FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY, DOWN TO THE
OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.
In the preceding chapter we followed to its melancholy close the
united armament of Nikias and Demosthenês, first in the harbor and
lastly in the neighborhood of Syracuse, towards the end of September,
413 B.C.
The first impression which we derive from the perusal of that
narrative is, sympathy for the parties directly concerned, chiefly
for the number of gallant Athenians who thus miserably perished,
partly also for the Syracusan victors, themselves a few months before
on the verge of apparent ruin. But the distant and collateral effects
of the catastrophe throughout Greece, were yet more momentous than
those within the island in which it occurred.
I have already mentioned that even at the moment when Demosthenês
with his powerful armament left Peiræus to go to Sicily, the
hostilities of the Peloponnesian confederacy against Athens herself
had been already recommenced. Not only was the Spartan king Agis
ravaging Attica, but the far more important step of fortifying
Dekeleia, for the abode of a permanent garrison, was in course of
completion. That fortress, having been begun about the middle of
March, was probably by the month of June in a situation to shelter
its garrison, which consisted of contingents periodically furnished,
and relieving each other alternately, from all the different states
of the confederacy, under the permanent command of king Agis himself.
And now began that incessant marauding of domiciliated
enemies—destined to last for nine years until the final capture
of Athens—partially contemplated even at the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war, and recently enforced, with full comprehension
of its disastrous effects, by the virulent antipathy of the exile
Alkibiadês.[529] The earlier invasions of Attica had been all
temporary, continuing for five or six weeks at the farthest, and
leaving the country in repose for the remainder of the year. But the
Athenians now underwent from henceforward the fatal experience of a
hostile garrison within fifteen miles of their city; an experience
peculiarly painful this summer, as well from its novelty as from
the extraordinary vigor which Agis displayed in his operations. His
excursions were so widely extended, that no part of Attica was secure
or could be rendered productive. Not only were all the sheep and
cattle destroyed, but the slaves too, especially the most valuable
slaves, or artisans, began to desert to Dekeleia in great numbers;
more than twenty thousand of them soon disappeared in this way.
So terrible a loss of income, both to proprietors of land and to
employers in the city, was farther aggravated by the increased cost
and difficulty of import from Eubœa. Provisions and cattle from that
island had previously come over land from Oropus, but as that road
was completely stopped by the garrison of Dekeleia, they were now of
necessity sent round Cape Sunium by sea; a transit more circuitous
and expensive, besides being open to attack from the enemy’s
privateers.[530] In the midst of such heavy privations, the demands
on citizens and metics for military duty were multiplied beyond
measure. The presence of the enemy at Dekeleia forced them to keep
watch day and night throughout their long extent of wall, comprising
both Athens and Peiræus: in the daytime the hoplites of the city
relieved each other on guard, but at night, nearly all of them were
either on the battlements or at the various military stations in
the city. Instead of a city, in fact, Athens was reduced to the
condition of something like a military post.[531] Moreover, the rich
citizens of the state, who served as horsemen, shared in the general
hardship; being called on for daily duty in order to restrain at
least, since they could not entirely prevent, the excursions of the
garrison of Dekeleia, their efficiency was, however, soon impaired by
the laming of their horses on the hard and stony soil.[532]
[529] Thucyd. i, 122-142; vi, 90.
[530] Thucyd. viii. 4. About the extensive ruin caused by the
Lacedæmonians to the olive-grounds in Attica, see Lysias, Or.
vii, De Oleâ Sacrâ, sects. 6, 7.
An inscription preserved in M. Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. (part ii,
No. 93, p. 132), gives some hint how landlords and tenants met
this inevitable damage from the hands of the invaders. The deme
Æxôneis lets a farm to a certain tenant for forty years, at a
fixed rent of one hundred and forty drachmæ; but if an invading
enemy shall drive him out or injure his farm, the deme is to
receive one half of the year’s produce, in place of the year’s
rent.
[531] Thucyd. vii, 28, 29.
[532] Thucyd. vii, 27.
Besides the personal efforts of the citizens, such exigencies
pressed heavily on the financial resources of the state. Already the
immense expense incurred in fitting out the two large armaments for
Sicily, had exhausted all the accumulations laid by in the treasury
during the interval since the Peace of Nikias; so that the attacks
from Dekeleia, not only imposing heavy additional cost, but at the
same time cutting up the means of paying, brought the finances of
Athens into positive embarrassment. With the view of increasing her
revenues, she altered the principle on which her subject-allies had
hitherto been assessed: instead of a fixed sum of annual tribute, she
now required from them payment of a duty of five per cent. on all
imports and exports by sea.[533] How this new principle of assessment
worked, we have unfortunately no information. To collect the duty and
take precautions against evasion, an Athenian custom-house officer
must have been required in each allied city. Yet it is difficult to
understand how Athens could have enforced a system at once novel,
extensive, vexatious, and more burdensome to the payers, when we
come to see how much her hold over those payers, as well as her
naval force, became enfeebled, before the close even of the actual
year.[534]
[533] Thucyd. vii, 28.
[534] Upon this new assessment on the allies, determined by the
Athenians, Mr. Mitford remarks as follows:—
“Thus light, in comparison of what we have laid upon ourselves,
was the heaviest tax, as far as we learn from history, at that
time known in the world. Yet it caused much discontent among the
dependent commonwealths; the arbitrary power by which it was
imposed being indeed reasonably execrated, though the burden
itself was comparatively a nothing.”
This admission is not easily reconciled with the frequent
invectives in which Mr. Mitford indulges against the empire
of Athens, as practising a system of extortion and oppression
ruinous to the subject-allies.
