Miserable as the condition of the city was generally, yet more

miserable was that of the prisoners confined; and worse, in every

way, was still to be looked for, since the Athenians would know

neither peace nor patience until they could reach, by some means

or other, the names of the undisclosed conspirators. The female

relatives and children of Andokidês, and his companions, were by

permission along with them in the prison,[300] aggravating by their

tears and wailings the affliction of the scene, when Charmidês, one

of the parties confined, addressed himself to Andokidês, as his

cousin and friend, imploring him to make a voluntary disclosure of

all that he knew, in order to preserve the lives of so many innocent

persons, his immediate kinsmen, as well as to rescue the city out

of a feverish alarm not to be endured. “You know (he said) all that

passed about the mutilation of the Hermæ, and your silence will now

bring destruction not only upon yourself, but also upon your father

and upon all of us; while if you inform, whether you have been an

actor in the scene or not, you will obtain impunity for yourself

and us, and at the same time soothe the terrors of the city.” Such

instances on the part of Charmidês,[301] aided by the supplications

of the other prisoners present, overcame the reluctance of Andokidês

to become informer, and he next day made his disclosures to the

senate. “Euphilêtus (he said) was the chief author of the mutilation

of the Hermæ. He proposed the deed at a convivial party where I was

present, but I denounced it in the strongest manner and refused all

compliance. Presently, I broke my collar-bone, and injured my head,

by a fall from a young horse, so badly as to be confined to my bed;

when Euphilêtus took the opportunity of my absence to assure the rest

of the company falsely that I had consented, and that I had agreed

to cut the Hermes near my paternal house, which the tribe Ægeïs

have dedicated. Accordingly, they executed the project, while I was

incapable of moving, without my knowledge: they presumed that _I_

would undertake the mutilation of this particular Hermes, and you see

that this is the only one in all Athens which has escaped injury.

When the conspirators ascertained that I had not been a party,

Euphilêtus and Melêtus threatened me with a terrible revenge unless I

observed silence: to which I replied that it was not I, but their own

crime, which had brought them into danger.”

[300] Andokid. de Myst. sect. 48: compare Lysias, Orat. xiii,

cont. Agorat. sect. 42.

[301] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 21) states that the person who thus

addressed himself to, and persuaded Andokidês, was named Timæus.

From whom he got the latter name, we do not know.

Having recounted this tale, in substance, to the senate, Andokidês

tendered his slaves, both male and female, to be tortured, in

order that they might confirm his story that he was in his bed and

unable to leave it, on the night when the Hermæ were mutilated.

It appears that the torture was actually applied (according to

the custom so cruelly frequent at Athens in the case of slaves),

and that the senators thus became satisfied of the truth of what

Andokidês affirmed. He delivered in twenty-two names of citizens as

having been the mutilators of the Hermæ: eighteen of these names,

including Euphilêtus and Melêtus, had already been specified in the

information of Teukrus; the remaining four, were Panætius, Diakritus,

Lysistratus, and Chæredêmus; all of whom fled, the instant their

names were mentioned, without waiting the chance of being seized.

As soon as the senate heard the story of Andokidês, they proceeded

to question Diokleidês over again; who confessed that he had given

a false deposition, and begged for mercy, mentioning Alkibiadês

the Phegusian—a relative of the commander in Sicily—and Amiantus,

as having suborned him to the crime. Both of them fled immediately

on this revelation; but Diokleidês was detained, sent before the

dikastery for trial, and put to death.[302]

[302] The narrative, which I have here given in substance, is to

be found in Andokid. de Myst. sects. 48-66.

The foregoing is the story which Andokidês, in the oration De

Mysteriis, delivered between fifteen and twenty years afterwards,

represented himself to have communicated to the senate at this

perilous crisis. But it probably is not the story which he really

did tell, certainly not that which his enemies represented him as

having told: least of all does it communicate the whole truth, or

afford any satisfaction to such anxiety and alarm as are described to

have been prevalent at the time. Nor does it accord with the brief

information of Thucydidês, who tells us that Andokidês impeached

himself, along with others, as participant in the mutilation.[303]

Among the accomplices against whom he informed, his enemies affirmed

that his own nearest relatives were included, though this latter

statement is denied by himself. We may be sure, therefore, that the

tale which Andokidês really told was something very different from

what now stands in his oration. But what it really was we cannot make

out; nor should we gain much even if it could be made out, since

even at the time, neither Thucydidês nor other intelligent critics

could determine how far it was true. The mutilation of the Hermæ

remained to them always an unexplained mystery; though they accounted

Andokidês the principal organizer.[304]

[303] Thucyd. vi, 60. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ~αὐτός τε καθ’ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ κατ’

ἄλλων~ μηνύει τὸ τῶν Ἑρμῶν, etc.

To the same effect, see the hostile oration of Lysias contra

Andocidem, Or. vi, sects. 36, 37, 51: also Andokidês himself, De

Mysteriis, sect. 71; De Reditu, sect. 7.

If we may believe the Pseudo-Plutarch (Vit. x, Orator, p. 834),

Andokidês had on a previous occasion been guilty of drunken

irregularity and damaging a statue.

[304] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἐνταῦθα ἀναπείθεται ~εἷς τῶν δεδεμένων,

ὅσπερ ἐδόκει αἰτιώτατος εἶναι~, ὑπὸ τῶν ξυνδεσμωτῶν τινὸς, εἴτε

ἄρα καὶ τὰ ὄντα μηνῦσαι, εἴτε καὶ οὔ· ἐπ’ ἀμφότερα γὰρ εἰκάζεται·

τὸ δὲ σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οὔτε τότε οὔτε ὕστερον ἔχει εἰπεῖν περὶ τῶν

δρασάντων τὸ ἔργον.

If the statement of Andokidês in the Oratio de Mysteriis is

correct, the deposition previously given by Teukrus the metic

must have been a true one; though this man is commonly denounced

among the lying witnesses (see the words of the comic writer

Phrynichus ap. Plutarch, Alkib. c. 20).

Thucydidês refuses even to mention the name of Andokidês, and

expresses himself with more than usual reserve about this dark

transaction, as if he were afraid of giving offence to great

Athenian families. The bitter feuds which it left behind at

Athens, for years afterwards, are shown in the two orations

of Lysias and of Andokidês. If the story of Didymus be true,

that Thucydidês after his return from exile to Athens died by a

violent death (see Biogr. Thucyd. p. xvii. ed. Arnold), it would

seem probable that all his reserve did not protect him against

private enmities arising out of his historical assertions.

That which is at once most important and most incontestable, is the

effect produced by the revelations of Andokidês, true or false, on

the public mind at Athens. He was a young man of rank and wealth

in the city, belonging to the sacred family of the Kerykes,—said

to trace his pedigree to the hero Odysseus,—and invested on a

previous occasion with an important naval command; whereas the

preceding informers had been metics and slaves. Moreover, he was

making confession of his own guilt. Hence the people received his

communications with implicit confidence. They were delighted to

have got to the bottom of the terrible mystery: and the public mind

subsided from its furious terrors into comparative tranquillity.

The citizens again began to think themselves in safety and to

resume their habitual confidence in each other, while the hoplites

everywhere on guard were allowed to return to their homes.[305] All

the prisoners in custody on suspicion, except those against whom

Andokidês informed were forthwith released: those who had fled out

of apprehension, were allowed to return; while those whom he named

as guilty, were tried, convicted, and put to death. Such of them as

had already fled, were condemned to death in their absence, and a

reward offered for their heads.[306] And though discerning men were

not satisfied with the evidence upon which these sentences were

pronounced, yet the general public fully believed themselves to have

punished the real offenders, and were thus inexpressibly relieved

from the depressing sense of unexpiated insult to the gods, as well

as of danger to their political constitution from the withdrawal

of divine protection.[307] Andokidês himself was pardoned, and was

for the time an object, apparently, even of public gratitude, so

that his father Leogoras who had been among the parties imprisoned,

ventured to indict a senator named Speusippus for illegal proceedings

towards him, and obtained an almost unanimous verdict from the

dikastery.[308] But the character of a statue-breaker and an informer

could never be otherwise than odious at Athens. Andokidês was either

banished by the indirect effect of a general disqualifying decree; or

at least found that he had made so many enemies, and incurred so much

obloquy, by his conduct in this affair, as to make it necessary for

him to quit the city. He remained in banishment for many years, and

seems never to have got clear of the hatred which his conduct in this

nefarious proceeding so well merited.[309]

[305] Thucyd. vi, 60. Ὁ δὲ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄσμενος λαβὼν, ὡς

ᾤετο, τὸ σαφὲς, etc.: compare Andokid. de Mysteriis, sects. 67,

68.

[306] Andokid. de Myster. sect 66; Thucyd. vi, 60; Philochorus,

Fragment. 111, ed. Didot.

[307] Thucyd. vi, 60. ἡ μέντοι ἄλλη πόλις περιφανῶς ὠφέλητο:

compare Andokid. de Reditu, sect. 8.

[308] See Andokid. de Mysteriis, sect. 17. There are several

circumstances not easily intelligible respecting this γραφὴ

παρανόμων, which Andokidês alleges that his father Leogoras

brought against the senator Speusippus, before a dikastery of

six thousand persons (a number very difficult to believe), out

of whom he says that Speusippus only obtained two hundred votes;

but if this trial ever took place at all, we cannot believe

that it could have taken place until after the public mind was

tranquillized by the disclosures of Andokidês, especially as

Leogoras was actually in prison along with Andokidês immediately

before those disclosures were given in.

[309] See for evidence of these general positions respecting the

circumstances of Andokidês, the three Orations: Andokidês de

Mysteriis, Andokidês de Reditu Suo, and Lysias contra Andokidem.

