopt the most vigorous
measures to break the blockade, but if instead of doing this, they
temporize with the mob until, in consequence thereof, it becomes too
strong to be suppressed by them, and the troops of the State are called
on for assistance, the latter cannot be said to have caused the riots,
or held responsible for the consequences of an honest effort to enforce
the law. If the rioting was caused by the calling out of the troops,
and their subsequent actions, then the claim that that was an
insurrection falls to the ground, and if there was an insurrection,
then the troops cannot have been the cause of the rioting, as the two
positions are inconsistent, although held and advocated by a number of
prominent men.
All of which is respectfully submitted.
JOHN E. REYBURN,
_Chairman_.
E. D. YUTZY,
W. L. TORBERT,
_Committee of the Senate_.
W. M. LINDSEY,
_Chairman Joint Committee_.
D. C. LARRABEE,
A. F. ENGELBERT,
SAMU'L W. MEANS,
P. P. DEWEES,
_Committee of the House_.
Laid on the table.
PROCEEDINGS AND TESTIMONY.
SENATE COMMITTEE ROOM,
HARRISBURG, _February 4, 1878_.
The committee met and organized by the election of the following
officers:
W. M. Lindsey, _Chairman_.
Samuel B. Collins, _Clerk and Stenographer_.
J. J. Cromer, _Sergeant-at-Arms_.
---- ----, _Messenger_.
Adjourned to meet in Pittsburgh, an the 6th instant.
ORPHANS' COURT ROOM,
PITTSBURGH, _Wednesday, February 6, 1878_.
The committee met at half past ten o'clock, A.M., this day, in the
orphans' court room, city of Pittsburgh.
The roll of members being called, it was found that all the members
were present.
The committee engaged in a consultation as to the mode of procedure in
taking testimony--as to whether the sessions of the committee should be
public, and as to whether counsel should be admitted to represent
parties who might be summoned as witnesses.
G. H. Geyer, Esquire, counsel for the county commissioners, was invited
before the committee for the purpose of ascertaining what the
commissioners desired; also W. B. Rogers, Esquire, counsel for the city
of Allegheny, was invited before the committee for the same purpose.
The county commissioners in person also appeared before the committee.
The committee was waited upon by Mr. Johnson, a member of the chamber
of commerce, who gave information that the chamber had appointed a
committee, of which he had been elected chairman, for the purpose of
giving aid in obtaining information relative to matters being
investigated by the committee. On behalf of the chamber of commerce, he
also tendered the use of their hall for the sittings of the committee.
Upon motion of Senator Reyburn, it was ordered that a session should be
held this afternoon, from three to six o'clock.
Adjourned.
ORPHANS' COURT ROOM,
PITTSBURGH, _Wednesday, February 6, 1878_.
Pursuant to adjournment, the committee re-assembled at three o'clock,
P.M., this day.
The debate was resumed, as to the mode of procedure in taking
testimony.
Upon motion of Senator Reyburn, the chairman of the committee, Mr.
Lindsey, was selected to conduct the examination of witnesses on behalf
of the committee.
Adjourned.
ORPHANS' COURT ROOM,
PITTSBURGH, _February 7, 1878_.
Pursuant to adjournment, the committee met at ten o'clock, A.M., this
day.
The committee proceeded to the examination of witnesses. The first
witness called was:
John Scott, _sworn_:
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Where do you reside?
A. I am still a citizen of Pittsburgh, although I have been attending
to my business for the last three months in Philadelphia.
Q. What is your official relation to the Pennsylvania Railroad Company?
A. At present I am the general solicitor of the company.
Q. What was it in July last?
A. I was then what was called the general counsel of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, resident at Pittsburgh.
Q. Can you tell the committee whether, prior to July last, there were
any differences existing between the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and
its employés?
A. On that subject I have no personal knowledge. Any differences, if
they did exist, between the employés and the company were known to the
operating officers of the company, over whom I have no control. I only
know it as a matter of public history, as other persons.
Q. Were you present at the disturbances of the peace within the city of
Pittsburgh in July last?
