CHAPTER LVIII._History of Greece, Volume 07 (of 12)

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE, DOWN TO THE

FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.

For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final

resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, described in the

last chapter, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation.

I have already mentioned that this resolution, though long opposed by

Nikias with a considerable minority, had at last been adopted—chiefly

through the unforeseen working of that which he intended as a

counter-manœuvre—with a degree of enthusiasm and unanimity, and upon

an enlarged scale, which surpassed all the anticipations of its

promoters. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited

religious advisers, announced generally the favorable dispositions of

the gods, and promised a triumphant result.[236] All classes in the

city, rich and poor,—cultivators, traders, and seamen, old and young,

all embraced the project with ardor; as requiring a great effort, yet

promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandizement and

individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for

personal service; so that the three generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and

Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites,

instead of being forced to employ constraint and incur ill-will,

as happened when an expedition was unpopular, had only to choose

the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers. Every man provided

himself with his best arms and with bodily accoutrements, useful as

well as ostentatious, for a long voyage and for the exigencies of a

varied land-and-sea-service. Among the trierarchs, or rich citizens,

who undertook each in his turn the duty of commanding a ship of war,

the competition was yet stronger. Each of them accounted it an honor

to be named, and vied with his comrades to exhibit his ship in the

most finished state of equipment. The state, indeed, furnished both

the trireme with its essential tackle and oars, and the regular pay

for the crew; but the trierarch, even in ordinary cases, usually

incurred various expenses besides, to make the equipment complete

and to keep the crew together. Such additional outlay, neither

exacted nor defined by law, but only by custom and general opinion,

was different in every individual case, according to temper and

circumstances. But on the present occasion, zeal and forwardness

were universal: each trierarch tried to procure for his own ship the

best crew, by offers of additional reward to all, but especially to

the thranitæ or rowers on the highest of the three tiers:[237] and

it seems that the seamen were not appointed specially to one ship,

but were at liberty to accept these offers, and to serve in any ship

they preferred. Each trierarch spent more than had ever been known

before in pay, outfit, provision, and even external decoration of his

vessel. Besides the best crews which Athens herself could furnish,

picked seamen were also required from subject-allies, and were bid

for in the same way by the trierarchs.[238]

[236] Thucyd. viii, 1.

[237] Thucyd. vi, 31. ἐπιφοράς τε πρὸς τῷ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθῷ

διδόντων τοῖς θρανίταις τῶν ναυτῶν καὶ ~ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις~, καὶ

τἄλλα σημείοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς πολυτελέσι χρησαμένων, etc.

Dobree and Dr. Arnold explain ὑπηρεσίαις to mean _the petty

officers_, such as κυβερνήτης, κελευστὴς, etc. Göller and Poppo

construe it to mean “_the servants of the sailors_.” Neither

of the two seems to me satisfactory. I think the word means

“to the crews generally;” the word ὑπερησία being a perfectly

general word comprising all who received pay in the ship. All the

examples produced in the notes of the commentators testify this

meaning, which also occurs in the text itself two lines before.

To construe ταῖς ὑπηρεσίαις as meaning “the crews generally, or

the remaining crews, along with the thranitæ,” is doubtless more

or less awkward. But it departs less from ordinary construction

than either of the two senses which the commentators propose.

[238] Thucyd. vii, 13. οἱ ξένοι, οἱ μὲν ἀναγκαστοὶ ἐσβάντες, etc.

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact, that five years had

now elapsed since the Peace of Nikias, without any considerable

warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with

fresh accumulations,[239] and the triremes increased in number, the

military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had

forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic

disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in

number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the

second year of the previous war under Periklês, was incomparably

superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest,

in the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral; in

picked men, universal ardor, ships as well as arms in the best

condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was

the confidence of success, that many Athenians went prepared for

trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock thus added

to the public outfit, and to the sums placed in the hands of the

generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. Much of

this was visible to the eye, contributing to heighten that general

excitement of Athenian imagination which pervaded the whole city

while the preparations were going forward: a mingled feeling of

private sympathy and patriotism,—a dash of uneasiness from reflection

on the distant and unknown region wherein the fleet was to act,—yet

an elate confidence in Athenian force, such as had never before been

entertained.[240] We hear of Sokratês the philosopher, and Meton the

astronomer, as forming exceptions to this universal tone of sanguine

anticipation: the familiar genius which constantly waited upon the

philosopher is supposed to have forewarned him of the result. Nor is

it impossible that he may have been averse to the expedition, though

the fact is less fully certified than we could wish. Amidst a general

predominance of the various favorable religious signs and prophecies,

there were also some unfavorable. Usually, on all public matters of

risk or gravity, there were prophets who gave assurances in opposite

ways: those which turned out right were treasured up: the rest were

at once forgotten, or never long remembered.[241]

[239] Thucyd. vi, 26. I do not trust the statement given in

Æschinês, De Fals. Legat. c. 54, p. 302, and in Andokidês, De

Pace, sect. 8, that seven thousand talents were laid by as an

accumulated treasure in the acropolis during the Peace of Nikias,

and that four hundred triremes, or three hundred triremes, were

newly built. The numerous historical inaccuracies in those

orations, concerning the facts prior to 400 B.C., are such as to

deprive them of all authority, except where they are confirmed

by other testimony; even if we admitted the oration ascribed to

Andokidês as genuine, which in all probability it is not.