But the comfort arising out of these disclosures respecting the

Hermæ, though genuine and inestimable at the moment, was soon again

disturbed. There still remained the various alleged profanations of

the Eleusinian mysteries, which had not yet been investigated or

brought to atonement; and these were the more sure to be pressed

home, and worked with a factitious exaggeration of pious zeal,

since the enemies of Alkibiadês were bent upon turning them to his

ruin. Among all the ceremonies of Attic religion, there was none

more profoundly or universally reverenced than the mysteries of

Eleusis, originally enjoined by the goddess Dêmêtêr herself, in

her visit to that place, to Eumolpus and the other Eleusinian

patriarch, and transmitted as a precious hereditary privilege in

their families.[310] Celebrated annually in the month of August

or September, under the special care of the basileus, or second

archon, these mysteries were attended by vast crowds from Athens

as well as from other parts of Greece, presenting to the eye a

solemn and imposing spectacle, and striking the imagination still

more powerfully by the special initiation which they conferred,

under pledge of secrecy, upon pious and predisposed communicants.

Even the divulgation in words to the uninitiated, of that which was

exhibited to the eye and ear of the assembly in the interior of the

Eleusinian temple, was accounted highly criminal: much more the

actual mimicry of these ceremonies for the amusement of a convivial

party. Moreover, the individuals who held the great sacred offices at

Eleusis,—the hierophant, the daduch (torch-bearer), and the keryx, or

herald,—which were transmitted by inheritance in the Eumolpidæ and

other great families of antiquity and importance, were personally

insulted by such proceedings, and vindicated their own dignity at the

same time that they invoked punishment on the offenders in the name

of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê. The most appalling legends were current

among the Athenian public, and repeated on proper occasions even by

the hierophant himself, respecting the divine judgments which always

overtook such impious men.[311]

[310] Homer, Hymn. Cerer. 475. Compare the Epigram cited in

Lobeck, Eleusinia, p. 47.

[311] Lysias cont. Andokid. init. et fin.; Andokid. de Myster.

sect. 29. Compare the fragment of a lost Oration by Lysias

against Kinêsias (Fragm. xxxi, p. 490, Bekker; Athenæus, xii,

p. 551), where Kinêsias and his friends are accused of numerous

impieties, one of which consisted in celebrating festivals on

unlucky and forbidden days, “in derision of our gods and our

laws,”—ὡς καταλεγῶντες τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἡμετέρων. The

lamentable consequences which the displeasure of the gods had

brought upon them are then set forth: the companions of Kinêsias

had all miserably perished, while Kinêsias himself was living

in wretched health and in a condition worse than death: τὸ δ’

οὕτως ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον χρόνον διατελεῖν, καὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν

ἀποθνήσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι τελευτῆσαι τὸν βίον, τούτοις μόνοις

προσήκει τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἅπερ οὗτος ἐξερματεκόσι.

The comic poets Strattis and Plato also marked out Kinêsias

among their favorite subjects of derision and libel, and seem

particularly to have represented his lean person and constant ill

health as a punishment of the gods for his impiety. See Meineke,

Fragm. Comic. Græc. (Strattis), vol. ii, p. 768 (Plato), p. 679.

When we recollect how highly the Eleusinian mysteries were venerated

by Greeks not born in Athens and even by foreigners, we shall not

wonder at the violent indignation excited in the Athenian mind by

persons who profaned or divulged them; especially at a moment when

their religious sensibilities had been so keenly wounded, and so

tardily and recently healed, in reference to the Hermæ.[312] It was

about this same time[313] that a prosecution was instituted against

the Melian philosopher Diagoras for irreligious doctrines. Having

left Athens before trial, he was found guilty in his absence, and a

reward was offered for his life.

[312] Lysias cont. Andokid. sects. 50, 51; Cornel. Nepos, Alcib.

c. 4. The expressions of Pindar (Fragm. 96) and of Sophoklês

(Fragm. 58, Brunck.—Œdip. Kolon. 1058) respecting the value of

the Eleusinian mysteries, are very striking: also Cicero, Legg.

ii, 14.

Horace will not allow himself to be under the same roof, or in

the same boat, with any one who has been guilty of divulging

these mysteries (Od. iii. 2, 26), much more then of deriding them.

The reader will find the fullest information about these

ceremonies in the _Eleusinia_, forming the first treatise in the

work of Lobeck called Aglaophamus; and in the Dissertation called

_Eleusinia_, in K. O. Müller’s Kleine Schriften. vol ii, p. 242,

_seqq._

[313] Diodor. xiii. 6

Probably the privileged sacred families, connected with the

mysteries, were foremost in calling for expiation from the

state to the majesty of the two offended goddesses, and

for punishment on the delinquents.[314] And the enemies of

Alkibiadês, personal as well as political, found the opportunity

favorable for reviving that charge against him which they had

artfully suffered to drop before his departure to Sicily. The

matter of fact alleged against him—the mock-celebration of these

holy ceremonies—was not only in itself probable, but proved by

reasonably good testimony against him and some of his intimate

companions. Moreover, the overbearing insolence of demeanor

habitual with Alkibiadês, so glaringly at variance with the equal

restraints of democracy, enabled his enemies to impute to him

not only irreligious acts, but anti-constitutional purposes; an

association of ideas which was at this moment the more easily

accredited, since his divulgation and parody of the mysteries

did not stand alone, but was interpreted in conjunction with

the recent mutilation of the Hermæ—as a manifestation of the

same anti-patriotic and irreligious feeling, if not part and

parcel of the same treasonable scheme. And the alarm on this

subject was now renewed by the appearance of a Lacedæmonian army

at the isthmus, professing to contemplate some enterprise in

conjunction with the Bœotians, a purpose not easy to understand,

and presenting every appearance of being a cloak for hostile

designs against Athens. So fully was this believed among the

Athenians, that they took arms, and remained under arms one whole

night in the sacred precinct of the Theseium. No enemy indeed

appeared, either without or within; but the conspiracy had only

been prevented from breaking out, so they imagined, by the recent

inquiries and detection. Moreover, the party in Argos connected

with Alkibiadês were just at this time suspected of a plot for

the subversion of their own democracy, which still farther

aggravated the presumptions against him, while it induced the

Athenians to give up to the Argeian democratical government the

oligarchical hostages which had been taken from that town a few

months before,[315] in order that it might put these hostages to

death, whenever it thought fit.

[314] We shall find these sacred families hereafter to be

the most obstinate in opposing the return of Alkibiadês from

banishment (Thucyd. viii, 53).

[315] Thucyd. vi, 53-61.

Such incidents materially aided the enemies of Alkibiadês in their

unremitting efforts to procure his recall and condemnation. Among

them were men very different in station and temper: Thessalus son of

Kimon, a man of the highest lineage and of hereditary oligarchical

politics, as well as Androklês, a leading demagogue or popular

orator. It was the former who preferred against him in the senate the

memorable impeachment, which, fortunately for our information, is

recorded verbatim.

“Thessalus son of Kimon, of the deme Lakiadæ, hath impeached

Alkibiadês son of Kleinias, of the deme Skambônidæ, as guilty of

crime in regard to the two goddesses Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, in

mimicking the mysteries, and exhibiting them to his companions in

his own house, wearing the costume of the hierophant: applying to

himself the name of hierophant; to Polytion, that of daduch; to

Theodôrus that of herald, and addressing his remaining companions as

mysts and epopts; all contrary to the sacred customs and canons, of

old established by the Eumolpidæ, the Kerykes, and the Eleusinian

priests.”[316]

[316] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22. Θέσσαλος Κίμωνος Λακιάδης,

Ἀλκιβιάδην Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδην εἰσήγγειλεν ἀδικεῖν περὶ τὼ

θεὼ, τὴν Δήμητρα καὶ τὴν Κόρην, ἀπομιμούμενον τὰ μυστήρια, καὶ

δεικνύοντα τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἑταίροις ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, ἔχοντα

στολὴν οἵανπερ ἱεροφάντης ἔχων δεικνύει τὰ ἱερὰ, καὶ ὀνομάζοντα

αὐτὸν μὲν ἱεροφάντην, Πολυτίωνα δὲ δᾳδοῦχον, κήρυκα δὲ Θεόδωρον

Φηγεέα· τοὺς δ’ ἄλλους ἑταίρους, μύστας προσαγορεύοντα καὶ

ἐπόπτας, παρὰ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ τὰ καθεστηκότα ὑπὸ τ’ Εὐμολπιδῶν καὶ

κηρύκων καὶ τῶν ἱερέων τῶν ἐξ Ἐλευσῖνος.

Similar impeachments being at the same time presented against other

citizens now serving in Sicily along with Alkibiadês, the accusers

moved that he and the rest might be sent for to come home and take

their trial. We may observe that the indictment against him is quite

distinct and special, making no allusion to any supposed treasonable

or anti-constitutional projects: probably, however, these suspicions

were pressed by his enemies in their preliminary speeches, for the

purpose of inducing the Athenians to remove him from the command of

the army forthwith, and send for him home. For such a step it was

indispensable that a strong case should be made out: but the public

was at length thoroughly brought round, and the Salaminian trireme

was despatched to Sicily to fetch him. Great care however was taken,

in sending this summons, to avoid all appearance of prejudgment,

or harshness, or menace. The trierarch was forbidden to seize his

person, and had instructions to invite him simply to accompany the

Salaminian home in his own trireme: so as to avoid the hazard of

offending the Argeian and Mantineian allies serving in Sicily, or the

army itself.[317]

[317] Thucyd. vi, 61.

It was on the return of the Athenian army from their unsuccessful

attempt at Kamarina, to their previous quarters at Katana, that they

found the Salaminian trireme newly arrived from Athens with this

grave requisition against the general. We may be sure that Alkibiadês

received private intimation from his friends at Athens, by the same

trireme, communicating to him the temper of the people, so that his

resolution was speedily taken. Professing to obey, he departed in

his own trireme on the voyage homeward, along with the other persons

accused, the Salaminian trireme being in company; but as soon as they

arrived at Thurii, in coasting along Italy, he and his companions

quitted the vessel and disappeared. After a fruitless search on the

part of the Salaminian trierarch, the two triremes were obliged to

return to Athens without him. Both Alkibiadês and the rest of the

accused—one of whom[318] was his own cousin and namesake—were tried,

condemned to death on non-appearance, and their property confiscated;

while the Eumolpidæ and the other Eleusinian sacred families

pronounced him to be accursed by the gods, for his desecration of the

mysteries,[319] and recorded the condemnation on a plate of lead.