A. I was during a portion of those disturbances, but not during all of
them. If it is desired that I should give you a connected statement of
what I did see, I would begin with where my personal knowledge of the
transactions commenced.
Q. That is what the committee desire?
A. On the morning of Thursday--that week in which the disturbances
occurred--I cannot recollect the date--on that morning there was no
appearance of disturbance. I state this from the fact that Mr.
Pitcairn, the superintendent of the western division, and I live within
a very short distance of each other. We take trains at the same
station, and when I went there that morning I found him there with his
family, preparing to go, for a visit of some length, to Long Branch.
The strike which had occurred on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was
the subject of conversation between us during the few moments that we
were together there, and I know, at that moment, he had not the most
remote apprehension of any disturbance. I came into town on the train,
and knew nothing of any disturbance until about noon, when I heard of
the assault having been made upon Mr. Watt. I did not see it, or I
would narrate it.
Q. Who was Mr. Watt?
A. He was the chief clerk, or assistant to Mr. Pitcairn. About nine
o'clock that evening I received a dispatch, stating that Messrs.
Hampton and Dalzell, the local solicitors, who took charge of the
local business, were absent from the city, and requesting me to come to
the outer depot. I did so. I got off at the Twenty-eighth street
station. There was quite a large crowd of people at that station. Just
when I got off, an engine was coming up from the direction of the Union
depot. I do not know from whence it had started. Immediately, there was
a cry that it must be stopped, and there was a rush of a large number
of that crowd towards the engine. It did stop, and a loud halloo went
up from that crowd.
Q. Who composed that crowd, so far as you observed?
A. That I cannot tell. My point was to reach the outer depot, and I
spent no more time there than was necessary. At the outer depot I found
that Mr. Pitcairn had not yet reached the city, although he had been
telegraphed for. I found Mr. Watt there, his assistant, and learned
from him the extent to which the disturbance had gone. That he can give
you personally. Finding from that statement that a call had been made
upon the mayor for assistance to regain the property of the company,
and that it had been ineffectual, I went up to my office for the
purpose of looking at the act of Assembly passed in 1877, and also the
law providing for calling out the military by the Governor. I spent
some time in doing that, leaving word for Mr. Watt to come to my
office, so we might call upon the sheriff for the purpose of dispersing
the mob, and regaining possession of the company's property. He came up
in a short time, and we rode to the sheriff's residence, and woke him
up out of bed.
Q. Where is his residence?
A. In Washington street, between Wylie and Fifth avenue.
Q. What time was that?
A. That was, probably, between ten--no I am not certain about the
hour--about ten or eleven o'clock. I stated to the sheriff that the
property of the company was in the possession of a large number of the
employés and of citizens--the information was that--I had no personal
knowledge of it--Mr. Watt was with me--and that an effort had been
made, through the mayor, to regain possession, which had not succeeded,
and that we called upon him, as officers of the company, to ask him to
go to the outer depot and exert his power, as sheriff of the county, to
disperse the crowd assembled there, and to restore possession to the
company of its property. I said I came as counsel of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, and, that as it would probably be one of the most
delicate exercises of power he could be called upon to make, I insisted
he should send for his own counsel to accompany him, as if he found his
power insufficient to disperse the mob, and to restore to the company
possession of its property, we would ask him further to advise the
Governor, so he might exercise his power, if he found it necessary. The
sheriff replied that Mr. Carnahan was his counsel, and that he resided
at East Liberty, and that he could not get him in time to go to the
depot. He went for a deputy, who lived across the street--Mr. Haymaker,
I think--and we all drove to the outer depot, on the way finding Mr.
Pitcairn, who had arrived in a train from the East. When we reached the
outer depot, General Pearson was there. He had been apprized by the
Adjutant General. The sheriff was again informed of the desire of the
company to obtain possession of its property, and have the crowd
dispersed.