I do not know, however, on what authority he affirms that this
was “the heaviest tax then known in the world;” and that “it
caused much discontent among the subject commonwealths.” The
latter assertion would indeed be sufficiently probable, if it
be true that the tax ever came into operation; but we are not
entitled to affirm it.
Considering how very soon the terrible misfortunes of Athens came
on, I cannot but think it a matter of uncertainty whether the new
assessment ever became a reality throughout the Athenian empire.
And the fact that Thucydidês does not notice it as an additional
cause of discontent among the allies, is one reason for such
doubts.
Her impoverished finances also compelled her to dismiss a body of
Thracian mercenaries, whose aid would have been very useful against
the enemy at Dekeleia. These Thracian peltasts, thirteen hundred in
number, had been hired at a drachma per day each man, to go with
Demosthenês to Syracuse, but had not reached Athens in time. As soon
as they came thither, the Athenians placed them under the command
of Diitrephês, to conduct them back to their native country, with
instructions to do damage to the Bœotians, as opportunity might
occur, in his way through the Euripus. Accordingly, Diitrephês,
putting them on shipboard, sailed round Sunium and northward along
the eastern coast of Attica. After a short disembarkation near
Tanagra, he passed on to Chalkis in Eubœa in the narrowest part
of the strait, from whence he crossed in the night to the Bœotian
coast opposite, and marched up some distance from the sea to the
neighborhood of the Bœotian town Mykalêssus. He arrived here unseen,
lay in wait near a temple of Hermês about two miles distant, and fell
upon the town unexpectedly at break of day. To the Mykalessians,
dwelling in the centre of Bœotia, not far from Thebes, and at a
considerable distance from the sea, such an assault was not less
unexpected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble, in
some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even
taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the
barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest
difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The
scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to
Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses and even the temples
plundered, but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst
for blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living
thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle,
etc. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been
assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed
by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of
Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian
communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of second-rate or
third-rate magnitude.[535]
[535] Thucyd. vii, 29, 30, 31. I conceive that οὔσῃ ~οὐ~ μεγάλῃ
is the right reading, and not οὔσῃ μεγάλῃ, in reference to
Mykalêssus. The words ὡς ἐπὶ μεγέθει, in c. 31, refer to the size
of the city.
The reading is, however, disputed among critics. It is evident
from the language of Thucydidês that the catastrophe at
Mykalêssus made a profound impression throughout Greece.
The succor brought from Thebes, by Mykalessian fugitives, arrived
unhappily only in time to avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants.
The Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could
carry away, when the bœotarch Skirphondas overtook them, both
with cavalry and hoplites, after having put to death some greedy
plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to
relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore;
not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a
peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when
they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it
safe to approach very close, so that not less than two hundred and
fifty Thracians were slain before they could get aboard;[536] and the
Athenian commander, Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died
shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward.
[536] Thucyd. vii, 30; Pausanias. i, 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad
Aristophanis Fragment. Ἥρωες, vol. ii, p. 1069.
Meanwhile, the important station of Naupaktus and the mouth of
the Corinthian gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter.
It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable
victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year
of the Peloponnesian war,[537] wherein the nautical superiority
of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had
been so transcendently manifested. In that respect matters had now
considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since
the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston,
and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy
Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and
had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly,[538] at
Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, Phormion with
eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match
for twenty-five Corinthian; but the Athenian admiral of this year,
Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that
he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen
triremes with ten others,—out of the best of their fleet, at a
time when they had certainly none to spare,—on the ground that the
Corinthian fleet opposite, of twenty-five sail, was about to assume
the offensive against him.[539]
[537] See above, vol. vi, ch. xlix, p. 196 of this History.
[538] See the preceding chapter.
[539] Thucyd. vii, 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. 88,
89.
Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Konon, with some
fresh ships from Athens, which made the total number of triremes
thirty-three. The Corinthian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of
the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite
Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes.
They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of
the coast, or bay, in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting
promontories as horns: each of these promontories was occupied by a
friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both
flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to
sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it.
Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus,
it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither
party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was
destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and
feeble beaks, while it was favorable to the solid bows and thick
epôtids, or ear-projections, of the Corinthian trireme. After
considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on
their side, yet not advancing far enough out to sea to admit of the
manœuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some
time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three
Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of
all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian
side, not one trireme became absolutely water-logged, but seven
were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger
bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got
back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they
maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to
renew the fight: moreover, both the wind and the current set towards
the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies
came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself
entitled to erect a trophy, but the real feeling of victory lay on
the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The
reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties
to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been
the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it.[540]
[540] Thucyd. vii, 34.
This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out,
a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about
the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians
most anxiously expected news from that officer, with some account
of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent
him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at
home. Perhaps they may even have indulged hopes of the near capture
of Syracuse, as a means of restoring their crippled finances. Their
disappointment would be all the more bitter when they came to
receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches
announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon
Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse
could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt
whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would
not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding,
when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it.
They might possibly, however, write immediately on taking their
resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid
farther supplies of provisions, but this was the last practicable
opportunity; for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and
the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbor. The mere absence
of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in
Sicily were proceeding badly; but the closing series of calamities,
down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge
indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from
Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes, partly through individual
soldiers of their own armament who escaped.
According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at
Athens through a stranger, who, arriving at Peiræus, went into a
barber’s shop and began to converse about it, as upon a theme which
must of course be uppermost in every one’s mind.
