its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.C.: but we
now find it under the government of an oligarchy called the Geômori,
the proprietors of land, as at Syracuse before the rule of Gelon.
It cannot be doubted that these geômori were disposed to follow the
example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt from Athens, while the
people at Samos, as at Chios, were averse to such a change. Under
this state of circumstances, the Chian oligarchy had themselves
conspired with Sparta, to trick and constrain their Demos by surprise
into revolt, through the aid of five Peloponnesian ships. The like
would have happened at Samos, had the people remained quiet. But they
profited by the recent warning, forestalled the designs of their
oligarchy, and rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian
triremes which then chanced to be in the port. The oligarchy were
completely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle;
two hundred of them being slain, and four hundred banished. This
revolution secured—and probably nothing less than a democratical
revolution could have secured, under the existing state of Hellenic
affairs—the adherence of Samos to the Athenians; who immediately
recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the privilege of
an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people confiscated and
divided among themselves the property of such of the geômori as
were slain or banished:[572] the remainder were deprived of all
political privileges, and were even forbidden to intermarry with
any of the families of the remaining citizens.[573] We may fairly
suspect that this latter prohibition is only the retaliation of a
similar exclusion which the oligarchy, when in power, had enforced to
maintain the purity of their own blood. What they had enacted as a
privilege was now thrown back upon them as an insult.
[572] Thucyd. viii, 21. Ἐγένετο δὲ κατὰ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον καὶ
ἡ ἐν Σάμῳ ~ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς~, μετὰ
Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ἔτυχον ἐν τρισὶ ναυσὶ παρόντες. Καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Σαμίων
ἐς διακοσίους μέν τινας τοὺς πάντας τῶν δυνατῶν ἀπέκτεινε,
τετρακοσίους δὲ φυγῇ ζημιώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν καὶ
οἰκίας νειμάμενοι, Ἀθηναίων τε σφίσιν αὐτονομίαν μετὰ ταῦτα ~ὡς
βεβαίοις ἤδη~ ψηφισαμένων, τὰ λοιπὰ διῴκουν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ τοῖς
γεωμόροις μετεδίδοσαν οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς, οὔτε ἐκδοῦναι οὐδ’
ἀγαγέσθαι παρ’ ἐκείνων οὐδ’ ἐς ἐκείνους οὐδενὶ ἔτι τοῦ δήμου ἐξῆν.
[573] Thucyd. viii, 21. The dispositions and plans of the “higher
people” at Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians and revolt from
Athens, are fully admitted even by Mr. Mitford, and implied by
Dr. Thirlwall, who argues that the government of Samos cannot
have been oligarchical, because, if it had been so, the island
would already have revolted from Athens to the Peloponnesians.
Mr. Mitford says (ch. xix, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 191):
“Meanwhile the body of the higher people at Samos, more depressed
than all others since their reduction on their former revolt,
were _proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer
through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, of mending
their condition_. The lower people, _having intelligence of their
design_, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of
three Athenian ships then at Samos, overpowered them,” etc. etc.
etc.
“The _massacre and robbery_ were rewarded by a decree of the
Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent
administration of the affairs of their island; which, since the
last rebellion, had been kept _under the immediate control of the
Athenian government_.”
To call this a _massacre_ is perversion of language. It was an
insurrection and intestine conflict, in which the “higher people”
were vanquished, but of which they also were the beginners, by
their conspiracy—which Mr. Mitford himself admits as a fact—to
introduce a foreign enemy into the island. Does he imagine that
the “lower people” were bound to sit still and see this done? And
what means had they of preventing it, except by insurrection;
which inevitably became bloody, because the “higher people” were
a strong party, in possession of the powers of government, with
great means of resistance. The loss on the part of the assailants
is not made known to us, nor indeed the loss in so far as it fell
on the followers of the geômori. Thucydidês specifies only the
number of the geômori themselves, who were persons of individual
importance.
I do not clearly understand what idea Mr. Mitford forms to
himself of the government of Samos at this time. He seems to
conceive it as democratical, yet under great immediate control
from Athens, and that it kept the “higher people” in a state of
severe depression, from which they sought to relieve themselves
by the aid of the Peloponnesian arms.
But if he means by the expression, “_under the immediate
control of the Athenian government_,” that there was any
Athenian governor or garrison at Samos, the account here
given by Thucydidês distinctly refutes him. The conflict was
between two intestine parties, “the higher people and the lower
people.” The only Athenians who took part in it were the crews
of three triremes, and even they were there by accident (οἳ
ἔτυχον παρόντες), not as a regular garrison. Samos was under an
indigenous government; but it was a subject and tributary ally
of Athens, like all the other allies, with the exception of
Chios and Methymna (Thucyd. vi, 85). After this resolution, the
Athenians raised it to the rank of an autonomous ally, which Mr.
Mitford is pleased to call “rewarding massacre and robbery,” in
the language of a party orator rather than of an historian.
But was the government of Samos, immediately before this
intestine contest, oligarchical or democratical? The language
of Thucydidês carries to my mind a full conviction that it was
oligarchical, under an exclusive aristocracy, called The Geômori.
Dr. Thirlwall, however (whose candid and equitable narrative of
this event forms a striking contrast to that of Mr. Mitford), is
of a different opinion. He thinks it certain that a democratical
government had been established at Samos by the Athenians, when
it was reconquered by them (B.C. 440) after its revolt. That the
government continued democratical during the first years of the
Peloponnesian war, he conceives to be proved by the hostility of
the Samian exiles at Anæa, whom he looks upon as oligarchical
refugees. And though not agreeing in Mr. Mitford’s view of the
peculiarly depressed condition of the “higher people” at Samos
at this later time, he nevertheless thinks that they were not
actually in possession of the government. “Still (he says), as
the island gradually recovered its prosperity, the privileged
class seems also to have looked upward, perhaps contrived to
regain a part of the substance of power under different forms,
and probably betrayed a strong inclination to revive its ancient
pretensions on the first opportunity. _That it had not yet
advanced beyond this point, may be regarded as certain; because
otherwise Samos would have been among the foremost to revolt
from Athens_: and on the other hand, it is no less clear, that
the state of parties there was such as to excite a high degree
of mutual jealousy, and great alarm in the Athenians, to whom
the loss of the island at this juncture would have been almost
irreparable.” (Hist. of Gr. ch. xxvii, vol. iii, p. 477 2d edit.)
Manso (Sparta, book iv, vol. ii, p. 266) is of the same opinion.
Surely, the conclusion which Dr. Thirlwall here announces as
certain, cannot be held to rest on adequate premises. Admitting
that there was an oligarchy in power at Samos, it is perfectly
possible to explain why this oligarchy had not yet carried into
act its disposition to revolt from Athens. We see that none
of the allies of Athens—not even Chios, the most powerful of
all—revolted without the extraneous pressure and encouragement
of a foreign fleet. Alkibiadês, after securing Chios, considered
Milêtus to be next in order of importance, and had, moreover,
peculiar connections with the leading men there (viii, 17); so
that he went next to detach that place from Athens. Milêtus,
being on the continent, placed him in immediate communication
with Tissaphernês, for which reason he might naturally deem it
of importance superior even to Samos in his plans. Moreover,
not only no foreign fleet had yet reached Samos, but several
Athenian ships had arrived there: for Strombichidês, having come
across the Ægean too late to save Chios, made Samos a sort of
central station (viii, 16). These circumstances combined with
the known reluctance of the Samian demos, or commonalty, are
surely sufficient to explain why the Samian oligarchy had not
yet consummated its designs to revolt. And hence the fact, that
no revolt had yet taken place, cannot be held to warrant Dr.
Thirlwall’s inference, that the government was _not_ oligarchical.
We have no information how or when the oligarchical government
at Samos got up. That the Samian refugees at Anæa, so actively
hostile to Samos and Athens during the first ten years of the
Peloponnesian war, were oligarchical exiles acting against a
democratical government at Samos (iv, 75), is not in itself
improbable; yet it is not positively stated. The government of
Samos might have been, even at that time, oligarchical; yet, if
it acted in the Athenian interest, there would doubtless be a
body of exiles watching for opportunities of injuring it, by aid
of the enemies of Athens.
Moreover, it seems to me, that if we read and put together the
passages of Thucydidês, viii, 21, 63, 73, it is impossible
without the greatest violence to put any other sense upon
them, except as meaning that the government of Samos was now
in the hands of the oligarchy, or geômori, and that the Demos
rose in insurrection against them, with ultimate triumph. The
natural sense of the words ἐπανάστασις, ἐπανίσταμαι, is that
of _insurrection against an established government: it does
not mean, “a violent attack by one party upon another;” still
less does it mean, “an attack made by a party in possession of
the government:_” which nevertheless it ought to mean, if Dr.
Thirlwall be correct in supposing that the Samian government was
now democratical. Thus we have, in the description of the Samian
revolt from Athens—Thucyd. i, 115 (after Thucydidês has stated
that the Athenians established a democratical government, he next
says that the Samian exiles presently came over with a mercenary
force)—καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ~δήμῳ ἐπανέστησαν~, καὶ ἐκράτησαν τῶν
πλείστων, etc. Again, v, 23—about the apprehended insurrection of
the Helots against the Spartans—ἢν δὲ ἡ δούλεια ~ἐπανίστηται~:
compare Xenoph. Hellen. v, 4, 19; Plato, Republ. iv, 18, p. 444;
Herodot. iii, 39-120. So also δυνατοὶ is among the words which
Thucydidês uses for an oligarchical party, either in government
or in what may be called _opposition_ (i, 24; v, 4). But it is
not conceivable to me that Thucydidês would have employed the
words ἡ ἐπανάστασις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τοῖς δυνατοῖς—if the Demos had
at that time been actually in the government.
Again, viii, 63, he says, that the Athenian oligarchical party
under Peisander αὐτῶν τῶν Σαμίων προὐτρέψαντο τοὺς δυνατοὺς ὥστε
πειρᾶσθαι μετὰ σφῶν ὀλιγαρχηθῆναι, καίπερ ~ἐπαναστάντας αὐτοὺς
ἀλλήλοις ἵνα μὴ ὀλιγαρχῶνται~. Here the motive of the previous
ἐπανάστασις is clearly noted; it was in order that they might
_not be under an oligarchical government_: for I agree with
Krüger (in opposition to Dr. Thirlwall), that this is the clear
meaning of the words, and that the use of the present tense
prevents our construing it, “in order that their democratical
government might not be subverted, and an oligarchy put upon
them,” which ought to be the sense, if Dr. Thirlwall’s view were
just.
Lastly, viii, 73, we have οἱ γὰρ ~τότε τῶν Σαμίων ἐπαναστάντες
τοῖς δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος, μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις~—ἐγένοντό
τε ἐς τριακοσίους ξυνωμόται, καὶ ἔμελλον τοῖς ἄλλοις ~ὡς δήμῳ
ὄντι~ ἐπιθήσεσθαι. Surely these words—οἱ ἐπαναστάντες τοῖς
δυνατοῖς καὶ ὄντες δῆμος—“those who having risen in arms against
the wealthy and powerful, were now a demos, or a democracy,”
must imply, _that the persons against whom the rising had taken
place had been a governing oligarchy_. Surely, also, the words
μεταβαλλόμενοι αὖθις, can mean nothing else except to point out
the strange antithesis between the conduct of these same men at
two different epochs not far distant from each other. On the
first occasion, they rose up against an established oligarchical
government, and constituted a democratical government. On the
second occasion, they rose up in conspiracy against this very
democratical government, in order to subvert it, and constitute
themselves an oligarchy in its place. If we suppose that on
the first occasion, the established government was already
democratical, and that the persons here mentioned were not
conspirators against an established oligarchy, but merely
persons making use of the powers of a democratical government
to do violence to rich citizens, all this antithesis completely
vanishes.
On the whole, I feel satisfied that the government of Samos, at
the time when Chios revolted from Athens, was oligarchical, like
that of Chios itself. Nor do I see any difficulty in believing
this to be the fact, though I cannot state when and how the
oligarchy became established there. So long as the island
performed its duty as a subject ally, Athens did not interfere
with the form of its government. And she was least of all likely
to interfere during the seven years of peace intervening between
the years 421-414 B.C. There was nothing then to excite her
apprehensions. The degree to which Athens intermeddled generally
with the internal affairs of her subject-allies, seems to me to
have been much exaggerated.
The Samian oligarchy, or geômori, dispossessed of the government
on this occasion, were restored by Lysander after his victorious
close of the Peloponnesian war,—Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 3, 6—where
they are called οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πολῖται.
On the other hand, the Athenian blockading fleet was surprised and
defeated, with the loss of four triremes, by the Peloponnesian fleet
at Peiræum, which was thus enabled to get to Kenchreæ, and to refit
in order that it might be sent to Ionia. The sixteen Peloponnesian
ships which had fought at Syracuse had already come back to Lechæum,
in spite of the obstructions thrown in their way by the Athenian
squadron under Hippoklês at Naupaktus.[574] The Lacedæmonian admiral
Astyochus was sent to Kenchreæ to take the command and proceed to
Ionia as admiral-in-chief: but it was some time before he could
depart for Chios, whither he arrived with only four triremes,
followed by six more afterwards.[575]
[574] Thucyd. viii, 13.
[575] Thucyd. viii, 20-23.
