CORNWALLIS’ CAMPAIGNS
1791-1792
Cornwallis takes command of the Army--Advance on Bangalore--Order
of March--Floyd’s reconnoissance--Imprudent advance--Floyd
badly wounded--Casualties--Capture of Bangalore--Advance on
Seringapatam--Battle of Arikera--Army in great straits--Forced
to retreat--Junction of Mahratta contingent--19th sent to
Madras--Rejoin Cornwallis--Advance on Seringapatam--Night
attack--Floyd detached to meet Abercromby--Seringapatam
invested--Peace made--Tippoo’s hostages--19th return to
Shevtamodoo.
Cornwallis assumed command of the army, at Vellout, on the 29th
January 1791. By taking the field in person, he ensured the fullest
co-operation of the civil and military administration, while it was
hoped that his presence at the head of the troops, would induce the
Nizam and the Mahrattas to prosecute the war with more vigour than
they had yet shown. Instead of attacking Mysore from the south, as
had been done in the preceding year, Cornwallis proposed to operate
on a more direct line. The considerations that had led to the
rejection of this line in 1790, were, that Seringapatam could not
be approached without first taking Bangalore, a place only second
to Seringapatam in strength. The siege of Bangalore would have to
be carried on at a distance of ninety miles from the nearest depôt,
Amboor; and the country between Seringapatam and Bangalore was
unfertile, and not likely to furnish much in the way of supplies.
The army left Vellout on the 5th February. Tippoo, who had remained
in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, on hearing of the movement,
hastily regained Mysore by the Changama and Palicode Passes.
Cornwallis, after making a feint towards Amboor, which completely
deceived the Sultan, turned northwards, and carried the army through
the Mooglee Pass without opposition. Without firing a shot, the whole
army was concentrated on the Mysore plateau by the 18th February.
Here the army was joined by sixty-seven elephants from Bengal, the
first occasion of these animals being employed in any considerable
number by a British force. Hitherto, the movements of our armies had
been greatly hampered by the difficulties of moving heavy siege guns;
but on this occasion, by yoking the bullocks four instead of two
abreast, and by the use of elephants to lift and push the guns in bad
ground, the heavy guns were able to move with nearly as much ease as
any other part of the army.
Among other beneficial changes made by Lord Cornwallis, was an
improvement in the order of march of the army. Before this war, our
armies in India had marched with few cavalry and very small trains
of artillery. They moved in a single column two or three files deep,
with the stores, baggage and camp followers on one flank, covered by
a strong party. This order was fatiguing to the troops, made rapid
movement impossible, caused great delay in assuming any formation
on coming in contact with the enemy, and exposed the camp followers
and baggage to great losses from the enemy’s cavalry. Colonel
Fullarton, in his brief campaign of 1783, remedied this, to some
extent, by making the army move on a broad front of three brigades,
the artillery and baggage following in rear covered on each flank
by other brigades. The troops marched with intervals to permit of
speedily forming line in any direction.
At the commencement of the campaign of 1790 the old order was
reverted to. The battering train, which marched in rear of the
column, often fell so far behind, that it did not reach the camping
ground till the following day. It was then placed in the centre of
the column. This only had the effect of delaying all in rear of
the guns, and separating the army into two portions. It was then
tried to improve matters, by placing the heavy guns in front of the
column. This answered better when the guns were few, but with a large
battering train gave bad results. The plan adopted by Cornwallis,
was to make the infantry and cavalry move in parallel columns, some
distance apart. Between them, moved two columns one composed of
artillery and stores, while the other was composed of the baggage and
camp followers, controlled by a baggage master. The army thus moved
in a huge oblong, with the fighting men on the flanks. The front
was covered by the advance guard, consisting of a cavalry regiment
and the infantry picquets coming on duty. In the same way, the rear
was covered by a regiment of cavalry and the infantry picquets last
on duty, forming the rear guard. The same order was observed in
encamping. The infantry and cavalry camped in two lines, facing
outwards, with the artillery, engineer corps, stores, baggage and
camp followers in the space between. The order thus established by
Cornwallis during this campaign, may be said to have held good in
India up till the present day.