[318] Xenoph. Hellen. i, 2, 13.

[319] Thucyd. vi. 61; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22-33; Lysias, Orat.

vi, cont. Andokid. sect. 42.

Plutarch says that it would have been easy for Alkibiadês to

raise a mutiny in the army at Katana, had he chosen to resist the

order for coming home. But this is highly improbable. Considering

what his conduct became immediately afterwards, we shall see good

reason to believe that he _would_ have taken this step, had it

been practicable.

Probably his disappearance and exile were acceptable to his enemies

at Athens: at any rate, they thus made sure of getting rid of him;

while had he come back, his condemnation to death, though probable,

could not be considered as certain. In considering the conduct of

the Athenians towards Alkibiadês, we have to remark, that the people

were guilty of no act of injustice. He had committed—at least there

was fair reason for believing that he had committed—an act criminal

in the estimation of every Greek; the divulgation and profanation of

the mysteries. This act—alleged against him in the indictment very

distinctly, divested of all supposed ulterior purpose, treasonable

or otherwise—was legally punishable at Athens, and was universally

accounted guilty in public estimation, as an offence at once against

the religious sentiment of the people and against the public safety,

by offending the two goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, and driving

them to withdraw their favor and protection. The same demand for

legal punishment would have been supposed to exist in a Christian

Catholic country, down to a very recent period of history, if instead

of the Eleusinian mysteries we suppose the sacrament of the mass to

have been the ceremony ridiculed; though such a proceeding would

involve no breach of obligation to secrecy. Nor ought we to judge

what would have been the measure of penalty formerly awarded to a

person convicted of such an offence, by consulting the tendency of

penal legislation during the last sixty years. Even down to the

last century it would have been visited with something sharper than

the draught of hemlock, which is the worst that could possibly have

befallen Alkibiadês at Athens, as we may see by the condemnation

and execution of the Chevalier de la Barre at Abbeville, in 1766.

The uniform tendency of Christian legislation,[320] down to a

recent period, leaves no room for reproaching the Athenians with

excessive cruelty in their penal visitation of offences against the

religious sentiment. On the contrary, the Athenians are distinguished

for comparative mildness and tolerance, as we shall find various

opportunities for remarking.

[320] To appreciate fairly the violent emotion raised at Athens

by the mutilation of the Hermæ and by the profanation of the

mysteries, it is necessary to consider the way in which analogous

acts of sacrilege have been viewed in Christian and Catholic

penal legislation, even down to the time of the first French

Revolution.

I transcribe the following extract from a work of authority on

French criminal jurisprudence—_Jousse_, Traité de la Justice

Criminelle, Paris, 1771, part iv, tit. 27, vol. iii, p. 672:—

“Du Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine.—Les Crimes de Leze Majesté

Divine, sont ceux qui attaquent Dieu immédiatement, et qu’on doit

regarder par cette raison comme les plus atroces et les plus

exécrables.—La Majesté de Dieu peut être offensée de plusieurs

manières.—1. En niant l’existence de Dieu. 2. Par le crime de

ceux qui attentent directement contre la Divinité: comme quand on

profane ou qu’on foule aux pieds les saintes Hosties; ou qu’on

_frappe les Images de Dieu_ dans le dessein de l’insulter. C’est

ce qu’on appelle _Crime de Leze-Majesté Divine au prémier Chef_.”

Again in the same work, part iv, tit. 46, n. 5, 8, 10, 11, vol.

iv, pp. 97-99:—

“_La profanation des Sacremens et des Mystères de la Réligion

est un sacrilège des plus exécrables._ Tel est le crime de

ceux qui emploient les choses sacrées à des usages communs

et mauvais, _en dérision des Mystères_; ceux qui _profanent

la sainte Eucharistie_, ou qui en abusent en quelque manière

que ce soit; ceux qui en mépris de la Réligion, profanent les

Fonts-Baptismaux; qui jettent par terre les saintes Hosties,

ou qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes: _ceux qui,

en dérision de nos sacrés Mystères, les contrefont dans leurs

débauches; ceux qui frappent, mutilent, abattent, les Images

consacrées à Dieu, ou à la Sainte Vierge, ou aux Saints_, en

mépris de la Réligion; et enfin, tous ceux qui commettent

de semblables impiétés. Tous ces crimes _sont des crimes de

Leze-Majesté divine au prémier chef_, parce qu’ils s’attaquent

immédiatement à Dieu, et ne se font à aucun dessein que de

l’offenser.”

“... La peine du Sacrilège, par l’Ancien Testament, étoit celle

du feu, et d’être lapidé.—Par les Loix Romaines, les coupables

étoient condamnés au fer, au feu, et aux bêtes farouches,

suivant les circonstances.—En France, la peine du sacrilège est

arbitraire, et dépend de la qualité et des circonstances du

crime, du lieu, du temps, et de la qualité de l’accusé.—Dans _le

sacrilège au prémier chef, qui attaque la Divinité, la Sainte

Vierge, et les Saints_, v. g. à l’égard de ceux qui foulent aux

pieds les saintes Hosties, ou qui les jettent à terre, ou en

abusent, et qui les emploient à des usages vils et profanes, la

peine est le feu, l’amende honorable, et le poing coupé. Il en

est de même de ceux qui profanent les Fonts-Baptismaux; _ceux

qui, en dérision de nos Mystères, s’en moquent et les contrefont

dans leurs débauches_: ils doivent être punis de peine capitale,

parce que ces crimes attaquent immédiatement la Divinité.”

M. Jousse proceeds to cite several examples of persons condemned

to death for acts of sacrilege, of the nature above described.

Now in reviewing the conduct of the Athenians towards Alkibiadês,

we must consider, that this violation of the mysteries, of which

he was indicted in good legal form, was an action for which he

really deserved punishment, if any one deserved it. Even his

enemies did not fabricate this charge, or impute it to him falsely;

though they were guilty of insidious and unprincipled manœuvres to

exasperate the public mind against him. Their machinations begin

with the mutilation of the Hermæ; an act of new and unparalleled

wickedness, to which historians of Greece seldom do justice. It

was not, like the violations of the mysteries, a piece of indecent

pastime committed within four walls, and never intended to become

known. It was an outrage essentially public, planned and executed by

conspirators for the deliberate purpose of lacerating the religious

mind of Athens, and turning the prevalent terror and distraction to

political profit. Thus much is certain; though we cannot be sure

who the conspirators were, nor what was their exact or special

purpose. That the destruction of Alkibiadês was one of the direct

purposes of the conspirators, is highly probable. But his enemies,

even if they were not among the original authors, at least took upon

themselves half the guilt of the proceeding, by making it the basis

of treacherous machinations against his person. How their scheme,

which was originally contrived to destroy him before the expedition

departed, at first failed, was then artfully dropped, and at length

effectually revived, after a long train of calumny against the

absent general, has been already recounted. It is among the darkest

chapters of Athenian political history, indicating, on the part of

the people, strong religious excitability, without any injustice

towards Alkibiadês; but indicating, on the part of his enemies, as

well as of the Hermokopids generally, a depth of wicked contrivance

rarely paralleled in political warfare. It is to these men, not to

the people, that Alkibiadês owes his expulsion, aided indeed by

the effect of his own previous character. In regard to the Hermæ,

the Athenians condemned to death—after and by consequence of the

deposition of Andokidês—a small number of men who may perhaps have

been innocent victims, but whom they sincerely believed to be guilty;

and whose death not only tranquillized comparatively the public mind,

but served as the only means of rescue to a far larger number of

prisoners confined on suspicion. In regard to Alkibiadês, they came

to no collective resolution, except that of recalling him to take his

trial, a resolution implying no wrong in those who voted for it,

whatever may be the guilt of those who proposed and prepared it by

perfidious means.[321]

[321] The proceedings in England in 1678 and 1679, in consequence

of the pretended Popish Plot, have been alluded to by various

authors, and recently by Dr. Thirlwall, as affording an analogy

to that which occurred at Athens after the mutilation of the

Hermæ. But there are many material differences, and all, so far

as I can perceive, to the advantage of Athens.

1. The “hellish and damnable plot of the Popish Recusants,” (to

adopt the words of the Houses of Lords and Commons,—see Dr.

Lingard’s History of England, vol. xiii, ch. v, p. 88,—words, the

like of which were doubtless employed at Athens in reference to

the Hermokopids,) was baseless, mendacious, and incredible, from

the beginning. It started from no real fact: the whole of it was

a tissue of falsehoods and fabrications proceeding from Oates,

Bedloe, and a few other informers of the worst character.

At Athens, there was unquestionably a plot; the Hermokopids were

real conspirators, not few in number. No one could doubt that

they conspired for other objects besides the mutilation of the

Hermæ. At the same time, no one knew what these objects were, nor

who the conspirators themselves were.

If before the mutilation of the Hermæ, a man like Oates had

pretended to reveal to the Athenian people a fabricated

plot implicating Alkibiadês and others, he would have found

no credence. It was not until after and by reason of that

terror-striking incident, that the Athenians began to give

credence to informers. And we are to recollect that they did not

put any one to death on the evidence of these informers. They

contented themselves with imprisoning on suspicion, until they

got the confession and deposition of Andokidês. Those implicated

in _that_ deposition were condemned to death. Now Andokidês, as

a witness, deserves but very qualified confidence; yet it is

impossible to degrade him to the same level even as Teukrus or

Diokleidês, much less to that of Oates and Bedloe. We cannot

wonder that the people trusted him, and, under the peculiar

circumstances of the case, it was the least evil that they should

trust him. The witnesses upon whose testimony the prisoners under

the Popish Plot were condemned, were even inferior to Teukrus and

Diokleidês in presumptive credibility.