Q. Can you give the date of this?
A. I have said this was on the Thursday preceding the actual burning
and destruction. As a matter of memory, my recollection is that it was
the 19th, although I am cautious about dates, as I have not a good
recollection about dates. The sheriff then went out with General
Pearson to Twenty-eighth street. I did not go with him. He came back
after the lapse of probably three quarters of an hour, reporting that
he found himself unable to disperse the mob, and that he could get no
force to enable him to disperse it. I then said to the sheriff that it
was a question for him to determine whether he had exhausted his power
for the protection of the company's property. He said he had exhausted
it, and that he had made up his mind to ask the Governor to call out
the troops to disperse the mob. At his request, I wrote a dispatch to
the Governor, and submitted it to him, General Pearson, being present
as I understood, acting as his counsel at the time. Some requests had
come to send a dispatch to the Lieutenant Governor. I was satisfied
that it was not such an occasion as authorized the Lieutenant Governor
to act; but public information in the newspapers being that the
Governor was absent from the Commonwealth, I suggested to the sheriff,
as a matter of prudence, that a dispatch should be sent to the
executive office, at Harrisburg, addressed to the Governor; that a copy
of it should be sent to the Secretary of State, who was then in Beaver,
we understood, with information that it had been sent to executive
office; that another copy should be sent to the Adjutant General, who
was understood to be in Philadelphia, and that the Lieutenant Governor
should be informed of the fact that such a dispatch had been sent to
the Governor, that he might have that information, and, if he had the
authority to act, might exercise it.
Q. Who signed that dispatch?
A. The sheriff.
Q. At what time?
A. That was in the neighborhood of twelve o'clock that night. I am
giving my judgment about those hours. Those dispatches signed by the
sheriff were sent. There was a great deal of telegraphing that evening
there, between myself and the officials of the railroad company, Mr.
Pitcairn and others, the details of which I cannot now recollect. In
the course of several hours after that dispatches were received from
Mr. Quay and the Adjutant General by the Sheriff, informing him that
the Governor had ordered out the troops. Dispatches were also received
there by General Pearson, from the Adjutant General, giving him the
same information. I cannot give the hour of those dispatches; but I
know before we left the office, probably about five o'clock in the
morning--four or five o'clock, perhaps--the sheriff and General Pearson
had both received dispatches to the effect that the Governor had
ordered out the military to the assistance of the sheriff, and that
General Pearson had drawn an order, in pursuance of those dispatches,
for one of his own regiments of this city to turn out. Probably about
five or six o'clock that morning several of us left the office and went
to bed at the Union depot. That was Friday morning. Now as to the
actual progress of the strike. What occurred at the outer depot during
Friday, I believe, I have no personal knowledge, and I do not know that
I had any intercourse with any of the officials of the Pennsylvania
Railroad Company, and not, probably, with the military officers, until
about four or five o'clock that evening. There was delay in the
military responding to the general's orders. Some information reached
our office, where I was engaged in other business in the office of the
Penn company, that General Pearson was about to open the tracks with
the military, and was starting for that purpose from Union depot. Mr.
Thaw and I went up there together. When we arrived, there was a company
ready to go to Twenty-eighth street. Mr. Cassatt was there, one of the
vice-presidents of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. I do not know
what was said when I got there; but in some way my opinion was asked as
to the propriety of the movement. Somebody asked me, I do not know who.
There were a great many people around the dispatcher's office, where
General Pearson was. I was asked the question. I said in reply, that as
an officer of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company I had no opinion at all
to give, that the civil power of the country having been called upon,
and the sheriff having been called upon, and the military being there
with General Pearson in command of them, I certainly would not give any
instructions that would interfere with the discretion either of the
sheriff or of General Pearson. I might reply, as a citizen of
Pittsburgh, that there was no need of repeating the old maximum, which
had got very trite, that there was no use in firing blank shot at a
mob; but that when they were ready to strike, they should do it
effectually, and disperse the mob. The General stated to me there the
force he had, some sixty men in that company and a battery called
Breck's Battery, the remainder of his force was at Torrens station. He
also stated he had a number of men then at Twenty-eighth street.