But there exists an interesting Inscription which proves that

the sum of three thousand talents at least must have been laid

by, during the interval between the conclusion of the Peace of

Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, in the acropolis; and that

over and above this accumulated fund, the state was in condition

to discharge, out of the current receipts, various sums which it

had borrowed during the previous war from the treasury of various

temples, and seems to have had besides a surplus for docks and

fortifications. The Inscription above named records the vote

passed for discharging these debts, and for securing the sums so

paid in the opisthodomus, or back-chamber, of the Parthenon, for

account of those gods to whom they respectively belonged. See

Boeckh’s Corp. Inscr. part ii, Inscr. Att. No. 76, p. 117; also

the Staats-haushaltung der Athener of the same author, vol. ii,

p. 198. This Inscription belongs unquestionably to one of the

years between 421-415 B.C., to which year we cannot say.

[240] Thucyd. vi, 31; Diodor. xiii, 2, 3.

[241] Plutarch (Nikias, c. 12, 13; Alkibiad. c. 17). Immediately

after the catastrophe at Syracuse, the Athenians were very angry

with those prophets who had promised them success (Thucyd. viii,

1).

After between two and three months of active preparations, the

expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which

fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the

mutilation of the Hermæ, one of the most extraordinary events in all

Grecian history.

These Hermæ, or half-statues of the god Hermês, were blocks of marble

about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a

head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular

pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the

significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in

great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous

situations; standing beside the outer doors of private houses as well

as of temples, near the most frequented porticos, at the intersection

of cross ways, in the public agora. They were thus present to the

eye of every Athenian in all his acts of intercommunion, either

for business or pleasure, with his fellow-citizens. The religious

feelings of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or

domiciliated where his statue stood,[242] so that the companionship,

sympathy, and guardianship of Hermês became associated with most of

the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens,—political, social,

commercial, or gymnastic. Moreover, the quadrangular fashion of

these statues, employed occasionally for other gods besides Hermês,

was a most ancient relic handed down from the primitive rudeness

of Pelasgian workmanship and was popular in Arcadia as well as

peculiarly frequent in Athens.[243]

[242] Cicero, Legg. ii, 11. “Melius Græci atque nostri; qui,

ut augerent pietatem in Deos, easdem illos urbes, quas nos,

_incolere_ voluerunt.”

How much the Grecian mind was penetrated with the idea of the

god as an actual inhabitant of the town, may be seen illustrated

in the Oration of Lysias, cont. Andokid. sects. 15-46: compare

Herodotus, v, 67; a striking story, as illustrated in this

History, vol. iii, ch. ix, p. 34; also Xenophon, Hellen. vi, 4-7;

Livy, xxxviii, 43.

In an Inscription in Boeckh’s Corp. Insc. (part ii, No. 190, p.

320) a list of the names of Prytaneis, appears, at the head of

which list figures the name of Athênê Polias.

[243] Pausanias, i, 24, 3; iv, 33, 4; viii, 31, 4; viii, 48,

4; viii, 41, 4; Plutarch, An Seni sit Gerenda Respubl. ad

finem; Aristophan. Plut. 1153, and Schol.: compare O. Müller,

Archäologie der Kunst, sect. 67; K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstl.

Alterth. der Griechen, sect. 15; Gerhard, De Religione Hermarum.

Berlin, 1845.

About the end of May, 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same

night, all these Hermæ, one of the most peculiar marks of the city,

were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were

knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of

stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt

with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, Andokidês

affirms, and I incline to believe him, that there was but _one_ which

escaped unharmed.[244]

[244] Thucyd. vi, 27. ὅσοι Ἑρμαῖ ἦσαν λίθινοι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇ

Ἀθηναίων ... ~μιᾷ νυκτὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι~ περιεκόπησαν τὰ πρόσωπα.

Andokidês (De Myst. sect. 63) expressly states that only a single

one was spared—καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὃν ὁρᾶτε πάντες, ὁ παρὰ τὴν

πατρῷαν οἰκίαν τὴν ἡμετέραν, οὐ περιεκόπη, ~μόνος τῶν Ἑρμῶν τῶν

Ἀθήνῃσι~.

Cornelius Nepos (Alkibiad. c. 3) and Plutarch (Alkib. c. 13)

copy Andokidês: in his life of Nikias (c. 18) the latter uses

the expression of Thucydidês—οἱ πλεῖστοι. This expression is

noway at variance with Andokidês, though it stops short of his

affirmation. There is great mixture of truth and falsehood in the

Oration of Andokidês; but I think that he is to be trusted as to

this point.

Diodorus (xiii, 2) says that _all_ the Hermæ were mutilated, not

recognizing a single exception. Cornelius Nepos, by a singular

inaccuracy, talks about the Hermæ as having been all _thrown

down_ (dejicerentur).