The Athenian people have been censured for their folly in

believing the democratical constitution in danger, because the

Hermæ had been mutilated. I have endeavored to show, that,

looking to their religious ideas, the thread of connection

between these two ideas is perfectly explicable. And why are we

to quarrel with the Athenians because they took arms, and put

themselves on their guard, when a Lacedæmonian or a Bœotian armed

force was actually on their frontier?

As for the condemnation of Alkibiadês and others for profaning

and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries, these are not for a

moment to be put upon a level with the condemnations in the

Popish Plot. These were true charges, at least there is strong

presumptive reason for believing that they were true. Persons

were convicted and punished for having done acts which they

really had done, and which they knew to be legal crimes. Whether

it be right to constitute such acts legal crimes, or not, is

another question. The enormity of the Popish Plot consisted in

punishing persons for acts which they had not done, and upon

depositions of the most lying and worthless witnesses.

The state of mind into which the Athenians were driven after the

cutting of the Hermæ, was indeed very analogous to that of the

English people during the circulation of the Popish Plot. The

suffering, terror, and distraction, I apprehend to have been even

greater at Athens: but the cause of it was graver and more real,

and the active injustice which it produced was far less than in

England.

“I shall not detain the reader (says Dr. Lingard, Hist. Engl.

xiii, p. 105) with a narrative of the partial trials and judicial

murders of the unfortunate men, whose names had been inserted

by Oates in his pretended discoveries. So violent was the

excitement, so general the delusion created by the perjuries

of the informer, that the voice of reason and the claims of

justice were equally disregarded. Both judge and jury seemed to

have no other object than to inflict vengeance on the supposed

traitors. To speak in support of their witnesses, or to hint the

improbability of the informations, required a strength of mind,

a recklessness of consequences, which falls to the lot of few

individuals: even the king himself, convinced as he was of the

imposture, and contemptuously as he spoke of it in private, dared

not exercise his prerogative of mercy to save the lives of the

innocent.”

It is to be noted that the House of Lords, both acting as a

legislative body, and in their judicial character when the

Catholic Lord Stafford was tried before them (ch. vi, pp.

231-241), displayed a degree of prejudice and injustice quite

equal to that of the judges and juries in the law-courts.

Both the English judicature on this occasion, and the Milanese

judicature on the occasion adverted to in a previous note, were

more corrupted and driven to greater injustice by the reigning

prejudice, than the purely popular dikastery of Athens in this

affair of the Hermæ, and of the other profanations.

In order to appreciate the desperate hatred with which the exile

Alkibiadês afterwards revenged himself on his countrymen, it has been

necessary to explain to what extent he had just ground of complaint

against them. On being informed that they had condemned him to death

in his absence, he is said to have exclaimed: “I shall show them that

I am alive.” He fully redeemed his word.[322]

[322] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 22.

The recall and consequent banishment of Alkibiadês was mischievous to

Athens in several ways. It transferred to the enemy’s camp an angry

exile, to make known her weak points, and to rouse the sluggishness

of Sparta. It offended a portion of the Sicilian armament, most of

all probably the Argeians and Mantineians, and slackened their zeal

in the cause.[323] And what was worst of all, it left the armament

altogether under the paralyzing command of Nikias. For Lamachus,

though still equal in nominal authority, and now invested with the

command of one-half instead of one-third of the army, appears to have

had no real influence except in the field.

[323] Thucyd. ii, 65. τά τε ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν,

etc.

Nikias now proceeded to execute that scheme which he had first

suggested, to sail round from Katana to Selinus and Egesta, with the

view of investigating the quarrel between the two as well as the

financial means of the latter. Passing through the strait and along

the north coast of the island, he first touched at Himera, where

admittance was refused to him; he next captured a Sikanian maritime

town named Hykkara, together with many prisoners; among them the

celebrated courtezan Laïs, then a very young girl.[324] Having handed

over this place to the Egestæans, Nikias went in person to inspect

their city and condition; but could obtain no more money than the

thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit

of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara

to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of one hundred and

twenty talents,[325] and conducted the Athenian land-force across the

centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels

to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town

of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his

naval force.

[324] The statements respecting the age and life of Laïs appear

involved in inextricable confusion. See the note of Göller ad

Philisti, Fragment. v.

[325] Diodor. viii, 6; Thucyd. vi, 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα ~ἀπέδοσαν~,

καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word

ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to

their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for

their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had

Thucydidês said ἀπέδοντο, it would have meant that they were put

up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at

least possible, and, in my judgment, more admissible than that

proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

If, however, we refer to Thucyd. vi, 88, with Duker’s note, we

shall see that μεταπέμπειν is sometimes, though rarely, used in

the sense of μεταπέμπεσθαι. The case may perhaps be the same with

ἀπέδοσαν for ἀπέδοντο.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three

months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at

Rhegium; during which period they had achieved nothing except the

acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies—unless we are to reckon

the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as

Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias;

together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great

disappointment. What is still worse, in reference to the character of

the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing

serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by

Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the recent untried

armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as confidence

was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the

preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished;

the invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out

both hesitating and timorous,[326] and when he had disappeared out

of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta, still more when he assailed in

vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla, their minds underwent a

reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan

citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities,

called upon their generals to lead to the attack of the Athenian

position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach

Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult

the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to

settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring

the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on

the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his

inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of

his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse

in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry,

informing himself as to the ground near the city, through some exiles

serving along with him.[327]

[326] Thucyd. vi, 63; vii, 42.

[327] Thucyd. vi, 63; Diodor. xiii, 6.

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen, in his heart attached

to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other

side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the

friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian soldiers, so the

message ran, were in the habit of passing the night within the walls,

apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans

by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise them thus unprepared

and dispersed; while the philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised

to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within, and

setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans, they added,

were eager to coöperate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment

when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive

movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the

messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise

day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force

was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the

river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles

of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated,

choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with

his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast,

rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbor of Syracuse.

Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed

south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great

Harbor, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus

Olympius. Having broken down the neighboring bridge, where the

Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by

various embarrassing obstacles,—houses, walls, trees, and standing

water, besides the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his

left wing; so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and

was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of

his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down

the neighboring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by

throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at

the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive

works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb

him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on

arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time

in returning, the march back was a long one.[328] Such was the

confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a

march, they offered battle forthwith; but as Nikias did not quit his

position, they retreated, to take up their night-station on the other

side of the Helôrine road, probably a road bordered on each side by

walls.

[328] Thucyd. vi, 65, 66; Diodor. xiii, 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c.

13.

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his position and formed

his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep.

His front division was intended to attack; his rear division—in

hollow square, with the baggage in the middle—was held in reserve

near the camp, to lend aid where aid might be wanted; cavalry there

was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than

his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection;

they were ranged in the deeper order of sixteen, alongside of their

Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen,

the best part of their force, not less than twelve hundred in

number; together with two hundred horsemen from Gela, twenty from

Kamarina, about fifty bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites,

though full of courage, had little training; and their array,

never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by

the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their

families; others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already

begun, and took rank wherever they could.[329]

[329] Thucyd. vi, 67-69.

Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, according to his

practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the

combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief

harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to

modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of

professional honor and disgrace, without any thought of the cause

for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only

one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the

case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier’s mind at the eve

of action. Nikias adverted to the recognized military preëminence

of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians, as compared to

the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own

superiority,—this is a striking confession of the deplorable change

which had been wrought by his own delay,—but who would come short in

actual conflict, from want of discipline.[330] Moreover, he reminded

them that they were far away from home, and that defeat would render

them victims, one and all, of the Syracusan cavalry. He little

thought, nor did his prophets forewarn him, that such a calamity,

serious as it would have been, was even desirable for Athens, since

it would have saved her from the far more overwhelming disasters

which will be found to sadden the coming chapters of this history.

[330] Thucyd. vi, 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί

τε ἀμυνομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἀπολέκτους ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς· καὶ προσέτι

Σικελιώτας, οἳ ~ὑπερφρονοῦσι μὲν ἡμᾶς~, ὑπομένουσι δὲ οὔ· διὰ τὸ

τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τόλμης ἥσσω ἔχειν.

This passage illustrates very clearly the meaning of the adverb

πανδημεί. Compare πανδαμεὶ, πανομιλεὶ, Æschylus, Sept. Theb. 275.

While the customary sacrifices were being performed, the slingers and

bowmen on both sides became engaged in skirmishing. But presently the

trumpets sounded, and Nikias ordered his first division of hoplites

to charge at once rapidly, before the Syracusans expected it. Judging

from his previous backwardness, they never imagined that he would be

the first to give orders for charging; nor was it until they saw the

Athenian line actually advancing towards them that they lifted their

own arms from the ground and came forward to give the meeting. The

shock was bravely encountered on both sides, and for some time the

battle continued hand to hand with undecided result. There happened

to supervene a violent storm of rain, with thunder and lightning,

which alarmed the Syracusans, who construed it as an unfavorable

augury, while to the more practised Athenian hoplites, it seemed

a mere phenomenon of the season,[331] so that they still farther

astonished the Syracusans by the unabated confidence with which

they continued the fight. At length the Syracusan army was broken,

dispersed, and fled; first, before the Argeians on the right, next,

before the Athenians in the centre. The victors pursued as far as

was safe and practicable, without disordering their ranks: for the

Syracusan cavalry, which had not yet been engaged, checked all who

pressed forward, and enabled their own infantry to retire in safety

behind the Helôrine road.[332]

[331] Thucyd. vi, 70. Τοῖς δ’ ἐμπειροτέροις, τὰ μὲν γιγνόμενα,

καὶ ὥρᾳ ἔτους περαίνεσθαι δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀνθεστῶτας, πολὺ μείζω

ἔκπληξιν μὴ νικωμένους παρέχειν.

The Athenians, unfortunately for themselves, were not equally

unmoved by eclipses of the moon. The force of this remark will be

seen in the next chapter but one.

[332] Thucyd. vi, 70.