This appearance of a British army on the plateau of Mysore, marks
the increase that had taken place in the military power of the East
India Company during the past five years. In our previous wars with
Hyder Ali and Tippoo, the operations of our armies had been confined
to the low-lying country below the Ghauts, and the scene of warfare
had been almost always the Company’s own territories in the vicinity
of Madras, or the territories of our native allies in the Carnatic.
Now, for the first time, the war was carried into the very heart of
Mysore territory.
Tippoo’s movements, at this time, were characterised by unwonted
indecision and want of energy. Instead of impeding and harassing
the march of the army, he contented himself with watching the
advance, with the intention rather of taking advantage of any mistake
committed by the English commander, than of following any plan of his
own.
On the 5th March, the British force reached Bangalore, and took
up its ground without any loss, beyond a few casualties caused by
a distant cannonade on the march. On the following day, the army
changed ground, and took up a better position on the North West face
of the pettah.[27] In the afternoon, Colonel Floyd was detached
to the south west of the town, to cover a reconnoissance by the
engineers. He had with him his own brigade, consisting of the 19th
Light Dragoons under Captain Child, and five Regiments of native
Cavalry, besides a Brigade of three battalions of Infantry, with a
detachment of Artillery under Major Gowdie.
The work was satisfactorily accomplished, and the force was about
to return, when a body of the enemy’s horse appeared. Leaving the
infantry and guns, Floyd moved against it, and, on its giving way,
discovered some Mysore infantry, and guns, with large masses of
baggage and stores, elephants, bullock carts, camels and all the
paraphernalia of an Eastern Army on the march. Tippoo was changing
his ground, and, by accident, the reconnoitring party had crossed the
rear of his line of march. Disregarding his orders, Floyd allowed
himself to be persuaded to attack, by the young officers who were
clamorous for the fray. The temptation was irresistible, and the
cavalry advanced at a gallop. Some parties of infantry were charged
and broken, and nine guns captured. As the advance continued, the
ground became much broken with ravines and low rocky hills. The
horses were exhausted, and the enemy, collecting their forces, opened
a heavy fire of musketry and rockets that checked the advance. At
this moment, Floyd fell from his horse, apparently dead, with a
musket ball in his head. At his fall, the squadron behind him made a
half wheel to avoid trampling on their leader. This threw the line
into confusion, the flank squadrons took it for a signal to retire,
and, in a few moments, the whole force was falling back. Fortunately
for Floyd, Corporal Murray and Private Buchanan remained with him,
and, examining his wound, found that it was not mortal. Murray
remained with him, while Buchanan galloped after the regiment, and in
a short time returned with a troop of the 19th, under Cornet Roderick
Mackenzie: Floyd was mounted on Buchanan’s horse and brought back to
the regiment. He was able to halt the regiment, and show a front to
the enemy, which checked them; but darkness was coming on; the enemy
pressed on, and the confusion was very great. The exhausted horses
were scarcely able to get back through the ravines they had cleared
with ease in their advance, and had it not been for the good judgment
of Major Gowdie, who had advanced a mile beyond the place where he
had been left, and covered the retreat with his brigade, the losses
would have been very great. Lord Cornwallis, who had been able to see
what was occurring from the encampment, put a division in motion,
and met the whole detachment returning. Floyd’s wound was caused by
a bullet through his cheek, which lodged in his neck. It was never
extracted, and he carried it to his grave, but he was sufficiently
recovered to take up his command again eleven days later. The losses
of the detachment were as follows:--
_Killed_--
1 Officer.
1 Trumpeter.
18 Rank and File.
36 Horses.
_Wounded_--
2 Officers (European).
3 Native Officers.
43 Rank and File.
7 Horses.
_Missing_--
2 Trumpeters.
1 Rank and File.
228 Horses.
The losses of the 19th Light Dragoons were--
_Killed_--
1 Trumpeter.
2 Rank and File.
11 Horses.
_Wounded_--
1 Lieutenant Colonel.
7 Rank and File.
_Missing_--
4 Horses.
Major Skelly, Lord Cornwallis’ aide-de-camp, writing of the event a
short time afterwards, says: “I never saw Lord Cornwallis completely
angry before that evening. To this day he cannot speak of that
night’s business without evident signs of disapprobation.”