Q. What is the distance of Torrens station from Twenty-eight street?
A. Out to East Liberty is four miles, and Torrens station is probably a
quarter of a mile beyond that. From the length of time that had
elapsed, and a number of the men not having responded, I felt satisfied
it would be prudent to have more troops before striking, and I so
telegraphed to Philadelphia. General Pearson, at that point, said: I
believe I could take this battery up there and open the track at that
point, but it would be with very great sacrifice of life.
Q. To whom did you telegraph to Philadelphia?
A. To the president of the road--Colonel Scott. I said in that
dispatch, from the dilatory way in which the troops were coming, I
thought that the troops ought to come from some other quarter than from
Pittsburgh. General Pearson was evidently reluctant to sacrifice life,
even if he could open the road by doing so, and wished Mr. Thaw and
myself, as officers of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, to sign a
request asking him to delay his movement. I refused to do so, saying
that I would not control his discretion as a military man--that what
should be done, at that time, should be left to him to decide. I left
then and went out home that evening, and staid at home Friday night and
saw nothing more of the riot than a passenger would see in passing out
through the large crowd assembled at and about Twenty-eight street. I
cannot estimate the number there, but the road was blocked and the hill
was largely covered, when we went out on Friday evening. I returned to
the city on Saturday morning, but did not see what transpired along the
Pennsylvania railroad during that morning, as I was busy in my own
office at Tenth and Penn streets. There was a great deal of
communicating back and forth between the officials of the road, between
Philadelphia and here, and west of this point, in reference to the
strike. I was not present when the troops arrived from Philadelphia. I
was pursuing my business in my department that evening until I went
over to go out to my home, at Shady Side. The train I took was delayed,
the firing having already commenced at Twenty-eight street. Word had
come by telegraph, before that train started, that the firing had
occurred. I went out in that train, through a dense crowd, both of
civil and military men, at Twenty-eight street; and I was at my home
during that night. The firing began that night, probably about eight or
nine o'clock. I came into the city the next morning, and went to the
Union Depot Hotel with some ladies who had been left on the train that
could not get in the night before. It is not necessary for me to say
what occurred. I found a place of safety for them. I found that the
Union Depot Hotel was not a safe place at that time. I saw at that time
the fire progressing up, but I was not any nearer to the scene of the
riot at that time than the Union Depot Hotel. Secretary Quay and
Adjutant General Latta were in the Union Depot Hotel making
preparations to leave it.
Q. State the distance of your residence from the Union depot.
A. The station where I get off is a fraction over three miles from the
Union Depot Hotel, and my residence is probably four or five hundred
yards from the station.
Q. State whether at this time there was any rioting nearer to the Union
depot than Twenty-eighth street, at the time you speak about when
General Latta and Secretary Quay were in the Union Depot Hotel.
A. The fire had progressed, and was then progressing on this side of
Twenty-eighth street up toward the Union Depot Hotel. I cannot say
where the fire first originated, but looking up Liberty street from the
Union Depot Hotel, when I was there, I should say the fire was then
some six or seven blocks from the Union Depot Hotel. I could see it
distinctly spreading across the street. I was not at the scene of the
riot during Sunday; I was with the officers of the railroad company in
Allegheny City, in conference as to the best mode of preventing further
trouble, destruction, and rioting over portions of the road west of
Pittsburgh. I do not know that I can give any further information in
giving my personal knowledge of what I saw of the actual disturbances.
Q. Have you any knowledge as to what was done by the railroad company
after that time?