So little were the Syracusans dispirited with this defeat, that they

did not retire within their city until they had sent an adequate

detachment to guard the neighboring temple and sacred precinct of

the Olympian Zeus, wherein there was much deposited wealth, which

they feared that the Athenians might seize. Nikias, however, without

approaching the sacred ground, contented himself with occupying the

field of battle, burnt his own dead, and stripped the arms from the

dead of the enemy. The Syracusans and their allies lost two hundred

and fifty men, the Athenians fifty.[333]

[333] Thucyd. vi, 71. Plutarch (Nikias, c. 16) states that Nikias

refused from religious scruples to invade the sacred precinct,

though his soldiers were eager to seize its contents.

Diodorus (xiii, 6) affirms erroneously that the Athenians became

masters of the Olympieion. Pausanias too says the same thing (x,

28, 3), adding that Nikias abstained from disturbing either the

treasures or the offerings, and left them still under the care of

the Syracusan priests.

Plutarch farther states that Nikias stayed some days in his

position before he returned to Katana. But the language of

Thucydidês indicates that the Athenians returned on the day after

the battle.

On the morrow, having granted to the Syracusans their dead bodies

for burial, and collected the ashes of his own dead, Nikias

reëmbarked his troops, put to sea, and sailed back to his former

station at Katana. He conceived it impossible, without cavalry and

a farther stock of money, to maintain his position near Syracuse or

to prosecute immediate operations of siege or blockade. And as the

winter was now approaching, he determined to take up winter quarters

at Katana; though considering the mild winter at Syracuse, and the

danger of marsh fever near the Great Harbor in summer, the change

of season might well be regarded as a questionable gain. But he

proposed to employ the interval in sending to Athens for cavalry

and money, as well as in procuring the like reinforcements from his

Sicilian allies, whose numbers he calculated now on increasing by the

accession of new cities after his recent victory, and to get together

magazines of every kind for beginning the siege of Syracuse in the

spring. Despatching a trireme to Athens with these requisitions,

he sailed with his forces to Messênê, within which there was a

favorable party who gave hopes of opening the gates to him. Such a

correspondence had already been commenced before the departure of

Alkibiadês: but it was the first act of revenge which the departing

general took on his country, to betray the proceedings to the

philo-Syracusan party in Messênê. Accordingly, these latter, watching

their opportunity, rose in arms before the arrival of Nikias, put to

death their chief antagonists, and held the town by force against the

Athenians; who after a fruitless delay of thirteen days, with scanty

supplies and under stormy weather, were forced to return to Naxos,

where they established a palisaded camp and station, and went into

winter quarters.[334]

[334] Thucyd. vi, 71-74.

The recent stratagem of Nikias, followed by the movement into the

harbor of Syracuse, and the battle, had been ably planned and

executed. It served to show the courage and discipline of the army,

as well as to keep up the spirits of the soldiers themselves, and

to obviate those feelings of disappointment which the previous

inefficiency of the armament tended to arouse. But as to other

results, the victory was barren; we may even say, positively

mischievous, since it imparted a momentary stimulus which served

as an excuse to Nikias for the three months of total inaction

which followed, and since it neither weakened nor humiliated the

Syracusans, but gave them a salutary lesson which they turned to

account while Nikias was in his winter quarters. His apathy during

these first eight months after the arrival of the expedition at

Rhegium (from July 415 B.C. to March 414 B.C.), was the most

deplorable of all calamities to his army, his country, and himself.

Abundant proofs of this will be seen in the coming events: at

present, we have only to turn back to his own predictions and

recommendations. All the difficulties and dangers to be surmounted

in Sicily had been foreseen by himself and impressed upon the

Athenians: in the first instance, as grounds against undertaking

the expedition; but the Athenians, though unfortunately not

allowing them to avail in that capacity, fully admitted their

reality, and authorized him to demand whatever force was necessary

to overcome them.[335] He had thus been allowed to bring with him

a force calculated upon his own ideas, together with supplies and

implements for besieging; yet when arrived, he seems only anxious

to avoid exposing that force in any serious enterprise, and to

find an excuse for conducting it back to Athens. That Syracuse was

the grand enemy, and that the capital point of the enterprise was

the siege of that city, was a truth familiar to himself as well

as every man at Athens:[336] upon the formidable cavalry of the

Syracusans, Nikias had himself insisted, in the preliminary debates.

Yet, after four months of mere trifling, and pretence of action

so as to evade dealing with the real difficulty, the existence of

this cavalry is made an excuse for a farther postponement of four

months until reinforcements can be obtained from Athens. To all

the intrinsic dangers of the case, predicted by Nikias himself

with proper discernment, was thus superadded the aggravated danger

of his own factitious delay; frittering away the first impression

of his armament, giving the Syracusans leisure to enlarge their

fortifications, and allowing the Peloponnesians time to interfere

against Attica as well as to succor Sicily. It was the unhappy

weakness of this commander to shrink from decisive resolutions of

every kind, and at any rate to postpone them until the necessity

became imminent: the consequence of which was,—to use an expression

of the Corinthian envoy before the Peloponnesian war in censuring

the dilatory policy of Sparta,—that never acting, yet always seeming

about to act, he found his enemy in double force instead of single,

at the moment of actual conflict.[337]

[335] Thucyd. vi, 21-26.

[336] Thucyd. vi, 20.

[337] Thucyd. i, 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὦ

Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι,

καὶ μόνοι ~οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, ἀλλὰ

διπλασιουμένην, καταλύοντες~.

Great, indeed, must have been the disappointment of the Athenians,

when, after having sent forth in the month of June, an expedition

of unparalleled efficiency, they receive in the month of November a

despatch to acquaint them that the general has accomplished little

except one indecisive victory; and that he has not even attempted

anything serious, nor can do so unless they send him farther cavalry

and money. Yet the only answer which they made was, to grant and

provide for this demand without any public expression of discontent

or disappointment against him.[338] And this is the more to be noted,

since the removal of Alkibiadês afforded an inviting and even

valuable opportunity for proposing to send out a fresh colleague

in his room. If there were no complaints raised against Nikias at

Athens, so neither are we informed of any such, even among his own

soldiers in Sicily, though _their_ disappointment must have been

yet greater than that of their countrymen at home, considering

the expectations with which they had come out. We may remember

that the delay of a few days at Eion, under perfectly justifiable

circumstances, and while awaiting the arrival of reinforcements

actually sent for, raised the loudest murmurs against Kleon in

his expedition against Amphipolis, from the hoplites in his own

army.[339] The contrast is instructive, and will appear yet more

instructive as we advance forward.

[338] Αἰσχρὸν δὲ βιασθέντας ἀπελθεῖν, ἢ ~ὕστερον

ἐπιμεταπέμπεσθαι~, τὸ πρῶτον ἀσκέπτως βουλευσαμένους: “It is

disgraceful to be driven out of Sicily by superior force, or to

_send back here afterwards for fresh reinforcements, through our

own fault in making bad calculations at first_.” (Thucyd. vi, 21.)

This was a part of the last speech by Nikias himself at Athens,

prior to the expedition. The Athenian people in reply had passed

a vote that he and his colleagues should fix their own amount of

force, and should have everything which they asked for. Moreover,

such was the feeling in the city, that every one individually was

anxious to put down his name to serve (vi, 26-31). Thucydidês

can hardly find words sufficient to depict the completeness, the

grandeur, the wealth public and private, of the armament.

As this goes to establish what I have advanced in the text,—that

the actions of Nikias in Sicily stand most of all condemned by

his own previous speeches at Athens,—so it seems to have been

forgotten by Dr. Arnold, when he wrote his note on the remarkable

passage, ii, 65, of Thucydidês,—ἐξ ὧν ἄλλα τε πολλὰ, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ

πόλει, καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς·

ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἁμάρτημα ἦν πρὸς οὓς ἐπῄεσαν, ὅσον ~οἱ

ἐκπέμψαντες, οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες~,

ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας διαβολὰς περὶ τῆς τοῦ δήμου προστασίας, τά τε

ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ ἀμβλύτερα ἐποίουν, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν πόλιν πρῶτον

ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐταράχθησαν. Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks:—

“Thucydidês here expresses the same opinion which he repeats in

two other places (vi, 31; vii, 42). namely, that the Athenian

power was fully adequate to the conquest of Syracuse, _had not

the expedition been mismanaged by the general, and insufficiently

supplied by the government at home_. The words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα

τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες signify “_not voting afterwards

the needful supplies to their absent armament_:” for Nikias was

prevented from improving his first victory over the Syracusans

by the want of cavalry and money; and the whole winter was lost

before he could get supplied from Athens. And subsequently

the armament was allowed to be reduced to great distress and

weakness, before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.”

Göller and Poppo concur in this explanation.

Let us in the first place discuss the explanation here given of

the words τὰ πρόσφορα ἐπιγιγνώσκοντες. It appears to me that

these words do _not_ signify “_voting the needful supplies_.”

The word ἐπιγιγνώσκειν cannot be used in the same sense with

ἐπιπέμπειν—παρασχεῖν (vii, 2-15), ἐκπορίζειν. As it would not

be admissible to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν ὅπλα, νῆας, ἵππους, χρήματα,

etc., so neither can it be right to say ἐπιγιγνώσκειν τὰ

πρόσφορα, if this latter word were used only as a comprehensive

word for these particulars, meaning “_supplies_.” The words

really mean: “_taking farther resolutions_ (after the expedition

was gone) _unsuitable or mischievous to the absent armament_.”

Πρόσφορα is used here quite generally, agreeing with βουλεύματα,

or some such word: indeed, we find the phrase τὰ πρόσφορα used

in the most general sense, for “what is suitable;” “what is

advantageous or convenient:” γυμνάσω τὰ πρόσφορα—πράσσεται τὰ

πρόσφορα—τὰ πρόσφορ’ ηὔξατ’—τὰ πρόσφορα δρῳης ἂν—τὸ ταῖσδε

πρόσφορον. Euripid. Hippol. 112; Alkestis, 148; Iphig. Aul. 160,

B; Helen. 1299; Troades, 304.