It is of course impossible for any one to sympathize fully with the

feelings of a religion not his own: indeed, the sentiment with

which, in the case of persons of different creeds, each regards

the strong emotions growing out of causes peculiar to the other,

is usually one of surprise that such trifles and absurdities can

occasion any serious distress or excitement.[245] But if we take

that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the

history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and

political associations of the Athenians,[246] noted in ancient

times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and

magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we

shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror,

and wrath, which beset the public mind on the morning after this

nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all

the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian

invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt

or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and

temples of the gods.[247] If we could imagine the excitement of

a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the

Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a

parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt

at Athens, where religious associations and persons were far more

intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings

of every-day life; where, too, the god and his efficiency were more

forcibly localized, as well as identified with the presence and

keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the

following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway

dishonored and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that

the devastation was general, it would seem that the town had become

as it were godless; that the streets, the market-place, the porticos,

were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still,

that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away

with them alienated sentiments, wrathful and vindictive instead of

tutelary and sympathizing. It was on the protection of the gods, that

all their political constitution as well as the blessings of civil

life depended; insomuch that the curses of the gods were habitually

invoked as sanction and punishment for grave offences, political as

well as others:[248] an extension and generalization of the feeling

still attached to the judicial oath. This was, in the minds of the

people of Athens, a sincere and literal conviction, not simply a

form of speech to be pronounced in prayers and public harangues,

without being ever construed as a reality in calculating consequences

and determining practical measures. Accordingly, they drew from

the mutilation of the Hermæ the inference, not less natural than

terrifying, that heavy public misfortune was impending over the city,

and that the political constitution to which they were attached was

in imminent danger of being subverted.[249]

[245] It is truly astonishing to read the account given of this

mutilation of the Hermæ, and its consequences, by Wachsmuth,

Hellen. Alterthümer, vol. ii, sect. 65, pp. 191-196. While he

denounces the Athenian people, for their conduct during the

subsequent inquiry, in the most unmeasured language, you would

suppose that the incident which plunged them into this mental

distraction, at a moment of overflowing hope and confidence, was

a mere trifle: so briefly does he pass it over, without taking

the smallest pains to show in what way it profoundly wounded the

religious feeling of Athens.

Büttner (Geschichte der politischen Hetærieen zu Athen. p. 65),

though very brief, takes a fairer view than Wachsmuth.

[246] Pausanias, i, 17, 1; i, 24, 3; Harpokration v, Ἑρμαῖ. See

Sluiter, Lectiones Andocideæ, cap. 2.

Especially the ἀγυιατίδες θεραπεῖαι (Eurip. Ion. 187) were noted

at Athens: ceremonial attentions towards the divine persons who

protected the public streets, a function performed by Apollo

Aguieus, as well as by Hermes.

[247] Herodot. viii, 144; Æschylus, Pers. 810; Æschyl. Agam.

339. The wrath for any indignity offered to the statue of a

god or goddess, and impatience to punish it capitally, is

manifested as far back as the ancient epic poem of Arktinus:

see the argument of the Ἰλίου Πέρσις in Proclus, and Welcker,

Griechische Tragödien, _Sophoklês_, sect. 21, vol. i, p. 162.

Herodotus cannot explain the indignities offered by Kambyses to

the Egyptian statues and holy customs upon any other supposition

than that of stark madness, ἐμάνη μεγάλως; Herod. iii, 37-38.

Timæus the Sicilian historian (writing about 320-290 B.C.)

represented the subsequent defeat of the Athenians as a divine

punishment for the desecration of the Hermæ, inflicted chiefly by

the Syracusan Hermokratês, son of Hermon and descendant of the

god Hermes (Timæi Fragm. 103-104, ed. Didot; Longinus, de Sublim.

iv, 3).

The etymological thread of connection, between the Hermæ and

Hermokratês, is strange enough: but what is of importance to

remark, is the deep-seated belief that such an act must bring

after it divine punishment, and that the Athenians as a people

were collectively responsible, unless they could appease the

divine displeasure. If this was the view taken by the historian

Timæus a century and more after the transaction, much more keenly

was it present to the minds of the Athenians of that day.

[248] Thucyd. viii, 97; Plato, Legg. ix, pp. 871 _b_, 881 _d_.

ἡ τοῦ νόμου ἄρα, etc. Demosthen. Fals. Legat. p. 363, c. 24, p.

404, c. 60; Plutarch, Solon, c. 24.

[249] Dr. Thirlwall observes, in reference to the feeling at

Athens after the mutilation of the Hermæ:—

“We indeed see so little connection between acts of daring

impiety and designs against the state, that we can hardly

understand how they could have been associated together as

they were in the minds of the Athenians. But perhaps the

difficulty may not without reason have appeared much less to the

contemporaries of Alcibiadês, who were rather disposed by their

views of religion to regard them as inseparable.” (Hist. Gr. ch.

xxv, vol. iii, p. 394.)

This remark, like so many others in Dr. Thirlwall’s history,

indicates a tone of liberality forming a striking contrast

with Wachsmuth; and rare indeed among the learned men who have

undertaken to depict the democracy of Athens. It might, however,

have been stated far more strongly; for an Athenian citizen

would have had quite as much difficulty in comprehending our

_disjunction_ of the two ideas, as we have in comprehending his

_association_ of the two.