The loss of so many horses at this early stage of the campaign was
a serious one, as they could not be replaced. The cavalry had been
constantly employed for the last three days, and the horses had not
been regularly fed. Those that did not succumb on this occasion were
of little use for the remainder of the campaign.
On the following day, the pettah was taken by assault, and some
much-needed supplies were obtained: but there was great scarcity
of forage, and horses and transport animals suffered greatly. “The
draught cattle were daily dying at their pickets; grain and every
other necessary, including ammunition, were at the lowest ebb.” In
these straits, Lord Cornwallis resolved to try and take the Fort by a
_coup-de-main_. On the night of the 21st, the assault was delivered
by moonlight, and in an hour the Fort was captured under the eyes of
the Sultan, who made no serious attempt to cause a diversion.
The capture of Bangalore was the first great blow that had
been struck against the power of Mysore, by any foe, since its
establishment by Hyder Ali.
Leaving a garrison in the place, Cornwallis moved northward, on the
28th, with the twofold object of forming a junction with a corps of
the Nizam’s cavalry, and of meeting a convoy that was expected from
Amboor. After some delay, caused by false intelligence purposely
spread by Tippoo, the British force was joined at Cotapilli, on
13th April, by 10,000 irregular horse of the Nizam’s, and, a week
later, the much-needed convoy, escorted by four thousand men, was
met at Venkitagheri. The combined force then returned to Bangalore,
which was reached on the 28th. Arrangements were at once made for
the siege of Seringapatam, against which the Sultan sought to guard
himself, by wasting the intervening country; a measure that was not
without effect on subsequent events.
On the 13th May, the British force reached Arikera, about nine miles
from Seringapatam. The army moved with extreme difficulty, and
there was great distress, owing to the inadequate transport and the
wasted state of the country. The Nizam’s cavalry refused to forage
beyond the outposts, and added to the scarcity: great quantities of
ammunition were dependent for carriage on the private resources of
officers and other individuals with the army. Before laying siege
to Seringapatam, it was Cornwallis’ object to cross the Cauvery
at Caniembadi, and form a junction with the Bombay force, under
Abercromby, which was shortly expected. The Sultan, who had hitherto
confined himself to harassing the line of march, found it necessary
to offer battle, to prevent if possible the threatened junction. With
this purpose he took up an extremely strong position about three
miles from Seringapatam, with his right resting on the Cauvery, and
his left on a rugged hill. His front was covered by a deep, swampy
ravine the passages of which were defended by batteries along the
whole front. Cornwallis determined to turn Tippoo’s left wing, and,
by a night march, to place himself between Seringapatam and a great
portion of the Mysore army. Halting at Arikera on the 14th, the
force marched at night, leaving the camp standing, with the heavy
guns and stores. Unfortunately, there was a storm of extraordinary
violence that lasted several hours, which added to the confusion and
difficulties of a night march, and, when day broke, the force had
only accomplished three or four miles. All hope of surprise was at
an end, but Cornwallis continued his advance. To meet the movement,
Tippoo threw back his left, and in order to cover his change of
front, detached a large corps of cavalry and infantry, with eight
guns, to occupy a strong rocky ridge on his left, at right angles
to the line of march of the British column. Owing to the depth of
the ravine to be crossed, and the weakness of the gun bullocks, it
took two hours before the British force could form up in line for
attack; during which it was exposed to a galling artillery fire, and
to some charges of cavalry, which were repulsed. The British force
was disposed, with nine battalions under Major General Medows, in the
first line, opposite to the enemy’s main body; four battalions in
the second line, under Lt. Col. Harris; while five battalions, under
Lt. Col. Maxwell, were destined to attack the enemy’s corps on the
ridge to the right. The cavalry under Floyd, consisting of the 19th
Light Dragoons and five Regiments of Native Cavalry, and the Nizam’s
horse, were left on the opposite side of the ravine, out of reach of
artillery fire.