The astonished barber, hearing for the first time such fearful
tidings, ran up to Athens to communicate it to the archons as well
as to the public in the market-place. The public assembly being
forthwith convoked, he was brought before it, and called upon to
produce his authority, which he was unable to do, as the stranger
had disappeared. He was consequently treated as a fabricator of
uncertified rumors for the disturbance of the public tranquillity,
and even put to the torture.[541] How much of this improbable tale
may be true, we cannot determine; but we may easily believe that
neutrals, passing from Corinth or Megara to Peiræus, were the
earliest communicants of the misfortunes of Nikias and Demosthenês
in Sicily during the months of July and August. Presently came
individual soldiers of the armament, who had got away from the
defeat and found a passage home; so that the bad news was but too
fully confirmed. But the Athenians were long before they could bring
themselves to believe, even upon the testimony of these fugitives,
how entire had been the destruction of their two splendid armaments,
without even a feeble remnant left to console them.[542]
[541] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 30. He gives the story without much
confidence, Ἀθηναίους δέ ~φασι~, etc.
[542] Thucyd. viii, 1.
As soon as the full extent of their loss was at length forced
upon their convictions, the city presented a scene of the deepest
affliction, dismay, and terror. Over and above the extent of private
mourning, from the loss of friends and relatives, which overspread
nearly the whole city, there prevailed utter despair as to the public
safety. Not merely was the empire of Athens apparently lost, but
Athens herself seemed utterly defenceless. Her treasury was empty,
her docks nearly destitute of triremes, the flower of her hoplites
as well as of her seamen had perished in Sicily without leaving their
like behind, and her maritime reputation was irretrievably damaged;
while her enemies, on the contrary, animated by feelings of exuberant
confidence and triumph, were farther strengthened by the accession
of their new Sicilian allies. In these melancholy months—October,
November, 413 B.C.—the Athenians expected nothing less than a
vigorous attack, both by land and sea, from the Peloponnesian and
Sicilian forces united, with the aid of their own revolted allies, an
attack which they knew themselves to be in no condition to repel.[543]
[543] Thucyd. viii, 1. Πάντα δὲ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς ἐλύπει, etc.
Amidst so gloomy a prospect, without one ray of hope to cheer them
on any side, it was but poor satisfaction to vent their displeasure
on the chief speakers who had recommended their recent disastrous
expedition, or on those prophets and reporters of oracles who had
promised them the divine blessing upon it.[544] After this first
burst both of grief and anger, however, they began gradually to look
their actual situation in the face; and the more energetic speakers
would doubtless administer the salutary lesson of reminding them
how much had been achieved by their forefathers, sixty-seven years
before, when the approach of Xerxes threatened them with dangers
not less overwhelming. Under the peril of the moment, the energy of
despair revived in their bosoms; they resolved to get together, as
speedily as they could, both ships and money,—to keep watch over
their allies, especially Eubœa,—and to defend themselves to the last.
A Board of ten elderly men, under the title of Probûli, was named
to review the expenditure, to suggest all practicable economies,
and propose for the future such measures as occasion might seem to
require. The propositions of these probûli were for the most part
adopted, with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in
an Athenian assembly, springing out of that pressure and alarm of
the moment which silenced all criticism.[545] Among other economies,
the Athenians abridged the costly splendor of their choric and
liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison
which they had established on the Laconian coast; they at the same
time collected timber, commenced the construction of new ships, and
fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their numerous transport
ships in the passage from Eubœa to Peiræus.[546]
[544] Thucyd. viii, 1. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἔγνωσαν, χαλεποὶ μὲν ἦσαν
τοῖς ξυμπροθυμηθεῖσι τῶν ῥητόρων τὸν ἔκπλουν, ~ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοὶ
ψηφισάμενοι~, etc.
From these latter words, it would seem that Thucydidês considered
the Athenians, after having adopted the expedition by their
votes, to have debarred themselves from the right of complaining
of those speakers who had stood forward prominently to advise the
step. I do not at all concur in his opinion. The adviser of any
important measure always makes himself morally responsible for
its justice, usefulness, and practicability; and he very properly
incurs disgrace, more or less according to the case, if it turns
out to present results totally contrary to those which he had
predicted. We know that the Athenian law often imposed upon the
mover of a proposition not merely _moral_, but even _legal_,
responsibility; a regulation of doubtful propriety under other
circumstances, but which I believe to have been useful at Athens.
It must be admitted, however, to have been hard upon the advisers
of this expedition, that—from the total destruction of the
armament, neither generals nor soldiers returning—they were not
enabled to show how much of the ruin had arisen from faults in
the execution, not in the plan conceived. The speaker in the
Oration of Lysias—περὶ δημεύσεως τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ (Or. xviii,
sect. 2)—attempts to transfer the blame from Nikias upon the
advisers of the expedition, a manifest injustice.
Demosthenês (in the Oration De Coronâ, c. 73) gives an emphatic
and noble statement of the responsibility which he cheerfully
accepts for himself as a political speaker and adviser;
responsibility for seeing the beginnings and understanding the
premonitory signs of coming events, and giving his countrymen
warning beforehand: ἰδεῖν τὰ πράγματα ἀρχόμενα καὶ προαισθέσθαι
καὶ προειπεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις. This is the just view of the subject;
and, applying the measure proposed by Demosthenês, the Athenians
had ample ground to be displeased with their orators.
[545] Thucyd. viii, 1. πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα περιδεὲς, ὅπερ
φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν; compare Xenoph. Mem.
iii, 5, 5.
[546] Thucyd. viii, 1-4. About the functions of this Board of
Probûli, much has been said for which there is no warrant in
Thucydidês: τῶν τε κατὰ τὴν πόλιν τι ἐς εὐτέλειαν σωφρονίσαι, καὶ
ἀρχήν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν ἑλέσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων
ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ᾖ προβουλεύσουσι. Πάντα δὲ πρὸς τὸ παραχρῆμα
περιδεὲς, ὅπερ φιλεῖ δῆμος ποιεῖν, ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐτακτεῖν.
Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “That is, no measure was to be
submitted to the people, till it had first been approved by
this council of elders.” And such is the general view of the
commentators.
No such meaning as this, however, is necessarily contained in
the word Πρόβουλοι. It is, indeed, conceivable that persons
so denominated might be invested with such a control; but we
cannot infer it, or affirm it, simply from the name. Nor will
the passages in Aristotle’s Politics, wherein the word Πρόβουλοι
occurs, authorize any inference with respect to this Board in the
special case of Athens (Aristotel. Politic. iv, 11, 9; iv, 12, 8;
vi, 5, 10-13).
The Board only seems to have lasted for a short time at Athens,
being named for a temporary purpose, at a moment of peculiar
pressure and discouragement. During such a state of feeling,
there was little necessity for throwing additional obstacles
in the way of new propositions to be made to the people. It
was rather of importance to _encourage_ the suggestion of new
measures, from men of sense and experience. A Board destined
merely for control and hindrance, would have been mischievous
instead of useful under the reigning melancholy at Athens.
The Board was doubtless merged in the Oligarchy of Four Hundred,
like all the other magistracies of the state, and was not
reconstituted after their deposition.
I cannot think it admissible to draw inferences as to the
functions of this Board of Probûli now constituted, from the
proceedings of the Probûlus in Aristophanis Lysistrata, as is
done by Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthumskunde, i, 2, p. 198),
and by Wattenbach (De Quadringentorum Athenis Factione, pp.
17-21, Berlin 1842).
Schömann (Ant. Jur. Pub. Græcor. v, xii, p. 181) says of these
Πρόβουλοι: “Videtur autem eorum potestas fere annua fuisse.” I do
not distinctly understand what he means by these words; whether
he means that the Board continued permanent, but that the members
were annually changed. If this be his meaning, I dissent from
it. I think that the Board lasted until the time of the Four
Hundred, which would be about a year and a half after its first
institution.
While Athens was thus struggling to make head against her
misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excitement and
aggressive scheming against her. So vast an event as the destruction
of this great armament had never happened since the expedition of
Xerxes against Greece. It not only roused the most distant cities
of the Grecian world, but also the Persian satraps and the court of
Susa. It stimulated the enemies of Athens to redoubled activity;
it emboldened her subject-allies to revolt; it pushed the neutral
states, who all feared what she would have done if successful against
Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and put the finishing
stroke to her power as well as to her ambition. All of them, enemies,
subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that the doom of Athens was
sealed, and that the coming spring would see her captured. Earlier
than the ensuing spring, the Lacedæmonians did not feel disposed
to act; but they sent round their instructions to the allies for
operations both by land and sea to be then commenced; all these
allies being prepared to do their best, in hopes that this effort
would be the last required from them, and the most richly rewarded.
A fleet of one hundred triremes was directed to be prepared against
the spring; fifty of these being imposed in equal proportion on
the Lacedæmonians themselves and the Bœotians; fifteen on Corinth;
fifteen on the Phocians and Lokrians; ten on the Arcadians, with
Pellênê and Sikyon; ten on Megara, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Hermionê.
It seems to have been considered that these ships might be built
and launched during the interval between September and March.[547]
The same large hopes, which had worked upon men’s minds at the
beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of the
Peloponnesians;[548] the rather as that powerful force from Sicily,
which they had then been disappointed in obtaining, might now be
anticipated with tolerable assurance as really forthcoming.[549]
[547] Thucyd. viii, 2, 3. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ τὴν πρόσταξιν ταῖς
πόλεσιν ἑκατὸν νεῶν ~τῆς ναυπηγίας~ ἐποιοῦντο, etc.; compare also
c. 4—παρεσκευάζοντο τὴν ~ναυπηγίαν~, etc.
[548] Thucyd. viii, 5. ὄντων οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ὥσπερ ἀρχομένων ἐν
κατασκευῇ τοῦ πολέμου: compare ii, 7.
[549] Thucyd. viii, 2: compare ii, 7; iii, 86.
From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted for the
intended fleet by Agis, who moved about during this autumn with a
portion of the garrison of Dekeleia. In the course of his circuit, he
visited the town of Herakleia, near the Maliac gulf, and levied large
contributions on the neighboring Œtæans, in reprisal for the plunder
which they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot
Achæans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter
vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.[550]
[550] Thucyd. viii, 3.
It was during the march of Agis through Bœotia that the inhabitants
of Eubœa—probably of Chalkis and Eretria—applied to him, entreating
his aid to enable them to revolt from Athens; which he readily
promised, sending for Alkamenês at the head of three hundred
Neodamode hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the
island as harmost. Having a force permanently at his disposal, with
full liberty of military action, the Spartan king at Dekeleia was
more influential even than the authorities at home, so that the
disaffected allies of Athens addressed themselves in preference to
him. It was not long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this
purpose. So powerfully was their claim enforced by the Bœotians
(their kinsmen of the Æolic race), who engaged to furnish ten
triremes for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others, that he
was induced to postpone his promise to the Eubœans, and to direct
Alkamenês as harmost to Lesbos instead of Eubœa,[551] without at all
consulting the authorities at Sparta.
[551] Thucyd. viii, 5.