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager

and bustling movement of Athens, a few days before the Sicilian

expedition was in condition for starting. In reference to that

expedition it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen.[250]

It would doubtless have been so determined, had it been a mere

undesigned accident happening to any venerated religious object,

just as we are told that similar misgivings were occasioned by the

occurrence, about this same time, of the melancholy festival of the

Adonia, wherein the women loudly bewailed the untimely death of

Adonis.[251] The mutilation of the Hermæ, however, was something

much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as

the deliberate act of organized conspirators, not inconsiderable in

number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who

had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard

of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where

the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we

know no parallel: much more mutilation by wholesale, spread by one

band and in one night throughout an entire city. Though neither the

parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially

made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

[250] Thucyd. vi, 27. Καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα μειζόνως ἐλάμβανον· τοῦ τε

γὰρ ἐκπλοῦ οἰωνὸς ἐδόκει εἶναι, καὶ ἐπὶ ξυνωμοσίᾳ ἅμα νεωτέρων

πραγμάτων καὶ δήμου καταλύσεως γεγενῆσθαι.

Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiad. c. 3. “Hoc quum appareret non sine

magnimultorum consensione esse factam,” etc.

[251] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 18; Pherekratês, Fr. Inc. 84, ed.

Meineke; Fragment. Comic. Græc. vol. ii, p. 358, also p. 1164;

Aristoph. Frag. Inc. 120.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the

conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the

other: to ruin Alkibiadês, to frustrate or delay the expedition. How

they pursued the former purpose, will be presently seen: towards the

latter, nothing was ostensibly done, but the position of Teukrus,

and other metics implicated, renders it more likely that they were

influenced by sympathies with Corinth and Megara,[252] prompting

them to intercept an expedition which was supposed to promise great

triumphs to Athens, rather than corrupted by the violent antipathies

of intestine politics. Indeed, the two objects were intimately

connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise,

while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant

with future power and wealth to Alkibiadês himself. Such chances

would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at

all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of

religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the Hermæ, might

throw up the scheme altogether. Especially Nikias, exquisitely

sensitive in his own religious conscience, and never hearty in his

wish for going, a fact perfectly known to the enemy,[253] would

hasten to consult his prophets, and might reasonably be expected

to renew his opposition on the fresh ground offered to him, or

at least to claim delay until the offended gods should have been

appeased. We may judge how much such a proceeding was in the line of

his character, and of the Athenian character, when we find him, two

years afterwards, with the full concurrence of his soldiers, actually

sacrificing the last opportunity of safe retreat for the half-ruined

Athenian army in Sicily, and refusing even to allow the proposition

to be debated, in consequence of an eclipse of the moon; and when we

reflect that Spartans and other Greeks frequently renounced public

designs if an earthquake happened before the execution.[254]

[252] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 18; Pseudo-Plutarch, Vit. X, Orator.

p. 834, who professes to quote from Kratippus, an author nearly

contemporary. The Pseudo-Plutarch, however, asserts, what cannot

be true, that the Corinthians employed Leontine and Egestæan

agents to destroy the Hermæ. The Leontines and Egestæans were

exactly the parties who had greatest interest in getting the

Sicilian expedition to start: they are the last persons whom the

Corinthians would have chosen as instruments. The fact is, that

no foreigners could well have done the deed: it required great

familiarity with all the buildings, highways, and byways of

Athens.

The Athenian Philochorus (writing about the date 310-280 B.C.)

ascribed the mutilation of the Hermæ to the Corinthians; if we

may believe the scholiast on Aristophanês; who, however, is not

very careful, since he tells us that _Thucydidês_ ascribed that

act to Alkibiadês and his friends; which is not true (Philochor.

Frag. 110, ed. Didot; Schol. Aristoph. Lysistr. 1094).

[253] Thucyd. vi, 34.

[254] See Thucyd. v, 45; v, 50; viii, 5. Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7,

But though the chance of setting aside the expedition altogether

might reasonably enter into the plans of the conspirators, as a

likely consequence of the intense shock inflicted on the religious

mind of Athens, and especially of Nikias, this calculation was not

realized. Probably matters had already proceeded too far even for

Nikias to recede. Notice had been sent round to all the allies;

forces were already on their way to the rendezvous at Korkyra; the

Argeian and Mantineian allies were arriving at Peiræus to embark. So

much the more eagerly did the conspirators proceed in the other part

of their plan, to work that exaggerated religious terror, which they

had themselves artificially brought about, for the ruin of Alkibiadês.

Few men in Athens either had or deserved to have a greater number of

enemies, political as well as private, than Alkibiades; many of them

being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence,

and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by

his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much

increased, and threatened to be so much more increased, by the

Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in

compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the Hermæ seem to

have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to

profit.