A. In the way of suppressing the riot?
Q. Yes.
A. I might state upon that subject, that upon Saturday afternoon, while
the officers of the western lines were in Allegheny City, a committee
of citizens--at least a committee appointed at a citizens' meeting--a
representative of Bishop Twigg--one of his clergymen, whose name I do
not recollect--and Reverend Mr. Scoville, of the Presbyterian Church,
and James I. Bennett, came to see what we could do in the way of
suppressing the riot, and asking that some concession should be made to
the men on the road. We replied to them substantially, that so far as
the railroad company was concerned, we thought the mob had done about
its worst. This was when the Union depot was burning--at least Mr. Thaw
and I were on the hill a short time before, and saw the fire so near
that we supposed it was then burning. We said it had now ceased to be a
question between the railroad company and the employés, and was one
between the public authorities and the mob, between government and
anarchy, and that so far as we had anything to do with the question, we
were now in an utterly defenseless position, and we thought, being in
that position, if we were to make the concessions which had been
demanded in the beginning, we would be breaking down the only barrier
between anarchy and their property, and that now the question for the
citizens to determine was whether they would make any effort to stop
that lawlessness which would next reach them after it had spent its
fury on the railroad company. So far as the efforts to stop the rioting
by negotiations or compromising with the men were concerned, I had no
direct connection with them. That occurred between others--friends of
the road, the general management, and the representatives of the
men--and I knew of them only in a general way, from hearing what was
said by the officers, which was substantially, that while the men were
in the position of law breakers, and holding control of the company's
property, we could not yield to the demands extorted by that kind of
violence; but that, if things were restored to their normal condition,
the company was perfectly willing to meet the men, and negotiate with
them in regard to this matter just as in regard to any other
difference.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Upon this Thursday you speak of, you say you found, at a certain
stage, that the road was in possession of the mob--substantially a
mob--that then you went to the sheriff, and then, with him, to the
depot, and found General Pearson there. Now, can you state to us who
called for, or who sent for the militia--who called upon the State
Government?
A. I have already stated that the call for the militia was made by
Sheriff Fife, after he had gone out with General Pearson, and
endeavored to disperse the mob at Twenty-eighth street. He then came
back and reported his inability to do so, and that he had no further
power at his command, and announced his decision that he would call
upon the Governor, and, at his request, I wrote a dispatch to the
Governor, announcing his conclusion, and asking for the Governor's aid.
Q. At the request of the sheriff?
A. Yes; he signed that dispatch sent to the Governor.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Did you call upon the mayor for assistance before you called upon
the sheriff?
A. I did not personally. Mr. Watt informed me he did. He can give you
that.
Q. Was General Pearson connected with the sheriff's office at that time
as a deputy?
A. I don't know.
Q. You stated he was counsel for the sheriff?
A. Oh, no. I stated to the sheriff that I was calling upon him as
counsel for the railroad company, and I insisted that he ought to have
his own counsel to guide him in determining his duty in this emergency;
but, saying that Mr. Carnahan was his regular counsel, and that he
could not send for him, he went to the depot without him, with a deputy
named Haymaker. When we reached the depot General Pearson was there,
saying he had been requested by the Adjutant General to be there. When
Sheriff Fife saw him there, he turned to me and said: "Mr. Scott, I
know him, and for this occasion I will be governed by his counsel."
General Pearson was not there as a deputy or a clerk, but in obedience
to the dispatch of the Adjutant General, and the sheriff, finding him
there, was governed by his counsel at that time.
By Senator Reyburn:
Q. Have you any knowledge as to who sent for the troops at
Philadelphia, who ordered them here?
A. I have no other knowledge of it than that which came in the
dispatches that night, which was that the Adjutant General had ordered
them. A dispatch came from Mr. Quay saying that the Governor had
ordered out the militia.
Q. The Philadelphia troops of the First division?
A. I have no actual knowledge as to who ordered them out, except in a
general way; the Adjutant General was here afterwards, and when those
troops came it was my understanding, derived from my intercourse with
General Latta and all the others, that the military had been ordered
out by the Adjutant General, he being the military officer of the State
under the Governor. In speaking of all this, I am giving what occurred
by the dispatches in the outer depot while I was there.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Can you give the extent of the destruction of the railroad property
by the fire?
A. I cannot, with any accuracy.
By Senator Yutzy:
Q. Approximately?
A. I have been informed that the officers of the road are yet engaged
in making up a full statement of the losses of the company, and any
estimate I might make would be so entirely unreliable that, if it is
important to the committee, I prefer sending for those who have that
subject in charge.
Q. Can you give the extent of the burning, the destruction of property
in general?
A. My statement would be simply from observation--that the burning of
property commenced at or very near the station of Lawrenceville.