The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubœa, especially the latter,
was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But this was not the
worst. At the same time that these two islands were negotiating with
Agis, envoys from Chios, the first and most powerful of all Athenian
allies, had gone to Sparta for the same purpose. The government of
Chios,—an oligarchy, but distinguished for its prudent management and
caution in avoiding risks,—considering Athens to be now on the verge
of ruin, even in the estimation of the Athenians themselves, thought
itself safe, together with the opposite city of Erythræ, in taking
measures for achieving independence.[552]
[552] Thucyd. viii, 7-24.
Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was
sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the point of being
assailed by other enemies yet more unexpected, the two Persian
satraps of the Asiatic seaboard, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. No
sooner was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the court
of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these two satraps the
tribute due from the Asiatic Greeks on the coast; for which they
had always stood enrolled in the tribute records, though it had
never been actually levied since the complete establishment of the
Athenian empire. The only way to realize this tribute, for which the
satraps were thus made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens,
and break up her empire;[553] for which purpose Tissaphernes sent
an envoy to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and
Erythræans. He invited the Lacedæmonians to conclude an alliance with
the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian empire in
Asia; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for any forces which
they might send, at the rate of one drachma per day for each man
of the ship’s crews.[554] He farther hoped by means of this aid to
reduce Amorgês the revolted son of the late satrap Pissuthnês, who
was established in the strong maritime town of Iasus, with a Grecian
mercenary force and a considerable treasure, and was in alliance
with Athens. The Great King had sent down a peremptory mandate, that
Amorgês should be either brought prisoner to Susa or slain.
[553] Thucyd. viii, 5. Ὑπὸ βασιλέως γὰρ ~νεωστὶ~ ἐτύγχανε
πεπραγμένος (Tissaphernes) τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὓς
δι’ Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράσσεσθαι
ἐπωφείλησε. Τούς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομιεῖσθαι κακώσας
τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, etc.
I have already discussed this important passage at some length,
in its bearing upon the treaty concluded thirty-seven years
before this time between Athens and Persia. See the note to
volume v, chap. xlv, pp. 337-339, of this History.
[554] Thucyd. viii, 29. Καὶ μηνὸς μὲν τροφήν, ~ὥσπερ ὑπέστη ἐν
τῇ Λακεδαίμονι~, ἐς δραχμὴν Ἀττικὴν ἑκάστῳ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ
διέδωκε, τοῦ δὲ λοιποῦ χρόνου ἐβούλετο τριώβολον διδόναι, etc.
At the same moment, though without any concert, there arrived at
Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras, two Grecian exiles in the service
of Pharnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar character from
that satrap, whose government[555] comprehended the coast lands north
of Æolis, from the Euxine and Propontis, to the northeast corner of
the Elæatic gulf. Eager to have the assistance of a Lacedæmonian
fleet in order to detach the Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and
realize the tribute required by the court of Susa, Pharnabazus was at
the same time desirous of forestalling Tissaphernes as the medium of
alliance between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having
thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose
between them, one striving to attract the projected expedition to
Chios, the other to the Hellespont:[556] for which latter purpose,
Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered as a
first payment in part.
[555] The satrapy of Tissaphernes extended as far north as
Antandrus and Adramyttium (Thucyd. viii, 108).
[556] Thucyd. viii, 6.
From all quarters, new enemies were thus springing up against Athens
in the hour of her distress, and the Lacedæmonians had only to
choose which they would prefer; a choice in which they were much
guided by the exile Alkibiadês. It so happened that his family
friend Endius was at this moment one of the board of ephors; while
his personal enemy king Agis, with whose wife Timæa he carried on
an intrigue,[557] was absent in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well
the great power and importance of Chios, Alkibiadês strenuously
exhorted the Spartan authorities to devote their first attention to
that island. A periœkus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine
whether the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcoming,
brought back a satisfactory report, that the Chian fleet was not less
than sixty triremes strong: upon which the Lacedæmonians concluded
an alliance with Chios and Erythræ, engaging to send a fleet of
forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now ready in the
Lacedæmonian ports—probably at Gythium—were directed immediately
to sail to Chios, under the admiral Melanchridas. It seems to have
been now midwinter; but Alkibiadês, and still more the Chian envoys,
insisted on the necessity of prompt action, for fear that the
Athenians should detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just
then intervening, was construed by the Spartans as an index of divine
displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the
same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to supersede
Melanchridas, while five new ships were directed to be equipped, so
as to be ready to sail in the early spring along with the larger
fleet from Corinth.[558]
[557] Thucyd. viii, 6-12; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23, 24;
Cornelius Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 3.
[558] Thucyd. viii, 6.
As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were sent
to Corinth—in compliance with the pressing instances of the Chian
envoys—to transport across the isthmus from the Corinthian to the
Saronic gulf, the thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of
Lechæum. It was at first proposed to send off all, at one and the
same time, to Chios, even those which Agis had been equipping for the
assistance of Lesbos; although Kalligeitus declined any concern with
Chios, and refused to contribute for this purpose any of the money
which he had brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies
was held at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence
of Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus;
next, to Lesbos, under Alkamenês; lastly, to the Hellespont, under
Klearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the fleet, and bring
across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine, so as to distract
the attention of Athens, and divide her means of resistance. So low
was the estimate formed of these means, that the Lacedæmonians did
not scruple to despatch their expedition openly from the Saronic
gulf, where the Athenians would have full knowledge both of its
numbers and of its movements.[559]
[559] Thucyd. viii, 8.
Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought across
to Kenchreæ, when a fresh delay arose to obstruct their departure.