The action commenced by an advance of Maxwell’s force against the
ridge, which was taken, while the cavalry crossed the ravine, and
fell on the rear of the Mysore infantry, inflicting considerable
loss. But the exhausted horses could not raise a gallop, and they
were obliged to fall back from a strong body of infantry, that
had rallied and made a stand in some broken rocky ground. At this
juncture, the Nizam’s horse, which had followed the British cavalry
across the ravine, threw itself in an unwieldy mass in front of the
left wing, preventing its advance, and detaining it under the fire of
the enemy’s batteries in Seringapatam. This unfortunate circumstance,
which by many was ascribed to treachery on the part of the Nizam’s
commander, saved the enemy from destruction. The British line was
for some time unable to advance, and the enemy’s guns and infantry,
in great confusion, were able to withdraw under protection of their
batteries across the river. Four guns were taken. The British loss
was 81 killed, 339 wounded, and 6 missing. Of this, the 19th Light
Dragoons lost
_Killed_--
1 Officer. Cornet James Patterson.
2 Troopers.
_Wounded_--
2 Officers. Cornet Roderick Mackenzie.
Cornet John Fortnam.
2 Troopers.
_Horses_--
13 Killed.
11 Wounded.
The army was now in such a state, owing to want of proper supplies,
want of carriage, and an epidemic of smallpox, that it was
necessary to join hands with the Bombay force under Abercromby,
before undertaking the siege. Abercromby had encountered great
difficulties in ascending the Passes into Mysore, and so excellent
was the work done by Tippoo’s cavalry, that Cornwallis was without
any precise information as to his advance. Nor was anything known
of the Mahratta contingent, beyond the fact that they had captured
Dharwar. Cornwallis therefore resolved on continuing his march on
Caniembadi, to meet Abercromby. “For two marches, all the battering
train and almost every public cart in the army were dragged by the
troops,” and Cornwallis came to the conclusion, that the state of
his force rendered a retirement on Bangalore imperative. The siege
train and heavy stores could be carried no farther, and it was
resolved to destroy them. On the 21st May, orders were despatched
to Abercromby, who was then at Periapatam, about 25 miles to the
westward, to destroy his heavy stores, and retire below the Passes,
and Cornwallis’ army was retained five days in position, to cover
Abercromby’s movement. On the 22nd, the whole of the battering train
and heavy stores were destroyed, and on the 26th, the first march
of six miles was made in retreat. The distress was very great:
the troops were on half rations, and the only way of carrying what
grain was available was to distribute it among the fighting men.
“Great part of the horses of the cavalry were so reduced by want
and fatigue, that they could no longer carry their riders; and
many, unable to march, were shot at their pickets. The ground at
Caniembadi, where the army had encamped but six days, was covered,
in a circuit of several miles, with the carcasses of cattle and
horses.”[28] “All that occurred of mortality among the cattle, during
the siege of Bangalore, fell far short of the horrible scene and
pestilential air of this disgusting ground.”[29]
In the middle of the first day’s painful march, a body of two
thousand cavalry appeared on the left flank. Preparations were
made to meet them, and shots were fired, when it was suddenly
discovered that they were the advanced guard of the Mahratta force.
It was not known that they were within a hundred and fifty miles of
Seringapatam, and not one of the numerous messengers they had sent to
convey notice of their approach, had succeeded in escaping Tippoo’s
scouts. There were, in fact, two forces; one, under Hari Punt,
consisting of twelve thousand horse, and the other, under Pareshram
Bhow, of twenty thousand horse and foot, with two battalions of
Bombay sepoys, under Captain Little. They brought with them abundant
supplies, and plenty once more reigned in the British camp. Their
cavalry foraged boldly in every direction, bringing in supplies from
great distances, in striking contrast to the behaviour of the Nizam’s
force. But they came too late to permit of an attack on Seringapatam.