Q. How far from the Union depot?
A. I would suppose a mile and a quarter or a mile and a half. That is
an estimate. I do not know, I may be wrong about that. It is the second
stopping place out from the Union depot. The destruction on the track,
of cars that were there, and buildings extending from Lawrenceville all
along past the Union depot and embracing property of the Pittsburgh,
Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad Company, on Seventh street, in this
city, the number of cars burnt, the number of locomotives destroyed or
disabled, the value of the goods in those cars, and the value of the
buildings that were destroyed, and the injury done on the road are all
matters of computation upon which my estimate would not be worth
anything. It will have to be obtained from actual examination of those
who inspected them.
By Mr. Means:
Q. Was the first burning of cars or of buildings?
A. I cannot say, except as a matter of public information. I was not
present. I have already stated I was at Shady Side on Saturday evening,
when the fire commenced.
Q. Have you any knowledge about what time that fire commenced?
A. I saw the light in the evening about nine or ten o'clock, and sent
my son in to ascertain the state of things.
Q. Of your own knowledge you do not know whether it was a car that was
first burned or a building?
A. Of my own knowledge I cannot say at what point the fire began, or by
whom it was kindled.
By Mr. Lindsey:
Q. Can you state of your own knowledge what classes of men composed the
rioters during the burning. Whether the mob was composed of railroad
employés or of others than those, and if of others, of what class?
A. That would be in part my personal knowledge, but I could not give an
answer to that without confounding together my personal knowledge and
matters of information. I will give the result, if you wish it.
Q. State it?
A. The first difficulties, which were brought on by the employés of the
company taking possession of the engines and trains, were, so far as I
could judge, or saw, exclusively by those who had been railroad
employés up to that point. The action which Mr. Pitcairn took with
reference to that when they took that possession I cannot state. Things
went on, with a great crowd accumulating from that Thursday morning,
and while I say, as a lawyer, that there was a riot and mob there from
Thursday morning down until the firing began, with a crowd constantly
accumulating, as it would on account of any disturbance that had
occurred, yet there seemed to be a feeling that it was not that kind of
a riot or mob that called for the interposition of a very vigorous
public sentiment to put it down; but, when the military were brought
for the purpose of regaining possession of the property, and the
collision was actually brought on, I can say that the mob was made up
of a great many other people than railroad employés. I did not see
them, nor was actually among them so I could identify any of the
railroad employés, or any persons outside, but from my knowledge of the
immense crowd which was assembled at Twenty-eight street as I went in
and out, there were undoubtedly a great many other than railroad
employés about the scene of violence, and I have no doubt participating
in it.
By Mr. Larrabee:
Q. You say that while the employés were in possession of the cars of
the company, there seemed to be no such riot as required the
intervention of public sentiment to put it down?
A. I did not intend to say that, but that while it was confined to
railroad employés public sentiment did not seem to manifest itself as
requiring any decided interposition to put that down. In other words, I
am bound in candor to say, when asked for it, that public sentiment
here very clearly distinguished between the act of breaking the law on
the part of the employés in taking possession of the railroad property,
and stopping commerce at this point, and the act of rioting and
incendiarism which followed in consequence of that initial breaking of
the law.
Q. That is, that public sentiment did not assert itself vigorously
against the employés taking possession of the cars and engines prior to
the actual outbreak and destruction of property?
A. That is what I mean.
Q. In other words, public sentiment sympathized with the rioters?
A. I am a citizen of Pittsburgh, and here along with the rest of them,
am bound to say that the newspapers pretty fairly reflected the public
sentiment in what they said. If you wish to see what it was, instead of
asking my opinion, owing to my relation with the railroad company, if
you will take the editorials of the various morning and evening
newspapers from the 19th of July, from the day on which this thing
occurred, down until some days after the actual firing occurred, I
think you will find that the editors evidently tried to reflect the
public sentiment, and I think they succeeded pretty well in doing it.
If you wish to get that you had better ask the sheriff what responses
the people made to him when he asked them to become part of his
_posse_. I did not hear what was said, but the sheriff knows.
By Mr. Lindsey: