WAR WITH TIPPOO
1790
War with Tippoo--19th take the field--Advance on
Coimbatore--Division under Floyd detached towards Guzzulhutti
Pass--Frequent skirmishes--Satyamunglum--Dispersion of the
Army--Advance of Tippoo--19th hotly engaged--Tippoo’s Body-Guard
destroyed--Retreat from Satyamunglum--Casualties--March in
pursuit of Tippoo--Private Parkes--The Tapoor Pass--Tippoo eludes
pursuit, and ravages the Carnatic--Army returns to Madras.
In 1790, the Government of India again became involved in war with
Tippoo. He had been constrained to sign the peace of Mangalore by the
withdrawal of the French alliance, and the coalition of the British
and Mahrattas against him. But the war had been a triumph for Mysore
arms. South of the Kistna river, Mysore was the most powerful state
in India, and no single power could hold its own against the son of
Hyder Ali. But Tippoo failed to realize the increase of power of the
English Company, due to five years of peace. In 1785, a quarrel broke
out between him and the Mahrattas, who allied themselves with the
Nizam, and invaded Mysore territory. The campaign that ensued was
in Tippoo’s favour, and peace was concluded between the contending
parties in April 1787. Tippoo’s warlike restlessness continued to be
a menace to the other powers in India. In the end of 1787, overtures
for an alliance against him, were made to Calcutta by the Mahrattas.
To this, Lord Cornwallis, who had assumed the direction of affairs
as Governor General and Commander in Chief in September 1786, gave
a refusal. But nothing could keep Tippoo quiet. In 1788 he sent
an embassy to France, to propose an alliance against the English,
and, in December 1789, he attacked the Rajah of Travancore whom we
were bound by treaty to protect. Preparations were at once made to
punish the aggression, and orders were transmitted to Madras for the
commencement of operations against Mysore.
The time had come for the 19th Light Dragoons to show their worth.
One morning, early in January, came the news that war was imminent,
and that the Regiment was to join the army ordered to assemble at
Trichinopoly. “My men were on horseback, going to water, when the
news arrived, and they received it with three most cordial cheers.
Nothing but good humour and high hope prevail in the Army. My
regiment is ready in all that depends on us, and willing beyond
description.”[24] But great delay ensued, and some weeks elapsed
before a move was made. The Madras Government disobeyed the stringent
orders of Cornwallis, to warn Tippoo that an attack on Travancore
would entail war, and to take all necessary steps for prosecuting
war if the attack was made. There was a complete want of military
preparation. Fortunately, on 19th February, Major General Medows
arrived from England with full powers as Governor and Commander in
Chief in Madras, and preparations for the campaign were made in
earnest. A force was assembled near Wallajabad, and marched for
Trichinopoly on 29th March. The 19th Light Dragoons at this time
mustered 355 sabres. Meanwhile Tippoo took advantage of the delay
to prosecute his conquest over Travancore, which he would have
completed, had not a small force from Bombay, under Colonel Hartley,
landed in Travancore, in the end of April, and taken up a strong
defensive position. On 24th May, General Medows took command of the
army at Trichinopoly, amounting to about 15,000 men. On the same day,
Tippoo turned his back on Travancore, and made his way northwards to
confront his foes.
Mysore, the heart of Tippoo’s Kingdom, is a high plateau from 2000
to 3000 feet above the sea, open towards the north, but fenced in
to the East, South and West by precipitous, cliff-like ranges that
overlook the low country outside, and are only passable for an army
at certain places. Tippoo had also extensive possessions in the low
country, from which he drew large revenues and plentiful military
supplies. According to the plan of operations adopted, Medows was
to advance on Mysore from the southward, and, if possible, enter it
by the Guzulhutti Pass, after making himself master of the rich low
country about Coimbatore, where abundant supplies could be obtained.