Before he reached that island, however, the Chians, zealous in the
new part which they had taken up, and interested for their own safety
in multiplying defections from Athens, had themselves undertaken the
prosecution of the plans concerted by Agis and the Lacedæmonians at
Corinth. They originated an expedition of their own, with thirteen
triremes under a Lacedæmonian periœkus named Deiniadas, to procure
the revolt of Lesbos; with the view, if successful, of proceeding
afterwards to do the same among the Hellespontine dependencies of
Athens. A land force under the Spartan Eualas, partly Peloponnesian,
partly Asiatic, marched along the coast of the mainland northward
towards Kymê, to coöperate in both these objects. Lesbos was at
this time divided into at least five separate city governments;
Methymna at the north of the island, Mitylênê towards the south-east,
Antissa, Eresus, and Pyrrha on the west. Whether these governments
were oligarchical or democratical we do not know, but the Athenian
kleruchs who had been sent to Mitylênê after its revolt sixteen
years before, must have long ago disappeared.[576] The Chian fleet
first went to Methymna and procured the revolt of that place, where
four triremes were left in guard, while the remaining nine sailed
forward to Mitylênê, and succeeded in obtaining that important town
also.[577]
[576] See the earlier part of this History, vol. vi, ch. l, pp.
257, 258.
[577] Thucyd. viii, 22.
Their proceedings, however, were not unwatched by the Athenian fleet
at Samos. Unable to recover possession of Teos, Diomedon had been
obliged to content himself with procuring neutrality from that town,
and admission for the vessels of Athens as well as of her enemies: he
had, moreover, failed in an attack upon Eræ.[578] But he had since
been strengthened partly by the democratical revolution at Samos,
partly by the arrival of Leon with ten additional triremes from
Athens: so that these two commanders were now enabled to sail, with
twenty-five triremes, to the relief of Lesbos. Reaching Mitylênê—the
largest town in that island—very shortly after its revolt, they
sailed straight into the harbor when no one expected them, seized
the nine Chian ships with little resistance, and after a successful
battle on shore, regained possession of the city. The Lacedæmonian
admiral Astyochus—who had only been three days arrived at Chios from
Kenchreæ with his four triremes—saw the Athenian fleet pass through
the channel between Chios and the mainland, on its way to Lesbos; and
immediately on the same evening followed it to that island, to lend
what aid he could, with one Chian trireme added to his own four, and
some hoplites aboard. He sailed first to Pyrrha, and on the next day
to Eresus, on the west side of the island, where he first learned the
recapture of Mitylênê by the Athenians. He was here also joined by
three out of the four Chian triremes which had been left to defend
that place, and which had been driven away, with the loss of one of
their number, by a portion of the Athenian fleet pushing on thither
from Mitylênê. Astyochus prevailed on Eresus to revolt from Athens,
and having armed the population, sent them by land together with his
own hoplites under Eteonikus to Methymna, in hopes of preserving that
place, whither he also proceeded with his fleet along the coast.
But in spite of all his endeavors, Methymna as well as Eresus and
all Lesbos was recovered by the Athenians, while he himself was
obliged to return with his forces to Chios. The land troops which
had marched along the mainland, with a view to farther operations at
the Hellespont, were carried back to Chios and to their respective
homes.[579]
[578] Thucyd. viii, 20.
[579] Thucyd. viii, 23. ἀπεκομίσθη δὲ πάλιν κατὰ πόλεις καὶ ὁ
~ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός~, ὃς ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ἐμέλλησεν ἰέναι.
Dr. Arnold and Göller suppose that these soldiers had been
carried over to Lesbos to coöperate in detaching the island
from the Athenians. But this is not implied in the narrative.
The land-force _marched along_ by land to Klazomenæ and Kymê (ὁ
πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων
~παρῄει~ ἐπὶ Κλαζομένων τε καὶ Κύμης). Thucydidês does not say
that they ever crossed to Lesbos: they remained near Kymê,
prepared to march forward, after that island should have been
conquered, to the Hellespont.
Haacke is right, I think, in referring the words ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν
νεῶν πεζός to what had been stated in c. 17; that Alkibiadês
and Chalkideus, on first arriving with the Peloponnesian five
triremes at Chios, disembarked on that island their Peloponnesian
seamen and armed them as hoplites for land-forces; taking aboard
fresh crews of seamen from the island. The motive to make this
exchange was, the great superiority of bravery, in heavy armor
and stand-up fighting, of Peloponnesians as compared with
Chians or Asiatic Greeks (see Xenoph. Hell. iii, 2, 17). These
foot-soldiers taken from the Peloponnesian ships are the same as
those spoken of in c. 22: ὁ πεζὸς ἅμα Πελοποννησίων τε τῶν
παρόντων καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ξυμμάχων ... ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν πεζός.
Farther, these troops are again mentioned in c. 24, as οἱ μετὰ
Χαλκιδέως ἐλθόντες Πελοποννήσιοι, where Dr. Arnold again speaks
of them in his note incorrectly. He says: “The Peloponnesians
who came with Chalkideus must have been too few to offer any
effectual resistance to one thousand heavy-armed Athenians,
being only _the epibatæ_ of five ships.” The fact is that they
were not merely the epibatæ, but the _entire crews_, of five
ships; comprising probably from eight hundred to one thousand
men (ἐκ μὲν τῶν ~ἐκ Πελοποννήσου νεῶν τοὺς ναύτας ὁπλίσαντες~ ἐν
Χίῳ καταλιμπάνουσι, c. 17), since there were a remnant of five
hundred left of them, after some months’ operations and a serious
defeat (viii, 32).
The recovery of Lesbos, which the Athenians now placed in a better
posture of defence, was of great importance in itself, and arrested
for the moment all operations against them at the Hellespont. Their
fleet from Lesbos was first employed in the recovery of Klazomenæ,
which they again carried back to its original islet near the shore;
the new town on the mainland, called Polichna, though in course of
being built, being not yet sufficiently fortified to defend itself.
The leading anti-Athenians in the town made their escape, and went
farther up the country to Daphnûs. Animated by such additional
success—as well as by a victory which the Athenians, who were
blockading Milêtus, gained over Chalkideus, wherein that officer
was slain—Leon and Diomedon thought themselves in a condition to
begin aggressive measures against Chios, now their most active enemy
in Ionia. Their fleet of twenty-five sail was well equipped with
epibatæ; who, though under ordinary circumstances they were thêtes
armed at the public cost, yet in the present stress of affairs were
impressed from the superior hoplites in the city muster-roll.[580]
They occupied the little islets called Œnussæ, near Chios on the
northeast, as well as the forts of Sidussa and Pteleus in the
territory of Erythræ; from which positions they began a series of
harassing operations against Chios itself. Disembarking on the island
at Kardamylê and Bolissus, they not only ravaged the neighborhood,
but inflicted upon the Chian forces a bloody defeat. After two
farther defeats, at Phanæ and at Leukonium, the Chians no longer
dared to quit their fortifications; so that the invaders were left
to ravage at pleasure the whole territory, being at the same time
masters of the sea around, and blocking up the port.