Amidst the mournful dismay spread by the discovery of so unparalleled

a sacrilege, it appeared to the Athenian people,—as it would

have appeared to the ephors at Sparta, or to the rulers in every

oligarchical city of Greece,—that it was their paramount and

imperative duty to detect and punish the authors. So long as these

latter were walking about unknown and unpunished, the temples were

defiled by their presence, and the whole city was accounted under

the displeasure of the gods, who would inflict upon it heavy public

misfortunes.[255] Under this displeasure every citizen felt himself

comprehended, so that the sense of public security as well as of

private comfort were alike unappeased, until the offenders should be

discovered and atonement made by punishing or expelling them. Large

rewards were accordingly proclaimed to any person who could give

information, and even impunity to any accomplice whose confession

might lay open the plot. Nor did the matter stop here. Once under

this painful shock of religious and political terror, the Athenians

became eager talkers and listeners on the subject of other recent

acts of impiety. Every one was impatient to tell all that he knew,

and more than he knew, about such incidents; while to exercise

any strict criticism upon the truth of such reports, would argue

weakness of faith and want of religious zeal, rendering the critic

himself a suspected man, “metuunt dubitasse videri.” To rake out

and rigorously visit all such offenders, and thus to display an

earnest zeal for the honor of the gods, was accounted one auxiliary

means of obtaining absolution from them for the recent outrage.

Hence an additional public vote was passed, promising rewards and

inviting information from all witnesses,—citizens, metics, or even

slaves,—respecting any previous acts of impiety which might have

come within their cognizance,[256] but at the same time providing

that informers who gave false depositions should be punished

capitally.[257]

[255] See the remarkable passage in the contemporary pleading of

Antiphon on a trial for homicide (Orat. ii. Tetralog. 1. 1, 10).

Ἀσύμφορόν θ’ ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τόνδε μιαρὸν καὶ ἄναγνον ὄντα εἰς τὰ

τεμένη τῶν θεῶν εἰσιόντα μιαίνειν τὴν ἁγνείαν αὐτῶν ἐπί τε

τὰς αὐτὰς τραπέζας ἰόντα ~συγκαταπιμπλάναι τοὺς ἀναιτίους· ἐκ

γὰρ τούτων αἵ τε ἀφορίαι γίγνονται δυστυχεῖς θ’ αἱ πράξεις

καθίστανται~. ~Οἰκείαν~ οὖν χρὴ τὴν ~τιμωρίαν ἡγησαμένους~, αὐτῷ

τούτῳ τὰ τούτου ἀσεβήματα ἀναθέντας, ἰδίαν μὲν τὴν συμφορὰν

καθαρὰν δὲ τὴν πόλιν καταστῆσαι.

Compare Antiphon, De Cæde Herodis, sect. 83 and Sophoklês, Œdip.

Tyrann. 26, 96, 170, as to the miseries which befell a country,

so long as the person guilty of homicide remained to pollute

the soil and until he was slain or expelled. See also Xenophon,

Hiero. iv, 4, and Plato, Legg. x, p. 885-910, at the beginning

and the end of the tenth book. Plato ranks (ὕβρις) outrage

against sacred objects as the highest and most guilty species

of ὕβρις; deserving the severest punishment. He considers that

the person committing such impiety, unless he be punished or

banished, brings evil and the anger of the gods upon the whole

population.

[256] Thucyd. vi, 27.

[257] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sect. 20.

The Senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action;

while Diognêtus, Peisander, Chariklês, and others, were named

commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries, and public

assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports.[258] The

first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave

and recent mutilation of the Hermæ, but to analogous incidents of

older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in

drunken frolic; and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated

in various houses,[259] by parties of revellers caricaturing and

divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head

that the first impeachment was preferred against Alkibiadês.

[258] Andokidês de Mysteriis, sects. 14, 15, 36; Plutarch,

Alkibiad. c. 18.

[259] Those who are disposed to imagine that the violent feelings

and proceedings at Athens by the mutilation of the Hermæ were

the consequence of her democratical government, may be reminded

of an analogous event of modern times from which we are not yet

separated by a century.

In the year 1766, at Abbeville in France, two young gentlemen

of good family—the Chevalier d’Etallonde and Chevalier de la

Barre—were tried, convicted, and condemned for having injured

a wooden crucifix which stood on the bridge of that town: in

aggravation of this offence they were charged with having

sung indecent songs. The evidence to prove these points was

exceedingly doubtful; nevertheless, both were condemned to

have their tongues cut out by the roots, to have their right

hands cut off at the church gate, then to be tied to a post

in the market-place with an iron chain, and burnt by a slow

fire. This sentence, after being submitted by way of appeal to

the Parliament of Paris, and by them confirmed, was actually

executed upon the Chevalier de la Barre—d’Etallonde having

escaped—in July, 1766; with this mitigation, that he was allowed

to be decapitated before he was burnt; but at the same time

with this aggravation, that he was put to the torture, ordinary

and extraordinary, to compel him to disclose his accomplices

(Voltaire, Relation de la Mort du Chevalier de la Barre, Œuvres,

vol. xlii, pp. 361-379, ed. Beuchot: also Voltaire, Le Cri du

Sang Innocent, vol. xii, p. 133).