Thucydidês appears to have in view the violent party contests

which broke out in reference to the Hermæ and the other

irreligious acts at Athens, after the departure of the armament,

especially to the mischief of recalling Alkibiadês, which grew

out of those contests. He does not allude to the withholding

of supplies from the armament; nor was it the purpose of any

of the parties at Athens to withhold them. The party acrimony

was directed against Alkibiadês exclusively, not against the

expedition.

Next, as to the main allegation in Dr. Arnold’s note, that _one

of the causes_ of the failure of the Athenian expedition in

Sicily, was, that it was “insufficiently supplied by Athens.” Of

the two passages to which he refers in Thucydidês (vi, 31; vii,

42), the first distinctly contradicts this allegation, by setting

forth the prodigious amount of force sent; the second says

nothing about it, and indirectly discountenances it, by dwelling

upon the glaring blunders of Nikias.

After the Athenians had allowed Nikias in the spring to name and

collect the force which he thought requisite, how could they

expect to receive a demand for farther reinforcements in the

autumn, the army having really done nothing? Nevertheless, the

supplies _were sent_, as soon as they could be, and as soon as

Nikias expected them. If the whole winter was lost, that was not

the fault of the Athenians.

Still harder is it in Dr. Arnold, to say, “that the armament

_was allowed_ to be reduced to great distress and weakness

before the second expedition was sent to reinforce it.” The

second expedition was sent the moment that Nikias made known

his distress and asked for it; his intimation of distress

coming quite suddenly, almost immediately after most successful

appearances.

It appears to me that nothing can be more incorrect or

inconsistent with the whole tenor of the narrative of

Thucydidês, than to charge the Athenians with having starved

their expedition. What they are really chargeable with, is, the

having devoted to it a disproportionate fraction of their entire

strength, perfectly enormous and ruinous. And so Thucydidês

plainly conceives it, when he is describing both the armament of

Nikias and that of Demosthenês.

Thucydidês is very reserved in saying anything against Nikias,

whom he treats throughout with the greatest indulgence and

tenderness. But he lets drop quite sufficient to prove that

he conceived the mismanagement of the general as _the cause_

of the failure of the armament, not as “one of two causes,”

as Dr. Arnold here presents it. Of course, I recognize fully

the consummate skill, and the aggressive vigor so unusual in a

Spartan, of Gylippus, together with the effective influence which

this exercised upon the result. But Gylippus would never have

set foot in Syracuse, had he not been let in, first through the

apathy, next through the contemptuous want of precaution, shown

by Nikias (vii, 42).

[339] Thucyd. v, 7. See volume vi of this History, chap. liv, p.

464.

Meanwhile the Syracusans were profiting by the lesson of their

recent defeat. In the next public assembly which ensued, Hermokratês

addressed them in the mingled tone of encouragement and admonition.

He praised their bravery, while he deprecated their want of tactics

and discipline. Considering the great superiority of the enemy in

this last respect, he regarded the recent battle as giving good

promise for the future; and he appealed with satisfaction to the

precautions taken by Nikias in fortifying his camp, as well as to

his speedy retreat after the battle. He pressed them to diminish

the excessive number of fifteen generals, whom they had hitherto

been accustomed to nominate to the command; to reduce the number to

three, conferring upon them at the same time fuller powers than

had been before enjoyed, and swearing a solemn oath to leave them

unfettered in the exercise of such powers; lastly, to enjoin upon

these generals the most strenuous efforts, during the coming winter,

for training and arming the whole population. Accordingly Hermokratês

himself, with Herakleidês and Sikanus, were named to the command.

Ambassadors were sent both to Sparta and to Corinth, for the purpose

of entreating assistance in Sicily, as well as of prevailing on the

Peloponnesians to recommence a direct attack against Attica;[340]

so as at least to prevent the Athenians from sending farther

reinforcements to Nikias, and perhaps even to bring about the recall

of his army.

[340] Thucyd. vi, 72, 73.

But by far the most important measure which marked the nomination of

the new generals, was, the enlargement of the line of fortifications

at Syracuse. They constructed a new wall, inclosing an additional

space and covering both their inner and their outer city to the

westward, reaching from the outer sea to the Great Harbor, across

the whole space fronting the rising slope of the hill of Epipolæ,

and stretching far enough westward to inclose the sacred precinct of

Apollo Temenites. This was intended as a precaution, in order that

if Nikias, resuming operations in the spring, should beat them in

the field and confine them to their walls, he might, nevertheless,

be prevented from carrying a wall of circumvallation from sea to sea

without covering a great additional extent of ground.[341] Besides

this, the Syracusans fitted up and garrisoned the deserted town of

Megara, on the coast to the north of Syracuse; they established a

regular fortification and garrison in the Olympieion or temple of

Zeus Olympius, which they had already garrisoned after the recent

battle with Nikias; and they planted stakes in the sea to obstruct

the convenient landing-places. All these precautions were useful

to them; and we may even say that the new outlying fortification,

inclosing the Temenites, proved their salvation in the coming siege,

by so lengthening the circumvallation necessary for the Athenians to

construct, that Gylippus had time to arrive before it was finished.

But there was one farther precaution which the Syracusans omitted

at this moment, when it was open to them without any hindrance,

to occupy and fortify the Euryâlus, or the summit of the hill of

Epipolæ. Had they done this now, probably the Athenians could never

have made progress with their lines of circumvallation: but they did

not think of it until too late, as we shall presently see.

[341] Thucyd. vi, 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι

πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, ~τεῖχος

παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολὰς~ ὁρῶν, ~ὅπως μὴ δι’ ἐλάσσονος

εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν~, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, etc.

I reserve the general explanation of the topography of Syracuse

for the next chapter, when the siege begins.

Nevertheless it is important to remark, in reference to the general

scheme of Athenian operations in Sicily, that if Nikias had

adopted the plan originally recommended by Lamachus, or if he had

begun his permanent besieging operations against Syracuse in the

summer or autumn of 415 B.C., instead of postponing them, as he

actually did, to the spring of 414 B.C., he would have found none

of these additional defences to contend against, and the line of

circumvallation necessary for his purpose would have been shorter and

easier. Besides these permanent and irreparable disadvantages, his

winter’s inaction at Naxos drew upon him the farther insult, that

the Syracusans marched to his former quarters at Katana and burned

the tents which they found standing, ravaging at the same time the

neighboring fields.[342]

[342] Thucyd. vi, 75.

Kamarina maintained an equivocal policy which made both parties hope

to gain it; and in the course of this winter the Athenian envoy

Euphêmus with others was sent thither to propose a renewal of that

alliance, between the city and Athens, which had been concluded

ten years before. Hermokratês the Syracusan went to counteract his

object; and both of them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted

to address the public assembly.

Hermokratês began by denouncing the views, designs, and past history

of Athens. He did not, he said, fear her power, provided the

Sicilian cities were united and true to each other: even against

Syracuse alone, the hasty retreat of the Athenians after the recent

battle had shown how little they confided in their own strength.

What he did fear, was, the delusive promises and insinuations of

Athens, tending to disunite the island, and to paralyze all joint

resistance. Every one knew that her purpose in this expedition was

to subjugate all Sicily,—that Leontini and Egesta served merely

as convenient pretences to put forward,—and that she could have no

sincere sympathy for Chalkidians in Sicily, when she herself held in

slavery the Chalkidians in Eubœa. It was, in truth, nothing else but

an extension of the same scheme of rapacious ambition, whereby she

had reduced her Ionian allies and kinsmen to their present wretched

slavery, now threatened against Sicily. The Sicilians could not too

speedily show her that they were no Ionians, made to be transferred

from one master to another, but autonomous Dorians from the centre

of autonomy, Peloponnesus. It would be madness to forfeit this

honorable position through jealousy or lukewarmness among themselves.

Let not the Kamarinæans imagine that Athens was striking her blow at

Syracuse alone: they were themselves next neighbors of Syracuse, and

would be the first victims if she were conquered. They might wish,

from apprehension or envy, to see the superior power of Syracuse

humbled, but this could not happen without endangering their own

existence. They ought to do for her what they would have asked her to

do if the Athenians had invaded Kamarina, instead of lending merely

nominal aid, as they had hitherto done. Their former alliance with

Athens was for purposes of mutual defence, not binding them to aid

her in schemes of pure aggression. To hold aloof, give fair words

to both parties, and leave Syracuse to fight the battle of Sicily

single-handed, was as unjust as it was dishonorable. If she came off

victor in the struggle, she would take care that the Kamarinæans

should be no gainers by such a policy. The state of affairs was so

plain, that he (Hermokratês) could not pretend to enlighten them: but

he solemnly appealed to their sentiments of common blood and lineage.

The Dorians of Syracuse were assailed by their eternal enemies the

Ionians, and ought not to be now betrayed by their own brother

Dorians of Kamarina.[343]

[343] Thucyd. vi, 77-80.

Euphêmus, in reply, explained the proceedings of Athens in reference

to her empire, and vindicated her against the charges of Hermokratês.

Though addressing a Dorian assembly, he did not fear to take his

start from the position laid down by Hermokratês, that Ionians

were the natural enemies of Dorians. Under this feeling Athens, as

an Ionian city, had looked about to strengthen herself against

the supremacy of her powerful Dorian neighbors in Peloponnesus.

Finding herself after the repulse of the Persian king at the head

of those Ionians and other Greeks who had just revolted from him,

she had made use of her position as well as of her superior navy

to shake off the illegitimate ascendency of Sparta. Her empire was

justified by regard for her own safety against Sparta, as well as

by the immense superiority of her maritime efforts in the rescue of

Greece from the Persians. Even in reference to her allies, she had

good ground for reducing them to subjection, because they had made

themselves the instruments and auxiliaries of the Persian king in

his attempt to conquer her. Prudential views for assured safety to

herself had thus led her to the acquisition of her present empire,

and the same views now brought her to Sicily. He was prepared to show

that the interests of Kamarina were in full accordance with those

of Athens. The main purpose of Athens in Sicily was to prevent her

Sicilian enemies from sending aid to her Peloponnesian enemies, to

accomplish which, powerful Sicilian allies were indispensable to her.