[580] Thucyd. viii, 24, with Dr. Arnold’s note.
The Athenians now retaliated upon Chios the hardships under which
Attica itself was suffering; hardships the more painfully felt,
inasmuch as this was the first time that an enemy had ever been
seen in the island since the repulse of Xerxês from Greece and the
organization of the confederacy of Delos, more than sixty years
before. The territory of Chios was highly cultivated,[581] its
commerce extensive, and its wealth among the greatest in all Greece.
In fact, under the Athenian empire, its prosperity had been so marked
and so uninterrupted, that Thucydidês expresses his astonishment
at the undeviating prudence and circumspection of the government,
in spite of circumstances well calculated to tempt them into
extravagance. “Except Sparta (he says),[582] Chios is the only state
that I know, which maintained its sober judgment throughout a career
of prosperity, and became even more watchful in regard to security,
in proportion as it advanced in power.” He adds, that the step of
revolting from Athens, though the Chian government now discovered it
to have been an error, was at any rate a pardonable error; for it
was undertaken under the impression, universal throughout Greece,
and prevalent even in Athens herself after the disaster at Syracuse,
that Athenian power, if not Athenian independence, was at an end, and
undertaken in conjunction with allies seemingly more than sufficient
to sustain it. This remarkable observation of Thucydidês doubtless
includes an indirect censure upon his own city, as abusing her
prosperity for purposes of unmeasured aggrandizement: a censure not
undeserved in reference to the enterprise against Sicily. But it
counts at the same time as a valuable testimony to the condition of
the allies of Athens under the Athenian empire, and goes far in reply
to the charge of practical oppression against the imperial city.
[581] Aristotel. Politic. iv, 4, 1; Athenæus, vi, p. 265.
[582] Thucyd. viii, 24. Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἤδη οὐκέτι
ἐπεξῄσαν, οἱ δὲ (Ἀθηναῖοι) τὴν χώραν, καλῶς κατεσκευασμένην καὶ
ἀπαθῆ οὖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν μέχρι τότε, διεπόρθησαν. Χῖοι γὰρ
μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην, εὐδαιμονήσαντας ἅμα
καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον,
τόσῳ δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον, etc.
viii. 45. Οἱ Χῖοι ... πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, etc.
The operations now carrying on in Chios indicated such an unexpected
renovation in Athenian affairs, that a party in the island began to
declare in favor of reunion with Athens. The Chian government were
forced to summon Astyochus, with his four Peloponnesian ships from
Erythræ, to strengthen their hands, and keep down opposition, by
seizing hostages from the suspected parties, as well as by other
precautions. While the Chians were thus endangered at home, the
Athenian interest in Ionia was still farther fortified by the arrival
of a fresh armament from Athens at Samos. Phrynichus, Onomaklês, and
Skironidês conducted a fleet of forty-eight triremes, some of them
employed for the transportation of hoplites; of which latter there
were aboard one thousand Athenians, and fifteen hundred Argeians.
Five hundred of these Argeians, having come to Athens without arms,
were clothed with Athenian panoplies for service. The newly-arrived
armament immediately sailed from Samos to Milêtus, where it effected
a disembarkation, in conjunction with those Athenians who had been
before watching the place from the island of Ladê. The Milêsians
marched forth to give them battle; mustering eight hundred of
their own hoplites, together with the Peloponnesian seamen of the
five triremes brought across by Chalkideus, and a body of troops,
chiefly cavalry, yet with a few mercenary hoplites, under the satrap
Tissaphernês. Alkibiadês, also, was present and engaged. The Argeians
were so full of contempt for the Ionians of Milêtus who stood
opposite to them, that they rushed forward to the charge with great
neglect of rank or order; a presumption which they expiated by an
entire defeat, with the loss of three hundred men. But the Athenians
on their wing were so completely victorious over the Peloponnesians
and others opposed to them, that all the army of the latter, and
even the Milesians themselves on returning from their pursuit of the
Argeians, were forced to shelter themselves within the walls of the
town. The issue of this combat excited much astonishment, inasmuch
as, on each side, Ionian hoplites were victorious over Dorian.[583]
[583] Thucyd. viii, 25, 26.
For a moment, the Athenian army, masters of the field under the walls
of Milêtus, indulged the hope of putting that city under blockade,
by a wall across the isthmus which connected it with the continent.
But these hopes soon vanished when they were apprized, on the very
evening of the battle, that the main Peloponnesian and Sicilian
fleet, fifty-five triremes in number, was actually in sight. Of
these fifty-five, twenty-two were Sicilian,—twenty from Syracuse and
two from Selinus,—sent at the pressing instance of Hermokratês, and
under his command, for the purpose of striking the final blow at
Athens; so at least it was anticipated, in the beginning of 412 B.C.
The remaining thirty-three triremes being Peloponnesian, the whole
fleet was placed under the temporary command of Theramenês, until he
could join the admiral Astyochus. Theramenês, halting first at the
island of Lerus,—off the coast, towards the southward of Milêtus,—was
there first informed of the recent victory of the Athenians, so
that he thought it prudent to take station for the night in the
neighboring gulf of Iasus. Here he was found by Alkibiadês, who came
on horseback, in all haste, from Milêtus to the Milesian town of
Teichiussa on that gulf. Alkibiadês strenuously urged him to lend
immediate aid to the Milêsians, so as to prevent the construction
of the intended wall of blockade; representing that if that city
were captured, all the hopes of the Peloponnesians in Ionia would
be extinguished. Accordingly, he prepared to sail thither the next
morning: but, during the night, the Athenians thought it wise to
abandon their position near Milêtus and return to Samos with their
wounded and their baggage. Having heard of the arrival of Theramenês
with his fleet, they preferred leaving their victory unimproved, to
the hazard of a general battle. Two out of the three commanders,
indeed, were at first inclined to take the latter course, insisting
that the maritime honor of Athens would be tarnished by retiring
before the enemy. But the third, Phrynichus, opposed with so much
emphasis the proposition of fighting, that he at length induced his
colleagues to retire. The fleet, he said, had not come prepared for
fighting a naval battle, but full of hoplites for land-operations
against Milêtus: the numbers of the newly-arrived Peloponnesians
were not accurately known; and a defeat at sea, under existing
circumstances, would be utter ruin to Athens. Thucydidês bestows
much praise on Phrynichus for the wisdom of this advice, which was
forthwith acted upon. The Athenian fleet sailed back to Samos; from
which place the Argeian hoplites, sulky with their recent defeat,
demanded to be conveyed home.[584]
[584] Thucyd. viii, 26, 27.