As this movement would uncover Madras, a small force was held at
Conjeveram, under Colonel Kelly, which was augmented later by a force
of six battalions of sepoys and some artillery, that were dispatched
overland from Bengal. On the west, a force from Bombay under
Major General Abercromby[25] was destined to act against Tippoo’s
possessions in Malabar, and, if events rendered it desirable, to
effect a junction with Medows. On the occurrence of Tippoo’s attack
on Travancore in December, the Peishwa had renewed his offers of
alliance to Lord Cornwallis. This time they were accepted, and a
triple convention between the Peishwa, the Nizam and the British,
was concluded. By it, the two former engaged to attack Tippoo’s
Northern possessions at once with 25,000 horse, and after the rains,
to act with their utmost means. So dilatory were their movements,
that it was not till the following year that their operations had any
share of importance in the campaign.
[Illustration: Map
to illustrate MYSORE CAMPAIGNS
_Walker & Boutall sc._]
On the 26th May, the army marched from Trichinopoly, but, owing to
badness of transport, it was not till 15th June that Karoor was
occupied. Avaracoorchi and Darapooram were occupied, on the 5th
and 10th July respectively. Tippoo was at this time at Coimbatore,
where it was hoped he would make a stand. The siege guns and stores
were therefore deposited in Darapooram, and the army advanced.
Information was soon received of his having gone northward, and
ascended the defiles on to the Mysore plateau, leaving a force of
Cavalry numbering from 3000 to 5000, under Said Sahib, as a corps
of observation. After recovering the heavy guns, the advance was
continued, watched by Said Sahib who fell back on Coimbatore, with
the intention of burning the town on the near approach of the British
force. To prevent this, Floyd with the cavalry was dispatched to
occupy the town, which was accomplished on 21st July, the main body
arriving the following day, while Said Sahib fell back to Demiacotta
on the Bhowani river. Floyd, with the 19th Light Dragoons, three
regiments of Native Cavalry, two companies of sepoys and four 6
pr. guns, was dispatched in pursuit. About ten o’clock at night on
the 22nd, after a thirty-mile march, he surprised near Demiacotta
a small body of horse, about thirty of whom were made prisoners.
The exaggerated accounts they gave him, led him to believe that the
force with Said Sahib was larger than had been supposed. The Fort of
Demiacotta having taken the alarm, opened fire, and, there being no
forage obtainable, Floyd considered it prudent to fall back a few
miles. On the 28th, he moved forward again, and, on reaching the
banks of the river, discovered that Said Sahib had carried his force
across the river, and was encamped on the other side. The Bhowani
river, at this time, was only fordable at certain places. A few long
shots from the six pounders made Said Sahib decamp, and direct his
march towards the Guzulhutti Pass. Floyd then fell back to Velladi,
and remained in observation of the two roads leading from Coimbatore
to the Bhowani river, moving occasionally to Shawoor and Occarro. On
the 16th of August, Colonel Floyd with a Corporal and six Dragoons,
set out from Shawoor to visit Occarro, where there was a troop of
Native Cavalry on detachment duty. On arrival at Occarro, it was
reported to him that there was a body of the enemy’s horse in the
neighbourhood. Taking twelve men of the troop with his original
escort, he went in search of them, and discovered them close to
the village. He immediately charged them, and put the whole body
to flight. Four days later, Major Affleck[26] of the 19th Light
Dragoons, with two troops of the 19th and an equal number of the
5th Native Cavalry, while patrolling, fell in with a large body of
the enemy’s horsemen whom they instantly attacked, killing upwards
of forty, and capturing twenty horses. Not many days after this, an
equally successful skirmish occurred under the command of Lieut.
Bayly of the 19th Light Dragoons, who, with a troop of the 19th and
two troops of Native Cavalry, put a large body of the enemy’s horse
to rout, and drove them into the river. In a private letter written
four months later, Floyd says: “Among a great number of cavalry
skirmishes I was always successful, and fully established for the
first time in India, the infinite superiority of European over Native
horse.”
While Floyd was thus engaged to the north of Coimbatore, a force
under Colonel Oldham was sent against Erode, which surrendered,
on the 6th August, after a feeble resistance. Another force, under
Colonel Stuart, was sent against Dindigal, which surrendered, after
one unsuccessful assault, on the 23rd August. Several other small
forts in the neighbourhood were also captured. Further reinforcements
were sent to Stuart, who was directed to proceed against Palghat. A
breach was effected, and the place surrendered on 22nd September;
but, before this, events had occurred that completely altered the
aspect of affairs.