Had Cornwallis known of their approach five days sooner, all would
have been well, and another campaign would have been spared him. But
his siege train no longer existed, the Bombay force had descended
the Ghauts, and there was nothing for it but to adhere to his resolve
of falling back. The allied forces remained in the vicinity of
Seringapatam till the 6th June, when they leisurely moved northwards
to Nagmunglum, and thence eastward to Bangalore, taking the small
hill fort of Hooliadroog on the way. “So reduced were the horses of
our cavalry from want and fatigue, that the only service they could
now render was to walk on slowly with the sick and wounded soldiers
on their backs, for whom we were in great want of conveyance; and it
was highly pleasing to see the cheerfulness with which the troopers
walked by the side of their horses, while their distressed comrades
of the infantry rode upon the march.”[30] The Mahratta cavalry
effectually prevented the march being harassed by the enemy, from
whom they took some convoys and elephants.
Pending the completion of arrangements for another advance on
Seringapatam, the Mahratta force withdrew northwards to Sara; the
Nizam’s force also withdrew to Gunjicotta, which, with several other
small places, had been captured by a force of the Nizam’s.
The 19th Light Dragoons with the rest of the cavalry were sent, under
Floyd, to the Carnatic, to recruit. The regiment reached Madras early
in August; and, as horses to remount the cavalry were not procurable,
three native cavalry regiments were dismounted in order to complete
the horses required for the 19th. The 3rd and 5th Native cavalry had
their ranks partially filled in the same way, so that by the end of
the monsoon these three Regiments were ready to rejoin the army.
“The 19th Light Dragoons, which under their gallant leader, had
made so powerful an impression on the minds of the enemy during
the war, was again completely remounted; and with the addition
of the draughts and recruits that had arrived from England, was
in nearly as great force as when it first took the field. This
favourite corps was reviewed by General Musgrave at the Mount
in the beginning of October, when it shewed near four hundred
mounted, both men and horses in perfect order.”[31]
Meanwhile, the army at Bangalore was engaged in securing the passes
into the Carnatic, and in reducing the numerous hill fortresses
that abounded in Mysore. The most important of these, Nundydroog
and Savandroog, were taken by assault on the 19th October and 21st
December, respectively. Tippoo, on his side, had not been idle.
In the middle of June a large Mysore force invested Coimbatore,
which was weakly held. The defence was obstinate, and after a two
months’ siege the place was relieved from Palghat. In October, it
was invested a second time, and, the attempts to relieve it being
unsuccessful, Coimbatore was forced to surrender, on 3rd November.
Several parties of Mysore horse also succeeded in making raids into
the Carnatic, doing much mischief. One party penetrated to within
a few miles of Madras, early in January, after the cavalry had
marched to rejoin Cornwallis, and carried off much plunder. During
the preceding half century, the country within fifty miles of Madras
had been the constant scene of warlike operations. In that period,
Madras had fallen to a French attack, and been held by them for four
years. Again, it had been frequently threatened and once besieged,
by France, and Hyder had dictated a peace within sight of Fort St.
George. Too often, the inhabitants of Madras had heard the sound
of an enemy’s guns, and seen the sky red with the glare of burning
villages: and now again the horsemen of Mysore were plundering and
burning within sight of the Mount. But it was for the last time.
Shevtamodoo was plundered and burned by one of these parties.
In the meantime, large convoys of supplies and material were being
forwarded to Bangalore, the last and most important, conveying
all the ammunition for the army, being escorted by the 19th Light
Dragoons under Colonel Floyd. Ascending by the Pednaikdirgum Pass,
on the 23rd December, and marching by Kolar, Ooscotta and Bangalore,
he joined Cornwallis at Magre, near Ootradroog, on the 12th January
1792. Everything was now ready for an advance on Seringapatam,
and the army was in a more efficient state than it had been at
any time since the war began. Owing to Lord Cornwallis’ excellent
arrangements, supplies of all sorts were in the greatest abundance.