I extract from this treatise a passage showing how—as in this

mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens—the occurrence of one act of

sacrilege turns men’s imagination, belief, and talk, to others,

real or imaginary:—

“Tandis que Belleval ourdissoit sécrètement cette trame, il

arriva malheureusement que le crucifix de bois, posé sur le pont

d’Abbeville, étoit endommagé, et l’on soupçonna que des soldats

ivres avoient commis cette insolence impie.

“Malheureusement l’evêque d’Amiens, étant aussi evêque

d’Abbeville, donna à cette aventure une célébrité et une

importance qu’elle ne méritoit pas. Il fit lancer des monitoires:

il vint faire une procession solennelle auprès du crucifix; _et

on ne parla en Abbeville que de sacrilèges pendant une année

entière_. On disoit qu’il se formoit une nouvelle secte qui

brisoit les crucifix, qui jettoit par terre toutes les hosties,

et les perçoit à coups de couteaux. On assuroit qu’ils avoient

répandu beaucoup de sang. Il y eut des femmes qui crurent en

avoir été témoins. On renouvela tous les contes calomnieux

répandus contre les Juifs dans tant de villes de l’Europe. Vous

connoissez, Monsieur, jusqu’à quel point la populace porte la

credulité et le fanatisme, toujours encouragé par les moines.

“La procédure une fois commencée, il y eut une foule de

délations. Chacun disoit ce qu’il avoit vu ou cru voir—ce qu’il

avoit entendu ou cru entendre.”

It will be recollected that the sentence on the Chevalier de

la Barre was passed, not by the people, nor by any popular

judicature, but by a limited court of professional judges sitting

at Abbeville, and afterwards confirmed by the Parlement de Paris,

the first tribunal of professional judges in France.

So fully were the preparations of the armament now complete, that

the trireme of Lamachus—who was doubtless more diligent about the

military details than either of his two colleagues—was already moored

in the outer harbor, and the last public assembly was held for the

departing officers,[260] who probably laid before their countrymen

an imposing account of the force assembled, when Pythonikus rose to

impeach Alkibiadês. “Athenians,” said he, “you are going to despatch

this great force and incur all this hazard, at a moment when I am

prepared to show you that your general Alkibiadês is one of the

profaners of the holy mysteries, in a private house. Pass a vote of

impunity, and I will produce to you forthwith a slave of one here

present, who, though himself not initiated in the mysteries, shall

repeat to you what they are. Deal with me in any way you choose,

if my statement prove untrue.” While Alkibiadês strenuously denied

the allegation, the prytanes—senators presiding over the assembly,

according to the order determined by lot for that year among the ten

tribes—at once made proclamation for all uninitiated citizens to

depart from the assembly, and went to fetch the slave—Andromachus by

name—whom Pythonikus had indicated. On being introduced, Andromachus

deposed before the assembly that he had been with his master in the

house of Polytion, when Alkibiadês, Nikiadês, and Melêtus, went

through the sham celebration of the mysteries; many other persons

being present, and especially three other slaves besides himself. We

must presume that he verified this affirmation by describing what

the mysteries were which he had seen, the test which Pythonikus had

offered.[261]

[260] Andokidês (De Myster. s. 11) marks this time minutely—Ἦν

μὲν γὰρ ἐκκλησία τοῖς στρατηγοῖς τοῖς εἰς Σικελίαν, Νικίᾳ καὶ

Λαμάχῳ καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ, καὶ τριήρης ἡ στρατηγὶς ἤδη ἐξώρμει ἡ

Λαμάχου· ἀναστὰς δὲ Πυθόνικος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ εἶπεν, etc.

[261] Andokid. de Myster. s. 11-13.

Such was the first direct attack made upon Alkibiadês by his enemies.

Pythonikus, the demagogue Androklês, and other speakers, having

put in evidence this irreverent proceeding,—probably in substance

true,—enlarged upon it with the strongest invective, imputed to him

many other acts of the like character, and even denounced him as

cognizant of the recent mutilation of the Hermæ. All had been done,

they said, with a view to accomplish his purpose of subverting the

democracy, when bereft of its divine protectors; a purpose manifested

by the constant tenor of his lawless, overbearing, antipopular

demeanor. Infamous as this calumny was, so far as regarded the

mutilation of the Hermæ,—for whatever else Alkibiadês may have done,

of that act he was unquestionably innocent, being the very person

who had most to lose by it, and whom it ultimately ruined,—they

calculated upon the reigning excitement to get it accredited, and

probably to procure his deposition from the command, preparatory

to public trial. But in spite of all the disquietude arising from

the recent sacrilege, their expectations were defeated. The

strenuous denial of Alkibiadês, aided by his very peculiar position

as commander of the armament, as well as by the reflection that

the recent outrage tended rather to spoil his favorite projects in

Sicily, found general credence. The citizens enrolled to serve,

manifested strong disposition to stand by him; the allies from Argos

and Mantineia were known to have embraced the service chiefly at his

instigation; the people generally had become familiar with him as

the intended conqueror in Sicily, and were loth to be balked of this

project. From all these circumstances, his enemies, finding little

disposition to welcome the accusations which they preferred, were

compelled to postpone them until a more suitable time.[262]

[262] Thucyd. vi, 29. Isokratês (Orat. xvi, De Bigis, sects. 7,

8) represents these proceedings before the departure for Sicily,

in a very inaccurate manner.