On the ensuing morning, the Peloponnesian fleet sailed from the gulf
of Iasus to Milêtus, expecting to find and fight the Athenians, and
leaving their masts, sails, and rigging—as was usual when going into
action—at Teichiussa. Finding Milêtus already relieved of the enemy,
they stayed there only one day, in order to reinforce themselves with
the twenty-five triremes which Chalkideus had originally brought
thither, and which had been since blocked up by the Athenian fleet at
Ladê, and then sailed back to Teichiussa to pick up the tackle there
deposited. Being now not far from Iasus, the residence of Amorgês,
Tissaphernês persuaded them to attack it by sea, in coöperation with
his forces by land. No one at Iasus was aware of the arrival of the
Peloponnesian fleet: the triremes approaching were supposed to be
Athenians and friends, so that the place was entered and taken by
surprise;[585] though strong in situation and fortifications, and
defended by a powerful band of Grecian mercenaries. The capture of
Iasus, in which the Syracusans distinguished themselves, was of
signal advantage, from the abundant plunder which it distributed
among the army; the place being rich from ancient date, and probably
containing the accumulations of the satrap Pissuthnês, father of
Amorgês. It was handed over to Tissaphernês, along with all the
prisoners, for each head of whom he paid down a Daric stater, or
twenty Attic drachmæ, and along with Amorgês himself, who had been
taken alive, and whom the satrap was thus enabled to send up to Susa.
The Grecian mercenaries captured in the place were enrolled in the
service of the captors, and sent by land under Pedaritus to Erythræ,
in order that they might cross over from thence to Chios.[586]
[585] Phrynichus the Athenian commander was afterwards displaced
by the Athenians,—by the recommendation of Peisander, at the time
when this displacement suited the purpose of the oligarchical
conspirators,—on the charge of having abandoned and betrayed
Amorgês on this occasion, and caused the capture of Iasus
(Thucyd. viii, 54).
Phrynichus and his colleagues were certainly guilty of grave
omission in not sending notice to Amorgês of the sudden
retirement of the Athenian fleet from Milêtus, the ignorance
of which circumstance was one reason why Amorgês mistook the
Peloponnesian ships for Athenian.
[586] Thucyd. viii, 28.
The arrival of the recent reinforcements to both the opposing fleets,
and the capture of Iasus, took place about the autumnal equinox or
the end of September; at which period, the Peloponnesian fleet being
assembled at Milêtus, Tissaphernês paid to them the wages of the
crews, at the rate of one Attic drachma per head per diem, as he
had promised by his envoy at Sparta. But he at the same time gave
notice for the future,—partly at the instigation of Alkibiadês, of
which more hereafter,—that he could not continue so high a rate
of pay, unless he should receive express instructions from Susa;
and that, until such instructions came, he should give only half a
drachma per day. Theramenês, being only commander for the interim,
until the junction with Astyochus, was indifferent to the rate at
which the men were paid,—a miserable jealousy, which marks the low
character of many of these Spartan officers,—but the Syracusan
Hermokratês remonstrated so loudly against the reduction, that he
obtained from Tissaphernês the promise of a slight increase above
the half drachma, though he could not succeed in getting the entire
drachma continued.[587] For the present, however, the seamen were in
good spirits; not merely from having received the high rate of pay,
but from the plentiful booty recently acquired at Iasus;[588] while
Astyochus and the Chians were also greatly encouraged by the arrival
of so large a fleet. Nevertheless, the Athenians on their side were
also reinforced by thirty-five fresh triremes, which reached Samos
under Strombichidês, Charminus, and Euktêmon. The Athenian fleet
from Chios was now recalled to Samos, where the commanders mustered
their whole naval force, with a view of redividing it for ulterior
operations.
[587] Thucyd. viii, 29. What this new rate of pay was, or by
what exact fraction it exceeded the half drachma, is a matter
which the words of Thucydidês do not enable us to make out. None
of the commentators can explain the text without admitting some
alteration or omission of words: nor do any of the explanations
given appear to me convincing. On the whole, I incline to
consider the conjecture and explanation given by Paulmier and
Dobree as more plausible than that of Dr. Arnold and Göller, or
of Poppo and Hermann.
[588] Thucyd. viii, 36.
Considering that in the autumn of the preceding year, immediately
after the Syracusan disaster, the navy of Athens had been no less
scanty in number of ships than defective in equipment, we read with
amazement, that she had now at Samos no less than one hundred and
four triremes in full condition and disposable for service, besides
some others specially destined for the transport of troops. Indeed,
the total number which she had sent out, putting together the
separate squadrons, had been one hundred and twenty-eight.[589] So
energetic an effort, and so unexpected a renovation of affairs from
the hopeless prostration of last year, was such as no Grecian state
except Athens could have accomplished; nor even Athens herself, had
she not been aided by that reserve fund, consecrated twenty years
before through the long-sighted calculation of Periklês.
[589] Thucyd. viii, 30; compare Dr. Arnold’s note.
The Athenians resolved to employ thirty triremes in making a landing,
and establishing a fortified post, in Chios; and lots being drawn
among the generals, Strombichidês with two others were assigned to
the command. The other seventy-four triremes, remaining masters of
the sea, made descents near Milêtus, and in vain tried to provoke
the Peloponnesian fleet out of that harbor. It was some time before
Astyochus actually went thither to assume his new command, being
engaged in operations near to Chios, which island had been left
comparatively free by the recall of the Athenian fleet to the general
muster at Samos. Going forth with twenty triremes,—ten Peloponnesian
and ten Chian,—he made a fruitless attack upon Pteleus, the Athenian
fortified post in the Erythræan territory; after which he sailed
to Klazomenæ, recently retransferred from the continent to the
neighboring islet. He here—in conjunction with Tamôs, the Persian
general of the district—enjoined the Klazomenians again to break
with Athens, to leave their islet, and to take up their residence
inland at Daphnûs, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them
still remained established since the former revolt. This demand being
rejected, he attacked Klazomenæ, but was repulsed, although the town
was unfortified, and was presently driven off by a severe storm,
from which he found shelter at Kymê and Phokæa. Some of his ships
sheltered themselves during the same storm on certain islets near
to and belonging to Klazomenæ; on which they remained eight days,
destroying and plundering the property of the inhabitants, and then
rejoined Astyochus. That admiral was now anxious to make an attempt
on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising revolt from
Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet were so averse to
the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish it and sail back to
Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there, being again dispersed by
the storms, frequent in the month of November.[590]
[590] Thucyd. viii, 31, 32.
Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Milêtus,—at the head
of the mercenary force made prisoners at Iasus, as well as of five
hundred of the Peloponnesian seamen who had originally crossed the
sea with Chalkideus, and since served as hoplites,—had reached
Erythræ and from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him and to
the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to undertake the expedition to
Lesbos; but he experienced from them the same reluctance as from the
Corinthians, a strong proof that the tone of feeling in Lesbos had
been found to be decidedly philo-Athenian on the former expedition.