On the 26th of August, having been reinforced by three battalions of
sepoys and five guns, Floyd crossed the Bhowani, and made himself
master of the Fort of Satyamunglum, which was taken by surprise
without any loss. A native battalion was placed in the Fort, and all
Said Sahib’s detached horsemen were driven into the Guzulhutti Pass.
The force was then withdrawn to the south bank of the river, the
fords of which were constantly visited by strong patrols. Further
reinforcements reached Floyd, whose force now consisted of the 19th
Light Dragoons and three regiments of Native Cavalry, H.M. 36th, and
four battalions of sepoys, with eleven guns of different calibres.
Exclusive of the artillerymen, the force numbered about two thousand
eight hundred fighting men.
So far, all had gone well in spite of much sickness in the army, and
great difficulties due to the heavy rains. A chain of posts had been
established to the foot of the Guzulhutti Pass, the flanks of the
army were well protected, and Tippoo’s garrisons had been expelled
from every important place in the Coimbatore district. The force
under Medows, at Coimbatore, had been reduced to three native and
two European battalions without their flank companies. Floyd, with
the force already mentioned, was watching the Guzulhutti Pass, some
forty miles to the northward. With Stuart besieging Palghat, some
thirty miles south west of Coimbatore, were one regiment of Native
Cavalry, one European and five Native battalions of Infantry, besides
six European companies belonging to three different Regiments, and
a detachment of Artillery. Besides this, there were detachments
occupying Karoor, Erode, Darapooram, Dindigal, and a few other
small posts. Nothing but the fall of Palghat was wanting to permit
of a concentrated forward movement on the Guzulhutti Pass. To the
eastward, the force that had been left at Conjeveram under Colonel
Kelly had been reinforced by the division from Bengal, and had
moved to Arnee, where Colonel Kelly’s death gave the command to
Colonel Maxwell. It consisted of one regiment of Native Cavalry,
three European and eight Native battalions of Infantry, and some
Artillery, amounting altogether to nine thousand five hundred men.
To the southward on the Travancore border was Colonel Hartley,
with one European and four Native battalions of Infantry, moving
towards Palghat, which he reached after its capture. The whole
force was dangerously scattered, and Tippoo, who had excellent
intelligence of all that occurred, was not slow to take advantage of
the circumstance. So far, the only active measure he had undertaken
had been the dispatch of a small body of marauding horse into the
Carnatic by the Changama Pass. They plundered and burned Porto Novo,
but did little other damage.
Leaving Seringapatam on the 2nd September, with forty thousand men
and a large train of Artillery, Tippoo reached the Guzulhutti Pass
on the 9th, and completed the descent in the two following days.
Floyd was not unaware of the increased force in his front, and of
the reports of Tippoo’s advance, and, in his report to Medows,
suggested the advisability of his falling back towards Coimbatore.
But the intelligence was disbelieved, and he was ordered to maintain
his position. He was at that time encamped on the south side of the
Bhowani opposite to Satyamunglum. On the 12th Floyd dispatched an
express messenger to Medows telling of the increased forces of the
enemy, and that Tippoo was advancing in person. At two o’clock in the
morning of the 13th, Cavalry picquets of the 19th Light Dragoons and
2nd and 5th Native Cavalry, under Captain Child of the 19th, were
ordered to reconnoitre towards the Poongar ford, about ten miles up
the river. A few hours later, the 5th Native Cavalry, under Major
Darley, was ordered to follow in support. By some mischance, Darley
took a different road from that which Child had followed. Tippoo had
however begun to pass his troops over the river the day before, after
the withdrawal of the morning reconnoissance, and Child suddenly
found himself opposed by a considerable body of horse. Charging them
at once, he drove them into the river, whereby many were killed and
drowned: he then fell back by the same road. The country all around
was laid out in small enclosures with cactus hedges, rendering it
very difficult to see any distance. Major Darley, advancing by the
other road, charged and overthrew a body of about two hundred horse,
inflicting great loss, but was, immediately after, nearly surrounded
by some six or seven thousand of the enemy’s Cavalry. Sending back
news to the camp, he took up a position on some high ground where
his flanks were protected by cactus hedges, and kept the enemy at
bay by carbine fire. After some time he was joined by the 3rd Native
Cavalry, and, a little later, Floyd with the 19th Light Dragoons,
and the picquets under Captain Child, attracted by the firing,
came up. On seeing these reinforcements, the enemy drew off, Floyd
followed them up and inflicted heavy losses on them. Two squadrons
of the 19th charged a large body of the Sultan’s Body Guard that had
got entangled in an enclosure from which there was no outlet, and
put upwards of five hundred, it is said, to the sword. The enemy’s
leader was slain by a private dragoon, while his standard bearer
was cut down and the standard taken by a Corporal. The green flag of
Islam was also captured. The field was cleared of every opponent,
and the cavalry returned to camp. Scarcely had they dismounted when
a large force was seen approaching on the north bank of the river,
whence some heavy guns were brought to bear. At the same time, a
second force was perceived approaching the left flank along the
south bank. This necessitated a change of position by our troops,
and the Sultan contented himself with keeping up a heavy cannonade,
without a closer attack. During the whole day, the force remained in
this trying position. Floyd’s eleven guns were not only outnumbered,
but were obliged to husband their ammunition which was limited.