But Alkibiadês saw full well the danger of having such charges

hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived

from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people

to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to

stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting

the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting

above all things on the mischief to the city, of sending him on

such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the

hardship to himself, of being aspersed by calumny during his absence,

without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in

themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that

the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were

very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the

trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility

to Alkibiadês. These men affected a tone of candor, deprecated the

delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition,

if he were put upon his trial forthwith, and proposed deferring the

trial until a certain number of days after his return.[263] Such was

the determination ultimately adopted; the supporters of Alkibiadês

probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving

that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for

his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus

his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his

immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure

for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing

their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther

accusation until he and the armament had departed.[264]

[263] Thucyd. vi, 29. Οἱ δ’ ἐχθροὶ, δεδιότες τό τε στράτευμα,

μὴ εὔνουν ἔχῃ, ἢν ἤδη ἀγωνίζηται, ὅ τε δῆμος μὴ μαλακίζηται,

θεραπεύων ὅτι δι’ ἐκεῖνον οἵ τ’ Ἀργεῖοι ξυνεστράτευον καὶ τῶν

Μαντινέων τινες, ἀπέτρεπον καὶ ἀπέσπευδον, ~ἄλλους ῥήτορας

ἐνιέντες~, οἳ ἔλεγον νῦν μὲν πλεῖν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ κατασχεῖν τὴν

ἀγωγὴν, ἐλθόντα δὲ κρίνεσθαι ἐν ἡμέραις ῥηταῖς, βουλόμενοι

ἐκ μείζονος διαβολῆς, ἣν ἔμελλον ῥᾷον αὐτοῦ ἀπόντος ποριεῖν,

μετάπεμπτον κομισθέντα αὐτὸν ἀγωνίσασθαι.

Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 19.

[264] The account which Andokidês gives of the first accusation

against Alkibiadês by Pythonikus, in the assembly, prior to

the departure of the fleet, presents the appearance of being

substantially correct, and I have followed it in the text. It

is in harmony with the more brief indications of Thucydidês.

But when Andokidês goes on to say, that “in consequence of this

information, Polystratus was seized and put to death, while the

rest of the parties denounced fled, and were condemned to death

in their absence,” (sect. 13,) this cannot be true. Alkibiadês

most certainly did not flee, and was not condemned at _that

time_. If Alkibiadês was not then tried, neither could the other

persons have been tried, who were denounced as his accomplices in

the same offence. My belief is that this information, having been

first presented by the enemies of Alkibiadês before the sailing

of the fleet, was dropped entirely for that time, both against

him and against his accomplices. It was afterwards resumed, when

the information of Andokidês himself had satisfied the Athenians

on the question of the Hermokopids: and the impeachment presented

by Thessalus son of Kimon against Alkibiadês, was founded, in

part at least, upon the information presented by Andromachus.

If Polystratus was put to death at all, it could only have been

on this second bringing forward of the charge, at the time when

Alkibiadês was sent for and refused to come home. But we may

well doubt whether he was put to death at that time or on that

ground, when we see how inaccurate the statement of Andokidês

is as to the consequences of the information of Andromachus. He

mentions Panætius as one of those who fled in consequence of that

information, and were condemned in their absence: but Panætius

appears afterwards, in the very same speech, as _not_ having

fled at that time (sects. 13, 52, 67). Harpokration states (v.

Πολύστρατος), on the authority of an oration ascribed to Lysias,

that Polystratus was put to death on the charge of having been

concerned in the mutilation of the Hermæ. This is quite different

from the statement of Andokidês, and would lead us to suppose

that Polystratus was one of those against whom Andokidês himself

informed.

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment

so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection

of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at

Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied

contingents to rendezvous at once at Korkyra. But the Athenian force

alone was astounding to behold. There were one hundred triremes,

sixty of which were in full trim for rapid nautical movement, while

the remaining forty were employed as transports for the soldiers.

There were fifteen hundred select citizen hoplites, chosen from

the general muster-roll, and seven hundred Thêtes, or citizens too

poor to be included in the muster-roll, who served as hoplites on

shipboard,—epibatæ, or marines,—each with a panoply furnished by the

state. To these must be added, five hundred Argeian and two hundred

and fifty Mantineian hoplites, paid by Athens and transported on

board Athenian ships.[265] The number of horsemen was so small, that

all were conveyed in a single horse transport. But the condition,

the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the

armament, was still more impressive than the number. At daybreak

on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Peiræus,

for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from

the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole

population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the

appearance was that of a collective emigration, like the flight to

Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners,

brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the

spectacle, the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more

stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends,

were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens

had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful,

known to none of them accurately, and into a sea of undefined

possibilities; glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of

unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas

of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had

been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all

the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the

relatives now separating at the water’s edge could not banish the

dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the

last time.