The Isthmian festival, celebrated every alternate year, and kept
especially holy by the Corinthians, was just approaching; nor would
they consent to begin any military operations until it was concluded,
though Agis tried to elude their scruples by offering to adopt the
intended expedition as his own. It was during the delay which thus
ensued that the Athenians were first led to conceive suspicions about
Chios, whither they despatched Aristokratês, one of the generals of
the year. The Chian authorities strenuously denied all projects of
revolt, and being required by Aristokratês to furnish some evidence
of their good faith, sent back along with him seven triremes to the
aid of Athens. It was much against their own will that they were
compelled thus to act; but they knew that the Chian people were in
general averse to the idea of revolting from Athens, nor did they
feel confidence enough to proclaim their secret designs without some
manifestation of support from Peloponnesus, which had been so much
delayed that they knew not when it would arrive. The Athenians, in
their present state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept
insufficient assurances, for fear of driving this powerful island to
open revolt. But during the Isthmian festival, to which they were
invited along with other Greeks, they discovered farther evidences
of the plot which was going on, and resolved to keep strict watch
on the motions of the fleet now assembled at Kenchreæ, suspecting
that this squadron was intended to second the revolting party in
Chios.[560]
[560] Thucyd. viii, 10. Ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τὰ Ἴσθμια ἐγένετο· καὶ οἱ
Ἀθηναῖοι (ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ) ἐθεώρουν ἐς αὐτά· καὶ κατάδηλα μᾶλλον
αὐτοῖς τὰ τῶν Χίων ἐφάνη.
The language of Thucydidês in this passage deserves notice. The
Athenians were now at enmity with Corinth: it was therefore
remarkable, and contrary to what would be expected among Greeks,
that they should be present with their theôry, or solemn
sacrifice, at the Isthmian festival. Accordingly Thucydidês, when
he mentions that they went thither, thinks it right to add the
explanation—~ἐπηγγέλθησαν γὰρ~—“for they had been invited;” “for
the festival truce had been formally signified to them.” That
the heralds who proclaimed the truce should come and proclaim it
to a state in hostility with Corinth, was something unusual, and
merited special notice: otherwise, Thucydidês would never have
thought it worth while to mention the proclamation, it being the
uniform practice.
We must recollect that this was the first Isthmian festival
which had taken place since the resumption of the war between
Athens and the Peloponnesian alliance. The habit of leaving out
Athens from the Corinthian herald’s proclamation had not yet been
renewed. In regard to the Isthmian festival, there was probably
greater reluctance to leave her out, because that festival was
in its origin half Athenian; said to have been established, or
revived after interruption, by Theseus; and the Athenian theôry
enjoyed a προεδρία, or privileged place, at the games (Plutarch,
Theseus, c. 25; Argument. ad Pindar. Isthm. Schol.).
Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually started
from Kenchreæ to Chios, under Alkamenês; but an equal number of
Athenian ships watched them as they sailed along the shore, and
tried to tempt them farther out to sea, with a view to fight them.
Alkamenês, however, desirous of avoiding a battle, thought it best
to return back; upon which the Athenians also returned to Peiræus,
mistrusting the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed
part of their fleet. Reappearing presently with a larger squadron of
thirty-seven triremes, they pursued Alkamenês, who had again begun
his voyage along the shore southward, and attacked him near the
uninhabited harbor called Peiræum, on the frontiers of Corinth and
Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his ships,
and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alkamenês himself
was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where on the morrow the
Peloponnesian land-force arrived in sufficient numbers to defend
them. So inconvenient, however, was their station on this desert
spot, that they at first determined to burn the vessels and depart.
Nor was it without difficulty that they were induced, partly by the
instances of king Agis, to guard the ships until an opportunity could
be found for eluding the blockading Athenian fleet; a part of which
still kept watch off the shore, while the rest were stationed at a
neighboring islet.[561]
[561] Thucyd. viii, 11.
The Spartan ephors had directed Alkamenês, at the moment of his
departure from Kenchræa, to despatch a messenger to Sparta, in order
that the five triremes under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês might leave
Laconia at the same moment. And these latter appear to have been
actually under way, when a second messenger brought the news of the
defeat and death of Alkamenês at Peiræum. Besides the discouragement
arising from such a check at the outset of their plans against Ionia,
the ephors thought it impossible to begin operations with so small a
squadron as five triremes, so that the departure of Chalkideus was
for the present countermanded. This resolution, perfectly natural to
adopt, was only reversed at the strenuous instance of the Athenian
exile Alkibiadês, who urged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to
start forthwith. Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach
Chios before the defeat at Peiræum became public, it might be passed
off as the precursor of the main fleet; while he (Alkibiadês) pledged
himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities,
through his personal connection with the leading men, who would
repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens, as
well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand by them. To
these arguments, Alkibiadês added an appeal to the personal vanity
of Endius; whom he instigated to assume for himself the glory of
liberating Ionia as well as of first commencing the Persian alliance,
instead of leaving this enterprise to king Agis.[562]
[562] Thucyd. viii, 12.
By these arguments—assisted doubtless by his personal influence,
since his advice respecting Gylippus and respecting Dekeleia had
turned out so successful—Alkibiadês obtained the consent of the
Spartan ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the five
triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy and ascendency could
have extorted from men both dull and backward, a determination
apparently so rash, yet, in spite of such appearance, admirably
conceived, and of the highest importance. Had the Chians waited for
the fleet now blocked up at Peiræum, their revolt would at least have
been long delayed, and perhaps might not have occurred at all: the
accomplishment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadês
was the proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and
was ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peiræum, by
distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this unprincipled
exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where to inflict the
dangerous wounds upon his country!