The only deficiency was in horses for the Cavalry. The losses
experienced in this respect, in the previous year, had not been made
good, and this arm of the service was represented only by the 19th
Light Dragoons, six troops, the 3rd Native Cavalry, six troops,
the 5th Native Cavalry, four troops, and the Body Guards of Lord
Cornwallis and General Medows, one troop each. The force altogether
consisted of 22,033 men, of which about 15,500 were infantry. The
advance was still delayed by the absence of the Nizam’s force, which
was occupied in the siege of Gurramconda. On the 25th January it
arrived, under the command of the Nizam’s son, Secunder Jah. Part of
the Mahratta contingent, under Hari Punt, had already joined Lord
Cornwallis, but the greater part, under Pareshram Bhow, had gone off
on a plundering expedition to the northwestward, in defiance of the
agreement made six months before. It did not join the British force,
till the campaign was over.
The Bombay army, under Abercromby, consisting of eight thousand four
hundred men, was also on the march from the westward. Ascending by
the Poodicherim Pass, Abercromby directed his march by Periapatam
and Eratoor, so as to join hands with Cornwallis in front of
Seringapatam.
On the 31st January, Cornwallis held a review of his whole force
at Hooliadroog, for the benefit of his allies. As the Nizam’s son
reached the right of the line “a salute of 21 guns was fired from the
park, while the cavalry, with drawn swords and trumpets sounding,
received him with due honours as he passed their front. He returned
the officers’ salute, and looked attentively at the troops. The 19th
Dragoons, of which they had all heard, attracted their particular
notice.”[32] On the following day, the army marched, and encamped
within sight of Seringapatam, at about seven miles’ distance, on the
5th February. No opposition on the march was experienced.
Seringapatam is situated on an island in the Cauvery river, four
miles in length and a mile and a half broad. At the western end of
the island was the fortress, the eastern portion being also strongly
defended by connected batteries and redoubts. On the north side, on
what may be called the main land, was an oblong space about three
miles in length, enclosed by a hedge of cactus and other thorny
plants, and commanded by redoubts on the highest points. In this
space Tippoo was encamped. He believed that he could protract the
defence, till the coming of the monsoon and the scarcity of supplies
should force Cornwallis to raise the siege; he further believed that
no serious attack would be made on the position, till the arrival
of Abercromby’s force. But Cornwallis had plans of a very different
nature. The 6th being spent in reconnoitring, orders were issued,
about sunset, for the troops to parade at once for a night attack.
About 8 o’clock all was ready, and the infantry advanced in three
columns, the centre column being headed by Cornwallis in person. The
cavalry were left to guard the camp, and the artillery were left
behind also. When all was ready, Cornwallis sent word of his plans to
his native allies, who were dismayed at hearing of an advance against
a fortified camp without artillery, and that his lordship should have
gone to fight “like a common soldier.” Moving in silence, the heads
of the columns, which were more than a mile apart, came in touch with
the enemy about half past ten. The attack was completely successful.
One redoubt after another was carried, Tippoo’s camp was taken, some
of the troops, in their ardour, crossing the stream and penetrating
to the farther side of the island. The brunt of the fighting fell on
the centre column, which, towards daylight, was heavily attacked by
the Mysore troops, who had recovered from their first surprise. The
fighting continued till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 7th, the
last serious attack being headed by Tippoo’s French regiment. But
nothing availed to dislodge the British troops from the positions
they had gained, and Tippoo was forced to withdraw on to the island,
where also our troops had made good their footing. Our loss amounted
to 535 of all ranks, killed, wounded and missing. Eighty guns and
an enormous quantity of supplies were captured. The enemy’s loss
was estimated at four thousand killed, great numbers having been
forced into the river and drowned. Greater still was the loss caused
by desertion; numbers of the enemy having taken advantage of the
confusion, to throw down their arms and make off to their homes.
The whole loss to the Sultan, in killed, wounded and missing, was
estimated at twenty thousand men.
On the 12th, the cavalry under Floyd were detached to meet
Abercromby, with whom he effected a junction on the 14th. In a
private letter, still extant, he writes:--
“On the 11th February I convoyed 13,000 Brinjarries (Brinjara
bullocks carrying grain) into camp. On the 12th February, I was
detached with nine squadrons, one battalion of sepoys, and about
1500 allied horse, to meet General Abercromby, and his army.