Pedaritus even peremptorily refused to let him have the Chian
triremes for any such purpose, an act of direct insubordination in a
Lacedæmonian officer towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus
resented so strongly, that he immediately left Chios for Milêtus,
carrying away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling
the Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look
in vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it. He halted
with his fleet for the night under the headland of Korykus (in
the Erythræan territory), on the north side; but while there, he
received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythræ by means
of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at Samos. Instead
of pursuing his voyage to Milêtus, he therefore returned on the
next day to Erythræ to investigate this plot, which turned out to
be a stratagem of the prisoners themselves in order to obtain their
liberation.[591]
[591] Thucyd. viii, 32, 33.
The fact of his thus going back to Erythræ, instead of pursuing
his voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his fleet. For
it so happened that on that same night the Athenian fleet, under
Strombichidês—thirty triremes, accompanied by some triremes carrying
hoplites—had its station on the southern side of the same headland.
Neither knew of the position of the other, and Astyochus, had he gone
forward the next day towards Milêtus, would have fallen in with the
superior numbers of his enemy. He farther escaped a terrible storm,
which the Athenians encountered when they doubled the headland going
northward. Descrying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the
storm became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty
in making their own harbor, while the three foremost Athenian ships
were wrecked on the neighboring shore, all the crews either perishing
or becoming prisoners.[592] The rest of the Athenian fleet found
shelter in the harbor of Phœnikus on the opposite mainland, under the
lofty mountain called Mimas, north of Erythræ.
[592] Thucyd. viii, 33, 34.
As soon as weather permitted, they pursued their voyage to Lesbos,
from which island they commenced their operations of invading Chios
and establishing in it a permanent fortified post. Having transported
their land-force across from Lesbos, they occupied a strong maritime
site called Delphinium, seemingly a projecting cape having a
sheltered harbor on each side, not far from the city of Chios.[593]
They bestowed great labor and time in fortifying this post, both on
the land and the sea-side, during which process they were scarcely
interrupted at all either by the Chians, or by Pedaritus and his
garrison; whose inaction arose not merely from the discouragement of
the previous defeats, but from the political dissension which now
reigned in the city. A strong philo-Athenian party had pronounced
itself; and though Tydeus its leader was seized by Pedaritus and
put to death, still, his remaining partisans were so numerous, that
the government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever, and
to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to trust.
In spite of numerous messages sent to Milêtus, intreating succor,
and representing the urgent peril to which this greatest among all
the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed, Astyochus adhered to his
parting menaces, and refused compliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent
to prefer complaint against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile
the fortress at Delphinium advanced so near towards completion,
that Chios began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from
Dekeleia, with the farther misfortune of being blocked up by sea.
The slaves in this wealthy island—chiefly foreigners acquired by
purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state except
Laconia—were emboldened by the manifest superiority and assured
position of the invaders to desert in crowds; and the loss arising,
not merely from their flight, but from the valuable information and
aid which they gave to the enemy was immense.[594] The distress of
the island increased every day, nor could anything relieve it except
succor from without, which Astyochus still withheld.
[593] Thucyd. viii, 34-38. Δελφίνιον—~λιμένας~ ἔχον, etc.
That the Athenians should select Lesbos on this occasion as the
base of their operations, and as the immediate scene of last
preparations, against Chios,—was only repeating what they had
once done before (c. 24), and what they again did afterwards (c.
100). I do not feel the difficulty which strikes Dobree and Dr.
Thirlwall. Doubtless Delphinium was to the north of the city of
Chios.
[594] Thucyd. viii, 38-40. About the slaves in Chios, see the
extracts from Theopompus and Nymphodôrus in Athenæus, vi, p. 265.
That from Nymphodôrus appears to be nothing but a romantic local
legend, connected with the Chapel of the _Kind-hearted Hero_
(Ἥρωος εὐμένους) at Chios.
Even in antiquity, though the institution of slavery was
universal and noway disapproved, yet the slave-trade, or the
buying and selling of slaves, was accounted more or less odious.
That officer, on reaching Milêtus, found the Peloponnesian force on
the Asiatic side of the Ægean just reinforced by a squadron of twelve
triremes under Dorieus; chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a
political revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and was
now decidedly in the hands of the active philo-Laconian party; the
chief persons friendly to Athens having been exiled.[595] Dorieus
and his squadron, crossing the Ægean in its southern latitude,
had arrived safely at Knidus, which had already been conquered by
Tissaphernês from Athens, and had received a Persian garrison.[596]
Orders were sent from Milêtus that half of this newly-arrived
squadron should remain on guard at Knidus, while the other half
should cruise near the Triopian cape to intercept the trading vessels
from Egypt. But the Athenians, who had also learned the arrival
of Dorieus, sent a powerful squadron from Samos, which captured
all these six triremes off Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped
ashore. They farther made an attempt to recover Knidus, which was
very nearly successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side.
On the morrow the attack was renewed,—but additional defences
had been provided during the night, while the crews of the ships
captured near Triopium had come in to help,—so that the Athenians
were forced to return to Samos without any farther advantage than
that of ravaging the Knidian territory. Astyochus took no step to
intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough to keep the
sea against the seventy-four Athenian triremes at Samos, though his
fleet at Milêtus was at this moment in high condition. The rich booty
acquired at Iasus was unconsumed; the Milêsians were zealous in
the confederate cause; while the pay from Tissaphernês continued to
be supplied with tolerable regularity, though at the reduced rate
mentioned a little above.[597]
[595] See the life of Lysias the Rhetor, in Dionysius of
Halikarnassus, c. i, p. 453, Reisk., and in Plutarch, Vit. x,
Orat. p. 835.
[596] Thucyd. viii, 35-109.
[597] Thucyd. viii, 35, 36. καὶ γὰρ μισθὸς ἐδίδοτο ~ἀρκούντως~,
etc.
Though the Peloponnesians had yet no ground of complaint—such as they
soon came to have—against the satrap for irregularity of payment,
still, the powerful fleet now at Milêtus inspired the commanders
with a new tone of confidence, so that they became ashamed of the
stipulations of that treaty to which Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, when
first landing at Milêtus with their scanty armament, had submitted.
Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at Milêtus, and
even before the departure of Theramenês,—whose functions had expired
when he had handed over the fleet,—insisted on a fresh treaty with
Tissaphernês, which was agreed on, to the following effect:—
“Convention and alliance is concluded, on the following conditions,
between the Lacedæmonians, with their allies, and king Darius, his
sons, and Tissaphernês. The Lacedæmonians and their allies shall not
attack or injure any territory or any city which belongs to Darius,
or has belonged to his father or ancestors; nor shall they raise any
tribute from any of the said cities. Neither Darius nor any of his
subjects shall attack or injure the Lacedæmonians or their allies.