There was, indeed, little danger in crossing the Ægean to Ionia,
with ever so small a squadron; for Athens in her present destitute
condition had no fleet there, and although Strombichidês was detached
with eight triremes from the blockading fleet off Peiræum, to pursue
Chalkideus and Alkibiadês as soon as their departure was known, he
was far behind them, and soon returned without success. To keep their
voyage secret, they detained the boats and vessels which they met,
and did not liberate them, until they reached Korykus in Asia Minor,
the mountainous land southward of Erythræ. They were here visited by
their leading partisans from Chios, who urged them to sail thither
at once before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly,
they reached the town of Chios—on the eastern coast of the island,
immediately opposite to Erythræ on the continent—to the astonishment
and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters who had
invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the council was
found just assembling, so that Alkibiadês was admitted without
delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing all mention of
the defeat at Peiræum, he represented his squadron as the foremost
of a large Lacedæmonian fleet actually at sea and approaching,
and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as well as by land,
incapable of maintaining any farther hold upon her allies. Under
these impressions, and while the population were yet under their
first impulse of surprise and alarm, the oligarchical council took
the resolution of revolting. The example was followed by Erythræ,
and soon afterwards by Klazomenæ, determined by three triremes from
Chios. The Klazomenians had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the
continent; on which latter, however, a portion of their town, called
Polichnê, was situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of
attack from Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the
Chians and Erythræans also actively employed themselves in fortifying
their towns and preparing for war.[563]
[563] Thucyd. viii, 14.
In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find occasion
to repeat remarks already suggested by previous revolts of other
allies of Athens,—Lesbos, Akanthus, Torônê, Mendê, Amphipolis,
etc. Contrary to what is commonly intimated by historians, we may
observe first, that Athens did not systematically interfere to
impose her own democratical government upon her allies; next, that
the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly by an established belief
in her superior force, was nevertheless by no means odious, nor
the proposition of revolting from her acceptable to the general
population of her allies. She had at this moment no force in Ionia;
and the oligarchical government of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only
prevented from openly declaring its intention by the reluctance of
its own population, a reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise
arising from the sudden arrival of Alkibiadês and Chalkideus, partly
by the fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponnesian force
approaching.[564] Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselves have
determined to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now
the safer course, inasmuch as Athens was now ruined, and her power
to protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.[565] The
envoys of Tissaphernês had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta, so
that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of Athens
had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pretensions of
their former foreign master, against whom Athens had protected them
for the last fifty years. We may well doubt, therefore, whether
this prudent government looked upon the change as on the whole
advantageous. But they had no motive to stand by Athens in her
misfortunes, and good policy seemed now to advise a timely union with
Sparta as the preponderant force. The sentiment entertained towards
Athens by her allies, as I have before observed, was more negative
than positive. It was favorable rather than otherwise, in the minds
of the general population, to whom she caused little actual hardship
or oppression; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their
leading men, since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love
of town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.
[564] Thucyd. viii, 9. Αἴτιον δ’ ἐγένετο τῆς ἀποστολῆς τῶν νεῶν,
~οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν Χίων οὐκ εἰδότες τὰ πρασσόμενα~, οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι
ξυνειδότες, ~τό τε πλῆθος οὐ βουλόμενοί πω πολέμιον ἔχειν~,
πρίν τι καὶ ἰσχυρὸν λάβωσι, καὶ τοὺς Πελοποννησίους οὐκέτι
προσδεχόμενοι ἥξειν, ὅτι διέτριβον.
Also viii, 14. Ὁ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης καὶ ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς ...
προξυγγενόμενοι τῶν ξυμπρασσόντων Χίων τισὶ, καὶ κελευόντων
καταπλεῖν μὴ προειπόντας ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἀφικνοῦνται αἰφνίδιοι τοῖς
Χίοις. ~Καὶ οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ ἐν θαύματι ἦσαν καὶ ἐκπλήξει· τοῖς δ’
ὀλίγοις παρεσκεύαστο~ ὥστε βουλήν τε τυχεῖν ξυλλεγομένην, καὶ
γενομένων λόγων ἀπό τε τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου, ὡς ἄλλαι τε νῆες πολλαὶ
προσπλέουσι, καὶ τὰ περὶ τῆς πολιορκίας τῶν ἐν Πειραίῳ νεῶν οὐ
δηλωσάντων, ἀφίστανται Χῖοι, καὶ αὖθις Ἐρυθραῖοι, Ἀθηναίων.
[565] See the remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 24, about the
calculations of the Chian government.
The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at Athens
with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom, as well as the heaviest
aggravation, of their fallen condition; especially as there was every
reason to apprehend that the example of this first and greatest
among the allies would be soon followed by the rest. The Athenians
had no fleet or force even to attempt its reconquest: but they now
felt the full importance of that reserve of one thousand talents,
which Perikles had set aside in the first year of the war against
the special emergency of a hostile fleet approaching Peiræus. The
penalty of death had been decreed against any one who should propose
to devote this fund to any other purpose; and, in spite of severe
financial pressure, it had remained untouched for twenty years.
Now, however, though the special contingency foreseen had not yet
arisen, matters were come to such an extremity, that the only chance
of saving the remaining empire was by the appropriation of this
money. An unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal
enactment, or standing order, against proposing any other mode of
appropriation; after which the resolution was taken to devote this
money to present necessities.[566]
[566] Thucyd. viii, 15.