The cannonade ceased at nightfall, and the enemy withdrew to some
distance. Tippoo never liked camping too close to the English, for
fear of a night surprise. Of the English guns, three were disabled,
and there had been serious casualties among the troops, the horses,
and the gun bullocks. Many of the bullock drivers had also deserted.
The night was very dark with heavy rain, the Infantry lay on their
arms, and the Cavalry remained at the heads of their horses. About
midnight, it was determined to fall back upon Coimbatore, through
Shawoor, the force having been driven from the direct line of retreat
through Velladi. It was necessary first to bring the garrison of
Satyamunglum across the river. In doing this, great delay ensued, and
it was four o’clock before the troops could be put in motion. Owing
to the destruction among the gun bullocks, three guns were obliged
to be left behind. Fortunately for the English, the Sultan’s army
had been greatly inconvenienced by the heavy rain during the night,
and it was some hours before Tippoo could collect a sufficient force
to follow the retreat. When he moved, his well-equipped artillery
soon caught up the slow-moving British column, and pressed heavily
on its flanks and rear. The first attack was made by a body of
Cavalry, who fell upon the baggage, the greater part of which was
lost, and the Surgeon’s mate, Sutherland, of the 19th Light Dragoons
killed. The force reached Occarro about eleven o’clock, but after a
short halt was obliged to resume its march, as Tippoo’s army was now
moving on its flank. Owing to the exhaustion of the gun bullocks,
three more guns were obliged to be left behind there. The safety of
the remaining guns was assured by a number of officers sacrificing
their baggage, and giving their private bullocks to draw the guns.
On account of the close nature of the country, the rear guard duty
had to be taken by the Infantry, and the Cavalry was sent forward.