On the 14th of February, I was attacked by full 4000 of the
enemy’s horse, who had got in among my baggage, and attached
themselves to my allied horse. I soon recovered every article
of my baggage, but was forced to stop there, not being able to
distinguish friend from foe. The Nizam’s Horse under a son of
the Nawab of Canoul, and the Mahratta Horse also kept firm. The
enemy drew off, rather worsted by the allied horse. Immediately,
the head of Abercromby’s column appeared at a distance, and the
enemy made for them. I posted my battalion, my allied horse, and
my baggage, and ranged along between the enemy and Abercromby’s
with the nine squadrons of our own horse; the enemy collected and
went clear off.”
Dirom, the principal chronicler of the campaign, says:--
“Tippoo had meant a more serious opposition to this junction,
and for that purpose had detached the whole of his cavalry on
the evening of the 13th; they had crossed (the Cauvery) a few
miles above the fort, and lay in wait till Colonel Floyd moved in
the morning of the 14th. The detachment of allies, in spite of
the Colonel’s orders, and the remonstrance of Major Scott, who
was sent with them, remained loitering on the ground for some
time after the Colonel had marched: the Sultan’s horse seized
the opportunity, and attacked them with great vigour. They stood
their ground for some time, and then retreating towards Colonel
Floyd, he returned to support them, and soon put the enemy to the
rout.”
On the 16th, Abercromby joined Cornwallis on the north side of
Seringapatam, without further hindrance, and preparations were made
for prosecuting the siege. On the 19th, Abercromby made a detour,
and, crossing the Cauvery, invested the place from the south. A
strong Brigade, under Colonel Stuart, was entrenched on the island,
and Floyd with the Cavalry was stationed about four thousand yards
to the eastward, linking up the distance between Cornwallis and
Abercromby. Seringapatam was completely invested. On the 22nd,
an attack on Abercromby’s force was repulsed with loss, and then
Tippoo, who had been for some days in negotiation with Cornwallis,
realised that the time for surrender had arrived. The losses he had
experienced in the fighting of the 6th and 7th, rendered prolonged
resistance impossible.
It was no part of Lord Cornwallis’ policy to destroy the Mysore
State, but the disposition of Tippoo, “a faithless and violent
character on whom no dependence could be placed” required that his
power should be so far curtailed, as to render him less dangerous. On
the 23rd February, the preliminaries of peace were signed by Tippoo,
and warlike operations ceased, much to the disgust of the army,
whose minds were inflamed to an extraordinary degree against the
Sultan, on account of the barbarous cruelties inflicted by him on all
prisoners that fell into his hands. One of the stipulations was that
two of Tippoo’s sons should be handed over, as hostages for the due
performance of the treaty of peace. On the 26th, the young princes
were received by Lord Cornwallis with much ceremony. The occasion
seems to have made a great impression at the time. Three,[33] if not
more, pictures of the event were painted by A. W. Devis, a well-known
artist, who was present. In all of them, Colonel Floyd is prominently
represented, a fine martial figure. Cornet Hale and Captain Child of
the 19th Light Dragoons also appear in some of the pictures. This
was evidently regarded in India as the most striking event in Lord
Cornwallis’ career in the country. The base of the statue erected to
him in Madras, has another representation of the scene.
The Princes remained in British territory till March 1794, when they
were sent back to the Sultan with all honour.
[Illustration: AN OFFICER OF THE XIX^{TH} LIGHT DRAGOONS, 1792.
_to face p. 99._]
A considerable amount of prize money gained during the war was
further enhanced by the surrender of their respective shares by Lord
Cornwallis and General Medows, and by liberal gratuities from the
Government. The share of every private soldier amounted to £14, 11.
9., the shares of other ranks being in proportion.
Sixty-seven forts and eight hundred and one guns were captured during
the three campaigns; of which, fifty-six forts and six hundred and
fifty-six guns were captured by the British forces, the remainder
falling to their native allies.
On the 20th March, the Treaty of Peace was duly ratified, and on
the 26th, the army marched from Seringapatam, for Madras, which was
reached about the end of May. The 19th Light Dragoons returned to
their old quarters at Shevtamodoo.
A medal for the three campaigns, 1790-92, was bestowed on the Bengal
native troops who took part in them.