By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and
equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready in their harbor,
and thus to spare a portion from their blockading fleet off Peiræum;
out of which Strombichidês with his squadron of eight triremes was
despatched immediately to Ionia; followed, after a short interval,
by Thrasyklês, with twelve others. At the same time, the seven
Chian triremes which also formed part of this fleet, were cleared
of their crews; among whom such as were slaves were liberated,
while the freemen were put in custody. Besides fitting out an equal
number of fresh ships to keep up the numbers of the blockading
fleet, the Athenians worked with the utmost ardor to get ready
thirty additional triremes. The extreme exigency of the situation,
since Chios had revolted, was felt by every one: yet with all their
efforts, the force which they were enabled to send was at first
lamentably inadequate. Strombichidês, arriving at Samos, and finding
Chios, Erythræ, and Klazomenæ already in revolt, reinforced his
little squadron with one Samian trireme, and sailed to Teos,—on the
continent, at the southern coast of that isthmus, of which Klazomenæ
is on the northern,—in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not
been long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three
triremes, all or mostly Chian; while the forces of Erythræ and
Klazomenæ approached by land. Strombichidês was obliged to make a
hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian fleet. Upon
this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the superiority of the enemy,
the Teians admitted into their town the land-force without; by the
help of which, they now demolished the wall formerly built by Athens
to protect the city against attack from the interior. Some of the
troops of Tissaphernês lending their aid in the demolition, the town
was laid altogether open to the satrap; who, moreover, came himself
shortly afterwards to complete the work.[567]
[567] Thucyd. viii, 16.
Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian government were
prompted by considerations of their own safety to instigate revolt in
all other Athenian dependencies; and Alkibiadês now took advantage
of their forwardness in the cause to make an attempt on Milêtus.
He was eager to acquire this important city, the first among all
the continental allies of Athens, by his own resources and those
of Chios, before the fleet could arrive from Peiræum; in order
that the glory of the exploit might be insured to Endius, and not
to Agis. Accordingly, he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of
twenty-five triremes, twenty of them Chian, together with the five
which they themselves had brought from Laconia: these last five had
been remanned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having been
armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Conducting
his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate enough to pass
unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos, where Strombichidês had
just been reinforced by Thrasyklês with the twelve fresh triremes
from the blockading fleet at Peiræum. Arriving at Milêtus, where he
possessed established connections among the leading men, and had
already laid his train, as at Chios, for revolt, Alkibiadês prevailed
on them to break with Athens forthwith: so that when Strombichidês
and Thrasyklês, who came in pursuit the moment they learned his
movements, approached, they found the port shut against them, and
were forced to take up a station on the neighboring island of Ladê.
So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiadês in this
enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the
Asiatic coast as far as Anæa, opposite to Samos, in order to hear
the result and to render aid if required. A message from Chalkideus
apprized them that he was master of Milêtus, and that Amorgês, the
Persian ally of Athens at Iasus, was on his way at the head of an
army; upon which they returned to Chios, but were unexpectedly seen
in the way—off the temple of Zeus, between Lebedos and Kolophon—and
pursued, by sixteen fresh ships just arrived from Athens, under the
command of Diomedon. Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at
Ephesus, and five at Teos: the remaining four were obliged to run
ashore and became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite
of this check, however, the Chians came out again with fresh ships
and some land-forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back
to Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Eræ from
Athens.[568]
[568] Thucyd. viii, 17-19.
It was at Milêtus, immediately after the revolt, that the first
treaty was concluded between Tissaphernês, on behalf of himself and
the Great King, and Chalkideus, for Sparta and her allies. Probably
the aid of Tissaphernês was considered necessary to maintain the
town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so closely on the
neighboring island: at least it is difficult to explain otherwise an
agreement so eminently dishonorable as well as disadvantageous to the
Greeks:—
“The Lacedæmonians and their allies have concluded alliance with the
Great King and Tissaphernês, on the following conditions: The king
shall possess whatever territories and cities he himself had, or his
predecessors had before him. The king, and the Lacedæmonians with
their allies, shall jointly hinder the Athenians from deriving either
money or other advantages from all those cities which have hitherto
furnished to them any such. They shall jointly carry on war against
the Athenians, and shall not renounce the war against them, except by
joint consent. Whoever shall revolt from the king, shall be treated
as an enemy by the Lacedæmonians and their allies; whoever shall
revolt from the Lacedæmonians, shall in like manner be treated as an
enemy by the king.”[569]
[569] Thucyd. viii, 18.
As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Milêtus was handed
over to Tissaphernês, who immediately caused a citadel to be erected
and placed a garrison within it.[570] If fully carried out, indeed,
the terms of the treaty would have made the Great King master not
only of all the Asiatic Greeks and all the islanders in the Ægean,
but also of all Thessaly and Bœotia, and the full ground which had
once been covered by Xerxes.[571] Besides this monstrous stipulation,
the treaty farther bound the Lacedæmonians to aid the king in keeping
enslaved any Greeks who might be under his dominion. Nor did it,
on the other hand, secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for
the payment of their armament, which was their great motive for
courting his alliance. We shall find the Lacedæmonian authorities
themselves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of
its exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence of
the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and insular
Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken up, the
revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master; whom nothing
had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years, except Athens,
first as representative and executive agent, next as successor and
mistress, of the confederacy of Delos. We thus see against what evils
Athens had hitherto protected them: we shall presently see, what is
partially disclosed in this very treaty, the manner in which Sparta
realized her promise of conferring autonomy on each separate Grecian
state.
[570] Thucyd. viii, 84-109.
[571] Thucyd. viii, 44.
The great stress of the war had now been transferred to Ionia
and the Asiatic side of the Ægean sea. The enemies of Athens had
anticipated that her entire empire in that quarter would fall an
easy prey: yet in spite of two such serious defections as Chios and
Milêtus, she showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the
remainder. Her great and capital station, from the present time to
the end of the war, was Samos; and a revolution which now happened,
insuring the fidelity of that island to her alliance, was a condition
indispensable to her power of maintaining the struggle in Ionia.