[265] Thucyd. vi, 43; vii, 57.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers

were already on board, and the keleustês was on the point of

beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn

and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained by sound of

trumpet, both the crews in every ship and the spectators on shore

followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success,

and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine

prepared, out of which the officers and the epibatæ made libations,

with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was

given, and the whole fleet quitted Peiræus in single file, displaying

the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as

far as Ægina.[266] Never in Grecian history was an invocation more

unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was

the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory. All these details,

given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from

Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad

issue which will hereafter be unfolded.

[266] Thucyd. vi, 32; Diodor. xiii, 3.

The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the contingents of the

maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found

assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found

to comprise one hundred and thirty-four triremes with two Rhodian

pentekonters; five thousand one hundred hoplites; four hundred and

eighty bowmen, eighty of them Kretan; seven hundred Rhodian slingers;

and one hundred and twenty Megarian exiles serving as light troops.

Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of

war, bakers, masons, and carpenters, etc., the number was not less

than five hundred; besides which, there was a considerable number

of private trading-ships, following it voluntarily for purposes

of profit.[267] Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in

advance to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would

welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice

at Egesta, that the succor solicited was now on its way, requiring

at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be

produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three

divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and

Lamachus, they crossed the Ionic gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian

promontory.

[267] Thucyd. vi, 44.

In their progress southward along the coast of Italy to Rhegium, they

met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None

would receive them within their walls or even sell them provisions

without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of

taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to

them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium,

immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town-gate was still

kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market

of provisions was furnished to them, and they were allowed to encamp

in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They

here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of

the three scout-ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into

negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavoring

to induce them to aid the armament in reëstablishing the dispossessed

Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But

the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise

nothing more than neutrality, and coöperation in any course of policy

which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they,

as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated

by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave

themselves open latitude of conduct for the future, not without

mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration

of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative

from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been

the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the

operation of Chalkidic sympathies.[268]

[268] Thucyd. vi, 44-46.

It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra, about

July 415 B.C., that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both

of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against

Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, from several

quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding

March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going

on in consequence. There was, however, a prevailing indisposition

to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any

encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid,

the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of

the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to

cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided

the intelligence as mere idle rumor; others anticipated, at most,

nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years

before.[269] No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy

with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian

conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start.

Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their duty to make

preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state.[270]

[269] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. Mr. Mitford observes: “It is not

specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes

it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government

of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration,

since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of

Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii, sect. iii, vol. iv, p. 46). The

democratical party now bore the sway,” etc.

I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford

founds this conjecture, which appears to me pure fancy. He had

spoken of the government as a democracy before, he continues

to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered

vituperative strain.

[270] Thucyd. vi, 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, etc.

Hermokratês, however, whose information was more complete, judged

these preparations insufficient, and took advantage of a public

assembly—held seemingly about the time that the Athenians were

starting from Peiræus—to impress such conviction on his countrymen,

as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit

that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but

even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on

their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs

of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city

should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable

invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the

firmest assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the

approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive

them into hearty defensive coöperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed

did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as

might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by

which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations,

however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely

at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and

Italian Greeks, to the Sikels, and to the Carthaginians, who had for

some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of

Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially serviceable,

and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in

Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he

(Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organized,

that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian[271]

allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two

months’ provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbor of

Tarentum, from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet

and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic gulf from Korkyra. They

would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but

even forward in coming to blows: the only way of taking down the

presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan

lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she

solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would

probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition

until winter approached: in which case Nikias, the ablest of the

three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme

against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext

to return.[272]

[271] Thucyd. vi, 34. Ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον,

~ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ’ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε~, ὅμως

εἰρήσεται.

That “habitual quiescence” which Hermokratês here predicates of

his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless

activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which

Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i, 144;

vi, 7). Both of the governments, however, were democratical. This

serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications

about _all_ democracies; for it is certain that one democracy

differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted,

however, whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to

his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his

language implies.

[272] Thucyd. vi, 33-36.

Though these opinions of Hermokratês were espoused farther by

various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of

speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his

warnings. We have already noticed Hermokratês nine years before as

envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela,—then,

as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in

Sicily,—then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and

of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution;

but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and

even angry debate arose upon his present speech.[273] Though there

was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging

either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it

would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken

up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that which

he characterized as the “habitual quiescence” of the Syracusans,

into contemptible remissness and disorganization under those

administrators and generals, characterized as worthless, whom the

democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who, in replying to

Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations

and retorted upon their authors, a citizen named Athenagoras was the

most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical

politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse.[274]

[273] Thucyd. vi, 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς

ἀλλήλους ἔριδι ἦσαν, etc.

[274] Thucyd. vi, 35. παρελθὼν δ’ αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε

προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε

τοιάδε, etc.

The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same

as that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens—ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’

ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, etc. (iv, 21).

Neither δήμου προστάτης nor δημαγωγὸς, denotes any express

functions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold), at

least in these places. It is possible that there may have been

some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office

bearing that title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed.

Nor would the words δήμου προστάτης always imply an equal degree

of power: the person so designated might have more power in one

town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv, 67) it seems that the

oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the

popular party had become the most influential men in the city.