Should the Lacedæmonians or their allies have any occasion for the
king, or should the king have any occasion for the Lacedæmonians or
their allies, let each meet, as much as may be, the wishes expressed
by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war against Athens and
her allies: neither party shall bring the war to a close, without
mutual consent. The king shall pay and keep any army which he may
have sent for, and which may be employed in his territory. If any
of the cities parties to this convention shall attack the king’s
territory, the rest engage to hinder them, and to defend the king
with their best power. And if any one within the king’s territory,
or within the territory subject to him,[598] shall attack the
Lacedæmonians or their allies, the king shall hinder them, and lend
his best defensive aid.”
[598] Thucyd. viii, 37. Καὶ ἤν τις τῶν ~ἐν τῇ βασιλέως χώρᾳ, ἢ
ὅσης βασιλεὺς ἄρχει~, ἐπὶ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἴῃ ἢ τῶν ξυμμάχων,
βασιλεὺς κωλυέτω καὶ ἀμυνέτω κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν.
The distinction here drawn between _the king’s territory_, and
the territory _over which the king holds empire_, deserves
notice. By the former phrase, is understood, I presume, the
continent of Asia, which the court of Susa looked upon, together
with all its inhabitants, as a freehold exceedingly sacred and
peculiar (Herodot. i, 4): by the latter, as much as the satrap
should find it convenient to lay hands upon, of that which had
once belonged to Darius son of Hystaspes or to Xerxes, in the
plenitude of their power.
Looked at with the eyes of Pan-Hellenic patriotism, this second
treaty of Astyochus and Theramenês was less disgraceful than the
first treaty of Chalkideus. It did not formally proclaim that all
those Grecian cities which had ever belonged to the king or to his
ancestors, should still be considered as his subjects, nor did
it pledge the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in hindering any of
them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however, by
implication, the same undiminished extent of the king’s dominion, as
it had stood when at its maximum under his predecessors; the same
undefined rights of the king to meddle with Grecian affairs; the
same unqualified abandonment of all the Greeks on the continent of
Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed by
Theramenês, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his voyage
home, in a small boat, no one knew how.[599]
[599] Thucyd. viii, 38. ἀποπλέων ἐν κέλητι ἀφανίζεται.
Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by the urgent
solicitations of the distressed Chians for relief, and, in spite of
his reluctance, was compelled by the murmurs of his own army to lend
an ear to them, when a new incident happened which gave him at least
a good pretext for directing his attention southward. A Peloponnesian
squadron of twenty-seven triremes under the command of Antisthenês,
having started from Cape Malea about the winter tropic or close of
412 B.C., had first crossed the sea to Melos, where it dispersed
ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them; then afterwards,
from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians would make known
its approach at Samos, had made a long circuit round by Krete, and
thus ultimately reached Kaunus at the southeastern extremity of
Asia Minor. This was the squadron which Kalligeitus and Timagoras
had caused to be equipped, having come over for that purpose a
year before as envoys from the satrap Pharnabazus. Antisthenês was
instructed first to get to Milêtus and put himself in concert with
the main Lacedæmonian fleet; next, to forward these triremes, or
another squadron of equal force under Klearchus, to the Hellespont,
for the purpose of coöperating with Pharnabazus against the Athenian
dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom was
Lichas, accompanied Antisthenês, to be attached to Astyochus as
advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lacedæmonians.
These men were not only directed to review the state of affairs at
Milêtus, and exercise control coördinate with Astyochus, but even
empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss that admiral himself, upon
whom the complaints of Pedaritus from Chios had cast suspicion; and
to appoint Antisthenês in his place.[600]
[600] Thucyd. viii, 39. Καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς, ἐς Μίλητον ἀφικομένους
~τῶν τε ἄλλων ξυνεπιμελεῖσθαι~, ᾗ μέλλει ἄριστα ἕξειν, etc.
No sooner had Astyochus learned at Milêtus the arrival of Antisthenês
at Kaunus, than he postponed all idea of lending aid to Chios, and
sailed immediately to secure his junction with the twenty-seven new
triremes as well as with the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage
southward he captured the city of Kôs, unfortified and half-ruined
by a recent earthquake, and then passed on to Knidus; where the
inhabitants strenuously urged him to go forward at once, even
without disembarking his men, in order that he might surprise an
Athenian squadron of twenty triremes under Charmînus; which had been
despatched from Samos, after the news received from Melos, in order
to attack and repel the squadron under Antisthenês. Charmînus, having
his station at Symê, was cruising near Rhodes and the Lykian coast,
to watch, though he had not been able to keep back, the Peloponnesian
fleet just arrived at Kaunus. In this position he was found by the
far more numerous fleet of Astyochus, the approach of which he did
not at all expect. But the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed
it, that Charmînus, seeing at first only a few ships apart from the
rest, mistook them for the smaller squadron of new-comers. Attacking
the triremes thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage,
disabling three and damaging several others. But presently the
dispersed vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round
him, so that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping,
first to the island called Teutlussa, next to Halikarnassus. He
did not effect his escape without the loss of six ships; while the
victorious Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island
of Symê, returned to Knidus, where the entire fleet, including
the twenty-seven triremes newly arrived, was now united.[601] The
Athenians in Samos—whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes
which will be explained in the ensuing chapter—had kept no watch on
the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Milêtus, and seem
to have been ignorant of its departure until they were apprized of
the defeat of Charmînus. They then sailed down to Symê, took up the
sails and rigging belonging to that squadron, which had been there
deposited, and then, after an attack upon Loryma, carried back their
whole fleet, probably including the remnant of the squadron of
Charmînus, to Samos.[602]
[601] Thucyd. viii, 42.
[602] Thucyd. viii, 43. This defeat of Charmînus is made the
subject of a jest by Aristophanês, Thesmophor. 810, with the note
of Paulmier.
Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus consisted of
ninety-four triremes, much superior in number to the Athenian, it
did not try to provoke any general action. The time of Lichas and
his brother commissioners was at first spent in negotiations with
Tissaphernês, who had joined them at Knidus, and against whom they
found a strong feeling of discontent prevalent in the fleet. That
satrap—now acting greatly under the advice of Alkibiadês, of which
also more in the coming chapter—had of late become slack in the
Peloponnesian cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen,
during the last weeks of their stay at Milêtus. He was at the same
time full of promises, paralyzing all their operations by assurances
that he was bringing up the vast fleet of Phenicia to their aid: but
in reality his object was, under fair appearances, merely to prolong
the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in the
midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissaphernês the
future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed displeasure
at his past conduct, but even protested against the two conventions
concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramenês, as being, both the one
and the other, a disgrace to the Hellenic name. By the express terms
of the former, and by the implications of the latter, not merely
all the islands of the Ægean, but even Thessaly and Bœotia, were
acknowledged as subject to Persia; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned
such conditions, would be merely imposing upon the Greeks a Persian
sceptre, instead of general freedom, for which she professed to be
struggling. Lichas, declaring that he would rather renounce all
prospect of Persian pay, than submit to such conditions, proposed
to negotiate for a fresh treaty upon other and better terms, a
proposition which Tissaphernês rejected with so much indignation as
to depart without settling anything.[603]
[603] Thucyd. viii, 43.