During the whole march, the force was exposed to a continuous fire
of musketry, heavy guns, and rockets, which was especially directed
against H.M.’s 36th. On approaching Shawoor, the enemy pressed so
closely on the column, that the Infantry were obliged to form up
and show a front, while the Cavalry, unable to act among the cactus
hedges, led the column. At this moment, a report was spread that
General Medows had arrived to their assistance, and a detachment
of the 19th Light Dragoons which had passed through Shawoor, and
appeared on the opposite side of the village, was mistaken for the
head of his column. The news was greeted with cheers; and Tippoo was
also deceived by the report which spread through both armies. The
Infantry advanced, and drove back the enemy, whose discomfiture was
completed by the Cavalry, who pursued on both flanks, and completely
cleared the field. The force remained in Shawoor during the night,
without being molested, Tippoo, who at first believed the news of
Medow’s arrival, having drawn off to some distance. Floyd fired
three signal guns to show his position to General Medows, who had
marched on the same day to Floyd’s assistance, but not being aware
of his retreat by the Shawoor route, had marched on Velladi, where
he encamped that evening. Floyd had received intelligence of Medow’s
march on Velladi, and, recognizing the great importance of forming
a junction, marched again before daylight, and reached Velladi on
the evening of the 15th. The enemy did not pursue, and the troops
were enabled to get food and rest, after being three days without
either. Medows however was not at Velladi, having gone on towards
Demiacotta, to which circumstance may be ascribed the peaceful march
of Floyd’s troops on the 15th. The junction between the two forces
was effected on the 16th. The Sultan, on hearing of Medows’ movement
towards Demiacotta, withdrew on the same day to the north side of
the Bhowani. Had he acted with greater energy, and pressed Floyd’s
force on the 15th, he might have won a great success. The troops
were exhausted, and would have yielded to determined attacks on the
third day of their retreat. In such an event, the disaster would
certainly have extended to Medows’ force, which consisted only of
five incomplete battalions, and Stuart’s force at Palghat would also
have been involved in ruin. The respect with which Tippoo treated the
retreating force was largely due to the gallant bearing of the 19th,
and especially to the severe lesson they taught the enemy on the
13th. In addition to the six guns abandoned, the losses of the whole
detachment under Floyd, during the 13th and 14th, were as follows:--
_Europeans_--
Killed 43
Wounded 98
Missing 7
_Natives_--
Killed 128
Wounded 137
Missing 148
_Horses_--
Killed 22
Wounded 8
Missing 28
The Infantry were the principal sufferers. The losses of the 19th
Light Dragoons amounted to
_Killed_--
1 Assistant Surgeon.
5 Troopers.
_Wounded_--
1 Quarter-Master.
8 Troopers.
_Horses_--
5 killed.
3 wounded.
Five officers killed and eight wounded were among the casualties
of the force, and nearly the whole of the baggage was lost. The
losses of the enemy were very heavy, among the slain being Tippoo’s
brother-in-law and many leaders of note. In spite of their tactical
success, the result of the two days’ fighting was to depress the
spirits of Tippoo’s men, while the minds of the British troops were
proportionately elated at their successful retreat, in presence of
such an overwhelming force. Floyd received much credit, and Medows
was generous enough to acknowledge his error, in leaving the force
in such an exposed position. Tippoo ascribed his want of success to
the cactus hedges, and, some years later, ordered them to be levelled
throughout the whole district. The gallant bearing of the 19th Light
Dragoons in this portion of the campaign, made an impression that
spread to every Native Court in southern India, and gained them a
reputation for fighting, that clung to them during the whole of their
service in India.
On the 18th, Medows marched from Velladi, and returned to Coimbatore
on the 23rd, after visiting Shawoor. At Coimbatore, he was joined by
Colonel Stuart from Palghat. On the 29th he left Coimbatore again,
marching northward to the Bhowani. Tippoo meanwhile had gone towards
Erode, which fell into his hands on the 25th. From Erode, Tippoo
marched towards Karoor, hoping to cut off a large convoy destined for
Medows’ army. Medows followed, and received his convoy safely on the
7th October. Tippoo meanwhile marched on Darapooram, which he took on
the 8th, and then marched towards Coimbatore, where Medows had left
stores and heavy guns with but a feeble garrison. Fortunately, under
orders from Medows, Colonel Hartley, on reaching Palghat, had sent
on three sepoy battalions, which reached Coimbatore in time to save
it from attack, and Tippoo turned off northwards when within a few
miles of the place. Medows reached Coimbatore on the 15th, and, after
strengthening the defences, again marched for Erode, which he reached
on the 2nd November. Some slight skirmishing with a small party of
the enemy’s horse occurred on the march, during which Private Parkes
of the 19th Light Dragoons signalised himself, while on flanking
duty, by attacking, single handed, six horsemen whom he encountered
in a narrow road, and bringing in three horses and a prisoner.