To enfeeble or subjugate her Sicilian allies would be folly: if she

did this, they would not serve her purpose of keeping the Syracusans

employed in their own island. Hence her desire to reëstablish the

expatriated Leontines, powerful and free, though she retained the

Chalkidians in Eubœa as subjects. Near home, she wanted nothing but

subjects, disarmed and tribute-paying, while in Sicily, she required

independent and efficient allies; so that the double conduct, which

Hermokratês reproached as inconsistent, proceeded from one and the

same root of public prudence. Pursuant to that motive, Athens dealt

differently with her different allies, according to the circumstances

of each. Thus, she respected the autonomy of Chios and Methymna, and

maintained equal relations with other islanders near Peloponnesus;

and such were the relations which she now wished to establish in

Sicily.

No: it was Syracuse, not Athens, whom the Kamarinæans and other

Sicilians had really ground to fear. Syracuse was aiming at the

acquisition of imperial sway over the island; and that which she

had already done towards the Leontines showed what she was prepared

to do when the time came, against Kamarina and others. It was under

this apprehension that the Kamarinæans had formerly invited Athens

into Sicily: it would be alike unjust and impolitic were they now to

repudiate her aid, for she could accomplish nothing without them; if

they did so on the present occasion, they would repent it hereafter

when exposed to the hostility of a constant encroaching neighbor,

and when Athenian auxiliaries could not again be had. He repelled

the imputations which Hermokratês had cast upon Athens, but the

Kamarinæans were not sitting as judges or censors upon her merits. It

was for them to consider whether that meddlesome disposition, with

which Athens was reproached, was not highly beneficial as the terror

of oppressors, and the shield of weaker states, throughout Greece.

He now tendered it to the Kamarinæans as their only security against

Syracuse; calling upon them, instead of living in perpetual fear of

her aggression, to seize the present opportunity of attacking her on

an equal footing, jointly with Athens.[344]

[344] Thucyd. vi, 83-87.

In these two remarkable speeches, we find Hermokratês renewing

substantially the same line of counsel as he had taken up ten years

before at the congress of Gela, to settle all Sicilian differences at

home, and above all things to keep out the intervention of Athens;

who if she once got footing in Sicily, would never rest until she

reduced all the cities successively. This was the natural point of

view for a Syracusan politician; but by no means equally natural,

nor equally conclusive, for an inhabitant of one of the secondary

Sicilian cities, especially of the conterminous Kamarina. And the

oration of Euphêmus is an able pleading to demonstrate that the

Kamarinæans had far more to fear from Syracuse than from Athens.

His arguments to this point are at least highly plausible, if not

convincing: but he seems to lay himself open to attack from the

opposite quarter. If Athens cannot hope to gain any subjects in

Sicily, what motive has she for interfering? This Euphêmus meets

by contending that if she does not interfere, the Syracusans and

their allies will come across and render assistance to the enemies

of Athens in Peloponnesus. It is manifest, however, that under the

actual circumstances of the time, Athens could have no real fears of

this nature, and that her real motives for meddling in Sicily were

those of hope and encroachment, not of self-defence. But it shows

how little likely such hopes were to be realized, and therefore how

ill-advised the whole plan of interference in Sicily was,—that the

Athenian envoy could say to the Kamarinæans, in the same strain

as Nikias had spoken at Athens when combating the wisdom of the

expedition: “Such is the distance of Sicily from Athens, and such

the difficulty of guarding cities of great force and ample territory

combined, that if we wished to hold you Sicilians as subjects,

we should be unable to do it: we can only retain you as free and

powerful allies.”[345] What Nikias said at Athens to dissuade his

countrymen from the enterprise, under sincere conviction, Euphêmus

repeated at Kamarina for the purpose of conciliating that city;

probably, without believing it himself, yet the anticipation was not

on that account the less true and reasonable.

[345] Thucyd. vi, 86. ἡμεῖς μέν γε οὔτε ἐμμεῖναι δυνατοὶ μὴ

μεθ’ ὑμῶν· εἴ τε καὶ γενόμενοι κακοὶ κατεργασαίμεθα, ἀδύνατοι

κατασχεῖν, διὰ μῆκός τε πλοῦ καὶ ἀπορίᾳ φυλακῆς πόλεων μεγάλων

καὶ παρασκευῇ ἠπειρωτίδων, etc.

This is exactly the language of Nikias in his speech to the

Athenians. vi, 11.

The Kamarinæans felt the force of both speeches, from Hermokratês

and Euphêmus. Their inclinations carried them towards the Athenians,

yet not without a certain misgiving in case Athens should prove

completely successful. Towards the Syracusans, on the contrary, they

entertained nothing but unqualified apprehension, and jealousy of

very ancient date; and even now their great fear was, of probable

suffering, if the Syracusans succeeded against Athens without their

coöperation. In this dilemma, they thought it safest to give an

evasive answer, of friendly sentiment towards both parties, but

refusal of aid to either; hoping thus to avoid an inexpiable breach,

whichever way the ultimate success might turn.[346]

[346] Thucyd. vi, 88.

For a city comparatively weak and situated like Kamarina, such was

perhaps the least hazardous policy. In December, 415 B.C., no human

being could venture to predict how the struggle between Nikias and

the Syracusans in the coming year would turn out; nor were the

Kamarinæans prompted by any hearty feeling to take the extreme

chances with either party. Matters had borne a different aspect,

indeed, in the preceding month of July 415 B.C., when the Athenians

first arrived. Had the vigorous policy urged by Lamachus been then

followed up, the Athenians would always have appeared likely to

succeed, if, indeed, they had not already become conquerors of

Syracuse; so that waverers like the Kamarinæans would have remained

attached to them from policy. The best way to obtain allies, Lamachus

had contended, was, to be prompt and decisive in action, and to

strike at the capital point at once, while the intimidating effect

of their arrival was fresh. Of the value of his advice, an emphatic

illustration is afforded by the conduct of Kamarina.[347]

[347] Compare the remarks of Alkibiadês, Thucyd. vi, 91.

Throughout the rest of the winter, Nikias did little or nothing.

He merely despatched envoys for the purpose of conciliating the

Sikels in the interior, where the autonomous Sikels, who dwelt in

the central regions of the island, for the most part declared in

his favor,—especially the powerful Sikel prince Archônidês,—sending

provisions and even money to the camp at Naxos. Against some

refractory tribes, Nikias sent detachments for purposes of

compulsion; while the Syracusans on their part did the like to

counteract him. Such Sikel tribes as had become dependents of

Syracuse, stood aloof from the struggle. As the spring approached,

Nikias transferred his position from Naxos to Katana, reëstablishing

that camp which the Syracusans had destroyed.[348]

[348] Thucyd. vi, 88.

He farther sent a trireme to Carthage, to invite coöperation from

that city; and a second to the Tyrrhenian maritime cities on the

southern coast of Italy, some of whom had proffered to him their

services, as ancient enemies of Syracuse, and now realized their

promises. From Carthage nothing was obtained; why, we do not know;

for we shall find the Carthaginians, six years hence, invading

Sicily with prodigious forces; and if they entertained any such

intentions, it would seem that the presence of Nikias in Sicily must

have presented the most convenient moment for executing them. To the

Sikels, Egestæans, and all the other allies of Athens, Nikias sent

orders for bricks, iron bars, clamps, and everything suitable for the

wall of circumvallation, which was to be commenced with the first

burst of spring.

While such preparations were going on in Sicily, debates of

portentous promise took place at Sparta. Immediately after the

battle near the Olympieion, and the retreat of Nikias into winter

quarters, the Syracusans had despatched envoys to Peloponnesus to

solicit reinforcements. Here, again, we are compelled to notice the

lamentable consequences arising out of the inaction of Nikias. Had

he commenced the siege of Syracuse on his first arrival, it may be

doubted whether any such envoys would have been sent to Peloponnesus

at all; at any rate, they would not have arrived in time to produce

decisive effects.[349] After exerting what influence they could upon

the Italian Greeks in their voyage, the Syracusan envoys reached

Corinth, where they found the warmest reception and obtained promises

of speedy succor. The Corinthians furnished envoys of their own to

accompany them to Sparta, and to back their request for Lacedæmonian

aid.

[349] Thucyd. vi, 88; vii, 42.

They found at the congress at Sparta another advocate upon whom they

could not reasonably have counted, Alkibiadês. That exile had crossed

over from Thurii to the Eleian port of Kyllênê in Peloponnesus in

a merchant-vessel,[350] and now appeared at Sparta on special

invitation and safe-conduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was

at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against

them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much

trouble before the battle of Mantineia. He now appeared, too, burning

with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her

all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to

plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this ill-starred

venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her

irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations,

supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and

inflamed the tardy good-will of the Spartan ephors into comparative

decision and activity.[351] His harangue in the Spartan congress is

given to us by Thucydidês, who may possibly have heard it, as he was

then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the

mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree;

and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed

speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the

substance, without professing to translate the words.

[350] Plutarch (Alkib. c. 23) says that he went to reside at

Argos; but this seems difficult to reconcile with the assertion

of Thucydidês (vi, 61) that his friends at Argos had incurred

grave suspicions of treason.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkib. c. 4) says, with greater probability of

truth, that Alkibiadês went from Thurii, first to Elis, next to

Thebes.

Isokratês (De Bigis, Orat. xvi, s. 10) says that the Athenians

banished him out of all Greece, inscribed his name on a column,

and sent envoys to demand his person from the Argeians; so that

Alkibiadês _was compelled_ to take refuge with the Lacedæmonians.

This whole statement of Isokratês is exceedingly loose and

untrustworthy, carrying back the commencement of the conspiracy

of the Four Hundred to a time anterior to the banishment of

Alkibiadês. But among all the vague sentences, this allegation

that the Athenians banished him out of _all Greece_ stands

prominent. They could only banish him from the territory of

Athens and her allies. Whether he went to Argos, as I have

already said, seems to me very doubtful: perhaps Plutarch copied

the statement from this passage of Isokratês.