His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellors.
Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united in
Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated on
being able to get money to pay their men without Persian aid; and
an invitation, which they just now received from various powerful
men at Rhodes, tended to strengthen such confidence. The island of
Rhodes, inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in number as
well as distinguished for nautical skill, was at this time divided
between three separate city governments, as it had been at the epoch
of the Homeric Catalogue,—Lindus, Ialysus, and Kameirus; for the
city called Rhodes, formed by a coalescence of all these three,
dates only from two or three years after the period which we have
now reached. Invited by several of the wealthy men of the island,
the Peloponnesian fleet first attacked Kameirus, the population of
which, intimidated by a force of ninety-four triremes, and altogether
uninformed of their approach, abandoned their city, which had no
defences, and fled to the mountains.[604] All the three Rhodian
towns, destitute of fortifications, were partly persuaded, partly
frightened, into the step of revolting from Athens and allying
themselves with the Peloponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose
commanders were just now too busy with political intrigue to keep
due military watch, arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and
presently returned to the former island, leaving detachments at
Chalkê and Kôs to harass the Peloponnesians with desultory attacks.
[604] Thucyd. viii, 44. Οἱ δ’ ἐς τὴν Ῥόδον, ἐπικηρυκευομένων ἀπὸ
τῶν δυνατωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, τὴν γνώμην εἶχον πλεῖν, etc.
... Καὶ προσβαλόντες Καμείρῳ τῆς Ῥοδίας πρώτῃ, ναυσὶ τέσσαρσι
καὶ ἐνενήκοντα, ~ἐξεφόβησαν μὲν τοὺς πολλοὺς, οὐκ εἰδότας τὰ
πρασσόμενα~, καὶ ἔφυγον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀτειχίστου οὔσης τῆς
πόλεως, etc.
We have to remark here, as on former occasions of revolts among
the dependent allies of Athens, that the general population
of the allied city manifests no previous discontent, nor any
spontaneous disposition to revolt. The powerful men of the
island—those who, if the government was democratical, formed the
oligarchical minority, but who formed the government itself,
if oligarchical—conspire and bring in the Peloponnesian force,
unknown to the body of the citizens, and thus leave to the latter
no free choice. The real feeling towards Athens on the part of
the body of the citizens is one of simple acquiescence, with
little attachment on the one hand, yet no hatred, or sense of
practical suffering, on the other.
The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribution of
thirty-two talents, and adopted the island as the main station for
their fleet, instead of Milêtus. We can explain this change of place
by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphernês, and their
desire to be more out of his reach.[605] But what we cannot so easily
explain, is, that they remained on the island without any movement
or military action, and actually hauled their triremes ashore, for
the space of no less than eighty days; that is, from about the middle
of January to the end of March 411 B.C. While their powerful fleet
of ninety-four triremes, superior to that of Athens at Samos, was
thus lying idle, their allies in Chios were known to be suffering
severe and increasing distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid:[606]
moreover, the promise of sending to coöperate with Pharnabazus
against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont, remained
unperformed.[607] We may impute such extreme military slackness
mainly to the insidious policy of Tissaphernês, now playing a double
game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up intelligence with
the Peloponnesians at Rhodes, paralyzed their energies by assurances
that the Phenician fleet was actually on its way to aid them,
and insured the success of these intrigues by bribes distributed
personally among the generals and the trierarchs. Even Astyochus,
the general-in-chief, took his share in this corrupt bargain, against
which not one stood out except the Syracusan Hermokratês.[608] Such
prolonged inaction of the armament, at the moment of its greatest
force, was thus not simply the fruit of honest mistake, like the
tardiness of Nikias in Sicily, but proceeded from the dishonesty and
personal avidity of the Peloponnesian officers.
[605] Thucyd. viii, 44: compare c. 57.
[606] Thucyd. viii, 40-55.
[607] Thucyd. viii, 39.
[608] Thucyd. viii, 45. Suggestions of Alkibiadês to
Tissaphernês—Καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν πόλεων
ἐδίδασκεν ~ὥστε δόντα χρήματα αὐτὸν πεῖσαι~, ὥστε ~ξυγχωρῆσαι
ταῦτα ἑαυτῷ~, πλὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων· τούτων δὲ, Ἑρμοκράτης
ἠναντιοῦτο ~μόνος~ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ξύμπαντος ξυμμαχικοῦ.
About the bribes to Astyochus himself, see also c. 50.
I have noticed, on more than one previous occasion, the many
evidences which exist of the prevalence of personal corruption—even
in its coarsest form, that of direct bribery—among the leading Greeks
of all the cities, when acting individually. Of such evidences the
incident here recorded is not the least remarkable. Nor ought this
general fact ever to be forgotten by those who discuss the question
between oligarchy and democracy, as it stood in the Grecian world.
The confident pretensions put forth by the wealthy and oligarchical
Greeks to superior virtue, public as well as private,—and the quiet
repetition, by various writers modern and ancient, of the laudatory
epithets implying such assumed virtue,—are so far from being borne
out by history, that these individuals were perpetually ready as
statesmen to betray their countrymen, or as generals even to betray
the interests of their soldiers, for the purpose of acquiring money
themselves. Of course, it is not meant that this was true of all of
them; but it was true sufficiently often, to be reckoned upon as a
contingency more than probable. If, speaking on the average, the
leading men of a Grecian community were not above the commission
of political misdeeds thus palpable, and of a nature not to be
disguised even from themselves, far less would they be above the
vices, always more or less mingled with self-delusion, of pride,
power-seeking, party-antipathy or sympathy, love of ease, etc. And
if the community were to have any chance of guarantee against such
abuses, it could only be by full license of accusation against
delinquents, and certainty of trial before judges identified in
interest with the people themselves. Such were the securities
which the Grecian democracies, especially that of Athens, tried to
provide; in a manner not always wise, still less always effectual,
but assuredly justified, in the amplest manner, by the urgency and
prevalence of the evil. Yet in the common representations given of
Athenian affairs, this evil is overlooked or evaded; the precautions
taken against it are denounced as so many evidences of democratical
ill-temper and injustice; and the class of men, through whose
initiatory action alone such precautions were enforced, are held up
to scorn as demagogues and _sycophants_. Had these Peloponnesian
generals and trierarchs, who under the influence of bribes wasted two
important months in inaction, been Athenians, there might have been
some chance of their being tried and punished; though even at Athens
the chance of impunity to offenders, through powerful political
clubs and other sinister artifices, was much greater than it ought
to have been. So little is it consistent with the truth, however
often affirmed, that judicial accusation was too easy, and judicial
condemnation too frequent. When the judicial precautions provided
at Athens are looked at, as they ought to be, side by side with the
evil, they will be found imperfect, indeed, both in the scheme and in
the working, but certainly neither uncalled for nor over-severe.