Meanwhile, Maxwell’s force had advanced from Arnee, and entered the
Baramahal district near Vaniembadi on the 24th October. This forced
Tippoo to leave the Coimbatore district, and march northward to
intercept Maxwell. So well was the movement covered, that several
days elapsed before Medows discovered where he had gone. But Tippoo,
failing to find Maxwell in a position favourable for attack, withdrew
after threatening him for four days, and was nearly caught between
two fires by Medows’ advancing force. On the 17th, the two armies
formed a junction, 12 miles south of Cauveripatam. Supplies were
abundant, and Medows was now at the head of the finest army the
Company had ever put into the field. But Tippoo’s excellent system
of intelligence, and the greater mobility of his army gave him the
great advantage of choosing his own field of action, so long as he
was not brought to bay in the heart of his own country. He calculated
with justice that, if he moved in the direction of the Carnatic,
Medows would be obliged to follow him, and relinquish his projects
on Mysore. Accordingly, on the 18th, he put his army in motion for
Trichinopoly by the Tapoor Pass. As fortune would have it, Medows
marched on the same day, with the intention of traversing the same
Pass, and reached it after the Sultan’s army had begun to enter
it. The British advance brigade, under Colonel Floyd, consisted
of the 19th Light Dragoons, three regiments of Native Cavalry and
three sepoy battalions. The Sultan’s rear was covered by a body of
two thousand Cavalry, who showed a bold front. Medows became over
cautious, and waited for his artillery. So well were the Mysore
Cavalry handled, that no advantage was gained beyond the cutting off
from the Pass of three battalions which were forced into the jungle.
Tippoo’s baggage also was unable to enter the Pass, but suffered no
loss; the main body got through, and continued its march without
mishap. Thus was let slip an opportunity of striking a severe blow
under most advantageous conditions.
Tippoo continued his march on Trichinopoly, wasting the country as he
proceeded, and hoping to make himself master of the place, which was
not strongly defended, before Medows could reach it. But the swollen
state of the Cauvery river saved the place from attack, and Tippoo
withdrew, in time to avoid Medows, who arrived before Trichinopoly
on the 14th December. Two days before this, Lord Cornwallis arrived
in Madras, with the intention of taking command of the army in the
field; and at once summoned Medows to bring the force to Madras.
Meanwhile, Tippoo turned northwards, and, ravaging the country as
he passed, attacked Tiaghur, a small rock fortress, under the walls
of which a great number of the country people had gathered for
protection. Here also Tippoo was rejoined by his heavy baggage,
which had become separated from him at the Tapoor Pass. After two
assaults, which were repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants,
the Sultan left Tiaghur, and marched on Trinomalli which was not
garrisoned. After a feeble resistance from the inhabitants, the place
was plundered, and great barbarities committed. Turning eastward,
Tippoo took Permacoil, where there was only a single company of
Native Infantry, whose commander had orders to retreat if threatened.
Owing to treachery, Tippoo was able to surround the place before this
could be done. Tippoo then marched towards Pondicherry, where he
remained some time, and dispatched an embassy to France, proposing
an alliance, and asking for a force of 6000 French troops to be
sent him. Medows followed the Mysore force as far as Trinomalli,
whence he turned towards Madras. The siege-guns and heavy stores
were left at Arnee, with a division under Major General Musgrave,
and the remainder of the force reached Vellout, eighteen miles from
Madras, on the 27th January 1791. Before this, a brilliant success
had been gained by Colonel Hartley, who, with three battalions,
completely routed a large Mysore force near Calicut, on the 10th
December, capturing Tippoo’s lieutenant and two thousand four hundred
prisoners, in the action and in the subsequent pursuit. The Bombay
force under General Abercromby, whose movements had been greatly
delayed, was not able to commence operations till the beginning of
December. Then Tippoo’s garrisons in Malabar were quickly captured,
and the whole province occupied.
The Mahrattas and the Nizam had been tardy in their operations.
Both were unwilling to come within Tippoo’s reach, until they could
be certain of his being fully occupied with the English forces. On
the 25th August, the Mahrattas commenced operations, and, on 18th
September, laid siege to Dharwar. The attack was so badly conducted,
that the place did not capitulate till 4th April following, when the
Mahratta force, under Pareshram Bhow and Hari Punt, moved on toward
Seringapatam. The Nizam moved in concert with the Mahrattas, but
delayed greatly, after crossing the Kistna, before attacking Kopaul,
the siege of which was begun on the 28th October. The fortress
capitulated on the 18th April following.
According to a muster roll taken at Clive’s Choultry on 24th
December, the 19th Light Dragoons had fifty men in hospital, out of a
total of 270 non-commissioned officers and troopers present. Fourteen
deaths occurred in the preceding six months. During the same period,
50 horses had died, and 14 had been rendered unfit for further
service, out of a total effective strength of 386.