But under all circumstances, we are not to believe that

Alkibiadês turned against his country, or went to Sparta, _upon

compulsion_. The first act of his hostility to Athens, the

disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê, was committed

before he left Sicily. Moreover, Thucydidês represents him as

unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he

was afraid of the Spartans; in fact, waiting for a safe-conduct

and invitation from them. Thucydidês mentions nothing about his

going to Argos (vi, 88).

[351] Thucyd. vi, 88.

“First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices

current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair

hearing on public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public

connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarrelled

with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your

favor on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at

Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took

the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ

my enemies as your agents, thus strengthening their hands, and

dishonoring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite

with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with

me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some

of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan

of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Peisistratid

despots; and as all opposition to a reigning dynasty takes the name

of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as

leaders of the people.[352] Moreover, our established constitution

was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey, though I did my

best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst

of the reigning license. It was not my family, but others, who in

former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses,

those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader, not

of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that

constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom,

and which I found already existing.[353] For as to democracy, all we

Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally,

I have better reason than any one else to rail against it, if one

_could_ say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not

think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as

enemies.

[352] Thucyd. vi, 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροί ἐσμεν,

πᾶν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ’

ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always

opposed to τύραννοι, or despots, and had been particularly

opposed to the Peisistratid τύραννοι, whom they in fact put

down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this

source, Alkibiadês took the best means of excusing them before a

Lacedæmonian audience.

[353] Thucyd. vi, 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν,

δικαιοῦντες ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη

οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασῴζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν

γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν

χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολογουμένης ἀνοίας

οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν

ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

“So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the

business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet

know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the

Sicilian Greeks; next, the Italian Greeks; afterwards, to make an

attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all

or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus.

We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the

Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and

other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes

built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of

treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round

with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force;

and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others

as permanent fortified positions, that we should easily conquer the

whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You

thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows

it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will

execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can

hinder them. If, indeed, the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they

might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannot, beaten as

they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they

are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all

Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I

have described will be soon upon you.

“It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily,—it is for

the safety of Peloponnesus,—that I now urge you to send across,

forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I

consider still more important than an army, a Spartan general to

take the supreme command. Moreover, you must also carry on declared

and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be

encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to

send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and

permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica:[354] that is the contingency

which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which

therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get

into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, interrupt the

working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of

their profits from judicial fines as well as of their landed revenue,

and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

[354] The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified

post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even

before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i, 122).

“None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this

vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies,

I who once passed for a patriot.[355] Nor ought you to mistrust

my assurances, as coming from the reckless passion of an exile.

The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like

you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved

my country,[356] while I was secure as a citizen; I love her no

more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to

be assailing a country still mine; I am rather trying to win back

a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who, having

unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience, but he whose ardor

makes him try every means to regain her.

[355] Thucyd. vi, 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι,

εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι,

νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

[356] Thucyd. vi, 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ’

ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ’ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν

ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις

οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ’

ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

“Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or

suffering; the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more

good I can now do you as a friend. But above all, do not shrink back

from instant operations both in Sicily and in Attica, upon which so

much depends. You will thus put down the power of Athens, present as

well as future; you will dwell yourselves in safety; and you will

become the leaders of undivided Hellas, by free consent and without

force.”[357]

[357] Thucyd. vi, 89-92.

Enormous consequences turned upon this speech, no less masterly

in reference to the purpose and the audience, than infamous as an

indication of the character of the speaker. If its contents became

known at Athens, as they probably did, the enemies of Alkibiadês

would be supplied with a justification of their most violent

political attacks. That imputation which they had taken so much

pains to fasten upon him, citing in proof of it alike his profligate

expenditure, overbearing insolence, and derision of the religious

ceremonies of the state,[358]—that he detested the democracy in his

heart, submitted to it only from necessity, and was watching for the

first safe opportunity of subverting it,—appears here in his own

language as matter of avowal and boast. The sentence of condemnation

against him would now be unanimously approved, even by those who

at the time had deprecated it; and the people would be more firmly

persuaded than before of the reality of the association between

irreligious manifestations and treasonable designs. Doubtless the

inferences so drawn from the speech would be unsound, because it

represented, not the actual past sentiments of Alkibiadês, but those

to which he now found it convenient to lay claim. As far as so very

selfish a politician could be said to have any preference, democracy

was, in some respects, more convenient to him than oligarchy.

Though offensive to his taste, it held out larger prospects to

his love of show, his adventurous ambition, and his rapacity for

foreign plunder; while under an oligarchy, the jealous restraints

and repulses imposed on him by a few equals, would be perhaps more

galling to his temper than those arising from the whole people.[359]

He takes credit in his speech for moderation, as opposed to the

standing license of democracy. But this is a pretence absurd even to

extravagance, and which Athenians of all parties would have listened

to with astonishment. Such license as that of Alkibiadês had never

been seen at Athens; and it was the adventurous instincts of the

democracy towards foreign conquest, combined with their imperfect

apprehension of the limits and conditions under which alone their

empire could be permanently maintained, which he stimulated up to the

highest point, and then made use of for his own power and profit. As

against himself, he had reason for accusing his political enemies

of unworthy manœuvres, and even of gross political wickedness, if

they were authors or accomplices—as seems probable of some—in the

mutilation of the Hermæ. But most certainly, their public advice to

the commonwealth was far less mischievous than his. And if we are to

strike the balance of personal political merit between Alkibiadês

and his enemies, we must take into the comparison his fraud upon the

simplicity of the Lacedæmonian envoys, recounted in the last chapter

but one of this History.

[358] Thucyd. vi, 28.

[359] See a remarkable passage of Thucyd. viii, 89, ῥᾷον τὰ

ἀποβαίνοντα, ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἐλασσούμενός τις φέρει,

and the note in explanation of it, in a later chapter of this

History, chap. lxii.

If, then, that portion of the speech of Alkibiadês, wherein he

touches upon Athenian politics and his own past conduct, is not

to be taken as historical evidence, just as little can we trust

the following portion in which he professes to describe the real

purposes of Athens in her Sicilian expedition. That any such vast

designs as those which he announces were ever really contemplated

even by himself and his immediate friends, is very improbable; that

they were contemplated by the Athenian public, by the armament, or

by Nikias, is utterly incredible. The tardiness and timid movements

of the armament—during the first eight months after arriving at

Rhegium—recommended by Nikias, partially admitted even by Alkibiadês,

opposed only by the unavailing wisdom of Lamachus, and not strongly

censured when known at Athens, conspire to prove that their minds

were not at first fully made up even to the siege of Syracuse;

that they counted on alliances and money in Sicily which they did

not find; and that those who sailed from Athens with large hopes

of brilliant and easy conquest were soon taught to see the reality

with different eyes. If Alkibiadês had himself conceived at Athens

the designs which he professed to reveal in his speech at Sparta,

there can be no doubt that he would have espoused the scheme of

Lamachus, or rather would have originated it himself. We find him,

indeed, in his speech delivered at Athens before the determination

to sail, holding out hopes that by means of conquests in Sicily,

Athens might become mistress of all Greece. But this is there put as

an alternative and as a favorable possibility, is noticed only in

one place, without expansion or amplification, and shows that the

speaker did not reckon upon finding any such expectations prevalent

among his hearers. Alkibiadês could not have ventured to promise,

in his discourse at Athens, the results which he afterwards talked

of at Sparta as having been actually contemplated,—Sicily, Italy,

Carthage, Iberian mercenaries, etc., all ending in a blockading fleet

large enough to gird round Peloponnesus.[360] Had he put forth such

promises, the charge of juvenile folly which Nikias urged against

him would probably have been believed by every one. His speech at

Sparta, though it has passed with some as a fragment of true Grecian

history, is in truth little better than a gigantic romance dressed up

to alarm his audience.[361]

[360] Thucyd. vi, 12-17.

[361] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 17.

Intended for this purpose, it was eminently suitable and

effective. The Lacedæmonians had already been partly moved by the

representations from Corinth and Syracuse, and were even prepared

to send envoys to the latter place with encouragement to hold out

against Athens. But the Peace of Nikias and the alliance succeeding

it, still subsisted between Athens and Sparta. It had indeed been

partially and indirectly violated in many ways, but both the

contracting parties still considered it as subsisting, nor would

either of them yet consent to break their oaths openly and avowedly.

For this reason—as well as from the distance of Sicily, great even

in the estimation of the more nautical Athenians—the ephors could

not yet make up their minds to despatch thither any positive aid.

It was exactly in this point of hesitation between the will and the

deed that the energetic and vindictive exile from Athens found them.

His flaming picture of the danger impending,—brought home to their

own doors, and appearing to proceed from the best informed of all

witnesses,—overcame their reluctance at once; while he at the same

time pointed out the precise steps whereby their interference would

be rendered of most avail. The transfer of Alkibiadês to Sparta

thus reverses the superiority of force between the two contending

chiefs of Greece: “Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum.”[362] He had

not yet shown his power of doing his country good, as we shall find

him hereafter engaged, during the later years of the war: his first

achievements were but too successful in doing her harm.

[362] Lucan, Pharsal. iv, 819.

The Lacedæmonians forthwith resolved to send an auxiliary force

to Syracuse. But as this could not be done before the spring,

they nominated Gylippus commander, directing him to proceed

thither without delay, and to take counsel with the Corinthians

for operations as speedily as the case admitted.[363] We do not

know that Gylippus had as yet given any positive evidence of that

consummate skill and activity which we shall presently be called

upon to describe. He was probably chosen on account of his superior

acquaintance with the circumstances of the Italian and Sicilian

Greeks; since his father Kleandridas, after having been banished

from Sparta fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war for taking

Athenian bribes, had been domiciliated as a citizen at Thurii.[364]

Gylippus desired the Corinthians to send immediately two triremes for

him to Asinê, in the Messenian gulf, and to prepare as many others as

their docks could furnish.

[363] Thucyd. vi, 93; Plutarch, Alkib. c. 23; Diodor. xiii, 7.

[364] Thucyd. vi, 104.